THE WAY TO FREEDOM | Robert O. Johann
Freedom has always been a word to stir men’s hearts. Today it is fast becoming
a universal battle cry. Not only in our own land, but through the world, individuals
and groups and whole nations loudly insist on their right to live their own lives, to
make their own decisions. They will break no outside interference in their exercise of
this basic human prerogative.
Without in any way questioning the justice of their cause, it may not be amiss
to point out that modern champions of freedom sometimes overlook an essential step
on the way to the goal they need. Too often it is merely as an absence of external
restrictions on my native capacity for self- determination. Too seldom is it recognized that
the greatest obstacles to freedom are not outside but within me; that, quite apart from
what others do, I need more than free will to be free. What is “more” is perhaps best be
seen if we look at freedom in the light of its corollary, responsibility.
Suppose we start out by saying that a free act is one for which I am responsible.
It is an act of which I am the source. In this sense, freedom is identical with my selfhood,
with my capacity to act on my own, to say yes or no to my surroundings, to decide for
myself what shall I do. This is freedom in the sense of free will, and I have it simply
by being a person. Because a person is, himself, the origin of what he does, he is held
accountable for his deeds. He is responsible for them.
But the fact that I am responsible for what I do does not mean automatically that
my actions are responsible actions. A person is not infrequently charged with irresponsible
behavior. He is held accountable for doing something for which he cannot give a
rational account.
Here we come to some of the ambiguity in the notion of responsibility, an
ambiguity thatalso affects the idea of freedom. Being a person makes me responsible
for my actions: being responsible for my action however, does not make me a
responsible person. Responsibility in the fuller sense is not mere accountability. It is
precisely the ability to give an account. It means that I can actually justify my actions as
truly responsible to the objective demands of the situation.
Responsibility thus includes responsiveness. The responsible person is one whose actions
are shaped in response to objective requirements and not simply by his own whims.
Because he takes all the factors in his complex environment into account when he acts,
seeking to respond to them and not merely assert himself, he has no difficulty later in
accounting for what he has done.
Now, just as mere accountability does not by itself insure my being able to give an
account, so neither does mere free will insure my being free. Freedom means more than
my ability to act on my own, so that my actions are mine and not someone else’s.
Being free means that I have the expedite capacity to act rationally, i.e., in a way that is
genuinely proportionate to the concrete situation that confronts me. In relation to this
fuller freedom, free will is merely a means. Obviously, I cannot act rationally unless it is
first of all I who act. For besides the absence of necessity which first makes my actions
mine, it demands an absence of egoism, which alone lets them to be rational. I am not
free so long as I am unable to see beyond my nose, inattentive to what surrounds me,
incapable of feeling genuine concern for the other-than-myself, imprisoned within the
circle of my private dreams.
The ability to act rationally thus presupposes and arduous shifting of life’s focus.
It means putting the Other in the forefront in place of myself and learning to respond to
requirements instead of yielding to caprice. That this involves a long and painful process
without saying. Apart from it, however, there is no freedom at all worth the name. For
this is that “dying to self” which, as the Gospels proclaim, is the only portal to life and
to
the
freedom
of
children
of
God.
THE WAY TO FREEDOM | Robert O. Johann
Freedom has always been a word to stir men’s hearts. Today it is fast becoming
a universalbattle cry. Not only in our own land, but through the world, individuals
and groups and whole nations loudly insist on their right to live their own lives, to
make their own decisions. They will break no outside interference in their exercise of
this basic human prerogative.
Without in any way questioning the justice of their cause, it may not be amiss
to point outthat modern champions of freedom sometimes overlook an essential step
on the way to the goal they need. Too often it is merely as an absence of external
restrictions on my native capacity for self-determination. Too seldom is it recognized that
the greatest obstacles to freedom are not outside butwithin me; that, quite apart from
what others do, I need more than free will to be free. What is “more” is perhaps best be
seen if we look at freedom in the light of its corollary, responsibility.
Suppose we start out by saying that a free act is one for which I am responsible.
It is an act of which I am the source. In this sense, freedom is identical with my selfhood,
with my capacity to act on my own, to say yes or no to my surroundings, to decide for
myself what shall I do. This isfreedom in the sense of free will, and I have it simply
by being a person. Because a person is, himself, the origin of what he does, he is held
accountable for his deeds. He is responsible for them.
But the fact that I am responsible for what I do does not mean automatically that
my actions are responsible actions. A person is not infrequently charged with irresponsible
behavior. He is held accountable for doing something for which he cannot give a
rational account.
Here we come to some of the ambiguity in the notion of responsibility, an
ambiguity thatalso affects the idea of freedom. Being a person makes me responsible
for my actions: being responsible for my action however, does not make me a
responsible person. Responsibility in thefuller sense is not mere accountability. It is
precisely the ability to give an account. It means that Ican actually justify my actions as
truly responsible to the objective demands of the situation.
Responsibility thus includes responsiveness. The responsible person is one whose actions
are shapedin response to objective requirements and not simply by his own whims.
Because he takes all the factors in his complex environment into account when he acts,
seeking to respond to them and not merely assert himself, he has no difficulty later in
accounting for what he has done.
Now, just as mere accountability does not by itself insure my being able to give an
account, so neither does mere free will insure my being free. Freedom means more than
my ability to act on my own, so that my actions are mine and not someone else’s.
Being free means that I have the expedite capacity to act rationally, i.e., in a way that is
genuinely proportionate to the concrete situation that confronts me. In relation to this
fuller freedom, free will is merely a means. Obviously,I cannot act rationally unless it is
first of all I who act. For besides the absence of necessity whichfirst makes my actions
mine, it demands an absence of egoism, which alone lets them to be rational. I am not
free so long as I am unable to see beyond my nose, inattentive to what surrounds me,
incapable of feeling genuine concern for the other-than-myself, imprisoned within the
circle of my private dreams.
The ability to act rationally thus presupposes and arduous shifting of life’s focus.
It means putting the Other in the forefront in place of myself and learning to respond to
requirements insteadof yielding to caprice. That this involves a long and painful process
without saying. Apart from it, however, there is no freedom at all worth the name. For
this is that “dying to self” which, as the Gospels proclaim, is the only portal to life and
to the freedom of children of God.