24 Jollibee Foods Corporation CASE Leonardo R. Garcia Jr., Christopher Lovelock, and Jochen Wirtz A Philippine fast food company has achieved market dominance in three segments in its home country — burgers and chicken, pizzas, and Chinese food — beating out well-known international competitors such as McDonald’s and Pizza Hut. What is the secret to its domestic success and what are the lessons for its international ventures? Around the world, when someone says “fast food restaurant,” the chances are high that the first name that comes to mind will be McDonald’s, the world’s largest quick-service restaurant chain. In 2004, McDonald’s held a 20% share of the US fast food market, triple that of its nearest competitor Burger King. This was not the case, however, in the Philippines where, for more than two decades, fast food had been synonymous with the name Jollibee. In the global business arena, Jollibee Foods Corporation (JFC) was not exactly a household name. But in its niche, the Philippines, where it controlled four brands — Jollibee, Delifrance, Greenwich Pizza, and Chowking — it dominated the market. During the 1990s, JFC extended its sights overseas, opening a small number of restaurants in several Asian and Middle Eastern locations. The company’s chairman and chief executive officer (CEO), Tony Tan Caktiong, observed: Internationalization remains a key component of our business strategy, even as we continue to reinforce our domestic network of stores. Our goals of continued growth, profitability, and market leadership, as well as our contribution to the development of our country, may lie not just in continuing to expand aggressively at home but also in becoming a truly multinational Filipino corporation. © 2005 by Leonardo R. Garcia, Jr., Christopher H. Lovelock, and Jochen Wirtz. The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Kristine Abante. This case is based on published sources, student research, and personal experience. It was prepared solely for use as a learning tool and is not intended to serve as an endorsement, source of primary data, or illustration of effective or ineffective management. Financial data in the Philippine pesos (exchange rates in mid-2004 were PHP1 = US$0.018, or US $1 = PH56). By September 2004, the total number of stores worldwide in the JFC Group had grown to 1,128, of which 1,008 were located in the Philippines, and the balance in several other countries, led by the recently acquired Yonghe King chain in China. That year, Jollibee beat 31 other entrepreneurs from around the world to win the 2004 World Entrepreneur of the Year award, sponsored by Ernst and Young, one of the world’s top accounting firms. JOLLIBEE: THE EARLY YEARS Humble Beginnings In 1975, Tony Tan Caktiong, a Filipino of Chinese ancestry, and his brothers opened two ice cream parlors in Manila’s commercial districts of Cubao and Quiapo. These ice cream parlors were an instant hit among foodloving Filipinos, who came to associate the stores with special occasions such as birthdays and holidays. In no time, the Tan brothers had decided to expand their menu and began offering other quick meals such as hot sandwiches, spaghetti, and burgers. After its second year of operations, the Tan brothers noted that the store was actually earning more from the side orders, specifically their burgers, than from the ice cream. Following the taste and feel of the market, the Tan brothers decided to develop their own unique brand by Case Studies C24.1 coming up with a menu that would appeal to the Filipino palate. Jollibee was conceived as a fast food outlet of highquality but reasonably-priced food products tailored especially for Filipinos, who were served by a jolly, “busy-as-a-bee” restaurant crew. Hence the birth of the bright red and yellow “Jolly Bee” mascot, which had since become a favorite among Filipino children. In response to the growing popularity of their sweet homemade burgers — made from their mother’s secret recipe — and the other hot meals, Tony Tan and his brothers formed Jollibee Foods Corporation (JFC) in 1978 to exploit the possibilities of a hamburger concept more fully. By that time, the firm had seven outlets. When McDonald’s entered the Philippine market in 1981 and began opening stores in Manila, some industry observers questioned whether the little 11store local chain could survive. However, Jollibee’s management team decided to see this as an opportunity that would allow them to benchmark the American giant’s operations and then bring their own chain up to world-class standards. In particular, they focused on learning about the sophisticated operating systems that enabled McDonald’s to control its quality, costs, and service at the store level — an area of weakness in the local firm that had constrained further expansion. As Tony Tan gained a better understanding of McDonald’s business model, he recognized not only strengths but also specific areas of weakness in the latter’s strategy, reflecting its standardized product line and a USdominated decision processes. Capturing Filipinos’ Taste Buds In the Philippines, people love to eat and are used to doing so up to five times daily, enjoying snacks in between meals and a comfortable place to chat with friends and loved ones. As a result, the nation had become an attractive market for global players such as McDonald’s, KFC, Wendy’s, Burger King, and Pizza Hut. Yet, despite growing competition, Jollibee had managed to maintain its dominant position as the leading fast food chain in the Philippines, with a menu tailored specifically to the Filipinos’ preferences. Jollibee’s keen insight and understanding of the Filipino psyche had brought to everyone’s lips the promise of langhap-sarap (freely translated, this means “smells good so it must taste good”). In addition to meals with fries, Jollibee offered rice or spaghetti with its entrees. Its moist burger patties and spicy sauces were so distinctly Filipino that Jollibee’s burgers were C24.2 Case 24 ▪ Jollibee Foods Corporation often likened to what a Filipino mother would cook at home. This strong understanding of Filipino’s taste and preferences set Jollibee apart from its competitors. Although long-time favorites like Chickenjoy, Spaghetti Special, Jolly Hotdog, French Fries, and Yumburgers still continued to hold their appeal, over time, Jollibee had broadened the product range to create more excitement and variety. The enlarged menu included more rice-based products like Honey Beef Rice and Shanghai Rolls, a variety of burger choices from mushroom to garlic and cheese, a variety of chicken dishes, more flavorful desserts like the Ice Craze in buko pandan (coconut and jelly) and mais con yelo (sweet corn) served with milk and crushed ice, traditional Filipino breakfast rice meals, and options such as the Tuna Pie and Pies-to-Go. Never before had Filipinos — children, families, and adults from all walks of life — been offered so much in a single location. Addition of New Brands By 1989, Jollibee had become the first Philippine fast food chain to break the 1 billion peso sales mark. In 1993, Jollibee Foods Corporation (JFC) went public on the Philippine Stock Exchange to broaden its capital base, laying the groundwork for expansion both within and beyond Philippine shores. Over the years, the size, geographic expanse, and breadth of the company’s operations had continued to grow. In addition to the original chain of Jollibee burger restaurants, several new brands had been added through acquisition. Even as the Jollibee brand achieved market dominance, the firm was also pursuing a strategy of diversification as a hedge against both competition and downturns in specific market niches. Reaching out to other segments, JFC had acquired a portfolio of other fast food concepts, to which it applied its carefully honed operational and marketing skills. In 1994, it purchased Greenwich Pizza, the Philippines’ leading pizza and pasta chain. The following year, seeking to cater to the changing taste preferences of the Filipinos, JFC acquired the right to operate the Philippine’s franchise of Délifrance, an international chain of French bakerycafés headquartered in France. In 2000, JFC bought Chowking Foods Corporation, the Philippines’ top chain serving Chinese fast food. Although Chowking had reported excellent sales and performance since its purchase, it took time before Greenwich Pizza was able to establish a strong position in the market. By the end of 2003, JFC was the And finally, JFC’s pizza and pasta outlet, Greenwich, Philippines market leader in three segments. In the had 213 stores as compared to 113 for its nearest rival, hamburger and chicken segment, Jollibee had 467 Pizza Hut. 1 Exhibit 1 shows trends in the number of outlets to only 240 for its nearest rival, McDonald’s. In stores by brand between the end of 1998 and September Chinese fast food, there were 245 Chowking restaurants 2004. compared to 136 for its nearest competitor, Luk Yuen. Exhibit 1 Trends in number of stores by brand, 1998–2004 Year ending December 31 Q3 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 The Philippines Jollibee 478 467 436 408 374 350 302 Greenwich 226 213 191 194 193 191 169 Chowking 276 245 216 194 164 159 142 Delifrance 28 30 28 24 13 6 4 1,008 955 871 832 744 712 617 23 21 21 23 22 21 n.a. Chowking 8 9 8 7 6 6 n.a. Tomi's Teriyaki – 3 2 1 – – n.a. 89 – – – – – n.a. Subtotal 120 33 31 31 28 27 n.a. TOTAL 1,128 988 902 863 772 739 n.a. Subtotal International Jollibee Yonghe King Source: Fourth quarter reports, 1998–2003; 3rd quarter report, 2004. Exhibit 2 Jollibee Foods Corporation: Selected annual financial and operational data, 1998–2003 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 Consolidated System-Wide Sales (billion pesos) 28.9 26.8 24.1 20.3 18.1 16.7 Gross Revenues (billion pesos) 21.6 20.3 18.8 15.7 14.1 12.9 Income from Operations (billion pesos) Net Income (billion pesos) 1.4 1.5 0.8 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.0 0.5 0.9 0.6 0.8 Source: Annual Reports, Jollibee Foods Corporation, 1998–2003. 1 “Jollibee beats McDonald’s at its own game,” PJI Journal, www. journal.com.ph, accessed February 17, 2021. Case Studies C24.3 Exhibit 3 Jollibee Food Corporation: Values, mission, and vision Values • • • • • Always put customer first Excellence through teamwork Spirit of family and fun Frugality, honesty, and integrity Humility to listen and learn Mission We bring great taste and happiness to everyone Vision Become the most dominant and best tasting QSR… The most endearing brand that has ever been We will be within reach of every Filipino… We will lead in product taste at all times We will provide FSC excellence in every encounter… Happiness in every moment By that time, Jollibee had become an international brand that, as management declared, made Filipinos proud. Forbes, Far Eastern Economic Review, and Asian Business had all ranked JFC among Asia’s top companies. It was recognized as the number one food company in Asia by Euromoney, the best-managed company in the Philippines by Asiamoney, and was consistently ranked among Asia’s best employers in the Far Eastern Economic Review’s annual survey. In 2004, JFC topped the “Asia’s Most Admired Company” (AMAC) survey conducted by Hong Kongbased Asian Business Magazine. Exhibit 2 shows annual financial and operational data for JFC from 1998 to 2003. Exhibit 3 reproduces the company’s values, vision, and mission. Twenty-nine years after Jollibee was founded, JFC controlled about 55% of the quick-service restaurant market in the Philippines based on “visit shares” and held 70% of the burger-based meals market. One million customers ate at JFC stores daily, averaging a per capita spending of about 40 pesos ($0.71). Each day, JFC bought or produced 40,000 packs of chicken (with eight pieces in each pack), 320,000 pieces of burger, and 44,250 eggs. With more than 1,000 stores across the Philippines, JFC’s four brands enjoyed substantial economies of scale, gaining leverage in terms of retail site selection and operations, procurement, manufacturing, distribution, and marketing at levels unavailable to most industry players. Despite a recent economic slowdown in the Philippines and unfavorable business conditions, JFC had continued to deliver same-store sales growth. C24.4 Case 24 ▪ Jollibee Foods Corporation Source: www.jollibee.com.ph, accessed February 2021. MARKETING, OPERATIONS, AND HUMAN RESOURCES Jollibee’s ‘FSC’ Commitment The acronym FSC, described by the company on its website as “a byword in all of Jollibee,” represented its commitment to meeting high standards in three key areas: Every Food (F) item served to the public must meet the company’s excellent standards or it will not be served at all; the Service (S) must be fast and courteous; and Cleanliness (C) from sidewalk to kitchen, from uniforms to utensils, must be maintained at all times. The company recognized that maintaining high standards required that employees be committed to FSC. Jollibee Foods Corporation (JFC) paid the highest compensation and benefits package in the Philippine fast food industry. All employees underwent comprehensive training programs based on the underlying standards. In addition, managers received ongoing training in the latest operations systems and people management skills. Opportunities existed for qualified crew members to pursue a career path to management positions. Marketing Strategy Jollibee Foods Corporation’s (JFC) marketing philosophy was based on being closer to Filipino families than its competitors. There was wide awareness that Jollibee was a local Filipino service Exhibit 5 Value proposition of Jollibee versus McDonald’s in the Philippines Value Proposition McDonald’s Jollibee Target Market Business Operations Menu Promotions Families and Children Families and Children To provide high quality food, fast and friendly service in a clean and comfortable environment Tailored to the Filipino palate. E.g., peachmango pies, meals with spaghetti or rice To provide outstanding quality, service, cleanliness, and value • Langhap Sarap Value Meals • Jolly Kiddie Meal (with premium items and toys) • Eats for Free purchase rewards program • Bestsellers Campaign (20% discounts on various combinations of the popular Langhap Sarap Value Meals) 472 • Extra Value Meal • Happy Meal (with premium items and toys) Standardized fare. E.g., meals with fries* No. of Stores in the 241 Philippines Mode of International Franchising Franchising Expansion *McDonald’s has since bowed to the pressure of conforming to Filipino taste preferences by introducing menu items such as McSpaghetti business establishment that had captured the unique Filipino taste, so it appealed to patriotic or “pam-Pinoy” instincts. The chain also appealed to a broad crosssection of the population who felt comfortable and very much at home in an environment the crew talked to them in the local language, unlike other outlets where the crew spoke in English and the atmosphere might be perceived by some as projecting an elitist appeal. The Jollibee chain had tailored its marketing strategies to suit the Filipino culture and lifestyle. “What happens in the normal Filipino family is that weekends are reserved especially for children,” notes a Filipino business analyst, “and parents try to ask their children where they want to eat.” Jollibee appealed to children with in-store play activities and a cast of captivating characters. Its hamburger-headed Champ, complete with boxing gloves, went head-to-head against McDonald’s Hamburglar. Industry observers reported that Jollibee’s giant smiling red and yellow bee (Exhibit 4) and a blond spaghetti- Exhibit 4 Typical Jollibee outlet in the Philippines and McDo, a heavily-seasoned burger. Source: DLSU student research project, 2004. haired girl named Hetti (a mascot for Jollibee restaurants) were better known and loved in the Philippines than Ronald McDonald. Jollibee endeavored to maintain its dominance in the children’s segment by promoting its Jolly Kiddie Meals and offering a choice of Regular Yum, Spaghetti Special, or Chickenjoy. Having an advertising strategy that was deeply rooted in the traditional values of family, with a Case Studies C24.5 tinge of national pride, allowed Jollibee to position itself as the destination outlet for family outings. The De La Salle University Survey A survey conducted by advertising management students from De La Salle University in Manila contrasted Jollibee’s value proposition against that of McDonald’s operations in the Phillipines (Exhibit 5) and revealed the main rational and emotional factors that drove Filipino consumers’ choices in fast food restaurants. Rational Attributes. Of the top 10 rational attributes underlying the selection of a fast food restaurant, the most significant, cited by 90% of respondents, was for it to be “affordable and/or cheap” (Exhibit 6). Next came “faster service” (cited by 78%), followed by “accessibility” (70%). Other attributes mentioned were “tasty,” “variety of food,” “accommodating personnel,” “delivery services,” “promotional items are useful,” “frequent and effective ads,” and “offers seasonal products.” Among Jollibee’s patrons, affordable/cheaper prices was ranked top, with 94% mentioning this attribute, followed by accessibility/ many outlets (72%), and tastier (66%). However, only 44% of respondents cited “faster” as a desired attribute. Emotional Attributes. For fast food in general, the three most dominant attributes were friendly atmosphere (76%), family-oriented or pampamilya (74%), and hang out or tambayan (66%). The other emotional attributes considered by respondents were mass appeal, better environment for kids, patriotic or pam-Pinoy or lasang Pinoy, “brings you closer to home,” “likeable Filipino selections” or putaheng Pinoy/sangkap Pinoy, “use of Filipino language” particularly by the service crew, and the use of “wholesome” or “cute” endorsers (Exhibit 7). Broadly similar ratings of these attributes were achieved for Jollibees, although “family-oriented” was ranked first, and “friendly” second. Organizational Structure By concentrating on a country market with distinct preferences, Jollibee had been able to tailor its menu and marketing strategies to better reach and satisfy the customers. While global players like McDonald’s and KFC chose to spread their resources among their fast food chains worldwide, for many years, Jollibee focused its efforts only in the Philippines. During the 1980s, when political instability hit the Philippines, McDonald’s had to curtail its expansion process. Jollibee, on the other hand, Exhibit 6 Rational attributes Filipinos look for in fast food restaurants/Jollibee Fast Food Market Overall Jollibee Rank Attribute % Attribute % 1 Affordable/Cheaper 90% Affordable/Cheaper 94% 2 Faster service 78% Accessibility/Many outlets 72% 3 Accessibility/“Maraming” (many) outlets 70% Tastier 66% 4 Tastier 68% Frequent and effective ads 56% 5 Variety of food chains 60% Variety of food chains 50% 6 Accommodating personnel 34% Faster service 44% 7 Delivery services 42% Promotional items are useful 40% 8 Promotional items are useful 38% Accommodating personnel 38% 9 Frequent and effective ads 34% Delivery services 38% 10 Offers seasonal products 28% Offers seasonal products 36% Total N = 50 100% Source: DLSU student research project, 2004. Exhibit 7 Emotional attributes Filipinos look for in fast food restaurants/Jollibee C24.6 Case 24 ▪ Jollibee Foods Corporation 100% Fast Food Market Jollibee Rank Attribute N % Rank Attribute N % 1 Friendly atmosphere 38 76% 1 39 78% 2 37 74% 2 32 64% 3 Family togetherness (“pampamilya”) Hang-out (“tambayan”) Family togetherness (“pampamilya”) Friendly atmosphere 33 66% 3 Patriotic, “pam-Pinoy,” “lasang Pinoy” 30 60% 4 Mass appeal 27 54% 4 Mass appeal 30 60% 5 Better environment for kids 27 54% 5 28 56% 6 Patriotic (“pam-Pinoy”/”lasang Pinoy”) 22 44% 6 Likeable Filipino selections, “putaheng Pinoy,” “sangkap Pinoy” Better environment for kids 28 56% 7 Brings you closer to home 17 34% 7 Use of Filipino language 20 40% 8 16 32% 8 Wholesome/“cute” endorsers 13 26% 9 Likeable Filipino selections (“putaheng Pinoy”/”sangkapPinoy) Use of Filipino language 13 26% 9 Hang-out (“tambayan”) 12 24% 10 Wholesome/”cute” endorsers 8 16% 10 Brings you closer to home 11 22% N: 50 N: 50 Source: DLSU student research project, 2004. continued with its strategic plans of expansion. By the time the country was back on track, Jollibee had already gained the upper hand in terms of store locations, thus leaving the global giant trailing behind. The unique geographical structure of the Philippines with its many islands made it a challenging market for fast food companies. Among all the fast food chains competing in the Philippines, Jollibee was the only one that operated nationwide. In some locations, it faced no competition from other fast food chains. Jollibee Foods Corporation’s (JFC) strategy included a focus on achieving operational efficiency in its commissary and hiring the right candidates to manage its operations and strategy planning. To meet the challenges of a more intensely competitive market and manage business more effectively, the company had undertaken a major initiative in 2000 to re-align the structure of Jollibee Philippines, decentralizing the organization into four autonomous Regional Business Units (RBUs) that corresponded to the country’s major geographic markets: Mega Manila, Luzon, South Luzon, and VisayasMindanao. This structure ensured a more manageable business size and span of control. Key support functions like human resources and administration, finance, and network development were transferred to the RBUs for greater efficiency in the delivery of products and services, quicker coordination, and more timely decision-making. The Head Office/Corporate Services functions (Marketing, Finance, Restaurant Systems, Engineering) were re-aligned as a Support Center to provide corporatelevel direction and continuing assistance to the RBUs. Top management believed that the new structure had resulted in better execution of programs and renewed enthusiasm and commitment from JFC’s managers and employees. The continuing growth in the number of Jollibee, Chowking, and Greenwich restaurants obscured the fact that each year, some stores were closed, either because they were underperforming or because they were being replaced by newer and larger stores in a better location. Over time, a higher percentage of stores were being operated by franchisees instead of company-owned (Exhibits 8A and 8B). Case Studies C24.7 INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS Building on its success in the Philippines, Jollibee turned its sights overseas. Initially, the company focused on reaching communities with a large Filipino population to capitalize on its brand awareness, targeting markets where there were substantial numbers of “OFWs” (Overseas Filipino Workers). By the early 1990s, Jollibee restaurants were operating in Hong Kong, Brunei, Saipan and Guam (both islands in the Pacific Northwest), Vietnam, Indonesia, Dubai, and Kuwait. In 1998, the firm entered one of the most demanding fast food markets in the world, the US, which had at the time an estimated 2 million Filipino immigrants. But aside from Jollibee’s popularity among Filipinos, the brand also sought to appeal to other ethnic groups in its US outlets. Other immigrants from Asia came with their families in tow to eat at Jollibee’s. One AfricanAmerican customer stated that the chicken is “excellent, almost like my mother’s Southern fried chicken!” And white Americans enjoyed delicacies not offered by competitors, such as Peach Mango Pie. The company’s international expansion strategy focused on markets where management believed it “could successfully develop the Jollibee brand and put up the supply chain to support the critical mass of stores in these selected markets.” In the US, the first state targeted was California, with plans to expand into Nevada, Hawaii, and New York in future years. By adopting a franchise model in the US, Jollibee Foods Corporation (JFC) was able to draw on local capital and entrepreneurial drive. In 2001, the firm purchased a majority interest in Tokyo Teriyaki House, a Japanese restaurant in California, with the objective of expanding into the Japanese quick service restaurant (QSR) segment and developing it into another major chain; it renamed the restaurant Tomi’s Teriyaki House. The annual report for 2002 noted that the overseas stores were providing the company “the experience in the know-how that we need in gearing up to the realities of international competition and in reorienting ourselves to the global environment.” JFC had identified several markets in Asia for its expansion activities. In 2004, the company was looking at the possibility of expanding its three-store network in Vietnam. Plans for introducing the Chowking brand in Indonesia were also underway based on the growing market for Chinese food in that nation. Despite an C24.8 Case 24 ▪ Jollibee Foods Corporation earlier, unsuccessful experience operating a nowclosed Jollibee’s store in Xiamen, eastern China, JFC saw huge potential in the People’s Republic of China. In March 2004, the company signed an agreement to purchase 85% ownership in the Shanghai-based Yonghe King chain, Exhibit 8A Location of JFC group stores by brand, December 31, 2002 Jollibee Greenwich Chowking Délifrance* Tomi’s Teriyaki** TOTAL Philippines Co-owned 194 110 69 23 – 396 Franchised 242 81 147 5 – 475 436 191 216 28 – 871 Hong Kong 4 – – – – 4 USA 8 – 5 – 2 15 Dubai – – 3 – – 3 Others 9 – – – – 9 1,128 988 902 863 772 739 Subtotal TOTAL *JFC was a master franchisee for Délifrance, a French-owned franchise, in the Philippines but not in other countries. **Initially known as Tokyo Teriyaki House. Exhibit 8B Location of JFC group stores by brand, September 30, 2004 Jollibee Greenwich Chowking Délifrance* Yonghe King TOTAL Philippines Co-owned 190 119 82 23 – 414 Franchised 288 107 194 5 – 594 478 226 276 28 – 1,008 Hong Kong 2 – – – – 2 USA 9 – 8 – – 17 Co-owned – – – – 84 84 Franchised – – – – 5 5 12 – – – – 12 501 226 254 30 89 1,128 Subtotal China Other TOTAL *JFC was a master franchisee for Délifrance, a French-owned franchise, in the Philippines but not in other countries. which offered Chinese style fast food in 10 cities. The number of Yonghe King stores grew from 77 at the end of 2003 to 89 by the end of the third quarter of 2004 by which point this brand accounted for 6% of JFC’s systemwide sales and was more profitable than the domestic operation which had been hit by rising costs. The strategy for Yonghe King was to open 20 new stores a year in each of the next 3 years, increasing to another 50 in the fourth year and 100 additional stores in the fifth year. Case Studies C24.9 In May 2004, Ysmael V. Baysa, the company’s chief finance officer, announced that during the first quarter of the year, JFC had opened 21 new stores but closed down 13, of which seven were in foreign operations. It closed all three Chowking stores in Dubai, one Jollibee store in the US, and shuttered its three-store Tomi’s Teriyaki operation in the US. Said Baysa, “Tomi’s Teriyaki business did not grow according to expectations. Its basic concept is sound, but there is still much work to be done to turn it into a strong brand. We are keeping the brand trademark and the recipes for possible future use. In the meantime, management is placing its priority on brand development of Yonghe King in China.” However, he added that the company expected to open new Jollibee stores soon in the US. Summarizing the company’s strategy, the chairman, Tan, noted: There are still major challenges to address to ensure the long-term soundness of the C24.10 Case 24 ▪ Jollibee Foods Corporation business — we have to improve our cost structure particularly in the support groups, we have to sustain positive growth in same store sales and we have to win big in foreign operations if we are to become a truly World Class Business. REFERENCES Additional sources consulted for this case include: Jollibee Foods Corporation Website (www.jollibee.com. ph), Christopher A.Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal (March–April 2001), “Going Global: Lessons from Late Movers,” Harvard Business Review, Vol. 78, pp. 132–145.
