British Colonial Policy-Making towards Palestine (1929-1939)
Author(s): G. Sheffer
Source: Middle Eastern Studies , Oct., 1978, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Oct., 1978), pp. 307-322
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4282716
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British Colonial Policy-Making Towards Palestine
(1929-1939)
G. Sheffer
I
The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of both the process and
the contents of British policy-making towards the Palestinian question during a
decade of colonial rule (1929-1939). This period is particularly interesting and
amenable to this kind of treatment for three main reasons. First, by now we
may have gained a better historical perspective of events, partly as a result of
the availability of written evidence concerning the actors, processes and
contents of policies. Second, we are dealing with a sufficiently complex
phenomenon involving both British domestic and external factors during a
relatively long span of time. The complexity and the long span of time enable
us to study the dynamics of British policy-making and the changes in policies
over time. It should be noted that the period started with a comparative calm in
international affairs (and British predominance in the Middle East), but ended
with the apocalyptic storm of World War II (and encroachments on British
hegemony in the region). Third, we are now witnessing, especially in Israel,
the emergence of a revisionist school of academics who are re-examining the
history of Zionism, the development of the Yishuv, the accumulation of power
by the Jewish Labour Movement in Mandatory Palestine, and the history of
Jewish-Arab relations. The present article is a contribution to this trend.
Crucial decisions concerning Palestine were almost always made by the
Cabinet. However, the advice, upon which these decisions were based,
naturally emanated from other groups. Notwithstanding distinguishable areas
of responsibility within the Government, the locus at which a policy,
ultimately adopted, was shaped shifted according to changing circumstances. It
is our contention that the right time to influence decisions was that during the
formulation phase.
During the decade examined here, only once did the Cabinet itself act as a
group in the predecision stages of policy-making; that was during the
Palestinian Arab Rebellion of 1936. This happened because the course of
action jointly suggested by the Colonial and Foreign Offices, which were the
traditional sources of advice, was considered by the Cabinet as unsatisfactory.
Therefore the Cabinet itself considered alternative strategies and means for
their implementation.' The Cabinet's Palestine ad hoc committees acted as
bodies for deliberation over suggested strategies, that is they served as filters for
the Cabinet, rather than as groups for formulating strategies.
These observations, and those which will follow, are significant if one
attempts to gauge the Zionist Movement's or the Arab Palestinian's mistakes in
judging the most efficient ways of pressurizing the British in order to attain
their goals, or in identifying the locus of the most sensitive nerves of that
establishment.
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308
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II
The elite concerned with shaping policies towards Palestine consisted of
surprisingly small, identifiable and little-changing groups of ministers and
officials.
Of the three Prime Ministers who had occupied 10 Downing Street in the
1930's, only Ramsay MacDonald had persistently and personally participated
in the formulation of alternative policy options towards Palestine. He did so
only during his second Labour Government (1927-1931), but not during his
premiership in the National Governments. (The motives for his personal
participation will be later elaborated.) Baldwin left the Palestine question
entirely in the hands of the efficient and the much-trusted Cunliffe-Lister and
his officials in the Colonial Office. Chamberlain intervened only once. This was
in December 1937 when he gave his support to the general Middle East policy
favoured by Eden and the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office then suggested a
strategy which sharply contradicted the plans that the Colonial Office had
cherished for the future of the region and Palestine. However, the Prime
Minister's intervention was insufficient to bring about the immediate and final
rejection of the Peel Partition Plan which had been opposed by the Foreign
Office but accepted by the Colonial Office. The Prime Minister's intervention
helped only by speeding up the appointment of the Woodhead Commission, a
move to which the Colonial Office itself agreed at that time.2
Throughout our period, each Colonial Secretary took an active part in the
formulation of policies towards Palestine within the framework of his office.
Although Passfield has been thought of as a weak Secretary,3 he, nevertheless,
actively participated in the formulation of all major decisions, including that to
reject Sir John Chancellor's far-reaching proposals to alter radically the
Mandate to the Zionists' great disadvantage.4 Cunliffe-Lister's significant role
in policy formulation had not been noted by Jewish or Arab politicians at the
time, nor has it been noted by later historians of Palestine. In fact he, with the
help only of Sir Arthur Wauchope, shaped British policies in the period
between 1931-1935.5 In retrospect it may be concluded that Cunliffe-Lister
succeeded in achieving one of the government's central objectives, namely,
shifting the centre of activities, but not of decision-making, to Palestine.
Ormsby-Gore revived and advocated the idea of cantonisation which paved
the way to the Peel Partition Plan,6 and Malcolm MacDonald was more than
instrumental in the process which led to the rejection of that Plan.7
These successive Colonial Secretaries were assisted by an almost
unchanging small cluster of senior officials - notably among them were J
Shuckburgh, Cosmo Parkinson and Grattan Bushe - the Legal Adviser - and
by those in the Middle Eastern Department - in which 0. G. R. Williams
exercised much influence. The long tenure in office of these members of the
permanent staff resulted in a consistent approach to Palestine's problems. A
basic ingredient of this consistent approach was the concept of symmetrical
isolation; for Palestine, from both general Middle Eastern questions and from
the problems of the Jewish Diaspora. The idea of isolating Arab Palestine from
the maelstrom of Middle Eastern affairs was bound to clash at any time of real,
or imagined, crisis with the predisposition of the Foreign Office to look at the
region as an entity. On the other hand, the Foreign Office concurred whole-
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BRITISH POLICY-MAKING TOWARDS PALESTINE 309
heartedly with the second part of the conception, namely, the tendency to
isolate Palestine from the general Jewish problem.
In contrast, the formulation of policy towards Palestine within the Foreign
Office, was almost totally the concern of the officials there. The only Foreign
Secretary to play a decisive role in influencing British action was Henderson
who led the Labour Government to revise Passfield's White Paper of 1930.8
The senior officials responsible for the Office's views on Palestine were
Vansittart and Lancelot Oliphant (who was responsible for the Eastern
Department), and they were assisted by the Eastern Department. The veteran
head of that Department, George Rendel ( 1931-1938), became a pivotal force
within the Office and hence in the process as a whole during the period that
followed the rendering of the Peel Commission's report.9 Generally speaking,
the Foreign Office had come to exert significant influence on Britain's policy
only in the aftermath of the Abyssinian War, when Italy's success began to
pose a challenge to British predominance in the Red Sea region and therefore
potentially in the Middle East itself. Until then the Office resented any idea that
it, rather than the Colonial Office, should shoulder all responsibilities for the
administration of or for the actual policies towards Palestine. Foreign Office
apprehensions regarding the behaviour of the Arab states in case of a World
War, increased its interest in Palestine and contributed to the breaking of the
first part of the conception of symmetrical isolation.
The lack of effective inter-departmental co-ordination procedures in the
process of policy formulation afforded additional governmental agencies scope
to intervene. At times they were even able to persuade the Cabinet to follow
their advice rather than that of the Colonial or the Foreign Office which were
traditionally regarded as being responsible for that region. Such intervention
occurred when certain departments felt that changes in the political
environment liable to influence Palestine, impinged on matters within their
jurisdiction. For instance, against the background of the Depression during the
early 1930's, the Labour Government accepted the Exchequer's objection to
the implementation of Hope Simpson's recommendations for lavish British
investment in the development of Palestine.10 This had far-reaching
consequences such as that of the final form of Passfield's White Paper. The
final text of that White Paper differed substantially from the original Colonial
Office's draft.1' Again, during the Arab general strike of 1936, the Cabinet
went some way towards adopting the view of the Services which, unlike the
Colonial and Foreign Offices, were averse to concessions to the Arabs,
particularly regarding the cessation of Jewish immigration."2 Furthermore,
desiderata formulated by the Chiefs-of-Staff decisively influenced the Peel
Commission's territorial recommendations.'3 Finally, at their persuasion,
Malcolm MacDonald adopted his 'dual policy' i.e. the simultaneous use of
massive force and political placation in order to quell the Arab Rebellion
towards the end of 1938. This was done in the light of the Chiefs-of-Staff
estimates concerning the probable outbreak of the Second World War.'4
The High Commissioners in Palestine (whether strong or weak) had an
influential share in the process of policy-shaping. Their significant position in
the system stemmed mainly from their direct personal control of the main
formal channels of communication between Palestine and London.
Considering the traditional hierarchical British system, this meant that t
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were able to transmit to London, unchecked, their own personal impressions
of events (particularly concerning the two communities which were locked in
combat) and suggestions for strategies or discrete policies. In fact the High
Commissioners alone belonged to the two distinctive subsystems comprising
the British policy-making system. Therefore, the introvert Chancellor and the
sociable Wauchope, who were both unmistakably politically attuned,
contributed much to the policy of the Home Government. Chancellor did so by
arousing antagonism in London by his radical proposals for alteration of the
Mandate, though not so strongly as to check London's readiness to
compromise with some of his short term suggestions.Is Wauchope contr
to policy formation by complementing Cunliffe-Lister's ideas and by
transmitting motions acceptable in Whitehall until the Arab Rebellion
gathered momentum. The withdrawn MacMichael contented himself with
executing policies formulated by his chiefs in Whitehall.
III
As in other questions of imperial and foreign policy, governing Palestine was
the peculiar concern and the undivided responsibility of the executive.
Although the Government was regularly questioned in Parliament about
Palestine affairs, and its policies were reviewed and criticized by M.P.'s in
general and by Select Committees on Estimates, policy towards that territory
was determined in Whitehall. Hence, although parliamentary factions exerted
pressures on policy makers, Parliament could not be regarded as a locus of
power in that process. For as long as a Government's majority was secure it
was unfettered in formulating and implementing its own decisions. Thus, only
Ramsay MacDonald's second Labour Government - a minority Government
- was responsive to direct parliamentary pressures. Inter-party politics
influenced this Government's decisions vis-d-vis Palestine during the first part
of 1930,16 while internal Labour politics partly caused the withdrawal from
Passfield's White Paper and led to the 'Black Letter'.'7 However, even this
form of pressure was effective only when accompanied by other cumulative
pressures coming either from international or other domestic sources.
Organized public opinion represented in Parliament evolved attitudes towards
Britain's Palestine policy in a manner generally unconnected with party
affiliation. This means that we cannot identify either the Labour or the
Conservatives as pro-Arab or pro-Zionist, but that we have to examine crossparty associations. Contrary to widely-held views about Parliament's complete
support of the Zionists, there existed an organised anti-Zionist lobby in the
Commons. This lobby became active as from the early 1930's - during the
Arab Rebellion of the mid-1930's this group was even encouraged by the
Government.'8 Thus, the idea that the Agency or the Jews exercised an
overwhelming influence on the British Government through the pro-Zionist
lobby has been grossly exaggerated. Zionist influence was inflated by certain
Zionist leaders' vanity about the exercise of such influence and by the need for
their political strategy. By creating the impression that they were able to
influence Parliament they had, short-sightedly, we believe, thought to deter or
to persuade officialdom as the circumstances required. However, it was true
that the Zionists benefited by the readiness of the Opposition (or opposition
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BRITISH POLICY-MAKING TOWARDS PALESTINE 311
groups within the reigning party) to attack
means of furthering domestic party ends.
important example of this phenomenon, and the case of the pressures that
Bevin and the T.U.C. exerted on the Government to withdraw from the
Passfield White Paper before the important Whitechapal by-election of 1930 is
another telling example of this pattern).19 Generally, this writer could find n
evidence that British Jewry successfully pressurised the Government into
changing any major decision. The 'irresistible Jewish pressure' is thus again a
myth that well-wishers of Zionism as well as their opponents created and
maintained out of opposing purposes. Finally, in this context it should be
added that the pro-Arab lobby was not very successful in its efforts.
To attribute the same measure of British public interest in Palestine shown
during the years following the Second World War to an earlier period would
be a mistake. Recurring unrest in Palestine of the 1930's took place against a
background of almost total ignorance on the part of the majority of the British
public. Detailed information about current events in that territory was
transmitted neither by the B.B.C. nor by the popular press. Apart from British
Jewish publications, informed discussion of Palestinian problems was to be
found only in quality newspapers such as The Times, and to a somewhat lesser
degree in The Manchester Guardian; quite naturally, this was also mainly so
during periods of acute unrest there. The B.B.C. and the quality newspapers
were generally sympathetic to the Government's policies and to Britain's
Zionist policy in particular. In any case, these media were content to rely upon
official sources of information and reached only a select minority within
Britain.
IV
We will turn next to the influence of the international environment on British
policy-makers. In the 1930's Britain's economic well-being and her status as a
major power depended to a large extent on possessing a colonial empire,
including the mandated territories she acquired as a result of World War I.
However, by that time Britain's effective control and leadership of the White
Dominions had already begun to wane. The sensitive official class in Whitehall
therefore came to regard any attack on the empire or encroachments on
Britain's hegemony in the mandated territories as an attack upon Britain itself.
Thus, this class came to see the integrity of the empire as the equivalent of
defending one of the nation's most vital interests. Palestine, because of its
geostrategic location, its potential as a market for Britain's exports and
investments, its centrality for both the Moslems and Jews and because of
diplomatic considerations connected to Britain's obligations to the League, was
seen by London as an integral part of that national interest. However, granted
that the maintenance of Britain's rule in Palestine was her chief objective, the
idea of Trusteeship and the obligation to that international organisation was
not only relegated to a secondary place but was used as a means to justify
continued rule when attacked either by Jews or Arabs or by domestic fringe
political groups.
The conviction that Palestine was a vital and integral part of Britain's
national interest was firm and unshaken by challenge whether from within or
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outside Britain. The U.S.A., the Commonwealth, and the main European
powers, with the only exception of Italy, all recognized Palestine's semi-formal
annexation. The group that was theoretically in a position to deny the totality
of British supremacy in Palestine - the Permanent Mandates Commission never did so. For it should be remembered that Britain was a very important
member of this Commission and a firm supporter of the League of Nations.
Britain was thus unchallenged by other world powers. She was equally
unchallenged by the two warring communities in Palestine. Until the 1937
Peel partition plan the Yishuv did not - as a body - put forward any official
demand for the creation of an independent Jewish State and for the departure
of the British. Even after 1937, though the Zionists' official policy was that of
support of the partition plan many of the Jewish leaders, including Ben
Gurion, thought in terms of British-Jewish partnership within the framework
of the British Commonwealth. Until the early 1940's the Agency was
laboriously engaged in securing the goodwill of Britain offering her their
undivided loyalty. Furthermore, during the prelude to the Holocaust
(1933-1939) the Agency did not seriously challenge the British principle of
isolating Palestine from solutions of the general Jewish problem. This meant,
for instance, that the Agency did not challenge the immigration policy. Their
debates with the Government were over numbers of Jewish immigrants, not
over the principles that governed the allocation of immigration permits.
Similarly, the Agency did not attack the principles behind Britain's land policy
in Palestine - they merely argued about specifics.
Regarding the Arab Palestinian leadership, it is true that towards the end of
1935 they were publicly and vehemently disputing the British conception of
indefinitely ruling Palestine. Nevertheless, it is clear that they thought
about independence not in terms of short range achievement but only as an
ultimate and a remote political possibility. Thus, we maintain that the main
causes for the Arab Rebellion were not connected with British rule in Palestine
but rather with the internal radicalization of the Arab community and with
internal inter-party politics. At the time the Arab Palestinian potential
supporters - the Arab independent and semi-independent states (especially
Saudi Arabi and Iraq) had not seriously conceived of an independent Arab
State in Palestine. In fact, during 1937 and 1938, it became clear that they were
averse to any such idea as this might hamper their own long-term plans for the
future shape of the Middle East. But, the suggestions for partition caused a
furore in the Arab Middle East, the result being that the British had to consider
the implications of their policy in Palestine for their relations with the Arab
countries. Hence, the British policy-making elite felt entitled rigidly to maintain
those notions without significant opposition from those quarters.
While on the subject of inflexible British unchanging conceptions, it is
worth mentioning another, that policy-makers neither reviewed nor revised
throughout our period, namely, their respective images of both the Arab and
Jewish communities. Neither in Palestine nor in London did British senior
officials conceive either community as a militant national movement.
Because the Jewish Agency operated through an established and legal
political-diplomatic machinery in London (which resembled in its manner of
operation other interest groups) and because the Agency was far from
employing violent guerilla tactics, the British viewed it as just another
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BRITISH POLICY-MAKING TOWARDS PALESTINE 313
organised interest group. The Arab community in Palestine was conceived,
even after 1936, as a loose, and therefore manageable, conglomeration of
competing and conflicting factions. A Palestinian national revolt was ruled out.
The British were mostly apprehensive of riots with religious undertones rather
than on national grounds. Furthermore, they were certain that difficulties with
that community could be confined to the local level.
These almost unchanging images contributed to mistaken estimates about
the possible behaviour of both communities and therefore this was a source of
weakness in the process of policy-making. Policy-makers, at least in London,
adhered to these notions in spite of the political, social and economic
transformation that the two communities underwent during the first half o
the decade. This led officials in Whitehall to believe that they themselves, and
their man-on-the-spot could deal effectively with the Zionist interest group an
with the Arab community respectively.
During the first half of the decade (1931-1936) the preferred means for
dealing with the communities were the 'politics of notables', introduced by
Wauchope,20 and the threat to deploy additional military forces. But these
mistaken notions led to three years of disorder in Palestine (1936-1938).
Paradoxically, in dealing with the Arab Rebellion, this classic pragmatic
approach representing the wish to keep open as many options as possible and
of maximising the number of means for coping with such situations, was
mistakenly reduced to a single gambit, that of supporting one section of the
Arab community, (the Husaynis) and of adopting a conciliatory line towards
that section alone.
During the second half of the decade (1936-1939), changed conditions
caused London to alter its tactics. Now it set out to secure the support of the
Arab rulers, thus breaking the symmetry of the principle of symmetrical
isolation of Palestine, but otherwise it did not basically change its attitudes and
methods vis-a-vis the warring communities. Thus, in the late 1930's, even
though there were virtually no serious doubts concerning the fundamental
notion that Palestine was essential to Britain's long-term national interests, the
British domestic and external environments supplied two kinds of input which
influenced British policy-makers to think that there was a need for short-term
adjustment of policies. Direct and indirect pressure was exerted first by the
Arabs and then by the Jews, and in addition by the Arab states and by
European countries (mainly by Italy). Secondly, and according to our view, of
greater impact were the inputs emanating from the psychological environment
of the policy-makers in London themselves. These inputs were not the product
of the developments connected directly with Palestine but were produced by
cumulative changes in the policy-makers' long-range predictions and estimates
of the trends in international politics in Europe and in the Middle East. The
realisation that the Second World War was unavoidable, the detection
(although mistaken) of strong subterranean pan-Arab trends in the region
helped to reshape their notions. An understanding of these changes is
necessary to grasp the rearrangement of short term objectives of British policy
and of the new means that the policy-makers intended to employ in order to
attain these ends. Lastly, it should be re-emphasised, that the long-term
objectives cherished by the British regarding Palestine, remained almost
unaltered.
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Up to this point in the present article we have tried to portray the more static
aspects of the structure of policy-making, the actors, and their basic images and
notions. The following pages will attempt to deal with the dynamics of the
process. Thus, we will try to summarise briefly the changes that occurred in
the images which were formulated in policy objectives and the changing
means that were proposed for their achievement in each of the following four
periods: 1929-1931; 1931-1935; 1936-1937 and 1938-1939.
V
It passed almost unnoticed that during the span of life of Ramsay MacDonald's
second Labour Government, London came to conceive of Palestine's strategic
value as greater than it had previously thought.21 This new evaluation emerged
against the background of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations of 1928-1930, and
Britain's own plans to grant independence to Iraq in 1932.
The international scene was at this time relatively calm and hence the
possibility of international interference in Palestinian affairs remote (except f
continuous Italian representations regarding her share in the Palestinian
market). Therefore, the pressures exerted on Whitehall both by the 'man-onthe-spot' and by groups within Britain were bound to loom large and to be
taken seriously.
In these circumstances, the proposals for drastic changes in the form of the
Mandate for Palestine which were put forward by Sir John Chancellor
immediately after the 1929 disturbances, caused quite a stir.22
The proposals, aimed at guaranteeing the Arabs the status of a permanent
majority in Palestine, were generated by Chancellor's psychological
identification with that community, and his wish to leave Palestine as soon as
possible which depended on his quelling the Arabs.23 Predictably, these
proposals were rejected by Passfield himself at the Colonial Office level.24
Contrary to the myths concerning Passfield's opposition to the British Zionist
policy, even he could not endorse Chancellor's drastic proposals which, if
implemented, would have ultimately caused the termination of British rule.
However, in order to placate Chancellor, Passfield was ready to meet him, and
consequently the Arabs, half-way. The ensuing short-lived concessions to the
Arabs in the form of temporary restrictions on the growth of the Yishuv, -
announced in May 193025 - caused the Jews to bring pressure to bear on
London. Mainly because of the weakness of the Labour Government, the
intervention of the Opposition in April-May 1930, prevented the Government
from pursuing this line.26 Consequently Whitehall started to seek a formula
which would be acceptable to Chancellor, the Arabs and the Jews. Hope-
Simpson's original plan for lavish British investment in a development scheme
for Palestine seemed to be a proper solution.27
However, the execution of Hope Simpson's proposals was blocked by the
Exchequer28 on grounds of the worsening economic conditions which were
connected to the obvious signs of the approaching Depression - this proposal
contradicted colonial traditions regarding investment in remote and underdeveloped territories.
This veto resulted in Passfield's famous White Paper29 (or rather Snowden's
White Paper) and the inevitable Jewish storm that followed (coming from
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BRITISH POLICY-MAKING TOWARDS PALESTINE 315
both Zionist and non-Zionist quarters as a result of the enlargement of the
Agency in 1929). In the ensuing retreat from that particular White Paper, one
can discern the major influence exercised by implicit assumptions upon actual
decision-making. For instance: Ramsay MacDonald's unfounded notion of
Jewish influence over U.S. policy and world finances, and his general view on
the best methods of dealing with conflicts; Arthur Henderson's anxiety
regarding Britain's, and his own, reputation at the League of Nations, and,
more important, his reluctance to expose Britain to international arbitration
regarding colonial or imperial matters. (This was advocated by Hailsham and
Simon in a letter to The Times,30 and in our view, this letter, more than any
other pressure, brought about the retreat from the White Paper.)3' Finally, the
knowledge shared by MacDonald and Henderson of the precarious position of
the Government and its susceptibility to I.L. and T.U.C. pressures. These
factors, and not merely Jewish pressures, played a decisive role in the Cabinet's
decision to withdraw from the policy proclaimed in the 1930 White Paper.
While the British were conducting their retreat, the Jews succeeded in
restoring the status quo ante. In the Arab camp the Husayni faction was
compensated by its permanent establishment at the controls of the supreme
Moslem Council, and more significantly of the Waqf funds.
Although the policy of conciliation towards both communities brought
about a period of temporary calm in Palestine (which enabled Chancellor to
leave earlier than was envisaged), it was to become the root cause of future
difficulties in the later 1930's. For by adopting this policy, the Home
Government abundantly demonstrated its willingness to deal with the intercommunal conflict in Palestine by employing conciliatory measures. This
policy had been regarded by Whitehall as the cheapest means for securing
long-term objectives, but was differently interpreted by the Jews and the
Arabs.
More specifically, by finally installing the Mufti as President of the Moslem
Council, in charge of the Waqf for an indefinite period, and thus putting
additional power into the hand of his faction, the Government unintentionally
added an important ingredient of permanent tension within the Arab
community, as it aroused the competing factions. On the other hand, their
wish to shift the centre of political activities to Palestine as a result of
Whitehall's dislike of direct Zionist pressure,32 paved the way to the
implementation of Wauchope's Policy of Notables, which in its turn proved
instrumental in aggravating the Arab Rebellion of 1936.
To say a1I this is not to suggest that by restraining the two communities the
Government could have solved the Arab-Jewish conflict; however, this might
have prevented the gradual radicalisation of the Arabs and the growth of the
Jewish Labour movement in Palestine - two processes that cumulatively
contributed to the violent outbreak of 1936-1938.
VI
During MacDonald's National Governments, and Wauchope's first term of
office in Palestine, (1931-1935), Whitehall did not alter its basic notion
concerning Palestine's importance in the imperial framework. Quite the
contrary, this importance steadily grew in Whitehall's perception.
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However, three major developments respectively in the international,
Palestinian and domestic environment had a bearing on the attitudes of the
policy-making elite, and hence on the Government's policy towards Palestine.
These new factors were: first, the world Depression; secondly, the deliberate
British attempt to transfer the centre of political activities to Palestine; and
thirdly, towards the end of the period, Italy's success in Abyssinia.
First, the impact of the Depression on British policy: this major
development reinforced the then Colonial Secretary's (Cunliffe-Lister)
predisposition, that the problems of the colonial empire were primarily
economic.33 The implications of this concept for Palestine were profound. His
general outlook on colonial problems, as applied to Palestine, produced a
tendency to relax the regulations concerning Jewish immigration, and the
related land sales to the Jews. By approving larger Labour Schedules CunliffeLister hoped to transform Palestine into a self-sufficient economic unit which
would become, as a result of larger Jewish capital imports, less dependent on
the British tax-payer's purse. Wauchope himself supplemented his master's
approach towards the question of Jewish immigration by promoting his own
ideas about the ultimate need for conciliation (assimilation according to his
terminology) of more or less numerically equal communities.34
Wauchope strove to facilitate the achievement of this goal by governing the
territory through the notables of both communities. The notion of governing
Palestine through notables was firmly anchored in the fixed British view
regarding the political features of each community - namely inherent British
inability to perceive the two communities as opposing national entities.
These views, more than the advent of the Nazis to power in Germany,
brought about the decision to admit large numbers of Jewish immigrants into
Palestine from 1932 (and not 1933) to 1935 (and not 1936). Therefore, it
should be emphasised here that a meaningful increase in Jewish immigration
occurred almost one year before the Nazi rise to power, and the significant
decrease in Jewish immigration occurred before the outbreak of the 1936 Arab
Rebellion. The decisions for both the increase and decrease of immigration
rates were made out of political and economic considerations.
The implementation of Wauchope's politics of notables succeeded, partly
because it coincided with a tendency within the Zionist movement. This
happened during 1930-1933 when the Labour movement in Palestine, and
Mapai in particular under the leadership of Ben Gurion emerged as the leading
force within the Zionist movement. The centre of this movement was in
Palestine; naturally, therefore, its leaders greeted the British decision to
transfer the centre of political activities to that country favourably, and were
more than merely satisfied with Wauchope's eagerness to establish close
relations with them.
Nevertheless, we believe that Wauchope's policy contributed heavily to the
outbreak of the Arab Rebellion. Moreover, his unfounded confidence that he
would be able to control the Arab notables added to the prolongation of the
Rebellion in 1936 and to its second outbreak in 1937 - for Wauchope
cultivated his relations with only one faction within the Arab community,
namely, the Husaynis. This enhanced the internal radicalisation of the
community as a whole, and this, rather than the mere opposition to the growth
of the Yishuv, was one of the main reasons for the outbreak of the Arab
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BRITISH POLICY-MAKING TOWARDS PALESTINE 317
Rebellion. Wauchope's wish, and that of his new master, Ormsby-Gore, to
maintain, almost at any cost, supreme control over the government in
Palestine rather than hand it over to the military,35 prevented the Britis
quelling the Rebellion at an early stage.
Towards the end of this period Italy's successful pursuit of her imperial
ambitions in Africa generated continuous Foreign Office concern about the
conduct of Middle Eastern and particularly Palestinian affairs. Consequently,
the Foreign Office increasingly and continuously intervened in the formulation
and handling of actual policy towards Palestine. The Foreign Office's concern
was coloured by its fear that the Middle East might cease to be an impregnable
bastion of British imperial power. This image was created both by a feeling of
guilt about Britain's inadequate political diplomatic reactions to Italy's deeper
penetration into the Red Sea area, and by fears of a possible worsening of the
international climate in Europe.
These fears resulted in tacit British consent to, and encouragement of, the
Arab rulers' intervention in Palestine.36 Whereas until 1936 the British
Government had successfully conducted its policy of symmetrical isolation,
both from regional Arab interference, and from linking the fate of Palestine to
a solution of the general Jewish problem - after the Abyssinian crisis, the
Government itself (though with some initial reluctance) threw the Palestine
question into the regional arena.
In this context we may add, that the Arab rulers intervened in Palestine, not
because of a great concern for the fate of their Palestinian brethren, but rather
to further their own interests. However, there was one common factor - they
all strove to stop the Palestinian Rebellion rather than to fan it. Thus, Iraq and
Saudi Arabia offered to mediate between the Palestinians and the British partly
because of their rivalry for leadership in the Arab World, and partly because of
their internal problems and their special relations with Britain.37 Egypt offered
its good services in order to quell the Rebellion, because of its fears that a
considerable part of the British troops stationed along the Canal would be
transferred to Palestine.38 Syrian leaders emphatically rejected Palestinian
requests for support because of their fears that the British Government would
suspect its help to their cause.39 Hence, what was interpreted by some
historians (mainly British of the Chatham House School) as Pan-Arab unity
regarding Palestine, had in reality been a sign of disunity and competition
between rival governments. In any case, the Arab rulers' intervention created
a new dimension of the Palestinian problem.
VII
Against the background of ever-increasing British worries in 1936, a need was
felt in Whitehall to solve the Palestine question in a more fundamental manner
than traditional adjustments to their rigid, long-range policy. Not surprisingly,
this task evolved on a Royal Commission. After the termination of the Arab
strike of 1936, which was achieved by a combination of internal pressures
within the Arab community, the threat of military force and the Arab rulers'
mediation, the Peel Commission was able to start its work in Palestine. The
Peel Commission indeed attempted to change drastically the Palestine
environment. However, the Commission's partition plan constituted neither a
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318
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novel approach nor a revolutionary change, nor a genuine attempt at solving
the problem for good.
The partition plan was only a further logical step beyond the idea of cantonization which the Colonial Office advocated at that time and which the Colonial
Secretary suggested to the Peel Commission before it left Britain for Palestine.40
The same pattern can be discerned in the way in which Victor Jacobson, for
instance, developed his own ideas concerning partition in the early 1930's.
Furthermore, in its final formthe plan,4' which had been reached after thorough
consultations with the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff,42 was primarily
designed to safeguard British imperial interests, and only secondly aimed at
solving the inter-communal conflict. The suggested system of British enclaves
(the Aqaba enclave, the Jerusalem-Jaffa corridor, the Nazareth and Tiberias
enclaves) was intended to secure British military-strategic aims in Palestine.
The inclusion of the Negev in the proposed Arab state, and the inclusion of the
Galilee in the proposed Jewish state, were aimed at pacifying the neighbouring
Arab countries, especially Ibn-Saud, rather than as a rational solution based on
the actual territorial division between Jews and Arabs.
The plan caused sharp reactions in the regional and other opposition
countries: a) because of the suggestion contained in the Peel report to combin
the proposed Arab state with Transjordan under Hashemite rule; b) because of
the profound opposition of the Arab Palestinian community to the inclusion of
the densely Arab-populated Galilee within the boundaries of the Jewish state;
c) it also stimulated the Foreign Office to reconsider its views on the desirab
future political shape of the Middle East as a whole. This reconsideration
brought the Foreign Office to vehement opposition of the plan, after initial
consent.43 The Office had concluded that it detected strong pan-Arab feelings in
the area and therefore an Arab confederation, or a federation, rather than
national states, was the best means of securing British interests. Further, the
Foreign Office's profound opposition to the emergence of new national states
in the Middle East may have been an expression of their reactions to the
emergence of the two aggressive dictatorships in Europe. This concept strongly
clashed with the views held by the Colonial Office. The latter advocated that
the British Government should encourage the creation and support the
existence of separate national states, including a Jewish State. According to
their views, a disunited Arab world would best suit British interests.44
This interdepartmental clash was not resolved in December 1937 when the
British Cabinet decided to appoint the Woodhead Commission in order to
revise the partition plan.45 The partition plan was not shelved towards the end
of 1937, but towards the end of 1938 and against the background of Munich.46
In the meantime, in Palestine, the British introduced a double-edged policy
of simultaneously using military force and political pressures on the Arab
community.47 This was done in order to suppress the fresh outburst of the
Rebellion in 1937. This policy resulted in the expulsion of Arab leaders and the
'secret' withdrawal of the Mufti from Jerusalem to Lebanon. And these
developments brought about a period of bitter internal strife within the Arab
Community which resulted in its considerable weakening as a political unit.
Therefore the concessions made by the British to the Arabs through the May
1939 White Paper were not aimed exclusively at this shattered community but
primarily at the Arab states in the region.
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BRITISH POLICY-MAKING TOWARDS PALESTINE 319
The British withdrawal from support of the
accepted after a heart-searching debate with
the Jewish side to feel embittered towards t
though the British maintained the principle of isolating Palestine from the
solution of the Jewish problem, the approaching World War induced the Jews
to offer, once again, their undivided loyalty to Britain.
VIII
During the last period surveyed in this article (1937-1939), the German
menace in Europe, coupled with Italy's threats to Britain's Mediterranean and
Middle Eastern dominance loomed larger than any other factor in the minds of
the British policy-making elite. Consequently, Whitehall considered the
maintenance of Arab goodwill and calm in Palestine to be the cornerstone of
Britain's regional policy.48 Therefore, whereas formerly only the Foreign Office
had cherished the notion of an Arab federation, this was now widely accepted
by other Departments, including the Colonial Office.49
In this climate of opinion and especially when it was not clear whether the
British would succeed in buying time by negotiations with Hitler over Central
Europe and thus postponing the outbreak of a European war, it was almost
inevitable that the partition plan would die. This was so because it was
believed that the establishment of Jewish and Arab states might upset the
status quo in the Middle East, not to mention the long-term schemes that had
been nursed by Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, as the world horizon was
not clear and British military capability was limited, London was far from
enthusiastic about getting involved in a partition plan - a plan, which at least
would have dictated the enforcement of the transfer of Arabs from the densely
Arab-populated region of Galilee which had been suggested as a part of the
Jewish state.
The shelving of the partition plan occurred indeed in September 1938 just
before Munich. By then the Colonial Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald, had
dispatched to Palestine and to British Legations in the region a draft statement
to the effect that the partition plan would be officially rejected in the case of the
actual outbreak of a European war.50 After Munich, when it became clear to
the British that they had only postponed that war, they saw no point in
reviving the partition plan; especially as the various British Legations in the
region enthusiastically greeted the withdrawal of the plan.51
The British Government was assured that by rejecting partition they had
protected the Middle East against upsets. The notions underlying this last
adjustment of their long-range policy to changing circumstances were:
conciliation, playing safe, and sticking to the familiar. Guided by such views,
Whitehall started to prepare the ground for the 1939 London Conference on
Palestine that ultimately led to the 1939 White Paper.52 In Palestine itself the
Government employed repressive measures and political means to quell the
remaining pockets of Arab rebellion.
It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the outcome of this policy
during the first stages of World War II. Opinions are divided. Some regard this
policy as a success, but we share the doubts whether the rejection of partition,
and the temporary restrictions on the growth of the Yishuv were the real
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320
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factors that ensured Arab neutrality and loyalty at the beginning of the war.
We would like, however, to suggest two hypotheses regarding the
developments of the Middle Eastern question during and after World War II.
The first is, that notions concerning the desirability of Arab federation
(although temporarily neglected during World War II), persisted and were
revived, ultimately forming the basis for the Arab League. The second
hypothesis which can be substantiated by documentary evidence is, that in
1939 the British had no intention of permanently crystallizing the Jewish
National Home, but only to implement a policy which would help them
overcome the years of World War II.5"
Ix
When assessing British policy towards Palestine from a strictly British point of
view, it may be concluded that their essential objective, namely the
maintenance of British rule over Palestine at minimal cost and for an indefinite
period, was achieved. However, the British Government had made some
costly tactical errors, chiefly by their endorsement of Wauchope's method for
governing Palestine.
When assessing British policy from the point of view of the emerging ArabJewish conflict, failure seems to have been more complete. We do not maintain
that the British could have prevented or solved this conflict. However, the
Government at times completely disregarded and otherwise failed to correctly
estimate the impact of social and economic developments on the political fabric
of intra- and inter-communal politics. Consequently the British belief -
unchanged until after World War II - that the communities were somehow
manageable, hampered the early creation of two separate states. Indeed, this
misconception may have lost Britain an opportunity of moderating the conflict
in a realistic manner. But then, cumulative and simultaneous changes in the
international and domestic spheres and in the psychological environment of
decision-makers in Whitehall, more than actual developments in Palestine and
in the region, dictated adjustments in British policies towards Palestine.
NOTES
1. See for instance Cab. Con. 36(26), 51(36) and 52(36). Crown copyright records reproduced
by permission of Controller, H.M. Stationery Office.
2. See Cab. Con. 46(37).
3. See for instance Chancellor's appreciation in his draft memoirs; Chancellor's private papers,
Rhodes House, Oxford 18/2.
4. Chancellor's memorandum of the 17 Jan. 1930 is in C.O. 733 183 77050/B; for Passfield's
views, see Webb. B., Cole, M. (ed.), Beatrice Webb's Diaries 1924-32 London, 1956, pp.
215-216; Passfield to Ramsay MacDonald 24 Mar. 1930, C.O. 733 183 77050/B.
5. See his own minute on his intentions regarding future policy in Palestine, 17 Jan. 1931, C.O.
733 215 97050/B; for the futility in pressurizing him, see for instance Brodetsky, S. Memoirs.
From Ghetto to Israel London, 1960, pp. 156-157; and see Middlemas, J. and Barnes, J. Baldwin,
A Biography London, 1969, pp. 623, 629, 630, 631., and Viscount Swinton (the title taken by
Cunliffe-Lister when he became a peer), I Remember London, 1948, p. 64.
6. He mentioned it already in 1936. See Ormsby-Gore to Wauchope 10 June 1936, C.O. 733
297 75156. Pt. III, and see the Minutes of a meeting between Weizmann, Ben Gurion and
Ormsby-Gore held on 30 June 1936 in C.O. 733 297 75156.
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BRITISH POLICY-MAKING TOWARDS PALESTINE 321
7. See the minutes of the interdepartmental secret meetings held during Oct. 1938 in F.O. 371
12864.
8. Cab. Con. 66(30), 6 Nov. 1930.
9. Palestine Royal Commission Report, Cmd. 5479, 1937.
10. Dated Aug. 18. 1930 it was included in C.P. 301 (30) 15 Sept. 1930.
1 1. For instance, the following passage was omitted: 'There is reason to hope that if such
development is undertaken in accordance with a definite plan, there will unquestionably be
sufficient land for an Arab population increasing ... and for additional Jewish settlement.' The
corrected drafts in C.O. 733 183 67050/B.
12. Cab. Con. 51(36) 10 July 1936.
13. See the Chiefs-of-Staff memo, 'Strategical Aspects of the Partition of Palestine,' 14 Feb.
1938, F.O. 371 21870, Playfair, History of the Second World War. The Mediterranean and the
Middle East, Vol. I. London, 1954, pp. 14-16, see also Hore Belisha's confirmation that the
Commission consulted the Services, Hansard, Vol. 326, cols. 3839-40.
14. See the minutes of the interdepartmental secret meetings held in October 1938, especially
the minutes of the 1st meeting, 7 Oct. and the 3rd meeting 8 Oct. in F.O. 371 12864.
15. Passfield to Chancellor 29 Mar. 1930, C.O. 733 183 77050/B.
16. See for instance Ramsay MacDonald to Passfield 19 Mar. 1930. C.O. 733 183 77050/B and
Cab. Con. 18(30) 2 Apr. 1930.
17. For its text see Hansard, Vol. 248, cols. 755-757. For pressure exerted by Bevin to satisfy
the Jews on the background of the Whitechapel by-elections, see Bullock. A. The Life and Times of
Ernest Bevin (London, 1960) part I, pp. 455-457.
18. Ormsby-Gore's private letter to Wauchope, 30 Jul. 1936, C.O. 733 297 75156.
19. See Note 17 above.
20. See Sheffer, G. 'Policy Making and British Policies Towards Palestine 1929-1939'
(unpublished thesis, Oxford 1970), pp. 132-190.
21. See Williams' minute 31 Jan. 1930, C.O. 733 183 77050, and Malkin's minute 10 Mar.
1930, F.O. 371 14485.
22. Shuckburgh to Wilson 1 Feb. 1930, C.O. 733 183 77050.
23. Chancellor's letter to his son, 21 Feb. 1930, Chancellor, R.H. 16/3.
24. See Note 4 above.
25. C.P. 151(30), Cab. Con. 27(30) 14 May 1930.
26. See infra p. 309.
27. 18 Aug. 1930. It was included later in C.P. 301(30) Sep. 1930.
28. C.P. 301(30), Cab. Con. 54(30), 19 Sept. 1930.
29. Palestine Statement of Policy, Cmd. 3692, 1930., see also ESCO, Vol. II, pp. 644-648.
30. The Times, 4 Nov. 1930.
31. See infra pp. 310-11.
32. Passfield to MacDonald 24 July 1931, C.O. 733 197 87050.
33. Swinton, Viscount, I Remember London, 1948, p. 65 also the Earl of Swinton, Sixty Years
of Power London, 1966 p. 103.
34. Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore 24 June 1936, C.O. 733 297 75156 Part III.
35. See for instance Ormsby-Gore to Wauchope 3 June 1936, C.O. 733 297 75156.
36. Referring here to the second phase of the intervention which started on August 1936,
Bateman to Wauchope 17 Aug. 1936 (copy), C.O. 733 314 75528/ and see Bateman to Rendel, I
Sept. 1936, F.O. 371 20025.
37. See Sheffer. G. 'Saudi Arabia and the Palestine Problem During the Arab Rebellion,
1936-1939'. Hamizrah Hechadash, Vol. 22. No. 2. 1972.
38. See minutes of Nahas Pasha's talk with Ormsby-Gore 28 Aug. 1936 (copy), F.O. 371
20024.
39. MacKereth to Wauchope 21 Apr. 1936, C.O. 733 310 75528.
40. See infra p. 309.
41. Palestine Royal Commission Report. 1937.
42. See infra p. 309.
43. See Rendel's memo of 21 Sept. 1937, F.O. 371 20814.
44. Ormsby-Gore to Chamberlain, 9 June 1938, F.O. 371 21862.
45. Cab. Con. 46(37) 8 Dec. 1937.
46. Malcolm MacDonald to O.A.G. Palestine 10 Oct. 1938 (copy), F.O. 371 21864.
47. See MacDonald to High Commissioner in Palestine, 24 Sept. 1938 (copy), F.O. 371 21864.
48. See MacDonald in Cabinet Cab. Con. 49(38) 19 Oct. 1938.
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49. ibid.
50. See Note 47 above.
51. Trott to Foreign Office 26 Sept., Bateman to Foreign Office 26 Sept. Houston Boswell to
Foreign Office 29 Sept, 1938, F.O. 371 21864.
52. Palestine Statement of Policy, Cmd. 6019, 1939.
53. See the minutes of the 4th meeting of the Cabinet Sub-Committee on Palestine 11 Dec.
1938, Cab. 25 651.
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