Quantum Sensing’s Potential Impacts on
Strategic Deterrence and Modern Warfare
February 2021
By Sarah Jacobs Gamberini and Lawrence Rubin
Abstract: This article examines the impact of quantum sensing on strategic deterrence and
modern warfare. It has two related objectives. The first is to highlight quantum sensing as
an important area of research for the policy communities considering the role of emerging
technologies on strategic deterrence and countering weapons of mass destruction. The second
aim is to present the potential warfighting implications of quantum sensing if employed by
either the United States or its adversaries. While quantum sensing technologies offer
opportunities to transform modern warfare, they also present challenges and risks. The article
contends that the quantum sensing investment, research, and development should be prioritized
within the Department of Defense’s quantum science modernization agenda to ensure that the
U.S. military does not cede technological advantage to competitors, such as the People’s
Republic of China, who are actively investing in quantum sensing applications that could
upend the United States’ existing deterrence and warfighting capabilities.
Q
uantum physics is an area of scientific inquiry that receives great public
interest, media reporting, and policy attention. For the layman, the mere
mention of the word “quantum” bespeaks head-spinning science where
Albert Einstein’s famous phrase “spooky action at a distance” seems more
appropriate to describe a kind of magic than the physical principles of entangled
particles. Media and public policy discussions tend to lump quantum
technologies together and shower much attention on the potential of quantum
computing and communication advances to transform commercial life and
military operations. Meanwhile, the National Quantum Initiative Act of 2018,1
recent defense authorization acts, and defense modernizations priorities 2 all
The National Quantum Initiative Act, 115th Congress (Public Law 115-368, Dec. 21,
2018, Washington, D.C.).
2 Modernization Priorities, Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering,
U.S. Department of Defense, Aug. 28, 2020, Washington, D.C.,
https://www.cto.mil/modernization-priorities/.
1
© 2021 Published for the Foreign Policy Research Institute by Elsevier Ltd.
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doi: 10.1016/j.orbis.2021.03.012
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GAMBERINI AND RUBIN
highlight quantum technologies broadly as critical for Department of Defense
(DoD) investment. Yet, the specific area of quantum sensing receives less
attention in the deterrence and countering weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) policy community. The insufficient consideration of quantum
sensing’s potential impacts on strategic deterrence and modern warfare merits
additional discussion among these communities. Technologies related to
quantum sensing, which include atomic clocks, underlie many aspects of critical
and commercial infrastructure through Global Positioning Systems (GPS).
Recent advances in quantum gravity sensors (gravimeters and gravity
gradiometers) for nuclear material detection and atomic clock and
accelerometers to improve Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT), to name a
few, offer new possibilities that could transform warfighting and deterrence.
While quantum sensing technologies offer opportunities to transform
modern warfare and certainly make the case for greater attention, they also
present challenges and risks. Among the extremely hard and complex
engineering and physics problems is the technical challenge of miniaturization.
Some quantum sensors show promise in the lab at a low technology readiness
level (TRL), but transforming them into something compact, rugged, and
autonomous will require a substantial investment of funding and time. The
major risk is falling behind U.S. competitors, such as the People’s Republic of
China, who are also interested in quantum sensing’s transformative potential.
Similar to other technology-defense races, the first mover may be able to exploit
these technological advantages on or off the battlefield. Given the potential
risks associated with falling behind in quantum sensing research and
development (R&D), U.S. policymakers must have a clear picture of research
timelines and an understanding of the potential de-stabilizing effects that these
capabilities, when fielded, may bring both to deterrence architectures and
approaches to warfighting.
This article has two related objectives. The first is to highlight quantum
sensing as an important area of research for the policy communities considering
strategic deterrence and countering WMD. The second aim is to present the
potential warfighting implications of quantum sensing if, and when, employed
by either the United States or its adversaries. We begin by defining quantum
sensors and their disruptive potential. Then, we outline the impact on strategic
deterrence and modern warfare, including countering weapons of mass
destruction (CWMD) elements. Finally, we conclude by contending why
quantum sensors must remain a priority focus area for DoD R&D investment.
Defining a Quantum Sensor
Quantum sensors measure the same thing as other sensors, physical
phenomena such as magnetic fields or acceleration. However, they are unique
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Quantum Sensing’s Potential Impact on Strategic Deterrence and Modern Warfare
in that they make these measurements at the highest levels of sensitivity that are
physically possible with quantum mechanics and often feature greatly enhanced
performance as a result. The specific advantages vary, but they often include
higher sensitivity, better long-term stability, or small sensor size compared with
alternatives. Quantum sensing may be used to describe one of the following:
I. Use of a quantum object (i.e., an entity whose
behavior can only be described by the laws of quantum
mechanics, which typically relate to objects that are
extremely small or extremely cold) to measure a physical
quantity (classical or quantum). The quantum object is
characterized by quantized energy levels. Specific
examples include electronic, magnetic or vibrational
states of superconducting or spin qubits, neutral atoms,
or trapped ions.
II. Use of quantum coherence (i.e., the property that
quantum systems are described by waves that can
interfere with or reinforce each other) to measure a
physical quantity.
III. Use of quantum entanglement (i.e., the property
that two quantum systems can be connected in such a
way that measurements of one can instantly determine
properties of the other, even when separated by a large
distance) to improve the sensitivity or precision of a
measurement, beyond what is possible classically.3
The three types of quantum sensing make possible a wide range of
potential sensor types, including: atomic clocks, accelerometers,
magnetometers, electrometers, gravimeters, and gravity gradiometers needed
for measuring “a range of physical quantities such as frequency, acceleration,
rotation rates, electric and magnetic fields, or temperature with the highest
relative and absolute accuracy.”4
Christian L. Degen, Friedemann Reinhard, and Paola Cappellaro, “Quantum
Sensing,” Reviews of Modern Physics, July 25, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1103/
RevModPhys.89.035002.
4 Andreas Thoss, Markus Krutzik, and Andrea Wicht, “Quantum Technology:
Quantum sensing is gaining (s)pace,” Laser Focus World, Jan. 18, 2018,
https://www.laserfocusworld.com/lasers-sources/article/16555248/quantum3
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GAMBERINI AND RUBIN
Quantum sensing is not a monolithic field. R&D efforts are varied, and
the resulting technological applications defy sweeping generalizations. These
applications span TRLs, with some sensors, such as atomic clocks, having been
commercially available since the 1950s with new low TRL versions possessing
order of magnitude capability improvements. Atomic clocks and quantumbased sensors have ubiquitous applications and, for example, are a vital
component in modern PNT capabilities, such as the GPS, a critical enabling
capability for maneuver force operations, joint fires, and logistics among other
military functions.5 Juxtaposed against the perhaps familiar example of atomic
clocks are exotic-sounding, novel quantum sensors that bring with them the
promise to disrupt and transform military operations. The spectrum of
quantum sensors demonstrates the inherent complexity of this field. It is made
even more complicated by the fact that much more research into the best
application of sensors must be undertaken to determine if using a quantum
sensor instead of other sensors makes enough of a difference to be worth the
investment.
Determining the Disruptive Potential of Quantum Sensors
For non-experts or policymakers who are interested in learning about
quantum sensing and its potential to disrupt military operations, information
comes in the form of either complicated physics papers or generalized nonspecialist pieces written for non-experts, which may overstate the potential for
quantum sensing technologies to disrupt industrial practices and military
operations.6 Reporting is often fraught with speculation regarding advances in
quantum sensing, and quantum innovation in general. The speculation is born
technology-quantum-sensing-is-gaining-space. For a comprehensive list of quantum
sensor types and measured quantities reference, see Degen, Krutzik, and Wicht,
“Quantum Technology,” https://arxiv.org/pdf/1611.02427.pdf.
5 Michael A. Lombardi, Mitch Narins, Per Engen, Ben Peterson, Sherman Lo, and
Dennis Akos, “The Need for a Robust Precise Time and Frequency Alternative to
Global Navigation Satellite Systems,” National Institute of Standards and
Technology, Sept. 17, 2012, http://web.stanford.edu/group/scpnt/
gpslab/pubs/papers/NarinsLo_IONGNSS_2012_APNTIONPaperFinal.pdf. See,
also, Jon Harper, “Pentagon Trying to Manage Quantum Science Hype,” National
Defense, Dec. 10, 2020, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/
articles/2020/12/10/pentagon-trying-to-manage-quantum-science-hype.
6 See, Richard Claridge, “Quantum sensing: A new frontier for revolutionary
technology,” ComputerWeekly, 2019, https://www.computerweekly.com/
opinion/Quantum-sensing-a-new-frontier-for-revolutionary-technology. Also, see,
Tim Bowler, “How Quantum Sensing is changing the way we see the world,” BBC,
2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-47294704.
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Quantum Sensing’s Potential Impact on Strategic Deterrence and Modern Warfare
out of a combination of media-proliferated inaccuracies based on amateur
assessment and/or commercial or political interest in propagandizing levels of
advancement. 7 Furthermore, media conjecture on quantum sensing R&D
efforts often leads to difficulty in assessing the disruptive potential of quantum
sensing advances and the near-term military opportunities and threats they
pose.
A quantum sensor holds the potential to become disruptive when the
combination of advantages adds up to an entirely new system capability. As an
example, atomic clocks that combine high stability and a “form factor,” or the
ability to fit on a satellite-enabled GPS, is a disruptive capability which provides
precision and timing for a host of critical DoD and civilian applications. As
GPS signals are weak and susceptible to jamming, further advances towards
even higher stability and lower size, weight, power, and cost (SWaP-C) atomic
clocks would enable resilient communications and other critical timing
applications in the absence of GPS, delivering a transformational improvement
to an existing PNT capability.8
Yet, evaluating the disruptive potential of advances in quantum sensing
should be made with a healthy skepticism when considering reports of nearterm, field-ready quantum sensor capabilities. In seeking to assess better the
viability of emergent and emerging quantum sensing capabilities, analysts
should first evaluate SWaP-C trade-offs. For example: Does the quantum
sensor provide better sensing capability than an existing, fielded system or
deliver approximately equal capability at far lower overall cost? Another
potential indicator of technology readiness is the state of enabling technologies
for field use. Exquisite laboratory capabilities involving cryogenics (low
temperatures) and high-end lasers may limit new sensors. These measures of
readiness, taken together, can help analysts cut through both inaccuracies and
hype surrounding quantum sensor advances.
A magnetometer based on a quantum system can be compared to a
traditional magnetometer but perhaps with different performance requirements
and design constraints including noise limit, bandwidth, and long-term
measurement accuracy. Given system constraints of available SWaP-C, a
system designer may choose among technology types and use a technology with
the best combined performance across the important metrics for the specific
7 Michael J. Biercuk, “Read Before Pontificating on Quantum Technology,” War on
the Rocks, July 2020, Washington, D.C., https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/readbefore-pontificating-on-quantum-technology/.
8 Applications of Quantum Technologies: Executive Summary, Defense Science Board, 2019,
https://dsb.cto.mil/reports/2010s/DSB_QuantumTechnologies_
Executive%20Summary_10.23.2019_SR.pdf.
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GAMBERINI AND RUBIN
application. The advantages most commonly associated with quantum sensors
are improved sensitivity, resolution, accuracy, or long-term stability or lower
SWaP-C compared with similar performing sensors.
Regarding technological challenges to advancing quantum sensing, the
primary impediment to fielding quantum sensors is the fragility of the quantum
systems and the availability of enabling technologies that are required to support
them. As noted in a Congressional Research Service Report, “Military
application of such technologies [quantum sensors] could be constrained,
however, by the fragility of quantum states, which can be disrupted by minute
movements, changes in temperature, or other environmental factors.”9 The
development of suitably portable or robust enabling technologies are a major
chokepoint in quantum sensor development.
Another technological challenge is how to utilize the unprecedented
sensitivity of a quantum sensor apart from the challenges associated with
fielding it. Using magnetometers to illustrate the point, many magnetic sensing
applications need to be performed in the presence of Earth’s magnetic field.
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA’s) AMBIIENT
program, for example, is developing magnetic gradiometers for biomagnetic
measurement in the Earth’s ambient field.10 Since quantum magnetometers can
reach sensitivities up to 10 billion times smaller than Earth’s ambient field, new
signal processing techniques, perhaps requiring specialized quantum sensor codesign, must be developed to harness high sensitivity without being swamped
by background signals.
Finally, when assessing the disruptive potential of quantum sensors,
analysts must consider the underlying level of quantum sensing R&D.
Quantum sensors can rely on different underlying quantum technologies at
different maturity levels. For example, there are multiple types of quantum
magnetometers: Superconducting Quantum Interference Devices (SQUIDs)
are mature at excellent performance, but require cryogenics; atomic
magnetometers exist in both mature and R&D versions that could offer
significant performance and SWaP-C improvements; and Nitrogen Vacancy
Centers in diamond are an emerging technology at lower TRL, but offer
unmatched spatial resolution at quantum-limited sensitivity and are finding
numerous applications that are otherwise impossible to realize.11 The disruptive
Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional
Research Service, Aug. 7, 2020, Washington, D.C., https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
natsec/R46458.pdf.
10 AMBIIENT Proposers Day, DARPA Conference Center,
March 29, 2017(archived), Arlington, VA, https://www.darpa.mil/newsevents/ambiient-proposers-day.
11 Degen, Reinhard, Cappellaro, “Quantum Sensing.”
9
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Quantum Sensing’s Potential Impact on Strategic Deterrence and Modern Warfare
potential of quantum sensors relates directly to how they will outperform extant
sensors and how their application would transform the military environment.
Deterrence Disruptions
In a renewed period of great power competition, the U.S. military’s
failure to stay ahead of competitors like China in the race to field and integrate
new and/or improved quantum sensors could result in disadvantageous
technological asymmetries for the United States. Whether quantum sensing
capabilities have the potential to disrupt long-held strategic deterrence
architectures, as well as transform the dynamics of modern warfare, is worth
exploring.
The case of China’s purported advances in developing an operational
quantum radar illustrates the real and perceived risks of falling behind in the
technological supremacy race. In Beijing’s effort to challenge U.S. and Western
primacy in the quantum innovation space, some Chinese government-funded
research institutions have developed a track record of over-promoting quantum
sensor advances. A 2018 Center for a New American Security report notes,
CETC [China Electronics Technology Group Corporation]
researchers have claimed that the next generation of their
quantum radar system will be able to detect stealth bombers and
‘effectively monitor high-speed flying objects in the upper
atmosphere and above,’ thus supporting the tracking of ballistic
missiles.12
Quantum radar does not appear likely to provide any military advantage
in radar capability for some time; but if and when China succeeds in its claims,
a quantum radar with these purported capabilities could prove disruptive to
power balances in the Indo-Pacific region, where China has undertaken a
concerted challenge to U.S. military dominance.
From a deterrence perspective, China’s ability to field a fully functional
quantum radar system, capable of detecting U.S. stealth aircraft, would prove
disruptive to strategic stability in the region, undermining the survivability of
America’s stealth bomber force (including the B-2 Spirit and in-development
B-21 Raider) intended to penetrate China’s air defenses to prosecute targets in
Elsa Kania and John Costello, Quantum Hegemony: China’s Ambitions and the Challenge
to U.S. Innovation Leadership (Washington, D.C.: CNAS 2018), https://s3.amazonaws.
com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReport-Quantum-Tech_FINAL.pdf?
mtime=20180912133406.
12
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GAMBERINI AND RUBIN
times of conflict. Quantum radars could also negate the stealth capabilities of
U.S. 5th Generation fighter aircraft, including the F-35 Lightning and F-22
Raptor, degrading some of their tactical qualitative advantages vis-à-vis Chinese
combat aircraft and air defense systems. Even though some experts question
whether a quantum radar provides any improved capability than other radars in
realistic scenarios, China’s investment in these types of quantum radars, which
could significantly degrade U.S. air superiority in the region with lasting,
detrimental effects on regional stability, is still a critical area to watch.
The advent of new and improved quantum sensing applications such as
atomic clocks and gravimeters should give those in the U.S. nuclear deterrence
community pause. These extant and emergent applications, when fielded by
the United States or competitor militaries, might offer capabilities that could
prove disruptive to the maintenance of strategic and regional deterrence
architectures. Quantum physicist, Michael Biercuk, and Center for New
American Security’s CEO Richard Fontaine offer a warning of the potential
role quantum sensors could play in detecting and tracking military assets needed
for strategic deterrence,
Even the relatively mundane near-term development of new
quantum-enhanced clocks may impact security, and beyond just
making GPS devices more accurate. Quantum-enabled clocks
are so sensitive that they can discern minor gravitational
anomalies from a distance. They thus could be deployed by
military personnel to detect underground, hardened structures,
submarines, or hidden weapons systems. Given their potential
for remote sensing, advanced clocks may become a key
embedded technology for tomorrow’s warfighter.13
While this outlook is speculative because even sensitive research-grade
atomic clocks are not the best gravimeters at present, it does underline that
there are technology-driven potential challenges for the United States’ modern
deterrence architecture.
China is pursuing applications of quantum sensing to detect large metal
objects like stealth aircraft, and perhaps one day, submarines. 14 If a competitor
such as China is able to field and integrate quantum sensors to track submarines,
13 Michael J. Biercuk and Richard Fontaine, “The Leap into Quantum Technology: A
Primer for National Security Professionals,” War on the Rocks, Nov. 17, 2017,
https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/leap-quantum-technology-primer-nationalsecurity-professionals/.
14 Martin Giles, “The US and China are in a quantum arms race that will transform
warfare,” MIT Technology Review, Jan. 3, 2019, https://www.technologyreview.com/
2019/01/03/137969/us-china-quantum-arms-race/.
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Quantum Sensing’s Potential Impact on Strategic Deterrence and Modern Warfare
this could place U.S. undersea deterrence operations at increased operational
risk, particularly where they play a vital role in the Indo-Pacific region.15 For
example, competitor-fielded quantum sensors enabling the tracking of deployed
U.S. navy submarines would both degrade a boat’s survivability and limit its
ability to penetrate maritime defenses. Comprising what is often described as
the most survivable leg of the U.S. Nuclear Triad, the U.S. Navy’s 14 Ohio
Class ballistic missile submarines (SSBN)16 are equipped with the D-5 Trident
II missile capable of delivering nuclear payloads.17 The potential for quantum
sensing capabilities to denude the Ohio and Columbia SSBNs of the ocean’s
concealment, if fully or partially realized, will degrade the SSBN’s key
operational attribute: stealth. Since deterrence is based on perception, increased
vulnerability due to degradation of stealth, whether full or partial, will reduce
confidence in an SSBN’s ability to deliver an assured second-strike nuclear
response in the event of a nuclear crisis or conflict. This action would, thereby,
undermine their credibility as a deterrent. Loss of credibility would also erode
their utility as a tool for allied assurance in situations where the U.S. provides
extended deterrence capabilities.
Quantum sensing applications hold potential to disrupt deterrence
architectures through increasing the vulnerability of fielded nuclear systems and
forces. Yet, perhaps just as disruptive is the role that quantum sensing advances
may play in modern warfighting. As peers and regional powers alike seek to
offset the U.S. military’s long-held conventional overmatch on the battlefield,
quantum sensors hold the potential to offset some U.S. warfighting advantages.
Warfighting Disruptions: A2/AD, PNT, and CWMD
Quantum sensors may also play a disruptive role in modern warfighting
and will require time, investment, and research to develop relevant and fieldable
David Hambling, “China’s quantum submarine detector could seal South China
Sea,” New Scientist, Aug. 22, 2017, https://www.newscientist.com/article/2144721chinas-quantum-submarine-detector-could-seal-south-china-sea/.
16 “U.S. Navy Ohio class SSBNs are scheduled to be replaced by 12 Columbia Class
SSBNs starting in 2030,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: Irreversible Implementation
of the National Defense Strategy (Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Defense, 2020),
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/
fy2021_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
17 “Ballistic Missile Submarines,” Submarine Force Pacific, U.S. Navy,
https://www.csp.navy.mil/SUBPAC-Commands/Submarines/Ballistic-MissileSubmarines/.
15
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GAMBERINI AND RUBIN
devices. If quantum sensors could provide PNT functionality, it would enable
or bolster anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities designed to prevent and
counter U.S. power projection. Conversely, U.S. military integration of new
and improved quantum sensing technology may enable and improve upon
access and entry operations in previously denied or contested theaters.
Anti-access operations are those meant to “prevent US forces entry into
a theater of operations,” while area denial operations prevent “freedom of
action in the more narrow confines of the area under an enemy’s direct
control.” 18 Although many defense analysts increasingly question the value of
A2/AD as a framework for assessing competitor operations and capabilities,
for the purpose this assessment, A2/AD offers a useful construct for
understanding the potential impact of quantum sensors in warfighting
scenarios.19
If fielded and integrated into competitor militaries, quantum sensors
might deliver operational benefit to multiple competitor A2/AD capabilities.
For instance, competitor advances in gravimeters and gravity gradiometers may
provide a realizable technology pathway for tracking U.S. undersea assets
operating in-theater, increasing the likelihood of their detection in contested
waters to include littoral zones. Improved gravimeters and gravity gradiometers
could prove to be a pivotal enabling capability in competitor A2/AD operations
that are designed to prevent and/or limit all U.S. submarines from accessing
contested sea lanes and littorals using a variety of anti-submarine capabilities.
Perhaps nowhere is the convergence of A2/AD operations and
quantum sensing applications more pronounced than in the case of China’s
efforts to contest U.S. military dominance of the Indo-Pacific.20 In the case of
China, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) already fields the
DF-26 intermediate range ballistic missile known as the “Guam Killer,” and the
DF-21D anti-ship, medium range ballistic missile, which is sometimes referred
Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry Watts, Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial
Challenge (Washington, D.C., Center for Strategic and Budget Assessments, 2003),
https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/a2ad-anti-access-areadenial#:~:text=This%20report%20looks%20at%20the,adapt%20to%20an%20exped
itionary%20era.&text=A2%20and%20AD%20capabilities%20are,and%20demonstra
ted%20power%2Dprojection%20capabilities.
19 Michael Kofman, “It’s Time to Talk about A2/AD: Rethinking the Russian
Military Challenge,” War on the Rocks, Sept. 2019, https://warontherocks.com/
2019/09/its-time-to-talk-about-a2-ad-rethinking-the-russian-military-challenge/.
20 David Santoro and Brad Glosserman, “Healey Is Wrong: It’s Deterrence, Stupid,”
War on the Rocks, Oct. 14, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/healeyswrong-its-deterrence-stupid/.
18
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Quantum Sensing’s Potential Impact on Strategic Deterrence and Modern Warfare
to as a carrier killer.21 These capabilities highlight Beijing’s focus on improving
the PLARF’s precision kinetic-strike capabilities, designed to hold in-theater
United States and allied forces at risk across the Indo-Pacific. Consider the
example of gravimeters, which are notoriously sensitive to motion. If the
research and engineering overcame this challenge and a gravimeter were able to
be integrated into these missile systems, it could directly improve their accuracy.
Though the underlying research is needed, and the underlying engineering
challenge must be hurdled,22 if such a scenario is realized, the increased overall
efficiency and lethality of China’s missile capability would bolster Beijing’s
A2/AD strategy.
Extant and emergent advances in quantum sensing may prove to be a
critical enabler of the U.S. military’s operational approach outlined in these
operating concepts. For example, advances in atomic clock size and precision
offer the possibility of a near-term, feasible technology alternative to time
distribution via GPS. As competitors seek to deny and degrade U.S. space
capabilities as part of their A2/AD operations, advances in quantum clock
technology could deliver low SWaP-C position and timing solutions, which
would be critical for a capability as an alternative to GPS. This technology holds
the potential for continued precision navigation in GPS-degraded or -denied
operating environments, as well as for the targeting of precision guided
munitions in GPS-denied environments. Leveraging ground-based, highly
precise, small, and rugged atomic clocks could also support command and
control (C2) efforts through allowing cross-domain operational
synchronization when GPS in unavailable.
Moreover, as quantum sensor-enabled gravity mapping may prove
beneficial to competitor A2/AD capabilities, these innovations also hold
promise for countering A2/AD challenges. Advances in gravity mapping
provide a pathway for navigation in GPS-denied operating environments and,
therefore, offer the potential to compensate for limited C2 connectivity for
forces operating for extended periods of time in underground or underwater
environments. As competitors, such as China and North Korea, invest in areadenial capabilities, including extensive underground tunnel networks for
concealment and defense, gravity mapping could one day deliver a critical tool
21 “China’s Carrier Killer Ballistic Missiles are Operational,” Defense Tech, Dec. 28,
2010, http://www.defensetech.org/2010/12/28/chinas-carrier-killer-ballisticmissiles-are-operational/.
22 “Applications of Quantum Technologies: Executive Summary,” Defense Science
Board, U.S. Department of Defense, Oct. 23, 2019, https://dsb.cto.mil/reports/
2010s/DSB_QuantumTechnologies_Executive%20Summary_10.23.2019_SR.pdf.
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GAMBERINI AND RUBIN
for U.S. warfighters, like special operations forces, tasked with executing
operations in these environments. Not only could this enable target defeat
options, but the gravity mapping could also benefit hard target intelligence
collection efforts.
Quantum sensing has the potential to drive changes to both competitor
A2/AD operations and the use of force projection concepts and capabilities
that have been developed and implemented to overcome them. Extant and
emergent capabilities in atomic clock innovation point to a future where
position and timing could be assured even in GPS-denied operating
environments, reducing reliance on space-based position and timing
capabilities. Furthermore, gravimeters and gravity gradiometers hold the
potential to detect concealed targets. While impossible to predict the
operational impacts of these emergent systems on the long-term viability of
U.S. force project capabilities and the competitor A2/AD strategies designed
to counter them, quantum sensing advances may play an outsized role in these
military scenarios. This potential role is due to their widespread applicability as
enablers for U.S. required capabilities and for competitor military critical
systems.
Another area in which advances in quantum sensing potentially could
impact warfighting is in Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction operations.
For the U.S. military, quantum sensors hold promise for a range of operations
and missions, including: mobile missile tracking and targeting; hazardous
material detection; and the entire spectrum of disrupting an adversary’s ability
to obtain and use a WMD.23 With the right imagination and advancements, the
field of quantum sensing may be leveraged for innovative solutions to
countering some WMD challenges. When considering the means to dissuade,
prevent, and deter an actor, advances in quantum sensing might help transform
military capabilities needed to track, target, and locate WMD threats. Here,
advances in quantum sensing might help transform military capabilities needed
to track, target, and locate WMD threats.
The DoD’s 2014 National Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons
of Mass Destruction establishes areas that must be executed to counter WMD.
These areas include: 1) understanding the environment, threads, and
vulnerabilities; 2) controlling, defeating, disabling, and disposing of WMD; and
safeguarding the force and managing consequences.24
Annex 3-4 Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Operations: Controlling, Defeating,
Disabling, and Disposing of WMD (Curtis E. Lemay Center: 2016),
https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/Annex_3-40/3-40-D12CBRN-Controlling.pdf.
24 “Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction,”
(Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 2014).
23
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Quantum Sensing’s Potential Impact on Strategic Deterrence and Modern Warfare
Quantum sensing applications, when mature, could enable each of these
military activities. Quantum sensors such as gravimeters and gravity
gradiometers hold promise for improving stand-off sensor capabilities for
detecting threats such as concealed nuclear weapons. Although standoff or
remote detection of chemical or biological agents still remains a formidable
challenge, advances in quantum sensing in the fields of magnetic resonance
imaging, and nuclear magnetic resonance, as examples, could aid in the future
identification of dangerous chemical and biological agents.25, They may also
someday yield insight into biological materials, allowing for greater
understanding of both naturally occurring, infectious disease and biological
warfare agent threats. As quantum sensors achieve higher TRLs, they offer the
promise of improved understanding of WMD threats, which could enable more
informed threat assessments of vulnerability to these types of weapons.
WMD detection capabilities will also enable military activities associated
with controlling, defeating, disabling, and disposing of WMD threats. The
ability of warfighters to detect threats from a distance will provide the U.S.
military with an increased ability to track, target, and locate WMD threats.
Quantum sensing capabilities could also benefit a wide array of military-led or
-supported efforts from nuclear treaty compliance operations to North Korean
de-nuclearization efforts to international maritime counterproliferation
partnerships.
Already, quantum sensors with potential counter WMD applications
have started to yield results in laboratory settings. Research progress has been
made on the use of quantum gravity detectors to locate hidden nuclear
materials.
A 2013 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory project
successfully leveraged gravitational imaging to detect nuclear material in a
moving car. 26 While this capability is not poised for deployment anytime soon,
it points to the possibility that quantum sensing research could yield new WMD
detection capabilities.
Kim E. Sapsford, Christopher Bradburne, James B. Delehanty, and Igor L.
Medintz,“Sensors for detecting biological agents,” Materials Today, vol. 11, no.
3, (March 2008), pp. 38-49, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S136970210870018X. Also, see, Clare E. Rowland, Carl W. Brown, III, James B.
Delehanty, and Igor L. Medintz, “Nanomaterial-based sensors for the detection of
biological threat agents,” Materials Today, vol. 19, no. 8, (Oct. 2016), pp. 464-477,
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1369702116000675.
26 “Gravity Detector Applies Outside-the-Box Thinking to Show What’s Inside the
Box,” Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Sept. 2013, https://str.llnl.gov/
september-2013/libby.
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Quantum sensors, when fully integrated into military force structures,
could prove destabilizing if the United States and its competitors do not possess
the same capability. On the other hand, quantum sensing applications offer the
potential to increase strategic stability through reinforcement of crisis stability
architectures, such as the implementation of arms control treaties and
agreements. Gravimeters and gravity gradiometers may hold the potential to
detect nuclear materials, offering a potentially improved national technical
means needed for accurate, stand-off nuclear treaty compliance and verification
activities. While the use of such capabilities would need to be negotiated into
future treaties and agreements, they could offer a new range of compliance
verification measures to either augment or replace onsite inspection regimes.
The wide array of quantum sensing applications provides a range of technology
pathways for detection of WMD threats. While many quantum sensing
applications with potential WMD applications are at low TRLs and may require
leaps in engineering achievements, ongoing research demonstrates the potential
for innovative military applications in countering WMD operations.
Recommendations for the Near Future
Given quantum sensors’ potential to disrupt and transform modern
warfare, they must remain a priority focus area for the Defense Department’s
R&D investment. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Research
and Engineering) already has singled-out quantum science as one of the DoD’s
top 11 modernization priorities. 27 However, DoD should focus efforts on
developing quantum sensors with those who might use them and fund missionrelevant applied research in quantum sensors. Quantum sensing R&D must be
front and center within the Department of Defense’s quantum science
modernization agenda to ensure that the U.S. military does not cede
technological advantage to competitors, like China, who are actively investing
in quantum sensing applications that could upend the United States’ existing
deterrence and warfighting capabilities. While public investment in academic
and national laboratory R&D is essential for maintaining a competitive edge in
quantum sensing applications, particularly those with direct military
applications, the DoD must also seek to offset competitor R&D advances with
sustained outreach to the private sector to highlight awareness of procurement
of capabilities by potential U.S. adversaries.
For the U.S. military, losing the race to field game-changing quantum
sensing applications could lead to adverse technological asymmetries wherein
U.S. advanced capabilities like SSBNs could become increasingly vulnerable to
Modernization Priorities, Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering,
U.S. Department of Defense, https://www.cto.mil/modernization-priorities/.
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Quantum Sensing’s Potential Impact on Strategic Deterrence and Modern Warfare
detection and tracking across a variety of operating environments. These
vulnerabilities, in turn, could result in increased risk to U.S. forces responsible
for providing deterrence and power projection capabilities. Ultimately,
technological asymmetries wrought by competitor quantum sensing advantages
hold the potential to undermine the United States’ ability to deter adversaries
and assure allies through a reduced confidence in the effectiveness of U.S.
strategic nuclear responses in times of crisis and conflict. Moreover, a failure
to keep pace with competitors in the fielding of quantum sensing innovations
could undermine U.S. warfighting advantages, resulting in contingency
operations requiring an increased amount of blood and treasure to counter
adversaries with these advanced capabilities.
Media conjecture and public opinion (and misunderstanding) of
quantum science shape thinking about the applications of quantum innovation
in CWMD and deterrence policy efforts. In addition to challenges of
understanding and explaining a complicated science and technology area, the
wide array of quantum sensing applications means these advances, which have
outsized defense and national security implications, are not getting the right
level of attention in policy conversations about emerging
technology. In order to prioritize quantum sensing innovation,
Washington policymakers and defense officials must have a clear
picture of relevant military applications and an understanding of
their potentially destabilizing effects in modern warfare.
Sarah Jacobs Gamberini is a Policy Fellow at the National Defense University's
Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CSWMD).
Lawrence Rubin is an Associate Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International
Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology.
The authors would like to thank Alexa Harter and Robert Wyllie (Georgia Tech
Research Institute) and Dain Hancock (CSWMD) for their valuable input. The views
expressed in this paper are those of the authors and are not an official policy or position
of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government.
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