Leadership Change
in Vietnam: A
Reader
Carlyle A. Thayer
Thayer Consultancy
April 2023
Leadership Change in Vietnam
1
Leadership Change in Vietnam: A Reader
Table of Contents
Introduc)on .................................................................................................................................................. 1
Vietnam Dismisses Two Western-Educated Deputy Prime Ministers .............................................................. 2
Leadership Dismissals in Vietnam: Implica)ons for U.S.-Vietnam Rela)ons.................................................... 3
Vietnam’s An)-Corrup)on Campaign and the Future of Nguyen Phu Trong and Pham Minh Chinh ................ 4
Vietnam: Why Did Two Deputy Prime Ministers Resign? ................................................................................ 6
Vietnam’s Na)onal Assembly to Decide Fate of President Nguyen Xuan Phuc ................................................ 7
How Will Leadership Change in Vietnam Impact on Foreign Policy? ............................................................... 7
Who Will Be Vietnam’s Next President: Implica)ons for CombaVng Corrup)on ............................................ 9
What Are the Fundamental Factors Behind Leadership Change in Vietnam? ................................................ 10
Impact of Changes on Vietnam’s Politburo and Foreign Policy...................................................................... 13
Vietnam to Name New State President – 1 .................................................................................................. 15
Vietnam to Name New State President – 2 .................................................................................................. 16
Vo Van Thuong: Vietnam’s Next Party Leader? ............................................................................................. 17
Vietnam: Vo Van Thuong Under the Microscope .......................................................................................... 18
Vietnam: Observing the Proprie)es in Elec)ng a New President .................................................................. 20
Vietnam: Recent Leadership Changes .......................................................................................................... 21
Vietnam: Who Determines Economic Policy and Rela)ons with China? ....................................................... 22
Vietnam: Challenging Four Major Assump)ons About Recent Leadership Change........................................ 24
Introduc)on
This Reader is a new service that Thayer Consultancy is providing to its clients and subscribers
on the Hanoi Watchers Distribu?on List. Each Reader will contain a compila?on of Thayer
Consultancy Background Briefs on a par?cular theme. This inaugural Reader focuses on
leadership changes in Vietnam in early 2023. It includes relevant Background Briefs that have
been issued.
Carlyle A. Thayer
Carlyle A. Thayer
Director
April 6, 2023
Leadership Change in Vietnam
2
Vietnam Dismisses Two Western-Educated Deputy Prime Ministers
Deputy Prime Ministers Pham Binh Minh and Vu Duc Dam were removed from their posi?ons
as members of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s Central CommiMee, the state-controlled
Vietnam News Agency reported.
The dismissals were announced without specific reasons, but the move comes aQer each was
involved in separate scandals related to authori?es’ handling of COVID-19 outbreaks.
Q1. How do you assess the dismissals of two deputy prime ministers from their posi?ons on
the party Central CommiMee?
ANSWER: General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong has made clear in his many revisions of party
rules governing the behaviour of members of the Vietnam Communist Party that they will be
disciplined for not carrying out du?es and responsibili?es assigned to them and they will also
be held responsible for the persons they have vouched for irrespec?ve when the
transgressions took place.
Deputy Prime Ministers Pham Binh Minh and Vu Duc Dam both held posi?ons in the party
organisa?ons within the state bureaucracy in addi?on to their membership on the party
Central CommiMee. Also, Minh was a member of the Politburo.
The reasons the Central CommiMee requested their resigna?ons has not yet been officially
announced. But it is clearly a case of “damned if you do, damned if you don’t.” In other words,
they are presumed guilty if they were directly involved in COVID-related scandals, or they are
guilty for not discovering and taking disciplinary ac?on against the network of corrupt officials
under their care. The fact that they were allowed to offer their resigna?ons from the Central
CommiMee suggests the laMer.
Q2. Lawyer Nguyen Van Dai, based in Germany, told Radio Free Asia that Pham Binh Minh and
Vu Duc Dam are the last two educated and kind persons in the Vietnam Communist Party, and
their removal is the Communist Party shoo?ng itself in the foot. What is your response to this
statement?
ANSWER: Both Minh and Dam received higher degrees abroad at universi?es in the United
States and Belgium, respec?vely. However, there are other highly educated members on the
party Central CommiMee.
Minh performed credibly as foreign minister and only a restric?on on serving two-terms in
office prevented him from con?nuing as foreign minister. Dam clearly has widespread support
among the public at large because he is compara?vely young, has administra?ve talent, and
successfully handled the COVID-19 pandemic from 2020.
Both were well regarded by delegates to the 13th na?onal party congress to be elected to the
Central CommiMee.
However, Vietnam’s system of collec?ve leadership includes individual responsibility. Pham
Binh Minh reportedly failed to provide proper supervision of repatria?on flights for
Vietnamese ci?zens stranded abroad due to COVID-19. A wide network of foreign affairs
officials has been implicated in taking bribes in exchange for seats on these aircraQ. If Minh
personally benefiMed from this, he is dammed; if Minh was unaware or failed to take ac?on,
he is also dammed.
Leadership Change in Vietnam
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Deputy Prime Minister Dam’s assistant, Nguyen Van Trinh, was implicated in a bribery scandal
involving the sale of Viet A JSC COVID-19 test kits at inflated prices. Dam too appears to have
failed to provide proper supervision and take ac?on against a widespread network of corrupt
officials. Like Minh, if Dam personally benefiMed from this, he is dammed; if Dam was unaware
or failed to take ac?on, he is also dammed.
The dismissal of Minh and Dam from the Central CommiMee is unrelated to unsubstan?ated
specula?on that corrup?on-related arrests are a result of a power struggle in the Vietnam
Communist Party to shape leadership selec?on for the 14th na?onal party congress to be held
in 2026.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam Dismisses Two Western-Educated Deputy Prime Ministers,”
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, January 1, 2023.
Leadership Dismissals in Vietnam: Implica)ons for U.S.-Vietnam Rela)ons
Pham Binh Minh "resigned" last week from the Politburo and Central CommiMee.
Q1. Does the dismissal of Pham Binh Minh from party posts mean the United States has lost
a key conduit within the Vietnam Communist Party?
ANSWER: Pham Binh Minh speaks English and earned an M.A. degree in Law and Diplomacy
from the Fletcher School at TuQs University in Boston. He later served as Deputy Chief of
Mission in Vietnam’s Embassy in Washington (1999-2003). ThereaQer he rose up the ranks in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs eventually becoming minister for two terms (2011-2021).
Minh’s resigna?on from his high-level party posts represents Vietnam’s loss of a very
experienced statesman and his network of personal contacts. This goes not only for rela?ons
with the United States but Vietnam’s seventeen other strategic partners.
The reality is that Vietnam’s policy towards the major powers, including the U.S., is overseen
by the Politburo. From August 2011 to January 2016 Minh was Foreign Minister but not a
member of the Politburo.
Minh was first elected to the Politburo in January 2016 and con?nued to serve as Foreign
Minister un?l 2021. Donald Trump won the U.S. presiden?al elec?ons in November 2016 and
assumed office in January 2017. Vietnam’s rela?ons with the U.S. went on a roller coaster ride,
rising in the early years of the Trump presidency (Vietnam’s Prime Minister was received in
the White House in May) and then plumme?ng at the end of his term when Trump called
Vietnam the "single worst abuser" on trade with the United States, worse even than China
(November 2019).
Minh ceased to be Foreign Minister in 2021 aQer serving the statutory maximum of two terms
in office.
In sum, Minh may have been a conduit for rela?ons with the U.S. but there is liMle evidence
he played a decisive role during his tenure as foreign minister.
Q2. How concerned should the U.S. be that much of the Vietnamese foreign ministry has now
been purged, especially aQer a rather lack luster year for U.S.-Vietnam rela?ons?
ANSWER: Since 2021, American-educated Bui Thanh Son (MA, Columbia University) has been
Vietnam’s foreign minister. Foreign Minister Son has been reprimanded and ordered to make
Leadership Change in Vietnam
4
a severe self-cri?cism for his failure to oversee the proper running of the COVID repatria?on
flights on his watch.
Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry is represented by a small group on the party Central CommiMee
none of whom serve on the Politburo. From 2021 un?l the present, the weight of evidence
suggests that the lack of progress in upgrading bilateral rela?ons from a comprehensive to a
strategic partnership rests with the party’s most senior members.
This situa?on is likely to persist irrespec?ve of the dismissal of a network of corrupt officials
who abused their posi?ons to profit from COVID repatria?on flights for Vietnamese ci?zens
stranded abroad. This network included diplomats who served in a variety of countries, such
as Angola, Japan, Malaysia and Russia, and not just the United States.
In sum, the dismissal of Minh from the Politburo and his resigna?on from the party Central
CommiMee (along with deputy prime minister Vu Duc Dam) will only reinforce the power of
senior Politburo members. The Politburo will appoint one of their members to take on the
foreign affairs responsibili?es of depar?ng member Minh. This means bilateral rela?ons with
the United States are likely to be put in a holding paMern un?l the dust seMles.
Q3. And how should Minh’s resigna?on be read amid General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s
focus on an ideological partnership with China?
ANSWER: The removal of Minh from the Politburo, as well as concurrent disciplinary ac?on
against a wide number of government officials, including two deputy prime ministers, is best
explained as the inevitable outcome of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s an?-corrup?on
campaign. Under Trong’s direc?on officials who abuse power or engage in criminal ac?vi?es
will be punished as well as officials who fail in providing effec?ve oversight of those under
their care.
It is my assessment that there is no internal power struggle taking place within the Vietnam
Communist Party involving pro-United States and pro-China fac?ons. China under Xi Jinping,
in Vietnamese eyes, represents con?nuity and stability in bilateral rela?ons for the near term
future. General Secretary Trong is making ideological hay while the sun shines.
The United States, post mid-term elec?ons, is a riskier proposi?on over the next two years
because of domes?c polarisa?on, America’s heavy investment in suppor?ng Ukraine against
Russian aggression, and focus on the 2024 presiden?al elec?ons.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Leadership Dismissals in Vietnam: Implica?ons for U.S.-Vietnam Rela?ons,”
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, January 3, 2023.
Vietnam’s An)-Corrup)on Campaign and the Future of Nguyen Phu Trong and Pham
Minh Chinh
We request you assessment of Vietnam’s current an?-corrup?on campaign and its
rela?onship with the recent dismissals of two deputy prime ministers who are also members
of the Vietnam Communist Party Central CommiMee.
Q1. Do you think General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s an?-corrup?on campaign is based
on law, policy, ideology, or it’s only the further consolida?on of power by the Trong and his
followers/his group? Why?
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ANSWER: General Secretary’s Nguyen Phu Trong’s an?-corrup?on campaign is grounded in
ideology and based on party rules and state law. Trong’s en?re career has been wrapped up
in party-building, including a PhD from Russia and years working on the party’s journal Tap Chi
Cong San.
Trong’s an?-corrup?on campaign is conducted along two lines. The first involves party rules
and norms. Trong has been quite ac?ve in revising party rules or introducing new rules to suit
his campaign. The signpost of this is the list of things party members must not do. Party
members who transgress are expelled from the party and all posi?ons they held.
The second line in Trong’s an?-corrup?on campaign is legal. Party members who face party
discipline are also inves?gated by the police to see if they violated the law; if so they are tried,
convicted and sent to prison.
Secretary General Trong is mo?vated to keep in power party members who share his views
on ideology. His an?-corrup?on campaign may be viewed as his legacy to the Vietnam
Communist Party. Trong is not trying to consolidate his power by staying in office for a fourth
term. Prior to the 13th na?onal party congress, Trong picked a successor, Tran Quoc Vuong,
and put his name forward. In an unexpected development, the Central CommiMee rejected
Vuong. In these unprecedented circumstances Trong did not re?re but was kept on for a third
term.
One of the du?es of the party General Secretary is to groom a successor. It is not clear yet
whom Trong favours at this stage. Prepara?ons for the 14th party congress usually begin
around the halfway point, which would be mid-2023.
Q2. In your assessment, how can Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh survive his term as he must
reshuffle his cabinet due to the an?-corrup?on campaign?
ANSWER: Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh’s tenure in office is not under threat due to the
dismissal of two deputy prime ministers. Chinh is new to office and cannot be held responsible
for transgressions allegedly commiMed by Pham Binh Minh and Vu Duc Dam prior to 2021.
Chinh has experience in personnel selec?on as the former head of the party’s Central
Organisa?on CommiMee and as a member of the Politburo. It appears the Politburo has
already decided who the new deputy prime ministers will be. This decision apparently has the
concurrence of the Central CommiMee. Chinh will put the nomina?ons to the Na?onal
Assembly along with any other changes to his Cabinet. It is very likely these nomina?ons will
be approved. Since reunifica?on in 1976, the Na?onal Assembly has rejected the prime
minister’s nomina?ons on ministerial candidates only twice (Cao Si Kiem, Governor of the
State Bank in 1997 and Le Minh Huong, Minister of Public Security in 2002).
Q3. In your assessment, what will Trong due in the future, especially as he created a lot of
enemies around him?
ANSWER: General Secretary Trong failed to get his protégé Tran Quoc Vuong approved as the
next party leader because a coali?on of provincial party leaders reportedly found Vuong too
abrasive in execu?ng Trong’s an?-corrup?on campaign. Trong was given an unprecedented
third term in office because no consensus could be reached on any other candidate.
Trong will re?re at the next na?onal party congress in 2026 if not sooner. Trong will quietly
canvass members of the Politburo, Secretariat and other senior party officials about his
Leadership Change in Vietnam
6
successor. In the mean?me, Trong will con?nue with his “burning furnace” campaign because
he knows that corrup?on in the party is the major threat to its legi?macy to rule Vietnam.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam’s An?-Corrup?on Campaign and the Future of Nguyen Phu Trong
and Pham Minh Chinh,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, January 5, 2023.
Vietnam: Why Did Two Deputy Prime Ministers Resign?
We request your insights into the recent resigna?on of two deputy prime ministers in
Vietnam.
Q1. Why were both men made to resign instead of being dismissed?
Officials who are going to be charged with criminal offences under the law are not permiMed
to resign. They are summarily dismissed and then subject to legal prosecu?on. In the case of
the two deputy prime ministers, they failed in their du?es as senior members on party
commiMees within the government to properly supervise their subordinates. This is not a
criminal offence so they were permiMed to offer their resigna?ons.
Q2. What does their de facto removal say about Vietnam's an?-corrup?on campaign?
The two cases are excep?onal in that they both relate to the COVID-pandemic scandals,
bribery on repatria?on flights for Vietnamese stranded aboard, and bribery and price hiking
in the sale of masks. The two cases are also an illustra?on of a new front opened by the party
General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong. Members of the party who fail in their supervision
du?es and/or vouched or promoted officials later found to be corrupt will also be subject to
party discipline.
Q3. What does their removal say about the current state of Vietnam's poli?cs?
The two COVID-related cases provoked widespread outrage by ci?zens and members of the
party aQer very tough lockdown restric?ons were imposed on the general public especially in
the south. There was palpable moral outrage.
The recent dismissals are unrelated to a so-called power struggle in the party or alleged
aMempts by General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong to consolidate his power. They are sui
generis.
Prepara?ons for the next party congress in 2026 will begin aQer mid-year 2023 and gather
pace thereaQer. It is unlikely that Trong, who was planning to re?re at the last party congress,
will seek a fourth term. He has the responsibility to groom and nominate a successor.
It is too early in the present five-year cycle to know who will be the next party leader. Of the
17 members of the Politburo, only five will be under 65 years of age at the start of 2026 (Vo
Van Thuong, Tran Cam Tu, Tran Thanh Manh, Tran Tuan Anh, and Dinh Tien Dung). Party rules
permit gran?ng exemp?ons in excep?onal cases. Three persons who will be over 65 feature
in specula?on about who will be the next party general secretary: Prime Minister Pham Minh
Chinh, Vuong Dinh Hue and Truong Thi Mai.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam: Why Did Two Deputy Prime Ministers Resign?” Thayer
Consultancy Background Brief, January 13, 2023.
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Vietnam’s Na)onal Assembly to Decide Fate of President Nguyen Xuan Phuc
Why is a special session of Vietnam’s Na?onal Assembly being held tomorrow? What is the
significance of this mee?ng and what is on the agenda? What outcome is expected?
ANSWER: On the 5th of January, the Politburo voted and requested that President Nguyen
Xuan Phuc tender his resigna?on from the Politburo. The ostensible reason is that during his
term as prime minister (2016 to April 2021) he failed in his oversight du?es as the most senior
member of the party commiMee supervising government affairs. Two deputy prime ministers
who served during Prime Minister Phuc’s watch have resigned. Phuc was elected to the
Politburo by the Vietnam Communist Party Central CommiMee.
In 2016, Nguyen Xuyen Phuc was elected state president by the Na?onal Assembly. The
Na?onal Assembly must vote to accept his resigna?on. The current Prime Minister Pham Minh
Chinh has the duty to nominate a replacement subject to the approval of the Na?onal
Assembly.
It is a foregone conclusion that President Phuc will cease to hold high office and re?re aQer
the Na?onal Assembly convenes. What is less certain is who will replace Phuc as president.
The rumour mill suggests three possibili?es: General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong will assume
the presidency concurrently as he did when the then President Tran Dai Quang died in office.
Others suggest the current Minister of Na?onal Defence Phan Van Giang will be promoted. To
Lam, the current Minister of Public Security, is also touted as a possible candidate.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam’s Na?onal Assembly to Decide Fate of President Nguyen Xuan
Phuc,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, January 17, 2023.
How Will Leadership Change in Vietnam Impact on Foreign Policy?
We request your assessment of recent developments in Vietnam’s poli?cs, par?cularly the ongoing an?-corrup?on campaign of incumbent General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong. There is
a rumor that state President Nguyen Xuan Phuc has submiMed a leMer of resigna?on and the
Na?onal Assembly will meet on 18 January to accept it and select a new president. .
Q1. What is your assessment of this rumour?
ANSWER: I visited Vietnam from 7-14 January. On the day of my departure reliable sources
informed me that the Politburo had requested President Nguyen Xuan Phuc to step down.
Since President Phuc was elected by the Na?onal Assembly Vietnam will have to observe the
cons?tu?onal proprie?es and have Na?onal Assembly depu?es vote to accept Phuc’s
resigna?on.
President Phuc reportedly failed in his du?es as Prime Minister (2016-April 2021) and senior
head of the party’s commiMee in the government to properly supervise two deputy prime
ministers, Pham Binh Minh and Vu Duc Dam, and other ministers under his watch. Minh and
Dam have already resigned from office and their posi?ons on the party Central CommiMee.
Minh also resigned from the Politburo.
Due to the lack of transparency, it is not known, why Vietnam’s Politburo engineered these
leadership changes piecemeal. This gives rise to uncertainty who will be next, and who will
replace Phuc as state president.
Leadership Change in Vietnam
8
Q2. How do you evaluate Vietnam-US rela?ons during the past years when Mr. Phuc was
Prime Minister and later President?
ANSWER: Nguyen Xuan Phuc plays an influen?al but not decisive role in foreign policy due his
membership on the Politburo. The same can be said of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs
Pham Binh Minh who has a junior member of the Politburo.
Vietnam’s foreign policy towards the major powers is made collec?vely by the Politburo in
which the influence of its most senior members is paramount. It is clear that since the Biden
Administra?on was elected and sought to raise bilateral rela?ons with Vietnam from a
comprehensive to a strategic partnership Vietnam’s leaders adopted a cau?ous approach and
slow walked discussions. In sum, President Nguyen Xuan Phuc was not the decisive leader
who set the course and direc?ons of Vietnam rela?ons with the United States.
Q3. Some sources claim that incumbent Minister of Public Security To Lam may become the
state president and Vietnam may move closer to China? What do you think?
ANSWER: My sources report there are three likely candidates. First, General Secretary Nguyen
Phu Trong might assume the office of president concurrently with his role as party leader. This
would follow the precedent set when President Tran Dai Quang died in office in 2018. Second,
Minister of Na?onal Defence General Phan Van Giang’s name has been men?oned. And third,
as your ques?on suggests, To Lam is likely to be a prospec?ve candidate.
Vietnam’s policy on China, as that of the United States, is decided collec?vely by the Politburo.
Vietnam has good rela?ons with China at present but will not ?lt so far as to fall into China’s
orbit. China under Xi Jinping is a known quan?ty and its ac?ons are largely predictable. Xi’s
China represents an element of stability and con?nuity in rela?ons with Vietnam. Vietnam
will con?nue to follow a policy of nurturing trouble free rela?ons.
The role of any individual, To Lam included, should not be overexaggerated. If he becomes
president there will be no discernible change in Hanoi’s rela?ons with Beijing.
Q4. Newly-appointed Deputy Prime Minister Tran Luu Quang will oversee foreign affairs
although he has no experience in the field. What is your assessment?
ANSWER: The implementa?on of Vietnam’s foreign policy will go through a rough patch aQer
the dismissal of former Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh as permanent deputy prime minister
with responsibility in this area, cri?cism levelled at Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son, and the
recent dismissal and arrest of a network of corrupt diplomats for their involvement in the
COVID repatria?on flights. Morale at the Foreign Ministry will also be at a low ebb because of
these developments.
The new deputy prime minister Tran Luu Quang will come to office with scant relevant
experience or exper?se in foreign affairs. He will be on a steep learning curve as members of
the Politburo constantly look over his shoulder.
In sum, Vietnam appears to be short on talent in interna?onal affairs at the highest level and
this could affect the efficacy of Vietnam’s diplomacy at a turbulent ?me in global affairs.
Q5. As Deputy Prime Minister Trần Luu Quang has no experience in foreign affairs, how will
this affect Vietnam's course on the South China Sea issue?
ANSWER: There will not be any sudden changes brought about when Trần Luu Quang takes
on foreign policy responsibili?es as deputy prime minister.
Leadership Change in Vietnam
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Vietnam’s policy on the South China Sea is set by the Politburo and implemented by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “How Will Leadership Change in Vietnam Impact on Foreign Policy?” Thayer
Consultancy Background Brief, January 17, 2023.
Who Will Be Vietnam’s Next President: Implica)ons for CombaPng Corrup)on
We request your analy?c input into the following two ques?ons:
Q1. Who are the likely candidates to replace President Nguyen Xuan Phuc? What would they
bring to this office?
ANSWER: There are at least three possible candidates to become Vietnam’s next president.
The first is Nguyen Phu Trong who would concurrently hold the posts of state president and
general secretary of the party. This was the formula used when President Tran Dai Quang died
in office in 2018. The other two candidates are the Minister of Na?onal Defence, Phan Van
Giang, and the Minister of Public Security, To Lam.
The role of the state president is largely circumscribed by the state cons?tu?on that
enumerates the president’s du?es and responsibili?es but subjects these powers to approval
by the Na?onal Assembly. In reality, the President is directed by and answerable to the
Politburo.
If General Secretary Trong assumed the post of president he would undermine the pres?ge of
that office and deny someone else in the Politburo from gaining valuable experience. Either
Giang and Lam would suit the office. In the past, former Minister of Na?onal Defence Le Duc
Anh and the former Minister of Public Security Tran Dai Quang both served as state president.
Q2. In his ar?cle en?tled “’Red Card’ for the President? Vietnam’s Biggest Poli?cal Drama in
Decades” author Le Hong Hiep wrote:
On the contrary, the purge of corrupt leaders may pave the way for cleaner and more capable
leaders to rise, helping the Party fight corrup?on beMer and improve its governance. As long
as the leadership reshuffles do not lead to radical policy changes, their impact on the economy
will also be limited. In fact, amidst all these personnel changes, Vietnam s?ll recorded a GDP
growth rate of 8 per cent in 2022, the fastest pace in 25 years.1
What is your assessment of Hiep’s argument?
ANSWER: Any conclusion that we draw about the future of Vietnam’s an?-corrup?on
campaign is premature at this stage. Hiep refers to fac?ons in his ar?cle and seemingly
assumes all the poten?al candidates to fill vacancies, with the excep?on of the current Prime
Minister Pham Minh Chinh, are not corrupt. Vietnamese writers last year referred to arrests
for corrup?on as the “?p or the iceberg.”
It is equally plausible to speculate that if fac?ons exist, as Hiep claims, they will hunker down
to defend their posi?ons at the expense of their rivals. Good guys do not always win.
1
https://fulcrum.sg/red-card-for-the-president-vietnams-biggest-political-drama-indecades/?fbclid=IwAR2KJmx8pYCB09H-cf2hhhBdvp3MAo4CWVPhCTbNptMZBwaXKpH-UZxGtxY
Leadership Change in Vietnam
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Carlyle A. Thayer, “Who Will Be Vietnam’s Next President: Implica?ons for Combavng
Corrup?on,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, January 17, 2023.
What Are the Fundamental Factors Behind Leadership Change in Vietnam?
The resigna?on of President Nguyễn Xuân Phúc has captured widespread public aMen?on. We
request your analysis of nine major issues with respect to current leadership change in
Vietnam.
Q1. How do you judge the process of removing President Phúc, both in the party and state
systems? Is it fair, well-orchestrated? Any observed irregulari?es?
ANSWER: President Phúc achieved high office through two separate processes. First,
delegates to the 13th na?onal party congress in 2021 elected him to the new Central
CommiMee and the Central CommiMee elected him to the Politburo. The Politburo then
handed out work assignments and Phúc was nominated as candidate for state President. He
was re-elected deputy to the Na?onal Assembly in elec?ons held in May 2021. He was
subsequently nominated for and successfully elected as state president.
President Phúc’s decision to resign from office was a two-step process and was carried out by
the book. Once Phúc lost the confidence of the Politburo he was treated with respect and
permiMed to resign from his party posts rather than be summarily dismissed. Next, his
resigna?on was conveyed to the Na?onal Assembly for its decision.
As at this wri?ng, the Na?onal Assembly is in session. It is almost certain that its depu?es will
vote to accept his resigna?on.
Q2. The ?ming of the removal – just several days ahead of the Lunar New Year – was it hasty?
What message does the Party want to communicate via the ?ming of the extraordinary
session of the Na?onal Assembly?
ANSWER: The ?ming of President Phúc’s dismissal was carried out aQer the resigna?ons of
two deputy prime ministers earlier in the month. It is unclear why this was a piecemeal
process when all resigna?ons could have been packaged together. No doubt the ?ming of
Phuc’s dismissal prior to Tet, officially on 21 January, was to aMract minimum public reac?on.
The party is sending a message that its members will be held accountable if they fail to
exercise their du?es and responsibili?es while members of party commiMees embedded in
the state structure of Vietnam’s one-party regime.
Q3. What are the poli?cal, economic and social implica?ons of Phúc’s resigna?on? Will it
undermine or boost public confidence in the an?-graQ campaign, given that Phuc was one of
two 'excep?ons' who were allowed to remain on the Central CommiMee alongside Nguyễn
Phú Trọng?
ANSWER: The main implica?ons of President Phúc’s resigna?on is that the party will not shirk
from exercising its authority over its senior members serving in government and other state
posts. Some background in necessary.
During the period when Nguyễn Tấn Dũng was prime minister (2006-16), the government and
state bureaucracy arguably grew more influen?al in daily life than the Vietnam Communist
Party. This was due to the growth of Vietnam’s economy, increased revenue for the
government, and greater central control over the provinces. This expansion weakened the
Leadership Change in Vietnam
11
network of party commiMees embedded in the Cabinet and various ministries and state
agencies. The central party apparatus ability to effec?vely monitor and control the
implementa?on of policy on a daily basis atrophied. Prior to the đổi mới era, the Central
CommiMee had numerous sub-commiMees under its control that oversaw state ministries.
This number was greatly reduced thus weakening central party control over the state.
Vietnam’s rapid economic growth invariably led to the emergence of corrup?on networks,
some quite extensive (e.g. Vinashin). This prompted General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng to
shiQ the Central Steering CommiMee for An?-Corrup?on from state to party control. The an?corrup?on campaign expanded its focus to include derelic?on of duty by party members
holding posi?ons of authority on party commiMees in the state apparatus.
In general terms, when the an?-corrup?on campaign neMed high-ranking officials this was
supported by the general public. The recent focus of the an?-corrup?on campaign on COVIDrelated scandals especially was welcomed by the public who were outraged at the behaviour
of senior officials who profited while they endured severe priva?ons under lockdown.
It is too early to judge the general public’s reac?on to Phuc’s resigna?on because of the
coming Tet holidays. Responses by the elite who post on social media has been cri?cal. How
is it that Nguyễn Xuân Phúc, who scored so highly on internal party votes of confidence, and
who was given an exemp?on on excep?onal grounds to hold the office of state president in
2021, could be dismissed for unspecified “viola?ons and wrongdoings”?
Q4. The removal of Phuc is unprecedented in the party's and country's history. Why did Mr
Trong and the Politburo have to do this? Were there any other alterna?ves?
ANSWER: General Secretary Trọng has long let it be known that no stone would be unturned
in his quest to root out corrup?on and that high ranking officials would not be shielded from
accountability. It can only be speculated that as the COVID-related corrup?on inves?ga?on
gained momentum it uncovered connec?ons involving Phuc’s family. This raised the ques?on
of accountability in light of the dismissal of two deputy prime ministers.
The Politburo had the alterna?ve of issuing a reprimand, a warning, and/or requiring Phuc to
undergo a self-cri?cism before the Politburo.
Q5. How do you judge Mr Phúc in terms of contribu?ons and integrity. Can he be considered
'clean'? What are his biggest legacies?
ANSWER: Nguyễn Xuân Phúc has had a stellar career in government service and there is no
hint he was corrupt. He served ably as Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng ‘srighthand man and
as permanent deputy prime minister. It seemed a natural progression that Phúc stepped up
to the Office of Prime Minister on the re?rement of Dung. Phúc was most effec?ve in
overseeing a whole-of-government approach to combavng the COVID-19 pandemic. He only
served one term as prime minister before being shunted to state president. As state president
Phuc ably represented Vietnam on the world stage. His demise was a shock to Vietnamese as
well as the interna?onal community.
Q6. Trọng is said to model his an?-graQ campaign aQer that of Xi Jinping. But so far Xi has
barely struck down any Politburo member except Zhou Yongkang, while Trọng sacked one of
the highest officials who ranked second in the hierarchy. Does this mean that Trọng is more
heavy-handed than his Chinese counterpart?
Leadership Change in Vietnam
12
ANSWER: The two an?-corrup?on campaigns in China and Vietnam were contemporaneous.
Vietnam closely follows what the Chinese Communist Party and its leader Xi Jinping do. But it
should be born in mind that long before Xi came to office, Trọng has been fixated on partybuilding for his en?re career. He earned a PhD in the Soviet Union with a thesis on partybuilding. He then worked on party-building in various departments of the party journal Tạp
Chí Cộng Sản.
Trọng is definitely mo?vated to root out corrup?on. He has proceeded cau?ously and
deliberately by amending party rules and direc?ves over the course of ?me. In doing so he
has laid the legal basis for his aggressive pursuit of corrupt officials no maMer what their rank.
The intensity of his recent an?-corrup?on ac?ons for COVID-related scandals may be
explained by strong public outrage.
While Xi Jinping may remain General Secretary and President for life, Trọng seems mo?vated
to leave his an?-corrup?on campaign as his legacy to a cleaner party.
Q7. Any signs of poli?cal infigh?ng or fac?onal rivalry in this incident?
ANSWER: Various commentators have argued that fac?onal infigh?ng was the cause of Phúc’s
demise. These commentators assert that there are pro-China and pro-US fac?ons or
ideological versus technocra?c fac?ons, a fac?on of public security officials or “securocrats”
and a fac?on of Trong supporters who are opposed to Phúc.
I prefer to use the terms “party wing” and “government wing” not fac?ons. In other words,
party members serving in the party bureaucracy and party members serving in the
government have different ins?tu?onal interests and outlooks. This surfaced when Tran Quoc
Vuong, Trọng’s nominee as his successor, was rejected by the Central CommiMee on the eve
of the 13th party congress. The government wing pushed Phúc to throw his hat into the ring,
while the party wing rallied around Trọng because of their ins?tu?onal interests. Phúc lost his
bid.
Phúc’s dismissal was not due to a power struggle in the party so much as he was a vic?m of
Trọng’s focus on accountability of senior party officials in carrying out their duty to monitor
and supervise those under their care. The urgency of this maMer was shaped by the moral
outrage felt by the public over COVID-related scandals.
Q8. In terms of interna?onal rela?ons, Mr Phúc has been the face of Vietnam in the
interna?onal arena. He met former President Trump and President Biden, Chinese President
Xi Jinping and a host of other world leaders. How will his removal affect Vietnam's foreign
rela?ons? Is Mr Phúc more aligned with Washington or Beijing?
ANSWER: Vietnam’s foreign policy framework and orienta?on has been consistent since the
adop?on of Resolu?on No. 13 in May 1988. Vietnam pursues a policy of mul?lateralizing and
diversifying its foreign rela?ons as well as independence and self-reliance by managing
seventeen strategic partnerships and addi?onal comprehensive partnerships.
While the conduct of foreign policy is in the hands of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (with
oversight by a deputy prime minister), the Politburo sets policy on rela?ons with China and
the United States in par?cular. Vietnam’s rela?ons with these two countries will not change
because of the resigna?ons of Phúc and Pham Binh Minh (who had oversight of foreign affairs
as a junior member of the Politburo and former foreign minister).
Leadership Change in Vietnam
13
Most likely Vietnam’s foreign policy will be in a holding paMern un?l new personnel on the
Politburo, Cabinet and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have ?me to seMle into office.
Q9. Ten years ago, Trọng failed in his aMempt to discipline the then Prime Minister Nguyễn
Tấn Dũng. But now he can remove President Nguyễn Xuân Phúc; is this evidence of Trọng’s
unchallenged influence in the party?
ANSWER: The balance has swung in Trọng’s favour as he has revised and adopted new party
rules and direc?ves governing party members. Changes in these rules, for example, prevented
Dung from nomina?ng himself aQer the Central CommiMee had approved nominees to be put
forward at a na?onal party congress.
Trọng has modified party rules to include what party members can and cannot do and to
include accountability of party officials who serve on party commiMees within the
government. Trọng can exercise power so long as he has the majority support of the Politburo
and Central CommiMee. A majority of the Central CommiMee can overturn a decision by the
party general secretary at any ?me such as the case of Tran Quoc Vuong in November 2020.
The boMom line is that party officials have long acknowledged that corrup?on is the major
challenge to their legi?macy to rule Vietnam. The uncovering of corrup?on networks has
raised the ques?on how did these individuals rise to the posi?ons that they occupied? The
focus under Trọng has been to iden?fy party members who aided and abeMed the rise of
corrupt officials or failed to monitor and iden?fy corrupt officials and hold them accountable.
Trong was able to engineer Phúc’s resigna?on because he secured a majority of the 17
members on the Politburo and a majority of the 180 members of the Central CommiMee. In
sum, General Secretary Trọng, as primus inter pares (first among equals) has the most
influence but it is not absolute and can be challenged.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “What Are the Fundamental Factors Behind Leadership Change in
Vietnam?” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, January 18, 2023.
Impact of Changes on Vietnam’s Politburo and Foreign Policy
We request your assessment of how the change of Vietnam’s Politburo members will affect
Vietnam's foreign policy. We have five major concerns:
Q1. In Vietnam, foreign policies are decided by the Politburo. Currently, the Politburo has lost
two members (including President Nguyen Xuan Phuc); what effect will that have on Vietnam's
future foreign policy?
ANSWER: The framework, objec?ves and immediate goals of Vietnam’s foreign policy were
set by the 13th na?onal party congress and further shaped by resolu?ons adopted
subsequently by the Central CommiMee.
Tac?cal changes and adjustments will be advised by the Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son and
will be reviewed and approved by the Politburo. It is a consensual process. The loss of Pham
Binh Minh from the Politburo will rob the Politburo of exper?se and ins?tu?onal memory.
Minh’s oversight of foreign affairs, as deputy prime minister, has passed to a new deputy prime
minister, Tran Luu Quang. Quang is not a member of the Politburo and has no discernable
experience or exper?se in foreign rela?ons.
Leadership Change in Vietnam
14
In sum, personnel changes in the Politburo will only have a marginal effect on the future longterm direc?on of Vietnam’s foreign policy.
Q2. If yes, how would Vietnam's foreign policies towards essen?al partners like China and the
US change?
ANSWER: Vietnam’s policies towards partners like China and the United States will con?nue
as usual. Decision-making may be slowed because of personnel changes at high-level. No new
ini?a?ves are an?cipated.
Q3. Will there be any change on policy on the South China Sea?
ANSWER: Vietnam’s policy on the South China Sea is set within the framework of coopera?on
and struggle (vừa hợp tác, vừa đấu tranh) adopted in 2003 and refined since then. The major
changes of note occurred in 2017 and 2018 when Vietnam acquiesced to Chinese pressure
and stopped oil explora?on ac?vi?es involving foreign contractors in waters near Vanguard
Bank. There have been no major incidents since then, in contrast to Chinese asser?veness in
waters claimed by Philippine, Indonesia and Malaysia.
Q4. Although there has been no official informa?on, some scholars believe that the successor
to the State President may be To Lam (Minister of Public Security) or Nguyen Van Thuong
(Head of the Propaganda Department). If one of these two men wins the Presiden?al seat,
how will it affect Vietnam's diplomacy?
ANSWER: The President of Vietnam represents the country in its rela?ons with foreign
powers. Mee?ngs at head of state level are highly scripted, with joint statements processed
by the bureaucracy in advance. The president is like an actor who reads his lines in a play
wriMen by someone else. Both Lam and Thuong would be rela?vely unknown quan??es on
the interna?onal stage and their encounters with foreign leaders will be important mainly to
the extent that they can develop rapport with their counterparts. There is no room for the
Vietnamese president to freelance and advance ini?a?ves that have not already been
endorsed by the Politburo.
Q5. Will the change of high-ranking leaders affect foreign economic investment in Vietnam?
ANSWER: The 13th na?onal party congress set the framework and objec?ves for economic
development over the next ten years and out to 2045. The Central CommiMee and the
Na?onal Assembly have both adopted resolu?ons focusing on objec?ves for the next year as
well as a five-year framework. In other words, the personnel changes that are occurring in
Vietnam will have liMle impact on aMrac?ng foreign investment. More important are such
factors as Vietnam’s high GDP growth rate and its effec?ve implementa?on of a broad range
of free trade agreements, including the Comprehensive and Progressive Trade Pacific
Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Improvement in
governance with respect to foreign investment will play a major role.
One immediate priority for Vietnam’s leaders is how to respond to discussions on the Biden
Administra?on’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Vietnamese officials charged with
responsibility in this area will have to give priority to on-going discussions on the IPEF. This
will be a major role for the new deputy prime ministers. Ul?mately, however, the Politburo
will have to sign off on the recommenda?ons put before them.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Impact of Changes on Vietnam’s Politburo and Foreign Policy,” Thayer
Consultancy Background Brief, January 19, 2023.
Leadership Change in Vietnam
15
Vietnam to Name New State President – 1
On 18 January, the Na?onal Assembly
appointed Vice President Võ Thị Ánh Xuân
Ac?ng President following the resigna?on
of Nguyễn Xuân Phúc un?l a successor is
found. Unofficial sources in Hanoi reported
today that the Vietnam Communist Party
Politburo met six days ago and reached
consensus on a candidate to become the
next state president. The new president
will serve un?l the present term in office
expires in 2026.
Sources in Hanoi report that Tô Lâm declined to have his name put forward, preferring to
remain as Minister of Public Security and complete his second term in office. Lâm was born
in July 1957 and will be sixty-six in early 2026 when the VCP’s 14th na?onal congress is likely
to be held. Under present rules, Lâm can serve only two terms in the same office and would
be expected to re?re aQer reaching 65 years of age unless an exemp?on for “excep?onal
service” was approved.
Tô Lâm’s withdrawal puts paid to specula?on by foreign Hanoi watchers that the public
security apparatus is becoming all dominant in Vietnam.
In the aQermath of President Phúc’s resigna?on, VCP General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng
reportedly received pushback from senior party members that he was going too hard and too
fast in his an?-corrup?on campaign by proposing to take ac?on against Prime Minister Phạm
Minh Chính on allega?ons of corrup?on by his family members.
The VCP Central CommiMee will be called into execu?ve session from 27-28 February to
consider the Politburo’s decision to recommend Võ Văn Thưởng as the next state president.
Prime Minister Chính’s poli?cal fate appears to have been put on hold.
Thưởng, who was born in December 1970 in Hai Duong province, is the youngest member of
the Politburo. His official biography lists Vinh Long as his home town (quê quán). He majored
in Marxist-Leninist ideology as an undergraduate. He received an M.A. in Philosophy, and later
received an advanced degree in poli?cal theory from the Ho Chi Minh Na?onal Academy of
Poli?cs.
Before aMaining na?onal stature, Thưởng spent two decades working in Ho Chi Minh City on
student and youth affairs, including rising to the post of Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh City
Communist Youth Union.
Thưởng was first elected to na?onal office when he became an alternate member of the VCP
Central CommiMee in April 2006 and was appointed First Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh
Communist Youth Union Central CommiMee. In 2011, Thưởng was elected a full member the
Central CommiMee and appointed party secretary of Quang Ngai province from August 2011
to April 2014. The Politburo then appointed Thưởng Standing Deputy Secretary of the Ho Chi
Minh City Party CommiMee (2015-2020).
Leadership Change in Vietnam
16
Thưởng was re-elected to the Central CommiMee in 2016 and for the first ?me became a
member of the Politburo. He served as Secretary of the VCP Central CommiMee and head of
the Central Propaganda Department (Trưởng Ban Tuyên giáo Trung ương). In February 2021,
he was re-elected to both posi?ons and appointed Standing Secretary of the VCP Secretariat
(Thường trực Ban Bí thư Ban Chấp Hành Trung, see photo below).
Thưởng is a ‘dyed in the wool’ party
apparatchik and a trusted member of
Secretary General Trọng’s inner circle.
He serves concurrently as deputy head
of the Central Steering CommiMee on
Preven?on and Control of Corrup?on
and Nega?ve Phenomena. If Thưởng’s
nomina?on is approved by the Central
CommiMee, his name will be formally
presented to the Na?onal Assembly for
official ra?fica?on on or about 20 May.
When the fourteenth VCP na?onal congress convenes in 2026, Thưởng will be approaching
his 56th birthday at the end of the year and can look forward to another decade of service at
the highest level in the party. If he excels in his presump?ve new role as state president he
would be an obvious candidate to replace Trọng as the next party leader.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam to Name New State President – 1,” Thayer Consultancy
Background Brief, February 20, 2023.
Vietnam to Name New State President – 2
Unofficial sources in Hanoi reported
yesterday that the Vietnam
Communist Party Politburo recently
met and reached consensus on a
candidate to become the next state
president. The new president will
serve un?l the present term in office
expires in 2026. On 18 January, the
Na?onal Assembly appointed Vice
President Võ Thị Ánh Xuân Ac?ng
President following the resigna?on
of Nguyễn Xuân Phúc.
Sources in Hanoi report that Tô Lâm declined to have his name put forward, preferring to
remain as Minister of Public Security and complete his second term in office. Lâm was born
in July 1957 and will be sixty-six in early 2026 when the VCP’s 14th na?onal congress is likely
to be held. Under present rules, Lâm can serve only two terms in the same office and would
be expected to re?re aQer reaching 65 years of age.
Tô Lâm’s withdrawal puts paid to specula?on by foreign Hanoi watchers that the public
security apparatus was becoming all dominant in Vietnam.
Leadership Change in Vietnam
17
In the aQermath of President Phúc’s resigna?on, VCP General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng
reportedly received pushback from senior party members that he was going too hard and too
fast in his an?-corrup?on campaign by proposing to take ac?on against Prime Minister Phạm
Minh Chính on allega?ons of corrup?on by his family members.
The VCP Central CommiMee will be called into execu?ve session from 27-28 February to
consider the Politburo’s decision to recommend Võ Văn Thưởng as the next state president.
Prime Minister Chính’s poli?cal fate appears to have been put on hold.
Thưởng, who was born in December 1970 in the southern province of Vinh Long, is the
youngest member of the Politburo. He is a died in the wool party apparatchik who holds a
Master’s degree in philosophy and an advanced degree in poli?cal theory. Before aMaining
na?onal stature, he spent two decades working in Ho Chi Minh City on student and youth
affairs, including rising to the post of Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh City Communist Youth
Union. In 2006, he was elected First Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union
Central CommiMee. Thưởng next served a nearly three years as party secretary of Quang Ngai
province (August 2011-April 2014).
Thưởng was first elected to na?onal office when he became an alternate member of the VCP
Central CommiMee in April 2006. He was elected a full member in 2011 and re-elected in 2016
and 2021. He served as Secretary of the VCP Central CommiMee and head of the Central
Propaganda Commission. In 2021, the Central CommiMee elected Thưởng to the Politburo
and shortly aQer he was appointed Standing Member of the VCP Secretariat.
Thưởng is a trusted member of Secretary General Trọng’s inner circle and serves concurrently
as deputy head of the Central Steering CommiMee on Preven?on and Control of Corrup?on
and Nega?ve Phenomena. If Thưởng’s nomina?on is approved by the Central CommiMee, his
name will be formally presented to the Na?onal Assembly for official ra?fica?on roughly on
20 May.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam to Name New State President – 2,” Thayer Consultancy
Background Brief, February 21, 2023.
Vo Van Thuong: Vietnam’s Next Party Leader?
Vo Van Thuong’s career has been mainly in the Vietnam Communist Party; if he is
appointed/elected as Vietnam’s new president he will have to shiQ his focus to state maMers
and foreign policy issues. We request your response to the following ques?ons:
Q1. What are Vo Van Thuong’s contribu?ons to the na?on's domes?c and external policies?
ANSWER: Vo Van Thuong has spent his en?re career within the Vietnam Communist Party
organisa?on. He has been focused on the educa?on and training of party members in
ideology, culture, ethics and morality at grassroots level and above. As Thuong has risen in the
party’s ranks, he has taken on more responsibili?es in the general area of party-building
par?cularly in personnel maMers.
Since Thuong’s eleva?on to head the party’s Secretariat he has assumed significant
responsibility for the campaign to combat corrup?on and nega?ve phenomena. Thuong has
focused on preven?ng individualism, ending lobbying for jobs, and encouraging cadres who
have erred to voluntarily resign. In addi?on, he has been in?mately involved in decisions on
streamlining the party bureaucracy, rota?on of cadres, and emula?on movements.
Leadership Change in Vietnam
18
Thuong is rela?vely new to foreign policy. His experience to date has been to travel overseas
with senior party leaders and to interface with officials from other communist and fraternal
par?es as well as par?es in power. For example, over the past year he has met poli?cal party
leaders from Cambodia, China, Cuba, India, Japan, Laos, Mexico, Mozambique, Singapore and
South Korea. Importantly, he accompanied General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong to Beijing last
year for Trong’s mee?ng with General Secretary Xi Jinping.
Q2. Will there be any notable policy changes if Thuong becomes president?
ANSWER: As state president Thuong is not expected to ini?ate any new change in Vietnam’s
foreign policy. This is because there is a high degree of consensus among the top leaders on
Vietnam’s foreign policy orienta?on. Also, foreign policy is the result of collec?ve decisionmaking and consensus on the Politburo. However, Thuong is not as well versed in global affairs
as his predecessor; he will be on a fast learning curve, and will be a rela?vely unknown
quan?ty when he meets his foreign counterparts.
Q3. How will becoming state president affect Thuong’s chances of becoming party leader in
2026?
ANSWER: If Vo Van Thuong successfully carries out the du?es of state president, he would be
an odds on favourite to replace Nguyen Phu Trong as party General Secretary. His long and
unblemished career in the party’s ranks as well as his rela?vely youthful age all weigh in his
favour. In addi?on, he has a rather unique background with experience in all three regions of
Vietnam. His family regrouped from South Vietnam to North Vietnam following the 1954
Geneva Conference. Thuong was born in Hai Duong province in the North. He returned to the
South aQer reunifica?on and his official biography lists Vinh Long as his home province. He
went to university in Ho Chi Minh City and spent the bulk of his career in the South. Finally,
he served as secretary of Quang Ngai province in Central Vietnam from 2011-14.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vo Van Thuong: Vietnam’s Next Party Leader?” Thayer Consultancy
Background Brief, February 23, 2023.
Vietnam: Vo Van Thuong Under the Microscope
Agence France Presse just reported that the Na?onal Assembly will hold an extraordinary
session to approve officially Vo Van Thuong as Vietnam’s next state president on Thursday, 2nd
March.2 The Vietnam Communist Party Central CommiMee will meet on Wednesday, 1st
March.
Q1. How powerful is General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong in Vietnam;s poli?cal system today?
Will he be able to manipulate the process of selec?ng the president of the country and turn
an individual decision by members of the Politburo into a collec?ve decision?
ANSWER: The office of General Secretary of the Vietnam Communist Party can be
characterized by the La?n expression ‘primus inter pares’ or first among equals. The General
Secretary has pres?ge and influence as the senior leader now in his third term. He cannot
2
Agence France Presse, “Vietnam to name new president this week,” Bangkok Post, February 28, 2023;
h]ps://www.bangkokpost.com/world/2517126/vietnam-to-name-new-president-this-week’ .
Leadership Change in Vietnam
19
force his will on the Politburo but must lead and lobby the support of a majority of its
members.
In the case of selec?ng a person to replace Nguyen Xuan Phuc as state president, General
Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong likely would have canvassed the other Politburo members before
puvng his nomina?on forward. Politburo mee?ngs are kept secret so we know nothing about
the process that is currently taking place such as whether other persons were considered.
The real centre of decision-making is the Central CommiMee which must approve Politburo
recommenda?ons. For example, in November 2020, the outgoing Central CommiMee failed to
support the General Secretary’s nomina?on of his successor, Tran Quoc Vuong. Vuong then
dropped out of conten?on.
Finally, the Na?onal Assembly must formally elect the next state president. It seems a
foregone conclusion because the Na?onal Assembly is oQen characterized as a rubber stamp.
Usually the margin of the vote by depu?es tells us something about the degree of support on
a par?cular issue or nominee.
It should be recalled that at least twice in recent history the Na?onal Assembly voted down
nomina?ons for ministerial office that were approved by the Politburo – Cao Sy Kiem as
Governor of the State Bank of Vietnam (1997), and Le Minh Huong as Minister of Public
Security (2003).
Q2. In your opinion, why will Mr. Thuong be chosen as the next president? Mr. Thuong’s
career has been focused on the educa?on and training of party members in ideology, culture,
ethics and morality at grassroots level and above. Is this a key factor for Mr. Trong to pick him?
ANSWER: The new state president will only serve out the remaining term in office, that is un?l
May 2026. He will then have to repeat the process to be re-elected president.
The fourteenth na?onal party congress will very likely be held in early 2026, Delegates to
congress will elect a new Central CommiMee based on nomina?ons approved by the outgoing
Central CommiMee. On the last day of the 14th congress the new Central CommiMee will meet
and hold its first plenum to elect the new Politburo and from among its members elect the
new General Secretary.
The new Politburo will then decide the work assignments of its members. In the case of the
office of state president, the Politburo’s nominee will have go through a separate process to
be elected. First, the aspirant must successfully stand for elec?on as deputy to the Na?onal
Assembly in na?onal elec?ons usually held in May. When the new Na?onal Assembly
convenes its first session depu?es will vote on the nomina?on of state president and other
government leaders (prime minister, members of Cabinet etc.).
Q3. Does Mr. Thuong have a ‘clean profile’ according to the criteria of General Secretary Trong,
who is leading a far-reaching an?-corrup?on campaign?
ANSWER: It can only be speculated that Thuong is free of the taint of criminal corrup?on
because he will have been thoroughly veMert. Also there have been no reports in social media
faul?ng him for his behaviour as a party member that have come to light.
Q4. People believe that China has certain influence on the selec?on of top-level officials in
Vietnam. What is your perspec?ve?
Leadership Change in Vietnam
20
ANSWER: China certainly makes its views on leadership selec?on in Vietnam known to
Vietnam’s top leaders. This takes the form of private comments by senior Chinese diplomats
in Hanoi and Beijing to their Vietnamese counterparts. Such interven?ons are to call out
individuals who are viewed as harbouring ‘an?-China views’ in the hopes of blocking their rise
in Vietnam’s poli?cal system.
Q5. When accompanying General Secretary Trong to Beijing in November, 2022, Mr. Thuong
was unable to meet his counterpart Cai Qi in person. They held a virtual conversa?on instead.
This sparked specula?on that Thuong was not welcome and supported by China. What is your
opinion on this, is this going to be detrimental to Mr. Thuong’s promo?on?
ANSWER: It is more likely that China’s super sensi?vity towards COVID-19 was the reason the
mee?ng between Cai Qi and Vo Van Thuong was held online rather than in person. A wellinformed western diplomat emailed me aQer the visit to offer his assessment that Thuong was
the only member of the Vietnamese delega?on, besides General Secretary Trong, to be
men?oned prominently in the Chinese press.
Q6. Is Thuong’s promo?on to the presidency of Vietnam just a stepping-stone for him to be
Trong’s successor as party leader in 2026? If this happens will it break a tradi?on that the
General Secretary is normally from the North?
ANSWER: Since the 1990s, Vietnam’s party General Secretary has broken new ground by
visi?ng non-Communist countries and gaining recogni?on of his role in Vietnam’s poli?cal
system. For example, Do Muoi and Nong Duc Manh visited Australia in 1995 and 2009,
respec?vely. Nguyen Phu Trong visited the United States and Japan in 2015 and France in
2018.
Thuong was likely picked to be the new president to gain experience in interna?onal affairs
and to serve a sufficient ?me for his party peers to evaluate him as a likely choice for party
General Secretary.
Thuong was born in December 1970. He will be 55 years of age at the fourteenth na?onal
party congress if it is held in early 2026. In other words, he has a decade ahead of him to serve
as a senor member of the Politburo, if not party leader.
Thuong’s background is unique. His family regrouped from South Vietnam to North Vietnam
aQer the 1954 Geneva Conference. Thuong was born in Hai Duong province in the north. AQer
reunifica?on, Thuong moved to South Vietnam and established official residency in Vinh Long
province. Most of his career was then spent in Ho Chi Minh City. He also served as Secretary
of Quang Ngai province from August 2011 to April 2014. If elected state president he would
be establishing a new norm in leadership selec?on.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam: Vo Van Thuong Under the Microscope” Thayer Consultancy
Background Brief, February 27, 2023.
Vietnam: Observing the Proprie)es in Elec)ng a New President
The Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) Central CommiMee held a mee?ng/session (họp/ hội
nghị) on Wednesday, 1st March. This mee?ng announced two decisions:
1. The decision to introduce personnel (nhân sự) for elec?on to the posi?on of President of
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for the term 2021-2026.
Leadership Change in Vietnam
21
2. To elect 3 addi?onal members to the Central Inspec?on CommiMee (Ủy ban Kiểm tra Trung
ương) XIII term, including Nguyễn Mạnh Hùng, Director of the Region I Department, the
Central Inspec?on Commission; Đinh Hữu Thành, Member of Standing CommiMee of
Provincial Party CommiMee, Chairman of Inspec?on CommiMee of Quang Binh Provincial Party
CommiMee; and Lê Văn Thành, Member of Standing CommiMee of the City Party CommiMee,
Chairman of the Inspec?on CommiMee of Can Tho City Party CommiMee.
Prior to the 1st March mee?ng of the Central CommiMee, there were rumours that this
mee?ntg would promote Deputy Prime Minister Trần Lưu Quang to the Politburo and elevate
Phan Đình Trạc to Permanent Secretary of the Secretariat to fill the vacancy if Võ Văn Thưởng
was elected state president.
These personnel changes could s?ll be the works to observe proprie?es. For example, the
Na?onal Assembly could promote Trần Lưu Quang to Standing Deputy Prime Minister in the
Cabinet thus paving the way for the party Central CommiMee to elect him to the Politburo.
If the Na?onal Assembly elects Võ Văn Thưởng state president, this would clear the way for
Phan Đình Trạc, the current Chair of the VCP Central CommiMee for Internal Affairs, to be
elevated to Permanent Secretary of the Secretariat to fill the vacancy.
It was also announced that the fiQeenth Na?onal Assembly would hold its fourth
extraordinary session (Kỳ họp bất thường) in the morning on Thursday, 2nd March to decide
on the selec?on of the state president.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam: Observing the Proprie?es in Elec?ng a New President,” Thayer
Consultancy Background Brief, March 2, 2023.
Vietnam: Recent Leadership Changes
The Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) Central CommiMee held a mee?ng/session (họp/ hội
nghị) on Wednesday, 1st March. This mee?ng announced two decisions:
1. The decision to introduce personnel (nhân sự) for elec?on to the posi?on of President of
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for the term 2021-2026.
2. To elect 3 addi?onal members to the Central Inspec?on CommiMee (Ủy ban Kiểm tra Trung
ương) XIII term, including Nguyễn Mạnh Hùng, Director of the Region I Department, the
Central Inspec?on Commission; Đinh Hữu Thành, Member of Standing CommiMee of
Provincial Party CommiMee, Chairman of Inspec?on CommiMee of Quang Binh Provincial Party
CommiMee; and Lê Văn Thành, Member of Standing CommiMee of the City Party CommiMee,
Chairman of the Inspec?on CommiMee of Can Tho City Party CommiMee.
The fiQeenth Na?onal Assembly held its fourth extraordinary session (Kỳ họp bất thường) in
the morning on Thursday, 2nd March and on the recommenda?on of its Standing CommiMee
elected Võ Văn Thưởng state president.
In January 2007, Tuổi trẻ newspaper published Thưởng’s biography which stated he was born
in Hải Dương province in northern Vietnam (“Anh Võ Văn Thưởng sinh năm 1970 tại Hải
Leadership Change in Vietnam
22
Dương…”).3 Official biographies published since 2011, when Thưởng was appointed Party
Secretary of Quang Ngai province, all state that Thưởng’s home town (quê quán) was An
Phước village, Măng Thít district, Vĩnh Long province in southern Vietnam. This is his family’s
ancestral home. Thưởng’s family reportedly regrouped to North Vietnam following the 1954
Geneva Agreements and returned to South Vietnam aPer reunificaRon. This would have
become his legal residence under Vietnam’s household registraRon system.
Prior to the Central CommiMee’s 1st March mee?ng, there were reports that the Central
CommiMee would promote Deputy Prime Minister Trần Lưu Quang to the Politburo and
elevate Phan Đình Trạc to Permanent Secretary of the Secretariat to fill the vacancy if Võ Văn
Thưởng was elected state president. No confirma?on was made following the 1st March
mee?ng.4
However, these rumoured personnel changes could s?ll be the works to observe proprie?es.
For example, the Na?onal Assembly could appoint Trần Lưu Quang Standing Deputy Prime
Minister in the Cabinet thus paving the way for the party Central CommiMee to elect him to
the Politburo. Now that Võ Văn Thưởng has been elected state president,5 the way is clear for
Phan Đình Trạc, the current Chair of the VCP Central CommiMee for Internal Affairs (or some
other Politburo member), to be elevated to Permanent Secretary of the Secretariat to fill the
vacancy.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “ Vietnam: Recent Leadership Changes,” Thayer Consultancy Background
Brief, March 3, 2023.
Vietnam: Who Determines Economic Policy and Rela)ons with China?
What is your assessment of the following three asser?ons regarding the significance of Vo Van
Thuong’s eleva?on to Vietnam’s state president?
Q1. Some observers say by promo?ng Vo Van Thuong to the state president post, General
Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong strengthens his power which could lead to concerns about
?ghter party control over the economy.
ANSWER: The President’s du?es and responsibili?es are spelled out in the state Cons?tu?on
and all of his decisions and execu?ve ac?ons are subject to the approval of the Na?onal
Assembly. The Prime Minister and Cabinet (Chính Phủ) have responsibility for economic
maMers and they must conform to relevant resolu?ons passed by execu?ve sessions (hội nghị)
of the Central CommiMee.
3
“Anh Võ Văn Thưởng được bầu làm bí thư thứ nhất Trung ương Đoàn,” Tuổi trẻ, January 14, 2007.
h]ps://tuoitre.vn/anh-vo-van-thuong-duoc-bau-lam-bi-thu-thu-nhat-trung-uong-doan-182518.htm.
4
On 6 March, the Politburo appointed Trương Thị Mai Permanent Secretary of the Secretariat (Thường trực
Ban Bí thư), https://www.einnews.com/pr_news/620658407/tr-ng-thi-mai-assigned-to-post-of-permanentmember-of-party-central-committee-s-secretariat.
5
For background see: “Vietnam to Name New State President,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, February
20, 2023. h]ps://www.scribd.com/document/627396981/Thayer-Vietnam-to-Name-New-State-President and
“Vo Van Thuong: Vietnam’s Next Party Leader?” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, February 23, 2023.
h]ps://www.scribd.com/document/627969890/Thayer-Vo-Van-Thuong-Vietnam-s-Next-Party-Leader.
I
erroneously reported that Thưởng was born in Hải Dương province.
Leadership Change in Vietnam
23
Vietnam’s broad economic objec?ves were set by the 13th na?onal party congress. These
objec?ves are opera?onalised in five-year and annual plans approved by the Na?onal
Assembly.
The power of the General Secretary is vested in his posi?on as party leader and seniority as
the “first among equals” among his comrades on the Politburo. Nothing has changed with
respect to the power balance as a result of Vo Van Thuong’s elec?on as president. Prior to
January, General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong needed to obtain a majority of 18 Politburo
members. Now he must obtain a majority of 16 members.
Q2. General Secretary Trong could edge Hanoi closer to Beijing as he focuses on strengthening
the party.
ANSWER: Vietnam’s policy on rela?ons with China has been set for many years and follows a
consistent path of maintaining Vietnam’s independence, sovereignty, self-reliance and
diversifica?on and mul?lateraliza?on of rela?ons. The party General Secretary does not have
the authority to unilaterally shiQ Vietnam closer to China.
However, General Secretary Trong and the Politburo follow a policy of leveraging off the
convergence in ideology of the two communist par?es – China and Vietnam – that promotes
socialism.
In 2003, Vietnam adopted a policy of coopera?on and struggle (vừa hợp tác, vừa đấu tranh)
to deal with its rela?ons with China and the United States. This was reaffirmed in 2013. At the
moment party leaders are deba?ng how to define partners of coopera?on (đối tác) and
partners of struggle (đối tượng). Whatever changes in policy Vietnam makes towards China
will be the result of consensus on the Politburo with majority support of the Central
CommiMee and not as the result of the proclivi?es of General Secretary Trong or President
Thuong.
Q3. How about censorship and human rights given the fact that Vo Van Thuong was head of
the Central Propaganda Department of the party?
Thuong headed the Central Propaganda Department (Ban Tuyên giáo Trung ương) from
February 2016 to February 2023. The Central Propaganda Department plays a major advisory
role to the Central CommiMee, Politburo and Secretariat to guide informa?on and propaganda
ac?vi?es of the party. It has direct responsibility to oversee Vietnam’s press agencies,
reporters and service staff from central to local level, publishing houses, and ac?vi?es
promo?ng arts, culture and science to ensure they correctly propagate Marxism-Leninism and
the study and applica?on of Ho Chi Minh’s ideology, morality and lifestyle. To this extent
Thuong, as head of the Central Propaganda Department, contributed to the culture of
censorship in Vietnam.
Vietnam’s Ministry of Informa?on and Communica?on and Ministry of Public Security6 are the
main organisa?ons that enforce censorship and Vietnam’s Criminal Code (Bộ luật hình sự) that
criminalizes free speech and peaceful protests and thus violates interna?onal human rights
conven?ons to which Vietnam is a signatory.
6
See: Carlyle A. Thayer, “The Apparatus of Authoritarian Rule in Viet Nam,” in Jonathan London, ed., Politics in
Contemporary Vietnam: Party, State, and Authority Relations. Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific Series. London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 135-161.
Leadership Change in Vietnam
24
Vo Van Thuong’s tenure as state president is unlikely to have any discernible impact – posi?ve
or nega?ve – on Vietnam’s prevailing prac?ces of censorship and suppression of civil and
poli?cal rights.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam: Who Determines Economic Policy and Rela?ons with China?”
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, March 3, 2023.
Vietnam: Challenging Four Major Assump)ons About Recent Leadership Change
We request your assessment of key assump?ons in the ar?cle by Tomoya Onishi, “New
Vietnam president moves party chief Trong closer to one-man rule,” Nikkei Asia, March 3,
2023.7
ANSWER: This ar?cle makes four highly contestable asser?ons about the current poli?cal
situa?on in Vietnam:
General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong is emula?ng China’s Xi Jinping by using an an?-corrup?on
campaign to oust his poli?cal rivals.
General Secretary Trong, by consolida?ng power, is moving Vietnam towards a system of oneman rule.
The vic?ms of General Secretary Trong’s an?-corrup?on campaign are mainly pro-western and
pro-business, while Trong and his supporters lean towards China.
General Secretary Trong’s consolida?on of power will lead to the party’s greater control over
the economy.
Asser?on 1 – Vietnam’s Party Leader is Emula?ng China’s Xi Jinping in Ous?ng Rivals
The Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are both in
agreement that widespread corrup?on in their country is a major threat to the legi?macy of
one-party rule. Vietnam’s formal efforts to combat corrup?on on a na?onal basis predate
China’s. In August 2006, Vietnam’s Na?onal Assembly established the Central Steering
CommiMee for An?-Corrup?on headed by Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung.
In January 2011, at the VCP’s eleventh na?onal congress, Nguyen Phu Trong was elected
General Secretary. In 2012, Trong succeeded in gaining approval from the Central CommiMee
to transfer responsibility for the an?-corrup?on campaign from the Prime Minister to the
Central Steering CommiMee on Corrup?on Preven?on and Control. The reason for this is that
the an?-corrup?on campaign under Prime Minister Dung was lacklustre.
When Trong launched his an?-corrup?on campaign there were allega?ons that he was
specifically targe?ng allies and supporters of Prime Minister Dung, par?cularly aQer Dung’s
re?rement in 2016. In retrospect, however, it appears there was very liMle dis?nc?on between
corrupt officials who supported Prime Minister Dung because they benefiMed and other
corrupt officials who took advantage of lax law enforcement.
Recently, some analysts and journalists have erroneously characterized President Nguyen
Xuan Phuc as a poli?cal rival of General Secretary Trong. The basis for this allega?on is that
Phuc challenged/stood against Trong for elec?on as party secretary aQer the Central
7
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/New-Vietnam-president-moves-party-chief-Trong-closer-to-one-man-rule.
Leadership Change in Vietnam
25
CommiMee unexpectedly failed to ra?fy Tran Quoc Vuong, Trong’s chosen successor, as party
leader at a plenum on the eve of the thirteenth party congress.
The full account of what happened at this ?me is not known. Trong picked a successor and
showed every sign that he would re?re at the expira?on of his second term as General
Secretary. The Central CommiMee’s ac?on produced an unprecedented situa?on at the
eleventh hour before the na?onal party congress. There appears to have been no Plan B and
Central CommiMee members were leQ to iden?fy a suitable candidate. Did members of the
Central CommiMee insist on a choice? Was Trong persuaded to seek a third term or did he
throw his hat into the ring at the urging of his supporters? Was Phuc draQed to sa?sfy the call
for a choice or did he actually move to block Trong from a third term? Where is the evidence
Phuc’s nomina?on was a “hos?le” act to oppose Trong?
Finally, General Secretary’s an?-corrup?on campaign has been so wide-ranging as to defy
being classed as simply aimed at allege poli?cal opponents. In 2022, for example,
inves?ga?ons were caried out against 2,474 cases involving at least 4,646 persons for alleged
corrup?on, abuse of power and economic misconduct. An es?mated seventy party officials,
including five ministers or former ministers were disciplined since 2021.
Asser?on 2 – System of One-Man Rule
Xi Jinping was elected CCP General Secretary in 2012 and President of the People’s Republic
of China in 2013. AQer Xi elec?on to both posi?ons in 2018, he changed the rules to liQ all
restric?ons on his term in office. Xi is some?mes referred to as the “General Secretary of
Everything” and the General Secretary for Life.”
Vietnam has a long poli?cal tradi?on of collec?ve leadership and power sharing among its
most senior party leaders. Nguyen Phu Trong was elected as VCP General Secretary in 2011
and again in 2016. In October 2018, on the death in office President Tran Dai Quang, Trong
assumed the concurrent office of President of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Trong made
no move to amend the state Cons?tu?on to merge the posi?ons of General Secretary and
President. Trong, to all intents and purposes, showed every sign of re?ring as party leader at
the thirteenth party congress. When he was given an unprecedented third term as General
Secretary, he stepped down as state president at the expira?on his term in office in April 2021.
The concept that General Secretary is seeking to consolidate his power needs to be unpacked
and examined cri?cally. VCP regula?ons s?pulate that one of the du?es of the General
Secretary is to groom a successor; but the party leader isn’t given a free pass. As noted above,
the Central CommiMee can override decisions made by the Secretary General.
General Secretary Trong was dealt his hand when the Central CommiMee elected at the
thirteenth party congress elected an eighteen member Politburo, instead of nineteen as
planned, out of some twenty to twenty-three candidates. The General Secretary needs a
majority of members to support his ini?a?ves. The resigna?on of Phuc as president and the
elec?on of Vo Van Thuong does not change the electoral calculus. Trong needs a majority of
the current sixteen member Politburo.
The President of Vietnam is not just a ceremonial role. The President is vested with
considerable power under the state Cons?tu?on to appoint and dismiss government officials.
But all of these powers are subject to ra?fica?on by the Na?onal Assembly.
Leadership Change in Vietnam
26
The President does not have any special powers as a member of the Politburo, even while he
may be considered one of the four pillars. In sum, the eleva?on of Vo Van Thuong to state
president does not ipso facto enhance the powers of the General Secretary. Assuming Thuong
was a protégé of the General Secretary prior to March 2023, he s?ll remains a protégé with
only one vote.
In sum, the evidence just isn’t there to make the asser?on that Nguyen Phu Trong is seeking
to stay on in power like Xi Jinping. Vietnam’s system of collec?ve leadership, in which the
General Secretary is primus inter pares is not about to be replaced with a system of one man
rule.
The best perspec?ve to evaluate General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’ mo?va?ons is that he
will re?re at the next na?onal party congress (or as some analysts claim at a mid-term party
congress). Trong’s drive against an?-corrup?on and nega?ve phenomena should be viewed as
his legacy to his life-long commitment to party-building.
Asser?on 3 – Vic?ms are Pro-Western and Pro-Business, General Secretary Trong and his
supporters lean towards China
The basis for the claim that the vic?ms of General Secretary’s an?-corrup?on campaign are
pro-western and pro-business is spurious. This claim is based on two major cases involving
Deputy Prime Ministers Pham Binh Minh and Vo Duc Dam who were educated in the United
States and Belgium, respec?vely.
Vietnam has seventeen strategic partners, including seven western countries (United
Kingdom, Italy, France, Germany, Spain, Australia. New Zealand) and two close U.S. allies,
Japan and South Korea.8 Minh served two terms as Foreign Minister, while Dam’s por£olio
included science, technology, informa?on, and communica?on. In sum, the two Deputy Prime
Ministers were only doing their jobs by interac?ng with “western countries” that collec?vely
make up over half of Vietnam’s strategic partners. In addi?on, these countries also include
major world economies and are members of the G7 and G20.
The argument that the vic?ms of Trong’s so-called “consolida?on of power” are pro-business
may be dismissed out of hand. In 2022, inves?ga?ve officials aMached to the an?-corrup?on
campaign that uncovered evidence of alleged fraud by execu?ves involved in corporate bond
issuance, equity trading and stock price manipula?on. In sum, Vietnam’s weak regulatory
system over the economic sector, including the private sector, created an environment for
corrup?on and evasion of the law and legal regula?ons. The fact that Vietnam, under General
Secretary Trong, is tackling corrup?on of all varie?es in including corporate crime should not
be read as an?-business. Under General Secretary Trong Vietnam has improved its ranking on
Transparency Interna?onal’s Percep?ons of Corrup?on Index; but Vietnam s?ll has a long way
to go as it is currently ranked 87th out of 180 countries ranked in 2021.
The high-profile resigna?ons of two Deputy Prime Ministers were not because they were probusiness but because they failed to supervise subordinates who were heavily involved in
highly emo?ve COVID-related corrupt prac?ces.
8
The other strategic partners include: Russia, China, India,Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the
Philippines.
Leadership Change in Vietnam
27
The asser?on that General Secretary Trong and his supporters lean towards China is equally
spurious. Vietnam consistently pursues a foreign policy of diversifying and mul?lateralizing its
external rela?ons through a network of seventeen strategic partnerships and an addi?onal
number of comprehensive partnerships.
Vietnam, with a popula?on of nearly 100 million, is comparable to a middle size province in
China. The two countries share land and mari?me borders. China is Vietnam’s largest trade
partner. Both are one-party states led by their respec?ve communist par?es. Both follow their
own brand of socialist ideology. The laMer two factors provide a special conduit for bilateral
rela?ons that are not available in Vietnam’s other foreign rela?ons. Xi Jinping is both General
Secretary of the party and President of state and this factor largely explains the role of
Vietnam’s party General Secretary Trong in rela?ons with China. Trong outranks Vietnam’s
state president and this gives him unique access to Xi.
Vietnam’s leaders are commiMed to pursuing rela?ons with China (and other countries) on
the basis of their na?onal interests and protec?ng Vietnam’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity. Mari?me disputes in the South China Sea are the main irritant in bilateral rela?ons
and both party leaders appear to be in agreement that South China Sea disputes should not
hold hostage the development of their broader bilateral rela?onship.
The fact that Vietnam’s leaders con?nually engage with their northern neighbour should not
be taken as an indica?on they are leaning towards China at the expense of their rela?ons with
the United States and other western countries. In sum, Vietnam’s engagement with China
should not be viewed as leaning towards China but prac?cal everyday realpoli?k.
Asser?on 4 – Greater Party Control Over the Economy
This asser?on begs the ques?on who is in control of the economy if not the Vietnam
Communist Party itself?
The key day-to-day locus of decision-making on economic maMers rests with the Prime
Minister and relevant ministers in the Cabinet. The Prime Minister is invariably a member of
the Politburo and several ministers are members of the Central CommiMee. There are party
commiMees in all of Vietnam’s ministries or equivalent organisa?ons as well as state-owned
enterprises and private sector businesses.
In March 2019, the VCP Secretariat issued Instruc?on No 33-CT/TW that underscored the
importance of party and government policies “to make private economic en??es into a driving
force for the country’s socialist-oriented market economy.” Instruc?on No 33-CT/TW called for
the crea?on of party cells and mass organisa?ons in all economic en??es opera?ng in
Vietnam.
Instruc?on No 33-CT/TW decreed that “party cells in private economic en??es should adopt
their own opera?onal agenda in line with the condi?ons and characteris?cs of each type of
enterprise. They must co-ordinate closely with the enterprises’ management boards and
follow their day to day ac?vi?es to ensure workers’ rights, obliga?ons and interests are
protected.”
The thirteenth na?onal party congress set the long-term objec?ves of the VCP. Subsequent
Politburo mee?ngs and Central CommiMee execu?ve sessions or plenums opera?onalize this
guidance by developing annual and five-year socio-economic development plans. The Central
CommiMee is advised by the Central Economic Commission and other bodies. The Na?onal
Leadership Change in Vietnam
28
Assembly revises or adopts new legisla?on to enact these plans according to direc?ons from
the VCP.
The VCP has long been commiMed to developing a socialist market economy by domes?c
reform (priva?sa?on of state-owned enterprises), aMrac?ng foreign direct investment, and
proac?ve interna?onal economic integra?on. In sum, it is difficult to see how the VCP could
assume more power over the economy than it already has.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam: Challenging Four Major Assump?ons About Recent Leadership
Change” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, March 7, 2023.