Pleadings allowed under the Summary Procedure
G.R. No. 170483 April 19, 2010
MANUEL C. BUNGCAYAO, SR., represented in this case by his Attorney-in-fact ROMEL R.
BUNGCAYAO, - versus - FORT ILOCANDIA PROPERTY HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
FACTS
Manuel C. Bungcayao, Sr. (petitioner) claimed to be one of the two entrepreneurs who
introduced improvements on the foreshore area of Calayab Beach in 1978 when Fort Ilocandia
Hotel started its construction in the area. Thereafter, other entrepreneurs began setting up
their own stalls in the foreshore area. They later formed themselves into the DSierto Beach
Resort Owners Association, Inc. (DSierto).
In July 1980, six parcels of land in Barrio Balacad (now Calayad) were transferred, ceded,
and conveyed to the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1704. Fort Ilocandia Resort Hotel was erected on the area. In 1992, petitioner and other DSierto
members applied for a foreshore lease with the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) and was granted a provisional permit. On 31 January 2002, Fort
Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation (respondent) filed a foreshore
application over a 14-hectare area abutting the Fort Ilocandia Property, including the 5-hectare
portion applied for by DSierto members. The foreshore applications became the subject matter
of a conflict case, docketed Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Case
No. 5473, between respondent and DSierto members. In an undated Order, DENR Regional
Executive Director Victor J. Ancheta denied the foreshore lease applications of the DSierto
members, including petitioner, on the ground that the subject area applied for fell either within
the titled property or within the foreshore areas applied for by respondent. The DSierto
members appealed the denial of their applications. In a Resolution dated 21 August 2003, then
DENR Secretary Elisea G. Gozun denied the appeal on the ground that the area applied for
encroached on the titled property of respondent based on the final verification plan.
Petitioner alleged that his son, Manuel Bungcayao, Jr., who attended the meeting,
manifested that he still had to consult his parents about the offer but upon the undue pressure
exerted by Atty. Marcos, he accepted the payment and signed the Deed of Assignment,
Release, Waiver and Quitclaim[6] in favor of respondent.
Petitioner then filed an action for declaration of nullity of contract before the Regional
Trial Court of Laoag, City, Branch 13 (trial court), docketed as Civil Case Nos. 12891-13, against
respondent. Petitioner alleged that his son had no authority to represent him and that the deed
was void and not binding upon him.
In an Order dated 6 November 2003, the trial court confirmed the agreement of the
parties to cancel the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim and the return of
P400,000 to respondent. Petitioners counsel, however, manifested that petitioner was still
maintaining its claim for damages against respondent.
Petitioner and respondent agreed to consider the case submitted for resolution on
summary judgment. Thus, in its Order dated 28 November 2003, the trial court considered the
case submitted for resolution. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he
manifested in open court that he was withdrawing his earlier manifestation submitting the case
for resolution. Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
ISSUES
a. Whether respondents counterclaim is compulsory
b. Whether summary judgment is appropriate in this case
HELD
a.
Yes. A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any relief, which a defending
party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is
necessarily connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the plaintiffs complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the
court, does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in the future if not set up in the answer to the
complaint in the same case. Any other counterclaim is permissive.
The criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is compulsory or permissive are as
follows: (a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the
same?; (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim, absent the
compulsory rule; (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as
well as defendants counterclaim?; (d) Is there any logical relations between the claim and the
counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is
compulsory.
In this case, the only issue in the complaint is whether Manuel, Jr. is authorized to sign
the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim in favor of respondent without
petitioners express approval and authority. In an Order dated 6 November 2003, the trial court
confirmed the agreement of the parties to cancel the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim and the return of P400,000 to respondent. The only claim that remained was the
claim for damages against respondent. The trial court resolved this issue by holding that any
damage suffered by Manuel, Jr. was personal to him. The trial court ruled that petitioner could
not have suffered any damage even if Manuel, Jr. entered into an agreement with respondent
since the agreement was null and void.
G.R. No. 101747 September 24, 1997
PERFECTA QUINTANILLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RIZAL COMMERCIAL
BANKING CORPORATION, respondents
FACTS
On 12 July 1983, plaintiff (petitioner) executed a Real Estate Mortgage on a parcel of
land, situated in the City of Cebu in favor of defendant, RCBC, to secure a credit line in the
amount of P45,000.00. Plaintiff availed, from this collateralized credit line, the amount of
P25,000.00 only, secured and evidenced by promissory, with interest at the rate of 38% per
annum.
Plaintiff, Perfecta Quintanilla, who is engaged in business, under the name and style,
Cebu Cane Products, exports rattan products abroad. In connection therewith, she established
with defendant, RCBC, advance credit line, for her export bills against Letters of Credit from her
customers abroad.
Also, on an even date, 23 October 1984, plaintiff secured from defendant, RCBC, a loan
of P100,000.00, against her advance export credit line.
Again on November 8, 1984, plaintiff secured another advance credit of P100,000.00
against her advance export credit line.
On 20 November 1984, plaintiff shipped stocks of her Cane Products to her buyer in
Belgium upon a Letter of Credit, under Export Bill No. 84/199. Defendant, RCBC, received the
proceeds of this export shipment, in the amount of P208,630.00, from Bank Brussels LambertNew York. On November 27, 1984, plaintiff made another shipment from her Cebu Cane
Products, under Export Bill No. 84-205. Consequently, RCBC sent the export documents to the
issuing bank for collection.
However, on November 28, 1984, the issuing bank, Brussels Lambert-Belgium, refused
payment on Export Bill No. 84-199, and demanded reimbursement from defendant, RCBC, the
amount of US $20,721.70. After persistent demand for reimbursement, from Bank Brussels
Lambert- Belgium, defendant, RCBC, returned and reimbursed the total sum of US $20,721.70
to Bank Brussels Lambert-Belgium.
RCBC, then demanded payments from the plaintiff, the whole amount, including the
amount of P25,000.00, it collaterized by the real estate mortgage.
For failing to comply with the demands, RCBC sought to foreclose the real estate
mortgage, not only for the amount of P25,000.00 but also for the amount of P500,994.39 which
represents petitioner’s subsequent credit accommodations.
Rejecting RCBC’s claim, petitioner filed an action for specific performance, damages and
attorney’s fees with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, alleging that the obligation for
which the mortgage was executed was only for the maximum amount of P45,000.00 and that
petitioner had already paid her other unsecured loans. RCBC filed an answer denying
petitioner’s claim and set up a counterclaim for the payment of all her other outstanding loans
– totalling P500,694.39.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner’s claim.
RCBC appealed to the CA imputing error to the trial court in not granting its
counterclaim and in ruling that the foreclosure of the mortgage was limited to the P25,000.00
availed of by petitioner. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling in so far as the foreclosure was limited
to the amount of P25,000.00 but modified the same by granting the counterclaim.
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for a partial reconsideration, arguing for the first time that
respondent RCBC’s counterclaim is permissive in nature for which the trial court has not
acquired jurisdiction due to the non­payment of the docket fees. Petitioner’s motion was
denied by the CA, though it amended its earlier decision by ordering respondent RCBC to pay
docket fees on the counterclaim.Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether respondent RCBC’s counterclaim is compulsory or permissive in nature.
HELD
The counterclaim is compulsory in nature.The amount stated in the mortgage contract
between petitioner and RCBC does not limit the amount for which it may stand as security
considering that under the terms of that contract, the intent to secure future indebtedness is
apparent. It would have been different if the mortgage contract in the case at bar simply
provides that it was intended only “to secure the payment of the same and those that may
hereafter be obtained the principal of all of which is hereby fixed at P45,000.00...” Yet the
parties to the mortgage contract further stipulated: “... as well as those that the Mortgagee
may extend to the Mortgagor”. The latter phrase clearly means that the mortgage is not limited
to just the fixed amount but also covers other credit accommodations in excess thereof. Thus,
the general rule that mortgage must be limited to the amount mentioned in the mortgage
cannot be applied herein. Rather by specific provision and agreement of the parties, the
mortgage contract was designed to secure even future advancements.
Having determined that the mortgage contract extends even to petitioner’s other
advances in excess of the P25,000.00, RCBC’s counterclaim for such other advances cannot but
be considered as compulsory in nature. Such counterclaim necessarily arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of petitioner’s claim which is to enjoin the
foreclosure of the latter’s other credit accommodations in excess of P25,000.00. It thus satisfies
the “compelling test of compulsoriness” which requires “a logical relationship between the
claim and counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the
parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court.
Both claims are merely offshoots of the same basic controversy. Moreover, RCBC’s
counterclaim does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties upon whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction and the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
Finally, even granting that RCBC’s counterclaim is permissive where the trial court has
no/cannot exercise jurisdiction over said claim unless/until the corresponding docket fees
therefor has been paid, petitioner is however barred by estoppel from challenging the trial
court’s jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 192650 October 24, 2012
MARTOS, et. al vs. NEW SAN JOSE BUILDERS INC.
FACTS
New San Jose Builders, Inc. (hereafter petitioner) is a domestic corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines and is engaged in the construction of
road, bridges, buildings, and low cost houses primarily for the government. One of the projects
of petitioner is the San Jose Plains Project (hereafter SJPP), located in Montalban, Rizal. SJPP,
which is also known as the "Erap City" calls for the construction of low cost housing, which are
being turned over to the National Housing Authority to be awarded to deserving poor families.
Private respondents alleged that, on various dates, petitioner hired them on different
positions. Sometime in 2000, petitioner was constrained to slow down and suspend most of the
works on the SJPP project due to lack of funds of the National Housing Authority. Thus, the
workers were informed that many of them [would] be laid off and the rest would be reassigned
to other projects. Felix Martos et. al were among those who were retained and were issued
new appointment papers to their respective assignments, indicating therein that they are
project employees. However, they refused to sign the appointment papers as project
employees and subsequently refused to continue to work.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA was correct in dismissing the complaints filed by those
petitioners who failed to verify their position papers
HELD
Yes. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
SEC. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by law
or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by
affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleadings and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on
"information and belief" or upon "knowledge, information and belief" or
lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal
party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto
and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency
and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a
complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or
is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the
court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of
the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The
submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative
and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and
deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and
shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
The absence of a proper verification is cause to treat the pleading as unsigned and
dismissible. Admittedly, among the seven (7) petitioners mentioned, only Malcaba signed the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping in the subject petition. There was no proof
that Malcaba was authorized by his co-petitioners to sign for them. There was no special power
of attorney shown by the Formosos authorizing Malcaba as their attorney-in-fact in filing a
petition for review on certiorari. Neither could the petitioners give at least a reasonable
explanation as to why only he signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
Under the circumstances, the Court agrees with the CA that the dismissal of the other
complaints were brought about by the own negligence and passive attitude of the complainants
themselves.