Vicenzo Ciapparini Albertoni Professor Mor Segev PHH 3062 November 2, 2022 Research Paper Thirty-five dialogues are attributed to the Plato, each one of them questioning ethic issues, through the voice of Socrates, the author’s lifetime mentor. Plato makes use of his master’s image due to his unique style to philosophize, which later came to be known as the Socratic Method. He makes use of seemingly simple questions, which aim to reveal the contradictions present in the student’s current form of thinking. By conducting the student through a process of reflection and discovery of his own values, Socrates is capable of breaking down the flaws and preconceptions and redefining the other’s morals, and, it is through this process that Socrates inquires a Thessalian politician, Meno, on virtuosity. Plato's dialogue Meno begins with a question posed by Meno to Socrates: "Is virtue teachable?" (Meno, 70a 1-2). Socrates replies that he does not know what virtue is, and that therefore he cannot know anything about virtue - including whether it is teachable or not (Meno, 71b). This move by Socrates is extremely important and drives the entire course of the dialogue. He proposes an absolute priority of knowledge of the definition of a given thing over all other kinds of knowledge about that thing. He then challenges Meno to say what virtue is. Three times Meno answers what it is, but Socrates rejects Meno’s definitions. Because of this, Meno finds himself in a deadlock, and enunciates in 80d the famous Aporia of Meno. However, before dealing with the Aporia, I will analyze what are the characteristics of the Socratic definition. What Socrates demands from Memon as a "definition" is a property of virtue that can encompass all instances and all other properties of virtue. Not only that, but it can encompass only properties and instances of virtue. That is, Socrates requires that virtue and its defining property be coextensive, both necessary and sufficient for each other. This becomes evident as Socrates responds to Meno’s proposed definitions. The first response of Meno (Meno, 71e-72a) fails because he answered what virtue is by listing several instances of virtue and does not evidence what they have in common that makes them all virtues, that is, what property each instance possesses that allows them to be classified into the same kind of thing: virtue (Meno, 72b-c). The list of instances fulfills the first part of the biconditional: if it is one of these things, then it is virtue. It fails, however, when it does not fulfill the second part of the biconditional: if it is virtue, then it is one of these things. Meno’s first answer then fails for two reasons. Firstly, because it does not present as definiens a property, but a list of cases, which for Socrates is not an adequate definition. Secondly, because not everything that is virtue has been enumerated in the list of cases: in fact, the problem with the list of cases seems to be precisely the difficulty of making it an exhaustive and complete list, with all the cases of virtue. An incomplete list fails the requirement that Socrates seems to impose on definitions: that they be coextensive with the definienda. Meno’s second response (Meno, 73d) also fails as to coextensiveness, for the definitional property he chose, "the ability to command men," was not valid for all instances of virtue. Socrates quickly makes this clear: the virtue of the child and the slave cannot also be the ability to command men. Perhaps every ability to command men is a virtue (Socrates seems to grant this), but not every virtue is an ability to command men. Meno, in this way, has failed to capture in a property a term coextensive with virtue, as Socrates seems to require it to do. Meno’s third reply attempts to get rid of the previous coextensiveness, and be more specific, by adding the instance in which commanding men is good. So, he states that to “desire beautiful things and have the power to get them” is virtue. Such definition cannot be accepted, nonetheless, as it continues to be overly broad. It is not common to the virtuous man to want something beautiful, as the definition of beauty is not strictly provided, and a vicious man may also desire beautiful things. But coextension is not all that Socrates requires of an adequate definition. In his third definition, Meno fails, according to Socrates' requirements, by falling into circularity. Later, he states that "virtue is doing something with justice" (Meno, 78e - 79a), but also assumes that "justice is a part of virtue" (Meno, 79a). Thus, Meno’s definition is nothing but a tautology: "virtue is doing something with a part of virtue." Socrates rejects tautology as a definition, after all, from "virtue is virtue" one cannot extract any information of properties or cases of virtue. Coextension and absence of circularity are logical requirements of the Socratic definition. However, it also has two epistemological requirements. The first is that the definition must be true. The second epistemological requirement is explanatory relevance, or causal relevance. That is, the definition (definiens) needs to be the reason for the definiendum (e.g. "virtue") being what it is. Thus, the definition of virtue, for Socrates, needs to be coextensive with virtue, cannot be circular, needs to be true, and needs to be the reason virtue is virtue. Socrates manages, in this way, to lead Meno into a situation of deadlock. And in this state of mental confusion and inability to define virtue in the Socratic standards, Meno enunciates the famous Aporia of Meno. From the very beginning of the dialogue the Aporia was underlying and Socrates' intention was precisely to lead Meno into this situation. Meno asks Socrates three questions. The first question sets the challenge, and the subsequent two can be understood as problems for the search for new knowledge. The Aporia of the Meno suggests an impossibility of searching for new knowledge. It presupposes that the subject of the search is completely unaware of the object of the search, i.e., knows none of its characteristics. It presupposes that the subject of the search does not know the definition of the object, its properties, and its particular instances. This sophistical aporia can lead us to conclude that the search for new knowledge is innocuous, because it would be impossible. Socrates, unlike Meno, affirms the impossibility of any search for knowledge. This follows because: "someone either knows something or he doesn't know something" (implied); "if someone knows something, he cannot search for that something"; "if someone doesn't know something, he cannot search for that something". Therefore, "for any something, someone cannot look for that something". The Socratic dilemma affirms the impossibility of searching (or "seeking") for knowledge. Socrates thus establishes general rules of argumentation from the analysis of the Aporia of the Meno, namely: that the definition (definiens) must be coextensive with the defined object (definiendum); that the definition has explanatory priority over the cases and instances, but not epistemic simpiciter priority, and is thus sufficient, and not necessary in order to have knowledge of these cases and instances; that a definition can be discarded precisely because the one who discards it knows cases or instances of the definiendum that are not compatible with the definition in question. These general procedures of argumentation are fundamental to philosophical and scientific practice.
