Exam practise 6 : Evaluate to what extent the domestic policies used by Mao successfully achieved the consolidate of his authoritarian regime Mao’s domestic policies played a crucial role in consolidating his power as Chairman of China. Between 1949 and 1969, despite the successes of the domestic policies implemented in shifting towards socialist aims, particularly in instilling widespread Mao Zedong Thought, Mao’s policies included severe weakness that led to his ultimate demise in 1969. Thus, whilst Mao was indeed able to consolidate his authoritarian regime, this essay will regard to what extent he successfully achieved this. As of 1949, Mao had gathered an outstanding majority of peasantry support. 80% of the Chinese population (peasants) supported his regime. However, whilst initial support figures were high, Mao needed to sustain the loyalty of the peasants. Therefore, in 1958 via the implementation of the Great Leap Forward (GLF), Mao outlined his steps towards economic prosperity. The significance of this method lies in its impressive production figures, for example a 50million increase in grain production, vital as it was through the instilling of faith and trust within the Chinese peasant class towards Mao, that formed the basis of how Mao was to overcome his opposition. Whilst empirically successful, the policy’s effectiveness was limited, for example the reliability of these figures, out of fear of repercussions, they were heavily inflated, equally the quality of the production was weak. Such impact, would undermine and discredit Mao’s rule, as demonstrated by the Tibet resistance, Peng Dehai and President Krushnev criticism, resulting in reduced support to his regime. Historian Chang and Halliday suggest peasant faced severe hardship as a result of the GLF, in other words, the domestic policy was ostensibly successful but in de facto, a failure. However, to overcome this within the GLF, Mao implemented the decision to, as Mao recalls this, have China “walking on two legs”. In other words, it was through the decision to become independent, from private and foreign owned enterprises, that Mao maximised the benefits of the policy, to consolidate support and overcame any form of criticism. In theory, this independence was a form of power shift and political vacuum, destroying the threat of a class of potential counter-revolutionaries and forming strength within the peasant masses. In both ways, enhancing Mao’s own political power and establishment by repressing the upper class threat. This can be seen, as through collectivisation of APC’s and HAPC’s, Mao purged remnants of capitalism and shifted China towards his socialist aims, but also through the ‘backyard furnaces’ Mao empowered the revival of Yan'an spirit, encouraging an ideological shift within the peasant class towards collective solidarity and Mao Zedong Thought. Therefore, whilst this policy was aimed at purging the bourgeois opposition, the shift towards fanatical loyalty and trust in Mao’s aims is the most significant impact, as it would further aid in consolidating Mao’ own personal power. Whilst the use of terror was a means to purge and repress the opposition, Mao believed it was necessary to transform attitudes and ways of thinking as well. Therefore Mao implemented the ‘ thought reform campaign’ as a means of political indoctrination, renamed ‘re-education’ to shift away from precedent confucius principles. Such reform would enable Mao to eliminate his opposition, namely intellectuals and capitalist/GMD sympathisers in the hopes of stirring political indoctrination. To further epitomise this, Mao implemented the Little red book containing Mao Zedong Thought, to encourage this ideological shift towards socialism even further. For the primary aim of Mao to incite communist shift, this indoctrination was vital to successfully enforce submission to his regime. However, in 1957, it is evident that this policy had limited success, because through the encouragement of free speech and the outstanding criticism to his regime, it was a sign that Mao’s methods to encouraging ideological change were ineffective, and therefore of minor impact to consolidating the Maoist regime. With internal and external criticisms, notably even within the communist realm, Peng Dehai, Mao Zedong did not consolidate his regime. Moreover, it was due to the ineffectiveness of ‘thought reform’ policy at purging capitalist ideology,that Mao decided to empower the masses towards the cultural revolution. Differing from other dictators,through the combined efforts of the red army and the young pioneers, Mao mobilised the younger generation to violently enact socialist change. This method had significant impacts, the execution of 1 ½ million chinese elites, showcases how Mao was able to rapidly eliminate opposition, but also by making his executions public, he maximised the impact even further. By such, through violence and terror Mao weakened any opposition and strengthened his regime. However, towards the end of the revolution, Mao’s decision to stop and slowly abandon it, Mao instilled a sense of betrayal, diminishing faith and anger to his previously fanatical followers. As Chang documents in “Wild Swans” it was a sense of abandonment. This perhaps, is the determining factor to how successful Mao’s policies were, because through this critical public zeitgeist shift of Mao as a betrayer, and the long term disruptions of the revolution on education and the industry, Mao merely achieved a short lasting consolidation of power, because in the long run his betrayal to the masses, redirected any faith back into the capitalist cause, and rendered his regime weak and short lasting. In conclusion, whilst Mao was able to remove remnants of capitalism and shift China towards a socialist structure, he was still unable to achieve true and permanent revolutionary change, which was one of his ultimate aims. Therefore, whilst initially consolidating power, towards the latter stages of his policy implementation, Mao Zedong did not successfully consolidate his authoritarian regime in China. Firstly, revealed by “(the outbreak) ended any chance..creating a strong and centralised nation-state” the source depicts the inability to unite and centralise China as a result of the outbreak. Secondly, as it states that the GMD were deprived of “All major chinese industrial centers” the source reveals the economic consequences and losses created as a result of the war. Thirdly, demonstrated by how the GMD “tried to undertake economic and administrative reforms” the source reveals the struggle and challenges of commiting to long-term growth in China, as a result of the outbreak. 9a. What, according to Source J, were the challenges faced by the Nationalists (Guomindang) government of China as a result of the outbreak of war with Japan in 1937? - 5mins Firstly, the outbreak of war with Japan disturbed the GMD’s ability to “recentralise its authority and revive the economy. Secondly, it caused an inability to “crush the communist forces” , thirdly the outbreak led to a displacement of the Nationalists “from their traditional power base”. 9b. What does source L suggest about the relations between the Chinese Communist party and the Nationalists party (Guomindang) in 1937? 3mins Firstly, demonstrated by the title “A sacred handshake” the source details how both parties were prepared to cooperate with each other. Secondly, revealed by the Japanese representative being shut off, the source depicts how the relationship is built between the common goal of purging, “closing the door” on Japanese invasion. 10. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, evaluate the value and limitations of Source K for an historian studying political instability in China between 1931 and 1941 (4) ;8mins (lack time) The value of Source K for an historian studying political instability in China lies in its origin, as an excerpt from the head of Chinese GMD government, the source offers vital insight into government intelligence and decisions. Likewise, the source states that political instability was caused by “unprepared”, lack of organisation and unity within China. Thus, the content is vital in understanding the reasons for this political chaos. Lastly, the purpose is vital, as the source is extracted from a speech directed to a training camp, thus, it offers insight into the Chinese concerns, whereby the instability is considered an obstacle in the fight against Japan. The limitations of Source K for an historian studying political instability in China lies in origin, as a speech made by Chinese Nationalist leader, the source offers merely a narrow view and limited scope, thereby not a wholesome reflection for studying political instability in China. Secondly, as the source states that “naturally we(china) cannot resist Japan” placing the blame on the overall lack of preparation, but avoids addressing the Nationalist’s own role in causing this instability, defending his role. Thirdly, the purpose supports this limitation, as a speech this source holds a persuasive effect, rather than a historical evaluation, there risks exaggeration. Limiting, the accuracy of the source as a whole. + (Written during) does not provide comprehensive account 11. Compare and contrast what Source I and J reveal about political instability in China up to 1941 (6) ;15mins Both source i and source j reveal that political instability in china was caused by japanese outbreak, demonstrated in how the outbreak “ended any chance” (I) and “dealt a devastating blow”(j) to any efforts to centralise or unite China. Likewise, source i supports j in suggesting that the united front was a mean to stabilize and unite china, demonstrated in source i by suggesting that “the dream of national unity was kept alive” and equally in source j by declaring the outbreak as an “antidote to Chaos”. Lastly, in the same way that source i argues that the political instability existed prior to the outbreak, demonstrated by how “one again” the two parties clashed, source j argues the same, stating the conflict between the parties “persisted”. Source i disagrees with source j regarding how the outbreak affected the Nationalists, whilst source i argues that the the outbreak disrupted the N’aim of creating “A strong and centralized nation-state” , source j argues that the outbreak disrupted the n’ aim of “Crushing the communist forces”. To further explore this, source i details communist’s intentions to “spread the revolution”, engendering the political instability, whilst source j explains how communists optimistically postponed any political agendas, to unite with the nationalists. By such, source i and source j argue different perspectives onto who is most to blame for the political instability. MS: - Both sources identify 1937 as a turning point that ended the Nationalists’ chances to centralize power. - Both sources state that the Japanese invasion deprived the Nationalists of their control of industrial centres. - Both sources claim that the Communists were isolated in Shaanxi, a poor area Contrasts: - Source I considers isolation in northern China compromised the Communists’ opportunities to succeed whereas Source J claims that it provided them with an opportunity to expand their influence in the region. - Source J claims that the armed conflict between Communists and Nationalists persisted after 1937 whereas Source I states that they formed a united front and that only by 1941 they confronted one another again. • Source I identifies political instability in China as being caused by tensions between Nationalists and Communists whereas source j considers that regional militarists were also a serious threat to the government 12. Using the sources and your own knowledge, discuss the view that japanese aggression furthered political instability in China between 1931 and 1941 (9) ;25 mins The Japanese aggression played a key role in furthering political instability in China between 1931 and 1941, however it was also due to the failure of the occidental powers and the ulterior motives within the united front, that fuelled political fragmentation within China. As Japanese aggression progressed, particularly through the nanjing Massacres of 1938, china’s political stability fragmented. The pressure caused by both social and economic disruptions of the outbreak of war, would further cause disagreements between the already polarised government, and disrupt any chances of reuniting China, and stabilizing the fragmented country. As source I details, the Japanese “ended any chance” of creating “A strong and centralized nation-state” thus suggesting that china could have become politically stable, but it is through the pressures and disruptions of japanese invasion that catalytically furthered instability. Chiang’s appeasement, and the criticism that followed from the communists, only furthers this view that the japanese aggressions was used to the advantage of parties, to fuel political instability. However, whilst the japanese aggression did “disrupt the dream of national unity” (source I), it was through the failure of occidental powers to prevent the casus belli, japanese invasion, that fuelled political fragmentation. During the 1929 great depression, it appeared that the LoN were too occupied, to take action and prevent the expansion. This lack of quality support and resolving international issues, particularly as through the one year delay of the lytton report, is significant because without any foreign aid, China’s political instability only worsenened. Lastly, whilst externally, the failing response of the LoN did engender political instability, it was internally the pre-existing dichotomy between parties that ultimately meant, political instability was inevitable. As a sybol of change, the second united front entailed an”antidote to chaos” (source j)in such a way, whereby through the combined efforts of both parties to overcome the common enemY, japan. The japanese expansion, inversely provided an opportunity to overcome political instability. As source L illustrates via the handshake, there was a common sense of compromise. Whilst this may be true, the ulterior intentions and main focus of Chiang was to “crush communist forces” . As Chiang Kai Shek recalls it “japanese was the disease of the skin, whilst communism was a disease of the heart” and thus demonstrating how regardless of the opportunity provided by the japanese agression, it was due to the internal pre-existing polarisation, and the lack of compromise by the nationalist leader, that China fell into detrimental political instability up until 1941. In conclusion, whilst the japanese aggression furthered pressures and played a role in the political instability, the ulterior motives of Chiang and discriminatory focus on the communist threat, is the determining factor when discussing the lead up to political instrability in China. For example, the breaching of the Shidehara diplomacy and the buffer zones implemented between Japanese(J) and chinese(c) territories, in 1927, led to devastating Origin Content Values ● (Written during) contemporary to the events under study ● The Limitations ● (Written after) defend his ● The role ● (Written during event) does not provide a comprehensive account of the political situation, throughout the latter/entire stages of the event ● (Not published/released until after) suggests some level of censorship or political manipulation of the speech Purpose ● (gov) Access to government ● speech = reflect Chinese intelligence and decisions concern, concerned public zeitgeist ● exaggeration,blatant partisanship ●
