AARMS
SECURITY
Vol. 8, No. 2 (2009) 261–274
Are we there yet? A critique of 5GW
BÁLINT SOMKUTI, PÉTER ÁLMOS KISS
Miklós Zrínyi National Defence University, Budapest, Hungary
Although the theory of fourth generation warfare is new, some authors claim it is
already outdated. We take a closer look at the generations of warfare model in order to
explain why 4GW cannot yet be considered fully developed. We examine the qualitative
dialectical shifts in warfare which are the main force behind generational transitions.
As the previously unrecognised features of 4GW theory unfold we conclude that the
time has not dawned yet for the next generation.
Introduction
DONALD J. REED takes a close look at current trends in warfare in his article “Beyond
the War on Terror: Into the Fifth Generation of War and Conflict.” His thorough and
convincing writing explains in detail how future armed conflicts may look like, but, like
Col T. X. HAMMES USMC in an earlier article,1 seems to come to the wrong
conclusion. In short, the much acclaimed and much criticised “Generations of Warfare”
model – later to be discussed in detail – despite its flaws, is a useful tool to introduce
everybody to the murky and opaque world of today's and tomorrow’s wars.
Simplification allows the easy loss of focus – it is simple and tempting to look at the
fourth generation of warfare (in short 4GW) as nothing more than an “evolved” or
modern form of insurgency or people’s war. Well, it is not. It is also a temptation to say,
that warfare necessarily changes with the passing of time. Well, it does – but time is not
the primary driver of the change. Reed and Hammes argue that superempowered
individuals can and probably will “replace” organised groups (i.e. insurgents, street
gangs etc.) as warfighting entities, and this constitutes a novel form of warfare. In our
article we address the problems this theory raises.
New World Order?
In our opinion, the walls of limited, industrial warfare are tumbling down, and it is only
a matter of time before we see very small groups or single individuals inflicting major
1
HAMMES, (2007)
Received: June 23, 2009
Address for correspondence:
BÁLINT SOMKUTI
E-mail: b_somkuti@t-online.hu
B. SOMKUTI, P. Á. KISS: A critique of 5GW
damage (not necessarily physical, but also ecological or financial) in order to reach their
clear political goals. But the smaller number of perpetrators (in extreme cases as small
as a single individual) or their innovative methods of attack do not mean, that we are
seeing something completely new. These actors will certainly act in ways previously
not considered to be part of warfare, yet their final aim will be to wage war as a
continuation of politics, to paraphrase Clausewitz.
In these days of the internet, globalisation, 24/7 news channels and human rights
(meaning a white man’s life worth as much – or as little – as a black, yellow, red etc.
man’s), rogue individuals or groups determined enough to break some rules can turn the
world upside down through the exploitation of divided loyalties, the innovative use of
everyday contemporary technology and the application of new business management
and marketing techniques. We are already seeing this happening. Al-Qaeda, far from
being the monolithic, disciplined, centrally directed, sinister threat in the “Global War
on Terror”, is actually more like the owner and franchiser of a brand name – much like
McDonalds. A handful of well-known and highly respected experts, who provide
ideological direction and some tactical and operational guidance, and approve or
disapprove operational plans brought to them by enterprising adherents from all over
the world. Consider the London bombing on 7 July 2005, for example. The attacks were
planned, prepared and carried out by young muslims who were born, raised and
schooled in England. They received ideological guidance from local religious leaders,
internet-based radical networks and radical islamist propaganda materials freely
available in London. They surfed the internet for expertise in bomb-making, operational
planning and covert operations procedures; they used ordinary tools and materials to
construct their bombs, detonators and triggers. The attacks cost next to nothing – and
did not cost anything to Al Qaeda.2 Much the same can be said for the Madrid
commuter train bombings: they were financed by drug deals on the Spanish domestic
market; the explosives were acquired from a corruptible mine worker. It is next to
impossible to predict the attackers’ identity, their numbers, or locations, only one thing
is certain. They will not appear wearing uniforms and will not fight in organised and
identifiable military units, not to mention the lack of a costly and vulnerable industrial
hinterland. Modern war, in which our armies will fight, will be seriously asymmetrical
in technology and numbers. It will be fought primarily in the cognitive, cyber and social
domains, and only secondarily on physical battlefields. It has been with us for at least a
couple of decades and in the most easily comprehensible way it is called fourth
generation warfare.
2
TOWNSEND 2006 and BUCHANAN 2006
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In the near future 4GW conflict can become the “mother of all wars” with nothing
barred, no trick dirty enough to be banned, no target sacred enough to be spared. You
may well say “been there, done that”, and we would answer “not exactly.” The
destruction of Grozny, Dresden or Hiroshima may very well be unique in history, but
now or rather very soon non-state actors will be able to cause similar havoc surpassing
9/11 or the 3/11 Madrid bombings. The famous book of PLA colonels QIAO LIANG and
WANG XIANGSUI is a good guide. Years before 9/11 they came to conclusions that
predicted many of Osama Bin Ladin’s actions.3
The "generations of warfare"’ model4
Warfare has gone through significant changes in the last 60 years or so. In our
understanding warfare is organised violence, used almost exclusively by states. But
since the end of WWII there have been relatively few interstate wars (Korea, Israelneighbours, India-Pakistan, Irak-Iran, Irak-coalitions, Serbia-NATO, some border
clashes in Asia and Africa) – that is about it.
The majority of conflicts has been intrastate – national liberation movements, ethnic
and religious strife, revolutions and counterrevolutions. These, as their name suggests,
remained physically confined to the immediate surroundings of the disputed area. As
time progressed, insurgency has become the most common form of armed conflict. In
most of these conflicts – according to John Lyall’s research, in significant majority of
the cases5 – the state’s security forces were defeated. How this surprising result was
achieved despite the obvious superiority of the regular forces remained elusive until the
‘generations of warfare’ theory was developed. As its name implies, ‘generations of
warfare’ is a model, a simplified version of an immensely complicated phenomenon:
war. Using western historical examples, it explains why and how western armies fight,
and also shows why they end up losing if faced by opponents not playing by their rules.
The first three generations
The “generations of modern warfare” model starts with a historical event, the Peace of
Westphalia (1648), that ended the Thirty Years War.6 The highly complex medieval
social and political system with its multiple and divided loyalties was replaced by the
centralised and sovereign nation states. This was not an overnight event – it was an
3
QIAO LIANG and WANG XIANGSUI, 1999
LIND et al., 1989
5
LYALL, 2007
6
Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 2009
4
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evolution over several centuries. The result was the modern international system of
nation states. The state is sovereign – it has absolute power within its borders, it is equal
to all other states on the international stage, and it acknowledges no authority above
itself. Waging war – generally, organised, coercive violence – is a state monopoly.
• The first generation of modern warfare was the age of the smoothbore musket,
infantry in line and column. It lasted from mid-17th century to the late 19th. In
this age massed manpower was the decisive factor. Sometimes it is also called
pre-industrial warfare.
• The second generation was characterised by indirect fire artillery, magazine
rifles, machineguns, wars of attrition and materiel. It lasted from mid-19th
century to today – some military forces still rely on second generation principles.
• The third generation is maneuver warfare, from 1918 to today – the age of tanks,
close support aircraft and wide-ranging maneuver around the enemy’s flanks. Its
aim was to destroy the enemy’s warfighting capability either physically by
cutting his lines of communications or destroy his morale by attacking him from
unexpected directions and confusing his leadership. Just as the previous
generations, it emerged as a result of serious developments in theory (Guderian,
Tuhachevski, Liddel-Hart) and in technology (mostly communications). Since it
is not based on the quantity but on the clever use of technology it also called the
post industrial warfare.7
There is considerable overlap in the shift from one generation to the next, and the
boundaries between the generations are not rigid or geographically bound. There is also
some simplification: for example a fortified position like the Baar-Lev line or the fortress
of Brest had to be penetrated just like any WWI fortification. The generations represent
something we may best describe as preeminent doctrines or dominant warfighting style,
and they were – if they were applied correctly – irresistible in their times.
The first three generations – for all the development and evolution involved – all
follow the same paradigm of warfare.
• The state has a monopoly over warfare – and also has responsibility for warfare:
hostile action originating on its territory may be considered an act of war.
• The regular forces of nation states fight the regular forces of other nation states.
If irregular forces are employed, they are under strict control of the sponsoring
government. Coalitions may form, but they are the voluntary associations of
nation states.
7
HAMMES, 2004
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• Military operations follow clearly understood and internationally accepted rules
of warfare, in order to limit damage and suffering, particularly to civilians and to
the economy.
• War is played out on two levels – a trial of strength on the physical level, and a
clash of wills on the psychological level. In the modern paradigm the primary role
is that of the trial of strength – destroy the enemy's capability to wage war, and
thereby break his will – propaganda has an important supporting role in this effort.
• A formal declaration of war precedes military operations, which end after one
sides’ army have suffered enough casualties in one or more battles. A formal
peace accord is signed (or one state is completely annexed by the other) and the
hostilities are declared to have ended. There is clear distinction between war and
peace – the intention is to end war quickly, as so magnificently yet confusingly
summed up by Clausewitz. The war is fought by the country’s armed forces,
aimed at political objectives set by the state, at minimal expense and
participation of the population.
Developments in technology, in production techniques or in military science are
obviously very important, but in this evolution they play only a subsidiary role – they
are key enablers, but they are not the causes of generational shifts. The driving force is
the interplay and synergy of social, economic, technical and political developments. The
shift from one generation to the next occurs when these developments coalesce into
dialectic qualitative change.
No matter what quick and decisive results maneuver warfare brings, significant
heavy industry is still needed to produce its tools, and to deliver it to distant battlefields.
In the foreseeable future no other political entity (we intentionally use this broader
defintion instead of alliance, nation or country) will possess such power projection
capability as NATO does.8 Of course, classical inter-state conflicts cannot be ruled out,
but the existence of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction prevent any decisive
outcome. Russia’s Georgian “adventure” shows that just as people’s war was ever
present in history, we cannot discount the possibility of a classic high intensity second
or third generation conflict. But as globalisation’s spiderweb interconnects anything
with everything, a pull here can cause an entire system to collapse there (i.e. investors
retreated from the Russian stock exchange because of the August war, causing it to
collapse after the crisis has begun in earnest in September).9
8
9
e.g. 12 carrier battle grooups versus none
BUSH, 2008
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The stepchild of wars, 4GW
After World War II the myth of the “white man’s superiority” was in ruins. So were the
great colonial empires’ homelands, either physically or financially, but mostly both. The
populations of the colonies, in most cases with multiple ethnicities therefore hardly to
be called nations, strived to get rid of their masters. They were supported in their
struggle by the two superpowers even if for completely different reasons (not to be
discussed here due to space restraints). The age of wars of national liberation has begun.
They were desperate, yet at the end successful ventures: even if exhausted, colonial
powers like UK or France, but even Portugal possessed modern weapons and trained
men in sufficient numbers to deter any conventional war. Industrial background to
support such an undertaking was also lacking in the colonies. In these undeveloped
parts of the world the modern centralised state with enough bureaucracy and industry –
the prerequisites of modern warfare – did not exist. Therefore divided loyalties,
constant, low level internecine warfare, hit and run tactics and dispersed formations,
forgotten in the west for centuries, never went out of fashion. According to an ancient
proverb one cooks with everything one has at hand. So, the stage was set for Mao, Ho
Chi Minh and other theoreticians. As a sidenote, contrary to popular belief and the
“hype” surrounding him, Che Guevara was neither a highly successful revolutionary
theoretician nor a successful guerilla leader.
The Westphalian paradigm has worked for three and a half centuries – perhaps it has
worked too well: the state has acquired ever growing economic, political and coercive
power, it has come to dominate everything. It came to possess the power to suppress all
opposition, silence all dissent and force a compromise in every dispute. But some
opponents escape suppression, some disputes are not amenable to compromise, some
dissenting voices find other outlets. These challenge not only the state, but the whole
Westphalian system, and the challenge takes the form of fourth generation warfare. Its
principles are being worked out on a hundred battlefields, in revolutions, in wars of
national liberation and in organised crime and gang warfare.
Although the model which we use as our starting point is widely criticised, it would
be foolish to completely discard its numerous benefits. A new paradigm of warfare (i.e.
organised violence) is emerging. Its basic features are
• 24/7 news channels, filesharing sites and other phenomena directly connected to
globalisation place a limit on the state’s right to wage external war and to apply
unlimited force internally
• emergence of non-state actors with state-like capabilities erode the state’s
monopoly over warfare
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• 4GW actors employ new organisational principles which seriously limit the
traditional security forces’ effectiveness
• old and new tactical and operational principles and forms of coercion not
generally considered as military procedures are blended in one seamless, holistic
approach
• the relationship between military operations and propaganda is reversed:
propaganda is the driver, and military operations are undertaken to support the
message
• 4GW actors are not constrained by state responsibilities and find no incentive to
observe the internationally accepted rules of warfare
• they are not bound by any limitations of the Westphalian system
4GW is mainly criticised for its reliance on selective historical evidence and
simplifications.10 Well, yes and yes. There is no “general” military theory which is
valid everywhere on Earth and at all times. Maybe Sun Tzu. But he is too elusive and to
mystical for the contemporary reader. Clausewitz may have come the closest to it in
modern times, but nowadays even his theories are being criticised as outdated. Yet
4GW – a fairly new and not yet fully developed theory – is criticised precisely for not
being such a generally valid theory. Yes, the generations of modern warfare theory is
based on western (mainly European) historical examples, that mark significant
developments. As one of the authors later said. “[…]In the context of the Four
Generations of Modern War, “generation” is shorthand for a dialectically qualitative
shift.” If we use the model with a little flexibility (i.e. if we do not cling to the general
perception that generations follow each other in strict rhythmical and periodical order) it
offers much more than it hides. Paraphrasing Charles Francis Adams’s words to lord
Palmerston,11 for us it is only natural to think about ways we will have to fight on
ground we chose, to achieve goals we have set up. Just like any model, the “generations
of modern warfare” contains simplifications. It is not the “philosophers’ stone”, but a
tool which helps us discover our weaknesses.
As Lind in particular repeatedly argues, 4GW is a return to pre-Westphalian forms
of warfare. The ‘new’ aspects of 4GW are ‘who fights’, and ‘what they fight for’. To
further refine his definition we would like to add two other conditions: ‘using new
tools’ and ‘in a new international system’.
In the 17th century mass produced firearms, centralised states and the earliest
military theoriticians caused a dialectical qualitative shift in military affairs. Historians
called it the military revolution. Currently there is a new buzzword: RMA – Revolution
10
11
ECHEVARRIA, 2005
“It would be superfluous to remind your lordship that this means war.”
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in Military Affairs.12 In the authors’ opinion, significant as they may be, effects-based
operations and network-centric warfare do not amount to a giant leap forward, only a
major step. The way our armies fight has not changed, only their aim has improved, and
the number of targets they can engage at one time has increased. Just because a unit
looks like a mobile telephone switchboard, with more power output than a medium city
30 years ago, it does not necessarily mean that it is something completely new. Apart
from an updated Orwell’s 1984-like total control, no technology can provide complete
control on the chaos of the battlefield.
As we leave the previous generations behind, the shift to 4GW takes place due to
social, economic and political changes. One of the causes is a major crisis of the nation
state, brought about by globalisation. Both external and internal factors drive this
change. The increasingly interlinked global economy seriously limits the efforts of
national governments to manage their own economy, so it causes an erosion in the
state’s sovereignty. International public opinion also limits the choices available to the
nation states, as we can so clearly see in Gaza.
Supra-national political and economic institutions (UN, EU, NATO, IMF, WTO etc.)
and the interlinked global economy also limit the freedom of action of their member
nations, e.g. to protect their interests by force, or to apply the desired amount of force in
solving internal conflicts. The growing number of failed states are regional destabilising
factors, and are a burden on the rest of the world – their problems can be solved only by
violating their sovereignty, thereby further eroding the Westphalian system. A perfect
storm of this phenomenon is Somalia and its seemingly unstoppable pirates.13
At the same time, internal factors shake the citizen’s loyalty to, and respect for, the
state. Social networks of business, science, research, and even hobbies develop, which
completely ignore borders. Relying on these networks, some minority groups refuse to
accept the values, customs and laws of the host population, cannot or will not integrate
into the existing social fabric. They confront the state and demand individual and/or
group privileges, cultural and territorial autonomy, or even complete independence.
Justified or not, such demands further erode the state’s power. Another example is the
accelerating decline of discipline among children who respect nothing but raw power
and ruthlessness (personal experience of the authors).
Proponents of 4GW are often asked: What is ‘new’ about the nature of war and what
makes it ‘new’? How does a new tactic indicate a fundamental change in war itself?
12
Project on Defense Alternatives, 2009
Apart from the original problem using mercenaries to fight them is another dubious solution, because it
further erodes the current system, SHACHTMAN, 2008
13
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What conditions exist now that compel an adversary to not pursue a conventional war?
What makes those conditions enduring?
War was/is/will be a social “activity” and is an inseparable part of human nature –
even Keegan’s examples in his failed yet interesting try to refute Clausewitz prove it.14
As we have already pointed out ‘who fights.’ ‘what they fight for.’ ‘what tool they are
using’ and a ‘new international system’ are new aspects that 4GW introduces. The way
it is fought (through media-driven pseudo-military actions), the battlefield (the support
of the population and international public opinion), and its belligerents (militias, gangs
– not something we can call a military with OOB’s and C4ISR etc.) make it a new form
of warfare. And it is war, since it is waged against states, for clearly identifiable
strategic and political goals.
The changes are fundamental, because they make the size of our arsenal largely
irrelevant. The net effect of globalisation, the collapse of the colonial system, not to
mention the end of the cold war, is that you can’t just invade a country and suppress its
population with brute force. Hit and run tactics are not new, they are as ancient as the
Scythians, or even older. It’s not the new tactics that cause the change – a fundamental
change has taken place in the circumstances in which wars are fought. Any rational
enemy would avoid a direct confrontation with the military technological,
organizational superiority of the West. Why? Because it is obviously counterproductive. As long as we preserve a credible deterrent force, no enemy would stand a
chance in a classic high intensity conflict. Therefore, if he wants to pursue his goals by
force of arms (and again due to globalisation, the UN etc. he can be a non-state actor as
well), he will have to resort to non-conventional means, in which western powers have a
poor record.
If we could unmake globalisation, weapons of mass destruction and the events of the
past seventy or so years, there would be no reason not to resort to the Victorian methods
of brutal population suppression. But that is not likely to happen. History cannot be
undone. Classic military operations by army groups and dozens of divisions have ended
since any gain from such an industrial style war is insignificant compared to the level of
damage even the victor would have to sustain.
It also has to be noted that some actors cannot be declared as 4GW entities even
though they may use 4GW methods. Some street gangs and organised crime groups
may qualify as 4GW actors, but this aspect of theory has been not worked out yet.
Others acting for nothing more than profit, lunatic terrorists thirsty for nothing but
14
KEEGAN, 1993
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chaos, hackers or any other individuals or groups without clear and positive (even if it is
only for a fragment of the population) goals do not fit our category.
Futurists & Theorists: “4GW through 9GW?”15
Since the publication of the original article, almost twenty years have passed. In our
“publish or perish” times it is quite a long time. Even though the authors have refined
their views in follow-up publications, some supporters of the “generations of warfare”
model have looked further. One of them, Col. T. X. HAMMES (USMC) in his 2004 book
has shown us a new phenomenon, which he called 5th generation warfare (5GW): the
advent of the superempowered individuals. According to him the following features
distinguish a completely new era:
1. Strategic shift: from military campaigns supported by information operations to
strategic communications campaigns supported by guerrilla and terrorist
operations.
2. Organizational shift – from hierarchy to network. 4GW organizations reflect the
society in which they evolve – Mao’s and Ho’s forces were an image of Chinese
and Vietnamese hierarchical societies. Modern insurgency is primarily muslim
and Mideastern – organizations reflect the archaic Mideastern muslim society.
3. New types of participants – reactionary, opportunistic, ideological, criminal,
hybrid, PMC. Fighting groups are getting smaller.
4. WMD and high-tech (biotechnology, nanotechnology) in the hands of insurgents.
In his words: “Fifth-generation warfare will result from the continued shift of
political and social loyalties to causes rather than nations. It will be marked by the
increasing power of smaller and smaller entities and the explosion of biotechnology.
5GW will truly be a nets-and-jets war: networks will distribute the key information,
provide a source for the necessary equipment and material, and constitute a field from
which to recruit volunteers; the jets will provide for worldwide, inexpensive, effective
dissemination of the weapons. […] a super-empowered small group could use to attack
society. They may use any number of evolving technologies. The key fact to remember is
that changes in the political, economic, social, and technical spheres are making it
possible for a small group bound together by a cause to use new technologies to
challenge nation-states. We cannot roll back those changes, nor can we prevent the
evolution of war. Clearly, we as a Nation, and particularly our military, are not ready
15
Topic headline at www.smallwarsjournal.com, http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/forumdisplay.php?f=16
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to counter the coming attacks. It’s time to start thinking about how we might deal with
this next step in warfare.”15
It is an indisputable fact, that 4GW evolved greatly since Mao started his guerrilla
war in the 30’s of the last century but as Martin van Creveld sums up, 4GW is new due
to “[…]not merely how war is fought, but who fights and what they fight for.”16
In the opinion of WILLIAM S. LIND (one of the co-authors of the original article)
“From what I have seen thus far, honest attempts to discover a Fifth Generation suggest
that their authors have not fully grasped the vast change embodied in the Fourth
Generation. The loss of the state’s monopoly, not only on war but also on social
organization and first loyalties, alters everything (emphasis by the authors). We are
only in the earliest stages of trying to understand what the Fourth Generation means in
full and how it will alter or, in too many cases, end our lives. Attempting to visualize a
Fifth Generation from where we are now is like trying to see the outlines of the Middle
Ages from the vantage point of the late Roman Empire. There is no telescope that can
reach so far. We can see the barbarians on the march. In America and in Europe, we
already find them inside the limes and within the legions. But what follows the chaos
they bring in their wake, only the gods on Mount Olympus can see.”
DONALD J. REED takes it a step further. In his thoroughly illustrated article he uses
modern business methods (scorecards) visual elements (3D charts) and long quotes
from various sources usually connected to 4GW to support his argument.17 Spectacular
as they are, the scorecards’ arbitrary values, assigned without any explanations, are
unconvincing. He comes to the more or less accepted opinion (at least among those who
do not strictly oppose 4GW) that 4GW is just an evolved form of insurgency and has to
be treated as such. Unfortunately this conception shows a partial understanding of the
phenomenon which we call 4GW. Insurgencies are fought within state borders, to
achieve a political change within the state or to create a new one. 4GW on the other
hand is unrestricted war itself, total, unforgiving, brutal and encompassing every
possible battlefield. It “respects” nothing. Neither political correctness, nor centuries old
conventions such as internationally accepted rules of warfare, state borders, or innocent
civilians who are to be spared along with other resources of the conquerable territory.
15
HAMMES, 2007
LIND, 2006
17
REED, 2008
16
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5GW at the gates?
The transition from massed columns or nicely ordered lines to dispersed swarms and
indirect artillery fire was a significant step forward. So was the one from huge but slow
armies to fast-maneuvering mechanised troops striking at the will of the enemy with
smart use of new technology. Discarding it all is yet another such step. But once that
step has been taken, does it matter all that much how many (or how few) people use
what weapons and in which organisational environment?
In our opinion, the case for the existence of 5th, 6th and later generations of warfare
has not been made. We do not yet have to worry about future threats by 5GW actors,
since
a. 4GW is only unfolding: no 4GW actor has ever used it on a large scale, in an
organised, long term ‘offensive’. Yet.
b. 4GW already encompasses everything the world has invented since Clausewitz:
people’s war, globalisation and the decline of the nation state.
c. There may be a 5GW once, which will become dominant over the previous
generations (according to the “generations of warfare model”) yet it is hard to
see from here what it may be.
What about the future?
As with any model, to be taken seriously 4GW has to predict future events (maybe this
shortcoming was one of the reasons why 5GW was ‘created’), but as with any model,
the number of variables is decisive.
In the past we have used the original Star Wars trilogy as a tool to make people
understand how insurgencies work, but the analogy has a serious limit, since taking it
too far it may suggest that 4GW is nothing more than a highly evolved form of
insurgency. The reason for this perception may be that unlike the Rebel Alliance, so far
4GW has not really been used in offensives.
The goal of the “generations of warfare model” is to explain why and how armies
fight, and why and how our current way of war has developed. In other words, why we
fight the way we do and why it is not usable in certain circumstances. Thus, no
extrapolation has been made. We will address this in forthcoming articles, yet one thing
is sure. The warning signals are there. It is up to us whether we recognize them. De
Gaulle and Liddell-Hart met deaf ears. Surprisingly, Guderian and Tuhachevski were
only listened to in the world’s two most oppressive political systems.
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We may be going too far and too fast with our predictions – but one thing should be
obvious for those who dare to open their eyes. The world we live in has changed
significantly, and no country (not even the mighty USA) is strong enough to stop the
waves of change at its borders – much less beyond its borders, on other continents. The
principles of 4GW are being applied by military forces – but so far they are not western
forces: the para-military wing of the Iranian Republican Guard, the Basij has already
made plans (“[…]In a future war of the fourth generation[…]”18) called “Passive
defence”.19
We can rush blindly to our Adrinople, or we can prepare by adapting to the challenges,
yet keeping the core values of our culture, like Byzantium did. It is not too late. Maybe
and only maybe we should not wait until a pseudo blitzkrieg bursts through our Maginotline, destroying our hopes for resistance in less than twenty days. Maybe we should listen
to the “unknown” colonels like de Gaulle. We are not saying that all armed forces should
be transformed immediately to swarming light infantry. We are only saying without some
serious improvements in our perception we are doomed to fall.
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