Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 187912-14
January 31, 2011
JOEY P. MARQUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN 5th DIVISION and THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, Respondents.
DECISION
Facts:
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COA, in its Report on the Audit of Selected Transaction and Walis Ting-ting for Paranaque City for ’96-98,
found several anomalies involving Joey Marquez (Mayor and Chairman of Bids and Awards Committee)
and Ofelia Caunan (Head of General Services office).
Without public bidding, Marquez and Caunan procured thousands of rounds of bullets from VMY Trading
(even though it was not registered as an arms and ammunitions dealer w/ PNP and DTI).
A COA special audit team issued Notices of Disallowances for the ammunitions. They appealed this to COA
but they were denied.
Meanwhile, at the office of the Ombudsman (OMB), in response to charges filed against them [during
preliminary investigation], they filed their joint counter affidavit insisting on the propriety of the
transaction and raised the pendency of their appeal to COA.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) found probable cause for violation of RA3019 Sec 3(e) against
Marquez and Caunan and filed three informations against the Marque and Caunan.
Nov 24, 2003, before arraignment, Marquez sought referral of several documents to the NBI Questioned
Documents Section. Marquez asserted that his signatures on the disbursement vouchers, purchase
requests, and authorization requests [hereinafter referred as “documents in question”] were forged. He
also requested for reinvestigation.
This request was denied by the OSP
Before the Sandiganbayan(SB) 4th division, the prosecution presented 5 witnesses:
o Fatima Bermudez – COA State Auditor
o Elenita Pracale – Chief of Business Permit and License office of Paranaque
o Benjamin Cruz
o Police Inspector Rolando Columna – PNP Firearms Division Legal Officer
o Emerito Lejano – Guns Empire President
The prosecution also presented the documents that were earlier questioned by Marquez.
All of the evidence offered (on Jan 2006) by the prosecution was admitted by SB on March 2006.
After the prosecution rested, Caunan testified and partly presented her evidence.
April 1, 2008, Marquez moved for:
o The inhibition of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez
o The referral of the documents in question to the NBI.
The two Justices did inhibit themselves and the case was re-raffled to the 5th division. But the request for
the referral of the documents was not acted upon.
July 4, 2008, Marquez filed another motion for the referral of the documents in question to the NBI
alleging that his signatures on the same were forged.
Prosecution filed its Comment/Opposition arguing that:
o All of its documentary exhibits were offered in 2006 and had been duly admitted by SB.
o
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When confronted with the transactions during the COA audit investigation, Marquez never raised
the defense of forgery and instead insisted on the propriety of the transactions.
o Neither did he claim forgery when he filed his Counter Affidavit in the OSP.
o Rule 129.4; Since Marquez alleged on his pleadings that he relied on the competence of his
subordinates and thus there could be no palpable mistake, he is thus estopped from alleging that
his signatures on the documents in question were forged.
o The motion was filed merely to delay the proceedings.
Marquez filed a reply saying that he never admitted that his signatures on the documents in question
were his and that the motion was not filed for mere delay.
SB issued a resolution denying the motion of Marquez, citing Rule 132.22. They said that while, the
opinion of handwriting experts could be helpful in the examination of the alleged forged documents, it
was neither mandatory nor indispensible, since the court can determine forgery from its own
independent examination.
After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Marquez filed a Rule 65 certiorari with the SC, saying
that the denial of his motion for referral of the documents was in violation of his right to present evidence
and due process.
ISSUE: WoM denial of the motion to refer the documents in question to the NBI was done in GADALEJ?
Held: YES
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The right of the accused to an opportunity to be heard necessarily implies with it the reasonable
freedom to present its evidence.
Forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence by the
party alleging it.
In order to discharge this burden, the party alleging it must be afforded reasonable opportunity to
present evidence to support his allegation.
This opportunity is the actual examination of the signatures of the documents in question by no less
than the country’s premier investigative force, the NBI. If he is denied such opportunity, his only
evidence on this matter is negative testimonial evidence w/c is generally considered as weak.
The findings of NBI will still be subject to scrutiny and evaluation in line w/ Rule 132.22.
Nevertheless, Marquez shouldn’t be deprived of his right to present evidence. While this defense may
seem feeble to SB, Marquez should be allowed to adduce evidence of his own choice.
SB’s reason for denial of the motion is that it may validly determine forgery from its own
independent examination of the documentary evidence. But while it is true that appreciation of WoN
the signatures are genuine is subject to the discretion of SB, this discretion may rightly be exercised
only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. The prosecution had already offered
its evidence on the matter. The court should not deny the same right to the defense.
Contrary to what the prosecution asserts, Marquez’s motion was not a mere afterthought. As early as
Nov 24, 2003, even before arraignment, Marquez already sought referral of the documents in
question to the NBI and reinvestigation of the case against him.
The fact that Marquez did not raise this issue with COA is irrelevant and immaterial. His failure to do
so may affect the weight of his defense, but it should not bar him from insisting on it during his turn
to adduce evidence.
The fact that the documentary exhibit were already offered and admitted by SB cannot preclude an
examination of the signatures thereon by the defense. With proper handling by court personnel, this
can be accomplished by the NBI expert examiners.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN CASE DIGEST
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
FACTS:
On April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution in Criminal Case No. 26558, finding probable cause that
petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then the President of the Philippines has committed the offense of plunder, and that he be
prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder). The petitioner contended that RA 7080 was
unconstitutional, on the grounds that 1.) it was vague; 2.) it dispenses with the “reasonable doubt” standard in criminal
prosecutions; and 3.) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, thus
violating the fundamental rights of the accused. The said law allegedly suffers from vagueness on the terms it uses,
particularly: ‘combination’, ‘series’, and ‘unwarranted’. Based on this, the petitioner used the facial challenge to question the
validity of RA 7080.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
3.
WON the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.
WON the fact that the Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder leads to its
violation of the right of the accused to due process.
WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to
classify it as such.
RULE:
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law.
The over-breadth doctrine states that a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of a possible
“chilling effect” upon protected speech.
This rationale does NOT apply to penal statutes.
ANALYSIS:
1.
NO. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because of the employment of general terms or the failure to
define the terms used therein. The validity of a law is sustained, so long as that law provides some comprehensible
guide as to what would render those subject to the said law liable to its penalties. The petitioner cannot rely on the
void-for-vagueness doctrine, since this doctrine does not apply to laws that merely consist of imprecise language.
2. NO. The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of the accused in criminal prosecutions to be presumed innocent until
proven otherwise. Thus he is entitled to an acquittal unless the State succeeds in demonstrating the guilt of the
accused with proof beyond reasonable doubt. The contention that Sec. 4 of RA 7080 does away with proof of each and
every component of the crime is a misconception. Rather than proving each and every criminal act done, it is enough
that the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the crime as a
whole.
3. NO. Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. The legislative declaration in RA No. 7659
(which has been declared as constitutionally valid in a previous ruling) that plunder is a heinous offense implies that
it is a malum in se.
CONCLUSION:
Premises considered, the Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
CONSTITUTIONAL. Thus, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 164266 : July 23, 2008]
NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR y DE LEON, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
Facts:
The facts of the case follow:
Spouses Ernesto and Margarita Zuñiga had three daughters, namely: Marianne, Mary Ann and the victim Arlene. Mary
Ann was married to the petitioner herein. The Zuñiga family, including Mary Ann and the petitioner were living together at
550 Coloong I, Valenzuela City.
Their residence had three bedrooms - one for the Zuñiga spouses; the other for Marianne and Arlene; and the last for
Mary Ann and the petitioner.
On September 20, 1997, the Zuñiga spouses, together with Marianne, went to Bulacan to attend the wake of Ernesto's
mother; while Mary Ann with her new born child, and Arlene, stayed at their Valenzuela home. Petitioner, at that time,
asked permission to attend a birthday... party.[5]
At about 9:00 in the evening, petitioner, accompanied by Eduardo Palomares, returned home to get some karaoke tapes
to be used at the birthday party. They thereafter went back to the party and stayed there until 12 midnight before heading
back home.
At 4:30 in the morning, the following day, the Zuñiga spouses and Marianne arrived home. They opened the main door
which was then locked. After preparing for sleep, Marianne proceeded to the room which she was sharing with
Arlene. There she saw Arlene, who... suffered stab wounds, already dead. After seeing Arlene's body, the Zuñiga
spouses rushed to the room of Mary Ann and the petitioner. While Mary Ann proceeded to Arlene's room, petitioner
stayed at the sala and cried. He was later seen embracing Mary Ann... and telling her that he was innocent.[6]
At around 5:00 in the morning, police investigators arrived. The police found no forcible entry into the house; no valuables
were missing; and no bloodstains in other parts of the house except Arlene's room. They likewise discovered, on top of
the kitchen table,... petitioner's underwear (briefs), gray t-shirt and short pants.[7] They further found hair strands on
Arlene's bed. These pieces of evidence were brought to the laboratory for examination.
On September 21, 1997, Dr. Noel Minay (Dr. Minay), a medico-legal of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
conducted an autopsy of the deceased.[8] He found that Arlene suffered 21 stab wounds produced by a pointed
instrument, one side of which... was sharp like a balisong or a kitchen knife. He further declared the possibility that Arlene
struggled with the assailant before she died.[9]
The NBI Forensic Biologist also examined petitioner's briefs, t-shirt and short pants, and found that the briefs and shirt
were positive of type "O" human blood, Arlene's blood type.[10] The NBI Forensic Chemist, subsequently, conducted DNA
Analysis on the... following specimens:
One (1) dirty white Hanford brief[s];
One (1) light gray t-shirt with DKNY print infront;
Several strands of hair allegedly recovered in the bedroom of [the] victim;
Buccal swabs taken from the following:
ERNESTO ZUÑIGA (victim's father)
MARGARITA ZUÑIGA (victim's mother)
NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR (suspect)[11]
The examination of specimen no. 1 yielded a negative result for the presence of human DNA; while specimen nos. 2, 3,
and 4 a-c, yielded positive results.[12]
Petitioner was thus charged with Homicide in
Issues:
All the circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and
at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence
can be upheld, provided that... the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person
Held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 26, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26048 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Nover Bryan Salvador y
De Leon is hereby... sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In addition to civil
indemnity and moral... damages, petitioner is ordered to pay spouses Ernesto and Margarita Zuñiga the sum of
P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 185224
July 29, 2015
AMELIA CARMELA CONSTANTINO ZOLETA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN [FOURTH DIVISION] and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
Facts:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Amelia Carmela Constantino Zoleta assailing the
November 5, 2008 decision2 of the Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) in Criminal Case No. 28326.
The case stemmed from an anonymous complaint filed against the petitioner, Mary Ann Gadian, and Sheryll Desiree
Tangan before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman) for participating in the scheme of questionable
grants and donations to fictitious entities using provincial funds. As a result of this complaint, the Commission on Audit
(COA) conducted a special audit in Sarangani Province. Among the irregularities discovered by the Special Audit Team
was a ₱20,000.00 financial assistance given to Women in Progress (WIP), a cooperative whose members were mostly
government personnel or relatives of the officials of Sarangani Province.
The COA Special Audit Team submitted its report to the Ombudsman which, in turn, conducted a preliminary
investigation. Thereafter, the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charged the petitioner, ViceGovernor Felipe Constantino, Violeta Bahilidad, Maria Camanay, and Teodorico Diaz with malversation of public funds by
falsification of public documents defined and penalized under Article 217 in relation to Article 171(2) and Article48 of the
Revised Penal Code, conspiring and confederating with Violita Bahilidad, private individual, the public officers, while
committing the offense in relation to office, by falsifying the corresponding Disbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-01-822
and its supporting documents, thereby facilitating the release of the above-mentioned public funds in the amount of
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00)through encashment by the accused at Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
Check No. 36481 dated January 24, 2002 issued in the name of the Violeta Bahilidad, CONTRARY TO LAW.
On arraignment, the petitioner and Bahilidad pleaded "not guilty." Diaz and Camanay, on the other hand, remained at
large.
On April 25, 2006, Vice-Governor Constantino died in a vehicular accident, resulting in the dismissal of the case against
him.
In its decision dated November 5,2008, the Sandiganbayan found the petitioner and Bahilidad guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months, and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. It also imposed on them the additional penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding any public office.
The Sandiganbayan likewise directed them to pay back the Province of Sarangani ₱20,000.00 plus interest, computed
from January 2002 until fully paid.8
ISSUE: WON Balahidad will be held liable for the irregularities and malversation of public funds by falsification of public
documents
HELD:
We DENY the petition.
In the light of these considerations, we find no basis to invalidate the November 5, 2008 decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 28326.
At any rate, we hold that the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted the petitioner of the complex crime of malversation of
public funds through falsification of public documents.
First, it is undisputed that all the accused, except Bahilidad, are all public officers. A public officer is defined in the Revised
Penal Code as "any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election, or appointment by competent authority,
shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said
Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or class.
Constantino was the Vice-Governor of Sarangani Province, while the petitioner, Camanay, and Diaz were occupying the
positions of Executive Assistant (at the Office of the Vice-Governor), Provincial Accountant, and Provincial Board
Member, respectively.
Second, the funds misappropriated are public in character, as they were funds belonging to the Province of Sarangani.
Third, Vice-Governor Constantino and Camanay were accountable public officers. Under the Government Auditing Code
of the Philippines, an accountable public officer is a public officer who, by reason of his office, is accountable for public
funds or property. The Local Government Code expanded this definition with regard to local government officials. Section
340 of the LGC reads:
III. No denial of due process
The petitioner claims that he was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan granted the prosecution’s motion to
amend certain portions of the pre-trial order without any hearing. In essence, the petitioner argues that she could not be
convicted of malversation through consent, abandonment, or negligence because this allegation was not contained in the
Information.
The petitioner’s argument lacks merit.
The Proper Penalty
We modify the maximum term of the penalty imposed on the petitioner by the Sandiganbayan, from sixteen (16) years,
five (5) months, and eleven (11) days to eighteen (18) years, two (2) months, and twenty one (21) days of reclusion
temporal, in accordance with Articles 48 and 21 7 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation to the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.31 WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, we DENY the petition. Accordingly, we
AFFIRM the November 5, 2008 decision of the Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) in Criminal Case No. 28326 with the
MODIFICATION that the maximum term of the penalty imposed on the petitioner be increased from sixteen ( 16) years,
five ( 5) months, and eleven (11) days to eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and twenty one (21) days of reclusion
temporal.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 157171
March 14, 2006
ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents
DECISION
Garcia v. People (GR 157171, March 14 2006)
AUGUST 27, 2016 / RUSSELL JAY
FACTS: On May 11, 1995, within the canvassing period of 1995 senatiorial elections, Aquilino Pimintel, Jr., was informed that
Arsenia Garcia (Arsenia), along with her co-conspirators, willfully and unlawfully decreased the number of votes of the candidate
from 6,998 to 1921 votes.
Pimintel filed a complaint against Asenia and her co-conspirators. All the accused was acquited due to lack of evidence except for
Arsenia who was found guilty of the crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator
Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881.
Petitioner appealed to CA which also affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Arsenia appealed to SC, contending that the judgment of CA is erroneous and there was no motive on her part to reduce the votes of
private complainant.
Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of an election law, which falls under the class
of mala prohibita.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in se.
(2) Whether or not good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?
HELD: (1) YES. Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 provides: Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of
canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who
refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and
fatigue would be punishable.
(2) NO. Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members of the board of canvassers in
canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part would result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of
Canvass for senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive
election documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.
The instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioners conviction but increasing the
minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead of six months is AFFIRMED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148560
November 19, 2001
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
FACTS:
On April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution in Criminal Case No. 26558, finding probable cause that
petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then the President of the Philippines has committed the offense of plunder, and that he be
prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder). The petitioner contended that RA 7080 was
unconstitutional, on the grounds that 1.) it was vague; 2.) it dispenses with the “reasonable doubt” standard in criminal
prosecutions; and 3.) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, thus
violating the fundamental rights of the accused. The said law allegedly suffers from vagueness on the terms it uses,
particularly: ‘combination’, ‘series’, and ‘unwarranted’. Based on this, the petitioner used the facial challenge to question the
validity of RA 7080.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
3.
WON the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.
WON the fact that the Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder leads to its
violation of the right of the accused to due process.
WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to
classify it as such.
RULE:
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law.
The over-breadth doctrine states that a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of a possible
“chilling effect” upon protected speech.
This rationale does NOT apply to penal statutes.
ANALYSIS:
1.
NO. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because of the employment of general terms or the failure to
define the terms used therein. The validity of a law is sustained, so long as that law provides some comprehensible
guide as to what would render those subject to the said law liable to its penalties. The petitioner cannot rely on the
void-for-vagueness doctrine, since this doctrine does not apply to laws that merely consist of imprecise language.
2. NO. The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of the accused in criminal prosecutions to be presumed innocent until
proven otherwise. Thus he is entitled to an acquittal unless the State succeeds in demonstrating the guilt of the
accused with proof beyond reasonable doubt. The contention that Sec. 4 of RA 7080 does away with proof of each and
every component of the crime is a misconception. Rather than proving each and every criminal act done, it is enough
that the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the crime as a
whole.
3. NO. Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. The legislative declaration in RA No. 7659
(which has been declared as constitutionally valid in a previous ruling) that plunder is a heinous offense implies that
it is a malum in se.
CONCLUSION:
Premises considered, the Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
CONSTITUTIONAL. Thus, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 192330
November 14, 2012
ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
FACTS:.
The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas accused Arnold James M. Ysidoro before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 28228
of violation of illegal use of public propertry (technical malversation) under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte, operated a Core Shelter Assistance Program
(CSAP) that provided construction materials for the indigent calamity victims with which to rebuild their homes.
Lolita Garcia, the CSAP Officer-in-Charge sought the help pf Cristina Polinio, an officer of the MSWDO in charge of the
municipality’s Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP) that rationed food to malnourished children. Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still
had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom. And since she had already distributed food to the mother volunteers, what
remained could be given to the CSAP beneficiaries.
Polonio and Garcia went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to ask for his approval. Petitioner
approved the release and signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP.
On August 27, 2001 Alfredo Doller, former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed a complaint against Ysidoro for
committing technical malversation when he approved the distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP beneficiaries.
In his defense, Ysidoro claims that the diversion of the subject goods to a project also meant for the poor of the municipality was valid
since they came from the savings of the SFP and the Calamity Fund. Ysidoro also claims good faith, believing that the municipality’s
poor CSAP beneficiaries were also in urgent need of food.
On February 8, 2010 the Sandiganbayan found Ysidoro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of technical malversation. But, since his
action caused no damage or embarrassment to public service, it only fined him P1,698.00 or 50% of the sum misapplied. The
Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied public property to a public purpose other than that for which it has been appropriated by law
or ordinance. On May 12, 2010 the Sandiganbayan denied Ysidoro’s motion for reconsideration. On June 8, 2010 Ysidoro appealed
the Sandiganbayan Decision to this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation.
RULING: No, good faith is not a valid defense for technical malversation. Petitioner insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the
idea of using the SFP goods for the CSAP beneficiaries came, not from him, but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted
the accounting department if the goods could be distributed to those beneficiaries. Having no criminal intent, he argues that he cannot
be convicted of the crime.
But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting public property earmarked by
law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited
act is not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission based on considerations of
public policy, order, and convenience. It is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that
determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.
Dura lex sed lex. Petitioner’s act, no matter how noble or miniscule the amount diverted, constitutes the crime of technical
malversation. The law and the Sandiganbayan however, recognize that his offense is not grave, warranting a mere fine.