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ABO AKADEMI
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Vol.
3 8 nr
3
ON THE SEMANTICS
IN PLATO'S
TIMAEUS
BY
ERKKA
ABO
OF TIME
MAULA
AKADEMI
1970
Received12 February, 1970
Presented by Rolf Westman
AB SYDVASTKUSTEN
- ABO 1970
In the Timaeus*Plato develops to their full extent certain theories
of nature that he has discussedin passingelsewhere(e.g. Theaet.155d5
-157c3, Rep. X [in the myth of Er], Phaedo108c- l 13eand, if it is a
genuinely Platonic work, in the Epinomis).In general his argument
may be characterized as metaphysical, at times epistemologicaland
even mechanistic. But his main concern is with physical things in the
Timaeus,not with problems of language.
Somewhat surprising, then, is the fact that he discussestime from a
semantic point of view at Tim. 37d-38b(and indirectly,at 49a-50a).As
the Timaeushappens to be one of our main sourcesof informationabout
Plato's theories of time1, this exceptionalstyle of argument deserves
our close attention. Unfortunately, though, Plato has not given the
semantic key in the Timaeus.
In this paper2 I shall try to approach,through the semanticaltheories
of the Sophist,3 Plato's pedanticlikeprecisat Tim. 38a-b.
>>And
besides we make statements like these: that (a) what is past is
past, (b) what happens now is happeningnow, and again that (c) what
will happen is what will happen, and that (d) the non-existentis non* My studies in the Timaeus leadingto this and other related papers published
in Ajatus, vols. XXXI and XXXI I, have been generouslysponsoredby the Faculty
of Humanities, Abo Akademi, Finland, from funds placed at the Faculty's disposal
by Oily och Uno Donners fond for religionshistoriskoch kulturhistoriskforskning,
Abo, Finland. I wish to express my deep gratitude to the Faculty.
I am also grateful, and consider it as a great honour, that Abo Akademi has
accepted this paper for publication in its Acta series.
Other main sources are the Parmenides(there Plato speaksmore about temporal
changes like 'to become older and younger', temporal determinations like 'older
than, younger than, of the same age as', than of time as such), and the Statesman
(which gives an account of a >>recursive
world-process>>
and cyclic time).
2 For the structure of the argument, see the Retrospect.
3 In the text, I shall give reason for an assumptionthat these two dialoguesare
interdependent. In the Appendix, I further give a list of passagesthat suggest the
Sophist antedates the Timaeus.
1
Erkka
4
Maula
existent: no one of these expressionsis exact. But this, perhaps, may
not be the right moment for a precise discussionof these matters>>
(tr.
Cornford).
What are Plato's reasons for such precision of locution within the
myth of creation, which itself is, at best, a >>likely
story>>(29d)? Does
he compare time to nil and naught by juxtaposing these four statements?
Or is he telling us that there is no actual present, when pa~t has gone
and future will be? And what is, or was, or will be, the right moment
for the precise discussion?
I. In Plato's Cosmology,Cornfordfinds Plato hinting at the Sophist
in the last sentence of the quoted passage. He tells that the non-existent
means >>theabsolutely non-existent, of which, as the Sophist shows,
4 But is this really the import of
nothing whatever can be truly asserted>>.
the Sophiston our passage? If it is, then perhaps 'nothing whatever can
be truly asserted' of the juxtaposed past, present, and future events,
either? But I suspect that Cornfordhas simplifiedthe semantics of the
Sophist in a wrong way here.5
Relying on the Sophistpresupposessome connectionto the Timaeus.
But we need not get involved in the discussionof their chronological
order, however. Yet the best debate of their order, by Owen and Cherniss, will shed light on the semantic problems, too. And if Cornford's
reference to the Sophist is warranted, then we have a reliable guide in
Julius Moravcsik's monograph >>Being
And Meaning In The Sophist>>,
Acta PhilosophicaFennica XIV (1962).
G.E.L. Owen discusses the order of Plato's dialogues in his article
>>The
Place Of The Timaeus l n Plato's Dialogues>>
(I 953). Accordingto
him, the Timaeus is much earlier than it is generally held.6 Owen's
evidence of style is not convincing,as H.F. Cherniss has pointed out
(at least to my satisfaction) in his re-examination >>RelationOf The
Timaeus To Plato's Later Dialogues>>
(1957). For this, see also Holger
Thesleff's monograph >>Studies
In The Styles Of Plato>>,Acta Philosophica Fennica,XX (1967),p. 19.But Owen'srefutation of the dependance
Cf. the absolute iv of the first hypothesis of the Parmenides, and Plato's conclusion that we must admit both onenessand being in order to reach some positive
results (Parm. 142a-b).
5 I think it had been more appropriate to concentrate on Plato's conclusion in
the Sophist, according to which the µ~ ovin some sense 'is' after all.
6 Even if Owenwere right, it would not necessarilyinvalidate my interpretation,
unless it is further supposed that the Sophist and the Timaeus are not interdependent. But Owen's revolutionary order of the Platonic dialogues would mean that
one has to rely more on the Parmenidesthan I have done.
4
On the Semantics of Time in Plato's Timaeus
s
of the Timaeus on the Sophist on contextual grounds deservescloser
attention.
Cornford had maintained in Plato's Cosmologythat the Sophist>>provides the sole clue>>to the psychogony at Tim. 35a. This is a strong
thesis; e.g. Grube (Class. Phil. 27, 1932,80-82; Plato's Thought,142)
and Cherniss (Aristotle's Criticism, 409, n. 337) come with more reservations. Indeed, what Cornford borrows from the Sophist, has been
stated by Plato earlier than this dialogue(cf. Phaedo78d5- 7, Symp.
21lbl-2, Rep. 454a-b, 597c, Parm. 143b, al., and see Plato's Cosmology, pp. 59-66). Hence Owen is right in arguing against Cornford,in
so far as the selfsustaining argument about the soul-making in the
Timaeus is concerned. It borrows nothing essential from the Sophist,
while it adds something important to the explanation of _theinterrelation of souls and bodies (as I have tried to show in my paper >>Plato's
Agalma Of The Eternal Gods>>,
Ajatus XXXI) and to the explanationof
the process of obtaining knowledge(as I shall try to prove in >>Plato's
'Cosmic Com·puter' in the Timaeus>>,
Ajatus XXX II). This does not
prove, however, that the Sophist is later then the Timaeus.It suggests,
rather, that the Sophist antedates the Timaeus.
Owen's second point against Cornford is concerned with Toµ'Y}ov
(Tim. 38b2-3) which is highly relevant to this paper. As Owen notes,
the Timaeus does not presupposeanywhere the analysis of negation in
terms of .i&.reeovoffered in the Sophist. But Owenfurther asserts that
Toµ'Y}ov... lani,, 01,•Twc;
µ'Y}ovat Soph. 254d1, >>is
contradicted unreservedly by Timaeus' assertion that it is illegitimate to say Toµ'Y}ov
lan µ'Y}ov(38b2-3)>>. But from a contradiction, if there is one, we
cannot infer that the Timaeus is earlier than the Sophist. Owen also
refers to Taylor's comment, that >>Timaeus
always talks of the µ'Y}ov
in the old undiscriminating fashion familiar to us from the fifth book
of the Republic>>(cf. Taylor's Commentary,p. 32). Perhaps he thinks
that Taylor's comment is supporting his own chronology,but the whole
context (38a-b) shows that Plato's languageis far from 'the old undiscriminating fashion'. In this context, id µ'Y}ovis juxtaposed7 with three
temporal locutions.
Owen is right, however, in refuting Cornford'sinterpretation of the
sense of Toµ'Y}ov.This sense of the µ'Y}ov,>>We
could say, to treat ov
At least Plato says without qualifications that none of the four sentences is
exact. But the three first sentences, and Plato's discussionof time in the Timaeus,
are advanced forms of the Republic'sdoctrines.
7
6
Erkka Maul.a
8 as Owen adds, >>leads
as a proper adjective>>,
directly to absurdities>>
according to the Sophist's argument. (In the Timaeus 38b2, though,
Plato only speaks of 'inexact expressions'.) According to Owen, >>inthe
only sensewhichcan consistentlybe allowedto
ov>>,
Soph. 254d1 is a
wholly correct locution. Yet something can be 'truly asserted' of past,
present, and future events, too, at Soph. 262d.
Now Moravcsik has shown that Plato did not take up the problems
of adjectives in the Sophist, far less the problems of 'proper adjectives'
(op. cit. pp. 64-65), for they would have complicated his argument
unnecessarily. But the
ovmay mean simply (the refutation of sophists
rests on 'familiar vocabulary', cf. Moravcsik,op. cit. p. 68) 'not a thing' 9
or the emphasis at Tim. 38a-b may be on the word >>is>>
as Cornfordsays.
And there are other interpretations to be discussed later. On all these
interpretations, Plato may have invented something that differs from
'the only sense which can consistently be allowedto
ov'in the Sophist,
as the juxtaposition with temporal locutions suggests. Hence the inexactitude mentioned in the Timaeus need not even contradict the Sophist
254d1. As both Cornford and Owen have ignored the context in which
the
01 occurs in the Timaeus, they myopically focus on their 'only
senses' of the
ov.None of them is justified in concluding anything
as to the order and interdependence of the Sophist and the Timaeus,
on the basis of the
ov.
µn
µn
µn
µn
1
µn
µn
2. The basic distinction of Timaeus' account of the universe, is between the paradigm and its copy. The paradigm is, but does not become,
remaining always the same, and is intelligible but not sensible.10 The
copy is always involved in becoming,and never really is, changing perpetually, and is sensible but not intelligible. According to Owen, Plato
has jettisoned this distinction betweengenesisand ousia at Soph. 248a249b (actually at 248a-249d). From this alleged contradiction he infers
that the Timaeus is earlier than the Sophist. From a contradiction, we
must repeat again, one can infer also the opposite.
But Cherniss points out, correctly, that there is nothing in the text
to suggest that the original distinction between genesis and ousia is
renounced. The outcome of the argument (Soph. 249b5-d5) is that
>>Aproper adjective,> is an unfortunate expression, though, since Plato has not
discussed the logic of adjectives in the Sophist. Nor has Owen paid full attention
to the role of µiJ in theµ~ ov; it is not self-evident for Plato that the latter is a 'proper
adjective' even if the 01 is one. These subtleties are discussed by Moravcsik.
9 It is: not corresponding to any 'consonant-Form',
as we are going to suggest
in the text. Cf. Soph. 252e9-253a6.
10 As the paradigm is not sensible, at least physical change is excluded.
8
1
On the Semantics of Time in Plato's Timaew;
7
knowledgepresupposes moving nous and in every respect unalterable
objects of nous. Especially interesting are the lines (bS-6). >>So
it turns
out that no immobilething can have intelligenceof anything anywhere>>
(tr. Burnet). In this crystallizedform, it may be a novelty in the Sophist,
while the unalterability of the objects of knowledgeis a commonplace
in Plato.
Now in this special respect, there seemsto be a clear interdependence
between the Timaeus and the Sophist. For what the Sophistintroduces
to the 'friends of ideas' as a crux, is discussedin detail in the Timaeus.
As I see it, the import of Tim. 36e-37c is just to explainin technical
terms, how a revolving soul can fit the distinction between >>things
that
become>>
and >>things
that are always changeless>>
(37b).11 Whatever the
epistemologicalproblem of a moving nousbe, in the TimaeusPlato has
solved it to his satisfaction (cf. the languageat 37c).
Another hint toward the interdependenceof these two dialogues(not
mentioned by Owen) is the definition of 'production' as 'the bringing
into being of anything that formerly did not exist' at Soph. 219b4-6 12
(cf. Pol. 258el-2, Phil. 27al-2). For this is exactly what one is expecting to see in the Timaeusmetaphorof a divinecraftsmanwho creates
his artefacts according to a paradigm. The mythical creation, i.e., the
ordering activities of the Demiurge,is a detailedexplanationof the 'production' mentiened in the Sophist. The Demiurge>>brings
about» order
in Chaos.
The discourse in the World-Soul,that we referred to above, throws
light on the interdependence of the Sophist and the Timaeus also in
another respect. In the Sophist (and at Parm. 142b7-c2, 143b1-3,
158bl-2) the distinction between assertions about identity and attribution is noted (245b7-8). In the Timaeus (37a-b), a synthesis is
reached since the World-Soul >>tells
(1) in what respect precisely, and
how, and in what sense, and when, it comes about that something is
qualified as (2) either the same or different with respect to any given
thing>>.Here, again, we have a detailed list of different types of attribution used in statements about identity or non-identity, i.e., the 'second law of identity' is initiated. Things are either the same or different
with respect to different types of attributes. (We may note for further
use, that one ot them is a temporal attribute.)
In his criticism of Owen, Cherniss also mentioned the ontological
Just as Cherniss concludes at Soph. 249b5-d5: the objects of knowledge in
the paradigm (Forms) do not change, but the organ of knowledge moves.
12 This need not mean that 'production' starts ex nihilo. For instance, bringing
about order out of disorder, satisfies the definition of 'production'.
11
Erkka Maula
8
problem of images. The sophistic contention that there is no such thing
as an image, a likeness, or a semblance(Soph. 264c10-dl, referring to
239c ff; cf. 236el-237a4, 238d4 ff), leads to Theaetetus' definition of
images.Accordingto him, 'image' is a 'thing', although not a 'real thing'.
As Chernissnotes, we must turn to the Timaeusfor further enlightment,
and it is given in the theory of space (51e6-52d 1). Here again Plato
gives a concise account and an explanation of Theaetetus' puzzle. So
the Timaeus seems to discuss in detail a topic that is introduced in the
Sophist. In this context, we may note also that the 'substantive' Forms
and their copies in the Timaeus refer to a late dating. For in any case
the orthodox chronologyis unanimous about Plato's interest in ethical
and aesthetic Forms in early dialogues,while no such forms are discussed in the Timaeus.13 However, Forms like Existence, Sameness, and
Difference, the µiyurr:a yivn of the Sophist, seem to be referred to at
Tim. 35al-b3, as Ross notes (somewhat too confidently, I believe) in
Plato's Theory Of Ideas (p. 130).
In reviewingCherniss'criticismagainst Owen, I have confinedmyself
to such remarks as are directly relevant to the interdependence of the
Sophist and the Timaeus.There are other remarks (esp. on paradeigmatism and self-predication)that prove Owen's chronologyof the Platonic
It may be that the distinction between the 'consonant-Forms' and the 'vowelForms', as drawn in the Sophist, should be noted in the present discussion about
the self-predication of Forms. In the Parmenides, an infinite regress is shown in
the case of Largeness (131e-132b), and Parmenides' earlier examples Large, Equal,
and Small, likewise belong to the 'vowel-Forms'.Such Forms create difficulties (cf.
131e), and are hardly mentioned in the Timaeus. Let us suppose they are selfpredicational. But the term Third Man, incidentally, refers to a 'consonant-Form',
Man. Aristotle at Met. 990bl5 seems to draw the distinction. Some of Plato's >>more
precise arguments recognise (i) Forms of relativeterms which, we maintain, do not
form an independent class, (ii) othersstate the argument of the Third Man.>>Elsewhere (in JI eei l&wv A, quoted by Alexander on Met. 990b 15, p. 62, 33; Aristotle,
fr. 188 R.) the argument known by the name 'the Third Man', is likewise confined
to the Form of Man. At Met. 1038b30, it is argued that 'the Third Man' will result
from giving Animal (another 'consonant-Form', used in the Timaeus, too, cf. e.g.,
31a) a substantial existence apart from particular animals (cf. Soph. El. 178b36).
At Rep. 597c this infinite regress seems to be refuted, as Apelt observed (Beitriige,
53). Hence I suggest that 'the Third Man' was confined to self-predication of 'consonant-Forms', and was refuted by Plato, while the self-predication of 'vowel-Forms'
was left unanswered. The logic of adjectives differs from that of substantives, and
Plato's interim strategy seems to be to avoid the question of the self-predication of
the 'vowel-Forms'. In the Sophist, his discussion is limited to the realm of Forms,
and hence the question does not arise. In the Timaeus, 'consonant-Forms' and their
exemplifications are discussed. The transitory steps seem to be taken at Phaedr.
250bl-5, 250d (Justice, Wisdom, Temperance are mentioned) and in the Politicus,
285dl0-286a7, (no images clearly perceptible to men, of such Forms).
13
On the Seman tic., of Time in Plato's Timaem
9
dialogues false. In the light of these remarks and further evidence
brought from the Timaeus, it seems justifiable to conclude that the
Sophist probably antedates the Timaeus. Indeed, these dialogues differ
in many respects, but where they differ, the Timaeus seems to elaborate
points made in the Sophist. So they are interdependent, too.
3. What is the semantical import of the Sophist, then? In my opinion,
. the most valuable discussions are those of Moravcsik,Ackrill, and Ringbom. Sixten Ringbom has concisely discussed this question in his paper
>>PlatoOn Images>>,Theoria, XXXI, 2 (1965), pp. 100-104.
The art of picture-making may be divided (cf. Soph. 234b-235a) into
(a) the 1ikeness-n1akingart and (b) the semblance-makingart. The former produces a likeness (eikon), the latter a semblance (phantasma),as
we see from Soph. 235a-236c. An eikon depicts that which is (239c ff),
while a phantasma is said (after a long discussion)to be associated with
falseness (cf. 264c). In the Sophist Plato thus divides pictures into true
ones and false ones (Ringbom, op. cit., p. 102). When Plato discusses
the possibility of true and false propositions in the Sophist, he has in
mind the analogy between pictures and language. Yet the primitive
word-picture theory of the Cratylus (385a-c) is given up. In the Sophist
the Stranger argues that only certain word combinations have meaning.
Such composite word structures are defined by means of a logicalsyntax.
In language there are two kinds of words that signify Being, ov6µara
and e17para. If we put together words belonging to one of these kinds
only, the result is not a proposition (Soph.262a-e). Only a combination
of these kinds, constitutes a proposition. Such word combinations are
true pictures, while the activity of sophists consists in semblance-making
by means of words. Sophistry is the art of deception. However, what
distinguishes falsehood from truth, is not the lack of reference, but the
misrepresentation of the connection between parts of reality (see Moravcsik, op. cit., p. 41). Also the dialectician's language consists of pictures
expressed in words (cf. Tim. 29b-d) and not even an eikon can depict
reality perfectly. If, however, the relevant features and structures of
reality are rendered correctly, then the picture is a likeness (cf. Soph.
235d). Against this background, the semantical rules mentioned in the
Sophist, constitute a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition for true
propositions, conceived of as composite word structures depicting composite structures of reality.
What has Plato included into the categories of onoma and rhema
then? In Plato's exan1ples,the former one includes nouns, and the latter
includes verbs. >>A
man understands>>,is an example of the most fundamental type of proposition. In the Sophist, the logic of adjectives is not
Erkka Maula
10
discussed - probably for reasons which Moravcsik mentioned (op. cit.,
pp. 64-65). Yet at 257b7 the adjective mega is included into rhema.
Hence we must understand rhema in the sense of a combination of verbs
and adjectives. Thus the transition from the grammar of the Sophist to
that of the Timaeus, is by no means a drastic one.
Plato's example >>Aman understands>>calls for further discussion,
however, since no explicit temporal reference is included in it. Yet it is
supposed to be a standard example of meaningful propositions. This
would seem to constitute a hindrance for interpreting the temporal determinations n1entioned in the Timaeus (e.g. at 37a-b). Fortunately,
though, Jaakko Hintikka has explained this seeming lack of precision
in his paper >>Time,Truth, And Knowledge In Ancient Greek Philosophy>>,Am. Phil. Quart. 4.1 ( 1967). Sentences that seem to lack all
temporal reference on the one hand, and sentences containing determinations like >>nOW>>,
>>yesterday>>,
>>tomorrow>>
on the other hand, were
commonly used and understood in scientific discussion. This is due to
the fact that they refer implicitly to the speech-situation in which they
are uttered. Hintikka also refers to the 'eye-witness' quality' of the
Greek idea of knowledge. This is compatible with the indefinite (viz.,
indefinite from our point of view) temporal reference of the standard
Greek sentences.
But Moravcsik has argued convincingly, that onoma and rhema are
not merely grammatical categories. Plato's explanation of meaning relies
on logical form and not on mere grammar. Plato compares meaningful
sentences (Soph. 26Idl-7, 262d8-el) to the Communion of the Forms
(which is a necessary but not a sufficient ontological condition of meaningful discourse), and to the combination of letters into syllables. The
complex whole in each case is not a mere sum of the constituents. 14
(This is an innovation in comparison with the theory of soul in Rep. I).
The sophist, on the other hand, according to the examples of sentences lacking meaning, gives and names a collection of individual items
(cf. 262cl-5). The sophist's sequences of words fail because they are
not combinations. Only the combination of subject and predicate terms
can express active or passive states, positive or negative facts (Moravcsik, p. 63, backs his interpretation with 262c3).
This fourfold classification of what a statement can express, includes
all of the main categories within which statements of subject-predicate
type fall. At 262d2-6 Plato says that to make known something (timeless, or past, or present, or future), is not merely to name but to complete
I have noted elsewhere (cf. >>IsTime A Child Or A Grand-Child Of Eternity?,>,
Ajatus XXXI) that the logic of a genos displays similar features.
14
On the Semnntics of Time in Plato's Timaeus
II
a statement by interweaving subject and predicate. The metaphor of
interweaving is used also of the most fundamental union of a simple
subject and a predicate (at 262c6).It showsthat Plato dismissessemantical atomism (which figured in the Cratylus).Plato's doctrine of composite sentences as pictures, depicting composite structures of reality,
is his weapon against the sophists. It is also a further development of
his own earlier theories of meaning.
In the semantics of the Sophist, there is one more doctrine that is
directly relevant to the interpretation of Tim. 38a-b. It is Plato's distinction between different meanings of >>is>>.
This is due to the fact that
>>iS>>
often figures in sentences of subject-predicate pattern (although it
may be dropped in Greek).
Ackrill has shown in his paper >>Plato
And The Copula>>,
that >>iS>>
has
at least two different meanings in the Sophist. It may mean identity
and it rnay be used as a copula. Ackrill, and Durr in >>Dien1oderne
Darstellung der Platonischen Logik>>,
Museum Helveticum,2 (1945),
have shown further, that ;coivwvei1, with the genitive, p,erixeiv and
11eraJ.ap/3d.vt:t1•
are synonyms of the copulary >>iS>>,
and serve as technical
expressions signifying the copula. Also Cherniss in >>RelationOf The
TimaeusTo Plato's Later Dialogues>>
(Am. journ. of Philo!., 1957)notes
Platos' distinction between assertions of identity and attribution (e.g.
at Parm. I42b7-c2, 143b1-3, 158a; Soph. 245b7-8). Moravcsik remarks about the (possible)contrast betweenthe existential >>iS>>
and identity at Soph. 255el4--256al, and elsewhere in the Sophist (op. cit., pp.
51-56).
To this we may add, finally, Owen's remarks about the tense of lani·
in >>PlatoAnd Parmenides On The Timeless Present>>,The Monist 50.3
(1966). According to Owen, a tenseless >>is>>
is reserved to stable and
changeless Forms. Tensed forms are reserved for Becoming. He says
that Plato takes his stand with Parmenidesand against Melissus,without being disturbed by the apparent contradiction that the timeless
Forms »remain>>
changeless.Tenseless>>iS>>,
then, is almost identical with
the existential >>is>>,
for surely the Forms exist. Owen says, further, that
Parmenides' isolation of one tense (a tenseless >>is>>,
rather!) from its
fellowssuggests a view of language which underlies some puzzles in the
Theaetetusand Cratylusand which Plato very effectively >>dismantles
in
the Sophist>>.
Accordingto Owen, Plato seems to be under Parmenides'
spell in the Timaeus.
These remarks outline, I think, the most relevant semantical possibilities offered by Plato in the Sophist. It is our task to study how they
can be applied to the interpretation of Tim. 38a-b. We shall investigate
the meanings of terms involved in the three 'inexact' phrases about
12
Erkka Maula
time, and use the analysis of the fourth juxtaposed phrase about the
non-existent as a test.
4. What is 'the right moment for a precise discussion'(Tim. 38b) of
temporal determinations?
In the Parmenides(l4ld-e) all "modes of partaking of being" are
listed without any regard to the chorismosbetween Forms and their
images. "Was", "has become", and "was becoming" signify "a participation in past time". "Will be", "will become", and "will have become" signify "a participation in future time". And "is", or "becomes"
signifies"a participationin presenttime". If the evis robbed of these
modes, then it "cannot possibly partake of being", and then "there is
no name, nor expression, nor perception, nor opinion, nor knowledge
of it" (142a). But all this applies only to the absolute lv of the first hypothesis. At best we can say that it does not participate in time, and
paradoxes ensue from that hypothesis.But at Tim. 38a-b participation
in time is admitted, and presumably "is" is not on a par with "becomes" (cf. 37e).
In the RepublicVI,499d, Plato says that whenever the perfected
philosopher is in charge of the state, then the best state either "has
been" or "is" or "will be" realized.Such a state and its constitution are
copies of the Form of State (see also 592b). Hence "is" is not reserved
to the Forms alone, and we hardly can gain any information as to the
correct use of different tenses or temporal determinations.Besides,Plato
is not focusing on terminologythere. In the myth of Er, Rep. X, 617,
Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos are singing of past, present and future.
The upshot seems to be that past, present, and future are associated
with the revolutions of the physical spheres - but this passage throws
no light on terminology, either.
Of the relatively few Platonic passagesabout past, present and future
together, one in the Philebus(which,accordingto orthodox chronology,
is later than the Timaeus),at 38-41, seems more promisingthan any
of the previous passages. The outcome of the argument may be summarizedas follows.Opinionis based on perception,which may be correct
or mistaken. Of perceptionswe register in the soul verbal descriptions
and painted images. These descriptions and images are either true or
false. These descriptionsand imagesmay represent either past, present,
or future. Finally, there may be opinions about things which are not,
were not, and will not be. Such opinions, by implication from the context, are false.
It is not clear, whether Plato means that perceptions are independently registered both verbally and optically, or that the images are
On the Semantics of Time in Plato's Timaeus
13
imagesof the verbal content. Although his example (Phil. 38) refers to
seeingalone, we cannot exclude the former alternative (as inapplicable
to other sense perceptions than sight). Nevertheless,false descriptions
and imagespresumably lead to false opinions.It is problematic,in which
sense(if any) false or true descriptions and images, being registered in
the soul at the moment of perceiving, may represent future time. The
only way out seems to be, that such descriptionsand imagesare false.
This problem notwithstanding, if the descriptions and images representing past, present and future are juxtaposed with opinions "about
thingswhich are not, were not, and will not be", then such descriptions
and images seem to be false.
This conclusionis too strong to elucidate the juxtaposition at Tim.
38a-b, however.There Plato says only that the juxtaposed expressions
are not exact. Moreover,the argument at Phil. 38-41 is mixed up with
a discussionof the analogy between opinion and pleasure and it does
not focus on usages of language. But there are no such side-issuesat
Tim. 38a-b. Hence Phil. 38-41 does not seem to be 'the right moment for a precise discussion'of these matters, referred to at Tim. 38b.
Rather, it seems to be an epistemicparallel to the quoted ('physical')
passages(499d, 592b, 617) of the Republic.
There remains one more candidate for the 'precisediscussion'referred
to, viz. Soph. 262c-d. In the Sophist, -roµ~ ov is investigated with all
precision.At 262d we learn that if statements satisfy the conditions of
Plato's logical syntax, being combinationsof onoma and rhema, then
such statements convey information. Such a statement "gives information about facts or events in the present or past or future: it does
not merely name something but gets you somewhereby weaving together onomata with rhemata". Further, "hencewe say it 'states' something, not merely 'names' something,and in fact it is this complexthat
we mean by the word statement" (tr. Cornford).
Hence, followingthe rules of Plato's logical syntax, we can "weave
together" statements carrying "information about facts or events in
the present or past or future". Providing that the four juxtaposed
sentencesat Tim. 38a-b are about "facts or events", they need not be
simplyfalse or meaningless.Hence Cornford'ssuggestionthat theµ~ ov
of the fourth sentence means "the absolute non-existent, of which, as
the Sophist shows, nothing whatever can be truly asserted" (Plato's
Cosmology,p. 98, fn. 4), misses the point. We have an assertion about
theµ~ ov here, as well as assertions about facts or events in the present
or past or future. These four juxtaposed sentences, however, are said
to be, 'inexact'. This characterizationsuggestsas one possiblitythat the
four juxtaposed sentences do not fulfill the requirements of Plato's
14
ErkkaMaula
logical syntax for statements "of the most fundamental and shortest
possible kind" (Soph.262b).
What is wrong with them, then? No matter whether "is" in these
four sentencesmeans (i) existence,or (ii) identity, or (iii) copula, or (iv)
tenseless being, the word "is" belongs to rhema.(On the basis of the
Sophistwe know that Plato was able to distinguish between i-iv.)
If these sentences do not satisfy Plato's criteria, then, the other parts
of the sentences: "what is past", "what happens now", "what will
happen", and "the non-existent" cannot belong to onoma.I assert that
they belong to rhema,and that this is one reason why Plato calls these
sentences inexact. Before proving my thesis and discussingits implications, however, we must consider a number of alternative interpretations.
5. So let us suppose now in all alternative interpretations, that the
four inexact sentences (a-d) satisfy Plato's semantical criteria. Then
they either are, or are not, sentences about past, present and future
"facts or events".
Suppose first that they are not about "events", nor about material
"facts". If they are not, "is" may connect namesor concepts,
which are
separated (though such notations are not used) from their designataat
Prot. 349b, Soph. 244d, 255b8-10, 257bl0-c3. Three of them cannot
be about Forms, and their juxtaposition with the fourth sentencerules
out the possibility that the µ~ ovis a Form here. Note that this alternative must be investigated,for Plato does not distinguishbetween the
existence of words and the existence of what they refer to (cf. Soph.
244b9-dl3 and Moravcsik,op. cit. p. 31).
(i) The possibility that "is" means existenceis ruled out, since "is"
connects twopartsof sentences
in each 'inexact' statement.
(ii) If "is" means identity, there is no reason to call these expressions
inexact, for (a-d) are tautologies.
(iii) If "is" means copula, it connects (on our counter-hypothesis)
two occurrencesof onoma,and (a-d) are proper sentences.(A noun can
be both the subject and the predicate of a sentence). Hence there is no
reason to label them inexact - although they need not be true.
(iv) The possibility that "is" here means "timeless being" is ruled
out on the samegroundsas (i).We supposedthat (a-d) are about names
or concepts, which occur in two places of each statement, while a
timeless "is" presumablyfigures on sentencesof the type 'The Intelligible Living Being is' (cf. Tim. 37e-38a).
Suppose,then, that (a-d) are about future, present and past "facts
or events",and that the semanticalcriteria still are satisfied.
On the Semantics of Time in Plato's Timaeus
15
(i) If "is" means existence, there is some reason (cf. Tim. 38a) to
call (a-d) inexact, and substitute the 'forms of time' (37e),viz. "was"
and "will be" for it in (a) and (c), respectively.But on the one hand,
the present tense is appropriate in (b), and on the other hand, change
of tense seems inappropriate in (d). Hence this hardly is the common
source of inexactness in all four cases.
(ii) If "is" means identity, there is no reason to call such identitas
indiscernibiliumbetween "facts or events" inexact.
(iii) If "is" means copula, (a-d) are proper sentences,although they
hardly give "information about facts or events".16 (But if they do not,
the semantical criteria are not satisfied).
(iv) If "is" means timeless being, there are reasonsto avoid its use in
sentences that are not about Forms. (Cornfordhas capitalized on this
idea by using italics for "is" in his translation). But this is hardly what
Plato means, for "is" in (a-d) connectstwo parts of sentences.Should
it stand alone, a confusion might arise, e.g., in the sentence 'what is
past, is'.
But, thirdly, perhaps Plato means by the 'inexactness' at Tim. 38b
that we should substitute 'becomes'for 'is' in all four sentences(cf. Parm.
14ld-c: 'is' or 'becomes'). At least this conjecture is possible on one
reading of the passage 38a-b, i.e., if we reserve 'is' entirely for 'real
being', as Cornford does reserve it. This substitution alone, however,
makes the sentences unintelligibleif applied only once. For instance,
'what is past becomespast' does not make sense.Hencewe might apply
it twice, e.g., 'what becomespast becomespast' .16 But such expressions
in fact are exact. Hence we ought to conjecture further, that an idea
of difference should be included, e.g., 'what becomes present (from
having been future), becomespast (when time lapses)'. For an interpretation on these lines one might refer to the concept of 'production' at
Soph. 219b4-6, and to Plato's ideas about change and becoming in
general(e.g. at Parm. 155e-157b, Laws893 e ff.). But on the one hand,
this would presuppose a discussionof a cyclic time in the case of the
first 'inexact' sentence,for it should be rewritten 'what becomes(or 'is')
past becomespresent (or future)'. The concept of a cyclic time, however, would not be needed in the second and third sentences, for they
could be rewritten 'what becomes(or 'is') present, becomespast', and
For reasons that will be discussed later, mere temporal referenceswere of little
information, and could even be ignored, or replaced by implicit references to the
speech-situation.
16 There is a closely related expression, viz. 'what becomes past becomes more
past', which opens quite new lines of argument. They will be discussed in the next
sectio11.
16
16
Eikka Maula
'what is (rather than 'becomes') future becomes present'. On the other
hand, such substitutions in the fourth sentence are not as such applicable. A closer discussion about the problems of the use of 'becomes'
should be referred to at Tim. 38b. Besides, if Plato 111eantthat against
the background of his other theories (e.g., of becoming and cyclic time)
these four sentences are simply false, he would hardly have claimed
only that they are 'inexact'.
On these grounds I venture to conclude that Plato's note on their
inexact use refers to his semantical criterion in the Sophist, if it refers
to any known Platonic dialogue at all.
6. Owen's starting-point is that Plato has confused in the Timaeus
properties of things and properties of sentences. Are there paradoxes
ensuing from such an allegedconfusion?Owen, sticking to his hypothesis
that the Timaeus antedates the Sophist, finds such paradoxes in the
Timaeus and their solution in the Sophist. Now, the four statements
that we are discussing are not stated as paradoxes. This suggests that
Plato has understood that the correct way of speaking of time is to
attribute it to sentences. This seems to be the deepest import of calling
)>was>>
and >>shall
be>>
forms of time in contradistinction to the parts of
time (37e) or the units of measurement of time. In other words, tenses
are properties of sentences. And this explains, I think, the semantical
treattnent of time in the Timaeus. l think that this is why Plato leaves
temporarily his 'matter-of-fact' narration of the myth of creation.
In popular opinion, things alone change, while events(being changes)
do not change but happen. But on closer inspection we see that also
events and changes 1nay change physically while they are occurring
(we often call them >>processes>>
then; cf. Tim. 38a: 'was' and 'shall be'
are properlyused of beco1ningwhich proceedsin time, for they are motions). A modern example of physical change of change would be acceleration.
But did Plato distinguish between physical motion and grammatical
motion, and was he able, consequently, to distinguish between physical
time and grammatical time? His discussion of the µiyurr:a yi'V'Y}in the
Sophist (254d ff.; there Existence, Motion, and Rest are first mentioned)
suggests that he was. For in face of the firm declaration that Forms are
unchangeable, there is no space for the assumption that they change
physically. Even if Motion blends with other Forms, it does not mean
that such Forms move (see W. G. Runciman: Plato'sLaterEpistemology,
p. 88). Similarly in the Timaeus. Even if Plato calls the paradigm the
'Intelligible Living Being', it does not mean that the paradigm lives.
On the Semantics of Time in Plato's Timaeus
17
On the other hand, when he caJlsthe physical world the 'Sensible Living
Being', this means that the world of sensibles moves physically.
The field of application of the pair of opposites, stasis and kinesis, is
much broader and not limited to physics, as we see, for instance, in
Parm. 129el, l 36b5. Plato has identified the motion itself with 'otherness' or inequality or not-being or the great-and-s1nall,as Aristotle (Met.
l 066a11) and Eudeinus (ap. Simplic. Phys. 431, 6) 111ention
(see Cornford:
Plato and Parmenides, p. 152). Of these, the identification with notbeing is of greatest importance for us, since not-being occurs in the
juxtaposed four 'inexact' statements at Tim. 38a-b.
But have we any evidence in Plato's dialogues for the view that he
distinguished between physical and non-physical motion? When Plato
speaks of the geon1etricalfigures assigned to the elen1ents( Tim. 53c ff.)
and their trans1nutations (cf., for instance, 56c ff.), we must understand
such n1otions in the Pythagorean mathematical sense, in which points
'generate' a line, lines a plane, and planes a solid. (See Sir Thomas Heath:
Thirteen Books of Euclid, 11, p. 294 and Aristotle, Met. 992b20). At
Tim. 38a kinesis becomes close to the gran1matical sense of inflexion
(mentioned in Liddell and Scott,s.v.). In the Sophist 248dl -e5, too, we
meet a meaning of 'change' that hardly can be identical with physical
change (unless the point is that soul changes), since the Forms do not
so change. (See also Cornford's Plato and Parmenides,p. 199, and the
doctrine of 'the Sudden' at Parm. 156c-157b).
Now one exarnple of non-physicalchange(or 'motion') is temporal
'change' fron1past towardmorepast. This is a generalized notion for the
non-physical 'backward motion of time', covering the non-physical changes from future to present, from present to past, and from past toward
more past. 17 This is one way of looking at 'the river of time'. (It is also
possible to conceive time as 'advancing'; cf. Parm. 152a. If so, we need
a converse generalized relation. In the Parmenidesand Politicus, time
is conceived of in both ways.) Conversely, we may focus on physical
things and events which seem to move non-physically 'in time', i.e.,
instead of speaking of the 'backward motion of time', we may speak
of the 'forward motion of things in time' (cf. Parm. 152a). In general
terms, it can be called the non-physical 'change' from future towardmore
future. It is an appropriate term when we try to describe our idea about
things that are 'growing older' (cf. Parm. 154d-155b) withoutthinking
If we associate 'moving from past toward more past' with the motion of soul
(backing it, e.g., by Proclus' word that 'time has its place in soul'), then the distinction between physical and non-physical motions would be identical with Plato's
distinction between physical and psychic motions. But there is not enough evidence
for such a simple solution.
17
18
Erkka Maula
of, or in separation from, the accompaningphysical changes(like decaying, or getting wrinkled).18
These two types of non-physical change seem to underlie Plato's discussion of time and 'getting older' at Parm. 152a-e. Plato however
complicatesthe scheme by speaking, as the Greeks often did, also of
the standard of comparisonof the terms 'older' and 'younger'.19 According to the Greek idea, a man is older and is becoming older than he
used to be, i.e., older than himself (cf. Parm. 152a). Conversely,the
standard of comparison seems to be becoming younger than what he
is (ibid.), i.e., relative to 'now', when time is apparently going backward and the man is not 'moving in time' (this, I think, is referred to
at Parm. 152b). When he is in time (and not becoming or moving in
time), he may also (cf. Parm. 152e)be said to be older (cf. Parm. 152c)
than his former self (Parm. 152d), and the standard of comparison,
conversely, is younger than its present self (Parm. 152d). The nonphysical changes described above, however, do not take place while
eventsare occurring. >>Butthat which is becoming cannot skip the present; when it reaches the present it ceasesto become,and is then whatever it may happen to be becoming>>
(Parm. 152c-d, tr. Jowett).
On the other hand, physical motion and change are restricted to the
present time and to existing things. Non-existent things do not change
physically, nor do past and future events so change.
All these observations may be relevant for the interpretation of Tim.
38a-b. If physical changeis meant to be the opposite of >>iS>>
in the four
'inexact' sentences, then it is correctto say that 'what is past is past',
'what will happen is what will happen', and 'the non-existent is nonexistent'. For we have seen that past and future events and non-existent
As Plato's account of the planetary motions shows in the Timaeus, he was
able to speak of different physical motions occurring simultaneously, and he also
spoke of psychic and physical motions occurring simultaneously. Motions of the Same
and the Different are psychic motions in the World-Soul. The physical motions of
the planets, again, include circular motion, apparent individual deviations from a
perfect circular orbit, retrogradation, etc., as Cornford has shown in Plato's Cosmology
(cf. pp. 136-137). Hence the sense of motion may differ in 'growing older' and
'growing younger', and an expression like 'growing older and younger' need not be
self-contradictory. In addition, if 'growing older' and 'growing younger' denote nonphysical motions, things that participate of such motions, may also change physically (like 'getting wrinkled', or in the sense of locomotion and alteration).
19 This peculiarity - without distinguishing between different types of physical
and non-physical changes - has been discussed, among others, by E. Wyller in his
dissertation Platons Parmenides in seinemZusammenhangmit Symposion und Politeia
(Oslo 1960). See especially his analyses of the passages about time in I and I I hypotheses in the Parmenides.
18
On the Semantics of Time in Plato's Timaeus
19
things do not change physically. But it would not be unambiguousto
say 'what happens now is what is happeningnow', for an event may
change(and consequentlyis not) while it is occurring,viz. 'now'.
On the other hand, if the non-physicalchangefrom past toward more
past is meant to be the oppositeof >>iS>>,
then only the statement 'what
happensnow is what is happeningnow' wouldbe correct,for events do
not change non-physicallywhilethey are occurring.But the three other
statements would involve change or becoming(and hence >>iS>>
is not
correctlyused) in the sense of 'becomingfrom past toward more past'.
Now it might be said that the distinction betweenthe non-physical
'change of time' and physical change (locomotion,alteration, etc.,cf.
Laws 893 ff.) is too modern (although Plato at Parm. 152c-d, 154d155bseems to make it in contradistinctionto Parmenides,fr. 8: 5 and
19-20), and that 'becomingfrom past toward more past' is a metaphoricalway of speaking of change.The reasonwhy we have discussed
both possibilitiesis, that there is force in that metaphor.Both physical
change and 'change of time' fit the formula 'it was the case that p,
but it is not now the case that p', whichmight be said to give a definition of all types of change.20
7. We may look at the four inexact statements from another angle
too, starting from the observationthat >>was>>
and >>shall
be>>
are tensed
verbs grammatically,and the four statementsalso involvetensedverbs.
(In the following,my debt to Prior is obvious;for a non-technicaldiscussion see his >>Changes
In Events And ChangesIn Things>>,
1962).21
It is difficult to get rid of the simple noun-verbor subject-predicate
structure of statements: if a sentenceor a thought does not have this
pattern, we often try to force it into the simplepattern. The four inexact statements in fact have a more complexstructure. Hence Plato
may have meant that it is 'inexact' (and even incorrect)to conceiveof
these statements as examples of the onoma - rhema pattern of the
>>most
fundamental»type.
But if they are not examplesof the >>most
fundamental»sentences
(cf. Soph. 262c6) of this pattern, then what are they? If they do not
See J. J. C. Smart's conclusion.in ,>TheRiver of Time,>,in Anthony Flew (ed.)
Essays in ConceptualAnalysis.
21 The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas. The need to use generalised notions like 'change from past toward more past' arises if one wishes to axiomatize
such temporal locutions as we have used, within the frame-work of temporalized
modal logical systems. See also G. H. von Wright's paper >>Andnext ... >>,Acta
PhilosophicaFennica, Fasc. XVI, 1963, and A. N. Prior, Time and Modality (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1957).
20
Erkka Mau.la
20
>>interweave>>
subject and predicate,we may supposethat the word >>is>>,
grammaticallya tensedverb, connectssentences
(completeor incomplete)
in all four phrases. If so, we must note the differencesin the logical
behaviour of verbs on the one hand, and conjunctivesand adverbs on
the other hand. Verbs construct sentences out of names,i.e., out of
nouns,and hence cannot be applied again and again ('A man understands understands' does not make sense). Adverbs and conjunctives
construct sentencesout of sentences,
and can be applied again and again
('It is not the case that Theaetetus flies and does not fly'). Tensesare
essentiallyadverbs(tense-adverbs)and not verbs.Hence, if >>is>>
is used
as a tense-adverb(grammatically:as a tensed verb), it doesnot connect
names or nouns so as to construct sentencesof the >>most
fundamental»
subject-predicatepattern. Consequently,the four inexact phrasesdo not
correspond to communities of 'vowel-Forms' and 'consonant-Forms,'
but are essentially of a more complexpattern.
Someobjectionsmay be raised here, however.(i) Is it not simplythe
case that >>iS>>
connects adjectives in the four inexact phrases? I would
be only too pleased if past, present and future could be conceivedof
simply as adjectives,for then time too (a conclusionfrom the three first
statements) would be an adjectival expression (see the philosophical
implicationsof the assumptionthat Plato's semantical criteria are not
sati~fied).Yet such adjectives would refer to properties of sentences,
and not to properties of physical things, and we must face the same
problemsagain. As Moravcsiknotes, it is doubtful whether Plato would
have been able to conduct such a discussion.(ii) But is it not the case
that the Greeks had to use tenses always, since in the absence of an
22
exact chronologyall sentencesimplicitlyrefer to the speech-situation?
Yet the temporal referenceto the speech-situationcan be made by other
means too ('now', 'tomorrow', 'yesterday'), and as the referenceex hypothesiis implicit,the Greekscouldstill think that their sentences,when
stripped of such an implicit reference,are of the >>most
fundamental»
pattern. (iii) But is not Plato's theory too rudimentary, as he does not
The theoretical problems involved in inferences from linguistic findings to cultural data are discussed, among others, by Joseph Greenberg in >>Concerning
Inferences from Linguistic to Nonlinguistic Data,>,Languageand Culture,ed. by H. Hoijer
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956) and by Max Black in >>Linguistic
Relativity,>, The PhilosophicalReview, vol. 68 (1959), pp. 228-238.
For the Greek time-keeping and calendar, see A History of Technology.vol. 3, ed.
by C. Singer, E. J. Holmyard, A. R. Hall, and T. I. Williams (Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1954-1958), p. 569. For the connection between the problems of time-measurement and the tense-logic, see Y. Bar-Hillel >>lndexicalExpressions,>,Mind, vol.
22
63 (1954), pp. 359-379.
On the Semantics of Time in Plato's Timaeus
2.1
speak anything about the right order of words, or about categories(cf.
Moravcsik,op. cit., p. 65), or about syncategorematicterms? These defects one must admit, but at the same time it should be observed,that
Plato's theory of meaning in any case is much more advanced in the
Sophist than in the Cratylus.
On the other hand, all these difficultiesare avoided if >>iS>>
in the four
inexact statements is used tenselessly, i.e., as a tenseless verb.23 But
Plato has already said (Tim. 37e-38a) that such >>iS>>
belongs to the
Forms, to >>thatwhich is for ever in the same state immovably>>.
>>But
'is' alone (sc. in contradistinction to tensed forms) belongs to it and
describesit truly>>.Here, we could say, we have another exampleof the
deceiving character of language. But I cannot agree with Owen that
Plato was not worried about it (op. cit., p. 330). Quite the opposite, he
is worried about it in the Timaeus37e-38b, grasped or half-grasped
(cf. Cherniss: >>Timaeus
38a8-65>>,J. Hell. Stud. 77, 1957,pp. 18-23,
n. 46) the differencebetween temporality and atemporality,or between
tensed and tenseless statements, and tried to bring home the point as
best as he could be means of an unsatisfactoryterminology.
Yet this may be too complicatedan explanationfor the inexactness
of the four statements at Tim. 38a-b, since Plato has not discussed
the logic of tenses explicitly.
8. In the foregoing discussionswe have seen that there are many
interpretations according to which some or all of the four statements
at Tim. 38a-b seem to be quite correct. They seem to be correct, if
they are (i) about names or concepts,and >>iS>>
denotes either copula or
identity, or if they are (ii) about events and facts, and >>is>>
denotes
either copula or identity. Some of them seem to be correct also (iii) if
>>is>>
denotes the opposite of physical change, for then the statements
(a), (c), and (d) would seem to be correct. Again,(iv) if >>is>>
denotes the
opposite of non-physicalchangefrom past toward more past (this being
one general notion for change of time), the statement (b) would seem to
be correct. Yet Plato says that noneof the juxtaposed statements (a-d)
is exact.
If we then dismiss our digression into tense-logic as the probable
source of inexactnessin these four statements, we seem to be obligedto
turn once more to the Sophist for an explanation.My hypothesis is, as
I said earlier, that in fact none of these four juxtaposed sentencessatisfies Plato's semantical criteria stated in the Sophist. That is to say,
despite some apparently correct usages, all of them are meaningless.
23
A tenseless sense is clearly presupposed by Aristotle in Topics, V, 3, 131b5-18.
Erkka Maula
22
Their meaninglessness,when combined with these apparently correct
usages, means that they are ambiguous, or not 'exact' .24 They lend
themselves to both correct and incorrect usages.
But if one is 'quite exact', speaking in the 'strict sense of words', if
we 'speak with precision', if we are 'precise with language', and so forth,
as Liddell and Scott translate a%et{h1~
and related terms, then we must
not use statements like those at Tim. 38a-b. Fortunately, in the Sophist we have learnt how to speak precisely. All philosophicdiscourse
depends on >>weaving
together» such Forms as can be combined with
one another. Statements that do not refer to such combinations of
Forms are not genuine statements at all (cf. Soph. 262d-e). Again,
every genuine statement >>mustbe about something>>
(262e). Hence, if
the four phrases at Tim. 38a-b are not genuinestatements, they cannot
be about anything. Doesthis mean that present, past, and future events,
and the non-existent are nothing? Not quite, but they are not about
onomata,i.e., the word >>iS>>
does not combine proper nouns.
But if the four sentencesat Tim. 38a-b are 'inexact' when subjected
to the semantical test presented in the Sophist, this must mean that
Plato is not worried so much about the use of 'is' as about the other
parts of these sentences. That is to say, >>what
is past>>,>>what
happens
no>>,>>what
will happen>>,
and >>the
non-existent>>
are not in fact onomata,
and hence cannot be combined with the rhema >>iS>>
(no matter which
one of the four senses of >>iS>>
we ascribe to it), so as to form sentences
giving >>information
about facts or events in the present or past or future>>.For these expressions are not >>weaving
together rhemata with
onomata>>
(Soph. 262d).
Can this interpretation be based on Tim. 38a-b? There Plato contrasts >>thatwhich is for ever in the same state immovably>>
(38a; paraphrased >>eternal
being>>
at 37e) with >>the
moving things of sense>>
(38a).
We further read that these >>moving
things of sense>>
have >>come
into
being as forms of time>>
(38a). But just on the previous page (37e) we
are told that >>was>>
and >>shall
be>>
are >>forms
of time that have come to
be>>.Now >>was>>
and >>shall
be>>,are >>properly
used of becomingwhich
proceeds in time, for they are motions>>
(38a). So whether we call them
>>motions>>
or >>themoving things of sense>>,
they seem to belong to rhemata rather than to onomata.Hence it is semantically incorrect to say
>>What
is past is past>>,etc. Such sentences are not, strictly speaking,
meaningful.
It is worth noting that Plato very seldom labels an argument fallacious, and
hardly ever uses explicitly the notion of ambiguity. For Plato's attitude toward
logical fallacies, see Rosamund Sprague's Plato's Use of Fallacy, Routledge and
Kegan Paul, London, 1962. But take it cum granosalis, however.
24
On the Semantics of ,Time in Plato's Timaem
23
Plato's semantical rules, moreover, reflect his ontologicaldistinction
between the stability of Forms and the unstable character of the >>moving things of sense>>.
Temporal things should not be confusedwith what
>>cannot
be becoming older or younger by lapseof time>>
( Tim.38a). In the
Timaeuswe learn that the only claim of existence of the sensibilia is
derived fron1 the existence of the Receptacle and the Forms.
Can the same distinction be applied to the fourth juxtaposed sentence:
>>The
non-existent is non-existent>>?
Doesthe >>non-existent>>
at Tim. 38b2
belong to rhema?If it is the absolute non-existent or the Form of NonExistence (Soph.238c9),the wholephrase must be meaningless(cf. Soph.
237b7-e7), for the Non-Existence is inconceivableand nothing can
characterize a non-existent (Soph.238a5-cl 1),and nothing can be said
of Non-Existence (Soph.238d4-239b3). All these characterizations (although very Parmenidean; cf. fr. 2: 7-8; fr. 8: 8--9) are too strong for
the claim of 'inexactness' at Tim. 38b. Hence the >>non-existent»
there
must mean something else than the absolute non-existent. And even if
it means the absolute non-existent, it has no meaning (cf. Soph.237be), and the >>iS>>
in the fourth sentence alonehas no meaning either, since
it does not amount to any combinationof Forms.(SeeTaran: Parmenides,
p. 272).
But the >>non-existent>>
may also mean (a) non-identity, (b) qualitative
difference, or (c) some even stronger relation such as incompatibility.
In the illustration of the Communionof the Forms, the only sense of
>>other>>
that is involved in the analysis of the µ~ ov,is non-identity. At
Soph.256d-e we are shown that there is Not-Beingin the sense of nonidentity. As Moravcsik has shown (op. cit., pp. 66 ff) Not-Being at Soph.
257-258 cannot mean non-identity, however, throughout the passage
(as Cornford and Apelt supposed),25 nor incompatibility(as D. W. Hamlyn seems to suppose),26 nor yet mere qualitative difference. Moravcsik's own interpretation of Soph. 257-258 is that Plato there introduces a doctrine of negative predicates in statements of subject-predicate type. 27 Be that as it may, in all these interpretations the µ~ ov
belongsto rhemarather than to onoma.But if so, then the fourth 'inexact'
expression does not satisfy Plato's semantical criterion, either.
To sum up: if the source of inexactness in all the four 'inexact' sentences is one and the same, then the most probable explanation is that
Cf. F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge,pp. 290 ff., and 0. Apelt,
Sophistes, pp. 7-8, 148.
26 Cf. D. \V. Hamlyn, >>The
Communion of the Forms and the Development of
Plato's Logic>>,
Phil. Quart.,vol. 5 ( 1955), p. 292.
27 This interpretation is anticipated to some extent in L. Campbell's Sophistes,
p. 162.
26
Erkka Mau.la
24
they do not satisfy Plato's criteria for meaningful statements. On the
other hand, should Platos' emphasis lie on the word >>is>>
in these four
sentences, there seem to be many perfectly exact sentences among them
on the different interpretations ('existence', 'identity', 'copula', 'timeless being', 'opposite of physical 1notion', 'opposite of non-physical
motion') of "is". But as it is Plato's explicit purpose in the Sophist
to discuss semantical criteria of meaningful sentences, in contradistinction to the se1nanticalatomism of the Cratylus, it seems wise to discuss
these four sentences (a-d) as whole units, and not to restrict oneself
to the verb "is" alone.
9. What are the deeper philosophical reasons for Plato's note on the
inexactness of the four sentences at Tim. 38a-b? For him, meaningful
sentences describe unions of Forms. True sentences represent such unions
correctly, while false but n1eaningfulsentences mispresent them. But our
four 'inexact' sentences do not describe unions of Forms at all. A union
of Forms is the combination of 'consonant-Forms' with 'vowel-Forms',
to use the language of the letter-analogy (Soph. 252e9-253a6). But if
all parts of a sentence belong to rhemata, then we only have 'vowelForms' at best, and no 'consonant-Forms' at all to be combined by
them.
It is clear that if there are Forms to correspond to the different
meanings of "is" in these four sentences, they are 'vowel-Forms'. (The
copular "is" displays a difficulty, for although it combines a subject
with a predicate in a sentence, Plato does not say explicitly that there
is a corresponding Form of Copular-Being. According to Moravcsik,
however, this assumption can be proved by examining Soph. 255c8d9; cf. op.cit., pp. 53-56).
As to the other rhemata in our four sentences, firstly, the >>11on-existent>>clearly refers to a 'vowel-Form', be it interpreted either as nonidentity, or as incompatibility, or as qualitative difference, or yet as a
negative predicate (or as some combination of these). Secondly, there
are no separate Forms at all to correspond to 'the past', 'the present',
and 'the future'. As these are parts of time, >>Which
images eternity and
revolves according to numben>(Tim. 38a), the reference may be to alwv.
But if alwv is a Form at all, it is an all-inclusive Form in the sense that
all Forms are eternal. Hence it i$ not on a par with such 'consonantForms' as Man or Anin1al,that are discussed in the Timaeus.28 But since
our four sentences do not represent (nor even mispresent) combinations
of Forms, they do not yield >>informationabout facts or events ... by
28
See Ross: Plato's Theory of Ideas, p. 167.
On the Semantics of Time in Plato's Timaeu,
2,5
weaving together e1,para with ()J'O/laTa>>. For >>all
discoursedependson
the weaving together of Forms>>
(Soph. 259e).
If we keep in mind that this is the import of Plato's letter-analogy
(Soph. 252e9-253a6; it occurs also at Rep. 402a7-c8, and in Theaet.,
Crat., Pol., Phil.), a similar explanation can be offered to Tim. 48b-c.
There Plato warns that although the four arot-x,eia (fire, water, earth
and air) have been considered by some as letters of the universe, >>one
who has ever so little intelligenceshould not rank them in this analogy
even so low as syllables>>.
What is needed, therefore, is a discussionof
such Forms as may serve as 'vowel-Forms'combiningand characterizing
these 'elements'. It appears in the Timaeus that certain geometrical
Forms have such a function.
10. Turning now from our semantical considerations toward their
philosophical itnplications, we may ask what is Plato's idea of time as
implied by the four 'inexact' phrases at Tim. 38a-b? If his semantical
criteria for n1eaningfulsentences were satisfied, then >>whatis past>>,
>>What
happens now>>,
and >>what
will happen>>
should correspondto 'consonant-Forms'. What does it mean that they do not? It means, I think,
that Plato has resisted the temptation to hypostatize time. In this, he
is not quite alone. There is an (admittedly vague)ascriptionto Antiphon
that time is >>aconcept or a measure, and not a substance>>
(fr. 9 DielsKranz, cf. Doxographi Graeci 318.22),although this may be much later
scholarship. But also Democritussaid that not everythinghas comeinto
existence, and his counter-examplewas time (cf. Arist., Phys., 251b15
-17).
But if time was not hypostatized by Plato, then how did he conceive
of it? There is more than one indication pointing towards the same
answer: time is an attribute. I think that Plato's distinction between
>>facts>>
and >>events>>
at Soph. 262d is important here. If we apply it to
Tim. 38a-b, then, provided that the semantical criteria are satisfied,
the fourth 'inexact' phrase would yield information about a >>fact>>,
viz.
the non-existent (no matter which variant of 'different' we adopt). On
the same provision, the three first phrases would yield information
about >>events>>.
The point is that >>events>>
are not hypostatized, and
hence do not correspond to 'consonant-Forms'.(And the >>non-existent»,
too, corresponds to a 'vowel-Form').
We moderns can say meaningfullywith Plato that >>events>>
(if they
are not now occurring) become,or >>move>>
non-physicallyfrom present
to past, and from future to present, (J.J. C. Smart adds 'probable' and
'imminent' in his paper >>TheRiver of Time>>;
cf. Anthony Flew, ed.:
Essays in ConceptualAnalysis) and that only present events undergo
Erkka Mau.la
physical change. We also agree with Plato that facts do notbecome,or
change into, anything physically.But we may disagreewith him, when
he impliesthat events arenot, strictly speaking,past, present,or future.
Nevertheless, also we can aim at a greater precisionwith Plato, and
rephrase: 'future events are not future, but are becomingpresent' and
'past events are not past, but are becomingmore past', 'present events
are not stable, but may becomesomethingelse physically'. For Plato,
'events' seemto suggestmotions,either physicalor non-physical,and not
'things'.
Secondly, the Greeks had no Pan-Helleniccalendar nor chronology
(before300B.C.)nor chronometer,eachof whichcouldhave beenthought
to 'fix' events. These technical disadvantages perhaps are reflectedin
the fact that the Greeksoften used temporallyindefinitesentenceseven
in scientificdiscourse.29 In their ears it was not very informativeto say
only that some event is present, past, or future.30 As Hintikka has
shown, such referenceswere not even needed, since the temporallyindefinite sentenceswere generally understood as referring implicitlyto
the speech-situation.By the same token, if temporal referencesare made
by means of tenses (at least other than the present tense), they do _not
yield much information about things (cf. Tim. 38a about >>was>>
and
>>will
be>>).
But such temporally indefinitesentencesare token-reflexive,and token-reflexivityeasilymisleadsone to either (i) hypostatizingtime or (ii)
at least ascribing 'presentness' as an attribute to the speech-situation,
and further, if the speech-situationis not carefullyanalyzed,to the sentences uttered. We shall see presently,that Plato resistedthe temptation
of hypostatizingtime, but in doing so he falls the victim of the second
mistake.
Anyhow,token-reflexivelocutions that are not about things (as our
But of course there have been other factors as well to contribute to their
implicit way of referring to the speech-situation. Hintikka lists in his paper >>Time,
Truth, and Knowledgein Ancient Greek Philosophy>>
also the 'eye-witnessquality'
of the Greek concept of knowledge,and it is a plausible guess that usages inherited
from the past spokenculture still dominate in Plato, who very often emphasizesthe
supremacy of the spoken word.
30 Indeed, applying mechanically one set of paraphrases, the first three sentences read: 'what is earlier than this speech-situation,is earlier than it', 'what is happening when this sentence is uttered, is what is happening', 'what is happening later
than this speech-situation,is happening later than it'. At least the spatial reference
should be added in order that these sentences yield information about facts and
events: e.g., ' ... in the reach of eye-sight'. This tacit addition may be included in
sentences like 'Theaetetus is sjtting', but in these three sentences only the temporal
reference is spelled out. Such token-reflexivenesswithout any ostensible object at
all is not informative.
29
On the Semantics of Time in Plato's Timaetl\
27
four inexact sentences are not), do not carry much informationabout
anything, and in this Plato is right. Implicit temporal determinations,
as well as the explicit one, belongto the very frame of referencefor the
Greeks. Just as it is hard to discussthe Receptaclein separation from
its contents, it is hard to separate events from time.
But if even explicit temporal referenceswere thus superfluousfor the
Greeks, we can understand why the 'inexact' phrases were not philosophicallysatisfactory sentencesfor Plato. They consist of rhemata,i.e.
of verbs and attributes, but they miss a 'real' subject, becausePlato did
not hypostatize time. This, I think, is the significanceof the fact that
they are token-reflexive sentences.
When speculating in this way, I do not forget that there have been
a number of unfortunate attempts to reduce philosophicaltheories into
linguistic phenotnena - also in Greek philosophy.No doubt it is easy
to see 'substantive' senses in many adjectives and verbs, especiallyin
Greek. And no doubt it is easy to see 'attributive' or 'adjectival' senses
in many nouns. But surely we need more proof than such speculations,
if we assert that a pair of genuinegrammaticalnouns, aldn, and r.e6vot;,
are used as qualities only by Plato. In order to prove that ahhv and
related terms (like aldwwt;) in fact are conceivedof by Plato as attributes of Forms, and XQ6vot;and related terms as attributes of sensibles,
we need philosophical evidencefrom the text.
In my opinion, it is a dangerous method of proof that for instance
Owen adopts in his paper >>PlatoAnd Parmenides On The Timeless
Present>>.Owen says that in fact Parmenidesand Plato confusedproperties of statements and properties of things, so as to reach the idea
of immutable objects from a notion of 'tenselessly'used statements. But
even if it is true that Plato does not distinguishbetween the existence
of things and the existence of concepts at Soph. 244b9-d 13, nor between physical time and grammaticaltime (at least not strictly) at Tim.
38a, we must not build too much on such confusions.Indeed, Owen's
own contribution amounts to saying that since tenselessnessis a property of statements (is it really so?), and not of things, paradoxesensue
from confusing them (cf. The Monist 50. 3, pp. 335-336). 31
11. There is one passage in the Timaeus,which has been construed
to show that Plato in fact hypostatized time. At 37e Plato tells that
>>days,
nights, months, years ... are all partsof time>>.
Accordingto Owen
Owen eventually gives only one example of such 'paradoxes': >>The
conceptof
stability has been stretched so that stability is no longer a function of time>>
(p. 335).
But Owen has not distinguished between physical and non-physical change, which
seems to give meaning to Plato's concept of stability of the Forms.
31
28
Erkka Mau1a
(op. cit., pp. 331 ff) Plato is attacking Melissus(fr. 9) at Tim. 37e-38a.
Melissushad argued that something which is single and indivisible, as
any Eleatic subject must be, could not have a body; for anything with
a body has density (pachos),and consequently can be divided into parts;
and anything with parts is no longer single and indivisible. But Melissus
was not worried with parts of time and space, for divisibility comes
only with density. Divisibility in time and space are quite another thing
than divisibility of dense things. Now, according to Owen, Plato corrects
Melissus: "time has parts just as certainly as a block of wood". Also
Moravcsik, who seems to agree with Owen upon the chronological hypothesis that the Timaeus antedates the Sophist (cf. op.cit.,pp. 32, 35,
38, 43), presumably refers to this passage while discussing what Plato
means by saying that Existence is a whole, (op.cit., p. 32). "Plato's
view - e.g. in the Timaeus(NB. no precise reference!)- was that each
existent has parts, not necessarilyphysical ones, and that these are
related by the structure of the entity" (my italics).
We may leave aside the assertion that time is an 'existent'; also
qualities do exist in their peculiar way in the Timaeus, although their
meagre claim for existence is entirely dependent on the existence of the
Receptacle and the Forms. But we must tackle the statement that time
"has parts just as certainly as a block of wood". In Moravcsikthis seems
to mean that every physical body has parts even if these parts are not
physical. I cannot follow this argument. Anyhow, it seems to be based
on Plato's notion of the 'parts of time', just as Owen's argument is.
But if "days, nights, months and years ... are all parts of time",
does this prove that time is a physical body, on a par with such physical
bodies as man and other animals? Surely not, for Plato is speaking here
(Tim. 37e-38a) about units of measurement of calculable time. (But
at Parm. 154b he speaks of time as a magnitude.) Owen's conclusion
need not be drawn. Although yard-sticks perhaps can be said to be
'parts of length', they are not parts of the measured body. Similarly,
although units of temporal measurement can be said to be 'parts of time'
they are not parts of the measured period. Grains of sand in a sand-clock
are not parts of the time which they measure. And one more counterexample: although qualities may be measured or at least compared with
one another, the devices for measurement or comparison are not parts
of these qualities. Indeed, Plato adds immediately that the broadest
categories or >>forms
of time>>,viz. >>was>>
and >>Will
be>>,are (not things
or bodies but) >>changes>>
(Tim. 38a). And these >>changes>>
surely belong
to rhemata,for >>was>>
and >>Will
be>>
are verbs.
12. But even if alwv is a 'vowel-Form' and time correspondingly a
On the Semantics of Time in Plato's Timaeus
2,9
rhema,we must consider whether or not Plato distinguished 'things'
from their 'qualities' in the Timaeus.
A case, where he seems to distinguishthem, is Tim. 49a-50a, in the
discussionof the four elements. The elements >>slip
away and do not
wait to be described as 'that' or 'this' or by any phrase that exhibits
them as having permanent being. We should not use these expressions
of any of them, but say: 'that which is of certain quality and has some
sort of quality as it perpetually recurs in the cycle'>>
(49e).
Here we meet the idea of a certain quality, or state of affairs, that
presupposes cyclic time. As Cornford notes in Plato's Cosmology(pp.
180-181), the coining of the word >>quality>>
(poiotes)marks the clear
distinction of qualities from 'things' or substances also at Tim. 50a,
where Plato speaks of the adjectives >>hoband >>cold>>,
>>orany of the
opposites>>.
In the Timaeus, this distinction is expressedin terms of ostensibility. The lack of ostensibility characterizes all perpetually changing
qualities. >>Inevery case we should speak of fire (for example), not as
'this', but as 'what is of such and such quality', nor of water as 'this',
but always as 'what is of such and such quality'>>
(49d) - these being
examples of >>themoving things of sense>>
that we observeperpetually
changing.
In contradistinction to the transient qualities, the Receptacle is
ostensible.Of it >>We
may use the words'this' or 'that'>>(49e,cf. 50b1-2).
But all perceptible >>things
of sense>>
that >>are
in time, and partake of
time>>
(Parm. 141c-d) are credited with transient qualities only.
Is Plato applying this distinction betweenostensiblethings and nonostensible qualities to eternity, then? I think he is. For instance, the
Forms are s01netimessaid to be aionioi, sometimesaidioi, and at times
the problematic term aion is associatedwith them. The two first ones
are adjectives, and as Ackrill has shown in his paper >>Platoand the
copula:Sophist251-259>>,phrases like 'partake of eternity' or 'partake
of time' can be interpreted in one and the same way. >>The
role of 'partakes of' in Plato's terminology, is clear: 'partakes of' followedby an
abstract noun, the name of a concept, is equivalent to the ordinary·
languageexpressionconsistingof 'is' (copula)followedby the adjective
correspondingto that abstract noun>>.
It would be ridiculousto supposethat there are three distinct Forms,
viz. 'the aionion itself', 'the aidion itself', and 'the aion itself'. The
interchangeabilityof these descriptionsof Forms suggests,in my opinion, that they are attributes of Forms, or at best three variants of one
'vowel-Form', not 'things' on a par with the 'consonant-Forms'.
What do these attributes (and aion, when attributively used) mean,
30
Erkka Maula
then? They may mean 'atemporal' in somecontexts. But it is enlightening to note that they may also mean less problematic qualities. 'Aionios',for instance,can mean even'living', (aion means 'life' and 'life-time'
e.g. at Oorg.448c6 and Laws 701c4). For in the Timaeusthe paradigm
that consists of 'eternal' Forms, is also called the >>Intelligible
Living
Being>>repeatedly, and its paraphrase is >>thepattern of the 'everenduring' nature>>.On the other hand, if aioniossimply means 'living'
in some contexts, we could expect that it occurs in that sense also
outside the realm of Forms. And indeed, the copy of the paradigm is
called the >>Visible
Living Being>>
repeatedly, and at 37d Plato gives a
paraphrase (if he does not refer to the World-Soul alone) >>aionios
likeness>>.
There is also a fair amount of evidence that aioniosat times may
mean something like 'well-ordered',as I have tried to show in my paper
>>IsTime A Child Or A Grand-ChildOf Eternity?>>,
Ajatus XXX I, 1969.
I do not hazard a guess why Plato has chosen to call the paradigm
and its copy 'living' (unless that is just to emphasize the complex
'togetherness' of both Forms and their exemplifications,in accordance
with the new theory of meaning of the Sophist). It is more important
for us to note that Plato indeed has distinguishedbetween the attributes
aionios,aidios (and aion, when attributjvely used) and the 'things' of
which they are predicated.
Accepting, then, such readings of these terms as translators have
adopted, we see the distinction in several passages.At Tim. 37c-d Plato
says that the pattern is >>theIntelligible Living Being that is for ever
existent>>
(tr. Cornford). He also says that >>thenature of that Living
Being was aionios,and this character it was impossibleto conferin full
completeness on the generated thing>>
(37d, tr. Cornford). At 37e-38a
he speaks of the >>eternal
being>>
and of the being >>thatis for even>(at 37e
aidios is substituted for aionios).At 38b Plato says that the world is
made >>after
the pattern of the ever-enduring
nature>>,
and at 38c he paraphrases >>the
pattern is a thing that has being for all eternity>>
(tr. Cornford).
In all these passages, then, Plato has distinguished between the
paradigm that consists of 'consonant-Forms' of 'things', and the attributes aionios and aidios (and aion, when attributively used) of these
Forms.
13. Did Plato apply the distinction between 'things' and their properties to temporal determinations, then? There are passages in the
Timaeuswhere he seems to do so, although this is a very complicated
issue, since temporal determinations such as tenses in fact are properties
On the Semantics of Time in Plato's Timaeu.'i
31
of sentences, and not of physical entities like animals and heavenly
bodies.
A case in point is Tim. 38b. >>Time
came into being together with the
heaven, in order that, as they were brought into being together, so they
may be dissolved together, if ever their dissolution should come to
pass.>>
There is no reason to think that time and the heaven constitute a
curious 'double thing'. Far more natural a reading is, that time is a
permanent attribute of the heaven, i.e., the heaven is omnitemporal.
In the description of the transient qualities - appearing and vanishing in the Receptacle, too, Plato makes the same distinction, on which
we have already commented above. Fire, water, air and earth are
qualities, which are passing into one another (49b). >>Since,
then, in this
way no one of these things ever makes its appearance as the samething,
which of them can we steadfastly affirm to be this - whatever it may
be - and not something else, without blushing for ourselves?>>
(49c-d,
Cornford's italics). Hence we must speak of them in terms of qualities
(49d, e; 50a-b). And this applies to all things that are changing; >>and
so with anything else that is in process of becoming>>
(49e). The Receptacle >>appears
to have different qualities at different times>>
(50c),while
these qualities in fact belong to the things that enter it (and also this
is just a metaphor, as I have argued in >>Plato's
Mirror of Soul»,Ajatus
XXXI I). >>Themost correct account of it would be this: that part of
it (sc. the Receptacle) which has been made fiery appears at any time
as fire, the part that is liquefied as water; and as earth or air such parts
as receive likenesses of these>>
(51b).
Plato's account of the distinction between things and their qualities
is obscured by his emphasizingthat the 'things' entering the Receptacle
are not real (or do not really exist), either. But parallel to the distinction
between the Forms and their likenesses there runs the distinction
between these likenessesand their properties, or temporal qualities.
Similarly at Laws 721c where Plato says that >>mankind
is twin-born
with all time>>.Just as at Tim. 38b, we can interpret this as meaning
that mankind is omnitemporal. It is not a natural reading that there is
a curious 'doublething' called 'mankind-time'. Omnitemporality,rather,
is an attribute of mankind.
So we have seen that at times Plato treats time as a measure (37e),
at times as a quality of becoming,or the >>moving
things of sense>>
(38a),
at times as a magnitude (Parm. 154b). Indeed, it would be odd if time,
being a likeness of alwv which is a quality of Forms and not a 'thing',
were a 'thing' and not a quality. In the Sophist 247e3-4 Plato tells us
that dynamis characterizes all existents, i.e., Forms and the exempli-
Erkka Maula
32
fications of Forms. Accordingto Moravcsikthis must be read in the
light of the preceding lines 247d9-e3). They tell us that what exists
has to some degree,howeversmall, the ability to affect or to be affected.
Plato uses these terms in a very wide sense, such that if x is predicated
of y, x is said to be affecting y. Then 'x affects y' is equivalent to
'quality x inheres in y'. And there is, according to Moravcsik,more
evidence for such a reading (e.g. at Parm. 160a6-7, 164b5-6, Soph.
248d4-el). Such an interpretation seemsto explain why Plato at times
has attributed time to the exemplificationsof Forms and at times to
sentences, but on the other hand, he seems to be aware of the dangers
of such an ambiguous usage. Indeed, if my interpretation of the four
'inexact statements' at Tim. 38a-b is correct, he says that we should
not use the same terms of properties of sentences and of properties of
things, if we are to speak exactly.32 But if Plato in fact was aware of
the ambiguous character of the attribution of time, how then should
we understand the attribution of time?
My conclusionis that Plato was not always consistent in this respect.
Problemsof tense-logicand physicalversusnon-physicalmotionare just
on threshold of his philosophicalargument, but he had no adequate
logical tools for their proper analysis.
Appendix:Does the Sophistantedate the Timaeus?
There are a number of arguments that suggest that the Sophist
antedates the Timaeus.Most of them entangle the problem of a chorismos between the Forms and the sensibles.As Cornford notes in Plato's
Theoryof Knowledge(Introduction, p. 7), the problem of the existence
of eidolais stated but not solved in the Sophist(239c-240b). Also the
Parmenides(cf. 129d, 130b)discussesthe chorismos,but we must consult
the Timaeusfor a solution in the theory of chora.I shall give a short list
of other relevant problems, which suggest that the Sophist antedates
the Timaeus.
In the Parmenides,Socratesfelt uncertain about two groups of Forms,
(a) the Form of Man, and (b) the Forms of the elements (130c).These
two groups correspondto the products of divine craftsmanship described in the Sophist(266b, 265e, cf. 265c),and are exclusivelydiscussed
in the Timaeus.
Correspondingly,if tenses (grammatical time) are properties of sentences about
the exemplificationsof Forms, tenselessnessis a property of statements about Forms.
But if so, Owen's allegation that Plato simply confused (in the Timaeus) properties
of things and properties of sentences, is hardly acceptable.
32
On the Semantic.<;of Time in Pfoto'i; Timaeu,
33
In the Theaetetus,the claim of the world of eidolato yield knowledge
was rejected. The Sophistraises the question about their ontologicaland
epistemologicalstatus, but only in the Timaeus,in the discourseof the
World-Soul, shall we find an answer (anticipated, perhaps, at Parm.
155d-e).
According to the Sophist, 227b, the task of philosophic dicourse is
'to discern what is of the same kind and what is not'. In the Timaeus,
the World-Soul obtains knowledgeon the principle 'like knows like'.
In the allegory of the Cave in the Republic,a liberator turns the
prisoners round and tries to convince them about the greater degree of
reality attached to the actual images than that attached to the shadows
they watched before. In the Sophist,234c-e, the Stranger likewisetries
to bring Theaetetus and his young friends nearer to realities, and in the
Timaeus, the description of the physical world is already called 'a probable story' (29d). The actual images, in virtue of the Forms and the
Receptacle, enjoy so1nesort of reality (52c).
In the Sophist, both active and passive aspects are included in the
definition of dynamis.The power of 'acting and being acted upon' (247e)
is seen applied in the description of Chaos in the Timaeus.
In the Sophist, the combinations of Forms possessin some sense life
and are associated with some undefined sort of change(248e-249b). In
the Timaeus, the paradigm is called collectivelythe Intelligible Living
Being. (Pace Cornford, Plato's Theoryof Knowledge,p. 245, who asserts
that 'the f orn1s are never representedas livingand thinking beings'. Although this no doubt is true about the separate Forms, their combination in the Timaeus is compatible with the Stranger's characterization.)
In the Sophist, the question whether knowingand the physical intercourse of perception are analogous,seemsto be left unanswered. But in
the Timaeus, the World-Soul has knowledgeboth of the Forms and of
the sensible world. (For this, see Cornford:PTK, p. 247). The rings of
the San1eand the Different in their revolutionsobtain informationfrom
both worlds, as I try to show in >>Plato's'CosmicComputer' in the Timaeus>>,
Ajatus XXX I I, 1970.
Despite Cornford's refutation (PTK, p. 274), Plotinus may have been
right in associating the Sophist'sµeyun:a yev'Y/(Existence, Motion, Rest:
254d, and Sameness, Difference: 255c) with the composition of the
World-Soul in the Timaeus(35a, 37a). Cornford's objection is based on
the fact that Plato does not mention motion and rest as ingredients of
the World-Soul. But it surely is in motion (or composedof a complicated system of motions, rather), and there is a sense in which we can
associate even rest with it. For the immaterial rings of the World-Soul
may stay at rest relative to the circular motion of the material heavenly
34
Erkka Maula
bodies. This interpretation seems to account for the otherwise cryptic
passage Soph. 256b: >>Supposing
Motion itself did in anyway participate
in Rest, there would be nothing outrageous in speaking of it as stationary>>.Cornford, however, suspects a lacuna, which he fills so as to make
Motion and Rest entirely incompatible. (Another possible interpretation of their compatibility, in a sense, is Ritter's: 'Motion partakes of
stability in that it can be measured and described - quite as Plato
does in the Timaeus': cf. Neue Unters. 61).
If my interpretation of the >>optic
excursion>>
in the Timaeusis correct
(see >>Plato'sMirror of Soul»,Ajatus XXX 11), then Plato's notes on sight
and mirrors in the Sophist (239d, 266b-c) should be studied in the light
of the corresponding passages of the Timaeus (e.g., 43c, 45b, 46a, and see
Taylor's comment on the last-mentioned passage).
In addition to these details, if the Sophist antedates the Timaeus,
this may throw some light on Plato's reasons for dropping the planned
>>Philosopher>>
from the company of the Sophist and Politicus.The Philosophercould have been expected to follow the Sophist and the Politicus
on the basis of numerous hints (e.g., Pol. 257a-b, 258a, Soph. 217a,
249c, 253c, e). What seems to have been left for the Philosopher,is a
thorough discussion of the interrelation of Forms and their images.
(For this, see Cornford, PT K, pp. 169, 173, 248, 263, 323). But this is
exactly the problem discussed in the Timaeus, and answered in its
epistemic aspect in the theory of the World-Soul, and in its ontological
aspect in the theory of the Receptacle. Hence the Timaeus seems to
fulfill the promises given in the Sophist, and the Philosopherbecame
superfluous. Moreover, it seems likely that Plato's synthesis of the empiricists' (giants') and the idealists' (gods') arguments in the Sophist,
paves the way for his cosmological theories in the Timaeus.
As I find Moravcsik's monograph in other respects most instructive,
I must finally say a word about his allegation that Plato distinguishes
ousia from genesis in the Timaeus, but no more in the >>laterdialogues>>
(cf. p. 48; this presumably presupposes that the Timaeus antedates the
Sophist). Between the attacks on empiricism and idealism Moravcsik
finds (p. 37) a positive account of Existence. This account (Soph. 247e3
-4) is, according to him, regarded by Plato as satisfactory for a »revised>>
empiricism. This characterization of the class of existents amounts to
saying (Soph. 247d9-e3) that what exists has to some degree, however
small, the ability of affect or to be affected. As it stands, however, this
characterization applies also to the ingredients of Chaos in the Timaeus,
at 52e. Hence they are existent, too. As to the other side of Plato's
synthesis, the reality of soul is part of his doctrines in the Timaeus,
as Moravcsik himself admits (p. 38).
On the Semantics of Time in Plato's Timaeu.-;
3S
Hence the theory that >>only
the unchangingand unmoved exists>>
is
not presupposedin the Timaeus.Soulsexist, and also sensiblesexist in
virtue of the existence of the Formsand the Receptacle,in the Timaeus.
This is not contradictory with Soph. 249b2-3, which states against
the idealists that >>Motion
and that which is moved exist». However,
Formsdo not undergo change in either dialoguein the sense Moravcsik
imputes to Plato, viz. that >>dated
(temporal) propositionsare true of
them>>
(p. 40). I shall postpone a closerdiscussionof this point, however
(see >>Plato's'Cosmic Computer' in the Timaeus>>,
Ajatus XXX I I).
For the reasons given above, I do not find Gilbert Ryle's viewson the
date of the Timaeusvery convincingin Plato'sProgress(CambridgeUP,
1966),pp. 238-243. I think Ryle is leaningtoo heavily on the esoteric
character of the dialogue.One gets the impressionfrom Ryle, that only
the style of the Timaeus,at best, may bear resemblanceto the latest
dialogues. But then how can we explain away such doctrinal innovations as the positive account of the existenceof the sensibles,embedded
in the theory of space, and the detailed descriptionof the mechanism
of the World-Soul's cognitive processes?
There are two independent points that may seem to support Ryle's
chronology.The beginningof the Timaeussuggestsit was meant to be
a continuation of the Republic,and also meant to be followedby the
Critias. But these hints only affect the dating of that beginning (or
Plato may refer to Rep. X only, to the visionof Er), and not the whole
dialogue. One can also add the negative testimony, that the Timaeus
doesnot seem to draw much on the doctrineof the communionof Forms
taught in the Sophist. But notwithstandingother hints regardingtheir
interdependence,the term 'Intelligible Living Being' for the paradigm
suggests (as I have conjectured), that the community after all was
presupposedin the Timaeus.
Besides, Ryle's evidence for the terminologicalaffinity between the
Sophistand the Theaetetus(op. cit., p. 281) can partly be used to support such an affinity between the Sophist and the Timaeus,too (cf.
Tim. 50a, 37b).
Retrospect:The structure of the argument
In the Timaeus,Plato developstheoriesof the physicalworldin metaphysical,epistemological,and even mechanisticterms. His discussionof
time (37d-38b, 49a-50a), however,is conductedin semanticalterms.
At 38a-b especially,we need a semanticalkey of interpretation.
Ch. 1 ls it justifiable to rely on the Sophist'ssemanticaltheories in
interpreting Tim. 38a:___b?
Owen'srevolutionaryre-orderingof the Pia-
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tonic dialogues would make such an approach invalid. Similarly Cornford's interpretation of rd /l~ ovat 38b would hamper it. But right as
Owen is in refuting Cornford, he himself fails in trying to dissociate
the Sophist from the Timaeus.
Ch. 2 On the contrary, there are passages that suggest an interdependence of these two dialogues. For instance, Soph. 249b5-d5 seems to
have a natural explanation in Tim. 36e-37c. The problem of the ontological status of images raised in the Sophist, again, is solved in Tim.
5le6-52dl.
Ch. 3 What is the semantical key provided by the Sophist, then?
Plato gives up the semantical atomism of the Cratylus, developing instead a new theory of meaning. Only such word complexes as satisfy
certain criteria of a logical syntax, have meaning. Meaningful statements are combinations of ov6µara and e~µara, while temporal determinations refer implicitly to the speech-situation. It is also of great
importance for our interpretation of Tim. 38a-b to note the different
senses of >>iS>>
found in the Sophist.
Ch. 4 But what is >>theright moment for a precise discussion>>
about
the matters referred to at Tim. 38a-b? There are four main candidates:
on four occasions Plato juxtaposes past, present, and future statements
in a way similar to Tim. 38a-b. But Parm. 141d-e is not applicable,
Rep. 499d, 617 are not contributions to semantical problems, and Philebus 38-41 is about false opinions rather than about 'inexact statements'. Therefore, the most promising passage is Soph. 262c-d. Might
it be the case that the four 'inexact statements' at Tim. 38a-b simply
do not satisfy the criteria stated at Soph. 262c-d?
Ch. 5 Before we discuss this possibility and its philosophical implications, a number of alternative interpretations must be surveyed. In
all of them we assume that the semantical criteria are satisfied. The
four juxtaposed sentences at Tim. 38a-b, then, may be (i) about
names or conc~pts, or (ii) about facts and events. Or (iii) Plato may be
suggesting that 'becomes' should be substituted for 'is' in these four
statements. All of these counter-assumptions make some of the four
sentences valid on one or more interpretations of 'is' and 'becomes',
but not all of the four juxtaposed sentences.
Ch. 6 It is also possible that the term 'is' denotes the opposite of
'becomes'. If so, we must discuss both physical and non-physical becoming or change as suggested by Parm. 152a-e. It turns out, however, that on this interpretation also some of the four sentences at Tim.
38a-b are valid, but not all of them.
Ch. 7 Again, if we consider the fact that 'is' is a tensed verb grammatically, while from a logical point of view it is a tense-adverb which
On the Semantics of Time in Plato's Timaew,
37
does not construct sentences out of nouns, there is somethingwrong
with these sentences. They are not of the 'most fundamental'type which
satisfies Plato's semantical criteria.
Ch. 8 As none of the alternative interpretations has shown what is
the common root of trouble in all of the four juxtaposed sentences,we
then suppose that the semanticalcriteria of the Sophistare not satisfied.
This hypothesis does not counter Tim. 38a-b, and it applies also to
the fourth sentence on some interpretations of the 'non-existent'.
Ch. 9 Deeper philosophicalreasons for the violation of the semantical criteria are sought in the Sophist's doctrine of the Communionof
Forms.
Ch. 10 One implication of the hypothesisthat the semanticalcriteria
are not satisfied, is that Plato has not hypostatizedtime. Some indications suggest that time was conceivedof as an attribute by Plato.
Ch. 11 One passage in the Timaeus(37e),however,has beenconstrued
to show that time was hypostatized by Plato. It is a mistake, though.
Ch. 12 Plato did distinguish between things and their attributes in
the Timaeus. This distinction seems to be applied to aion and related
terms, which often are attributes of Forms. Plato has not said explicitly
that aion is a Form, but even if it is, it is at best a 'vowel-Form'.
Ch. 13 Also time (chronosand related terms) seemsto have been conceived of by Plato as an attribute. But Plato is not consistentas to the
distinction between properties of physicalthings and properties of sentences. So time may be attributed to sentencesor to physical things,
and in sotne contexts it is also conceivedof as a measure.
Appendix: A list of passagessuggestingthat the Sophistantedates the
Timaeus, and that they are interdependent.