Rapid #: -19207993
CROSS REF ID:
MR0048 IWOOT
LENDER:
VWM :: Swem Library
BORROWER:
EZ9 :: Streatham
TYPE:
Book Chapter
BOOK TITLE:
Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2021
USER BOOK TITLE:
Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2021
CHAPTER TITLE:
Chapter 9, The United Kingdom and Indo-Pacific Security
BOOK AUTHOR:
Alessio Patalano
EDITION:
VOLUME:
PUBLISHER:
YEAR:
2021
PAGES:
unknown
ISBN:
9781003223887
LCCN:
OCLC #:
Processed by RapidX:
6/22/2022 8:00:41 AM
This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code)
THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND INDO-PACIFIC
SECURITY
C H A P T E R
NINE
ALESSIO PATALANO
Speaking at the Labour Party’s Annual Conference in
1963, Labour leader and future prime minister Harold
Wilson identified the challenge a post-Imperial
Britain faced in finding a place in the world: ‘There
is no more dangerous illusion than the comfortable
doctrine that the world owes us a living. … From
now on Britain will have just as much influence in
the world as we can earn, as we can deserve.’1 His
words are as relevant today as they were in 1963. In
2021, it is not a post-Imperial Britain but a post-Brexit
Britain that stands at a crossroads.2 However, the
government’s attempts to use the notion of ‘Global
Britain’ to present Brexit as an opportunity to re-cast
the country’s engagement in world affairs have elicited considerable criticism,3 particularly in light of
the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and
the suppression of political liberties in Hong Kong.4
Criticisms have focused on how Britain would be a
diminished international actor outside the European
Union, pursuing a foreign policy ‘warped by delusions of national grandeur’ and lacking the necessary
diplomatic and military means to influence events.5
Given that a significant part of the United
Kingdom’s future foreign-policy agenda focuses on
enhancing the country’s role in the Indo-Pacific, these
criticisms are important. How realistic is Britain’s
ambition, in the words of Foreign Secretary Dominic
Raab, to ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific?6 Does Britain possess
the strategy and resources to transform ambitions
into reality? These are critical questions, the answers
to which highlight a potential gap between the UK’s
post-Brexit rhetoric regarding the country’s potential future role as a security actor in the region and
the actual prospects of achieving this aspiration.
These questions are also particularly timely since in
March 2021 the government released both its framework-setting Integrated Review of Security, Defence,
REGIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT
Development and Foreign Policy Review and the
more detailed Ministry of Defence Integrated Review
Command Paper.7 Taken together, these documents
set out the ‘handrails for future policy making’8 and
an outline of the UK’s future Indo-Pacific strategy,
tackling another common criticism of the Global
Britain idea – its lack of official articulation.
THE OUTLOOK FOR GLOBAL BRITAIN
Since then-prime minister Theresa May launched a
vision of a ‘Global Britain’ at the Conservative Party
Conference in October 2016, the UK’s Conservative
leaders have consistently argued that withdrawal from
the EU has provided an opportunity to rediscover a
‘global outlook’.9 In December 2016, then-foreign
secretary Boris Johnson proclaimed confidently that
post-Brexit Britain would ‘be more outward-looking
and more engaged with the world than ever before’.10
Global Britain’s gaze would be set beyond ‘the immediate European hinterland’, according to Johnson.
Within this widened geographical ambit, the aim was
to ‘make a distinctive approach to policy-making as
regards China and East Asia’.11
Early articulations of the notion of a Global Britain
therefore implicitly recognised that engaging more
deeply with the Indo-Pacific region was unavoidable and indeed desirable. This perspective gained
momentum in the following years. Foreign Secretary
Raab said in October 2020 that the Indo-Pacific would
be the government’s priority – ‘an area for extra
attention, investment and time spent’.12 Brexit had
established a correlation between Britain’s interest in
remaining a leading international actor and the need
to engage more actively with the political and security dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region.
By 2018, an expanded British diplomatic effort
was already supporting the UK’s greater interest in
153
of a long-term tilting of British foreign and security
policy towards the Indo-Pacific occurred when the
government heralded the most significant review of
British security policy since the Cold War.17 Initial
assessments focused, reasonably, on how to better
align defence-spending priorities to ensure a balance
of UK capabilities able to meet expected shifts in
(Ben Stansall/WPA Pool/Getty Images)
the Indo-Pacific, although the government started to
use the expression only in October 2020.13 In October
2018, then-foreign secretary Jeremy Hunt, pointing to
the rise of China and other Asian economies as a catalyst, announced the ‘biggest expansion of Britain’s
diplomatic network for a generation’, including 12
new posts worldwide and nearly 1,000 more personnel.14 The Indo-Pacific featured prominently, with new
High Commissions established in Samoa, Tonga and
Vanuatu, and a new British mission to the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) headquarters in
Jakarta. This would give Britain the same spread of
diplomatic representation globally as France, Hunt
noted, and only slightly behind that of the United
States and China.15
In January 2019, Hunt specifically sought to
restate that Global Britain meant the UK would be
more visible and active in the Indo-Pacific region.
Delivering an IISS Fullerton Lecture in Singapore,
he pointed out that the UK was among ‘a handful’
of European countries with diplomatic missions in
every ASEAN member state. He drew inspiration
from Singapore’s own history to stress that separation from the EU was making Britain more open, not
more insular – much like Singapore after separation
from Malaysia in 1965.16 Perhaps the clearest sign
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson arrives with Defence
Secretary Ben Wallace (2l) to visit military personnel at
Salisbury Plain Training Area, UK, 19 September 2019
foreign policy.18 Indeed, by October 2020, Raab was
clear that the priorities of British foreign policy were
changing.19 As a result of this process, the requirements for Britain’s Indo-Pacific ‘tilt’ would probably
inform the reconfiguration of defence capabilities
and priorities, as the announced increased focus on
maritime capabilities in procurement plans would
seemingly suggest.20
THE INDO-PACIFIC AS A PRIORITY REGION
FOR BRITISH TRADE
The need to enhance trade opportunities underpinned
much of the UK’s post-Brexit international strategy.
By January 2021, the government was stressing its
ambition to prioritise access to fast-growing markets
and major economies in its submission of an application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).21 This, in turn,
elevated the importance of ties with the Indo-Pacific.
Table 9.1: Major speeches/reports on ‘Global Britain’ and UK defence, 2016–20
Prime Minister
Speech/report delivered by
Title
theresa May
Michael Fallon (Ds)
Britain’s Global Role: stepping Up
theresa May (PM)
Britain after Brexit: A Vision of a Global Britain
2 oct 2016
Boris Johnson (Fs)
Beyond Brexit: A Global Britain
2 Dec 2016
Michael Fallon (Ds)
Britain extends Global Defence Reach
theresa May (PM)
Plan for Britain
17 Jan 2017
Gavin Williamson (Ds)
Hard as Well as soft Power: the Case for Modern Defence
15 Mar 2018
Jeremy Hunt (Fs)
An Invisible Chain
31 oct 2018
Jeremy Hunt (Fs)
Britain’s Role in a post-Brexit World
Gavin Williamson (Ds)
Defence in Global Britain
11 Feb 2019
Jeremy Hunt (Fs)
Lord Mayor’s Banquet 2019
14 May 2019
15 May 2019
Boris Johnson
Date
22 Jul 2016
12 Dec 2016
2 Jan 2019
Penny Mordaunt (Ds)
Keynote speech at sea Power Conference 2019
Dominic Raab (Fs)
Introduction to the Queen’s speech Debate
Boris Johnson (PM)
PM speech in Greenwich
Boris Johnson (PM)
PM statement to House of Commons
16 Jun 2020
Gen. nick Carter (CDs)
the Integrated operating Concept
30 sep 2020
Foreign Affairs Committee,
House of Commons
A Brave new Britain? the Future of the UK’s International Policy
22 oct 2020
13 Jan 2020
3 Feb 2020
Ds (Defence secretary); PM (Prime Minister); Fs (Foreign secretary); CDs (Chief of Defence staff )
source: IIss
154
CHAPteR nIne
REGIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT
(Suhaimi Abdullah/Getty Images)
(Behrouz Mehri/AFP via Getty Images)
Britain’s then-foreign secretary Jeremy Hunt shakes hands
with Japan’s then-foreign minister Kono Taro during the
Japan–UK Strategic Dialogue, Tokyo, 18 September 2018
As one observer noted, the UK aimed to recalibrate trade relations by harvesting opportunities
‘east of Suez’.22 The emergence of the Indo-Pacific
as a dynamic trading region already promised new
opportunities for the British economy. According to
2019 data, while the EU as a bloc remained the UK’s
largest trading partner, Asia already accounted for
approximately 20% of both UK exports and imports.
By way of comparison, the Americas accounted for
25% of UK exports and 16% of imports.23
In 2019, seven of the UK’s top 25 export markets
were in Asia. The top three in Asia – China, Japan
and Hong Kong – together accounted for some US$82
billion of exports in goods and services, a value
higher than that of Germany (the UK’s second-largest
export market).24 In 2017, when considered as a bloc,
the total value of UK exports to ASEAN (US$24.1bn)
meant that the bloc was the third-largest non-EU
export market, after the US and China.25 By 2019, the
foreign secretary was reporting that the UK was the
largest European investor in Southeast Asia, with
over 4,000 British companies employing more than
50,000 people in Singapore alone.26 This data was
symptomatic of a broader trend: trade volumes with
key Asian actors, notably China and India, have been
increasing significantly since the late 1990s.27
In terms of financial investments, Britain’s mature
relationship with Japan – defined in the 2015 National
Security Strategy document as the UK’s ‘closest security partner in Asia’ – is highlighted by the fact that the
country was in 2017 the fifth-largest recipient of British
foreign investments (5%).28 Equally crucial is the
UK’s status as the single most important recipient of
Japanese investments in Europe, with approximately
100 new projects per year across different sectors, and
some 800 Japanese businesses employing some 100,000
people.29 Brexit might affect specific elements of AngloJapanese economic ties, but it is unlikely to undermine
the overall importance of the relationship, as indicated
by the fact that Britain and Japan signed the former’s
first post-Brexit trade agreement in October 2020.30
AN IISS STRATEGIC DOSSIER
Charles, Prince of Wales, inspecting a
Singapore Armed Forces guard of honour with
President Halimah Yacob, 31 October 2017
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES IN THE INDOPACIFIC AFTER BREXIT
In 2020, informed observers highlighted how the
British government had promoted an ambitious
strategy to conclude agreements covering 80%
of national trade within the next three years.31 In
pursuing such an objective, the Indo-Pacific offers
two unique opportunities.
Firstly, the region is at the centre of a significant
economic transformation involving the liberalisation
of national markets and the expansion of requirements for services and digital standards. In this
context, the UK has been clear that membership
of the CPTPP would have considerable strategic
value.32 The CPTPP is the third-largest trading bloc
internationally, linking 11 countries in or bordering
the Pacific region (including Australia, Canada,
Japan, New Zealand and Singapore) that together
constitute 13% of the global economy.33 Japan and
Singapore have openly supported the UK’s ambition to join the agreement.34 A positive outcome of
the application submitted at the end of January 2021
would deliver an important political result: it is an
opportunity that can only be pursued outside the
EU and would be a key stepping stone towards ‘a
network of free trade agreements’ for the UK.35
Secondly, the Indo-Pacific potentially represents an area of long-term growth for UK defence
exports. In the context of continuing efforts by
many regional states to improve their military capabilities, the UK is poised to export a major naval
surface-combatant-ship design for the first time
since the 1970s. Both the Australian and Canadian
navies will introduce the BAE Systems Global
Combat Ship, based on the Royal Navy’s Type-26
frigate, as a major component of their future fleets.
In Australia, the US$22.7bn contract is expected to
help transform the Australian shipbuilding sector
(creating 5,000 jobs), cement bilateral industrial
and defence ties with the UK, and offer cuttingedge naval capabilities.36
tHe UnIteD KInGDoM AnD InDo-PACIFIC seCURItY
155
(IISS)
UK−Japan defence-industrial ties have also been
at the centre of British government interest. As part
of a widening agenda of industrial cooperation, in
2017 the two governments agreed to work together
in researching options for a future air-to-air missile
and combat aircraft. They also signed an Acquisition
and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) to facilitate
the sharing of equipment, facilities and services
more efficiently.37 Beyond Japan, Southeast Asia
also remains an area of significant British defence
engagement, as the UK continues to promote the
development and integration of capabilities, especially through the Five Power Defence Arrangements
(FPDA), which involve Australia, Malaysia, New
Zealand, Singapore and the UK.38
THE UK INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY:
CONTRIBUTING TO REGIONAL STABILITY?
Economic opportunities alone, however, are insufficient to explain Britain’s Indo-Pacific tilt. The UK has
not formally articulated a stand-alone Indo-Pacific
strategy that clearly sets out its security interests in
the region in the fashion of other European powers,
notably France and Germany.39 However, the integrated review directly tackled this question by
bringing back an Indo-Pacific geopolitical framework that senior government ministers first debated
in the mid-1960s during reviews of Britain’s overseas commitments.40 Indeed, the integrated review
expanded upon the British government’s willingness
to adopt an ‘Indo-Pacific’ framework to contextualise
its engagement with the region. In September 2020,
shortly after the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of
Defence had confirmed that the integrated-review
process was under way, the newly restructured
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(FCDO) established the first post of Director General
for the Indo-Pacific − a role that includes membership
of the FCDO Management Board.41
The UK’s formal adoption of an Indo-Pacific
framework builds upon a clearer political desire
within government circles to contribute to shaping
the region’s stability, a crucial precondition for any
prosperity agenda. In particular, Britain’s aim to
enhance stability draws upon guiding principles
that senior ministers, including Boris Johnson, have
consistently argued since 2016.42 These, in turn,
reflect a longer process of rethinking engagement
‘east of Suez’ that can be linked to the government
of former prime minister David Cameron.43 These
principles are free trade, democracy and open societies, human rights and the international rule of law.44
In the Indo-Pacific, these principles have informed
how the British government envisages the ‘influence
of friendly countries’ – including the UK – working
156
CHAPteR nIne
Britain’s then-defence secretary Penny Mordaunt speaks
at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 1 June 2019
to reduce miscalculation and ‘unwanted confrontation’ in favour of stability and prosperity.45 Standing
together with its allies and partners, notably the US,
the UK is deploying its influence to help counter an
increasingly assertive China.46 As then-foreign secretary Hunt stressed in 2018, British strategy should be
informed by an aspiration to be ‘an invisible chain’
linking democracies in defending the existing international order.47
Since the introduction of new security laws in
Hong Kong and the publication of reports on humanrights abuses in Xinjiang, the British government has
maintained a strong emphasis on a value-informed
foreign policy.48 This, in turn, informs an approach
to international affairs in which the chief threats to
British national security and values are understood to
come from authoritarian rivals – rivals who think in
terms of a ‘continuous struggle’ and ‘believe that they
are already engaged in an intense form of conflict
that is predominantly political rather than kinetic’.49
The UK Ministry of Defence’s Integrated Operating
Concept 2025, revealed in October 2020, was the first
British government doctrinal document that consistently referred to China, alongside Russia, as one
of Britain’s main rivals. In so doing, it highlighted
how these authoritarian regimes operating ‘below
obvious detection and response thresholds’ embrace
a way of warfare that is ‘strategic … synchronised
and systematic’.50 It was also the first government
document that indicated a shift of focus to peacetime
activities aimed at shaping security affairs, where
previously the UK had sought merely to react to or
manage security concerns as they arose.
In this respect, the Integrated Operating Concept
proposed three significant doctrinal shifts with clear
ramifications for the Indo-Pacific. The first was an
emphasis on ‘operating’ as opposed to ‘war fighting’.
This concept sought to address a state of persistent
competition through a posture that is engaged and
forward-deployed − with training and exercising
delivered as operations − and ‘shaping activities’,
REGIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT
(Wiktor Szymanowicz/Barcroft Media via Getty Images)
(Jeff J Mitchell - WPA Pool/Getty Images)
Britain’s then-prime minister David Cameron views
a model of a Global Combat Ship while visiting a
BAE Systems shipyard, Scotland, 20 February 2015
such as capacity-building and engagement designed
to support countries needing to counter adversarial
behaviour.51 The second shift reflected the premium
on building partnerships able to operate across the
spectrum of military activities on a regular basis. The
third concerned the need to integrate the different
military, economic and political tools of statecraft to
deliver desired ‘effects’, such as a more stable security
environment and reduced vulnerability to coercion
and attempts to change a given operational or legal
status quo.52
BRITAIN’S SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE
INDO-PACIFIC
In the Indo-Pacific, the UK’s doctrinal shift towards a
shaping posture is likely to address four fundamental
sets of security interests. The first consists of treaty
commitments and formal obligations in the region.
These derive predominantly from the UK’s role as a
permanent member of the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC), the FPDA and the Five Eyes intelligence framework. The UK is also part of the UN
Command overseeing the Korean War armistice
and is involved in implementing sanctions against
North Korea. UN Command membership implies no
automatic commitment of UK forces in the event of
hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, but there is nonetheless international expectation that the UK would be
involved in meeting such a challenge.53 Similarly, the
FPDA does not commit UK forces to regional crises but
members are required to consult each other ‘immediately’ in the event of a threat or an armed attack. This
creates a reasonable expectation for the UK to retain a
degree of commitment to regional stability, if anything
to reduce the risk that armed attacks occur.54
Beyond formal obligations, the second – and no
less relevant − set of UK Indo-Pacific security interests
concern support for its allies and partners.55 Given the
United States’ declared interests in the Indo-Pacific, the
importance of the region in the ‘special relationship’
should not go unnoticed. Still, the support for UK forces
AN IISS STRATEGIC DOSSIER
British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace and General
Sir Nick Carter arrive for a National Security Council
meeting on 5G and Huawei, London, 28 January 2020
Figure 9.1: UK two-way trade with selected Indo-Pacific markets, 2019
Australia
60.01
China*
39.04
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Japan
Malaysia
New Zealand
Singapore
South Korea
Thailand
Goods imports to UK
Services imports to UK
Goods exports from UK
Services exports from UK
Vietnam
0
3
6
9
12
15
60
US$ (billion)
*Mainland China only, excluding Hong Kong and Macau.
source: UK, office of national statistics, www.ons.gov.uk
tHe UnIteD KInGDoM AnD InDo-PACIFIC seCURItY
157
Map 9.1: Main countries visited by Royal Navy warships, 2018–20
Indian Ocean Theatre
Southeast Asian Theatre
HMS Enterprise
East Asian Theatre
South Pacific Theatre
Sea of
Japan
(East Sea)
CHINA
SOUTH
KOREA
HMS Albion
JAPAN
HMS Argyll
PAKISTAN
HMS Montrose
East
China
Sea
INDIA
Arabian
Sea
HMS Sutherland
Taiwan
Bay of
Bengal
HMS Dragon
HMS Enterprise
South
China
Sea
PHILIPPINES
HMS Montrose
HMS Enterprise
HMS Argyll
Guam (US)
VIETNAM
SRI LANKA
British Indian Ocean Territory
Pacific
Ocean
SINGAPORE
MALAYSIA
BRUNEI
Philippine
Sea
HMS Argyll
INDONESIA
Banda Sea
HMS Sutherland
HMS Montrose
Indian
Ocean
HMS Albion
Coral Sea
AUSTRALIA
EASTER ISLAND
NEW
CALEDONIA
CHILE
HMS Sutherland
HMS Montrose
NEW ZEALAND
Source: Navy News, www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/navy-news/archive
showcased during recent deployments in the region
has also highlighted the importance of the UK’s security ties with Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South
Korea, as well as the Southeast Asian Commonwealth
countries (Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore). Partly for
historical reasons but also because of Britain’s contemporary international standing as a UNSC permanent
member and as a major economy, to greater or lesser
degrees these actors have reasonable expectations that
the UK will contribute to maintaining security in the
158
Chapter nine
Indo-Pacific.56 The UK regards this network of partnerships as a significant asset for maximising British
influence. In particular, since 2015 the UK has started
exploring ways to enhance military cooperation and
coordination with US forces in the region, beginning
with the appointment of a liaison officer to the 7th
Fleet in Japan, who initially served also as a liaison to
the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), and
followed in 2018 by the creation of a similar position
to the US Indo-Pacific Command.57 These first steps
REGIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT
Table 9.2: Indo-Pacific theatres visited by Royal Navy warships, 2018–20
Vessel type
Indian
Ocean
Theatre
Southeast
Asian
Theatre
East
Asian
Theatre
South
Pacific
Theatre




HMS Sutherland
Frigate with surface-to-surface missile, hangar,
and surface-to-air missile (FFGHM)
HMS Albion
Landing platform/dock (LPD)



HMS Argyll
FFGHM



HMS Montrose
FFGHM



HMS Dragon
Destroyer with hangar and surface-to-air
missile (DDHM)
HMS Enterprise
Survey ship (AGS)





Source: Navy News, www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/navy-news/archive
suggest an intention to explore options for a more
sustainable and regular role for the UK’s armed forces
within an Indo-Pacific network of security partnerships,
albeit a network that is nonetheless aimed at reinforcing
the overall security relationship with the US.58
The third set of security interests concerns the
maintenance of the existing maritime order. As an
export-oriented economy and a party to the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the
UK has a strategic interest in maintaining respect
for freedom of navigation and overflight, as well as
the rule of law in managing maritime and territorial
disputes. In line with these interests, in September
2020 the British government published its position on legal issues in the South China Sea, inter alia
supporting the award of the 2016 Philippines v. China
arbitral tribunal constituted under UNCLOS,59 and
stressing how the UK’s practice is consistent with the
tribunal’s findings, as the example of Rockall attests.60
Last but by no means least, Prime Minister
Johnson has made clear that he intends to take advantage of the UK Presidency of the G7 and the hosting
of the UN Climate Change Conference (COP26) in
2021 to take the international lead on tackling climate
change.61 The COP26 aims to accelerate action to tackle
greenhouse-gas emissions and address the potentially devastating consequences of climate change.
This initiative is highly relevant to human-security
challenges in the Indo-Pacific and presents opportunities to renew British influence in the region. Urban
concentration along coastlines across the Indo-Pacific
has been a major factor in amplifying the effects of
natural disasters.62 Tackling climate change will resonate especially with small states in the South Pacific,
which are particularly vulnerable in this regard.63
AN IISS STRATEGIC DOSSIER
THE CHINA FACTOR IN THE UK’S INDOPACIFIC SECURITY ENGAGEMENT
The significant change of tone in the defence ministry’s new Integrated Operating Concept was, in good
part, the result of a growing political and expert
consensus in London on the need to recalibrate relations with China.64 In 2015, Chinese President Xi
Jinping’s state visit to London had contributed to
heralding a supposed ‘golden era’ of cooperation.65
By 2020, the state of bilateral ties had changed considerably. The combined effect of sceptical perceptions
in the UK about Beijing’s initial management of the
COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with China’s introduction in June 2020 of a new security law in Hong
Kong that, from a British perspective, undermined
the spirit of the Sino-British Joint Declaration signed
in 1984, brought the relationship from a golden era
to a ‘deep freeze’.66 In July, the UK government’s
final decision to exclude ‘high-risk vendors’ such as
Chinese telecoms firm Huawei from its 5G communications network – a conclusion apparently reached
under considerable US pressure – gave a strong indication of the changing nature of the UK’s engagement
with China.67
The British government’s official position is one in
which the desire to maintain positive relations with
China on issues such as climate change and trade is
counterbalanced by a ‘clear-sighted’ understanding of
the challenges that China presents to the UK’s values
and security.68 For example, the FCDO has been vocal
with regard to China’s human-rights abuses against
the Uighur population in China’s western Xinjiang
province, though it stopped short of following
the US State Department’s decision to declare that
Chinese actions amounted to ‘genocide’.69 Similarly,
The United Kingdom and Indo-Pacific Security
159
Table 9.3: Major Royal Navy training and operations in the Indo-Pacific, 2018–20
Vessel type Theatre
HMS Sutherland
FFGHM
Indian Ocean
Southeast Asian
HMS Albion
LPD
HMS Argyll
FFGHM
East Asian
Anti-submarine-warfare, replenishment-at-sea and boarding
operations with Japan
Joint training with South Korea
Operations for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2397
prohibiting ship-to-ship transfers of goods to or from North Korea
South Pacific
Joint training with US
Ocean Explorer exercise (in Australia, also with New Zealand)
Indian Ocean
Southeast Asian
Setia Kawan exercise (Brunei)
East Asian
Joint amphibious training with Japan (cancelled)
Joint training with South Korea
North Korean sanctions enforcement
South Pacific
Joint training with US
Indian Ocean
Combined Task Force 151 (multinational anti-piracy activities)
Joint training with Japan
Southeast Asian
Bersama Lima exercise (in Malaysia/Singapore, also with Australia/
New Zealand)
East Asian
Trilateral training with Japan and United States
North Korean sanctions enforcement
South Pacific
HMS Montrose
FFGHM
Indian Ocean
Southeast Asian
East Asian
Trilateral training with Japan and US
North Korean sanctions enforcement
South Pacific
HMS Dragon
DDHM
Indian Ocean
Konkan exercise (India)
Southeast Asian
East Asian
South Pacific
AGS
HMS Enterprise
Indian Ocean
Southeast Asian
East Asian
Joint training with Japan
South Pacific
Source: Navy News, www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/navy-news/archive
with regard to Hong Kong, the UK has steadfastly
denounced Chinese actions. In August 2020, both
individually and together with the UK’s Five Eyes
partners, Foreign Secretary Raab objected to China’s
erosion of Hong Kong’s democracy.70 The British
government also offered Hong Kong residents with
British National (Overseas) status the option to move
to the UK.71 Furthermore, in light of China’s imposition of new rules to disqualify elected legislators in
Hong Kong, Raab declared that Beijing was in ‘clear
breach’ of the Sino-British Joint Declaration.72
Relations with China seem unlikely to revert to
the previous emphasis on cooperation and economic
engagement. British public opinion seemingly
supports a clearer-eyed approach to China, and
events since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic have
160
Chapter nine
entrenched distrust towards Beijing.73 Indeed, a Pew
Research Center poll of the UK public in late 2020
revealed that 74% of those interviewed held a negative image of China, part of a consistent shift towards
distrust of China across all advanced economies.74
In February 2021, a detailed annual study of British
public opinion provided an even more damning
assessment of perceptions of China in the UK. In 2020,
only 13% of the British public said they would support
any Chinese involvement in the UK’s infrastructure,
while 40% of those interviewed believed the UK
should challenge China on its human-rights record.75
Crucially, public opinion regarding China is
largely shared in Parliament. Under the chairmanship of Conservative MP Tom Tugendhat, since 2018
the House of Commons’ cross-party Foreign Affairs
REGIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT
Figure 9.2: Persistence of HM warship deployments in the Indo-Pacific, Jan 2018–Oct 2020
HMS Sutherland
HMS Albion
HMS Argyll
HMS Montrose
HMS Dragon
Source: Navy News, www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/navy-news/archive
Select Committee has maintained a critical position
regarding the Cameron government’s golden era
policy of prioritising economic engagement with
China. Tugendhat also drove the establishment
in May 2020 of the China Research Group among
Conservative MPs, which has worked to raise awareness among MPs about problems in UK−China
relations. It has also demanded greater clarity and
action from the British government on key policy
issues such as future 5G infrastructure, the enactment of new security laws in Hong Kong, and on
human-rights abuses in Xinjiang.76 The Labour-led
opposition has broadly supported a firmer approach
towards China on all these issues: Shadow Foreign
Secretary Lisa Nandy said in July 2020 that she hoped
recent changes in UK policy represented the beginning of a ‘more strategic approach to China based on
an ethical approach to foreign policy’.77
FROM STRATEGY TO ACTION: A
PERSISTENT ENGAGEMENT?
Existing British security interests in the region have
informed how the UK has reviewed its engagement
with the region. From 2013−17, tensions significantly
increased in light of North Korea’s missile and nuclear
brinkmanship, as well as maritime disputes in the East
and South China seas. As a result, close UK defence
partners – notably Japan – faced heightened security
challenges, and deployed British military power was
notable by its absence. By early 2018, however, there
were signs of change.78 Establishing a small British
Defence Staff (BDS) for Southeast Asia in Singapore
was part of an effort to coordinate a more globally
postured network of defence relations and deployments (see Map 9.2).79 Consecutive and sometimes
AN IISS STRATEGIC DOSSIER
overlapping deployments by Royal Navy ships to the
Indo-Pacific in 2018−20 (see Figure 9.2) also helped to
address the UK’s prior absence, while also permitting
defence planners in London to test the requirements
for a more visible and persistent presence.
Starting with the deployment of the frigate HMS
Sutherland in April 2018, the UK became the first
permanent member of the UNSC to implement,
together with Japan, the latest UN sanctions against
North Korea.80 Just a few months later on 31 August
2018, in the South China Sea, the amphibious ship
HMS Albion conducted the first known challenge
(outside the context of US freedom-of-navigation
operations) to excessive maritime claims around
the Paracel Islands.81 In the Indian Ocean in 2018
and 2019, HMS Sutherland and another frigate, HMS
Montrose, also contributed to counter-piracy, countersmuggling and counter-terrorism operations, while
the destroyer HMS Dragon achieved a recordbreaking eight drug busts, seizing a total of some 18
tonnes of narcotics valued at over US$280 million.82
The UK’s capacity to deploy ships to the region
enabled a wide range of operations, highlighting the
value of a forward presence.
Crucially, the UK’s continuous naval presence in
the region in 2018−20 was also significant as a means
of developing functional defence relations with allies
and partners. For example, HMS Sutherland’s involvement in Australia’s largest annual naval exercise,
Ocean Explorer, highlighted for Australian defence
planners the potential benefits of greater interoperability with the Royal Navy, particularly in the context
of the Royal Australian Navy’s acquisition of Britishdesigned frigates.83 In Japan, all British warships
conducted complex anti-submarine-warfare (ASW)
The United Kingdom and Indo-Pacific Security
161
Oct 2020
Sep 2020
Aug 2020
Jul 2020
Jun 2020
May 2020
Apr 2020
Feb 2020
Mar 2020
Jan 2020
Dec 2019
Oct 2019
Nov 2019
Sep 2019
Jul 2019
Aug 2019
Jun 2019
Apr 2019
May 2019
Mar 2019
Feb 2019
Jan 2019
Dec 2018
Oct 2018
Nov 2018
Sep 2018
Jul 2018
Aug 2018
Jun 2018
Apr 2018
May 2018
Feb 2018
Mar 2018
Jan 2018
HMS Enterprise
(Max Mumby/Indigo/Getty Images)
exercises with their Japanese counterparts, while
HMS Argyll trained with the JMSDF in the Indian
Ocean, as well as in Northeast Asian waters.84 In
2019, HMS Argyll also conducted the first Royal Navy
exercise with the US Navy in the South China Sea,
signalling British support for its ally in the region.85
These deployments also included a robust
schedule of port visits. In its 15-month deployment
from June 2019 to October 2020, the Royal Navy
survey ship HMS Enterprise alone visited 15 different
ports in nine countries in the Indo-Pacific. Taken altogether, the experiences from 2018−20 indicated that
British military power – even if relatively limited
in scale – has supported the UK’s diplomatic credibility, political influence and soft power across the
region. Yet the gap in presence between the return of
HMS Enterprise and the confirmed deployment of the
carrier strike group centred on HMS Queen Elizabeth
in mid-2021 also prompted the question of whether
the UK can afford deployments to the Indo-Pacific for
longer periods at sustainable costs.
In July 2020, British media revealed that the UK
was contemplating plans to forward-base one of
the Royal Navy’s new aircraft carriers in East Asia.86
tion to forward-deploy an offshore-patrol vessel in
Southeast Asia – with open options in Singapore and
Brunei given the UK’s residual presence and logistical
support there.88 Royal Navy Fleet Commander Vice
Admiral Jerry Kyd has further stated that the navy
certainly has an ambition to operate persistently in the
region.89 However, the revelation of the carrier-basing
plans prompted a strong reaction from Defence
Secretary Ben Wallace, who discouraged senior
officers from further commenting on the matter.90
While this was not the first time that the idea of the
UK resuscitating its role as a ‘resident power’ in the
Indo-Pacific had been floated, it was the first time
that British media had claimed the defence staff were
actively exploring practical options.87 This added to
previous media coverage of the Royal Navy’s intentions to explore options to forward-base one of its
future Type-31 frigates and to the declared inten-
Recent debates over the opportunity to forwardbase naval assets in the Indo-Pacific build upon the
UK’s already significant regional military footprint,
including on the US base on the British Indian Ocean
Territory island of Diego Garcia and the Royal Navy
refuelling facility and naval berths at Sembawang,
Singapore. These facilities are essential to US naval
operations in the region and serve as a reminder of
Royal Navy Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Jerry Kyd attends
a service at Westminster Abbey, London, 11 December 2019
Map 9.2: Commonwealth members and British Defence Staff networks in the wider Indo-Pacific region
Commonwealth members
British Defence Staff
JAPAN
SOUTH KOREA
MYANMAR
THAILAND
VIETNAM
KENYA
INDONESIA
SEYCHELLES
TANZANIA
MOZAMBIQUE
MAURITIUS
SOUTH AFRICA
PAKISTAN
AUSTRALIA
MALDIVES
SRI LANKA
INDIA
BANGLADESH
NAURU
KIRIBATI
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
TUVALU
SOLOMON ISLANDS
SAMOA
VANUATU
FIJI
TONGA
SINGAPORE
MALAYSIA
BRUNEI
NEW ZEALAND
source: UK, Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth office, www.gov.uk/government/publications/international-defence-engagement-strategy-2017
162
CHAPteR nIne
REGIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT
(Aditya Irawan/NurPhoto via Getty Images)
(Tomohiro Ohsumi/Getty Images)
A helicopter aboard HMS Montrose during a Royal Navy
joint exercise with Japan and the US, 15 March 2019
the considerable commitment Britain has made to
the region in the past, especially in Southeast Asia.
In the 1960s, British military engagement in the
‘Confrontation’, a conflict in which Indonesia sought
to undermine the nascent Malaysian Federation,
included more than 50,000 troops and one-third of
the Royal Navy’s surface fleet.91
Today, the British Army’s Gurkha garrison in
Brunei remains the largest foreign contingent of
ground forces in Southeast Asia. Additionally,
in 2019 the army established an additional, third
Gurkha battalion as a ‘specialised’ infantry unit
designated to provide expert training in different
parts of the world, including the Indo-Pacific.92 This
development reflected the UK’s broader emphasis
since 2017 on defence-engagement strategy, as
attested by the establishment of British Defence
Staffs internationally, including in Singapore.93
The Royal Air Force (RAF) has also expanded its
portfolio of regional activities through training
programmes and exercises. In 2013, it launched a
bilateral exercise programme with the Indian Air
Force that has already involved fast-jet, air-transport
and, in 2020, force-protection personnel.94 In 2016, it
deployed four Typhoons for exercises in Japan and
South Korea, while in 2019 Typhoons were deployed
to Malaysia as part of an FPDA exercise.
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Harold Wilson was right. The world does not ‘owe’
Britain a living. In the Indo-Pacific, the British government has endeavoured to earn its place by setting the
foundations for a post-Brexit strategy that draws
on two interlinked dimensions. Firstly, the Johnson
government has consistently espoused a ‘prosperity
agenda’ that is sustainable, informed by values
that promote open societies, and that seeks to seize
opportunities in a future in which new technologies
can actively help tackle pressing global issues such
as climate change. The application to join the CPTPP
indicates that the dynamic markets in the Indo-Pacific
AN IISS STRATEGIC DOSSIER
A Royal Marine with a Jackal Coyote protected
mobility vehicle aboard HMS Albion, Jakarta, 22 April 2018
remain a priority for the government, especially in a
post-Brexit context.
Secondly, and relatedly, since 2018 British policy
towards the Indo-Pacific has increasingly emphasised
the importance for the UK of regional stability and
the maintenance of a rules-based order in the IndoPacific. As Foreign Secretary Raab has stressed, such
an order does not imply that rules are fixed, but rather
that changes need to be consistent with the rule of law.
This outlook may very well see the UK becoming more
involved in promoting and supporting concerted
efforts with like-minded partners to develop the
normative framework of relatively new security
domains such as cyber and space. However, the country’s standing as a champion of the rule of law is not
without taint. The UK’s continued claims over Chagos
archipelago – despite a February 2019 International
Court of Justice advisory opinion confirming
Mauritius’s sovereignty over Chagos and rejecting
Britain’s claims, and a January 2021 International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea confirmation of that
opinion – could be seen as undermining its standing
as a supporter of the rules-based order.95
The UK integrated review has recognised that
the Indo-Pacific is a centre of gravity in international geopolitical and geo-economic shifts, with
opportunities for ‘middle powers’ to play significant roles in shaping prosperity and security. Within
this context, the document also set the ambition for
the UK to establish in the Indo-Pacific ‘a greater and
more persistent presence than any other European
country’.96 This aspiration should be assessed in a
comprehensive fashion and in light of the UK’s wider
economic, political and security interests in the region.
Crucially, it is likely to be informed by the experience
gained through more continuous engagement during
2018−20. In this respect, defence activities have aimed
to maximise the effect of a persistent engagement by
helping to manage security issues central to regional
stability. This has entailed a strong maritime focus,
with naval deployments testing the feasibility of
tHe UnIteD KInGDoM AnD InDo-PACIFIC seCURItY
163
a potentially longer-term sustained presence that
could underwrite the UK’s credibility as a significant
regional security actor. In any future strategy, the key
issue will be how ‘persistent’ engagement is defined.
Limited forward deployments providing versatile
capabilities, such as offshore-patrol vessels, frigates
or amphibious ships, combined with periodical visits
by ‘high-end’ war-fighting ships, might offer the most
effective balance.
The logistical support available to British forces in
Diego Garcia, Singapore and Brunei represents important building blocks that speak to a wider requirement
for base access in, and support from, other regional
allies. This is particularly true regarding Australia
and Japan, which can further facilitate a sustainable
and meaningful UK regional-security contribution
in the eastern Indo-Pacific.97 The carrier-strike-group
deployment to the region in 2021 is likely to offer an
opportunity to grasp better the logistical requirements of a more persistent military footprint. To that
end, the UK and Japan agreed that they regarded the
deployment as ‘an opportunity to elevate Japan–UK
defence cooperation to a new level’.98
Britain’s efforts to enhance its presence in the
Indo-Pacific through a more persistent naval presence during 2018−20, as well as the confirmed plans
for the carrier-strike-group deployment in 2021,
also indicate a preference for a shift in approach.
The UK aims to play a more active role in shaping
regional stability through persistent engagement and
capacity-building. Defence and security cooperation
with the US is highly likely to remain a central feature
of the UK’s security efforts in the region, and it is
perhaps not a coincidence that during its deployment
to the region HMS Queen Elizabeth will be operating
US Marine Corps F-35B combat aircraft. Ties with
Australia and especially with Japan are also likely to
be enhanced, with specific emphasis on formalising
these relationships in support of greater military
interoperability and integration. The 2021 carrierstrike-group deployment will offer an important
opportunity to review Britain’s ability to create influence through its alliances and security partnerships.99
Looking to the future and beyond the question of
naval presence, the UK may seek to build upon its
Gurkha contingent in Brunei to expand the British
Army’s role in training and capacity-building. It
may also seek to renew the series of exercises and
exchanges between the RAF and its regional counterparts. The FPDA and the wider Commonwealth
community might offer opportunities for wider cooperation in this regard. Security ties with India have
been, to date, less developed in comparison to those
with other major regional players like Australia and
Japan. Prime Minister Johnson’s planned visit to India
164
Chapter nine
T H E U K A I M S TO P L AY
A MORE AC TIVE R OLE
IN SHAPING REGIONAL
S TA B I L I T Y T H R O U G H
PERSISTENT ENGAGEMENT
AND CAPACITY-BUILDING
in April 2021 might be ideally timed, as discussions
among the members of the Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue (Australia, India, Japan and the US) have
considered the possibility of involving additional
parties in their activities. British defence and naval
facilities in Duqm, Oman, are also an important factor
in a more sustainable British Indo-Pacific engagement, especially in the Indian Ocean. These will be
particularly relevant if the current plan to forwarddeploy a Littoral Response Group to the Indo-Pacific
by 2023, including marines and related expeditionary
capabilities, is to become reality.100
The greatest challenge to the notion of a Global
Britain − as the UK attempts to strengthen its security
role in the Indo-Pacific − is not unrealistic ambition or
a lack of capabilities. Rather, it is the still-undefined
but inevitable long-term economic impacts of both
Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic. In November
2020, the prime minister announced plans for the
‘largest military investment’ in British defence in 30
years, reversing an earlier move by the UK Treasury
to shelve a multi-year spending programme because
of the challenges caused by the pandemic.101 The plans
emphasised investments in cyber and space capabilities, which are regarded as critical new domains, but
also in naval capabilities, suggesting a return to a
maritime-centric defence posture consistent with an
Indo-Pacific tilt. In 2021, as the pandemic continued
to affect the UK’s economic recovery, delays to the
implementation of the defence and security dimensions of the UK’s Indo-Pacific strategy remain a
possibility. Yet sharpened concerns in Whitehall over
the implications of China’s rise, the importance of
the Indo-Pacific for the UK’s economic future, and
US President Joe Biden’s clear emphasis on closer
integration with allies all underscore the importance
of developing the UK’s security role in the region.
However, in the near term, the key determinant of
whether such a role is possible will be the extent to
which the UK is able to sustain the prosperity necessary to fund that ambition.
REGIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT
NOTES
1
Harold Wilson, ‘Labour’s Plan for Science’, speech deliv-
10
ered at the Labour Annual Conference, Scarborough, 1
December 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/
October 1963.
2
beyond-brexit-a-global-britain.
Britain in the World Project, ‘Making Global Britain Work:
11
Ibid.
8 ideas for revitalising UK foreign policy for the post-Brexit
12
Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, ‘Oral
age’, Policy Exchange, 24 July 2019, https://policyexchange.
evidence: Work of the Foreign, Commonwealth and
org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Britain-in-the-World.pdf.
3
Henry Mance, ‘Global Britain Strategy “Risks Damaging UK
Development Office, HC 253’, Q.181.
13
the ‘Indo-Pacific’ was made by Foreign Secretary Dominic
ft.com/content/637320aa-2554-11e8-b27e-cc62a39d57a0;
Raab. See Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons,
Stephen Wright, ‘“Global Britain” has become a government
‘Oral evidence: Work of the Foreign, Commonwealth and
January 2019, https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/
Development Office, HC 253’, Q. 160.
14
Foreign Secretary’, 31 October 2018, https://www.gov.uk/
Committee on International Relations, House of Lords, ‘UK
government/speeches/an-invisible-chain-speech-by-theforeign-secretary.
Session 2017−19, 18 December 2018, https://publications.
15
Ibid.
parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldintrel/250/250.pdf.
16
Government of the UK, ‘Foreign Secretary Hunt: Britain’s
Mark Landler, ‘Boris Johnson’s “Global Britain”: Inspired
role in a post-Brexit world’, 2 January 2019, https://www.
Vision or Wishful Thinking?’, New York Times, 3 July 2020,
gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-hunt-brit-
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/03/world/europe/
johnson-brexit-hong-kong.html.
ains-role-in-a-post-brexit-world.
17
“the most radical since 1945”’, Evening Standard, 23
Guardian, 20 May 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/
December 2019, https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/
commentisfree/2020/may/20/the-guardian-view-on-global-
defence-foreign-policy-review-dominic-cummings-
“Global Britain”: Inspired Vision or Wishful Thinking?’
a4320371.html.
18
Strategy – The 2020 Integrated Review’, First Report of
evidence: Work of the Foreign, Commonwealth and
Session 2019–21, HC 165, 13 August 2020, https://committees.
committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/1000/pdf/.
parliament.uk/publications/2265/documents/21808/default/.
19
Government of the UK, ‘Global Britain in a Competitive
Development and Foreign Policy’, 16 March 2021,
Development Office, HC 253’, Q.179.
20
Government of the UK, ‘PM Statement to the House on the
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
Integrated Review: 19 November 2020’, 19 November 2020,
global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-
of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy; and
UK, Ministry of Defence, ‘Defence in a Competitive age’, 30
to-the-house-on-the-integrated-review-19-november-2020.
21
Government of the UK, ‘UK applies to join huge Pacific
March 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
free trade area CPTPP’, 30 January 2021, https://www.gov.
defence-in-a-competitive-age#:~:text=Defence%20in%20a%20
uk/government/news/uk-applies-to-join-huge-pacific-free-
Competitive%20Age%20outlines%20defence’s%20contribution%20to%20the,the%20threats%20of%20the%20future.
9
Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, ‘Oral
evidence: Work of the Foreign, Commonwealth and
Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence,
8
Defence Committee, House of Commons, ‘In Search of
Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, ‘Oral
Development Office, HC 253’, 6 October 2020, Q.179, https://
7
Robert Dex, ‘Defence review led by Dominic Cummings
‘The Guardian view on “Global Britain”: a lonely fiction’,
britain-a-lonely-fiction; and Landler, ‘Boris Johnson’s
6
Government of the UK, ‘An Invisible Chain: speech by the
global-britain-british-foreign-policy-after-brexit; and Select
Foreign Policy in a Shifting World Order’, Fifth Report of
5
The first reference by a senior UK government minister to
Reputation”’, Financial Times, 12 March 2018, https://www.
slogan – but there’s little strategy to back it up’, Prospect, 9
4
Government of the UK, ‘Beyond Brexit: A Global Britain’, 2
trade-area-cptpp.
22
Stephen Booth, ‘Joining the CPTPP is how this
Government of the UK, ‘Global Britain in a Competitive
country can show it’s serious about being “Global
Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence,
Britain”’, ConservativeHome, 9 July 2020, https://
Development and Foreign Policy’, p. 18.
www.conservativehome.com/thecolumnists/2020/07/
See, for example, then-prime minister Theresa May’s
stephen-booth-joining-the-cptpp-is-how-this-country-can-
speech at the 2016 Conservative Party Conference: ‘Britain
after Brexit. A vision of a Global Britain. May’s Conference
show-its-serious-about-being-global-britain.html.
23
Matthew Ward, ‘Geographical pattern of UK trade’, Briefing
speech: full text’, ConservativeHome, 2 October 2016,
Paper, House of Commons Library, no. 7593, 25 November
https://www.conservativehome.com/parliament/2016/10/
2020, p. 6, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-
britain-after-brexit-a-vision-of-a-global-britain-theresamays-conservative-conference-speech-full-text.html.
AN IISS STRATEGIC DOSSIER
briefings/cbp-7593/.
24
Ibid., p. 7.
The United Kingdom and Indo-Pacific Security
165
25
26
Government of the UK, ‘ASEAN Economic Reform
37
Programme’, 19 December 2019, https://www.gov.uk/
Defence Ministerial Meeting 2017 – Joint Statement’, 15
government/publications/prosperity-fund-fco-programme-
December 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
summaries-countries.
uk-japan-foreign-and-defence-ministerial-meeting-
Government of the UK, ‘Foreign Secretary Hunt: Britain’s
role in a post-Brexit world’.
2017-joint-statement.
38
Government of the UK, ‘UK is Extensively Involved
27
Ward, ‘Geographical pattern of UK trade’, pp. 15−16.
in Southeast Asia: Speech by Scott Wightman’, 18
28
Government of the UK, ‘National Security Strategy and
July 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/
Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure
uk-is-extensively-involved-in-southeast-asia-speech-by-
and Prosperous United Kingdom’, 23 November 2015,
p. 57, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
scott-wightman.
39
in the Indo-Pacific’, May 2019, https://www.defense.gouv.
security-review-2015; and UK, Office for National
fr/layout/set/print/content/download/532754/9176250/
Statistics, ‘Exploring foreign investment: where does the
version/3/file/France+and+Security+in+the+Indo-
UK invest, and who invests in the UK?’, 1 November
Pacific+-+2019.pdf; and Germany, Federal Government,
2018, https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/
‘Policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific region’, September
balanceofpayments/articles/exploringforeigninvestment-
2020, https://rangun.diplo.de/blob/2380824/a27b62057f2d-
UK, Office for National Statistics, ‘Exploring foreign
2675ce2bbfc5be01099a/policy-guidelines-summary-data.pdf.
40
and the Shaping of Indo-Pacific Security’, Policy Exchange,
the UK?’; Government of the UK, ‘Japan and the UK: an
1 April 2019, https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/
uk/government/speeches/japan-and-the-uk-an-enduring-
uploads/2019/03/Days-of-Future-Past.pdf.
41
governance’, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisa-
to TPP Says Abe’, BBC News, 8 October 2018, https://www.
tions/foreign-commonwealth-development-office/about/
‘Britain and Japan Sign Post-Brexit trade deal’, BBC News,
our-governance.
42
23 October 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/busi-
32
33
34
UK, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, ‘Our
trade-partnership; and ‘Brexit: Japan “Would Welcome” UK
bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-45780889.
31
Alessio Patalano, ‘Days of Future Past? British Strategy
investment: where does the UK invest, and who invests in
enduring trade partnership’, 15 May 2018, https://www.gov.
30
France, Ministry of the Armed Forces, ‘France and Security
national-security-strategy-and-strategic-defence-and-
wheredoestheukinvestandwhoinvestsintheuk/2018-11-01.
29
Patalano, ‘Days of Future Past? British Strategy and the
Shaping of Indo-Pacific Security’, p. 9.
ness-54654814.
43
Ibid., pp. 9−10.
Booth, ‘Joining the CPTPP is how this country can show it’s
44
Government of the UK, ‘An Invisible Chain: speech by the
serious about being “Global Britain”’.
Foreign Secretary’; Government of the UK, Dominic Raab,
‘Liz Truss: The naysayers doubted the speed of the
‘Global Britain is leading the world as a force for good’, 21
UK’s deal with Japan. But it’s here – and takes us closer
September 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/
to more’, ConservativeHome, 10 November 2020,
global-britain-is-leading-the-world-as-a-force-for-good-ar-
https://www.conservativehome.com/platform/2020/11/
ticle-by-dominic-raab; and Government of the UK, ‘Foreign
liz-truss-the-naysayers-doubted-the-speed-of-the-uks-deal-
Secretary’s introduction to the Queen’s Speech debate’, 13
with-japan-but-its-here-and-takes-us-closer-to-the-cptpp.html.
January 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/
Government of the UK, ‘Global Britain and the CPTTP’, 3
foreign-secretary-introduction-to-queens-speech-debate.
July 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/global-
45
Government of the UK, ‘Beyond Brexit: A Global Britain’.
britain-and-the-cptpp.
46
UK, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Written Evidence
‘Brexit: Japan “Would Welcome” UK to TPP Says Abe’,
(FPW0027)’, Memorandum for the International Relations
BBC News; and Singapore, Ministry of Trade and Industry,
Committee, 28 February 2018, http://data.parliament.uk/
‘The United Kingdom (UK) and Singapore enhance
writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/
bilateral economic relations by signing a free trade agree-
international-relations-committee/foreign-policy-in-
ment and agreeing to work towards a digital economy
agreement’, Press Release, 10 December 2020, https://
changed-world-conditions/written/79900.html.
47
www.mti.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Releases/2020/12/
The-United-Kingdom-and-Singapore-enhance-bilateral-
166
Government of the UK, ‘UK–Japan Foreign and
Government of the UK, ‘An Invisible Chain: speech by the
Foreign Secretary’.
48
See Government of the UK, ‘Hong Kong and China:
economic-relations-by-signing-a-FTA.
Foreign Secretary’s statement in Parliament’, 20 July 2020,
35
Government of the UK, ‘Global Britain and the CPTTP’.
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/hong-kong-
36
‘BAE Wins £19.6bn Type 26 frigate deal with Australian
and-china-foreign-secretarys-statement-in-parliament;
Navy’, Engineer, 29 June 2018, https://www.theengineer.
and Government of the UK, ‘Human rights violations
co.uk/bae-type-26-frigate-australia/.
in Xinjiang and the government’s response: Foreign
Chapter nine
REGIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT
Secretary’s statement’, 12 January 2021, https://www.gov.uk/
government/speeches/foreign-secretary-on-the-situation-in-
ment-to-the-house-of-commons-16-june-2020.
62
xinjiang-and-the-governments-response.
49
Diplomacy and Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief in
East Asia’, RUSI Journal, vol. 160, no. 2, 27 April 2015, p. 34.
Government of the UK, ‘Chief of the Defence Staff, General
Sir Nick Carter launches the Integrated Operating Concept’,
Alessio Patalano, ‘Beyond the Gunboats: Rethinking Naval
63
Eleanor Ainge Roy, ‘“One day we’ll disappear”: Tuvalu’s
30 September 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/
sinking islands’, Guardian, 16 May 2019, https://www.
speeches/chief-of-the-defence-staff-general-sir-nick-carter-
theguardian.com/global-development/2019/may/16/one-day-
launches-the-integrated-operating-concept.
disappear-tuvalu-sinking-islands-rising-seas-climate-change.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
after UK suspends Hong Kong extraditions’, Guardian,
52
Ibid.
20 July 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/
53
Louisa Brooke-Holland, ‘UK defence obligations to South
jul/20/uk-risks-chinas-wrath-by-suspending-hong-kong-
Korea’, Briefing Paper, House of Commons Library, no.
extradition-treaty; Sebastian Payne, Helen Warrell and
CBP08100, 5 October 2017, https://commonslibrary.parlia-
Laura Hughes, ‘Senior Tories call for reset of China rela-
ment.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8100/.
tions’, Financial Times, 22 April 2020, https://www.ft.com/
Tim Huxley, ‘Developing the Five Power Defence
content/b1dfb7b5-5140-4408-abc0-7d0b7f783a58; Sophia
Arrangements’, IISS Analysis, 1 June 2017, https://www.iiss.
Gaston and Rana Mitter, ‘After the Golden Age: Resetting
org/blogs/analysis/2017/06/fpda; and Government of the
UK–China Engagement’, British Foreign Policy Group, 29
UK, ‘UK is Extensively Involved in Southeast Asia: Speech
July 2020, https://bfpg.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/
by Scott Wightman’.
BFPG-Report-July-2020-FINAL-4.pdf; and Charles Parton,
See, for example, Government of the UK, ‘Chief of the
‘Towards a UK strategy and policies for relations with
Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter launches the
China’, The Policy Institute, King’s College London, June
Integrated Operating Concept’.
2020, https://www.kcl.ac.uk/policy-institute/assets/towards-
54
55
56
65
Joshua Karsten, ‘US-UK Navies Build Alliance in the 7th
58
com/article/us-china-britain-idUSKCN0SB10M20151017.
66
From “golden era” to the deep freeze’, Financial Times, 14
This was certainly the case before the UK’s withdrawal from
July 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/804175d0-8b47-4427-
reviews of the mid-1960s.
9853-2aded76f48e4.
67
UK’s 5G network by 2027, Dowden confirms’, Guardian, 14
Hague delivered an award in the case of Philippines v. China
July 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/
that landed a decisive blow to China’s legal position in the
jul/14/huawei-to-be-stripped-of-role-in-uk-5g-network-by-
South China Sea by finding that its claims to historic rights
2027-dowden-confirms; and Toby Helm, ‘Pressure from
as defined by the ‘nine-dash line’ were illegal. For a brief
Trump led to 5G Ban, Britain tells Huawei’, Guardian, 18 July
summary of the award, see ‘South China Sea tribunal: Key
2020, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jul/18/
news/world-asia-36772813.
pressure-from-trump-led-to-5g-ban-britain-tells-huawei.
68
Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, ‘Oral
Rockall is an inhabited islet in the North Atlantic Ocean
evidence: Work of the Foreign, Commonwealth and
that lies within the UK’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
Development Office, HC 253’, Q154; and Government of
that the British government voluntarily recognised to
the UK, ‘Hong Kong and China: Foreign Secretary’s state-
be incapable of generating an EEZ of its own when the
UK joined UNCLOS. See UK, Foreign, Commonwealth
ment in Parliament’.
69
House of Commons, Liaison Committee, ‘Oral Evidence
& Development Office, ‘UK Government’s Position on
from the Prime Minister, HC 744’, Q124−126; and Edward
Legal Issues Arising in the South China Sea’, House of
Wong and Chris Buckley, ‘U.S. Says China’s Repression of
Commons, 3 September 2020, http://data.parliament.uk/
Uighurs is “Genocide”’, New York Times, 19 January 2021,
DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2020-0516/UK_govt_analysis_
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/19/us/politics/trump-
of_legal_issues_in_the_South_China_Sea.pdf.
61
Dan Sabbagh and Lily Kuo, ‘Huawei to be stripped of role in
In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The
points’, BBC News, 12 July 2016, https://www.bbc.co.uk/
60
Jonathan Ford and Laura Hughes, ‘UK–China relations:
Article/564930/us-uk-navies-build-alliance-in-the-7th-fleet/.
‘East of Suez’, and a significant factor informing the policy
59
‘China, Britain to benefit from “golden era” in ties –
Cameron’, Reuters, 18 October 2015, https://www.reuters.
Fleet’, Pacom News, United States Indo-Pacific Command,
15 December 2014, https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/
Peter Walker, ‘MPs call for overhaul of China policy
a-uk-strategy-and-policies-for-relations-with-china.pdf.
Patalano, ‘Days of Future Past? British Strategy and the
Shaping of Indo–Pacific Security’, pp. 11−12.
57
64
Government of the UK, ‘Prime Minister’s statement to the
china-xinjiang.html.
70
Government of the UK, ‘Hong Kong: Statement on the Erosion
House of Commons: 16 June 2020’, 16 June 2020, https://
of Rights’, 9 August 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/
www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-state-
news/hong-kong-statement-on-the-erosion-of-rights.
AN IISS STRATEGIC DOSSIER
The United Kingdom and Indo-Pacific Security
167
71
Government of the UK, ‘Home secretary announces details
2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-hamp-
of the Hong Kong BN(O) Visa’, 22 July 2020, https://www.
gov.uk/government/news/home-secretary-announces72
shire-47912842.
83
2018. Similar remarks were made by Vice Admiral Michael
Government of the UK, ‘Foreign Secretary declares breach
Noonan, Chief of Navy, Royal Australian Navy, at the event
of Sino-British Joint Declaration’, 12 November 2020, https://
‘Global naval partnerships: UK and Australian perspec-
www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-declares-
tives’, held at the International Institute for Strategic
breach-of-sino-british-joint-declaration.
73
74
75
Ford and Hughes, ‘UK–China relations: From “golden era”
Studies, 28 November 2018.
84
to Visit Japan in 12 Months’, Royal Navy, 10 January 2019,
Laura Silver, Kat Devlin and Christine Huang,
https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/
‘Unfavourable Views of China Reach Historic Highs
news/2019/january/10/190110---hms-montrose-to-visit-
in Many Countries’, Global Attitudes and Trends, Pew
japan-as-part-of-deployment; and Tim Kelly, ‘Japanese
Research Center, 6 October 2020, https://www.pewresearch.
carrier drills with British warship heading to contested
org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-
South China Sea’, Reuters, 27 September 2018, https://
historic-highs-in-many-countries/.
uk.reuters.com/article/uk-japan-defence-britain/
Sophia Gaston and Evie Aspinall, ‘UK Public Opinion on
japanese-carrier-drills-with-british-warship-heading-to-
British Foreign Policy Group, 16 February 2021, pp. 52−3,
contested-south-china-sea-idUKKCN1M7005.
85
military exercises in disputed South China Sea’, Japan
Annual-Survey-2021.pdf.
Times, 16 January 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/
Ford and Hughes, ‘UK–China relations: From “golden era”
news/2019/01/16/asia-pacific/u-s-british-navies-conduct-
who’s changing Britain’s China policy’, New Statesman,
first-joint-military-exercises-disputed-south-china-sea/.
86
carrier’, The Times, 14 July 2020, https://www.thetimes.
uk/2020/07/meet-former-soldier-whos-changing-britains-
co.uk/article/britain-set-to-confront-china-with-new-
Walker, ‘MPs call for overhaul of China Policy after UK
aircraft-carrier-v2gnwrr88.
87
“Indo-Pacific”’, Policy Exchange, 24 July 2019, https://
Government of the UK, ‘DSEI maritime conference 2017:
policyexchange.org.uk/publication/uk-defence-from-the-far-
September 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/
80
east-to-the-indo-pacific/.
88
Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2020 (London:
UK, Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2020),
Office, ‘UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy’,
p. 147; and UK, Ministry of Defence, ‘Defence in a
17 February 2017, p. 8, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.
Competitive Age’, 30 March 2021, p. 31, https://www.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
uk/government/publications/defence-in-a-competitive-
file/596968/06032017_Def_Engag_Strat_2017DaSCREEN.pdf.
age#:~:text=Defence%20in%20a%20Competitive%20Age%20
‘HMS Sutherland to monitor for North Korea trade at sea’,
outlines%20defence’s%20contribution%20to%20the,the%20
uk-scotland-highlands-islands-43724719.
threats%20of%20the%20future.
89
Tim Kelly, ‘British Navy warship sails near South China
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-china-southchi-
events/2020/07/uk-maritime-air-power.
90
Lucy Fisher, ‘Top armed forces officers gagged by defence
nasea-exclusive-idUSKCN1LM017.
secretary Ben Wallace over aircraft carrier discussion’, The
‘HMS Sutherland Home After Seven-Month Deployment’,
Times, 17 July 2020, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/
Royal Navy, 10 August 2018, https://www.royalnavy.mod.
top-armed-forces-officers-gagged-by-defence-secretary-ben-
uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2018/august/10/180810hms-sutherland-home-after-seven-month-deployment;
wallace-over-aircraft-carrier-discussion-jgsf29rc2.
91
Wm Roger Louis, ‘The Dissolution of the British Empire in
‘HMS Montrose Begins Permanent Deployment in Bahrain’,
the Era of Vietnam’, American Historical Review, vol. 107, no.
Forces Net, 11 April 2019, https://www.forces.net/news/
1, 2002, pp. 1−25, https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article/107/1
hms-montrose-sails-tokyo; and ‘HMS Dragon returns to
Portsmouth after drugs seizures’, BBC News, 12 April
168
IISS event, ‘A new era for UK maritime air power: testing
times, testing waters’, 13 July 2020, https://www.iiss.org/
Sea islands, angering Beijing’, Reuters, 6 September 2018,
82
Euan Graham, ‘Europe and Regional Security’, in IISS
dsei-maritime-conference-2017.
BBC News, 11 April 2018, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
81
Alessio Patalano, ‘UK Defence from the “Far East” to the
suspends Hong Kong extraditions’.
Speech by Admiral Sir Philip Jones, First Sea Lord’, 11
79
Lucy Fisher, ‘Britain set to confront China with new aircraft
15 July 2020, https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/
china-policy.
78
Jesse Johnson, ‘U.S. and British navies conduct first joint
https://bfpg.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/BFPG-
to the deep freeze’; and Ailbhe Rea, ‘Meet the former soldier
77
‘HMS Montrose to Become Fourth Royal Navy Warship
to the deep freeze’.
Foreign Policy and Global Affairs: Annual Survey – 2021’,
76
Author’s interview with Royal Navy officer, November
details-of-the-hong-kong-bno-visa.
Chapter nine
/1/175564?login=true.
92
British Army, ‘New specialist Gurkha battalion established’,
REGIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT
93
94
14 March 2019, https://www.army.mod.uk/news-and-events/
ment’, 3 February 2021, https://www.gov.uk/
news/2019/03/new-specialist-gurkha-battalion-established/.
government/publications/japan-uk-foreign-and-
UK, Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth
defence-ministerial-meeting-2021-joint-statement/
Office, ‘UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy’, p. 8.
japan-uk-foreign-and-defence-ministerial-meeting-
‘RAF on Exercise Indradhanush’, Royal Air Force, 24
February 2020, https://www.raf.mod.uk/news/articles/raf-
95
96
2021-joint-statement.
99
on-exercise-indradhanush/.
Pacific in 2021’, 9DashLine, 4 November 2020, https://
Philippe Sands, ‘Britain Holds On to a Colony in Africa,
www.9dashline.com/article/hms-queen-elizabeth-
With America’s Help’, New York Times, 1 April 2021, https://
deployment-to-the-indo-pacific-in-2021; and Ian Storey,
www.nytimes.com/2021/04/01/opinion/uk-mauritius-china-
‘Can the UK Achieve Its Naval Ambitions in the Indo-
us.html?referringSource=articleShare.
Pacific?’, Diplomat, 7 November 2020, https://thediplomat.
Government of the UK, ‘Global Britain in a Competitive
com/2020/11/can-the-uk-achieve-its-naval-ambitions-in-
Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence,
97
98
Tom Sharpe, ‘HMS Queen Elizabeth Deploys to the Indo-
the-indo-pacific/.
Development and Foreign Policy’, p. 62.
100
UK, Ministry of Defence, ‘Defence in a Competitive Age’, p. 48.
Patalano, ‘UK Defence from the “Far East” to the “Indo-
101
George Parker et al., ‘Shelved UK spending review
Pacific”’, pp. 23−7.
provokes cabinet unrest’, Financial Times, 21 October 2020,
Government of the UK, ‘Japan–UK foreign and
https://www.ft.com/content/f9a7223b-d9e9-4a61-bda3-
defence ministerial meeting 2021: joint state-
bd4b74385f1a.
Dr Alessio Patalano is Reader in East Asian Warfare at King’s College London.
AN IISS STRATEGIC DOSSIER
The United Kingdom and Indo-Pacific Security
169