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Property
•
Is an economic concept, meaning a mass of things useful
to human activity and which are necessary to life, for which
reason they may be organized and distributed in one way
or another, but, always for the good of man.
Things
•
All objects that exist and can be of some use to man.
•
Things, in a juridical sense, include only objects which can
be of utility to man.
•
It is more generic and extensive than the idea of property.
➢
➢
➢
Common things, as a whole mass, are not susceptible of
appropriation, but a limited quantity of the whole mass
may be appropriated and thereby converted into property.
Nature has made them common to all.
Ex: sun, stars, the core of the earth, the sea.
The human body is generally not considered a thing. The
juridical order admits of relations whose objects consists
of parts of the human body, such as blood, hair, teeth and
skin for surgical purposes. Upon death, the corpse
becomes a thing. However, it cannot be considered the
subject matter of a contract, except for a gratuitous one.
The personality of man demands respect even after death.
In order that a thing may be considered as property, it
must have:
1. Appropriability or susceptibility to appropriation
(res nulius) - capable of being obtained even if not yet
actually appropriated. The ability to be owned by man. It
has been considered as equivalent to occupation, which is
the willful apprehension of a corporeal object which has no
owner, with intent to acquire its ownership. (Example: A
right)
Additional characteristics only (according to Rabuya):
2. Utility – capacity to satisfy human wants
3. Individuality or Substantivity – an autonomous or
separate existence
Comments:
•
An example of a thing, which is not yet possessed by men
but treated as property - mga isda sa dagat, para kuhaon
sa mga mangigisda ug ibaligya. They are already
considered as a property, because they are susceptible of
being appropriated.
•
Gold buried underneath the soil – not yet possessed by
man but capable of being appropriated and is treated as
property.
•
Utility not really an essential requisite – Ex. Sun, gives
utility but it is not considered as property.
•
“within the commerce of man - Do not equate it with
appropriation. Even if the thing is beyond the commerce
of men, it is susceptible for being possessed that is still a
property.
RIGHTS AS PROPERTY
•
Not all rights can be considered as property, only those
that are transferable/transmissible.
•
Example: Usufructuary right, an intangible right, is
property, if there is no prohibition from its assignment
(meaning, it’s transmissible).
Real Rights vs. Personal Rights
Real Rights (jus in re)
•
The power belonging to a person over a specific thing,
without a passive subject individually determined against
whom such right may be personally executed.
•
•
It gives a person direct and immediate juridical power over
a thing which is capable of being exercised not only against
a determinate person, but against the whole world.
Ownership right – enforceable against the whole world.
Characteristics:
1. A subject and an object connected by a relation of
ownership of the former over the latter.
2. A general obligation or duty of respect for such relation,
there being no particular passive subject.
3. Effective actions recognized by law to protect such relation
against anyone who wants to disturb it.
Examples:
•
Right to lease your property to another person.
•
Right to secure the property as your security in a mortgage
contract.
•
Right to construct for improvement of the property and
other external manifestations.
•
Right to dispose, sell, encumber, mortgage
Personal Rights (jus ad rem)
•
The power belonging to one person to demand of another,
as a definite passive subject, the fulfillment of a prestation
to give, to do or not to do.
•
It is more properly called right of obligation or simply
OBLIGATION.
Characteristics:
1. There are two subjects, active and passive, who are
determined and specified. The passive subject is bound to
perform the prestation based on the juridical tie.
2. A general obligation on third persons to respect the relation
between active and passive subjects.
3. Effective actions in favor of active subject against the passive
subject for the performance of the prestation by the latter.
Examples:
•
Collection of sum of money – Movable Right, because the
object does not fall under the enumeration of Art. 415.
•
Accounts Receivables – Movable Property, because the
object of which are demandable sum/s. (Refer to Art. 417
(1), NCC)
Comment:
•
Not all personal rights qualify as property, like the
promise/right to get married, which cannot be enforced.
# of persons
involved in the
juridical relation
Object of the
juridical relation
Manner in which
the will of the
active subject
affects the thing
related to it
Causes of
creating the
juridical relation
REAL RIGHTS
(jus in re)
One active subject;
the rest of the world
without
individual
determination
as
passive subject
Generally
a
corporeal thing
Generally
affects
the thing directly
By mode and title
CTNegado | Property | Atty. W. Gravador | EH408 | USC Law | 1st Semester, A.Y. 2018-2019
PERSONAL RIGHTS
(jus ad rem)
Definite active and
passive subject
Intangible
thing
(i.e. the prestation
of the debtor)
Indirectly through
the prestation of
the debtor
By title alone
1|Page
Methods of
extinguishment
of the juridical
relation
Nature of the
actions arising
from them
Extinguished by the
loss or destruction
of the thing
Real actions against
third persons
Not extinguished
by the loss or
destruction of the
thing
Only
personal
actions against the
definite debtor
Two Ways of Classifying a Property:
1. Classifying a property on the basis of its Nature.
a. Immovable
b. Movable
2. Classifying a property on the basis of its Ownership.
a. Property of Public Dominion – They are beyond the
commerce of men but still considered as property.
b. Private Property
CLASSIFICATION UNDER THE CIVIL CODE
1. Immovable or Real Property (Art. 415)
1. Lands, buildings, road and constructions of all kinds
adhered to the soil (by nature)
•
Adhered to the soil - modifies only constructions;
based on the last antecedent rule.
2. Trees, plants, growing fruits while they are attached to the
land or form an integral part of an immovable (by
incorporation)
•
Based on the theory that they derive existence from
the soil. Must be incorporated in the land, not
necessarily by the owner.
3. Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner,
in such a way that it cannot be removed without breaking
the material or deterioration of the object (by
incorporation) (res vinta)
•
The material fact or incorporation or separation is
what determines the condition of these objects; so
that, as soon as they are separated from the
tenement, they recover their condition as movables,
irrespective of the owner's intention. (wells, cisterns,
railroads, aqueducts, fire exit)
4. Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects for use or
ornamentation, placed in buildings or on lands by the
owner of the immovable in such a manner that it reveals
the intention to attach them permanently to the tenements
•
It must be the owner who permanently places the
things.
•
The main consideration is the intention to attach
permanently.
•
The owner of the things mentioned in this number
must also be the owner of the tenement/immovable
where these are placed.
5. Machineries, receptacles, instruments and implements
intended by the owner of the tenement for industry or
works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece
of land, and which tends directly to meet the needs of the
said industry or works (by destination)
•
It must be the owner who permanently places the
things. The owner of the machinery must also be the
owner of the immovable to which it is attached.
6. Animal houses, pigeon houses, beehives, fish ponds or
breeding places of similar nature, in case their owner
has placed them or preserves them with the intention to
have them permanently attached to the land, and forming
a permanent part of it; the animals in these places are
included (by destination)
•
It must be the owner who permanently places the
things. Pigeons (messages) and bees (honey) were
economically important then.
7.
Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land (by
incorporation)
•
Does not include fertilizers in the shed or those still in
containers.
8. Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter thereof
forms part of the bed, and waters either running or
stagnant (by nature)
•
Once they are severed, they are no longer mines but
minerals. Waters are owned by the state.
9. Docks and structures which, though floating, are intended
by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a
river, lake or coast (by destination)
•
There must be intention to let them remain fixed. It
must be anchored. If floating freely, it is a movable.
10. Contract for public works and servitudes and other real
rights over immovable property (by analogy)
•
The obligations arising from contracts of public works;
the right to collect for infrastructure projects.
Servitudes are real rights over immovable property
except those from public works.
2. Movables or Personal Property
Art 416 The following are things deemed to be movable
property:
1. Those movables susceptible of appropriation which are not
included in the preceding article
2. RP which by any special provision of law is considered as
personal property
3. Forces of nature which are brought under the control by
science
4. In general, all things which can be transported from place
to place without impairment of the real property to which
they are fixed (c.f. Art 415 No 3)
Art 417 The following are also considered as personal
property:
1. Obligations and actions which have for their objects
movables or demandable sums
2. Shares of stock of agricultural, commercial and industrial
entities, although they may have real estate
Art 418. Movable property is either consumable or nonconsumable. To the first class belong those movables which
cannot be used in a manner appropriate to their nature without
their being consumed; to the second class belong all the
others.
Comments:
•
Example: Fishpond, Animal Houses – are considered
immovable, ok ra unta ni pero ang problema dha because
it is stated there “including the animals”
•
So ang isda nga nag langoy are considered immovable
•
Things that are moving are movables, so you harvest that
fish in the fishpond. You sell it in the public market, it’s no
longer moving. BUT MOVABLE SYA.
Importance of Classification
From point of view of:
a. Criminal Law
•
Usurpation (administration without authority) of
property can take place only with respect to real
property
•
robbery and theft (taking) can be committed only
against personal property
b. Form of contracts involving movables or immovables
•
only real property can be the subject matter of real
property, mortgage and antichresis
CTNegado | Property | Atty. W. Gravador | EH408 | USC Law | 1st Semester, A.Y. 2018-2019
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•
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
only personal property can be the subject matter of
simple loan or mutuum, voluntary deposit, pledge,
and chattel mortgage
Prescription
•
The determination of the prescriptive period depends
on whether the property is real or personal
•
Ownership over immovables is acquired through
prescription, although there is bad faith, in 30 years
(Art. 1137), whereas the period is only 8 years in case
of movables
•
Acquisitive Prescription - the acquisition of a right
by the lapse of time as expounded in par. 1, Article
1106. Other names for acquisitive prescription are
adverse possession and usucapcion.
•
Extinctive Prescription - whereby rights and actions
are lost by the lapse of time as defined in Article 1106
and par. 2, Article 1139.
•
Immovable Property – Can be acquired by
prescription:
➢ 10 years – Good Faith;
➢ 30 years – Bad Faith
•
Movable Property – Can be acquired by prescription:
➢ 4 years – Good Faith;
➢ 8 years - Bad Faith
•
Except: Things acquired thru theft/robbery it cannot
be acquired thru prescription
Venue
•
The general law is that immovables are governed by
the law of the country in which they are located.
•
Movables are governed by the personal law of the
owner, which in some case is the law of his nationality
and in other cases, the law of his domicile
Formalities required
•
Donation of Immovable property – It should be in a
public document. Consequence of absence of public
document – No binding effect.; Void
•
Donation of Movable property – The value of the
property will matter. Value of the movable property is
P5,000 or more. – It should be made in writing (not
necessarily in a public document)
•
Formality required in foreclosure of REM: Notice of
publication needed; no publication = void foreclosure
proceedings.
•
Formality required in chattel mortgage: No publication
needed.
Causes of Action to Recover
•
Immovable Property:
➢ Forcible Entry or Unlawful Detainer
➢ Accion Publiciana
➢ Accion Reivindicatoria
•
Movable Property:
➢ Replevin
Taxation
•
Real property = subject to realty taxes
•
Personal property = no realty taxes.
•
Atty. Gravador: Not only the NCC will apply, but the
Real Property Tax Code; specific vs. general law –
specific law will prevail.
Double sales under Art. 1544
•
Example: Property sold to two different persons, both
are in good faith. Our law provides for a solution on
the issue of ownership. For real property, it is that
person who first register the property.
•
The rule in movable property is different. If you are a
judge, before you can decide who is the owner – One
who may have first taken possession thereof in good
faith.
Preference of Credits
j.
Right of Redemption
•
Situation: Debtor obtained a loan from the bank
(creditor-mortgagee). As a security of the loan, the
debtor (debtor-mortgagor) entered into a contract of
mortgage (real property mortgage or chattel
mortgage) his property (immovable-real property or
movable-personal property). The creditor-mortgagee
will foreclose the mortgage, provided that the debtormortgagor failed to pay his obligation. Then the
subject property will be sold at a public auction. The
highest bidder will receive a certificate of sale (not
a deed of absolute sale) after the public auction.
•
Public Auction Sale: Whether Immovable or
Movable property ➢ Real Estate Property - (Immovable Property):
Within 1 year to redeem from the date of the
annotation of the certificate of sale (Right of
Redemption).
➢ Chattel/Personal
Property
(Movable
Property): No right of redemption. If you want to
redeem your property in a chattel mortgage,
make sure you pay your obligation before the
conduct of the auction sale. In a case of movable
property subject to writ of execution, you have no
right of redemption. (Refer to Rule 39, Section
27, ROC)
IMMOVABLES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE
Classes of Immovables
1. Immovables by nature
•
Those which cannot be moved from place to place.
•
Examples: Lands, Roads, Construction of all kinds
adhered to the soil.
2.
•
•
3.
•
•
•
•
•
Immovables by incorporation
Those which are essentially movables, but are attached
to an immovable in such a manner as to be an
integral part thereof.
Note: Further requirement to qualify it as an immovable
by incorporation is under Art. 415 (3) Everything attached
to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it
cannot be separated therefrom without breaking
the material or deterioration of the object.
Immovables by destination
Those which are essentially movables, but by the purpose
for which they have been placed in an immovable, partake
of the nature of the latter because of the added utility
derived therefrom.
Note: The machinery is not necessarily required to be
bolted to the ground in order to qualify it as an
immovable by destination. Therefore, immovable by
destination these are something that it’s attached or
placed. It can still be transferred from one place to another
There is a need to qualify the nature of its importance to
qualify it as immovable by destination, (1) it should be
essential to the industry to address the principal
needs of the industry, compared to some other
properties that are merely incidental to its business,
and (2) it must be placed by the owner or by the
agent of the owner.
Example: A rice-milling business cannot operate without
rice-mill machinery. (Essential to the industry), but it can
still operate without electric fan inside the office. (Merely
incidental)
Situation: I am renting a land, I put up a building there
for the purpose of commencing a rice-milling business and
CTNegado | Property | Atty. W. Gravador | EH408 | USC Law | 1st Semester, A.Y. 2018-2019
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I placed these machineries. What is the status of the
machinery? Whether the property is immovable or
movable?
➢ General Rule: The property (machinery) is
considered as movable property, if the equipment is
placed by an individual with merely a temporary right
(i.e. lessee).
➢ Exception: Unless, the lessee is acting as the agent
of the owner.
➢ Example: (Exception) If it is stipulated in the contract
of lease, that all of the machines/equipment that
brought by the lessee within the premises will become
the property of the lessor after the expiration of the
contract.
4.
•
•
Immovables by analogy or by law
Contracts such as in Paragraph 10.
Example: Right of way – right of way over the land.
Something that is intangible. It partakes of immovable,
because the object of the exercise of the right is an
immovable.
Art. 415, (1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of
all kinds adhered to the soil.
•
Separate treatment by the parties of building from the land
on which it stands does not change the immovable
character of the building.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery
The “Compañia Agricola Filipina” bought rice-cleaning
machinery from the machinery company and executed a
chattel mortgage thereon to secure payment of the
purchase price.
It included in the mortgage deed the building of strong
materials in which the machinery was installed, without
any reference to the land on which it stood.
The mortgage was foreclosed, and the machinery company
was the highest bidder.
Compania issued a deed of sale on land where the building
stood to the machinery company.
At the same time that the machinery was mortgaged,
Compania also mortgaged the building to Leung Yee,
separate and apart from the land on which it stood, to
secure payment of the balance of its indebtedness to
Leung Yee under a contract for the construction of the
building. Leung Yee had knowledge of the first mortgage.
Again, the mortgage was foreclosed.
Leung Yee and the machinery company are now fighting
over the ownership to the building.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
While the building of strong materials in which the ricecleaning machinery was installed by the "Compañia
Agricola Filipina" was real property, and the mere fact
that the parties seem to have dealt with it separate
and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise
changed its character as real property, it follows
that neither the original registry in the chattel
mortgage registry of the instrument purporting to
be a chattel mortgage of the building and the
machinery installed therein, nor the annotation in
that registry of the sale of the mortgaged property,
had any effect whatever so far as the building was
concerned.
•
The building of strong materials in which the machinery
was installed was real property, and the mere fact that the
parties seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from
•
•
•
the land on which it stood in no wise changed its character
as real property.
Yee had full knowledge of the machinery company's claim
of ownership when he executed the indemnity bond and
bought in the property at the sheriff's sale, he cannot be
said to have been an innocent purchaser for value.
He took the risk and must stand by the
consequences; and it is in this sense that we find
that he was not a purchaser in good faith.
In this case, a third party assailed the validity of the deed
of chattel mortgage, not one of the parties to the contract.
(This is important because as will be discussed later, the
parties to the contract may validly stipulate to treat a real
property as personal or vice-versa. Third parties in good
faith, however, are not affected by such stipulation)
Comments:
•
The parties here committed an error by making the
building as a chattel.
•
There was a contract of chattel mortgage and the object
of the contract was a building and machineries.
•
The parties were not correct in making as an object
(Building) in the chattel mortgage.
•
This case is not authority for the view that a building may
become a movable property. This is an exceptional case.
(The best case that would explain to us that a building is
an immovable is the case of Punzalan vs. Lacsamana)
•
SC still gives validity to the contract. It gave a better right
to the mortgagee with that erroneous contract. Although
there’s a third person involved, that third person is
not an innocent person, because he had prior
knowledge.
•
Prior knowledge is equivalent to registration. If you have
prior knowledge on a certain transaction then that binds
you.
Constructive Notice Rule
•
Registration of the document
•
The moment it is registered in the title, all persons are
deemed notified “It’s binding against the whole world”.
•
The equivalent of registration is actual knowledge.
Q: What is the consequence if there is a contract, but the
object of the contract is a movable but it’s a house that
was used as the object?
•
Even if the parties would voluntarily make the building as
a chattel mortgage, it does not change the fact that the
building as an immovable.
Q: What’s the effect if there is an error on the part of the
parties?
•
Still binding between the parties. In case of non-payment
of debt of which the chattel mortgage was executed.
•
“Third persons who are innocent should not be
prejudiced.”
Q: Should third person, who is innocent, and therefore
should not be adversely affected by the erroneous
determination of the parties?
•
If a third person will come in and that third person is
innocent, then that third person will not be prejudiced.
•
There’s no problem involving the Deed of Sale because
when we compare this to a contract of mortgage, the
buyer of the Deed of Sale has a superior right than the
mortgagee in the chattel mortgage.
CTNegado | Property | Atty. W. Gravador | EH408 | USC Law | 1st Semester, A.Y. 2018-2019
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Situation 1: In the first contract, the debtor executed a
chattel mortgage involving a house in favor of Creditor
A, knowing that it was executed thru a wrong document.
•
Still, it is a valid and binding contract between the parties.
Creditor A can foreclose, and the debtor cannot question
the foreclosure on the ground that it was executed by a
wrong document.
•
The debtor can no longer invoke the wrong that he
voluntarily committed to excuse him from liability.
•
If a third person will come in and that third person is
innocent, then that third person will not be prejudiced.
is the owner of the building and he wants to recover possession
and ownership of the building. Essentially this is a real action
because this is a case involving recovery of an immovable.
Situation 2: In relation to the first situation. This time
the same debtor obtained a loan with Creditor B and they
executed a “real estate mortgage” this time. The debtor
did not pay his due. Then the Creditor B foreclosed the
mortgage.
•
Normally, we have this principle in law “First in time, prior
in right.”
•
Creditor A should be given priority, however, since
Creditor B is innocent, the contract with Creditor B
is the correct contract.
•
Creditor B will be given preference by the law because that
erroneous determination will not prejudice him.
Exceptions:
1. There is a building and we entered into an agreement. I’m
selling to you the building but there’s a stipulation that
within three months you have to demolish the building and
get the materials and clear the premises.
ANTONIO PUNZALAN et.al. vs. REMEDIOS LACSAMANA
et.al. G.R. No. L-55729 MARCH 28, 1993
•
Punzalan is owner of land situated in Tarlac which he
mortgaged to PNB in 1963. This property was foreclosed,
with PNB as the HB.
•
While the land was still in possession of the petitioner, he
was allowed by PNB to construct a warehouse, which he
leased to another.
•
In 1978, deed of sale was executed between PNB and
herein respondent Lacsamana, including therein the
building.
•
Punzalan then filed a suit impugning the validity of the sale
of the building in the CFI of Rizal. Respondent PNB filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue
because the suit involves a real property, as such, it must
be tried in the province where the property or any part
thereof lies.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
The warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is an
immovable or real property as provided in article 415(1)
of the Civil Code.
•
Buildings are always immovable under the Code. A
building treated separately from the land on which it stood
is immovable property and the mere fact that the parties
to a contract seem to have dealt with it separate and apart
from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its
character as immovable property.
•
Filed in the wrong venue.
•
The Supreme Court denied the petition without prejudice
to the refilling of the case by Punsalan in the proper forum;
with cost against the petitioner.
Two Types of Actions:
1. Real Action - Action to recover possession and ownership,
it shall be filed with the appropriate court where the
property is situated.
2. Personal Action - It shall be filed where the plaintiff
resides or where the defendant resides at the option of the
plaintiff.
Note: We have to read the allegations in the complaint. The
allegation in the complaint in essence asserts that the plaintiff
General Rule: Building is always an immovable, even if the
land on which it stands belongs to another. (Subject to
exceptions)
Builder in Good Faith.
•
Described by law as somebody who believes that the land
belongs to him in good faith, but he was later on mistaken.
Q: What’s the object of our contract? Is it immovable or
movable?
•
A: Movable, because the object of our contract is the
materials constituting the building.
2.
Parties to a contract voluntarily treated the building as
movable.
Building or house sold to be demolished immediately
•
French court held the sale to be involving movable
property.
House that is superimposed on soil
•
Building can be treated as immovable
Buildings on rented land
•
There are authorities that buildings or constructions placed
on land by lessee do not become immovable, where
agreement gives the lessee the right to remove the
building and improvements.
Chattel Mortgage on house built on rented land:
•
Where a house stands on a rented land, the same
(house) may be subject of chattel mortgage if so
stipulated in the document of mortgage.
•
Validity of mortgage cannot be assailed by parties to the
mortgage (NAVARRO vs. REYES 9 SCRA 631)
•
Duty of the Register of Deeds is ministerial.
•
•
•
Standard Oil v. Jaranillo
Gervaci de la Rosa, a lessee of certain land in Manila and
the owner of a house built on that land, executed in favor
of Standard Oil, a chattel mortgage on both the leasehold
interest and the building that stands thereon.
Petitioner then went to the Register of Deeds of Manila to
have the same recorded in the book of chattel mortgages.
RD refused on the ground that the properties were not
personal properties within the meaning of the Chattel
Mortgage Law. Petition for mandamus was filed.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
The duties of a Register of Deeds in respect to the
registration of chattel mortgage are of a purely ministerial
character.
•
He has no power to determine whether or not the
property is real or personal.
•
In refusing the registration of a chattel mortgage on the
ground that the property is not a personal property, the
RD is engaging in the interpretation of the law, which is
the exclusive province of the courts.
CTNegado | Property | Atty. W. Gravador | EH408 | USC Law | 1st Semester, A.Y. 2018-2019
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•
It should also be noted that under given conditions,
property may have character different from that imputed
in said articles (NCC).
Parties to a contract may, by agreement, treat as
personal property that which by nature would be
real property, as long as no interest of third parties
would be prejudiced thereby.
Art. 415, (4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects
for use or ornamentation, placed in buildings or on lands
by the owner of the immovable in such a manner that it
reveals the intention to attach them permanently to the
tenements.
•
Immovable by incorporation and destination
•
These are known as “REAL PROPERTIES BY DESTINATION”
Art. 415, (2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while
they are attached to the land or form an integral part of
an immovable.
•
Note: Under the Chattel Mortgage Law, ungathered
fruits and growing crops have the nature of personal
property and can be a subject of chattel mortgage.
4.a. objects must be placed by the owner or by his agent.
It becomes immobilized only when placed in the tenement
by the owner of the tenement (Davao Sawmill Co. vs. Castillo
61 Phil. 709).
4.b. When placed by a mere holder, e.g. tenant,
usufructuary, or one with a temporary right over the
immovable, objects do not become immovable property,
unless the person acts as agent of the owner (Davao
Sawmill case, supra).
•
•
•
•
•
•
Sibal v. Valdez (not in syllabus)
In this case, the deputy sheriff of the Province of Tarlac
attached several properties of Leon Sibal, among which
was included the sugar cane in seven parcels of land.
Thereafter, the said deputy sheriff sold at public auction
said properties, including the sugar cane, to Valdez. Sibal
offered to redeem said sugar came and tendered to Valdez
the amount sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter.
Valdez, however refused to accept the money and to
return the sugar cane on the ground that the sugar cane
in question had the nature of personal property and was
not, therefore, subject to redemption.
There is a right of redemption for real properties,
none in chattel mortgage.
On the issue of whether the sugar in question is personal
or real property, the Supreme Court held that “for
purposes of attachment and execution, and for the
purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law, ungathered
products have the nature of personal property.”
Art. 415, (3) Everything attached to an immovable in a
fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated
therefrom
without
breaking
the
material
or
deterioration of the object.
•
Notes: “Rex Vinta” (Roman law), otherwise known as
“Immovable by Incorporation”
•
Under this kind, ownership of the thing is attached i.e.
whether it is the owner who placed it there or not, is
immaterial. The construction must be attached
permanently to the land/soil.
•
•
•
•
Board of Assessment Appeals v. Manila Electric
A law was enacted to build electric railway, street, light,
heat, and power system in Manila.
MERALCO, the winning bidder, then built electric
transmission wires which carry high voltage current, are
fastened to insulators attached on steel towers
constructed by respondent at intervals, from its
hydroelectric plant in the Laguna to the City of Manila.
The City Assessor sough to apply real estate tax on the 40
steel towers as they were attached to the land.
CTA said no real property tax should be imposed on them.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
The steel towers are removable and are merely attached
to a square metal frame by means of bolts.
•
They are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner,
and they can be separated without breaking the
material or causing deterioration upon the object to
which they are attached.
•
As such, they are not subject to real estate tax.
•
•
•
•
Davao Sawmill Co. vs. Castillo
Davao Sawmill placed machinery in a building erected by
it on land belonging to another, with the understanding
that the machinery was not included in the improvements
which would pass on the lessor on the expiration of the
lease.
In a number of occasions, Davao Sawmill also treated the
machinery as personal property by executing chattel
mortgages in favor of 3rd persons.
A judgment was issued against Davao Sawmill seeking to
levy upon the machineries mentioned.
RTC said that the machineries were personal in nature.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
The machinery unit must be classified as a personal
property.
•
Machinery which is movable in its nature becomes
immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of
the property or plant, but not when placed by a
tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a
temporary right, unless such person acted as an agent of
the owner.
Art. 415, (5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or
implements intended by the owner of the tenement for
an industry or works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works.
•
These are known as “Real Properties by Destination”
•
Immovable by destination depends upon their being
destined for use in the industry or work in the tenement.
•
Machinery which is movable in nature, only becomes
immobilized when placed on a plant by the owner of the
property or plant, but not when placed by a tenant (Davao
Sawmill Co. v. Castillo 61 Phil. 709)
•
Machinery, though in fact bolted to the ground, remains
movable property susceptible to seizure under a search
warrant, where its owner is not the owner of the land
and/or building on which it was placed (Burgos, Sr. vs.
Chief of Staff 133 SCRA 800) Basis in ruling validity of
replevin is not Article 415, but estoppel.
•
Before movables may be deemed immobilized in
contemplation of paragraph 5 of Article 415, it is necessary
that they must be “essential” and “principal”
elements of the industry or works without which such
industry or works would be unable to function or carry on
the industrial purpose for which it was established.
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Common between pars. 4 and 5:
•
It must be the owner who permanently places the things.
The owner of the machinery must also be the owner of the
immovable to which it is attached.
MAKATI LEASING AND FINANCE CORP. VS. WEAREVER
TEXTILE MILLS, INC. 122 SCRA 296
•
To be able to secure financial accommodations from the
petitioner, the private respondent discounted and assigned
several receivables under a Receivable Purchase
Agreement.
•
To secure the collection of the receivables, a chattel
mortgage was executed over machinery found in the
factory of the private respondent.
•
As the private respondent failed to pay, the mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed. Nonetheless, the sheriff was
unable to seize the machinery. This prompted petitioner to
file an action for replevin (action on personal
property).
•
The CA reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered
the return of the drive motor, after ruling that the
machinery may not be the subject of a chattel mortgage,
given that it was an immovable under the provisions of
Article 415. The same was attached to the ground by
means of bolts and the only way to remove it from the
plant would be to drill the ground.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
There is no logical justification to exclude the rule out that
the machinery may be considered as personal property,
and subject to a chattel mortgage.
•
If a house of strong materials, like what was involved in
the above Tumalad case, may be considered as personal
property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage
thereon as long as the parties to the contract so
agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced
thereby, there is absolutely no reason why a
machinery, which is movable in its nature and
becomes immobilized only by destination or
purpose, may not be likewise treated as such.
•
This is really because one who has so agreed that it is
personal property by entering a chattel mortgage is
estopped from denying the existence of the chattel
mortgage.
Immovable By Incorporation vs. Immovable By
Destination
•
Immovable By Incorporation – It is immaterial or it is
not relevant who was the one who incorporate the movable
by the land. Example: Building; fence
•
Immovable By Destination – It is relevant who was the
person who placed the property.
•
A real property by destination is not necessary being
attached to an immovable property (or land for example).
•
The property is intended for the principal needs/purposes
of the business/industry.
•
It is relevant where the industry is conducted, whether
inside the building or outside the building or on the land.
•
It is also relevant who was the one who paid the equipment
or machinery.
•
It will be considered as an Immovable By Destination, if
the owner of the land personally placed the property. This
is because of the presumed intention of the owner.
Q: How can you presume permanency if the one who
place in there is merely a tenant of the land? (LessorLessee Relationship)
•
You cannot reasonably enter that the equipment will be
placed there permanently. Upon the termination of the
lease contract, the lessee will remove all of his properties
brought in the premises. It will not attain permanency.
Q: Is it possible for the equipment to become immovable
if the tenant brought the movable property within the
premises of the owner?
•
It must be stipulated in the contract for the movable
property will become immovable after the termination of
the lease contract.
Q: Can you think of a situation where the thing is still
considered an immovable even if the one who brought
them there is a tenant?
•
After the end of the lease contract.
•
General Rule: If a tenant places the movable property in
the land of the owner, the said property is still considered
as movable property.
•
Exception: If the Lessor-Lessee agreed in the contract of
lease that all movable properties (Equipment or
machineries) brought in by the lessee within the premises
it will become an immovable by destination after the end
of the lease contract. The properties will become the
property of the lessor. That stipulation which means that
the lessee is acting as the agent of the owner.
Classification made under Article 415 of the Civil Code is
used as basis to determine whether there is liability to
realty tax:
Mindanao Bus Company v. City Assessor
•
Mindanao bus is a public transpo company who also owns
the lot used as a garage, repair shop, carpentry shop, etc.
•
The city assessor of CDO assessed P4,400 for real property
taxes involving several equipment of the bus company.
•
The Board of Tax Appeals sustained the assessor that said
items are subject to real property taxes.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
Welder Machine; Boring Machine (“Barrena”); Welding
Machine – These machines are not intended for principal
needs but merely incidentals for their business.
•
No realty tax is due on machineries of a transportation
company, such as welder, boring machine, lathe machine,
etc. sitting on a cement or wooden platform, because they
are not absolutely essential to its transportation
business which is not carried on in a building or
specified land, it is merely incidental.
•
Mindanao Bus Company’s transportation business is not
carried on in a building, tenement or on a specified land,
so said equipment may not be considered real estate
within the meaning of Article 415 (c) of the Civil Code.
Fels Energy, Inc. v. The Province of Batangas, G.R. No.
168557, February 16, 2007
•
Power barges are categorized as immovable property by
destination, being in the nature of machinery and other
implements intended by the owner for an industry or work
which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land
and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry
or work.
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Cases where the Civil Code was not applied for purposes
of determining liability to real property tax:
Caltex v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals
•
Caltex loaned machines and equipment to gas station
operators under a lease agreement, which stipulated that
upon demand, the operators shall return to Caltex the
machines and equipment.
•
The city assessor of Pasay city characterized the said
machines as taxable realty.
•
The machinery and equipment installed by Caltex in its gas
stations on leased lands were subjected to realty tax. The
machines included elevated tanks, underground tanks,
water pumps, air compressors, etc – all of which are used
in the pursuance of the gasoline service station.
•
These machines were loaned to various gas stations
operators by Caltex under a lease agreement.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
Yes, they are considered as real property for they are
necessary to the operation of the gas station
because without them, the gas stations would be
useless, according to the Real Property Tax Code.
•
In the RPTax code, unlike the Civil Code, it is not
required that they were placed there by the owner.
•
Further, they have been attached permanently to the gas
station site. Hence, they are taxable improvements and
machinery within the meaning of the Assessment Law and
the Real Property Tax Code.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. CENTRAL BOARD OF
ASSESSMENT APPEALS 114 SCRA 273 (not in syllabus)
•
MERALCO owns two oil storage tanks, made of steel plates
wielded and assembled on the spot. Their bottoms rest on
a foundation consisted of compacted earth, sand pad as
immediate layer, and asphalt stratum as top layer. The
tanks merely sit on its foundation.
•
The storage tanks were installed by MERALCO on a lot it
leased (from Caltex).
•
The municipal treasurer of Batangas made an assessment
for realty tax on the two tanks, based on the report of the
Board of Assessors.
•
MERALCO contends that tanks are not real property under
Article 415 of the Civil Code.
•
The Board concludes that while the tanks rest or sit on
their foundation, the foundation itself and the walls, dikes
and steps, which are integral parts of the tanks, are affixed
to the land while the pipelines are attached to the tanks
and required Meralco to pay realty taxes on the two tanks.
Supreme Court Ruling:
•
Used in resolving the issue is the Assessment Law and the
Real Property Code: “while two storage tanks are not
embedded in the land, they are considered improvements
that enhance utility and rendering it useful to the oil
industry.”
•
It is undeniable that the two tanks have been installed with
some degree of permanence as receptacles for the
considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its
operations.
•
Thus, the two tanks should be held subject to realty
tax because they were considered real property.
•
For purposes of taxation, the term real property may
include things, which should generally be considered as
personal property. It is familiar phenomenon to see things
classified as real property for purposes of taxation which
on general principle may be considered as personal
property.
Atty. Gravador’s View:
•
When the issue is real property taxation, in terms of
determination whether the property is movable or
immovable, there are cases where the SC applied the Civil
Code, and there are cases that the SC applied the Real
Property Taxation under the Local Government Code.
•
Current trend: Apply the Local Government Code – need
not be the owner who will place it there, the moment that
it is essential and necessary for the operation of the
business – subject to real property tax.
OTHER RELEVANT PRINCIPLES/CASES
•
The parties to a contract may, by agreement, treat as
personal property that which by nature would be real
property, subject to the following principles:
A. Such treatment is good only insofar as the contracting
parties are concerned. It does not apply to third
parties.
B. The parties, after agreeing to such treatment, are
then estopped from claiming otherwise.
•
•
•
Serg’s Products, Inc. v. PCI Leasing and Finance
Serg Products and PCI Leasing entered into a lease
agreement providing that the machines in question were
to be considered as personal property, although they were
essential and principal elements in the chocolate-making
business of SPI.
PCI then filed a complaint against SPI for sum of money
with an application of a writ of replevin (an action to
recover a personal property).
SPI contended that the machines were real property
having become immobilized by destination.
Supreme Court Ruling:
•
Yes. The contracting parties may validly stipulate that a
real property be considered as personal.
•
After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently
estopped from claiming otherwise.
•
Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is
ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material
fact found therein.
•
It should be stressed, however, that said treatment is good
only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned.
•
Hence, while the parties are bound by the Agreement,
third persons acting in good faith are not affected by
its stipulation characterizing the subject machinery
as personal.
•
In any event, there is no showing that any specific third
party would be adversely affected.
•
•
•
•
Tumalad v. Vicencio
Vicencio and Simeon executed a chattel mortgage in
favor of the Tumalads over their house of strong
materials located at 550 Int. 3, Quezon Boulevard,
Quiapo, Manila, over Lot 6-B and 7-B, Block 2554, which
were being rented from Madrigal & Company, Inc.
When Vicencio and Simeon defaulted in paying, the
mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed, and on 27 March
1956, the house was sold at public auction pursuant to the
said contract.
As highest bidder, the Tumalads were issued the
corresponding certificate of sale.
On 18 April 1956, the Tumalads commenced Civil Case
43073 in the municipal court of Manila, praying, among
other things, that the house be vacated, and its possession
surrendered to them, and for Vicencio and Simeon to pay
rent of P200.00 monthly from 27 March 1956 up to the
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•
time the possession is surrendered. MC ruled in favor of
Tumalad.
Nearly a year after the foreclosure sale, the mortgaged
house had been demolished on 14 and 15 January 1957
by virtue of a decision obtained by the lessor of the land
on which the house stood.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
Certain deviations from the rule in Lopez and Iya,
however, have been allowed for various reasons.
•
Hence, if a house belonging to a person stands on a
rented land belonging to another person, it may be
mortgaged as a personal property as so stipulated in
the document of mortgage.
•
It should be noted, however that the principle is predicated
on statements by the owner declaring his house to be a
chattel, a conduct that may conceivably estop him
from subsequently claiming otherwise.
•
Unlike in the Iya cases, Lopez vs. Orosa, Jr. and Plaza
Theatreand Leung Yee vs. F. L. Strong Machinery and
Williamson, wherein third persons assailed the validity of
the chattel mortgage, it is the defendants-appellants
themselves, as debtors-mortgagors, who are attacking the
validity of the chattel mortgage in this case.
•
The doctrine of estoppel therefore applies to the
herein defendants-appellants, having treated the subject
house as personal property.
Comments:
•
The Doctrine of Estoppel in Leung Yee is also applicable to
machineries.
•
Machinery with all the conditions under Art. 415 that will
make it an immovable. However, if made as an object in a
chattel mortgage would still be valid between the parties.
For as long as no third person will be prejudiced.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Ago v. CA [G.R. No. L-17898. October 31, 1962.]
In 1957, Ago bought sawmill machineries and equipment
from Grace Park Engineering, Inc., executing a chattel
mortgage over the same.
Ago defaulted, and, in 1958, Grace Park Engineering, Inc.
instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings of the
mortgage.
To enjoin said foreclosure, Ago instituted Special Civil Case
53 in the CFI Agusan.
The parties to the case arrived at a compromise agreement
and submitted the same in court in writing.
Still, Ago continued to default in his payments as provided
in the judgment by compromise, so Grace Park
Engineering filed with the lower court a motion for
execution, which was granted.
The Provincial Sheriff of Surigao, acting upon the writ of
execution, levied upon and ordered the sale of the sawmill
machineries and equipment in question.
Thereafter the sawmill machineries and equipment were
installed in a building and permanently attached to the
ground in Surigao where Ago sold or assigned them.
The Court of Appeals on 8 December 1959, issued a writ
of preliminary injunction against the sheriff but it turned
out that the latter had already sold at public auction the
machineries in question as scheduled.
Grace Park Engineering was the only bidder for
P15,000.00, although the certificate of sale was not yet
executed.
The CA instructed the sheriff to suspend the issuance of a
certificate of sale of the said sawmill machineries and
equipment until the final decision of the case.
•
On 9 November 1960, the CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction,
with costs against the petitioner.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals and declared that the issuance of the writ of
execution against the sawmill machineries and equipment
purchased by Ago from the Grace Park Engineering, Inc.,
as well as the sale of the same by the Sheriff of Surigao,
are null and void.
•
Sawmill machineries and equipment are real properties in
accordance with Art. 415 (5) By reason of installment
in a building, the said sawmill machineries and
equipment became real estate properties in
accordance with the provision of Art. 415(5) of the Civil
Code.
•
In the present case, the installation of the sawmill
machineries in the building of the Golden Pacific Sawmill
Inc., for use in the sawing of logs carried on in said
building, the same became a necessary and
permanent part of the building or real estate on
which the same was constructed, converting the
said machineries and equipment into real estate
within the meaning of Article 415(5) of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
•
Sale made by sheriff void for lack of publication.
Considering that the machineries and equipments in
question valued at more than P15,000.00 appear to have
been sold without the necessary advertisement of sale by
publication in a newspaper, as required in Section 16 of
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which requires publication
for properties with value above P400, the sale made by the
sheriff must be declared null and void.
MOVABLE PROPERTY
General Test of Movable Character:
1. Whether it can be carried from place to place
2. Whether the change of location can be effected without
injury to an immovable to which the object may be
attached, and
3. Whether the object is not included in any of the ten
paragraphs of Article 415. (Test by exclusion)
➢ Exception: Growing crops (Art 415, par 2) and fruits
for chattel mortgage purposes
LIST OF MOVABLES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE
Art.
416
(1)
Those
movables
susceptible
of
appropriation which are not included in the preceding
article.
Art. 416 (2) Real property which by any special provision
of law is considered as personal property.
•
Example: Act No. 1508 recognizes that growing crops are
personal property and may be the object of chattel
mortgage.
Art. 416 (3) Forces of nature which are brought under
control by science.
•
Example: Electricity, gas, oxygen, light, rays.
•
The United States vs. Ignacio Carlos G.R. No. 6295
September 1, 1911
Ignacio Carlos has been a consumer of electricity furnished
by the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company for a
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
building containing the residence of the accused and 3
other residences.
On 15 March 1909, representatives of the company,
believing that more light is consumed than what is shown
in the meter, installed an additional meter on a pole
outside Carlos’ house to compare actual consumption
(2,500 kilowatts against 233 kilowatts). Marks on the
insulation of the meter points to the use of “jumper.”
Further, the consumption registered in the inside meter is
not the reasonable amount for the number of lights
installed in Carlos’ building.
On the strength of a search warrant duly served by a police
officer, a “jumper” was found in a drawer of a small cabinet
in the room of the defendant’s house were the meter was
installed.
In the absence of any explanation for Carlos’ possession of
said device, the presumption raised was that Carlos was
the owner of the device whose only use was to deflect the
current from the meter. Thus, it was deduced that from 13
February, 1909 and until 3 March 1910, Carlos was found
to have taken 2,273 kilowatts of electric current, worth
P909.20, the electricity being the property of the Manila
Electric Railroad and Light Company, a corporation doing
business in the Philippine Islands, without the consent of
the owner thereof.
Thus, he was charged with the crime of theft. A warrant
for the arrest of Carlos was issued by Judge Jenkins on 4
March and placed in the hands of the sheriff.
The sheriff’s return shows that the defendant gave bond
for his appearance. On 14 March, the counsel for the
defendant demurred to the complaint claiming the court
has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, and
that the facts do not constitute a public offense.
The demurrer was overruled, and as defendant refused to
plead, a plea of not guilty was entered for him.
After due trial, Carlos was found guilty and was sentenced
to 1 year, 8 months and 21 days in prison, and was
ordered to indemnify Manila Electric Railroad and Light
company in the sum of P865.26 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
Carlos appealed and was denied.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
The right of ownership of electric current is secured by
articles 517 and 518 of the Penal Code; the application of
these articles in cases of substraction of gas, a fluid used
for lighting, and in some respects resembling electricity, is
confirmed by the rule laid down in the decisions of the
supreme court of Spain January 20, 1887, and April 1,
1897, construing and enforcing the provisions of articles
530 and 531 of the penal code of that country, articles
identical with articles 517 and 518 of the code in force” in
the Philippines (US v. Genato).
•
The true test of what is a proper subject of larceny seems
to be not whether the subject is corporeal or incorporeal,
but whether it is capable of appropriation by another than
the owner.
•
It is true that electricity is no longer, as formerly, regarded
by electricians as a fluid, but its manifestations and
effects, like those of gas, may be seen and felt.
•
There is nothing in the nature of gas used for
illuminating purposes which renders it incapable of
being feloniously taken and carried away. It is a
valuable article of merchandise, bought and sold like other
personal property, susceptible of being severed from a
mass or larger quantity, and of being transported from
place to place (Commonwealth v. Shaw).
•
•
•
•
•
Electricity, the same as gas, is a valuable article of
merchandise, bought and sold like other personal
property and is capable of appropriation by another.
LUIS MARCOS LAUREL VS. HON. ABROGAR G.R. No.
155076 January 13, 2009
It (PLDT) maintains that the Amended Information
charging petitioner with theft is valid and sufficient:
➢ that it states the names of all the accused who were
specifically charged with the crime of theft of PLDT’s
international calls and business of providing
telecommunication or telephone service on or about
September 10 to 19, 1999 in Makati City by
conducting ISR or International Simple Resale;
➢ that it identifies the international calls and business of
providing telecommunication or telephone service of
PLDT as the personal properties which were unlawfully
taken by the accused; and
➢ that it satisfies the test of sufficiency as it enabled a
person of common understanding to know the charge
against him and the court to render judgment
properly.
PLDT further insists that the Revised Penal Code should be
interpreted in the context of the Civil Code’s definition of
real and personal property. The enumeration of real
properties in Article 415 of the Civil Code is exclusive such
that all those not included therein are personal properties.
Since Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code used the words
“personal property” without qualification, it follows that all
“personal properties” as understood in the context of the
Civil Code, may be the subject of theft under Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code.
PLDT alleges that the international calls and business of
providing telecommunication or telephone service are
personal properties capable of appropriation and can be
objects of theft.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
Prior to the passage of the Revised Penal Code on
December 8, 1930, the definition of the term “personal
property” in the penal code provision on theft had been
established in Philippine jurisprudence.
•
This Court, in United States v. Genato, United States v.
Carlos, and United States v. Tambunting, consistently
ruled that any personal property, tangible or intangible,
corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be
the object of theft.
•
Moreover, since the passage of the Revised Penal Code on
December 8, 1930, the term “personal property” has had
a generally accepted definition in civil law.
•
In Article 335 of the Civil Code of Spain, “personal
property” is defined as “anything susceptible of
appropriation and not included in the foregoing
chapter (not real property).”
•
Thus, the term “personal property” in the Revised
Penal Code should be interpreted in the context of
the Civil Code provisions in accordance with the rule
on statutory construction that where words have been
long used in a technical sense and have been judicially
construed to have a certain meaning, and have been
adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning
prior to a particular statute, in which they are used, the
words used in such statute should be construed according
to the sense in which they have been previously used.
•
In fact, this Court used the Civil Code definition of
“personal property” in interpreting the theft provision of
the penal code in United States v. Carlos.
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Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication or
telephone service are personal property which can be the
object of theft under Art. 308 of the RPC. The act of
engaging in ISR is an act of “subtraction” penalized under
the said article
Indeed, while it may be conceded that international long
distance calls, the matter alleged to be stolen in the instant
case, take the form of electrical energy, it cannot be said
that such international long distance calls were personal
properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not
have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT
merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and
transmits said calls using its complex communications
infrastructure and facilities.
Comments:
•
But does it follow that the if there is something
wrong in the allegation there is already no crime?
NO.
•
The issue in this case boils down to: What is the object
that is taken? SC said that the objects taken were the
corporeal things (computers, equipment) and the
incorporeal things taken were the business itself and
the use of the facilities = equivalent to deprivation
to engage in business.
•
Things, corporeal or incorporeal, can be movable property
for as long as it can be appropriated.
•
Therefore, (interest in) BUSINESS in itself is movable
property. You may perceive the business through its
building, chairs and tables, but when you sell that
equipment, it is not a sale of your business. THAT IS SALE
OF TANGILBE MOVABLE PROPERTIES, BUT THE BUSINESS
REMAINS UNLESS YOU WILL SELL THE ENTIRE
INTEREST.
•
Interest is something that is intangible.
•
Atty G: For me, intangible movable properties are those
mentioned in Art 417.
Act No. 3952 (Bulk Sales Law)
•
The basis used by the SC to prove that business in itself is
movable.
•
Example: If I am selling the physical things in the business
just to change the physical set up, I am not actually selling
the business. I am only selling the tangible things used in
that business.
•
But if I’m going to enter into agreement selling my
business interest that I will not engage in that business
after signing that – GOVERNED BY BULK SALES LAW
•
•
Why make distinction between consumable and nonconsumable?
•
There are contracts which are treated as such because the
object is a non-consumable; conversely it is name like this
because the object is consumable
➢ Example: Commodatum – a gratuitous use of a
thing with the obligation on the part of the borrower
to return the very same thing.
•
It can only be commodatum when the object is nonConsumable because you will be returning the very same
thing
➢ Example: Mutuum – loan – this involves consumable
because it involves money.
Fungibles and Non-Fungibles
The basis of the classification is simply the intention of the
parties. This is a classification based on PURPOSE
•
Fungible, quality of being fungible depends upon their
possibility (because of their nature or the will of the
parties), of being substituted by others of the same kind,
not having a distinct individuality
➢ Example: ten heads of cattle, or 100 copies of a
newspaper of a given date; generic things
•
Non-fungibles are those which have their own
individuality and DO NOT admit of substitution
➢ Example: ten bottles of wine in my room; determinate
thing
•
•
Comments:
•
Do not confine yourselves in 416 and 417. In fact, the SC
mentioned that movable properties are those not
enumerated in 415 and are capable of appropriation.
•
Art. 416 (4) In general, all things which can be
transported from place to place without impairment of
the real property to which they are fixed.
Art. 417 (1) Obligations and actions which have for their
object movables or demandable sums; and
Art. 417 (2) Shares of stock of agricultural, commercial
and industrial entities, although they may have real
estate. (336a)
Consumables and Non-Consumables:
The basis of the classification s the very nature of the corporeal
object itself.
Consumables are those which cannot be used in a
manner appropriate to their nature without being
consumed. Things that when used, it cannot be used again
➢ Example: Food, money (ay lang kan-a); Gasoline;
Mutuum – Simple Loan (Consumable) – Return the
value of the amount.
Non-consumables are those not consumed by use.
Example: Table, Contract of Commodatum – You are
obliged to return he thing that was given to you for your
gratuitous use.
➢ Example: Contract of Commodatum – You are obliged
to return thing that was given to you for your
gratuitous use.
•
•
•
Even if the sole property of a corporation consists only of
real property, a share of stock in said corporation (owned
by a stockholder) is considered personal property
(Cedman vs Winslow, 10 Mass 145)
Is money considered merchandise?
➢ No. In domestic circulation, money is a LEGAL
TENDER, and NOT MERCHANDISE.
➢ Exception: When attempted to be exported or
smuggled, money is considered as merchandise or
commodity subject to forfeiture.
Movable property is not only limited to those which are
tangible, but also includes intangibles.
The only requirement being that, for a property to be
considered as movable property, it must be capable of
being appropriated (legal rights may be exercised over it)
and it is not one of those enumerated under Art. 415.
It does not however mean that if enumerated in Art. 415,
it is already an immovable.
Ex: standing crops, growing fruits (sugar cane) – strictly
speaking, immovable. But there is a law – Chattel
Mortgage Law which allows these to be a valid object of
chattel mortgage. So Art. 415 (a general law) should
give way to the Chattel Mortgage Law (a special law)
insofar as chattel mortgage is concerned (therefore,
it is movable). (Sibal vs. Valdez)
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Sibal vs. Valdes (not in syllabus)
In this case, the deputy sheriff of the Province of Tarlac
attached several properties of Leon Sibal, among which
was included the sugar cane in seven parcels of land.
Thereafter, the said deputy sheriff sold at public auction
said properties, including the sugar cane, to Valdez. Sibal
offered to redeem said sugar came and tendered to Valdez
the amount sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter.
Valdez, however refused to accept the money and to
return the sugar cane on the ground that the sugar cane
in question had the nature of personal property and was
not, therefore, subject to redemption.
There is a right of redemption for real properties,
none in chattel mortgage.
On the issue of whether the sugar in question is personal
or real property, the Supreme Court held that “for
purposes of attachment and execution, and for the
purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law, ungathered
products have the nature of personal property.”
Spouses Paray vs. Rodriguez (not in syllabus)
The right of redemption over mortgaged real property sold
extrajudicially is established by Act No. 3135, as amended.
The said law does not extend the same benefit to personal
property. In fact, there is no law in our statute books
which vests the right of redemption over personal
property.
Act No. 1508, or the Chattel Mortgage Law, ostensibly
could have served as the vehicle for any legislative intent
to bestow a right of redemption over personal property,
since that law governs the extrajudicial sale of mortgaged
personal property, but the statute is definitely silent on the
point.
Section 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
extensively relied upon by the Court of Appeals, starkly
utters that the right of redemption applies to real
properties, not personal properties, sold on execution.
PROPERTY IN RELATION TO THE PERSON TO WHOM IT
BELONGS
Classifying a property on the basis of its Ownership
1. Property of Public Dominion
•
They are beyond the commerce of men but still considered
as property. The state can control the property. Power of
control can regulate for public use.
•
Public dominion does not carry the idea of
ownership; property of public dominion is not owned by
the State, but pertains to the State, which as territorial
sovereign exercises certain juridical prerogatives over
such property.
•
The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person
but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public
welfare.
•
It uses Dominion because the owners are technically the
general public, but the public cannot just sell these
properties.
•
The administration of these properties is vested to the
State. It is the duty of the State to use these properties to
cater the needs of the general public.
•
The state cannot just sell or even lease the property,
unless it is converted into patrimonial property
(property of the State owned by it in its private or
proprietary capacity, i.e., the property is not intended for
public use)
2.
•
Private Ownership
Ownership concept - If you are the owner, you can enjoy
all the attributes of ownership such as right to enjoy (to
sell).
Principles governing the use of Property on Public
Dominion: (LIMITATIONS)
1. They cannot be sold, alienated, leased or otherwise
be the subject matter of contracts (including
commercial transactions).
➢ The property of public dominion is outside the
commerce of men for as long as the general public is
using it.
2. They cannot be acquired by prescription against the
state.
➢ If it is part of the public domain (national park,
mineral, forest, and not agricultural land), a private
person cannot acquire the property even if the has
possessed the land in reasonable time.
➢ Example: A Kainginized timber land – even if you are
living on the land for several years, you cannot say
that you acquire ownership over it through
prescription (see Malabanan case).
➢ Except for public agricultural land which can be
subject for prescription.
3. They are not subject to attachment and execution.
➢ When the state consents to be sued, it only consents
to proceedings before execution. So if magdaog ka,
these properties cannot be subject to execution or
attachment.
➢ If we talk about enforcement of the execution, it is
already another story. AND THOSE PROPERTIES OF
PUBLIC DOMINIONS CANNOT BE ATTACHED.
4. They cannot be burdened by voluntary easement.
➢ Example: Right of Way – when something is granted
only to a specific person, it could not be that only this
person is authorized to use the property of public
dominion.
•
•
Villa Rico vs Sarmiento (not in syllabus)
Generally, if you are a grantee of right of way, you are the
owner of that dominant estate and only you can use the
right of way, BUT This cannot be had in a property of public
dominion because this is supposed to be open to the
general public.
You cannot say that because you are a grantee of the right
of way given by the government, you can prohibit the
others from using that right of way because property of
public dominion cannot be burdened with easement.
ART 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
1. Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character
2. Those which belongs to the State, without being for public
use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the
character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial
property. (340a)
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of
the patrimonial property of the State. (341a)
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Art. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities
is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property.
(343)
Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and
municipalities, consist of the provincial roads, city streets,
municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works for public service paid for by
said provinces, cities, or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and
shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the
provisions of special laws. (344a)
Art. 425. Property of private ownership, besides the
patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, and
municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private
persons, either individually or collectively. (345a)
Examples of projects covered by BOT Law:
•
Reclamation
•
Ports
•
Airports
Q: Tomas enters into a contract with Gokongwei to sell
Colon Street, through an ordinance by the SP saying the
proceeds of the sale would be used for public purpose.
Is it valid?
•
No. there has to be a positive act by the city council
that the property will be withdrawn from public purpose,
after which, it will become patrimonial property which can
now be the subject of an ordinary contract.
•
Notwithstanding the prior authorization of the council of
the sale, it cannot be sold without the declaration by the
city council that it is withdrawn for public use.
•
Property of Public Dominion may refer to Properties of
the State itself and Properties of LGUs (Province, City,
Municipality EXCEPT the Barangays)
1. Property of the State - Property for public use - use
which is not confined to privileged individuals but is open
to the indefinite public. They may be used by the public
indiscriminately
➢ Example: Art. 420 (1) Toll Ways – when you do not
pay, you cannot use the road. Isn’t it properties for
public use are used INDISCRIMINATELY?
Collecting a toll does not negate the public use of the
road. It is for the maintenance.
➢ Discrimination Will Only Happen If Ikaw Nga
Pwede Makabayad, Dli Ka Paagion.
2. Property for public service - Although used for the
benefit of the public, cannot be used indiscriminately by
anyone but only by those that are authorized by proper
authority.
➢ Example: police cars, fire truck, ambulance
3. Property for development of national wealth. - The
constitution itself allows joint venture and co-production
agreements for national patrimony and economy. Again,
this is because of a technical insufficiency that we have.
➢ Example: Natural Resources
Build Operate Transfer (BOT) Law
•
Prior to this Build Operate Transfer Law, it is absolutely
prohibited to make as an object of the contract these
properties for public use and public service.
•
In BOT Law – there is a premise that the government has
insufficient resources to build infrastructure to serve the
general public just like Capital Intensive Projects
•
Here private investors will build infrastructures and then
they will be given time to recover their investments. One
way of recovering their investments is by way of collecting
tolls for the use of these facilities.
•
That’s why we have properties like North Luzon Express
Way, where a company was given the right to collect tolls.
Here you will ask yourself why is it that road, supposed to
be beyond commerce of man, being subjected to a
contract? It’s because of this BOT Law, this is a
statutory law passed by congress, which is of the
same footing with the Civil Code. Do not think that
CC is superior to this law.
•
This law somehow modifies the very strict application of
the rule that properties of public dominion are beyond the
commerce of man.
•
•
•
Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas
The municipal council of Cavite by Resolution No. 10,
leased to Rojas some 70 or 80 square meters of Plaza
Soledad (a public plaza) on which their house has been
constructed and had been occupying the same, on
condition that she pay rent quarterly in advance according
to the schedule fixed in Ordinance No. 43, series of 1903
and that she obligate herself to vacate said land within 60
days subsequent to notification to that effect.
Upon notice to vacate, however, she refused to vacate the
land, forcing the municipality to file a complaint before the
CFI to order her to vacate the land.
Rojas refused to vacate the said land because they had
acquired the right of possession to it and further alleged
that the lease agreement provided that they can only be
ordered to vacate the said property if the municipality
needed it for decoration or public use.
The trial court held that the municipality had no legal claim
to the property. This case was appealed through bill of
exceptions.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
The lease was null and void.
•
The LGU has no right to continue to occupy the land for it
is an integral part of the plaza which is for public use and
is reserved for the common benefit.
•
Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises
the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets,
fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public
works of general service supported by said towns or
provinces.
•
The said Plaza being a promenade for public use, the
municipal council of Cavite could not in 1907
withdraw or exclude from public use a portion
thereof in order to lease it for the sole benefit of the
defendant Hilaria Rojas.
•
The plaintiff municipality exceeded its authority in the
exercise of its powers by executing a contract over a thing
of which it could not dispose, nor is it empowered so to do.
•
The Civil Code, articles 1271, prescribes that everything
which is not outside the commerce of man may be the
object of a contract, and plazas and streets are outside of
this commerce. Therefore, it must be concluded that the
said lease is null and void.
•
•
Maneclang vs. IAC
Maneclang filed a complaint for quieting of title over a
certain fishpond located within the four parcels of land
belonging to them.
The trial court dismissed the complaint upon finding that
the body of water traversing the titled properties of
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•
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petitioners is a creek constituting a tributary of a river;
therefore, public in nature and not subject to private
appropriation.
The Maneclangs appealed the decision to the IAC but the
IAC affirmed the trial court decision.
After having been asked by the Court to comment to the
case, Petitioners manifested that for lack of interest on the
part of the awardee in the public bidding, Maza, they desire
to amicably settle the case by submitting a Compromise
Agreement praying that judgment be rendered recognizing
their ownership over the land and the body of water found
within their titled properties.
They state that there would be no benefit on their part,
but to the advantage of the municipality instead, since it
is clear that after the National Irrigation Authority built the
dike over the land, no water gets in or out of the land.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
A creek is a recess/arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. It is a property
belonging to the public domain, It is a property belonging
to the public domain. it is not susceptible to appropriation
and acquisitive prescription, it cannot be registered
under the Torrens System….Compromise Agreement
null and void.
•
As a public water, it cannot be registered under the
Torrens System in the name of any individual.
•
Its nature as property of the public domain cannot
be modified by the construction of irrigation dikes by
the National Irrigation Authority, or by its conversion into
a fishpond.
•
Hence, a compromise agreement adjudicating the
ownership of such property in favor of an individual is null
and void. The compromise agreement has no legal effect
since it is contrary to law and public policy.
•
Rule: creek is a property of the public domain
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
RP vs. Democrito Mendoza
Mendoza is in possession of 70 or so hectares in Silot Bay
through an Ordinary Fishpond Permit.
On Jan 16, 1967, Pres. Marcos ordered a memorandum
that about 700,000 fishpond areas (including Mendoza’s
land) shall be released by the Bureau of Forestry to the
Bureau of Lands as alienable and disposable, but subject
to the disposal of the Bureau of Fisheries for fishpond
purposes.
Pursuant to that, Mendoza issued a sales patent
application in order to purchase the said land and was
approved, thus an auction was scheduled.
Prior to the approval, Mendoza subdivided the lots and
assigned rights and interests in equal shares to each of his
daughters.
On 26 June 1974, Acting Director of the Bureau of Lands
Ramon N. Casanova issued an Order awarding the sales
patents over the disputed property to Democrito Mendoza,
Sr. and his three children Gwendolyn, Vilma, and
Democrito, Jr., respectively.
In 1988, a protest was filed by the fisherman-residents of
Liloan against the issuance of the sales patents to the
Mendozas.
Upon investigation, the DENR uncovered irregularities in
the issuance of the sales patents awarded to the
Mendozas.
The government then filed with the RTC of Cebu, a
complaint for Cancellation of Sales Patents and Titles
against the Mendozas.
•
The RTC declared the sales patents void ab initio as the
lots are inalienable and non-disposable, being parts of Silot
Bay. The CA reversed the RTC decision.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
Yes, the property is alienable and disposable. Despite
petitioners' assertion that Silot Bay is a navigable body of
water and by its very nature and inherent character is of
public dominion, thus, there is no need for a declaration
by any appropriate government agency that it is a
communal fishing ground before Silot Bay may be
recognized as such, it cannot be gainsaid that the
prerogative of classifying public lands pertains to
administrative agencies which have been specially tasked
by statutes to do so and that the courts will not interfere
on matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government and/or quasi-judicial agencies entrusted with
the regulation of activities coming under their special
technical knowledge and training.
•
It should be stressed that the function of administering
and disposing of lands of the public domain in the
manner prescribed by law is not entrusted to the
courts but to executive officials.
•
And as such, courts should refrain from looking into
the underlying reasons or grounds which impelled
the classification and declaration of Silot Bay as
timberland and its subsequent release as alienable
and disposable land.
•
From the facts of the case, it is evident that the Bureau of
Forestry released Silot Bay as alienable and disposable by
virtue of the Memorandum issued by then President
Marcos.
•
Hence, the courts, in view of the clear legal directive by
which said area was released as alienable and disposable,
will refrain from questioning the wisdom of such
classification or declaration.
Rule in an old case (Cabangis):
•
If your land is covered by a body of water and it becomes
permanent, then it becomes property of public dominion.
•
Practical advice: Protect your boundaries by building a
seawall.
•
•
•
•
Ignacio vs. Director of Lands
Ignacio filed an application alleging that among others that
he owned the parcel applied for by right of accretion. The
Director of Lands, Laureano Valeriano and Domingo
Gutierrez filed oppositions. Gutierrez later withdrew his
opposition.
The Director of Lands claimed the parcel applied for as a
portion of the public domain, for the reason that neither
the applicant nor his predecessor-in-interest possessed
sufficient title thereto, not having acquired it either by
composition title from the Spanish government or by
possessory information title under the Royal Decree and
that he had not possessed the same openly, continuously
and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since
July 26, 1894.
In his turn, Valeriano alleged he was holding the land by
virtue of a permit granted him by the Bureau of Fisheries
and approved by the President.
It is not disputed that the land applied for adjoins a parcel
owned by the applicant which he had acquired from the
Government by virtue of a free patent title in 1936. It has
also been established that the parcel in question was
formed by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the
action of the Manila Bay which boarders it on the
southwest.
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•
On the other hand, the Director of Lands sought to prove
that the parcel is foreshore land, covered by the ebb and
flow of the tide and, therefore, formed part of the public
domain.
After hearing, the trial court dismissed the application,
holding that the parcel formed part of the public domain.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
The disputed land is part of public domain. Appellant
contends that the parcel belongs to him by the law of
accretion, having been formed by gradual deposit by
action of the Manila Bay, and he cites Article 457 of the
New Civil Code (Article 366, Old Civil Code), which
provides that: To the owners of lands adjoining the banks
of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters.
•
The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers
to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers, while
the accretion in the present case was caused by
action of the Manila Bay.
•
River – Can be privately owned; Riparian Owner
•
Sea – Littoral Owner
•
Interpreting Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866, in the
case of Natividad vs. Director of Lands, (CA) 37 Off. Gaz.,
2905, it was there held that: Article 4 of the Law of Waters
of 1866 provides that when a portion of the shore is no
longer washed by the waters of the sea and is not
necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, or for coastguard
service, the government shall declare it to be the
property of the owners of the estates adjacent
thereto and as an increment thereof.
•
A bay is a part of the sea, being a mere indentation of
the same: "Bay. — An opening into the land where the
water is shut in on all sides except at the entrance; an inlet
of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a
bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake." 7
C.J. 1013-1014 (Cited in Francisco, Philippine Law of
Waters and Water Rights p. 6)
•
Land of the public domain is not subject to ordinary
prescription. Thus, it cannot be acquired by prescription.
•
This is a property of public dominion because this is an
issue on form by the sea, this is not accretion formed by
the river. Only accretion formed by the river can be
privately owned
•
In this case, the property is formed by seawater,
thus it cannot be registered.
•
•
Macasiano vs. Diokno
On June 13, 1990, Paranaque passed authorized the
closure of certain streets for the establishment of a flea
market thereon.
The Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance No.
86, s. 1990 of the municipal council of respondent
municipality subject to the following conditions:
1. That the aforenamed streets are not used for vehicular
traffic, and that the majority of the residents do not
oppose the establishment of the flea market/vending
areas thereon;
2. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as flea
market/vending area shall be marked distinctly, and
that the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall be
used by pedestrians;
3. That the time during which the vending area is to be
used shall be clearly designated;
4. That the use of the vending areas shall be temporary
and shall be closed once the reclaimed areas are
developed and donated by the Public Estate Authority.
•
•
By virtue of this Paranaque Mayor Ferrer was authorized
to enter into a contract to any service cooperative for the
establishment, operation, maintenance and management
of flea market and/or vending areas. Because of this
purpose, respondent Palanyag entered into an agreement
with the municipality of Paranaque with the obligation to
remit dues to the treasury. Consequently, market stalls
were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets.
October 16, 1990, petitioner Brig. General Macasiano
wrote a letter to respondent Palanyag giving the latter ten
(10) days to discontinue the flea market; otherwise, the
market stalls shall be dismantled.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
The Executive Order issued by acting Mayor Robles
authorizing the use of Heroes del '96 Street as a vending
area for stallholders who were granted licenses by the city
government contravenes the general law that
reserves city streets and roads for public use.
•
The LGC provision which gives authority to local
government units to close roads and other similar public
places should be read and interpreted in accordance with
basic principles already established by law. Since there
seems to be no limitation to this, the SC referred to
the NCC on properties of public dominion (Art 424).
•
Article 424 lays down the basic principle that properties of
public domain devoted to public use and made available to
the public in general are outside the commerce of man and
cannot be disposed or leased by the local government unit
to private persons.
•
Aside from the requirement of due process, the closure
of the road should be for the sole purpose of
withdrawing the road or other public property from
public use when circumstances show that such property is
no longer intended or necessary for public use or public
service.
•
When it is already withdrawn from public use, the
property becomes patrimonial property of the local
government unit concerned. It is only then that
respondent municipality can use or convey them for
any purpose for which other real property belonging
to the local unit concerned might lawfully used or
conveyed.
•
Those roads and streets which are available to the public
in general and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still
considered public property devoted to public use.
•
In such case, the local government has no power to
use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease
it to private persons. Hence the ordinance is null and
void.
•
•
Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles
A portion of land, sought to be registered, was declared,
through law, an abandoned road. The lot was awarded to
the petitioner for being the highest bidder.
The Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to
dismiss the application on the ground that the property
sought to be registered being a public road intended for
public use is considered part of the public domain and
therefore outside the commerce of man.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
Revised Charter of Cebu, under section 31, provides that
the City Council shall have the power to close any city
road, street or alley, etc, withdrawn from public servitude,
may be used or conveyed for any purpose.
•
It is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is
empowered to close a city road or street. Such power
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is discretionary and will not ordinarily be controlled or
interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse
or fraud or collusion.
It follows that such withdrawn portion becomes
patrimonial property which can be the object of an
ordinary contract.
•
Patrimonial property
•
Property of the State owned by it in its private or
proprietary capacity, i.e., the property is not intended for
public use.
•
•
Comparison: Macasiano and Cebu Oxygen
•
Macasiano – Lease; gigamit paman ang property
pagclose sa road; there is a built-in limitation; When the
ordinance/closure was effected, the road was still being
actually used by the public;
•
Cebu Oxygen – Sale; There is already an abandonment
of property; the road was no longer used by the public;
the resolution seems to be only confirmatory of the state
of the property.
•
But if the reality is that it is actually used by the public,
you cannot change the reality just because you have the
power to close.
•
Atty. Gravador: “I would assume that the determination of
the reality is subject to judicial review if there is grave
abuse of discretion.”
•
Note: The question on the existence of the authority to
close is not an issue in both cases. In both cases, the LGU
was the authority.
•
•
•
What if council closes a road on the sole basis that in
their judgment it is needed for public service? Can they
do that? – or close then they will sell – on the basis of
their power to close?
•
Ofcourse it can close (provided it meets certain
requirements), but it cannot sell.
•
What shall be doneso that the LGU can sell?
➢ There has to be a specific authority. – At present there
was none.
•
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•
Favis vs. City of Baguio (not in syllabus)
Guidelines on what are the considerations that shall be
taken by the Municipality who decides to close the street.
The material factors which a municipality must consider in
deliberating upon the advisability of closing a street are:
"the topography of the property surrounding the street in
the light of ingress and egress to other streets; the
relationship of the street in the road system throughout
the subdivision; the problem posed by the dead end' of the
street; the width of the street, the cost of rebuilding and
maintaining the street as contrasted to its ultimate value
to those visiting the subdivision; and whether the closing
of the street would cut off any property owners from
access to a street.”
Laurel vs. Garcia
These two (2) petitions for prohibition seek to enjoin
respondents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale
of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5Chrome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan. The latter case also,
prays for a writ of mandamus to fully disclose to the public
the basis of their decision to push through with the sale of
the Roppongi property.
The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties
in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the
Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan, the
Roppongi property.
The said property was acquired from the Japanese
government through Reparations Contract No. 300. It
consists of the land and building for the Chancery of the
Philippine Embassy.
As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy
until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai when the
Roppongi building needed major repairs.
President Aquino created a committee to study the
disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties
in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan.
The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens
or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and
services in the event of sale, lease or disposition.
The government adds that even assuming for the sake of
argument that the Civil Code is applicable, the Roppongi
property has ceased to become property of public
dominion. It has become patrimonial property because it
has not been used for public service or for diplomatic
purposes for over thirteen (13) years now (Citing Article
422, Civil Code) and because the intention by the
Executive Department and the Congress to convert it to
private use has been manifested by overt acts, such as,
among others; (1) the transfer of the Philippine Embassy
to Nampeidai; (2) the issuance of administrative orders for
the possibility of alienating the four government properties
in Japan; (3) the issuance of Executive Order No. 296; (4)
the enactment by the Congress of Rep. Act No. 6657 [the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] on June 10, 1988
which contains a provision stating that funds may be
taken from the sale of Philippine properties in foreign
countries; (5) the holding of the public bidding of the
Roppongi property but which failed; (6) the deferment by
the Senate in Resolution No. 55 of the bidding to a future
date; thus an acknowledgment by the Senate of the
government's intention to remove the Roppongi property
from the public service purpose; and (7) the resolution of
this Court dismissing the petition in Ojeda v. Bidding
Committee, et al., G.R. No. 87478 which sought to enjoin
the second bidding of the Roppongi property scheduled on
March 30, 1989.
Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law) which
provides as one of the sources of funds for its
implementation, the proceeds of the disposition of the
properties of the Government in foreign countries, did not
withdraw the Roppongi property from being classified as
one of public dominion when it mentions Philippine
properties abroad. Section 63 (c) refers to properties
which are alienable and not to those reserved for public
use or service. Rep Act No. 6657, therefore, does not
authorize the Executive Department to sell the Roppongi
property. It merely enumerates possible sources of future
funding to augment (as and when needed) the Agrarian
Reform Fund created under Executive Order No. 299.
Obviously, any property outside of the commerce of man
cannot be tapped as a source of funds.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
Property is classified under Art 420 as property belonging
to the State and intended for some public service.
•
The fact that it has not been used for actual Embassy
service does not automatically convert it to
patrimonial property. Such conversion happens only
if property is withdrawn from public use, through an
abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi
property for public service and to make it patrimonial
property. Abandonment must be a certain and
positive act based on correct legal premises.
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•
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The EO does not declare that the properties lost their
public character, merely intending the properties to be
made available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone, in
case of sale, lease or other disposition. Furthermore, it is
based on the wrong premise that the Japan properties can
be sold to end-users, when in fact it cannot.
Neither does the CARP Law reclassify the properties into
patrimonial properties, merely stating that sources of
funds for its implementation be sourced from proceeds of
the disposition of the Government in foreign countries, but
not that the Roppongi property be withdrawn from being
classified as a property of public dominion.
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property
of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such
conveyance must be authorized and approved by a
law enacted by the Congress.
It requires executive and legislative concurrence. It is
indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so
much because of the inflated prices fetched by real
property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic
value to all Filipinos, veterans and civilians alike.
Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will
eventually be sold is a policy determination where
both the President and Congress must concur.
Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws
on conversion and disposition of property of public
dominion must be faithfully followed.
There is a need for a law or formal declaration to
withdraw the Roppongi property from public domain
to make it alienable and a need for legislative
authority to allow the sale of the property.
Separate Opinion: SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
•
In holding that there is "a need for a law or formal
declaration to withdraw the Roppongi property from public
domain to make it alienable and a land for legislative
authority to allow the sale of the property," the majority
lays stress to the fact that: (1) An affirmative act —
executive or legislative - is necessary to reclassify property
of the public dominion, and (2) a legislative decree is
required to make it alienable.
•
It also clears the uncertainties brought about by earlier
interpretations that the nature of property — whether
public or patrimonial — is predicated on the manner it is
actually used, or not used, and in the same breath,
repudiates the Government's position that the continuous
non-use of "Roppongi", among other arguments, for
"diplomatic purposes", has turned it into State patrimonial
property.
Note:
•
The principles on the property of public dominion are no
longer applicable if the status of the property is
patrimonial.
•
Laurel vs. Garcia case is the authority for the view that for
there has to be a conversion from public dominion status
to patrimonial status, there has to be an explicit act.
There’s no such thing as implied conversion of property.
Note on the explicit acts:
1. Can only be done by the Executive through the President
in cases where he is authorized by law; and
2. The Legislative.
The Judiciary has no business in conversion of property.
•
MIAA vs. CA
The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Complex in
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•
•
•
•
Parañaque City under Executive Order No. 903 (MIAA
Charter), as amended. As such operator, it administers the
land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA
Complex.
In March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061 to the effect that
the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) withdrew the
exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under
Section 21 of its Charter. Therefore, MIAA was held to be
delinquent in paying its taxes.
Thus, MIAA paid some of the real estate tax already due.
In June 2001, it received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax
Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the taxable
years 1992 to 2001. The City Treasurer subsequently
issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the airport
lands and buildings.
Hence, MIAA filed this petition for review, pointing out that
it is exempt from real estate tax under Sec. 21 of its
charter and Sec. 234 of the LGC. It invokes the principle
that the government cannot tax itself as a justification for
exemption, since the airport lands and buildings, being
devoted to public use and public service, are owned by the
Republic of the Philippines.
On the other hand, the City of Parañaque invokes Sec. 193
of the LGC, which expressly withdrew the tax exemption
privileges
of
government-owned
and
controlled
corporations (GOCC) upon the effectivity of the LGC.
It asserts that an international airport is not among the
exceptions mentioned in the said law. Meanwhile, the City
of Parañaque posted and published notices announcing the
public auction sale of the airport lands and buildings. In
the afternoon before the scheduled public auction, MIAA
applied with the Court for the issuance of a TRO to restrain
the auction sale. The Court issued a TRO on the day of the
auction sale, however, the same was received only by the
City of Parañaque three hours after the sale.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
The airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from
real estate tax imposed by local governments. Sec. 243(a)
of the LGC exempts from real estate tax any real property
owned by the Republic of the Philippines. This exemption
should be read in relation with Sec. 133(o) of the LGC,
which provides that the exercise of the taxing powers of
local governments shall not extend to the levy of taxes,
fees or charges of any kind on the National Government,
its agencies and instrumentalities.
•
These provisions recognize the basic principle that local
governments cannot tax the national government, which
historically merely delegated to local governments the
power to tax.
•
The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must
be clear language in the law imposing the tax. This rule
applies with greater force when local governments seek to
tax national government instrumentalities. Moreover, a
tax exemption is construed liberally in favor of national
government instrumentalities.
•
MIAA is not a GOCC, but an instrumentality of the
government. It is owned by the state. The LGU
cannot tax the state.
•
The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the
properties. MIAA itself is owned solely by the Republic. At
any time, the President can transfer back to the Republic
title to the airport lands and buildings without the Republic
paying MIAA any consideration.
•
As long as the airport lands and buildings are
reserved for public use, their ownership remains
with the State. Unless the President issues a
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proclamation withdrawing these properties from public
use, they remain properties of public dominion. As such,
they are inalienable, hence, they are not subject to levy
on execution or foreclosure sale, and they are exempt from
real estate tax.
However, portions of the airport lands and buildings
that MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt
from real estate tax. In such a case, MIAA has granted
the beneficial use of such portions for a consideration to a
taxable person.
Comments:
•
The real owner there is the Republic/State. LGU cannot
tax the State.
•
It’s not correct to say that you cannot tax a government
instrumentality, the moment that it can be established that
a property registered for business purposes is being
actually used by a taxable person, you can be held
liable for tax.
•
•
•
•
PPA vs. City of Iloilo
PPA is created und PD 857 and under Section 25 of its
charter, PPA is exempted from paying real property tax.
PPA is engaged in the business of arrastre and stevedoring
and leasing of real estate. Also, it owns a warehouse for
its operation.
On June 11, 1984, PD 1931 withdrew all tax exemptions
privileges granted to GOCC. Thus, the city of Iloilo seeks
to collect from PPA business tax and real property tax from
the last quarter of 1984 up to the year 1986.
However, PPA claims the ff:
➢ The City of Iloilo cannot collect real property taxes
from PPA because the warehouse is part of the port.
Under Sec 420 of Civil Code, ports are part of public
dominion.
➢ PPA is not subject to business tax because they are
not engaged in business. Their leasing of its property
was not motivated by profit but duly to manage and
control port operations.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
The records show that the theory of petitioner before the
trial court was different from that of the present petition.
Initially, it argued that as a government-owned
corporation, it is exempt from paying real property taxes
by virtue of its specific exemption in its charter, Section 40
of the Real Property Tax Code and Executive Order No. 93.
•
Subsequently, in the memorandum it filed with the trial
court, it omitted its earlier argument and changed its
theory by alleging that it is a government instrumentality,
which, according to applicable jurisprudence, may not be
taxed by the local government.
•
PPA cannot claim that their warehouse is a public
dominion because such theory is different from the
theory they adopted and decided by the lower court.
•
Thus, PPA is bound by its admission of ownership of the
warehouse. It is therefore liable to pay real property tax.
•
Also, under Sec 420 of the CC, the ports mentioned are
those “constructed by the state”. Thus, PPA should prove
that its port was constructed by the state in order to
conclude that such property is a public dominion. However,
PPA failed to prove such.
•
Also, granting that its port is a public dominion, its
warehouse which they constructed is considered to be an
improvement. And improvement s made by the occupants
is not exempted from payment of tax.
•
On their second claim, PPA is liable for business tax for the
lease of their buildings to private corporations. During pre-
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•
•
•
•
•
trial, they did not refute the claims of the city of Iloilo that
they are engaged in business nor did they present proof of
exemption from tax.
PPA admitted that their act of leasing is not necessarily for
government function of administering ports but for
convenience. Therefore, any income or profit
generated by the entity, even without any intention
of realizing profit is still subject to business tax.
What matters is that PPA leased its properties to
private entities and from which PPA earned
substantial income.
Philippine Fisheries Development Authorities vs CA
The Ministry of Public Works and Highways reclaimed from
the sea a 21-hectare parcel of land in Barangay Tanza,
Iloilo City, and constructed thereon the IFPC, consisting of
breakwater, a landing quay, a refrigeration building, a
market hall, a municipal shed, an administration building,
a water and fuel oil supply system and other port related
facilities and machineries.
Upon its completion, the Ministry of Public Works and
Highways turned over IFPC to the Authority, pursuant to
Section 11 of PD 977, which places fishing port complexes
and related facilities under the governance and operation
of the Authority.
Notwithstanding said turn over, title to the land and
buildings of the IFPC remained with the Republic. The
Authority thereafter leased portions of IFPC to private
firms and individuals engaged in fishing related
businesses.
Sometime in May 1988, the City of Iloilo assessed
the entire IFPC for real property taxes. The assessment
remained unpaid until the alleged total tax delinquency of
the Authority for the fiscal years 1988 and 1989 amounted
to P5,057,349.67, inclusive of penalties and interests.
To satisfy the tax delinquency, the City of Iloilo scheduled
on August 30, 1990, the sale at public auction of the IFPC.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
For an entity to be considered as a GOCC, it must
either be organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation. (see below)
•
The Authority is not a GOCC but a national government
instrumentality which is defined as an agency of the
national government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter.
•
When the law vests in a government instrumentality
corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a
corporation. Unless the government instrumentality
is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it
remains a government instrumentality exercising
not only governmental but also corporate powers.
•
By express mandate of the Local Government Code, LGUs
cannot impose any kind of tax on national
government, its agencies and instrumentalities,
unless otherwise provided in this Code as stated in
the saving clause of Section 133.
•
The Iloilo fishing port which was constructed by the State
for public use and/or public service falls within the term
port in the aforecited provision.
•
Being a property of public dominion the same cannot
be subject to execution or foreclosure sale. In like
manner, the reclaimed land on which the IFPC is built
cannot be the object of a private or public sale without
Congressional authorization.
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Whether there are improvements in the fishing
port complex that should not be construed to be
embraced within the term port, involves evidentiary
matters that cannot be addressed in the present case.
In sum, the Court finds that the Authority is an
instrumentality of the national government, hence, it is
liable to pay real property taxes assessed by the City
of Iloilo on the IFPC only with respect to those
portions which are leased to private entities.
Notwithstanding said tax delinquency on the leased
portions of the IFPC, the latter or any part thereof,
being a property of public domain, cannot be sold at
public auction. This means that the City of Iloilo has
to satisfy the tax delinquency through means other
than the sale at public auction of the IFPC.
Comments:
•
Suability and liability are two different distinct entities. You
will be suable doesn’t mean that you’re liable. The principle
is that the waiver is only good up to proceedings before
the execution.
•
A property of public dominion cannot be subject to
execution or foreclosure sale.
Public Property cannot be subject to attachment and
execution Attachment and Execution
•
In a Civil Case involving Damages – Writ of Execution is
issued after the final judgment; to be able to enforce
whatever monetary judgment that maybe rendered in
favor of the plaintiff.
•
Example: When the government enters into a contract
with a private party. The government will not pay the
private party, the latter can sue the government.
➢ It is possible that the private party can win the case
against the former. But the problem is the
enforceability of the execution or the judgment.
➢ You cannot just go to the sheriff and make him levi
the city hall, city ambulance, or all cash deposits in
banks of the government, etc. It cannot be done
because they are property of public dominion.
➢ What will you do to satisfy the execution or
judgment? You can go the local council to enact an
ordinance to appropriate funds for you.
•
How about SRP? Can it be executed? YES, SRP is already
patrimonial.
•
RATIONALE: Property of public dominion could not be
attached and be executed because they are for public
service and public use.
To be a GOCC, it must be either a stock or non-stock
corporation:
•
Stock corporation
➢ Capital Stock is divided into shares and
➢ Authorized to distribute to the holders of such shared
dividends
•
Non-stock corporation
➢ Must have members
➢ Cannot distribute any part of their income to their
members.
Government Entities and Government Corporations
•
If a property is registered to the Government
Corporation, but it is not organized as stock or nonstock (not a GOCC), it is just a mere government
instrumentality, WHAT IS THE EFFECT?
➢ The property still belongs to the state, instrumentality
of government, IT CANNOT BE DISPOSED OF.
➢ If there is this real tax assessment, it is exempted.
•
•
•
What if this entity is engaged in business? Just like
the case of PPA where it owned warehouses that
were rented out by private businessmen. Is it
correct for the assessor to tax those warehouses
which are devoted to business?
➢ YES. Now if the PPA cannot pay those taxes, what
shall be done to those warehouses? Can they be
levied? NO.
SC held that PFDA, although created by a charter, it is not
a GOCC because this is not organized as a stock or nonstock corporation. Therefore, it is just a government
instrumentality. Warehouse cannot be levied.
If instrumentality of government – even if these properties
are registered in the name of its entities, the real owner is
the state. – NOT A SUBJECT TO LEVY AND EXECUTION
➢ So how shall we enforce the liabilities? From its
income!
Comments:
•
Ang problema ani kung sa charter, it’s not an income of
PPA but to be remitted to the National Government.
•
Remedy: In the Appropriation Act of PPA – attach the
execution here.
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Republic of the Phils., represented by the Philippine
Reclamation Authority (PRA) v. City of Parañaque
The Philippine Reclamation Authority reclaimed several
portions of the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay,
including those located in Parañaque City.
In 2003, Parañaque City Treasurer Liberato Carabeo
issued Warrants of Levy on PRA’s reclaimed properties
based on an assessment for delinquent real property
taxes.
In turn, PRA filed a petition for prohibition with a request
not to proceed with the public auction of the subject
reclaimed properties.
However, the RTC rendered its decision dismissing PRA’s
petition and ruled that PRA was not exempt from payment
of real property taxes, it being a GOCC.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
Reclaimed lands remain public lands and form part of the
public domain, owned by the State and, therefore, exempt
from payment of real estate taxes.
•
Yes, the subject lands are reclaimed lands, specifically
portions of the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay.
•
Reclaimed lands are reserved lands for public use
and are properties of public dominion.
•
The ownership of such lands remains with the State
unless they are withdrawn by law or presidential
proclamation from public use.
•
Properties of public dominion are not subject to execution
or foreclosure sale. The assessment, levy and foreclosure
made on the subject reclaimed lands are without basis.
•
Furthermore, foreshore and submerged areas irrefutably
belonged to the public domain and were inalienable unless
reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to disposition
and further declared no longer needed for public service.
•
The fact that alienable lands of the public domain
were transferred to the PRA and issued land patents
or certificates of title in PRA’s name did not
automatically make such lands private.
•
Jean Tan vs. RP
Tan and Co. (hereafter ‘registrants’) filed an application for
land registration over a parcel of land allegedly purchased
from Gatdula, alleging that they and their predecessorsin-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive
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possession of the property as owner for more than 30
years.
They rely on the following: (1) testimony of their attorneyin-fact on the length of possession of their predecessorsin-interest, (2) testimony of a caretaker who witnessed the
sale and attested to the length of possession of their
predecessors-in-interest, (3) testimony of a clerk in the
Docket Division of the Land Registration Authority finding
no issue with the registration, (4) tax declarations dating
from 1961 under the names of their predecessors-ininterest, (5) a single tax declaration dated 2003 under the
registrants, (6) a Sangunniang Bayan resolution dated
1998 reclassifying several lots, including the property,
from agricultural to residential/commercial, (7) a DARCO
Conversion order dated 2000 also converting the same to
residential/commercial, and (8) a certification by the DENR
dated 2002 stating that the area falls within the alienable
and disposable land of the town.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
Based on the evidence presented, this express declaration
of the property as patrimonial is in the DARCO Conversion
order which was issued by the DAR only on July 13, 2000,
which means that the counting of the thirty (30)year prescriptive period for purposes of acquiring
ownership of a public land under Section 14(2) can
only start from such date.
•
Before the property was declared patrimonial by
virtue of such conversion order, it cannot be
acquired by prescription.
•
However, this means that the period of acquisitive
prescription tolls only from 2000.
•
The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession
must prove the presence of the elements of acquisitive
possession using competent evidence.
•
Tax declarations are not by themselves competent
evidence of acquisitive prescription; they must be
supported by competent evidence of acts of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession.
•
The tax declarations presented in this case were precisely
of the kind, with only 11 tax payments out of the 40 years
that the registrants rely upon for their period of
possession.
•
Furthermore, the testimonial evidence presented only
mentioned conclusions of law-- they merely said that there
was possession for over 30 years, without stating any
specific acts of ownership or dominion performed during
that period.
Woodridge School, Inc., and Miguela Jimenez-Javier vs.
ARB Construction Co., Inc.
•
Woodridge School is the usufructuary of a parcel of land in
the name of spouses Ernesto T. Matugas and Filomena U.
Matugas. Its co-petitioner, Miguela Jimenez–Javier, is the
registered owner of the adjacent lot to that of Woodridge.
•
Respondent ARB Construction is the owner and developer
of Soldiers Hills Subdivision in Bacoor, Cavite, which is
composed of four phases. Phase 1 of the subdivision was
already accessible from the Marcos Alvarez Avenue. To
provide the same accessibility to the residents of Phase II
of the subdivision, ARB constructed the disputed road to
link the two phases.
•
Petitioners’ properties sit right in the middle of several
estates. They offered to pay ARB P50,000 as indemnity for
the use of the road.
•
ARB refused the offer and fenced the perimeter of the road
fronting the properties of petitioners, thus, cutting off
petitioners’ access to and from the public highway.
•
•
•
•
•
•
After failing to settle the matter amicably, petitioners
jointly filed a complaint in the RTC to enjoin ARB from
depriving them of the use of the disputed subdivision road
and to seek a compulsory right of way after payment of
proper indemnity.
The RTC rendered its decision in favor of petitioners relying
on the ruling of the Supreme Court in White Plains
Association, Inc. vs. Legaspi (193 SCRA 765) stating that
the government automatically becomes the owner of the
subdivisions’ roads the moment the subdivision plan is
approved, and thus is open to public use without any need
for compensation.
The CA reversed the Trial Court’s decision and stating that
the ruling of the Supreme Court in the 1991 case of White
Plains Subdivision is not applicable as it was not similarly
situated as in the present case.
However, the CA ruled that a compulsory right of way
exists in favor of petitioners as there is no other existing
adequate outlet to and from petitioners’ properties to the
Marcos Alvarez Avenue other than the subject existing
road lot belonging to ARB. It also awarded P500,000 to
ARB as compensation for the wear and tear that
petitioners’ use of the road would contribute to.
The petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court
arguing that ARB is not entitled to be paid any indemnity
since the contested road lot is a property of public
dominion pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code because
the disputed road falls under the category of “others of
similar character” which is the last clause of Article 420
(1). Hence, it is a property of public dominion which can
be used by the general public without need for
compensation.
Petitioners also assert that their initial offer of P50,000
should be sufficient compensation for the right of way.
Further, they should not be held accountable for the
increase in the value of the property since the delay was
attributable to the stubborn refusal of ARB to accept their
offer.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
The Court held that the road lots in a private
subdivision are private property.
•
The use of the subdivision roads by the general public does
not strip it of its private character. The road is not
converted into public property by mere tolerance of
the subdivision owner of the public's passage
through it.
•
The local government should first acquire them by
donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to
be utilized as a public road.
•
In the present case, since no donation has been made in
favor of any local government and the title to the road lot
is still registered in the name of ARB, the disputed
property remains private.
•
In order to be entitled to a legal easement of right of way,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the dominant
estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of
proper indemnity; (3) The isolation was not due to acts of
the proprietor of the dominant estate and; (4) the right of
way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate. In the present case, all of the requisites are
present except for number two.
•
The appellate and trial courts found that the properties of
petitioners are enclosed by other estates without any
adequate access to a public highway except the subject
road lot which leads to Marcos Alvarez Avenue.
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•
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Although it was shown that the shortest distance from the
properties to the highway is toward the east across a
creek, this alternative route does not provide an adequate
outlet for the students of the proposed school.
The Civil Code categorically provides for the measure by
which the proper indemnity may be computed. Under
Article 649, paragraph 2, it is stated: “Should this
easement be established in such a manner that its use may
be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate,
establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall
consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount
of the damage caused to the servient estate.”
The Supreme Court ordered the remand of the case to
the trial court for the reception of evidence and
determination of the limits of the property to be covered
by the easement, the proper indemnity to be paid and the
respective contributions of petitioners.
Properties of Public Dominion of Similar Character (Art
420)
1. Public streams, river channels, creeks, river beds
2. Accretions to the shores of the sea by action of the water
3. Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them
4. Lands that disappeared into the sea by natural erosion due
to the ebb and flow of the tide
5. Canals constructed on private lands
6. Foreshore lands when the sea moved toward and estate
and the tide invaded it
7. Lot on which stairways were built for the use of people as
passageway to the highway
Comments:
•
There are properties of public dominion in Art. 420 that
belong to other character:
➢ Alluvial deposits that is formed by movements of the
sea
➢ Creek in Maneclang Case
➢ Foreshore lot
➢ Public Plaza in Roxas Case
➢ RECLAMATIONS – there are two cases here
FORESHORE LANDS
•
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the
foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of
the "lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other
natural resources" and consequently "owned by the
State."
•
As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be
alienated," unless they are classified as "agricultural lands"
of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas
by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural
resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain” (See: FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY G.R. No. 133250 July 9,
2002)
•
Part of the land which is between high and low water and
left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. It is a strip of
land that lies between the high and low water marks and
is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the
tide.
•
A foreshore land or reclaimed lands are property of public
dominion.
•
When you place filling materials to the reclaimed lands,
still a property of public dominion. Mere reclamation will
not make that a patrimonial property.
Is it possible for the reclaimed lands could be alienated?
•
Yes.
Legal Step/s for the Reclaimed Lands to be alienated
1. The President will classify the property as alienated and
disposable land.
Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority (PEA) and Amari
Coastal Bay Development Corporation
•
PEA entered into a joint venture agreement with AMARI
Corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Under the
JVA, PEA would later transfer to AMARI the reclaimed lands
and foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay.
•
Now, Frank Chavez as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition
for Mandamus assailing the sale to AMARI of lands of the
public domain as a blatant violation the Constitution.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
Foreshore and submerged areas indisputably belong to the
public domain and are inalienable unless reclaimed,
classified as alienable lands open to disposition, and
further declared no longer needed for public service.
•
Under the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and
submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the “lands of
the public domain, waters x x x and other natural
resources” and consequently “owned by the State.” As
such, foreshore and submerged areas “shall not be
alienated,” unless reclaimed.
•
However, the mere reclamation of these areas does
not convert these inalienable natural resources of
the State into alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain.
•
There must be a law or presidential proclamation
officially classifying these reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable and open to disposition or
concession.
•
Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as
alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for
some public or quasi-public use.
•
Once reclaimed and transformed into public
agricultural lands, the government may then
officially classify these lands as alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition.
•
Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no
longer needed for public service. Only then can these
reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain and within the commerce of
man.
•
•
•
•
Francisco I. Chavez vs. National Housing Authority
et.al. G.R. No. 164527 August 15, 2007
On March 19, 1993, the National Housing Authority (NHA)
and R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement (JVA) for the development of the Smokey
Mountain dumpsite and reclamation area to be converted
into a low-cost medium rise housing complex and
industrial/commercial site.
The Project will involve 79 hectares of reclaimed land (it
was initially 40 hectares but the JVA was amended). The
JVA also provides that as part of the consideration for the
Project, NHA will convey a portion of the reclaimed lands
to RBI.
The reclamation of the area was made; and subsequently,
Special Patents were issued conveying the reclaimed land
to NHA.
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco I.
Chavez filed this Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus
seeking to declare NULL and VOID the Joint Venture
Agreement (JVA) and the Smokey Mountain Development
and Reclamation Project, and all other agreements in
relation thereto, for being
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Supreme Court Ruling
•
When Proclamations Nos. 39 (placed the lands under the
administration and disposition of the NHA) and 465
(increased the reclamation area from 40 hectares to 79
hectares) were issued, the inalienable lands covered
by said proclamations were converted to alienable
and disposable lands of public domain.
•
Furthermore, when the titles to such reclaimed lands were
transferred to the NHA, said alienable and disposable lands
of public domain were automatically classified as lands of
the private domain or patrimonial properties of the State.
•
The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not
converted to patrimonial land once transferred to
NHA, then it would be useless to transfer it to the
NHA since it will not be able to transfer such lands
to qualified entities and thus, it will not achieve its
purpose.
•
The DENR exercises exclusive jurisdiction on the
management and disposition of all lands of the public
domain. As such, it decides whether areas, like foreshore
or submerged lands, should be reclaimed or not and
whether they should be classified as alienable and
disposable.
•
In this case, when the President approved and ordered the
development of a housing project with the corresponding
reclamation work, making DENR a member of the EXECOM
(committee tasked to implement the project), the required
authorization from the DENR to reclaim land can be
deemed satisfied. Also, the issuance of the Environmental
Compliance Certificates by the DENR shows its ratification
of the reclamation project.
Compare: Chavez vs. PEA; Chaves vs. NHA, RBI
•
In PEA, there was no law or presidential proclamation
classifying the lands to be reclaimed as alienable and
disposal lands of public domain.
•
In the NHA, RBI case, MO 415 of former President Aquino
and Proclamation No. 39 of then President Ramos, coupled
with Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598, classified
the reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable;
•
In PEA, the lands to be reclaimed or already reclaimed
were transferred to PEA, a government entity tasked to
dispose of public lands under Executive Order No. (EO)
525.
•
In the NHA, RBI case, the reclaimed lands were transferred
to NHA, a government entity NOT tasked to dispose of
public land and therefore said alienable lands were
converted to patrimonial lands upon their transfer to NHA.
What’s the difference between the transfer to PEA and
transfer to NHA?
•
Transfer to PEA – PEA is tasked to hold lands of public
domain, not an end user agency. The transfer of the
reclaimed lands in its name would not convert the land into
patrimonial. It would remain as lands of public domain,
alienable and disposable, but not yet patrimonial.
•
Transfer to NHA – NHA is an end user agency. Transfer
thereof converts the land into patrimonial.
Alienable and disposable vs Patrimonial
•
Alienable and Disposable – cannot be transferred to a
corporation, it can only be transferred to an individual.
•
Patrimonial – there is no prohibition to whom it would be
transferred
End User Agency
•
They are the main beneficiaries, sila ang mu gamit.
•
If we say Reclaimed Lands – dli man ang PEA ang mugamit
•
•
“SILA ANG MUGAMIT” – why is it said that they will be the
one to use the land when in fact, it will be distributed to
the landless?
View this from the mandate of the agency
concerned. The mandate of the agency is to distribute
lands to the qualified beneficiaries.
SRP Cebu
•
Relating this to SRP in Cebu, Cebu City is an end user
agency.
•
Reclaimed Land – a land formerly covered by water filled
up with soil.
•
Before it can be transferred, it must be reclassified by the
President pursuant to his authority under CA 141
•
When reclassified, it’ll be alienable and disposable.
•
But even if it is alienable and disposable, that is not
equivalent that the land is patrimonial, the
constitutional prohibition still applies.
How do we make constitutional prohibition not
applicable?
•
Congress may declare it no longer needed for public use
or public service
•
Implied Conversion into Patrimonial – issuing of
patent in favor of an end user agency (Chavez vs NHA
case)
•
On the basis of the patent, certificate of title will be issued
to this end user agency
•
If it will be patrimonial already, the prohibition no
longer applies.
Comments:
•
SC – The property in the hands of NHA has become
patrimonial.
•
In effect, Chavez vs. NHA case is authority for the
view that there can be such an implied conversion.
•
The reclaimed lands were transferred to NHA (Corporation)
for purposes of implementing a program of national
housing authority.
•
SC’s Ruling: No violation of the Constitution on the
prohibition of transfer to a private corporation.
•
From NHA, a portion of the property it’d be transferred to
the private entity reclaimed the lands. A portion of the
reclaimed lands will be given to that private contractor.
•
If you read the case, there’s no explicit act there. The
only thing that the Executive did was to issue a
special patent to the NHA, and on the basis of that
special patent issued to the NHA, it was issued a
certificate of title. This act of issuance of the patent and
subsequent issuance of certificate of title was taken to
mean as conversion already of a property of public
dominion to patrimonial. (NO EXPLICIT ACT)
•
The issuance of the patent itself does not make it a
patrimonial property, instead it become alienable
and disposable. But when a certificate of title was
issued based on the patent it becomes now a
patrimonial property.
Q: What is the effect if the land given to NHA for which
the certificate of title was already issued?
•
The land that became patrimonial, it has a mere
characteristic of a private land, therefore it can now be
sold to private corporation.
•
In other words, the constitutional prohibition will no longer
apply because that provision only applies when the land is
alienable and disposable.
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Comparison (Doctrines on Explicit Act):
•
Laurel vs. Garcia is the controlling authority for the view
that for there has to be a conversion from public dominion
status to patrimonial status, there has to be an explicit
act. There is no such thing as implied conversion of
property.
•
In Chavez vs. NHA – The issue on implied conversion was
not raised as an issue in this case.
ESTOPPEL (AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT)
•
No estoppel can be held against the Government.
•
Relatedly, no prescription can run against
Government.
•
the
•
•
•
•
•
Land Bank vs. RP, Director of Lands
On September 26, 1969, an original certificate of title was
issue in favor of Bugayong, which emanated from a sales
patent issued in Bugayong's name on September 22,
1969.
The Original Certificate of Title was cancelled and was
replaced by 4 transfer certificates of title, all in the name
of Bugayong. Bugayong then sold all 4 lots to different
people.
One of the lots was sold to the spouses Du. Afterwards,
Du divided the land into 2 lots. One of the lots was sold to
Lourdes Farms, Inc., who then mortgaged the property to
Land Bank of the Philippines.
The validity of the original certificate of title was then
questioned by some residents of the land who filed a
formal petition before the Bureau of Lands (nearly 2
decades after).
Supreme Court Ruling
•
The Bureau of Lands found out that at the time the sales
patent was issued to Bugayong, the land was still classified
as a forest zone; it was declared as alienable and
disposable land only on March 25, 1981.
•
Forest lands cannot be owned by private persons and is
not registrable under the land registration law.
•
Thus, the original certificate of title is invalid as the it was
issued when the land was still classified as a forest zone.
•
The subject land, being a public domain, cannot be
encumbered, attached, or be the subject to levy and sold
at public auction to satisfy a judgment. Hence, the
mortgage agreement is invalid.
Comments:
•
Angelito Bugayong was issued an Original Certificate of
Title through administrative process, and along the years,
it was passed to Lourdes Farms Inc. which mortgaged the
said lot to the Land Bank of the Philippines.
•
Here, the title was issued in an administrative
proceeding instead of a judicial proceeding, and there are
certain restrictions here like the land cannot be
encumbered or alienated within 5 years from the issuance
of the patent.
•
Additionally, in administrative titling, you concede that the
government has title to the land, and that you have to
prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
•
Before that, said lot was classified as marshy and
underwater during high tide and that it was used to be a
portion of a dry riverbed near the mouth of Davao River.
So, a Certificate of Title was issued.
•
This said land underwent several transactions but last of
which would be the mortgage to Land Bank which Land
Bank foreclosed and eventually became the owner thereof.
This is where the Republic entered the picture.
•
•
What will you do before you can be issued a title
(judicial process)?
➢ You be ready with your monuments of title
➢ Prepare petition (attach with several documents)
➢ Survey Plan approved by DENR – Land Management
Services
➢ Then there is a hearing where the court will cause the
issuance of a Decree of Registration
➢ Decree of Registration will be issued by the Land
Registration Authority
➢ Then LRA will transmit the decree to Local Registry of
Deeds
➢ LRD will then issue the certificate of title
In Land Bank, the appropriate government agency
responsible for issuing the title committed a mistake
when it issued the sales patent. But can they be held
liable for that mistake?
➢ No, because estoppel cannot be held against the
state.
With the involvement of 4 agencies in the issuance of a
title and legal expenses, isn’t it a height of injustice if later
on the government will just say, THAT TITLE IS VOID?
➢ This is exactly what happened in land bank.
But is it a valid argument that because of the
involvement of 4 agencies, therefore can estoppel be
invoked against the government?
➢ No, because estoppel cannot be invoked against the
government.
➢ Why? Because of the principle of greatest good for
the greatest number.
➢ Ikaw ra man ang mu-suffer, whereas if your title will
be upheld, the general public will suffer. (That’s the
beauty of democracy!)
Why did the Republic of the Philippines enter the picture
in this case?
•
They opposed that such Certificate of Title cannot be
awarded because the lot that was given to Bugayong was
a public domain.
In this case, the Supreme Court still upheld the nullity of
the title because:
•
Said land was still inalienable and disposable since it was
part of public domain at the time it was issued to
Bugayong.
•
The investigation/survey showed that it was part of the
forest zone, marshy land and hence, not alienable and
disposable.
•
Obtaining a certificate of title is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. Title will only confer your ownership. If you
have no ownership in the first place, then there’s nothing
to confer, just like if your title is void.
How about the issue of all the government agencies
participating in the act of donating issuance of title, can
we not take this against the government? Like making a
survey plan, directing issuance of title in your favor, can
we not hold the government in estoppel for these acts?
•
No. Estoppel can only be applied if the property has been
passed to an innocent purchaser.
•
Land Bank was innocent in this case however, it is well
settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers
property of public domain classified as forest or timber or
mineral lands.
•
Any title issued covering non-disposable lots even in the
hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value shall be
cancelled.
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•
•
•
•
•
•
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Estate of Yujuico vs. Republic of the Philippines G.R.
No. 168661 October 26, 2007
Sometime in 1973, one Fermina Castro (Castro) filed an
application for registration and confirmation of her title
over a parcel of land somewhere in Paranaque City with
the RTC having jurisdiction over the same.
The Republic through the OSG filed its respective
opposition.
On 1974, the RTC rendered its decision, declaring Castro
as the true and absolute owner of the parcel of land.
Thereafter, Castro sold the aforementioned lot to Jesus
Yujuico and transferred the ownership of the land.
Subsequently, Yujuico died.
In 2001, the RP, through the OSG, filed a complaint for
annulment and cancellation of title and reversion against
the Heirs of Jesus Yujuico (Heirs), herein petitioners, over
the aforementioned land sold by Castro to Yujuico. The
complaint was filed with the RTC in Paranaque.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of the OSG.
On appeal, the CA reversed, it held that the parcel of land
was of public domain and therefore inalienable.
Now, the Heirs come before the Supreme Court assailing
the decision of the CA. They contend that the remedy of
reversion invoked by the OSG is not the proper remedy.
Hence this petition.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
The lapse of almost three decades in filing the
instant case, the inexplicable lack of action of the
Republic and the injury this would cause constrain
us to rule for petitioners.
•
Equitable estoppel may be invoked against public
authorities when as in this case:
➢ the lot was already alienated to innocent buyers
for value; and
➢ the government did not undertake any act to contest
the title for an unreasonable length of time.
Comments:
•
In this case, the ruling was different from the case of Land
Bank.
•
In this case, the government was held in estoppel from
cancelling the title because the parties innocently acquired
such subject lots from Castro, believing such land was
issued in the legal manner without violating any law.
•
It took 27 years for the government to question such title
and they also entered into an amicable settlement through
PEA.
•
The government, in effect, admitted that Yujuico is the
owner. Hence, there is equitable estoppel.
•
What are the opportunities for you to question the
validity of the title?
➢ To question in court within 1 year after the issuance
of the decree – to file petition for review
➢ Reconveyance
➢ Petition to have the title declared void
•
According to Justice Velasco, the government took
its sweet time, it did not question the title
accordingly.
•
Atty. Gravador: There is this factual element in this
case which is the most decisive
➢ The land in question is not a part of the Manila Bay,
and this was determined through an ocular
inspection and not just a table survey to determine
that such land was actually alienable and disposable.
➢ I am not comfortable with the equitable estoppel
component of the ruling, because it is NOT the
•
number of years of inaction of the government that
is controlling.
➢ Had it been that this land is part of the Manila Bay,
do you think the SC would reach into conclusion that
estoppel can be had against the government?
o
I don’t think so, because when you hold estoppel
against the government that is a very
revolutionary doctrine that would upset almost
all well settled rules on estoppel that There can
be no Estoppel against the government.
The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel in this case is
easily invoked because the land is not truly part of
Manila bay. It is a private land – determined through
an ocular inspection.
Compare: LBP; Yujuico
•
Estoppel is precisely directed towards errors committed by
the government employee.
•
In the case of LBP, the State was firm and consistent in
their position that subject lot is under public dominion.
•
However, in the case of Yujuico, it was not established that
the land was not alienable.
•
Atty. Gravador: Equitable Estoppel is a very
exceptional case only. The general rule is still the
Land Bank of the Philippines.
PRESCRIPTION AS A MODE TO ACQUIRE OWNERSHIP
OVER PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS
•
Prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership through the
lapse of time.
•
Generally, it cannot be invoked against the government.
Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines
•
On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an
application for original registration of title covering a parcel
of land in Silang, Cavite which he purchased from Eduardo
Velazco and that he and his predecessors in interest had
been in open, notorious, exclusive and continuous
possession of the said land for more than 30 years.
•
Velazco, the vendor, alleges that this land was originally
owned by his great-grandfather which passed down to his
four sons. By 1966, one of the sons became the
administrator of the properties which the son of the latter
succeeded his parents. One of the properties therein was
the one sold by the Velazco.
•
They also presented an evidence on the classification of
land to be alienable and disposable by the DENR on March
15, 1982.
•
The RTC ruled in favor with them, but the CA reversed
citing the case of Republic v Hebierto.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
Given the lengthy discussions of questions of law, we
would need to dissect them. The case settles down the
correct interpretation of Sec. 14 (1) and (2) of PD 1529
along with CA 141
1. It should be noted here first that CA 141, particularly
Section 48 (b) vests the right to ownership to those
who satisfy its prerequisites, while PD 1529 Sec 14 (1)
recognizes such rights. One did not repeal the other.
2. It is also recognized that the change of the term
“alienable and disposable” from “agricultural” by PD
1073 did limit the lands to be registered, as we may
take a look at Sec. 9 of CA 141.
•
The Court holds that the correct interpretation for Section
14 (1) is Naguit, not Herbierto, the latter being only an
orbiter dictum to a case where the MTC did not acquire
jurisdiction to settle the original registration. Thus:
1. The requirement of bona fide ownership since June
12, 1945 is satisfied when at the time of the
application, the land is already classified as alienable
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•
•
and disposable. Ad proximum antecedents fiat
relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
2. A contrary ruling with result to absurdity rendering the
presumption of the right nugatory and the provision
inoperative, aggravated by the fact that at the time
the Philippine is still not an independent state.
3. The correct interpretation then is that if the State, at
the time the application is made, has not yet deemed
it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is
still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence,
the need to preserve its ownership in the State
irrespective of the length of adverse possession even
if in good faith. If the reverse is true, then there is
already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
The Court rules that the interpretation for Sec 14 (2)
requires a mix of interpretation of Art. 1113, Art. 1137,
and Art. 420-422 of the New Civil Code.
1. It is well settled, per Art. 1113, that only objects
within the commerce of men and the patrimonial
property of the State can be subject to acquisitive or
extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
2. It is also clear that in Arts. 420-422, the property of
public dominion when no longer in use, is converted
into patrimonial property, if and only if, as held in
Ignacio vs. Director of Lands or Laurel vs. Garcia,
there is a positive act of the executive or
legislative declaring lands to be such.
3. Hence, combining both rulings, it is clear that only
when there is a positive act, regardless if the land was
classified as alienable and disposable, that the land
sought to be registered, can be acquired through
prescription.
Applying to the case at bar:
1. Sec. 14 (1) is unsatisfied as the earliest tax
declarations presented was 1948. No other
substantive evidence was presented.
2. Sec. 14 (2) is also unsatisfied as the subject property
was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there
is no competent evidence that is no longer intended
for public use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the
Civil Code. The classification of the subject property
as alienable and disposable land of the public domain
does not change its status as property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus,
it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription
Comments:
•
Can Public agricultural lands be alienated? Yes.
•
Can public agricultural lands be acquired through
prescription? No.
•
But why is it that the Constitution says that Public
Agricultural land maybe alienated and disposed of? In fact,
there is this judicial affirmation of title if you can prove
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945.
•
How do you reconcile this with the general rule that
prescription cannot be invoked against government?
•
When you invoke June 12, 1945, is that prescription?
•
In Malabanan, the SC made a distinction between
prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership and
that possession and occupation since June 12, 1945.
•
Public domain lands become only patrimonial property not
only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for public
service or the development of national wealth, under
Article 422 of the Civil Code.
•
And only when the property has become patrimonial can
the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of
the public dominion begin to run.
Who classifies land as being alienable and disposable?
1. Legislative through a law.
2. Executive, as authorized by CA 141 (Public Land Act)
The Property Registration Decree has 2 modes of acquiring
ownership over a property:
1. Sec 14 (1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,
or earlier
•
Acquisition through possession and occupation
•
Possession and occupation since June 12, 1945
2.
Sec. 14 (2) Those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.
•
Similar with Sec 48 (b) of CA 141 – Acquisition
through Acquisitive Prescription
•
Prescription of 30 years
Now let’s go back to Agricultural Lands – that it can be
alienated and disposed of if there is a certification that it is
disposable and alienable.
•
Is it the same as making the land patrimonial?
➢ No. To make the land patrimonial, there must, again,
a dispositive act in the part of the government
declaring that the particular land is alienable and
disposable, that it is no longer intended for public use
or public service or for the development of the
national wealth
•
Here, you can acquire through prescription if you can
prove that the lot is already patrimonial property.
•
•
•
In the Malabanan case, they were not able to prove the
Possession since they only have tax declaration dated
1948. They were also not able to prove prescription
because they were not able to present evidence that the
land is declared as not intended for public use or public
service or for the development of national wealth.
The state remains the owner.
There is a remedy here, however it is not in the province
of the court. It is more of a political nature. It is better
address to the legislator or executive.
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF TITLE (OVER LANDS OF
PUBLIC DOMAIN) REQUIRES THAT THERE BE PRIOR
CLASSIFICATION OF LAND AS “ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE”
Sec. of DENR vs. Yap
•
Respondents sought to register parcels of land in Boracay
in their name through a judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. They claimed that they and their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the lands since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
•
They also claim that the 1978 Proclamation No.1801 by
Marcos declared Boracay Island as a tourist zone, and,
thus, alienable.
•
Another party composed of several landowners in Boracay
also challenged the validity of Proclamation No. 1064
issued by Pres. Gloria Arroyo classifying parts of Boracay
into forest and agricultural land on the ground that such
proclamation infringed on their vested rights over portions
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of Boracay. They posit that there is no need for a
proclamation classifying Boracay agricultural land, as it is
already deemed agricultural land pursuant to the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926
Petitioners (DENR) opposed the registration saying that
the subject lots was an unclassified land of the public
domain and whatever possession they had cannot ripen
into ownership.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
Doctrine: There must be a positive act from the
government classifying lands as alienable and
disposable before registration.
•
Boracay Island, prior to Pres. GMA’s Proclamation in 2006,
was an unclassified land of public domain.
•
Thus, in accordance with the Regalian Doctrine which
states that all lands of public domain belong to the State,
and that all lands that have not been acquired by the
government belong to the State as part of the inalienable
public domain.
•
Before these inalienable lands of public domain becomes
alienable and disposable, there must be a positive act from
the government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes.
•
Since 1919 (Act No. 2874), the power to classify lands as
alienable and disposable belonged to the President, not to
the courts.
•
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 did not convert
portions of Boracay into agricultural land. Thus, they do
not have any vested rights over the occupied lands and
thus, they are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title.
•
Boracay Island remained an unclassified land of public
domain and thus, is State property. But then, just because
the land which the claimants are occupying cannot be
titled, it does not mean that they can be ousted from the
lands they currently occupy. Lack of title does not
necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
Comments:
•
This is a case involving Boracay Lands. Mayor Yap was an
owner of a parcel of land exactly found in Boracay.
•
Subsequently, there was a presidential proclamation
declaring Boracay Island as tourism site so he filed a
petition for declaratory relief.
•
It then came to a point where the legal standing of Mayor
Yap was questioned.
•
It was ruled that Mayor Yap was in possession of that land
for several years already which he relied upon hence, he
argued that he has acquired the land through prescription.
•
However, Supreme Court said that his land was
unclassified before hence it was a land belonging to the
public domain. It was neither timberland, agricultural nor
mineral; it had no classification. It’s like a person who has
no identity.
•
Fortunately, we have a law which provides for a
classification for unclassified lands and that is PD705 or
the Forestry Code which states that unclassified lands are
forest lands. Forest (timber) lands are not favorable
to Mayor Yap because forest lands cannot be
disposed of. As we have learned, it is only agricultural
land can be alienated and disposed of. No matter how
long Mayor Yap has occupied such land, that land can
never invoke prescription.
Lands of the Public Domain Which are Alienable and
Disposable, Requirement/s:
•
Possession and occupation since June 12, 1945
•
Land declared is alienable and disposable
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
RP vs. Emmanuel Cortez
Emmanuel Cortez filed with RTC an application for judicial
confirmation of title over a parcel of land located at
Barangay Aguho, Pateros, Manila.
Cortez submitted the following documents: tax
declarations for various years from 1966 until 2005,
survey plan of the property, with the annotation that the
property is classified as alienable and disposable, technical
description of the property, with a certification issued by a
geodetic engineer, tax clearance certificate, extrajudicial
settlement of estate conveying the property to Cortez and
Escritura de particion extrajudicial allocationg subject
property to Felicima Cotas (Cortez’ Mother)
There was no opposition, so RTC issued an Order of
General Default and Cortez was allowed to present his
evidence ex-parte.
Cortez claimed that the parcel of land was inherited by his
mother from her parents in 1946. After his parents’ death,
he and his siblings executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement
of Estate over the properties of their deceased parents.
He alleged that subject property has been in possession of
the family since time immemorial, the subject land is not
part of the reservation of DENR and is classified as
alienable and disposable by BFD.
He also adduced in evidence the testimony of Ernesto
Santos, that he has known the family for over 60 years
and that the family has been in possession of the property
since he came to know them.
RTC granted Cortez’ application for registration.
The OSG opposed stating that no document was presented
to establish his predecessors-in-interest’s possession of
the property during the period required by law. They also
claimed that Cortez’ assertion that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, adverse, and
continuous possession of the property for more that 30
years does not constitute well-neigh incontrovertible
evidence in land registration cases. It is merely a claim
which should not have been given weight. Petitioner also
alleged that there was no certification that the subject
property had been declared alienable or disposable so it
cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.
CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC. Under
Section 14(2) of PD 1529 having open, continuous, and
exclusive possession of the property for more than 30
years will suffice for its conversion to private property.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
Under Section 14(1) of PD 1529, applicants for registration
of title must sufficiently establish first that the subject land
forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the
public domain, the applicant and his predecessors-ininterest must be in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation and that it must be
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
or earlier.
•
They did not satisfy the first requirement since the
survey plan prepared by the Geodetic Engineer and
certified by Land Management Bureau of DENR is not
incontrovertible
evidence
to
overcome
the
presumption that the subject property remains part
of the inalienable domain.
•
The applicant must establish the existence of a positive act
of the government. (PD, EO or legislative act or statute)
They must also secure a certification from the government
that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable.
•
In the present case, the certification refers only to the
technical correctness of the survey plotted in the plan and
not the nature and character of the property surveyed.
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•
•
The Court also finds that Cortez likewise failed to establish
the second and third requirements since he only presented
oral and documentary evidence of his and his mother’s
ownership and possession of the property since 1946. It
is a mere claim and not a factual proof of possession.
Furthermore, Cortez failed to explain why the
earliest tax declaration presented was only in 1966.
At the time he filed his application for registration in 2003,
Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject property for only 57 years that
would not entitle him for registration under Section 14(2)
of PD 1529.
The Court emphasized that there must be an official
declaration by the State that the public dominion property
is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for
the development before it can be acquired by prescription.
The period of acquisitive prescription would only
begin to run from the time that the State officially
declares the public dominion property is no longer
intended for use.
Comments:
•
The applicant for the registration here only showed proof
of the Certification of Geodetic Engineer, further certified
by the Lands Management Bureau of DENR wherein it was
stated that the survey is inside the LC Map under so-andso classified as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of
Forest Development.
•
The basis of the certification was said to be alienable and
disposable.
•
But the Supreme Court said that it was insufficient. To
prove the alienable character of the land, there should be:
➢ Certification by the CENRO and PENRO that it is
alienable and disposable
➢ Copy of the land classification map signed the
DENR Secretary which approved the land
classification and released the land as
alienable and disposable, and duly certified by
the custodian.
•
As to additional requirement of possession since June 12,
1945, tax declaration must be shown. These requirements
should be attached to the petition, or else your case will
be dismissed.
•
•
•
•
•
•
RP vs. De Guzman vda. De Jason
An application for land registration was filed in the CFI in
Bulacan by herein Respondent. The subject property was
a rice land with an area of 12,342 sq.m. known as Lot
2633, Cad-297, Paombong, Bulacan.
It was originally owned and possessed by one Mamerto
Dionision since 1907 and was, thereafter, sold to
Romualda Jacinto in 1926.
Upon the death of Romualda Jacinto, her sister Maria
Jacinto (mother of the respondent) inherited the land.
Thereafter, upon the death of Maria Jacinto in 1963,
respondent had herself inherited the land, owning and
possessing it openly, publicly, uninterruptedly, adversely
against the whole world, and in the concept of owner since
then. Taxes due thereon had been paid as well.
The CFI ordered the registration of the land in favor of
respondent on the ground that she had sufficiently
established her open, public, continuous and adverse
possession in the concept of an owner for more than 30
years.
The OSG appealed to the CA and alleged that subject land
is a part of the unclassified region denominated as forest
land of Paombong, Bulacan. The CA affirmed the decision
of the trial court.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
CIVIL LAW: land belonging to public domain. Section 14
(1) and (2) of the Property Registration Decree provides
for those who may apply for registration of title to land.
•
The Court in Republic v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 171631 held
that under Section 14(1), respondent had to prove that:
(1) the land formed part of the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain and (2) she, by herself of
through her predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of
ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier. Thus, the
burden of proof is on the applicant and failure to do
so warrants the dismissal of the application.
•
It is without question that respondent complied with the
second requisite. However, the same cannot be said with
regard to the first requisite. No evidence was presented
that the subject land had been declared alienable
and disposable by the State.
•
Realizing that the burden to prove the second requisite
belongs to her, respondent attached to her appellee brief
the certification dated March 8, 2000 issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
declaring that Lot 2633 falls within the alienable or
disposable land of Paombong, Bulacan.
•
The CA, however, expunged the appellee brief. The Court
in Menguito v. Republic G.R. No. 134308 declared that a
survey conducted by a geodetic engineer that
included a certification on the classification of the
land as alienable and disposable was not sufficient
to overcome the presumption that the land still
formed part of the inalienable public domain.
•
It is a standing doctrine that land of the public domain, in
order to be the subject of appropriation, must be
declared alienable and disposable either by the
President or the Secretary of the DENR.
•
Granting for the sake of argument that the certification
alone would have sufficed, respondent application would
still be denied considering that the reclassification of the
land as alienable or disposable came only after the filing of
the application in court in 1976. The certification indicated
that the land was reclassified as alienable or disposable
only on October 15, 1980.
•
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree provides
that ownership of private lands acquired through
prescription may be registered in the owner name.
However, respondent did not acquire the land through
prescription notwithstanding the fact that possession of
the same by her and her predecessors-in-interest could be
traced back as early as in 1926.
•
The Court in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, G.R.
No. 179987 ruled that, property of public domain,
which generally includes property belonging to the
State, cannot be the object of prescription or,
indeed, be subject of the commerce of man.
•
It is only when such alienable and disposable lands
are expressly declared by the State to be no longer
intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of acquisitive
prescription can begin to run/span.
PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
•
Only the State or the political subdivision owns a
patrimonial property, but it is held by such within its
private capacity.
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•
It is property which the State has the same rights, and of
which it may dispose, to the same extent as private
individual
Legal Implication: All those principles that we discussed
have no application if patrimonial. It can be encumbered,
acquired by prescription, attached, subject of the writ of
execution and others of the like.
PROPERTY OF PROVINCES, CITIES, & MUNICIPALITIES
•
How are they classified? Under the Civil Code, they are
classified as for public use or patrimonial. (NO MORE FOR
PUBLIC SERVICE) – There is a different way of classifying.
•
Basis: Local Government Code
•
So, if the property is not for public use, then it is
patrimonial property. There is not property for public
service.
•
Would it be correct to say that property for public service
is patrimonial property? NO. Because it is still considered
as public property if it is intended for some public
purposes. So, if it is for public service, it is not patrimonial
•
•
•
•
•
Vda. De Tan Toco vs. Municipal Council OfIloilo
The widow of Tan Toco sued the municipal council of Iloilo
for the two strips of land, consisting of 592 sq.m and 59
sq.m with the amount of P42,966.40, which the
municipality of Iloilo had appropriated for widening said
street.
CFI Ilo-ilo ordered the said municipality to pay Mrs.
Tantoco the said amount, plus its interest. Said judgment
was appealed and was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
On account of lack of funds, the municipality of Iloilo was
unable to pay the said judgment, wherefore plaintiff had a
writ of execution issued against the property of the said
municipality, by virtue of which the sheriff attached two
auto trucks, one police patrol automobile, the police
stations on Mabini street, and in Molo and Mandurriao and
the concrete structures, with the corresponding lots.
After notice of the sale of said property had been made,
the provincial fiscal of Iloilo filed a motion with the CFI
praying that the attachment on the said property be
dissolved, that the said attachment be declared null and
void as being illegal and violate the rights of the
municipality.
The Court agreed, declaring the attachment levied
upon the aforementioned property of the municipality
null and void. Mrs. Tantoco appealed the decision of CFI
Iloilo.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of CFI Iloilo on
the ground that the principle governing property of the
public domain of the State is applicable to property for
public use of the municipalities as said municipal property
is similar in character.
•
The principle is that the property for public use of the
State is not within the commerce of man and,
consequently, is unalienable and not subject to
prescription.
•
Likewise, property for public use of the municipality
is not within the commerce of man so long
as it is used by the public and consequently,
said property is also inalienable.
•
The rule is that property held for public uses, such as
public buildings, streets, squares, parks, promenades,
wharves landing places, fire engines, hose and hose
carriages, engine houses, public markets, hospitals,
cemeteries,
and
generally
everything
held
for
governmental purposes, is not subject to levy and sale
under execution against such corporation.
Comments:
•
Properties involved here, levied for execution, are auto
trucks of police car, police stations, etc – FOR PUBLIC
SERVICE. SC held that it is not subject for execution and
attachment.
•
The properties are still intended for public purposes.
•
General Rule: Public funds cannot be seized
•
Exception: If the circumstances is similar to the case of
Pasay City Gov’t v CFI (see below).
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Pasay City Government vs. CFI
In 1964, Isip entered into a contract with the City of Pasay
represented by then Mayor Pablo Cuneta for the
construction of a new Pasay City Hall for the contract price
of P4.9 million.
Isip proceeded with the construction and accomplished the
amount of work equivalent to P1.7 million. Pasay paid only
the total amount of P1.1 million, leaving a balance of
P613,000.
Pasay failed to remit the amount, so Isip filed a case for
specific performance with damages before CFI Manila.
The parties arrived at a draft amicable agreement wherein
it was stated that Pasay will remit P613,000 to Isip and
that Isip will start the construction work corresponding to
the next stage. The Municipal Board enacted an ordinance
which approved the Compromise Agreement.
CFI
approved
the
compromise
agreement
and
subsequently issued a writ of execution. An application for
and notice of garnishment were made and effected upon
Pasay's funds with the PNB.
Pasay filed a motion to quash the writ of execution,
alleging that the Sheriff has no power to levy or garnish
on execution the general funds, specially the trust funds,
of Pasay City.
CFI denied the motion and ordered the enforcement of
garnishment. Hence, Pasay filed a petition for review
before the SC.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
All government funds deposited with the PNB by any
agency or instrumentality of the government, whether by
way of general or special deposit, remain government
funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy.
•
But, inasmuch as an ordinance has already been
enacted expressly appropriating the amount of
P613,096.00 of payment to Isip, then the funds may
be garnished.
Comments:
•
There is a judgment by compromise agreement.
•
Before the compromise agreement was entered, there was
already an appropriation hence it was already segregated
from the mass of public funds
•
If there’s an appropriation, you can pursue that funds set
aside pursuant to the appropriation
•
•
Espiritu vs. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio
During the last world war, the market building of the town
of Pozorrubio was destroyed, and after Liberation, the
market vendors began constructing temporary and makeshifts stalls, even small residences, on a portion of the
town plaza.
The Municipal Treasurer collected from these stall owners
fees at the rate of P.25 per square meter a month.
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•
•
•
•
•
In time, the whole municipal market was rehabilitated, but
the owners of the structures on the plaza failed and
refused to transfer to said market place.
Complaints were received from various civic organizations
like the Women's Club and the Puericulture Center, for the
removal of the market stalls on the plaza, which were
being used not only as stalls, but also for residence
purposes, said organization desiring to convert said
portion of the plaza into a children's park.
As a result, the Municipal Council of Pozorrubio No. 20,
Series of 1951, stating that the public market had already
been rehabilitated, and ordering the occupants and owners
of the structures on the plaza to remove their buildings
within sixty days from receipt of the resolution.
In answer to this resolution, eight of the market stall
building owners filed a petition for prohibition in the CFI of
Pangasinan against the Municipal Council, the Municipal
Mayor, and the Chief of Police of Pozorrubio.
The CFI ruled that the fee of P.25 per square meter
collected by the Municipal Tresurer, was not for the rent of
the portion of the public plaza occupied by the market
stalls, but rather the market stall fees charges on all
market vendors in a public market.
The occupation of the plaza and the construction of
temporary buildings thereon by appellants mostly for
market, even residence purposes, was merley tolerated by
the municipality, because of the destruction of the public
market during the war.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
There was absolutely no contract or agreement between
the appellants on one side and the municipality on the
other, about renting of the Plaza to the former.
•
There is absolutely no question that the town plaza
cannot be used for the construction of market stalls,
specially of residences, and that such structures
constitute a nuisance subject to abatement
according to law.
•
Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be
devoted to public use and to be made available to the
public in general. They are outside the commerce of man
and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the
municipality to private parties.
•
In case of war or during an emergency, town plazas may
be occupied temporarily by private individuals, as was
done and as was tolerated by the Municipality of
Pozorrubio, when the emergency has ceased, said
temporary occupation or use must also cease.
•
Appellants must have realized the absolute lack of merit in
their stand and the futility of their appeal because they
voluntarily removed their buildings on the plaza.
•
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is
hereby affirmed. With costs against appellants.
•
•
•
Province of Zamboanga Del Norte vs. City of
Zamboanga
On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was
approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into
Zamboanga City.
Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that “Buildings and
properties which the province shall abandon upon the
transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and
paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by
the Auditor General.”
Such properties include lots of capitol site, schools,
hospitals,
leprosarium,
high
school
playgrounds,
burleighs, and hydro-electric sites.
•
•
•
•
•
On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing
the province of Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga del
Norte and Zamboanga del Sur.
As to how the assets and obligations of the old province
were to be divided between the two new ones, Sec. 6 of
that law provided “Upon the approval of this Act, the funds,
assets and other properties and the obligations of the
province of Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between
the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of
Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the Philippines,
upon the recommendation of the Auditor General.”
However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was
approved amending Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39 by
providing that, “All buildings, properties and assets
belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and
located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby
transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of
Zamboanga.”
This constrained Zamboanga del Norte to file on March 5,
1962, a
complaint
against
defendants-appellants
Zamboanga City; that, among others, Republic Act 3039
be declared unconstitutional for depriving Zamboanga del
Norte of property without due process and just
compensation.
The lower court declared RA 3039 unconstitutional as it
deprives Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
RA 3039 is valid. The properties petitioned by Zamboanga
del Norte is a public property. The validity of the law
ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and
buildings thereon in question.
•
For, the matter involved here is the extent of legislative
control over the properties of a municipal corporation, of
which a province is one. The principle itself is simple:
If the property is owned by the municipality
(meaning municipal corporation) in its public and
governmental capacity, the property is public and
Congress has absolute control over it.
•
But if the property is owned in its private or
proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and
Congress has no absolute control. The municipality
cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment
of just compensation.
•
The capacity in which the property is held is, however,
dependent on the use to which it is intended and devoted.
Now, which of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil Code or
that obtaining under the law of Municipal Corporations,
must be used in classifying the properties in question?
•
The Civil Code provides: ART. 423. The property of
provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into
property for public use and patrimonial property; ART.
424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and
municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets,
municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works for public service paid for
by said provinces, cities, or municipalities. All other
property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall
be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the
provisions of special laws.
•
Applying the above cited norms, all the properties in
question, except the two (2) lots used as High School
playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial
properties of the former Zamboanga province.
•
Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites,
and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they
are not for public use. They would fall under the phrase
“public works for public service” for it has been held that
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•
•
•
•
under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must
be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the
preceding enumerated properties in the first paragraph of
Art 424. The playgrounds, however, would fit into this
category.
On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining
under the principles constituting the law of
Municipal Corporations: All those of the 50 properties in
question which are devoted to public service are deemed
public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be
considered public, it is enough that the property be held
and, devoted for governmental purposes like local
administration, public education, public health, etc.
The controversy here is more along the domains of
the Law of Municipal Corporations — State vs.
Province — than along that of Civil Law. If municipal
property held and devoted to public service is in the same
category as ordinary private property, then that would
mean they can be levied upon and attached; they can even
be acquired thru adverse possession — all these to the
detriment of the local community. It is wrong to
consider those properties as ordinary private
property.
Lastly, the classification of properties other than
those for public use in the municipalities as
patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil Code — is “…
without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.”
For purpose of this article, the principles, obtaining
under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be
considered
as
“special
laws”.
Hence,
the
classification of municipal property devoted for
distinctly governmental purposes as public should
prevail over the Civil Code classification in this
particular case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set
aside and another judgment is hereby entered as follows:
(1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to return
to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte in lump sum the amount
of P43,030.11 which the former took back from the latter
out of the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to the latter;
and
(2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments in
favor of plaintiff of whatever balance remains of plaintiff’s
54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial properties, after
deducting therefrom the sum of P57,373.46, on the basis
of Resolution No. 7 dated March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal
Committee formed by the Auditor General, by way of
quarterly payments from the allotments of defendant City,
in the manner originally adopted by the Secretary of
Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Comments:
•
In this case, there was a protest from the province when
the city was created. There were properties that formerly
belonged to the province that were transferred to the city.
•
Province relied on the Civil Code – that if it is not a property
for public use, it is patrimonial. Out of 50 properties there,
only 2 are intended for public use, others are property for
public service. Province alleged that they are deprived of
just compensation.
•
Kay patrimonial man kuno so it is a property which is held
by the Local Government in its proprietary capacity. Mura
ra kag gikuhaan ug property niana. If you will just transfer
the property, it would amount to deprivation without due
process of law. It must be compensated.
•
BUT SC RULED OTHERWISE because the congress had
direct control over the properties since these properties
are intended for public use. Because of Municipal
•
•
•
corporations, it is property for public use. That is what the
Special Law states.
Province of Zamboanga vs City of Zamboanga – addresses
the issue that just because the property is not classified as
property for public use, it is not correct to say that it is
patrimonial in the light of Art. 420 of Civil Code.
Because the Civil Code itself says “SUBJECT TO SPECIAL
LAWS” – Civil Code here is just being consistent. LGC is a
special law. Nothing in the code says that if it is not
classified as a property for public use, it is already
patrimonial.
Even if it is titled in the name of the LGU, it is
property for public use, and it is just a mere trustee.
Local Government Unit (LGU) is created through a law
•
In the law, there is this delineation of the territory
comprising the Local Government Unit Concerned
•
The grantor of the territory is the State through its
Congress while the grantee is the LGU
•
If the law grants the specific territory, the LGU becomes
the owner of that territory. Now what is the extent of
the ownership of the LGU of that territory? Is it an
absolute ownership?
•
NO, because for properties for public use, the
congress retains absolute control over these
properties even though they are used by the LGU.
•
However, if the properties are patrimonial in
character, LGU has full control.
•
What if the public purpose is abandoned?
•
In the Charter, it gives specific territory to local
government unit so that it can be used as a site of its town
hall. But the mayor and his council decided to transfer to
a bigger area. So, the former site is not abandoned. In the
basis of its Charter, the LGU is the owner, DOES
CONGRESS STILL HAVE CONTROL ON THE MANNER OF
DISPOSING THE PROPERTY?
•
YES, the intention that it is intended for public use is
the controlling factor.
•
So even if for a certain time the property is not used,
without an express declaration from the Congress, still
Congress retains control over the property.
Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene vs. Bercilles
•
This is a road near Mabolo that was declared, through a
resolution of the council of Cebu City, as an abandoned
road. As a consequence, it converted the property into a
patrimonial property thus allowing the mayor to sell the
property.
•
Where’s the act of Congress here that would support
our claim that the State still retains control over the
property even if it is not devoted for public use anymore?
•
IN THE CHARTER CREATING THE CITY OF CEBU, it has
the power to turn the property into patrimonial
property and allow the mayor to enter into contract to
sell the property.
•
Now who enacts the Charter?
•
The Congress, so the state through congress still it
retains control.
•
The INTENTION is what is controlling – if it is
intended for public use, even if for a time it is maybe
devoted for private purposes, so long as the original
intention was really for public use.
•
Salas vs. Jarencio
February 24, 1919 - the 4th Branch of the CFI Manila
rendered judgment in Case No. 18, G.L.R.O. Record No.
111, declaring the City of Manila the owner in fee simple
of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1, Block 557 of the
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•
•
•
•
Cadastral Survey of the City of Mani1a, containing an area
of 9,689.8 square meters, more or less.
August 21, 1920 – Title No. 4329 issued on in favor of the
City of Manila after the land in question was registered in
the City's favor. The Torrens Title expressly states that the
City of Manila was the owner in 'fee simple' of the said land
September 20, 1960 - the Municipal Board, presided by
then Vice-Mayor Antonio Villegas, requested the President
of the Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring the
city property bounded by Florida, San Andres and
Nebraska Streets, under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
25545 and 25547, containing an area of 7,450 square
meters, as patrimonial property of the City for the purpose
of reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof
The said resolution of the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila was officially transmitted to the President of the
Philippines the following day, to which a copy was
furnished to the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Congress of the Philippines.
June 20, 1964—RA 4118 was passed by the Senate and
approved by the President pursuant to the request. Such
bill was enacted for social justice purposes, that they be
sold to their currently landless occupants.
But due to reasons which do not appear in the record, the
City of Manila made a complete turn-about, for on
December 20, 1966, Antonio J. Villegas, in his capacity as
the City Mayor of Manila and the City of Manila as a duly
organized public corporation, brought an action for
injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary injunction to
restrain, prohibit and enjoin the herein appellants,
particularly the Governor of the Land Authority and the
Register of Deeds of Manila, from further implementing
Republic Act No. 4118, and praying for the declaration of
Republic Act No. 4118 as unconstitutional.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
The property involved is not patrimonial property of
the City of Manila, it is the property of the State.
•
The rule is that when it comes to property of the
municipality which it did not acquire in its private or
corporate capacity with its own funds, the
legislature can transfer its administration and
disposition to an agency of the National Government
to be disposed of according to its discretion.
•
The possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired
with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such
property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its
inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary
purposes.
•
The City of Manila, although declared by the Cadastral
Court as owner in fee simple, has not shown by any shred
of evidence in what manner it acquired said land as its
private or patrimonial property. The presumption is that
such land came from the State upon the creation of the
municipality.
•
That it has in its name a registered title is not questioned,
but this title should be deemed to be held in trust for the
State as the land covered thereby was part of the territory
of the City of Manila granted by the sovereign upon its
creation
•
Therefore, the land in question pertains to the State
and the City of Manila merely acted as trustee for the
benefit of the people therein for whom the State can
legislate in the exercise of its legitimate powers.
•
Consequently, the City of Manila was not deprived of
anything it owns, either under the due process clause or
under the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
If it failed to get from the Congress the concession
it sought of having the land involved given to it as
its patrimonial property, the Courts possess no
power to grant that relief. Republic Act No. 4118 does
not, therefore, suffer from any constitutional infirmity.
Regardless of the source or classification of land in the
possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired
with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such
property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its
inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary
purposes
Manila Lodge vs CA
Act No. 1360 authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a
portion of Manila Bay to form part of the Luneta extension.
The act provided that the reclaimed area shall be the
property of the City of Manila, and that the city is
authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land for a
hotel site. Act No 1657 further authorized the City of
Manila to lease or to sell the same.
Later, the City of Manila conveyed a portion of the
reclaimed area to Manila Lodge No. 761 (Petitioner). A TCT
was issued, and later Petitioner asked the court for the
cancellation of the right of the City of Manila to repurchase
the property which was granted.
Then Petitioner sold the land, together with all the
improvements, to the Tarlac Development Corporation
(TDC).
When the right of the City of Manila was later reinstated,
TDC was reserved the right to bring an action for
clarification of its rights.
The trial court held that the subject land was a “public park
or plaza,” that the sale of the subject land by the City of
Manila to Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was null and void;
that plaintiff TDC was a purchaser thereof in g faith and
for value from BPOE and can enforce its rights against the
latter; and that BPOE is entitled to recover from the City
of Manila whatever consideration it had 'paid the latter.’
Supreme Court Ruling
•
We hold that it is of public dominion, intended for public
use.
•
Firstly, if the reclaimed area was granted to the City of
Manila as its patrimonial property, the City could, by virtue
of its ownership, dispose of the whole reclaimed area
without need of authorization to do so from the lawmaking
body. The right to dispose (jus disponendi) of one's
property is an attribute of ownership. Act No. 1360, as
amended, however, provides by necessary implication,
that the City of Manila could not dispose of the reclaimed
area without being authorized by the lawmaking body. At
most, only the northern portion reserved as a hotel site
could be said to be patrimonial property for, by express
statutory provision it could be disposed of, and the title
thereto would revert to the City should the grantee fail to
comply with the terms provided by the statute.
•
Secondly, If the reclaimed area is an extension of the
Luneta, then it is of the same nature or character as the
old Luneta. It is not disputed that the old Luneta is a public
park or plaza hence the "extension to the Luneta" must be
also a public park or plaza and for public use.
•
Thirdly, the reclaimed area was formerly a part of the
manila Bay. When the shore or part of the bay is
reclaimed, it does not lose its character of being property
for public use.
•
Fourthly, Act 1360, as amended, authorized the lease or
sale of the northern portion of the reclaimed area as a
hotel site. The subject property is not that northern
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portion authorized to be leased or sold; the subject
property is the southern portion. Hence, applying
the rule of expresio unius est exlusio alterius, the
City of Manila was not authorized to sell the subject
property.
Fifthly, the executive and legislative department has the
power to make the declaration that a property is no longer
required for public use, and until such declaration is made,
the property must continue to form paint of the public
domain
Comments:
•
This involved a reclaimed land which was intended to be
used as a public plaza. But it was not actually used for such
purpose, so the city government of Manila wanted to sell
it. They alleged that it is not actually used as public plaza.
•
SC held that it does not matter. When the state granted
reclamation authority to the City of Manila for public plaza
purposes, then whatever reclaimed as a result of the grant
of authority, that land is property of public dominion. Not
to be sold.
What if a public road is used momentarily for market
vendors, can it be allowed?
•
No, it cannot be subject to commerce of man; not even a
temporary period is allowed.
Comments:
•
With regard to properties for public use given to the
province, city or municipality, even those are registered in
its name, it does not mean that the State abdicates its
control over these properties.
•
Even if the public purpose character has been abandoned,
still the LGU concerned, deciding to sell these properties,
it has to seek authority from the state. Unless, the
authority is given in advance pursuant to its charter.
•
The only properties where the state does not have any
control is in regard to properties acquired by LGU with its
own local funds. – HERE LGU HAS CONTROL
•
But if the property is given to it gratuitously from the state,
but later on public purpose is abandoned, the LGU cannot
sell the property.
GOVERNMENT FUNDS, GARNISHMENT
•
This will crop up when the issue is with the garnishing of
government funds.
•
Purposely included in the syllabus by Atty because of the
many controversies arising from the seizure of funds
belonging to the government which are deposited in
government depositary banks.
Why do we have controversies like that? Are we saying
that we can file a case against the government despite
of the principle that the State cannot be sued without its
consent? Can you file a case against the government?
•
Yes, a case can be filed against the government. If your
land is taken by the government for the road expansion
and when the government does not pay, you can file a
case.
When is a suit against the state?
•
Immunity of the state can be invoked when:
1. Sue a state by its name, requiring affirmative action
in the judgment.
2. Sue
an
unincorporated
government
agency
performing governmental function.
3.
Government official being sued in his official capacity
without acting in bad faith, malice, negligence &
corruption
Granted that it’s a suit against the state, what will
happen to the suit?
•
If there is no consent, case will be dismissed. If with
consent, case may proceed
If it is a suit against the state, what do you do next?
•
Obtain CONSENT of state.
GENERAL PROCEDURES IN SUING THE STATE:
a) Identify if it’s a suit against the state; if it is, obtain its
consent.
b) Prove state is liable.
c) If the state is found to be liable, ask the state to make a
separate appropriation through the legislature.
d) If no appropriation is made, compel legislature. To file a
mandamus is debatable since you cannot be sure if you
can compel congress to appropriate the funds.
•
The process is a long one, hence, there is no practical
benefit in suing the state.
•
A money claim arising from contract is not filed
before the court, you must go to COA.
Commissioner of Public Highways, Et Al. Vs. Lourdes R
San Diego
•
Before WWII, the Philippine Government filed an action for
the expropriation of a parcel of land owned by Hashim for
the construction of a public road.
•
The government took possession over the property after
the deposit of the amount of 23, 413.64. Records of the
case were destroyed during the WWII.
•
After the war, Hashim filed an action for money claims
before the CFI against Bureau of Public Highways.
•
The parties entered into a compromise agreement wherein
the Bureau shall pay almost half of the amount claimed.
•
The bureau failed to pay so Hashim filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution. Respondent judge granted
the motion.
•
The sheriff served the writ with a Notice of Garnishment to
PNB against the Bureau's funds. Hashim further filed a
motion for issuance of an order ordering the release of the
amount. It was granted.
•
PNB released the amount. Petitioner filed this petition for
certiorari with mandatory injunction to reimburse the
amount released.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
In expropriation proceedings, the State submits to the
court's jurisdiction and asks the court to affirm its right to
take the property sought to be expropriated. State
immunity does not apply.
•
Only the principal can question the authority of the counsel
to enter into a compromise agreement. The state cannot
raise it.
•
The assailed orders are void. Government funds are not
subject to garnishment.
•
Respondent estate and respondent Tomas N. Hashim as
prayed for by respondent Philippine National Bank in its
Answer, are ordered jointly and severally to reimburse said
respondent bank in the amount of P209,076.00 with legal
interest until the date of actual reimbursement.
Respondents Estate of N. T. Hashim, Philippine National
Bank and Benjamin Coruña are ordered jointly to pay
treble costs.
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Comments:
•
General Rule: No appropriation, there is no legal basis to
spend. Commission of Public Highways vs Lourdes San
Diego
•
This case is about garnishing funds pertaining to Bureau of
Public Highways (DPWH). It involves the expansion of
EDSA, an eminent domain proceeding.
•
The state in here already waived its right not to be sued.
As discussed earlier, even if there is waiver in regard
to being sued on the part of the state still, that
waiver is only good to proceedings anterior to the
execution.
•
Here there is money judgment in favor of the owner but
according to the court, this money judgment could not
be executed and enforced against public funds
pertaining to bureau of public highway.
•
•
•
•
•
•
Professional Video, Inc. vs. TESDA
In 1999, TESDA, an instrumentality of the government
established under R.A. No. 7796 (the TESDA Act of 1994)
and attached to the DOLE to develop and establish a
national system of skills standardization, testing, and
certification in the country.
To fulfill this mandate, it sought to issue security-printed
certification and/or identification polyvinyl (PVC) cards to
trainees who have passed the certification process.
Professional Video Inc. (PROVI) signed and executed the
“Contract Agreement Project PVC ID Card issuance” for the
provision of goods and services in the printing and
encoding of the PVC cards.
PROVI was to provide TESDA with the system and
equipment compliant with the specifications defined in the
proposal. In return, TESDA would pay PROVI a specified
sum of money after TESDA’s acceptance of the contracted
goods and services.
PPOVI alleged that TESDA has still an outstanding balance
and still remains unpaid.
TESDA claims that it entered the Contract Agreement and
Addendum in the performance of its governmental
function to develop and establish a national system of
skills standardization, testing, and certification; in the
performance of this governmental function, TESDA is
immune from suit.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
TESDA, as an agency of the State, cannot be sued without
its consent. The rule that a state may not be sued without
its consent is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the
1987 Constitution and has been an established principle
that antedates this Constitution.
•
It is as well a universally recognized principle of
international law that exempts a state and its organs from
the jurisdiction of another state.
•
The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty,
and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right
as against the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends.
•
It also rests on reasons of public policy. That public service
would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the
sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the
instance of every citizen and, consequently, controlled in
the uses and dispositions of the means required for the
proper administration of the government.
•
The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle
covers takes on various forms, namely: a suit against the
Republic by name; a suit against an unincorporated
government agency; a suit against a government agency
covered by a charter with respect to the agency’s
•
•
•
performance of governmental functions; and a suit that on
its face is against a government officer, but where the
ultimate liability will fall on the government.
In the present case, the writ of attachment was
issued against a government agency covered by its
own charter.
As discussed above, TESDA performs governmental
functions, and the issuance of certifications is a task
within its function of developing and establishing a
system of skills standardization, testing, and
certification in the country.
From the perspective of this function, the core reason for
the existence of state immunity applies i.e., the public
policy reason that the performance of governmental
function cannot be hindered or delayed by suits, nor can
these suits control the use and disposition of the means
for the performance of governmental functions.
Comments:
•
TESDA’s function is to provide IDs as a certification of
works. It entered into a contract of supplier of ID but
former could not pay. P
•
Professional Video filed a case and wanted to attach file
pertaining to TESDA’s general appropriation funds. SC held
that it could not be done because those are government
funds.
•
You will notice here that there is already a specific
appropriation for TESDA, but SC held that those
funds could not be attached.
•
In here, just because the government entity enters
into a contract it does not mean that the funds
pertaining to it under the general appropriations act
maybe garnished or maybe subject to a writ of
execution.
•
First, you need to determine the nature of the exercise of
its function when it enters into a contract. Whether it
entered into the contract in its governmental function.
•
The Contract here is maybe a commercial contract but that
is only incidental in the exercise of its governmental
function.
•
NOTE: There is no judgment yet here. This case is only for
the attachment.
•
Attachment – before the judgment to preserve the assets
of the defendant so that it will not be disposed during the
pendency of the case.
•
Execution – only after the judgment
General Process for Money Claims Arising from
Contracts
•
Under CA No. 327, as amended by PD No. 1445, a claim
against the government must first be filed with the
Commission on Audit, which must act upon it within sixty
days. If the claim is rejected the claimant is authorized to
elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and
in effect sue the State with its consent.
•
If case is won for money claim, there must be a separate
appropriation to get the money claim or purpose.
Steps for Money Claims Arising from Contracts
1. File with the Commission on Audit to determine if the
complaint is tenable which must act upon it.
2. If rejected or not acted upon within 60 days, the claimant
is authorized to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court
on Certiorari.
3. In effect, the claimant can sue the State with its consent.
4. If the claimant won the case, when final judgment of the
Supreme Court rendered, he will return to Commission on
Audit.
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5.
6.
Commission on Audit will submit a letter to the President
in which the latter will may recommend to the Congress to
make an appropriation law in the claimant’s favor.
If the Congress doesn’t make a law, the claimant may
ask/lobby to the congress to make a bill for his claims
enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation
ordinance and the corresponding disbursement of funds.
Rallos Case
•
This is a property near Southwestern University where
Mayor Rama did not want to pay the Rallos family. Former
Mayor Osmeña wanted to pay them because there is a final
and executory decision in favor of the owners.
•
Osmeña contend that if we will not pay the Rallos, interest
will add up. Rama on the other hand says that there is
allegedly a deed of donation in favor of the City.
•
The point here is pursuant to the final and executory
decision in favor of the Rallos, what the sheriff did here
went to the depository banks of the City of Cebu. He
served this writ of garnishment to hold the deposits of City
of Cebu. Can it be done?
➢ NO, public funds can only be spent if there is
corresponding appropriation.
Philippine National Bank vs Judge Pabalan
•
A case which involves funds pertaining to PVTA, a
government agency, subject to a writ of execution.
•
Writ was issued pursuant to a collection suit. It was direct
to the funds of PVTA. It was held valid by the court. The
reason of the court is that PVTA is a GOCC, it has a distinct
personality of its own from the state – its funds can be
garnished.
*For as long as the government entity concerned has a
personality distinct from the state, its funds can be garnished
subject to a writ of execution.
•
Is this still valid rule – in the light of the earlier discussion
of MIAA?
•
Of course, it is not enough that the entity has personality
distinct from the state.
➢ We can only consider that the agency is a true GOCC
(Government Owned and Controlled Corporation)
when it is organized in accordance with the
Corporation Code. – ALL FUNDS PERTAINING TO IT
CAN BE GARNISHED
➢ If it is a non-stock corporation, still organized with
corporation code, then it is still GOCC
➢ Thus, Pavalan ruling is modified accordingly by the
MIAA case
CHAPTER II. OWNERSHIP
DEFINITION
•
The independent and general power of a person over a
thing for purposes recognized by law and within the limits
established thereby.
•
It is an independent right of exclusive enjoyment and
control of a thing for the purpose of deriving therefrom all
the advantages required by the reasonable needs of the
owner (or holder of the right) and the promotion of the
general welfare, but subject to the restrictions imposed
by law and the rights of others (JBL Reyes)
•
It is a relation in private law by virtue of which is a thing
(or property right) pertaining to one person is completely
subjected to his will in everything not prohibited by
public law or the concurrence with the rights of
another (Scialoja)
•
It is the highest of all the real rights. Other kinds of real
rights: ownership, possession, usufruct, real or praedial
servitude, lease, retention, mortgages, preemption and
redemption. These are open-ended. There can be new real
rights created by law (Constitution: stewardship right for
25 years)
RIGHTS OF AN OWNER
Art 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a
thing, without other limitations than those established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder and
possessor of the thing in order to recover it.
Major Rights of the Owner:
1. Right to Enjoy
•
This includes the right to possess, right to use, and right
to the fruits.
•
Right of Possession – To use the thing/property. (Use:
for personal use or allowing another to use it with your
permission)
•
Right to Enjoy and Harvest the Fruits – Civil Fruit
substantial kind of fruit.
➢ Lease – Rentals as Fruits
➢ Corporation – Shares of stock; surplus profits
•
General Rule: Being the owner of the principal thing, you
are the owner of the fruits.
2.
•
Right to Dispose
Includes the right to destroy and right to consume of the
property.
➢ Right to Encumber
➢ Right to Sell
➢ Right to Lease
➢ Right to mortgage
➢ Pledge
3.
•
Right to Recover or Vindicate
The right to recover the possession of real or personal
property.
Various remedies to recover ownership or possession.
•
Other Property Rights of the Owner:
Right of Accession - Everything that is added to the principal
thing, everything that is incorporated to the principal thing that
would belong to the owner.
Rights included in ownership (bundle of rights) under
Roman Law:
1. Jus utendi - right to use and enjoy the property.
2. Jus fruendi - right to own the fruits.
3. Jus abutendi - right to consume the thing by its use;
abnormal use of the property.
4. Jus disponendi - right to dispose or alienate the property;
totally or partially; temporarily or permanently.
5. Jus vindicandi - right to vindicate or recover real right to
ownership. Don't allow anyone to dispossess your property
so there won't be an action.
6. Jus accessiones - right to accessories
7. Jus possidendi - right to possess; implied right; how can
you enjoy a property without possessing it?
FUNDAMENTAL THINGS TO CONSIDER:
Art. 434 – In an action to recover, the property must be
identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his
title and not on the weakness of the defendant’s claim.
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Source of identifying the property:
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Certificate of title – boundary of the land, etc.
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Tax Declarations
Note: Aside from identifying the property, you must assert
that you are the owner. By alleging that you become the owner
of the property through any of the ways of acquiring ownership.
Example: Ways of Acquiring Ownership
•
Acquired through Sale – present evidence like a Deed of
Sale.
•
Acquired through inheritance:
➢ Solo heir – present an affidavit of adjudication by sole
heir.
➢ Several heirs – extrajudicial settlement OR file a case
of judicial partition of property.
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Acquired through donation – present the Deed of
Donation.
ACTIONS TO RECOVER
Note: The form of actions available to the owner to judicially
recover his property depends on whether the property is real
or personal, and whether the purpose of the action is merely
to recover possession or ownership, or both.
1.
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Replevin
The right to recover movable property (Rule 60, ROC)
Incidental remedy – provided by the ROC.
Replevin as a main action of recovery of personal property.
Replevin is also applicable to property which is Immovable
by Destination (Equipment, Machineries)
2.
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Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
The right to recover possession of a real Property (Rule 70,
ROC)
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer is a disturbance of
the social order
These are the remedies available to the owner when his
property is intruded into by a squatter, to recover
possession
Preferred civil action because of its nature: Summary
Procedure; shorter than the usual proceedings.
Actions of choice by landowners or rightful possessors who
need immediate remedy to recover possession.
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•
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Governed by Rules on Summary Procedure:
•
Proceedings: File a complaint, file an answer, file a position
paper, then the court will decide, no need of witnesses.
•
There’s only one (1) court appearance during the
preliminary conference. After that, the judge will direct
you, in accordance with the rules on summary procedure,
to submit your position paper, 30 days from submission
(ideally speaking) the judge supposed to decide the case.
Forcible Entry
•
Summary action to recover material or physical
possession of real property when a person originally in
possession was deprived thereof by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth (FISTS).
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In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the
beginning and the only issue is who has the prior
possession de facto.
•
In theory of the forcible entry, the issue there is who
has actual and physical possession, regardless of
legal possession.
•
The ownership is not an issue, if at all the court will decide
the issue of ownership, it will only be provisional in
nature.
•
On the theory that you are the registered owner and you
are entitled to the possession of your property.
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Example: The party is claiming ownership by his
registered title of the property and the other party is
claiming ownership by his possession of the property (title
is not registered; no certificate of title). The court will
usually decide favorably on the party who is the registered
owner (only be provisional in nature – res judicata is not
applicable). Then the aggrieved party can still file an action
for accion reivindicatoria, because the aggrieved party is
relying on “being the owner” as his basis for the
possession.
Grounds of how the entry was made:
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Force/ Intimidation
•
Strategy – somewhat accompanied by fraud
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Stealth – done secretly, ninja moves
Where to File: MTC
When to File:
•
When through FIT (force, intimidation, threat) – 1 year
from dispossession
•
When through SS (Stealth, strategy) – 1 year from
discovery.
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Summary Action/Proceedings vs. Ordinary Action
•
In Summary Action, this is governed by Special Rule.
Position Papers and Affidavits are the only basis in these
cases.
•
In ordinary action, this is when you see presentation of
witness in the witness stand, direct examination, crossexamination, etc.
•
Presentation of affidavit – you may come across with
ruling of supreme court where if it is only and affidavit, it
not acceptable as evidence because it is self-serving.
Unless the one signing it is presented in court
•
In Ordinary Civil Action, it would take time to resolve the
case.
Cruz vs. Catapang (not in syllabus)
Leonor Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are co-owners
of a parcel of land in Batangas.
1992-Catapang with the consent of Norma Maligaya built
a house on a lot adjacent to the subject land. The house
built intruded the land of the three co-owners
1995- Cruz learned about the intrusion so she asked
Catapang to demolish the part intruding the property.
Catapang refused
January 25, 1996 - Cruz filed a complaint for forcible entry
against Catapang
MCTC and RTC ruled in favor of Cruz. However, CA ruled
for Catapang.
Catapang argues that she asked the permission of one of
the co-owners thus there is no forcible entry.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
Co-owners cannot devote common property to his or her
exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. The act
of Norma Maligaya is tantamount to devoting the property
to his or her exclusive use.
•
Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the
dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry filed against
the builder. The consent given by Norma Maligaya in
the absence of the consent of petitioner and Luz
Cruz did not vest upon respondent any right to enter
into the co-owned property. Her entry into the
property still falls under the classification through
strategy or stealth.
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The act of Catapang only asking for Maligaya’s (her sister)
was in a way clandestinely done. Thus, the act constitutes
a forcible entry.
Petitioner’s filing of a complaint for forcible entry, in our
view, was within the one-year period for filing the
complaint. The one-year period within which to bring
an action for forcible entry is generally counted from
the date of actual entry to the land. However, when
entry is made through stealth, then the one-year
period is counted from the time the petitioner
learned about it.
Although respondent constructed her house in 1992, it was
only in September 1995 that petitioner learned of it when
she visited the property.
Comments:
•
This is a case involves a co-owned property by 3 sisters; 1
of the sisters gave permission to a third person to build on
a co- owned property.
•
The other 2 sisters filed a case of forcible entry against the
third person.
•
Defense of the third person: S/he cannot be held liable of
forcible entry because of the consent of 1 of the co-owners.
•
Co-owner can possess not only the part, but also the whole
property.
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SC’s Ruling: That’s entry by strategy, that 1 co-owner
cannot decide alone. All co-owners must decide.
Unlawful Detainer
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Summary action to recover material or physical possession
of real property when a person against whom the
possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any
contract, express or implied.
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The possession is legal from the start but becomes
illegal later on.
•
In unlawful detainer, possession was originally
lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or
termination of the right to possess and the issue of
rightful possession is the one decisive, for in such
action, the defendant is the party in actual
possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the
termination of the defendant’s right to continue in
possession.
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Example: Contract of lease (lessee-lessor). The entry of
the lessee is valid from the start pursuant to the lease
contract. It will become illegal after the expiration of the
lease AND the lessee refuses to vacate the property even
if there is a demand to vacate.
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Note: Implied New Lease – There’s a continued
possession even after the expiration of the lease contract.
The lessor allowed the lessee to possess the property with
tolerance.
•
Example: Possession by mere tolerance – one becomes a
victim of his own kindness. You let someone possess your
land. Take note that in this situation, the possessor has an
implied obligation that anytime that the owner would need
the premises, he will vacate. The possessor could not even
ask for improvements before he will vacate, you cannot
even be considered as builder in good faith (will be
discussed later).
Where to File: MTC
When to File: 1 year from the time possession became
unlawful or date of last demand letter to vacate
Comments:
•
This 1-year period must be alleged in your complaint
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•
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In other words, on Sep 4, 2018, you send demand letter.
So, Sep 4, 2018 – Sep 4, 2019, you can file for unlawful
detainer suit.
Now on Sep 3, 2019, wa pa man kay budget sa
abugado, you did not file for unlawful detainer.
Would that mean you cannot file anymore?
➢ No, you can still file. Just give another demand letter
to have another renewal of that 1-year period!
➢ Bahalag mag cge kag padala demand letter dha – the
law said “1 year from the LAST demand letter.”
But take note that this only applies to unlawful detainer,
not applicable to forcible entry.
The Bread and Butter in this Situation: THE 1YEAR
PERIOD
•
This is the time limitation whether to file Forcible Entry and
Unlawful Detainer
•
This means that if it will go beyond 1 year, your remedy is
not FE and UD.
Comments:
•
We said that in UNLAWFUL DETAINER, the possession
at first is legal then later becomes illegal.
•
Now how can we make the possession illegal?
➢ The demand to vacate which is not complied.
•
If you don’t demand to vacate then the possession
continues to be legal.
•
Because there is the need of the demand to make the
possession illegal, you must allege in your compliant
that there was a demand letter sent.
•
Otherwise, if you do not allege, your complaint is fatally
defective. Basaha una ang complaint if naa ba allegation
nga demand to vacate. NO ALLEGATION, NO CAUSE OF
ACTION.
•
In FORCIBLE ENTRY, demand to vacate is not a
requirement because possession is already illegal from the
very start. But you have to allege how the entry was made.
•
When you allege – don’t say – “Entry is made through
force, intimidation, strategy and stealth” – THIS IS
WRONG! That allegation cannot stand.
Issue in Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer:
Possession
•
Possession and Ownership are two different things.
•
And Possession in itself has 2 different natures:
➢ Possession de jure – the legal possession, it is
entitled to protection even if you are not the owner.
Ex: lessee
➢ Possession de facto – without regard to legal
possession – this is a question of who is in actual
possession – this court here is still asking who
occupied the land, wa pa nangutana ang korte kung
unsa ba ang imo legality of possession.
•
There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is
entitled to physical or material possession of the premises,
that is, to possession de facto, not possession de jure.
Forcible Entry vs. Unlawful Detainer
•
It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which
determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry
or unlawful detainer.
•
If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed
against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry
is legal, but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the
case is unlawful detainer.
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Accordingly, in forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege
in the complaint and prove that he was in prior
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physical possession of the property in litigation until
he was deprived thereof by the defendant.
In unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have prior
physical possession of the property, or, elsewise stated,
prior physical possession is not an indispensable
requirement in an unlawful detainer case.
Estate of Soledad Manantan vs. Aniceto Somera
On 10 March 1998, Soledad Manantan filed with the MTCC
Baguio City a Complaint for ejectment and damages
against respondent Aniceto Somera and a certain
Presentacion Tavera (Tavera), whom se found out was
occupying a portion of her property after causing a
relocation survey of the subject property.
She asked them to leave as she was about to sell the
property, but they refused. Thus, the buyer backed out.
Manantan, throughher lawyer, sent a formal letter of
demand them to leave, but it was ignored.
Despite efforts at the Barangay level of justice, no
amicable settlement was arrived at.
In their Joint Answer, respondent Somera and Tavera
averred hat the MTCC had no jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. 10467, because it was neither an action for forcible
entry nor for unlawful detainer. They also said that the
complaint did not allege that Manantan was deprived of
possession of the disputed portions by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth, which would make a case for
forcible entry.
The respondents argued that the Complaint also did not
state that the respondents withheld possession of the
disputed portions from Manantan after expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession of the same by
virtue of an express or implied contract, which would build
a case for unlawful detainer.
Respondents claimed that their use of said portions had
been recognized by the Bayot family, Manantan's
predecessors-in-interest.
The MTCC rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 10467 on
21 May 1999, favoring Manantan. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the case.
Supreme Court Ruling
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Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of
possession of real property. This action may be filed by a
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration... or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.
•
In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the
defendant was originally legal, as his possession was
permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or
implied contract between them. However, defendant's
possession became illegal when the plaintiff demanded
that defendant vacate the subject property due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess under
their contract, and the latter refused to heed such demand.
•
It appears from the allegations in the Complaint that the
respondent was already in possession of the disputed
portion at the time Manantan bought the subject property
from the Bayot family, and it was only after the conduct of
a relocation survey, which supposedly showed that
respondent was encroaching on the subject property, did
Manantan begin asserting her claim of ownership over the
portion occupied and used by respondent. Clearly,
respondent's possession of the disputed portion was
not pursuant to any contract, express or implied,
with Manantan, and, resultantly, respondent's right
•
•
of possession over the disputed portion is not
subject to expiration or termination.
To vest the court with the jurisdiction to effect the
ejectment of an occupant from the land in an... action for
unlawful detainer, it is necessary that the complaint should
embody such a statement of facts clearly showing
attributes of unlawful detainer cases, as this proceeding is
summary in nature.
Noticeably, the Complaint does not allege facts showing
compliance with the prescribed one-year period to file an
action for unlawful detainer. It does not state the material
dates that would have established that it was filed within
one year from the date of Manantan's... last demand upon
respondent to vacate the disputed portion of land.
Note:
•
An action for forcible entry was filed.
•
The owner discovered that the defendant encroached on
the portion of the subject property.
•
No contract/lease contract in this case. No implied
contract (no formal contract – possession by mere
tolerance) in this case.
•
SC’s Ruling: Unlawful Detainer is not the appropriate
remedy in this case because there’s no valid contract.
•
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Casilang vs. Casilang-Dizon
On May 26, 1997, respondent Rosario filed with the MTC
of Calasiao, Pangasinan a complaint for unlawful detainer
to evict her uncle, petitioner Jose from Lot No. 4618.
Rosario claimed that Lot No. 4618 was owned by her father
Ireneo, as evidenced by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 555
issued in 1994 under her father’s name. On April 3, 1997,
the respondents executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition
with Quitclaim whereby they adjudicated Lot No. 4618 to
themselves. In the same instrument, respondents Mario,
Angelo and Rodolfo renounced their respective shares in
Lot No. 4618 in favor of Rosario.
In his Answer, Jose raised the defense that he was the
"lawful, absolute, exclusive owner and in actual
possession" of the said lot, and that he acquired the same
"through intestate succession from his late father."
He failed to appear at the pre-trial conference, thus, the
adverse judgment against him rendered by the MTC
ordering Jose to remove his house, vacate Lot No. 4618.
On June 2, 1998, the petitioners, counting 7 of the 8
children of Liborio and Francisca (The respondent’s aunts
and uncle), filed with the RTC of Dagupan City a Complaint
for "Annulment of Documents, Ownership and Peaceful
Possession with Damages" against the respondents, the
RTC of Dagupan rendered a decision in portioner’s favor.
Supreme Court Ruling
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Inferior courts are empowered to rule on the
question of ownership raised by the defendant in an
ejectment suit, but only to resolve the issue of
possession; its determination is not conclusive on
the issue of ownership.
•
It is well to be reminded of the settled distinction between
a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for
recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land.
•
What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer
from a possessory action (accion publiciana) and from a
reinvindicatory action (accion reivindicatoria) is that the
first is limited to the question of possession de facto.
•
Unlawful detainer suits (accion interdictal) together with
forcible entry are the two forms of ejectment suit that may
be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside from
the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the
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plenary action to recover the right of possession and
accion reivindicatoria or the action to recover ownership
which also includes recovery of possession, make up the
three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession.
Under Section 3 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the
Summary Procedure governs the two forms of ejectment
suit, the purpose being to provide an expeditious means
of protecting actual possession or right to possession of
the property. They are not processes to determine the
actual title to an estate. If at all, inferior courts are
empowered to rule on the question of ownership
raised by the defendant in such suits, only to resolve
the issue of possession and its determination on the
ownership issue is not conclusive.
As thus provided in Section 16 of Rule 70: Sec. 16.
Resolving defense of ownership. ― When the defendant
raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership
shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.
It is apropos, then, to note that in contrast to Civil Case
No. 847, which is an ejectment case, Civil Case No. 9802371-D is for "Annulment of Documents, Ownership and
Peaceful Possession;" it is an accion reivindicatoria, or
action to recover ownership, which necessarily includes
recovery of possession as an incident thereof. Jose asserts
his ownership over Lot No. 4618 under a partition
agreement with his co-heirs and seeks to invalidate
Ireneo’s "claim" over Lot No. 4618 and to declare TD No.
555 void, and consequently, to annul the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition and Quitclaim executed by Ireneo’s
heirs.
Fe U. Quijano vs. Atty. Daryll A. Amante
The petitioner and her siblings, namely: Eliseo, Jose and
Gloria, inherited from their father, the late Bibiano
Quijano, the parcel of land.
On April 23, 1990, prior to any partition among the heirs,
Eliseo sold a portion of his share to respondent Atty. Daryll
A. Amante (respondent).
On September 30, 1992, petitioner Fe, Eliseo, Jose and
Gloria executed a deed of extrajudicial partition to divide
their father's estate (consisting of the aforementioned
parcel of land) among themselves.
Due to the petitioner's needing her portion that was then
occupied by the respondent, she demanded that the latter
vacate it.
Despite several demands, the last of which was by the
letter dated November 4, 1994, the respondent refused to
vacate, prompting her to file against him a complaint for
ejectment and damages in MTCC.
The MTCC ruled in favor of petitioner but the RTC and CA
reversed the aforesaid decision.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
An ejectment case can be either for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer. It is a summary proceeding designed to
provide expeditious means to protect the actual
possession or the right to possession of the property
involved.
•
The sole question for resolution in the case is the
physical or material possession (possession de
facto) of the property in question, and neither a
claim of juridical possession (possession de jure)
nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can
outrightly deprive the trial court from taking due
cognizance of the case.
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Hence, even if the question of ownership is raised in the
pleadings, like here, the court may pass upon the issue
but only to determine the question of possession
especially if the question of ownership is
inseparably linked with the question of possession.
The adjudication of ownership in that instance is
merely provisional, and will not bar or prejudice an
action between the same parties involving the title
to the property.
Considering that the parties are both claiming ownership
of the disputed property, the CA properly ruled on the
issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining who
between them had the better right to possess the disputed
property.
In a co-ownership, the undivided thing or right belong to
different persons, with each of them holding the property
pro indiviso and exercising her rights over the whole
property. Each co-owner may use and enjoy the property
with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the
interests of his co-owners.
The underlying rationale is that until a division is actually
made, the respective share of each cannot be determined,
and every co-owner exercises, together with his coparticipants, joint ownership of the pro indiviso property,
in addition to his use and enjoyment of it.
Even if an heir's right in the estate of the decedent has not
yet been fully settled and partitioned and is thus merely
inchoate, Article 4932 of the Civil Code gives the heir the
right to exercise acts of ownership.
Accordingly, when Eliseo sold the disputed property to the
respondent in 1990 and 1991, he was only a co-owner
along with his siblings, and could sell only that portion that
would be allotted to him upon the termination of the coownership. The sale did not vest ownership of the disputed
property in the respondent but transferred only the seller's
pro indiviso share to him, consequently making him, as the
buyer, a co-owner of the disputed property until it is
partitioned.
SC dismissed saying that unlawful detainer is NOT the
proper remedy.
Comments:
•
Fe Quijano filed a case action to recover pursuant to
tolerance. Thus, not a forcible entry.
•
Atty. Amante bought a portion of the property, which is
co- owned by Quijano siblings (including Fe Quijano). He
bought the property without any partition. If you bought
something when there is no partition yet, the buyer cannot
claim a specific portion of the property. The buyer is only
buying the interest of the co-owner.
•
Atty. Amante occupied a specific portion of the property,
provided that there’s no partition yet among the siblings.
•
After such time, there was partition, the share that was
occupied by Atty. Amante was the share that pertain to Fe
Quijano.
•
Fe Quijano filed an ejectment case of unlawful detainer
(based on tolerance) against Atty. Amante.
•
Atty. Amante disagreed with the argument of Fe Quijano
on the ground that he bought the property. Fe Quijano
admitted that Atty. Amante bought the share of her
sibling.
•
SC’s Ruling:
➢ Did not agree with Fe Quijano.
➢ You cannot just invoke tolerance – “pwede na dayon,
successful na dayon imong unlawful detainer kay nay
word na tolerance” – Atty. G.
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There Are Situations Here That You Cannot Avoid Ruling
on the Issue on Ownership to Determine Who Has
Possession
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Example: 2 Claimants: 1 in actual possession, the other is
not. But both have title to the same lot.
•
So how is the real owner now? Aw wa ta kabaw, that’s the
beauty of law.
•
It is just unavoidable that the judge will just rule on
ownership preliminarily because it would be easy to
determine the right to possession. Remember that one
attribute to ownership is the right to possess.
•
But whatever the decision of the court in the issue
of ownership in the forcible entry case, that is not
final. That is only provisional.
➢ If later on the other party will again question the
ownership, the winning party could not invoke
res judicata because, again, the finding of the
court of the ownership in a Forcible Entry case
is just PROVISIONAL.
3.
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4.
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Accion Publiciana
Action to recover better right of possession of a Real
Property.
Judgment is conclusive only on the question of possession,
and not that of ownership. It does not bind the title or
affect the ownership of the property involved.
Can be resorted to when you’re really time-barred in filing
forcible entry.
➢ When the 1-year period has expired, but before the
lapse of 10 year period.
Can also be resorted to recover right of possession when
you have an independent right of possession.
Meaning, your action is not grounded by ownership as your
basis of your possession, when your right to the
possession is independent of ownership.
➢ Example: You are a lessee deprived of possession you can file action publiciana because you have the
right to possession independent of ownership.
Where to file:
➢ Regional Trial Court – If the assessed value of the
property is greater than P20, 000
➢ Metropolitan Trial Court – If the assessed value of the
property is up to P20,000 (less than or equal to
P20,000).
When to file: Within 10 years
•
Accion Reivindicatoria
Action to recover possession of a Real Property on the
basis of ownership.
Can be resorted if you’re relying on “being the owner” as
your basis for the possession.
This is not an action to recover ownership – this is
still an action to recover possession, but the possession
here is based on ownership.
The source of the right of possession here is the
ownership.
This is the Right mentioned earlier with regard to
ownership, the right to possess.
Where to file:
➢ Regional Trial Court – If the assessed value of the
property is greater than P20, 000
➢ Metropolitan Trial Court – If the assessed value of the
property is up to P20,000 (less than or equal to
P20,000).
When to file: Within 10 years
5.
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Injunction
Provisional remedy, not a remedy itself. (Rule 58)
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6.
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Writ of Possession
To recover possession.
Note:
•
If there’s already a judgment, adjudicating ownership of
the land, then you are not in possession. There’s no need
to file a separate ejectment suit.
•
All you have to do is to file a motion on the same
proceeding to be placed in possession. As owner, you are
entitled to possession.
It does not mean that that if a person gains possession
ahead of you, you will never win an ejectment case.
•
Example: You bought a real property, but it is occupied by
squatters ahead of your possession thereof.
•
You can still file unlawful detainer suit. Just allege that the
right of the former own is transmitted to you. The
tolerance of the former owner is also transmitted to you.
•
However, you should properly draft your complaint. In an
unlawful detainer suit, you must be very careful when you
draft the complaint. All necessary allegations must be
there.
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You must allege that there is a demand to vacate. No
demand to vacate, your complaint is defective.
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If the date of demand to vacate is not specified, you have
no way of determining the 1-year period.
When he is defeated in this unlawful detainer suit? Is he
also defeated of the ownership of the land? Can he no
longer ask the defendant to vacate?
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He can still file for Action Reivindicatoria, to recover the
possession of the land based on ownership.
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As distinguished from unlawful detainer, where it is not
dependent on ownership.
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So, if you win the action for reivindicatoria, the defendant
has no choice but to vacate the land because your title will
cover the said property and it is just your right to take
possession thereof.
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Pildi man ka sa unlawful detainer but the issue there is just
who is in the actual possession, while in action
reivindicatoria – the issue of ownership will be
exhaustively dealt with by the court.
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So if you are currently in possession of the property which
is subject to action reivindicatoria, would it be possible for
you to still file said action even if you are not actually
deprived of the possession of the property? Yes. (See INC
case)
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Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Ponferrada
In October 2001, Enrique Santos et.al filed a complaint for
quieting of title and/or accion reivindincatoria against
Iglesia ni Cristo.
They alleged that they are owners of a 936 sq.m. parcel of
land in Tandang Sora, Quezon City which they inherited
from Enrique Sr.
Iglesia filed a motion to dismiss contending that the action
has prescribed. It appears that it was able to obtain a TCT
over the same parcel of land way back in 1984-the year
when the title was issued in their favor.
In support of its contention, Iglesia contended that the
accion reivindicatoria presupposes that the plaintiff is not
in actual possession of the property he seeks to recover.
Thus, this is true in this case because it (Iglesia) was in
possession of the property in 1984 when the title was
issued to it.
Supreme Court Ruling
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The action has not yet prescribed.
Petitioner’s claim that it had been in actual or material
possession of the property since 1984 when TCT No.
321744 was issued in its favor is belied by the allegations
in the complaint that respondents had been in actual and
material possession of the property since 1961 up to the
time they filed their complaint on October 24, 2001.
Admittedly, respondents interposed the alternative
reinvindicatory action against petitioner. An accion
reivindicatoria does not necessarily presuppose that
the actual and material possession of the property is
on defendant and that plaintiff seeks the recovery of
such possession from defendant.
It bears stressing that an accion reivindicatoria is a
remedy seeking the recovery of ownership and
includes jus possidendi, jus utendi, and jus fruendi
as well. It is an action whereby a party claims ownership
over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full
possession.
Thus, the owner of real property in actual and
material possession thereof may file an accion
reivindicatoria against another seeking ownership
over a parcel of land including jus vindicandi, or the
right to exclude defendants from the possession
thereof.
In this case, respondents filed an alternative
reinvindicatory action claiming ownership over the
property and the cancellation of TCT No. 321744 under the
name of petitioner. In fine, they sought to enforce their jus
utendi and jus vindicandi when petitioner claimed
ownership and prevented them from fencing the property.
Comments:
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When there is certificate of title, 2 copies are issued. 1 to
the registered owner (Santos), 1 to the register of deeds.
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When the copy in the register of deeds will be burnt or lost,
the owner is required to file a petition for reconstitution of
title. The purpose of reconstitution is to reconstruct the
lost title of your property.
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One of the bases for the reconstitution is the copy of the
registered owner. Here, when the title was reconstituted,
nigawas na ang title but on the name of INC. Technically,
there are now two separate titles covering the same
property.
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There was a disturbance, not actually deprived. Because
there was fencing made on the property.
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So, when the Santoses discovered that there is another
title covering the same property, they filed for Quieting of
Title in order to silence any cloud of doubt that may be
cast about the title – to declare the other title void.
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But there is an alternative prayer in the complaint of
Santoses: an action reivindicatoria. This is the
opening attacked by the Iglesia ni Cristo – alleging in
their defense that they acquired their TCT on 1984 – they
put up a defense on prescription because the complaint
was filed on 2000. According to Iglesia, they were able to
get a title way back in 1984. If we will reckon the
deprivation of possession in 1984, the action has been
prescribed.
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At the time of filing there was no expiration of the
prescriptive period.
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LOGIC
BEHIND
THERE
DEFENSE:
Action
Reivindicatoria presupposes that the plaintiff is
deprived of the possession of the property.
➢ Because prescription will run, in Quieting of Title
case, if the plaintiff is not in possession (10
years).
But if the plaintiff is in possession, prescription
will never run.
INC alleged that since the case is action reivindicatoria,
implied that they are in fact deprived of possession.
Because who is this stupid person who will file AR if he is
not deprived of possession?
SC held that accion reivindicatoria can also be field not
only by a person deprived of possession but also by a
person who is in actual possession of the property.
Because in Accion Reivindicatoria what are actually
protected are all attributes of the right to ownership.
It is not therefore correct that if you are not
deprived of possession, you cannot have the remedy
of AR – because if other rights of ownership are
violated, then you can very well file AR.
As long as all attributes of rights of ownership are involved,
AR is a proper remedy
In this case what are the rights of Santoses that are
violated?
➢ Right to Enjoy (to fence their property)
➢
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Accion Reivindicatoria can be filed even if you are not
deprived of possession
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For an Accion Reivindicatoria to prosper, it’s not necessary
the possessor be deprived of possession. In other words,
even if you’re not actually deprived of possession, you can
still file an Accion Reivindicatoria.
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Even if you are in possession but for as long as there is a
violation of any attributes of ownership, the owner can still
find his recourse under Accion Reivindicatoria.
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Suarez vs. Emboy
A parcel of land was partitioned into 5 among the heirs of
the Carlos and Asuncion. Lot No. 1907-A-2 was occupied
by Felix and Marilou Emboy, who were claiming that they
inherited it from their mother Claudia Emboy, who
inherited it from her parents Carlos and Asuncion.
Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins to vacate Lot
No. 1907-A-2 and transfer to Lot No. 1907-A-5. They
refused to comply and insisted that Claudia's inheritance
pertained to Lot No. 1907-A-2.
In 2004, Felix and Marilou received a demand letter from
Carmencita requiring them to vacate the lot and informed
them that she had already purchased the lot from the
former's relatives.
Felix and Marilou did not heed the demand so Carmencita
filed before the MTCC a complaint against unlawful
detainer against them.
Felix and Marilou argued that the complaint for unlawful
detainer was fundamentally inadequate. There was
practically no specific allegation as to when and how
possession by tolerance of them began.
Supreme Court Ruling
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Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove how Emboy
entered the lot and constructed a house upon it. She was
also silent about the details on who specifically permitted
Emboy to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance
came about.
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In ejectment cases, it is necessary that the complaint must
sufficiently show a statement of facts to determine the
class of case and remedies available to the parties.
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When the complaint fails to state the facts
constituting a forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as
where it does not state how entry was effected or
how the dispossession started, the remedy should
either be
an accion publiciana
or accion
reivindicatoria.
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“Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is
entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot
simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual
occupation of the property. To recover possession, he
must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he
chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the
conditions necessary for such action to prosper.”
As an exception to the general rule, the respondents’
petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No.
1907-A can abate Carmencita’s suit for unlawful
detainer.
Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer is anchored
upon the proposition that the respondents have been in
possession of the subject lot by mere tolerance of the
owners.
The respondents, on the other hand, raise the defense of
ownership of the subject lot and point to the pendency of
Civil Case No. CEB-30548, a petition for nullification of the
partition of Lot No. 1907-A, in which Carmencita and the
Heirs of Vicente were impleaded as parties.
Further, should Carmencita’s complaint be granted, the
respondents’ house, which has been standing in the
subject lot for decades, would be subject to demolition.
The foregoing circumstances, thus, justify the exclusion of
the instant petition from the purview of the general rule.
Paul Gabriel vs. Crisologo
Carmeling Crisologo, represented by her attorney-in-fact,
Pedro Isican, filed her complaint for Recovery of
Possession and/or Ownership with Damages against Juliet
B. Pulkera, Paul P. Gabriel, Ireneo C. Calwag, and Thomas
L. Tingga-an (petitioners) before the MTCC.
Crisologo alleged, among others, that she was the
registered owner of two parcels of and covered by, two (2)
certificates of title; that the properties were covered by an
Assessment of Real Property; that the payments of realty
taxes on the said properties were updated; that sometime
in 2006, she discovered that petitioners unlawfully
entered, occupied her properties by stealth, by force and
without her prior consent and knowledge, and constructed
their houses thereon; that upon discovery of their illegal
occupation, her daughter, Atty. Carmelita Crisologo, and
Isican personally went to the properties and verbally
demanded that petitioners vacate the premises and
remove their structures thereon; that the petitioners
begged and promised to buy the said properties for; that
despite several demands they were not able to pay and or
vacate.;
On the other hand, petitioners countered that the titles of
Crisologo were products of Civil Registration Case No. 1,
Record 211, which were declared void by the Supreme
Court, that Crisologo failed to comply with the conditions
provided in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 for the validation of
said titles, hence, the titles were void; that petitioners had
been in open, actual, exclusive, notorious, uninterrupted,
and continuous possession of the subject land, in good
faith.
Supreme Court Ruling
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The Court holds that Crisologo has a better right of
possession over the subject parcels of land.
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Accion Publiciana: its nature and purpose - Also known as
accion plenaria de posesion, accion publiciana is an
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better
right of possession of realty independently of title. It
refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one
year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.
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The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is
to recover possession only, not ownership. When
parties, however, raise the issue of ownership, the court
may pass upon the issue to determine who between the
parties has the right to possess the property.
This adjudication, nonetheless, is not a final and
binding determination of the issue of ownership; it
is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession,
where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the
issue of possession.
The nullity of the decrees of registration and certificates of
titles in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 is not absolute.
Although Section 1 of P.D. No. 127 invalidated decrees of
registration and certificates of title within the Baguio Town
site Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211, the
nullity, however, is not that sweeping.
The said provision expressly states that "all certificates of
titles issued on or before July 31, 1973 shall be considered
valid and the lands covered by them shall be deemed to
have been conveyed in fee simple to the registered
owners" upon 1) showing proof that the land covered by
the subject title is not within any government, public or
quasi-public reservation, forest, military or otherwise, as
certified by appropriating government agencies; and 2)
compliance by the titleholder with the payment to the
Republic of the Philippines of the correct assessed value of
the land within the required period.
In the case at bench, the records show that the subject
parcels of land were registered on August 24, 1967.
The titles are, thus, considered valid although
subject to the conditions set.
But whether or not Crisologo complied with the said
conditions would not matter because, this would be a
collateral attack on her registered titles.
At any rate, petitioners, as private individuals, are not the
proper parties to question the status of the respondent’s
registered titles. It is the Solicitor General who shall
institute such actions or suits as may be necessary to
recover possession of lands covered by all void titles not
validated under the decree.
The respondent’s certificates of title give her the better
right to possess the subject parcels of land.
LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO OWNERSHIP
1. Imposed by the inherent powers of the state
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Police Power, Eminent Domain and Power of Taxation
2. Imposed by law –
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You can find it in our statutes.
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Easement – encumbrance imposed upon an
immovable for the benefit of another immovable.
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Encumbrance – The property that you own may carry
a burden for the benefit of another immovable.
(Example: compel to grant a right of way)
3. Imposed by the grantor
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In cases where you received a property from another
person (Example: donation with a condition;
conditions on the will and testaments)
4. Imposed by the owner
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Example: When you lease your property, you are in
effect restraining yourself from using the property.
The possessory right is given to the lessee, the owner
can’t just go inside the property to conduct an
inspection.
1. Limitations imposed by the inherent powers of the
state
a. Police Power
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The power of the state to regulate liberty and property
rights to its citizens for the promotion of general welfare.
It restricts the right of private owners to exercise their
rights to ownership
Examples: Registration of your vehicle; You have a parcel
of land in a subdivision, you cannot just put a business
building there because it is a residential area classified
pursuant to a zoning ordinance.
City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta
Sec. 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 was promulgated in
Quezon City which approved the regulation of
establishment of private cemeteries in the said city.
It is stated in the ordinance that 6% of the total area of
the private memorial park shall be set aside for charity
burial.
For several years, the said section of the Ordinance was
not enforced, but seven years after the enactment of the
ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution to
request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further
selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon
City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the
required 6% space intended for paupers’ burial.
The Quezon City Engineer then notified respondent
Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of the
ordinance would be enforced.
Himlayang Pilipino contends that the taking or confiscation
of property restricts the use of property such that it cannot
be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the
owner of all beneficial use of his property.
It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of
police power, since the properties taken in the exercise of
police power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the
public.
The RTC declared the Ordinance null and void.
Supreme Court Ruling
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It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police
power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation
or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the
promotion of the general welfare.
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Police power does not involve the taking or
confiscation of property with the exception of a few
cases where there is a necessity to confiscate
private property in order to destroy it for the
purpose of protecting the peace and order and of
promoting the general welfare as for instance, the
confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium
and firearms.
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Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon
City is not a mere police regulation but an outright
confiscation.
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It deprives a person of his private property without
due process of law without compensation.
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There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside
of at least six (6) percent of the total area of private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers
and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety,
or the general welfare of the people.
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The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of
a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers
who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of
building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose,
the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
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The expropriation without compensation of a portion of
private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of
Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City
which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of
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the dead within the center of population of the city and to
provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and
cemeteries.
When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg.
337 provides in Section 177(q) that a sangguniang
panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such
place and in such manner as prescribed by law or
ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its
own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private
properties to construct public cemeteries. This has
been the law, and practise in the past. It continues to the
present.
Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is different
from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions
to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds,
and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers
of subdivision lots.
The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience
are very clear from said requirements which are intended
to insure the development of communities with salubrious
and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the
regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision
developer when individual lots are sold to homeowners.
Comments:
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Legal basis of the City Government of Quezon City:
Quezon City Charter (Police power)
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SC’s Ruling: Did not agree that this is a proper exercise of
police power, because police power is merely a regulation
but not confiscation. Quezon City was practicing
confiscation because they were trying to get a portion of
the cemetery that is a private property.
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Note: Police power was resorted to because of money. You
are not obligated to compensate, whereas in eminent
domain, money should be paid upon taking of the
property. Proper power used here should be eminent
domain.
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What are the elements you need to remember in Eminent
Domain?
➢ Taking – there must be just compensation it must be
justified by reason of public purpose
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If you are a private subdivision developer, you are required
to allot certain percentage of the total land area for open
space. Then after that, you have to donate it to the LGU.
The latter must accept the donation. This is an example of
compulsory t donation. The reason that LGU must accept
so that the lot will become a city property. So that the
spending of city funds there will be justified.
Just Compensation in Eminent Domain
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The Court shall determine Just Compensation – this is a
judicial function. It cannot just be determined by mere
mathematical comparison.
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There was a case that there was a Presidential Decree
fixing just compensation. It was questioned because just
compensation is a judicial function. It deprived the court
of its function.
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City of Manila, et al. vs. Laguio
March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an
ordinance enacted which prohibited certain forms of
amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where
women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend
to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and
adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community.
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The Ordinance prohibited the establishment of sauna
parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night
clubs, day clubs, cabarets, motels, inns. Owners and
operators of the enumerated establishments are given
three months to wind up business operations or transfer
to any place outside Ermita-Malate or convert said
businesses to other kinds allowable within the area.
Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC), a
corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels,
motels, hostels and lodging houses, filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order.
MTDC prayed that the ordinance prohibiting the
establishment or operation of businesses providing certain
forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities
in the Ermita-Malate area insofar as it includes motels and
inns as among its prohibited establishments be declared
invalid and unconstitutional.
MTDC contend that they did not use women as tools for
entertainment, and neither did they disturb the community
nor adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community.
Further, MTDC maintains that the City Council has no
power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance
per se nor does it have the power to extrajudicially destroy
it.
Supreme Court Ruling
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The City Council cannot seek cover under the general
welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances
without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a
nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety
of persons and property and may be summarily abated
under the undefined law of necessity.
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It cannot be said that motels are injurious to the rights of
property, health or comfort of the community. It is a
legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it
may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that
purpose.
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The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long
line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid,
it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according
to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform
to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
Comments:
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Ordinance: Prohibition of certain establishments such as
motels in the Malate area because it might corrupt the
morals of the people.
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SC’s Ruling: The ordinance is invalid. Elimination of such
establishment will not diminish the immoral acts. Engaging
in motel businesses is valid.
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Note: Preventing of immoral acts can be a valid objective
in the police power, however it should also be germane
with the purpose of the law.
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OSG vs. Ayala Land
The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce and on
Justice and Human Rights conducted a joint investigation
to inquire on the legality of the parking fees charged by
Ayala Land Corp., Robinsons Land Corp., Shangri-La Plaza
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Corp., and SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (respondents) and to
find out the basis and reasonableness of the parking rates.
The Senate Committees concluded that the collection of
parking fee is contrary to the National Building Code as it
states that parking spaces are for free; thus, the
Committee recommended that the OSG should institute
the necessary action to enjoin the collection of parking
fees.
Civil cases for the recommendation arose in the RTC of
Makati. The court ruled that the respondents are not
obligated to provide parking spaces that are free of charge,
compelling them to do so would be an unlawful taking of
property right without just compensation.
Supreme Court Ruling
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Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually
invoking police power to justify the regulation by the State,
through the DPWH Secretary and local building officials, of
privately owned parking facilities, including the collection
by the owners/operators of such facilities of parking fees
from the public for the use thereof.
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In totally prohibiting respondents from collecting
parking fees from the public for the use of the mall
parking facilities, the State would be acting beyond
the bounds of police power.
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Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results
in the taking or appropriation of title to and possession of,
the expropriated property; but no cogent reason
appears why the said power may not be availed of
only to impose a burden upon the owner of
condemned property, without loss of title and possession.
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It is a settled rule that neither acquisition of title nor total
destruction of value is essential to taking. It is usually in
cases where title remains with the private owner that
inquiry should be made to determine whether the
impairment of a property is merely regulated or
amounts to a compensable taking.
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A regulation that deprives any person of the
profitable use of his property constitutes a taking
and entitles him to compensation, unless the invasion
of rights is so slight as to permit the regulation to be
justified under the police power.
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Similarly, a police regulation that unreasonably restricts
the right to use business property for business purposes
amounts to a taking of private property, and the owner
may recover therefor.
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The prohibition against their collection of parking
fees from the public, for the use of said facilities, is
already tantamount to a taking or confiscation of
their properties. The State is not only requiring that
respondents devote a portion of the latter’s properties for
use as parking spaces but is also mandating that they give
the public access to said parking spaces for free.
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Such is already an excessive intrusion into the
property rights of respondents. Not only are they being
deprived of the right to use a portion of their properties as
they wish, they are further prohibited from profiting from
its use or even just recovering therefrom the expenses for
the maintenance and operation of the required parking
facilities.
Comments:
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SolGen is prohibiting malls to collect parking fees from its
constituents.
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Initially it was the Congress who questioned the legality of
rules of such establishment.
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National building code allows owner to collect parking fees.
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Note: You cannot cite the National Building Code as the
legal basis to compel a building owner to provide a free
parking space. It’s the right of the property owner to
collect parking fees.
MMDA vs Trackworks
In 1997, the Government, through the DOTC, entered into
a build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT agreement) with
Metro Rail Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant
to Republic Act No. 6957 (Build, Operate and Transfer
Law), under which MRTC undertook to build MRT3 subject
to the condition that MRTC would own MRT3 for 25 years,
upon the expiration of which the ownership would transfer
to the Government.
In 1998, respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising,
Vending & Promotions, Inc. (Trackworks) entered into a
contract for advertising services with MRTC. Trackworks
thereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and
other advertising media in the different parts of the MRT3.
In 2001, however, MMDA requested Trackworks to
dismantle the billboards, signages and other advertising
media pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, whereby
MMDA prohibited the posting, installation and display of
any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers,
in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts,
trees, parks and open space.
After Trackworks refused the request of MMDA, MMDA
proceeded to dismantle the former’s billboards and similar
forms of advertisement.
Supreme Court Ruling
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Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards,
signages and other advertising media in the MRT3 from
MRTC’s authority under the BLT agreement to develop
commercial premises in the MRT3 structure or to obtain
advertising income therefrom is no longer debatable.
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Under the BLT agreement, indeed, MRTC owned the MRT3
for 25 years, upon the expiration of which MRTC would
transfer ownership of the MRT3 to the Government.
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Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of
the MRT3 during the time material to this case, and
until this date, MRTC’s entering into the contract for
advertising services with Trackworks was a valid
exercise of ownership by the former.
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In fact, in another case, this Court expressly recognized
Trackworks’ right to install the billboards, signages and
other advertising media pursuant to said contract. The
latter’s right should, therefore, be respected.
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It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to
justify the dismantling of Trackworks’ billboards, signages
and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no
power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy
the billboards, signages and other advertising media
installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks.
•
In numerous cases, the Court had the occasion to rule that
MMDA’s powers were limited to the formulation,
coordination,
regulation,
implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of
policies, installing a system, and administration.
Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA
police power, let alone legislative power.
•
The prohibition (in the MMDA resolution) against posting,
installation and display of billboards, signages and other
advertising media applied only to public areas, but MRT3,
being private property pursuant to the BLT agreement
between the Government and MRTC, was not one of the
areas as to which the prohibition applied.
Comments:
•
During the existence of agreement, it is still of private
ownership. Trackworks allowed installation of signages
and billboards.
•
MMDA took all of the signages because it was a nuisance
and of course, Trackworks objected. They told the court
that it was an improper use of police power measure.
•
SC’s Ruling: SC agreed. Agreement was between MRT
trade and also that part or MRT line is both private
ownership and MMDA has no standing yet.
b. Eminent Domain
•
The power of the state to take away private properties for
public purpose upon payment of just compensation.
•
This power is coercive in the sense that even if the
property owner does not want to part with his property,
especially a parcel of land, then the state can forcibly take
it away from him, but there has to be payment of just
compensation.
OLD RULE:
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ATO and MCIA vs. Gopuco
Respondent was the owner of a property located in the
vicinity of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City.
In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC) informed
the owners of the various lots surrounding the Lahug
Airport, including the herein respondent, that the
government was acquiring their lands for purposes of
expansion.
Some landowners were convinced to sell their
properties on the assurance that they would be able
to repurchase the same when these would no longer
be used by the airport. Others, including Respondent
refused.
Subsequently, when the Mactan International Airport
commenced operations, the Lahug Airport was ordered
closed by then President Corazon C. Aquino in 1989.
Respondent wrote the Bureau of Air Transportation,
through the manager of the Lahug Airport, seeking the
return of his lot and offering to return the money
previously received by him as payment for the
expropriation.
Respondent filed an amended complaint for recovery of
ownership of the said lot against the Petitioners.
RTC dismissed the complaint and directed the respondent
to pay the MCIAA exemplary damages, litigation expenses
and costs.
Respondent appealed to the CA, which overturned the RTC
decision, ordered petitioners to reconvey the property.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
The answer to the question (whether the owner may still
recover his property which was expropriated for public use,
when such public use is abandoned) depends upon the
character of the title acquired by the expropriator,
whether it be the State, a province, a municipality, or a
corporation which has the right to acquire property under
the power of eminent domain.
•
If, for example, land is expropriated for a particular
purpose, with the condition that when that purpose
is ended or abandoned the property shall return to
its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose
is terminated or abandoned the former owner
reacquires the property so expropriated.
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Heirs of Moreno vs. MCIAA
MORENO: successors of 2 parcels of land
MCIAA wanted to acquire land. Government assured
landowners that they could repurchase their lands once
Lahug Airport was closed or its operations transferred to
Mactan Airport. Moreno refused the offer.
Civil Aeronautics Administration as the successor agency
of the National Airport Corporation filed a complaint with
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, for the expropriation
of land.
Trial court promulgated public use upon payment of just
compensation. MORENO were paid; no appeal. Certificates
of title were issued.
LAHUG AIRPORT CEASED OPERATIONS, lands not utilized.
Moreno plead for repurchase of land. Filed complaint for
reconveyance and damages.
He averred that they have been convinced not to oppose
since they could repurchase. MCIAA did not object.
ENCHUAN FILED FOR MOTION OF TRANSFER. He acquired
through deeds of assignment the rights of land.
DPWH claimed it leased in good faith from MCIAA to
Regional Equipment Services and Region 7 Office.
TRIAL COURT GRANTED RIGHT TO REPURCHASE but
subject to the alleged property rights of Richard E.
Enchuan and the leasehold of DPWH.
CA reversed: rights gained by MCIAA were indicative of
ownership in fee simple
Supreme Court Ruling
•
Return or repurchase of the condemned properties of
petitioners could be readily justified as the manifest
legal effect or consequence of the trial court’s
underlying presumption that “Lahug Airport will
continue to be in operation” when it granted the
complaint for eminent domain and the airport
discontinued its activities.
•
ARTICLE 1454: “If an absolute conveyance of property is
made in order to secure the performance of an obligation
of the grantor toward the grantee, a trust by virtue of law
is established. If the fulfillment of the obligation is offered
by the grantor when it becomes due, he may demand the
reconveyance of the property to him.”
•
In the case at bar, government obliged itself to use of land
for the expansion of Lahug Airport.Failure to keep its
bargain: can be compelled to reconvey, otherwise,
petitioners would be denied the use of their properties
upon a state of affairs that was not conceived nor
contemplated when the expropriation was authorized.
•
Petitioners, as if they were plaintiff-beneficiaries of a
constructive trust, must restore to MCIAA what they
received as just compensation for the expropriation
of the lots with consequential damages by way of
legal interest from 16 November 1947.
•
Petitioners must likewise pay MCIAA the necessary
expenses it may have incurred in sustaining the
properties and the monetary value of its services in
managing them to the extent that petitioners will be
benefited thereby.
•
ARTICLE 1189: “If the thing is improved by its nature, or
by time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit of the
creditor.”
➢ CREDITOR: person who stands to receive something
as a result of the process of restitution.
➢ Petitioners must pay MCIAA the necessary expenses
in sustaining the properties and services.
➢ Government may keep whatever income or fruits it
may have obtained from the parcels of land.
➢
Petitioners need not account for the interests that the
amounts they received as just compensation may
have earned in the meantime.
NEW RULE:
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MCIA vs. Lozada
Bernardo Lozada was the registered owner of Lot No. 88
located in Lahug, Cebu City. In the early 1960s, the
Republic sought to acquire by expropriation said lot,
among others, in connection with its program for the
improvement and expansion of the Lahug Airport.
The CFI rendered a decision against the land owners,
among whom was Lozada.
During the pendency of the latter’s appeal to the CA, the
parties entered into a compromise settlement to the effect
that the subject property would be resold to the original
owner in the event that the Government abandons the
Lahug Airport. Thus, Lozada did not pursue his appeal.
The projected expansion and improvement of the Lahug
Airport, however, failed to materialize because former
President Aquino directed the transfer of general aviation
operations at the Lahug Airport to the Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority.
This prompted Lozada, et al. to repurchase their property
from the Republic.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
The decision in the expropriation case provides that the
acquisition by the Republic of the expropriated lots was
subject to the condition that the Lahug Airport would
continue its operation.
•
The condition not having materialized because the airport
had been abandoned, the former owner should then be
allowed to reacquire the expropriated property.
•
It is well settled that the taking of private property by the
Governments power of eminent domain is subject to two
mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular
public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to
the property owner.
•
These requirements partake of the nature of implied
conditions that should be complied with to enable the
condemnor to keep the property expropriated.
•
More particularly, with respect to the element of
public use, the expropriator should commit to use
the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the
petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it
should file another petition for the new purpose.
•
If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to
return the said property to its private owner, if the
latter desires to reacquire the same.
•
Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an
intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable
element for the proper exercise of the power of
eminent domain, namely, the particular public
purpose for which the property will be devoted.
•
Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied
due process of law, and the judgment would violate the
property owners right to justice, fairness, and equity.
•
In sum, the expropriator should commit to use the
property pursuant to the purpose stated in the
petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it
should file another petition for the new purpose. If
not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to
return the said property to its private owner, if the
latter desires to reacquire the same.
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Eminent Doman, Rules (Settlement of Conflicting
Rulings):
•
Whenever your property is taken for public use and the
public use is abandoned, former owners may or may not
be entitled to recover the property.
•
OLD RULE: You can recover the land if you entered
into an agreement that the moment the land is
abandoned, you have the right to recover it. (Heirs
of Moreno)
•
In Moreno, SC made a distinction that this right of recovery
on the part of the owner would be dependent on the
nature of the expropriators’ title. In other words, if at
the time the expropriator obtains title over the property as
a result of eminent domain, there was no condition –
meaning absolute ang ownership sa State – there is no
right to recovery even if the public purpose is abandoned.
•
OLD RULE: The rule before was that if the title of the
expropriator is absolute even if the public purpose it’s
already been abandoned, the former landowners are not
entitled to recovery. (The controlling rule/doctrine now is
in the case of Mactan-Cebu Int’l. Airport vs Lozada)
•
Atty. Galeon is one of the lawyers here in Lozada. Lozada
is now the controlling case and not the Air Transportation.
•
NEW RULE: The doctrine is that regardless whether
there is a condition of recovery or not, the moment
that the public property is abandoned, you are
entitled to recover (if the state has not filed another
petition for the new purpose).
•
In Lozada, you don’t have to prove if the expropriation is
absolute or not. If the public purpose of the taking has
been abandoned the former owner is entitled as a
matter of right to recover their property whether
there is a promise or not.
2. Limitations imposed by Law
•
Homestead Patents – Under the law when you are a
grantee of a free patent, you are not supposed to
encumber it for 5 years from the issuance of the patent.
•
If you are a grantee of an agricultural land pursuant to a
grant from the Department of Agrarian Reform because
you are a landless beneficiary, you cannot sell or loan that
land.
•
Grantee of the land pursuant to Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA), you cannot sell, encumber or
even lease the property for 10 years.
➢ Remedy: File a cancellation of CLOA.
•
Legal easement of waters (Art. 637) - Art. 637. Lower
estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally
and without the intervention of man descend from the
higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which they
carry with them. (552)
•
Legal easement of right of way (Art. 649) - Art. 649. The
owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may
cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by
other immovables pertaining to other persons and without
adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand
a right of way through the neighboring estates, after
payment of the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that
its use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant
estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity
shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the
amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage
for the cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and
for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate
without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in
the payment of the damage caused by such encumbrance.
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This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the
immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts.
Lunod vs. Meneses
On the 14th of March, 1904, Nicolas Lunod, et.al., alleging
that they each owned and possessed farm lands, situated
in the places known as Maytunas and Balot, near a small
lake named Calalaran.
He alleged that the defendant Higino Meneses, owner of a
fish-pond and a strip of land situated in Paraanan,
adjoining the said lake on one side, and the River Taliptip
on the other; that from time immemorial, and
consequently for more than twenty years before 1901,
there existed and still exists in favor of the rice fields of
the plaintiffs a statutory easement permitting the flow of
water over the said land in Paraanan, which easement the
said plaintiffs enjoyed until the year 1901 and consisted in
that the water collected upon their lands and in the
Calalaran Lake flow through Paraanan into the Taliptip
River.
From that year however, the defendant, without any right
or reason, converted the land in Paraanan into a fishpond
and by means of a dam and a bamboo net, prevented the
free passage of the water through said place into the
Taliptip River, that in consequence the lands of the plaintiff
became flooded and damaged by the stagnant waters,
They therefore asked that judgment be entered against
the defendant, declaring that the said tract of land in
Paraanan is subject to a statutory easement permitting the
flow of water from the property of the plaintiffs,
Meneses denied each and every one of the allegations of
the complaint, and alleged that no statutory easement
existed nor could exist in favor of the lands described in
the complaint, permitting the waters to flow over the fish
pond that he, together with his brothers, owned in the sitio
of Bambang, the area and boundaries of which were stated
by him, and which he and his brothers had inherited from
their deceased mother.
Supreme Court Ruling
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The defendant shoulf remove the dam placed on the east
of the Paraanan passage on the side of the Taliptip River
opposite the old dam in the barrio of Bambang, as well as
remove and destroy the obstacles to the free passage of
the waters through the strip of land in Paraanan
•
It appears to have been clearly proven in this case that the
lands owned by the plaintiffs in the aforesaid barrio, as
well as the small adjoining lake, named Calalaran, are
located in places relatively higher than the sitio called
Paraanan where the land and fish pond of the defendant
are situated, and which border on the Taliptip River; that
during the rainy season the rain water which falls on the
land of the plaintiffs, and which flows toward the small
Calalaran Lake at flood time, has no outlet to the Taliptip
River other than through the low land of Paraanan; that
the border line between Calalaran and Paraanan there has
existed from time immemorial a dam, constructed by the
community for the purpose of preventing the salt waters
from the Taliptip River, at high tide, from flooding the land
in Calalaran, passing through the lowlands of Paraanan
•
According to article 530 of the Civil Code, an
easement is charge imposed upon one estate for the
benefit of another estate belonging to a different owner,
and the realty in favor of which the easement is
established is called the dominant estate, and the one
charged with it the servient estate.
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The lands of Paraanan being the lower are subject to the
easement of receiving and giving passage to the waters
proceeding from the higher lands and the lake of
Calalaran; this easement was not constituted by
agreement between the interested parties; it is of a
statutory nature, and the law had imposed it for the
common public utility in view of the difference in the
altitude of the lands in the barrio Bambang.
Article 552 of the Civil code provides: Lower estates
must receive the waters which naturally and without the
intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as
well as the stone or earth which they carry with them.
Neither may the owner of the lower estates construct
works preventing this easement, nor the one of the higher
estate works increasing the burden.
The special law cited in the Law of Waters of August 3,
1866, article 111 of which, treating of natural easements
relating to waters, provides: Lands situated at a lower
level are subject to receive the waters that flow naturally,
without the work of man, from the higher lands together
with the stone or earth which they carry with them.
The defendant Meneses might have constructed the
works necessary to make and maintain a fish pond
within his own land, but he was always under the
strict and necessary obligation to respect the
statutory easement of waters charged upon his
property, and had no right to close the passage and
outlet of the waters flowing from the lands of the
plaintiffs and the lake of Calalaran into the Taliptip
River.
He could not lawfully injure the owners of the dominant
estates by obstructing the outlet to the Taliptip River of
the waters flooding the upper lands belonging to the
plaintiffs.
Comments:
•
This case involves an issue about whether you can stop
the flow of water coming from the higher estate to lower
estate.
•
When you are the owner of a lower estate, meaning
your land is in the lower portion, water is coming
from a higher estate, you cannot make a
construction that would impede the natural flow of
water.
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Valisno vs. Adriano
Nicolas Valisno alleges that he is the owner of a parcel of
land in Nueva Ecija which he bought from his sister,
Honorata Adriano Francisco.
Said land is planted with watermelon, peanuts, corn,
tobacco and other vegetables and adjoins the land of
Felipe Adriano, on the bank of the Pampanga River.
At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was
irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a
canal about 70 meters long, traversing Adriano’s land.
Later, Adriano levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so
that Valisno was deprived of the irrigation water and
prevented from cultivating his 57–hectare land. Thus,
Valisno filed a complaint for deprivation of waters rights in
the Bureau of Public Works and Communications (Bureau
– PWC).
Bureau – PWC ruled in favour of Valisno. Instead of
restoring the irrigation canal, Adriano asked for a
reinvestigation of the case which was granted.
In the meantime, Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his
own expense due to his urgent need to irrigate his
watermelon fields. Valisno then filed a complaint for
damages.
•
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•
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However, the Secretary of Bureau – PWC reversed its
decision and dismissed Valisno’s complaint. It held that
Eladio Adriano’s water rights which had been granted in
1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or 1937, when
his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of the water
rights since then for a period of more than five years
extinguished the grant by operation of law. Hence, the
water rights did not form part of his hereditary estate
which his heirs partitioned among themselves.
Likewise, Valisno, as vendee of the land which Honorata
received from her father’s estate did not acquire any water
rights with the land purchased.
The trial court held that Valisno had no right to pass
through the defendant's land to draw water from the
Pampanga River. It pointed out that under Section 4 of the
Irrigation Law, controversies between persons claiming a
right to water from a stream are within the jurisdiction of
the Secretary of Bureau-PWC and his decision on the
matter is final, unless an appeal is taken to the proper
court within thirty days.
He appealed to the Court of the Appeals who certified the
case to the Supreme Court.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
The provisions of the Civil Code shall apply. The existence
of the irrigation canal on Adriano’s land for the passage of
water from the Pampanga River to Honorata's land prior to
and at the time of the sale of Honorata's land to Valisno
was equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to
continue using it as provided in Article 624 of the Civil
Code: The existence of an apparent sign of easement
between two estates, established or maintained by the
owner of both shall be considered, should either of them
be alienated, as a title in order that he easement may
continue actively and passively, unless at the time,
theownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary
should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of
them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the
execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in
case of the division of a thing owned in common on by two
or more persons.
•
This provision was lifted from Article 122 of the Spanish
Law of Waters which provided: Whenever a tract of
irrigated land which previously received its waters from a
single point is divided through inheritance, sale or by
virtue of some other title, between two or more owners,
the owners of the higher estates are under obligation to
give free passage to the water as an easement of conduit
for the irrigation of the lower estates, and without right to
any compensation therefore unless otherwise stipulated in
the deed of conveyance.
•
The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the
"conveyance and transfer of the water rights and
improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's
property. By the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the
vendor Honorata Adriano Francisco sold, ceded, conveyed
and transferred to Dr. Nicolas Valisno all "rights, title,
interest and participations over the parcel of land abovedescribed, together with one Berkely Model 6 YRF
Centrifugal Pump G" suction, 6" discharge 500-1500 GPM,
with Serial No. 5415812 and one (1) set of suction pipe
and discharge of pipe with elbow, nipples, flanges and
footvalves," and the water rights and such other
improvements appertaining to the property subject of this
sale.
•
According to Valisno, the water right was the
primary consideration for his purchase of Honorata's
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property, for without it the property would be
unproductive.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch
for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel
of land, pass with the conveyance of the land,
although not specifically mentioned in the
conveyance.
The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch
running across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even
if the water is supplied by a third person. The fact that an
easement by grant may also have qualified as an
easement of necessity does detract from its permanency
as property right, which survives the determination of the
necessity.
As an easement of waters in favor of Valisno has been
established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction,
disturbance or wrongful interference (19 CJ 984), such as
Adriano’s act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him
of the use of water from the Pampanga River.
Comments:
•
This case involves an Easement of drainage.
•
The land is near the river.
•
SC’s Ruling: You can’t do that because by law, you are
bound whether you like it or not, that’s a built-in inhibition.
3. Limitations imposed by the grantor
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Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. CA
(case from ObliCOn – Impossible Condition)
Private respondents alleged that the spouses Eusebio de
Castro and Martina Rieta executed a deed of donation in
favor of therein defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila covering a parcel of land with a condition that the
done shall not dispose the property within a period
of 100 years from execution of the deed, otherwise it
would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation.
However, while still within the prohibitive period, petitioner
Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whose administration
of the properties in Cavite was transferred, executed a
deed of absolute sale in favor of Petitioner Ignao for
P114,000.
The RTC ruled that the action had already prescribed and
dismissed the complaint but was reversed by the CA;
hence, the case.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code
an action for the revocation of a donation must be brought
within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the
conditions of the donation, the same is not applicable in
the case at bar.
•
The deed of donation involved herein expressly provides
for automatic reversion of the property donated in case of
violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial
declaration revoking the same is not necessary.
•
In contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial
intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a
judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed
rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for
rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order
to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.
•
Article 764 was intended to provide a judicial remedy in
case of non-fulfillment or contravention of conditions
specified in the deed of donation.
•
Nonetheless, we find that although the action filed by
private respondents may not be dismissed by reason of
prescription, the same should be dismissed on the ground
that private respondents have no cause of action.
•
The cause of action of private respondents is based on the
alleged breach by petitioners of the resolutory condition in
•
•
•
the deed of donation that the property donated should not
be sold within a period of one hundred (100) years from
the date of execution of the deed of donation. Said
condition, in our opinion, constitutes an undue
restriction on the rights arising from ownership of
petitioners and is, therefore, contrary to public
policy.
In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed
of donation against the alienation of the property for an
entire century, being an unreasonable emasculation
and denial of an integral attribute of ownership,
should be declared as an illegal or impossible
condition within the contemplation of Art 727 of the Civil
Code.
Consequently, as specifically stated in said statutory
provision, such condition shall be considered as not
imposed. No reliance may accordingly be placed on
said prohibitory paragraph in the deed of donation.
Thus, respondents cannot anymore revoke the donation,
and the sale of the property by the petitioner to the Ignao
spouses shall be valid and with legal effects.
Comments:
•
This is a case of donation with condition. Donor can
actually impose limitations; in gratuitous donations they
have all the rights to impose a limitation.
•
In this case, the conditions imposed should be
reasonable. There is a perpetual limitation not to sell the
property in 100 years.
•
In the civil code, when there is a prohibition to
partition, the prohibition should not be more than 10
years, however it can be renewable for another 10
years.
4. Limitations imposed by the Owner
•
When owner enters into a pledge Why is it a limitation?
Isn’t it when you pledge something, you also get
something in return? – because you cannot sell that thing.
•
The testator can impose a prohibition that the property will
be received should not be partitioned. That condition shall
only be valid up to 20 years
•
Principle of the Prohibition in Partition: Good only up
to a maximum period of 20 years.
5. Constitutional Prohibition (Art. XII, Section 7)
•
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands
shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain.
PRINCIPLE OF SELF-HELP
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the
right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal
thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his
property.
Principle of Self-Help
•
This authorizes the lawful possessor to USE FORCE, as
may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual
or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of
his property.
•
This is a property right, a right of the property owner that
somehow qualifies the prohibition of taking the law into
your own hands. It is lawful to repel force by force.
•
There are instances where it is impracticable to go to court,
or to the police, especially if there is a continuing
aggression, not just on your own, but also on your
property. However, you must remember that force
employed shall be reasonable.
•
This is only available when the invasion is unlawful. Note
that there is such a thing as lawful invasion. You cannot
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invoke self-help to resist implementation of a writ of
execution or writ of demolition enforced by the sheriff
because although it’s aggression, it’s not unlawful
aggression.
When you repel force, it’s required that the force must
exist.
Actual invasion of property may consist of a mere
disturbance of possession or of a real dispossession.
•
Mere disturbance of possession – Force may be used
against it at any time as long as it continues, even beyond
the prescriptive period for an action of forcible entry.
➢ Example: If a ditch is opened by Pedro in the land of
Juan, Juan may close it or cover it by force any time.
•
Real dispossession – Force to REGAIN possession can
be used only immediately after the dispossession. In
other words, once the usurper’s possession has
become firm by the lapse of time, the lawful
possessor must resort to the competent authority to
recover his property.
Who may use force
•
The right to use force to defend property is given only to
the immediate possessor.
Nature of Aggression
•
There must be a real aggression, an imminent violation
of law. Preventive force to forestall aggression is not
authorized.
•
The aggression must be illicit or unlawful. It cannot be
exercised against the lawful exercise of the function of a
public official, such as a sheriff attaching property.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
German Management & Services, Inc. vs. CA
Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose,
residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are the
owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San
Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942 sq. m.
The land was originally registered on 5 August 1948 in the
Office of the Register of Deeds Rizal as OCT 19, pursuant
to a Homestead Patent granted by the President of the
Philippines on 27 July 1948.
On 26 February 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special
power of attorney authorizing German Management
Services to develop their property into a residential
subdivision. Consequently, German Management obtained
Development Permit 00424 from the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission for said development.
Finding that part of the property was occupied by Gernale
and Villeza and 20 other persons, German Management
advised the occupants to vacate the premises, but the
latter refused.
Nevertheless, German Management proceeded with the
development of the subject property which included the
portions occupied and cultivated by Gernale, et.al.
Gernale, et.al. filed an action for forcible entry against
German Management before the MTC Antipolo, Rizal,
alleging that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio
Inarawan who have occupied and tilled their farmholdings
some 12 to 15 years prior to the promulgation of PD 27,
and that they were deprived of their property without due
process of law when German Management forcibly
removed and destroyed the barbed wire fence enclosing
their farmholdings without notice and bulldozing the rice,
corn, fruit bearing trees and other crops that they planted
by means of force, violence and intimidation.
The MTC dismissed Gernale et.al.'s complaint for forcible
entry. On appeal, the RTC sustained the dismissal by the
MTC.
Gernale then filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. Said court gave due course to their petition and
reversed the decisions of the MTC and the RTC. The
Appellate Court held that since Gernale, et.al. were in
•
actual possession of the property at the time they were
forcibly ejected by German Management, they have a right
to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the
legality or illegality of possession.
German Management moved to reconsider but the same
was denied by the Appellate Court. Hence, here is the
present recourse.
Supreme Court Ruling
•
The justification that the drastic action of bulldozing and
destroying the crops of the prior possessor on the basis of
the doctrine of self-help (enunciated in Article 429 NCC) is
unavailing because the such doctrine can only be
exercised at the time of actual or threatened
dispossession, which is absent in the present case.
•
When possession has already been lost, the owner
must resort to judicial process for the recovery of
property.
•
At the time German Management entered the property,
the private respondents were already in possession
thereof.
•
This is clear from Article 536 New Civil Code which
provides that "in no case may possession be acquired
through force or intimidation as long as there is a
possessor who objects thereto. He, who believes that he
has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of
a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the
holder should refuse to deliver the thing."
Comments:
•
Alleged intruders built a house in the property of the
landowner.
•
The landowner used a bulldozer towards the property.
•
SC said that it’s not considered as “Self-help” because
there was no longer aggression on the time of the repelling
force was employed.
•
You are not allowed to just demolish other persons’
properties even if you are the owner of the land occupied
by the latter. You must first resort to court and file the
necessary action to recover (unlawful detainer or forcible
entry).
Self-help cannot be invoked if the possession is lawful
•
Will Art 429 apply to all type of aggression against your
property? For as long as there has aggression that disturbs
your possession of the property, can you invoke it?
➢ No, it only pertains to unlawful aggression.
•
Example: Aggression of a sheriff pursuant to a lawful writ
of execution ordered by the court. You cannot apply Art
429.
•
Example: When somebody destroy your property because
that is the only way to prevent the spread of fire. You
cannot apply Art 429.
•
Thus, the aggression in Art. 429 only pertains to unlawful
aggression.
Comments:
•
The rule that you cannot take the law into your own hands
is NOT AN ABSOLUTE RULE.
•
Example: The Doctrine of Self-Help – the owner of the
property has the right to use force reasonably necessary
to repeal or prevent the violence or threat of unlawful
invasion of his property.
•
If someone entered the premises at the time you
were not there, you only discovered it several days
after. But their entry is no doubt illegal and
unlawful. Can you invoke Art. 429?
➢ No, because you must be there at the time that there
is usurpation of your property right. In other words
when he is already there, you need to go to court.
•
When you went home, you found out that there are
thieves in your house. There are watching TV there.
Are you justified in driving them out or you will wait
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for tomorrow so that you can file appropriate case in
the provincial prosecutor?
➢ There’s no violence here, they are just watching TV.
In what manner must the entry be made so that it
can be justified in invoking 429? What if the entry is
not accompanied by force? They were allowed by
your caretaker to enter by their misrepresentation
that they are your relatives.
➢ There has to be actual force.
ACTS IN A STATE OF NECESSITY
Art. 432. The owner of a thing has no right to prohibit the
interference of another with the same, if the interference is
necessary to avert an imminent danger and the threatened
damage, compared to the damage arising to the owner from
the interference, is much greater. The owner may demand from
the person benefited indemnity for the damage to him.
Acts in a state of necessity
•
Limitation on your right to ownership.
•
You cannot prohibit an interference of your property rights
when such interference is necessary to prevent a greater
evil.
•
Imminent danger or threatening damage, compared to the
damage arising to the owner from the interference, MUST
BE MUCH GREATER.
•
Indemnity for Damages: The owner may demand from
the person benefited indemnity for the damage to him.
This right exists only when another’s property is
damaged by an act in a state of necessity.
Comments:
•
If property destroyed is the source of the danger, you are
not bound to pay compensation.
•
But if the property destroyed is not the source of the
danger, you are obliged to pay the indemnity.
“Learning is NOT a spectator sport.”
– D. Blocher
“Education is what survives when what has
been learned has been forgotten.”
– B. F. Skinner
“The purpose of learning is growth, and our
minds, unlike our bodies, can continue
growing as long as we live.”
– Mortimer Adler
PLEASE DO NOT POST THIS ON
SCRIBD, COURSEHERO, ACADEMIA, OR
ANY OTHER NOTE-SHARING PLATFORM
ONLINE!!!
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