TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
PIRACY
PEOPLE V. LOL-LO SARAW
Facts:
A boat in which there were eleven men, women and children arrived between the islands of
Buang and Bukid in the Ducth East Indies and was subsequently surrounded by six vintas
manned by twenty four moros all armed. They first asked for food but once on the boat,
took themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men and brutally violated two of the
women. All of the persons on the boat placed on it holes were made on it with the idea that
it would submerge, but after eleven days of hardship they were succoured. Two of the
moro marauders were Lol-lo and Saraw who later returned their home in Sulu, Philippines
where they were arrested and charged with the crime of piracy.
Issue:
Did the court of first instance in the Philippines have jurisdiction over Lol-lo and Saraw?
Held:
Yes, piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be
punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into
which he may be carried. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the
jurisdictional three-mile limit of a foreign state. Lol-lo who raped one of the women was
sentenced to death. There being the aggravating circumstance of cruelty, abuse of superior
strength and ignominy.
PEOPLE V. TULIN
Facts:
A cargo vessel owned by the PNOC shipping and transport corporation, loaded with barrels
or kerosene, regular gasoline and diesel oil was absorbed by 7 fully armed pirates. The
pirates including the accused Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio Loyola and Andres Infante detained
the crew and completely took over the vessel. The vessel was directed to proceed to
Singapore where the cargoes where unloaded, transferred and sold under the direct
supervision of accused Cheong San Hiong. Thereafter, the Bessel returned to the
Philippines. All the accused were charged with qualified piracy or violation of PD 532. The
accused Cheong argues that the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an
accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were executed outside the
Philippine waters and territory.
Issue:
Whether or not the Philippines is without jurisdiction to try a crime committed outside the
Philippine waters and territory.
Held:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
accused, appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside the Philippine waters
suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on M/T Tabangco and its cargo were
committed in PH waters, although the captive vessel was later brought to Singapore where
its cargo was off-loaded and such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong’s direct
supervision.
Although PD 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be
committed in PH waters. The disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still
deemed part of the act of piracy. Hence, the same need not to be committed in Philippine
waters.
PEOPLE V. CATANTAN
Facts:
The Pilapil brothers Eugene and Juan were fishing in the sea around 3 kilometers away
from the shores of Tabogan, Cebu. Suddenly, another boat caught with them. They were
later identified as the accused Emilio Catantan and Jose Ursal alias “Bimbo”. They
boarded the pump boat of the Pilapils and pointed his gun at Eugene. They hogtied Eugene
and covered him up and ordered Juan to ferry them to Daan Tagobon using their pump
boat. However, as they went farther out into the open sea the engine stopped running. They
saw another boat operated by Juanito and ordered the Pilapil brothers to approach the boat.
Catantan boarded Juanito’s pump boat and ordered him to take them to mungaz. Pilapil
brothers took the change and escaped. The regional trial court found Catantan and Bimbo
guilty of violating PD 532.
Issue:
Whether or not Emilio Catantan violated PD 532 and not grave coercion.
Held:
There were piracy and not grave coercion where as part of the act of seizing their boat. The
occupants of the vessel were forced to go elsewhere other than their place of destination.
This case falls squarely within the concept of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and
Juan were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such
compulsion was part of the act of seizing their boat.
ARBITRARY DETENTION
ASTORGA V. PEOPLE
Facts:
The offended parties together with SPO3 Andres Cinco Jr and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian were
sent to the Island of Daram Western Samar to conduct intelligence operations on possible
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
illegal logging activities. There they met petitioner Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who
turned out to be the owner of the boats found at around 4:30 to 5:00pm being constructed
at Brgy. Locob-Locob. A heated altercation ensued between petitioner and the DENR team.
Petitioner called for reinforcement and moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men, some
wearing fatigues arrived at the scene. The DENR team was then bought to petitioner’s
house in Daram, where they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00am.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is guilty of Arbitrary Detention.
Held:
Petitioner Astorga is acquitted of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of
reasonable doubt. The determinate factor in Arbitrary detention, in the absence of actual
physical restraint, is fear. The court find no proof that petitioner instilled fear in the minds
of the private offended parties. Furthermore, he admitted that it was raining at that time.
Hence, it is possible that the petitioner prevented the team from leaving the island because
it was unsafe for them to travel by boat.
CAYAO V. DEL MUNDO
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed by Fernando Cayao with the office of the Court
Administrator for charging Judge Justiano Del Mundo with abuse of authority, Cayao, a
bus driver overtook another bus and as a consequence, Cayao almost collided head on with
an oncoming owner-type jeepney owned by Judge Del Mundo. Cayao was brought by the
policemean in the Sala of Judge Del mundo and was compelled by Judge Del Mundo to
choose from 3 alternative punishment: a) to face charge of multiple homicide b) revocation
of is driver’s license c) to be put in jail for 3 days. Cayao chose confinement for 3 days and
was forced to sign a “waiver if detention” by Judge Del Mundo.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Del Mundo is guilty of the charge of warrantless arrest and arbitrary
detention.
Held:
Judge Del Mundo used and abused his position of authority in intimidating the complaint
as well as the members of the police force into submitting to his excesses. The complaint
was not accorded any of the basic rights to which an accused is entitled. Cayao was
deprived from the presumption of innocence, the right to be heard by himself and counsel,
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him as well as the
right to an impartial and public trial.
MILO V. SALONGA
Facts:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Accused Captain Tuvera Sr. was charged with Arbitrary Detention together with other
private persons for maltreating petitioner Valdez and for deliberately depriving the same of
his constitutional liberty without any legal ground. Accused respondent then filed a motion
to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute the elements
of said crime and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to support
the filing of the information. Petitioner Assistant Fiscal Milo filed an opposition, averring
that the accused respondent was not a public officer who can be charged with arbitrary
detention.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused respondent, being a barrio captain, can be liable for the crime
of arbitrary detention
Held:
Yes, the public officers liable for arbitrary detention must be vested with authority to detain
or order the detention of persons accused of a crime. One need not to be a police officer to
be chargeable with arbitrary detention. It is accepted that other public officer like judges
and mayors who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime. A perusal of
the powers and functions vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those of a
barrio captain except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller.
PEOPLE V. GARCIA
Facts:
Carlos Garcia, Patricio Botero and Luisa Miraples were accused of illegal recruitment. It
was alleged that they represented themselves as incorporators and officers of Ricorn
Philippine International Shipping Lines, Inc. and that Ricorn is a recruitment agency for
seamen. It was later discovered that Ricorn was never registered with the securities and
exchange commission and that it was never authorized to recruit by the POEA. Both were
convicted but Botero appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not Botero is a mere employee of Ricorn.
Held:
No, it was proven by evidence that he was introduced to the applicants as the vice
president of Ricorn. When he was receiving applicants, he was receiving them behind a
desk which has a nameplate representing his name and his position as a vice president of
Ricorn Philippine International Shipping Lines, Inc.
REBELLION OR INSURRECTION
PEOPLE V. VELASCO
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Facts:
Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 on 24 February 2006 declaring a "State of National Emergency,"
police officers arrested Crispin Beltran on 25 February 2006, while he was en route to
Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame, Quezon City. An inquest was held
and Beltran was later charged with rebellion before the RTC. Beltran moved for a judicial
determination of probable cause.
Issue:
Whether or not Beltran can be charged with Rebellion
Held:
No. Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed —
By rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing
from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the
Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or
depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers
or prerogatives.
The elements of the offense are:
1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either —
(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws:
(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(a) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers
and prerogatives.
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action
done in furtherance of a political end. The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who
conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other
documents. The bulk of the documents consists of affidavits, some of which were sworn
before a notary public, executed by members of the military and some civilians. Except for
two affidavits, executed by a certain Ruel Escala (Escala), dated 20 February 2006, and
Raul Cachuela (Cachuela), dated 23 February 2006, none of the affidavits mentions
Beltran. In his affidavit, Escala recounted that in the afternoon of 20 February 2006, he
saw Beltran and other individuals on board a vehicle which entered a chicken farm in
Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas and that after the passengers alighted, they were met by
another individual. For his part, Cachuela stated that he was a former member of the CPP
and that (1) he attended the CPP's "10th Plenum" in 1992 where he saw Beltran; (2) he
took part in criminal activities; and (3) the arms he and the other CPP members used were
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
purchased partly from contributions by Congressional members, like Beltran, who
represent party-list groups affiliated with the CPP.
The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran for taking
part in an armed public uprising against the government. What these documents prove, at
best, is that Beltran was in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14
years earlier, he was present during the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits stated
that Beltran committed specific acts of promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion as
found in the DOJ Resolution of 27 February 2006. None of the affidavits alleged that
Beltran is a leader of a rebellion. Beltran's alleged presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum
does not automatically make him a leader of a rebellion.
In his Comment to Beltran's petition, the Solicitor General points to Fuentes' affidavit,
dated 25 February 2006, as basis for the finding of probable cause against Beltran as
Fuentes provided details in his statement regarding meetings with Beltran and the other
petitioners attended in 2005 and 2006 in which plans to overthrow violently the Arroyo
government were allegedly discussed, among others. However, what the allegations in
Fuentes' affidavit make out is a case for Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, punishable
under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, not Rebellion under Article 134. Attendance
in meetings to discuss, among others, plans to bring down a government is a mere
preparatory step to commit the acts constituting Rebellion under Article 134. Even the
prosecution acknowledged this, since the felony charged in the Information against Beltran
in the criminal case is Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion and not Rebellion. The
Information merely alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and others conspired to form a "tactical
alliance" to commit Rebellion. Thus, the RTC Makati erred when it nevertheless found
probable cause to try Beltran for Rebellion based on the evidence before it.
PEOPLE V. SILONGAN
Facts:
On March 16, 1996, businessman Alexander Saldona went to Sultan Kudarat with three
other men to meet certain macapagal Silongan. They arrived in the morning and were able
to talk to Macapagal concerning the gold nuggets that purportedly being sold by the latter.
The business transaction was postponed and continued in the afternoon due to the death of
Macapagal’s relative and he has to pick his brother in Cotabato City. Around 8:30 pm. As
they headed to the highway, Macapagal ordered the driver to stop. Suddenly, 15 armed
men appeared. Alexander and his other companions were tied up and blindfolded. He
described the abductors as Macapagal’s brothers. Alexander’s companion were able to
escape but Alexander was released after the payment of P12,000,000 ransom.
Issue:
Whether it is necessary that there is actual payment of ransom in the crime of kidnapping.
Held:
No, it is not necessary for the crime to be committed. At least one overt act of demanding
ransom is enough. What the law requires is the purpose of extorting money as ransom.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
PEOPLE V. OLIVA
Facts:
Lorenzo Oliva, father of the complainant M, was charged with rape and was convicted of
the said crime. Accused filed an appeal questioning the testimony of his daughter M and
further alleged that it was not him who had raped his daughter but his brother-in-law,
Benjamin, who has committed the act.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimonies and credibility of the complaint witness is in doubt and
questionable.
Held:
Courts usually give credence to the testimony off a girl who is a victim of sexual assault
particularly if it constitutes incestuous rapes, because normally no person would be willing
to undergo the humiliation of public trial and to testify on the details of her ordeal, were it
not to condemn injustice. The grave man of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman under
any circumstances provided by law. In addition, mere denial, if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, has no weight in law and cannot be given any greater evidentiary
value than the positive testimony of a rape victim.
PEOPLE V. LOVEDIORO
Facts:
Elias Lovedioro with three other companions fatally shot SPO3 Jesus Lucilo while the
latter was walking along Burgos St. Albay public market. The victim died on the same day
from massive blood loss. On November 6, 1992, Elias Lovedioro was then charged of the
crime of murder and was subsequently found guilty. Lovedioro then appealed the decision
contesting the verdict of murder instead of rebellion. It was confirmed by the prosecution’s
principal witness that Lovedioro was a member of the New People’s Army (NPA).
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant committed rebellion or murder.
Held:
The killing of the victim, as observed by the solicitor general, offered no contribution to
the achievements of the NPA’s subversive claims, in fact there were no known acts of the
victim’s that can be considered as offending to the NPA. Evidence shows that Lovedioro’s
allegation of membership to the NPA was conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty
imposable upon him.
PEOPLE V. AMADO HERNANDEZ
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Facts:
About March 15, 1945, Amado Hernandez and other appellant were accuse of conspiring,
confederating and cooperating with each other, as well as with the thirty-one (31)
defendants charged in the criminal cases of CFI of Manila.
They were accused of being members of PKP Community Party of the Philippines which
was actively engaged in armed rebellion against the government of the Philippines. With
the party of HUKBALAHAP, they committed the crime of rebellion causing murder,
pillage, looting plunder, etc. enumerated in 13 attacks on government forces or civilians by
HUKS.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime of rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.
Held:
The court ruled that murder, arson, and robbery are mere ingredient of the crime of
rebellion as means “necessary” for perpetration of the offense. In Hernandez Doctrine,
rebellion cannot be complexed wit common crimes such as killings, destruction of
property, etc., committed on the occasion and in furtherance thereof. Rebellion constitutes
ONLY ONE CRIME.
PEOPLE V. DASIG
Facts:
Appellants Rodrigo Dasig, Edwin Nunez and six others were charged together of shooting
Redempto Manadtad, a police officer, as he died while performing duties. Dasig confessed
that he and the group of Edwin Nunez killed Pfc. Manadtad. He likewise admitted that he
and Nunez were members of the Sparrow unit and their aliases were “Armand” and
“Mabi”. The extra-judicial confession of appellant was signed by him on every page
thereof with the first page containing a certification likewise signed by him. However,
Dasig contends that it is legally defective. He claimed that the custodial interrogation was
done while he was very sick.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is liable for extra-judicial killing of the deceased and
participated in the act of rebellion.
Held:
Yes, accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act of rebellion beyond
reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 8 years imprisonment.
SEDITION
PEOPLE V. CABRERA
Facts:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Police officers conducted a buy-bust operation against appellant after receiving
information from residents of Sitio Galaxy, Tangke, Talisay, Cebu and a report from a
confidential asset of the illegal drug activities of appellant. At about 4:30 p.m., poseurbuyer, together with the confidential asset, approached appellant who was standing outside
his house. PO1 Palconit gave appellant two marked P50.00 bills, while the latter handed to
him two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. Thereupon, PO1 Palconit
made the pre-arranged signal by touching his head with his right hand. His back-ups then
rushed to the scene and simultaneously therewith PO1 Palconit arrested the appellant. He
then put the markings "EC" on the two plastic sachets and brought the same to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for forensic examination.
The chemistry report from the PNP Crime Laboratory later revealed that the white
crystalline substance with a total weight of 0.11 gram inside the two plastic sachets marked
with "EC" tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous
drug.
Issue:
Whether or not there is compliance with Section 21 of the implementing rules of RA 9165
Held:
With regard to the non-compliance by the police officers with Section 21 of the
Implementing Rules of RA 9165 as alleged by appellant in his Supplemental Brief,
particularly the lack of physical inventory of the seized specimen and the non-taking of
photograph thereof, the Court notes that appellant raised the same only in this appeal. The
records of the case is bereft of any showing that appellant objected before the RTC
regarding the seizure and safekeeping of the shabu seized from him on account of the
failure of the police officers to maintain an unbroken chain of custody of the said drugs.
The only time that appellant questioned the chain of custody was before the CA but not on
the ground of lack of physical inventory or non-taking of photograph, but on the alleged
gap between the time of confiscation of the specimen and the time of its submission to the
PNP Crime Laboratory. But even then, it was already too late in the day for appellant to do
so.
Appellant should have raised the said issue before the trial court. In similar cases, the
Court brushed aside the accused's belated contention that the illegal drugs confiscated from
his person were inadmissible because the arresting officers failed to comply with Section
21 of RA 9165. "Whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers from literally
complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because [appellant] did not question
during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Objection to evidence cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence
offered, he must so state in the form of an objection. Without such objection, he cannot
raise the question for the first time on appeal.
PEOPLE V. UMALI
Facts:
The complex crime of which appellants Narciso Umali, were found guilty was said to have
been committed during the raid staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
9:00 in the evening of November 14, 1951, by armed men. The raid took place resulting in
the burning down and complete destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan
including its content valued at P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000,
and the house of one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and civilians
Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and
five civilians.
During and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, robbing
one house and two Chinese stores; and that the raiders were finally dispersed and driven
from the town by the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellants are liable of the charges against them of complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery?
Held:
Yes. The appellants were guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and
physical injuries. For the crime of sedition each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years of
prision correctional and to pay a fine of P4,000; for each of the three murders, each of the
appellants is sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of each victim in
the sum of P6,000; and for the arson, for which we impose the maximum penalty provided
in Article 321, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the raiders in
setting fire to the buildings, particularly the house of Punzalan they knew that it was then
occupied by one or more persons, because they even and actually saw an old lady, the
mother of Punzalan, at the window, and in view of the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime, each of the appellants is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the
indemnities mentioned in the decision of the lower court. It shall be understood, however,
the pursuant to the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code the duration of all
penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In view of the heavy penalties already imposed and
their long duration, the court finds it unnecessary to fix and impose the prison sentences
corresponding to frustrated murder and physical injuries; however, the sums awarded the
victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector), by the court below will
stand. With these modifications, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
PEOPLE V. NABONG
Facts:
The appellant is an attorney and he had been retained to defend one Juan Feleo against a
charge of sedition that had been preferred against him. Feleo was in those days a
recognized leader of the communists in Nueva Ecija, and was related by marriage to the
appellant. After Feleo had been arrested and taken away, Ignacio Nabong delivered a
speech in a meeting. In the course of this speech Nabong criticized the members of the
Constabulary. While Nabong was talking his words were attentively listened to by deputy
fiscal Villamor, as well as Captain Cacdac and Lieutenant Arambulo, all of whom
understood the Tagalog language. At the same time Captain Cacdac and Lieutenant
Arambulo took notes of the substance of this part of the speech.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of inciting to sedition
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Held:
Yes. The language used by the appellant clearly imported an overthrow of the Government
by violence, and it should be interpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it was
evidently intended to be understood. It was the purpose of the speaker, beyond a doubt, to
incite his hearers to the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means. The words
used by the appellant manifestly tended to induce the people to resist and use violence
against the agents of the Constabulary and to instigate the poor to cabal and meet together
for unlawful purposes. They also suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies, thereby
tending to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the
community and the order of the Government. It is not necessary, in order to be seditious,
that the words used should in fact result in a rising of the people against the constituted
authorities.
DIRECT ASSAULTS
GELIG V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Petitioner Lydia Gelig impugns the decision promulgated by the court of appeals that set
aside the decision of RTC. Lydia was convicted of committing the complex crime of direct
assault with unintentional abortion but the court of appeals found her guilty of the crime
slight physical injuries. On July 17, 1981, Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed
her causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result, Gemma suffered contusion in her
maxillary area and continued experiencing abdominal pain and started bleeding two days
after the incident. Gemma later on suffered incomplete abortion.
Issue:
Whether or not the honourable court of appeals erred in finding that the petitioner can be
convicted of slight physical injuries under the information changing her for direct assault
with unintentional abortion.
Held:
Lydia Gelig was liable for direct assault and not unintentional abortion. It is clear from the
foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense against a person in authority. One mode
of committing it is; without public uprising, by attacking, employing force or seriously
intimidate or resist any person in authority or his agent. Gemma, being a public school
teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority. Gelig was not liable for unintentional
abortion for the absence of proof that such incident was the proximate cause of her
slapping and pushing.
RIVERA V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Ruben Rodil sustained injuries and was brought to the hospital for being ganged up by the
accused Edgardo Rivera and his brother Esmeraldo Rivera. Because of fist blows and coup
injury, Ruben sustained slight injuries. The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime
of frustrated murder. An appeal was made by the accused, but the court of appeals affirmed
the trial court’s decision with modification, changing the crime to attempted murder.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the court of appeals was correct in modifying the crime from
frustrated to attempted murder
(2) Whether or not there was an intent to kill.
Held:
(1) Yes, article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is an attempt when the
offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some causes other his own desistance.
(2) Yes, the court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature,
location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim.
PEOPLE V. ABALOS
Facts:
In the evening of March 20, 1983, while acciised Tiburcio Abalos and his father were
having a heated argument, a woman shouted “police officer, help us! Somebody is making
trouble here.” The victim P/Pfc. Labine,, then appeared at the scene and asked Major
Abalos what’s happening. The victim saluted Abalos when the latter turned around to face
him. As Major Abalos levelled his carbine at Labine, accused hurriedly left and procured a
piece of wood which is about two inches thick. He then swiftly returned and
unceremoniously swung with that wooden piece at Labine from behind, hitting the
policeman at the back of his head. Labine collapsed and sustained head fracture. The trial
court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of complex crime of direct assault
with murder.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of direct assault with murder.
Held:
The appellant committed the second mode of committing direct assault. The elements of
which are that there must be attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon
authority or his agent; that the assault was made when the said person was performing
duties. In this case the victim was performing his duties, that is, he was maintaining peace
and order during the fiesta in barangay. The killing in the instant case constituted the
felony of murder qualified by alevosia.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
PEOPLE V. DURAL
Facts:
On January 31, 1988, while two prosecution witnesses were on their way to Tupadahan,
they head gunshot and immediately hide. From the place they were hiding, they saw three
armed men firing upon the two Capcom soldiers. The three gunmen positioned themselves
as to immobilize the two Capcom soldiers. Two days after, eyewitnessed voluntarily went
at the Capcom headquarters to narrate what they have witnessed, consequently the
investigator brought them at the Capcom headquarters at Bicutan then at the camp Panopio
Hospital. At the said hospital, they identified one of the three gunmen referring to accused
Dural who shot two Capcom soldiers.
Issue:
Whether or not appellants are guilty of direct assault.
Held:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that there is no doubt that appellant Dural and the two other
gunmen knew that the victims, T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Mahiglot, were
members of the Philippine Constabulary detailed with the CAPCOM as they were then in
uniform and riding an official CAPCOM car. The victims were agents and persons in
authority. The crimes he committeed are two complex crimes of murder with direct assault
upon an agent of the person in authority.
ILLEGAL POSSESSION AND USE OF FALSE TREASURY OR BANK NOTES
AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF CREDIT
TECSON V. CA
Facts:
On April 28, 1990, a buy-bust operation was held by the Central Bank Operatives in order
to capture a certain Mang Andy who is involved in a syndicate engaging in the business of
counterfeit US dollar notes. Labita and Marqueta (members of the buy-bust operation
team) acted as poseur-buyer, approached Mang Andy inside the Jollibee restaurant. When
the civilian informer introduced them to Mang Andy, the latter was convinced and drew 10
pieces of US dollar notes from his wallet. At that moment, Labita and Marqueta introduced
themselves as Central Bank operatives and apprehended Mang Andy whom they later
identified as herein petitioner, Alejandro Tecson.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Petitioner denies liability for the crime of illegal possession and use of false treasury bank
notes and other instruments of credit as defined in Art, 168 of the Revised Penal Code.
According to him, to make him liable under the said provision, his possession of
counterfeit dollar notes should be coupled with intent to use. In other words, petitioner
contends that possession without intent to use counterfeit US dollar notes would not make
him criminally liable.
Issue:
Whether or not from the facts of the case, Alejandro Tecson is liable under Art. 168 of the
Revised Penal Code
Held:
It is true that in Art. 168, possession of fake dollar notes must be coupled with intent to use
the same by a clear and deliberate overt act in order to constitute a crime. However, from
the facts of the case it can be inferred that the accused had the intent to use the fake dollar
notes. In the course of the entrapment, petitioner’s natural reaction from the seeming
interest of the of the poseur-buyer to buy fake US dollar notes constitutes an overt act
which clearly shows his intent to use or sell the counterfeit US dollar notes. It is worthy to
note that prior to the buy-bust operation, the civilian informer had an agreement with the
petitioner to arrange a meeting with the prospective buyers. It was actually the petitioner
who planned and arranged said meeting and what the informer did was only to convince
the petitioner that there are prospective buyers. Clearly therefore, prior to the buy-bust
operation, the petitioner had already the intention to sell fake US dollar notes and from that
fact alone he cannot claim that he was only instigated to commit the crime. The petitioner
also failed to overcome the legal presumption that public officers regularly perform their
official duties.
CLEMENTE V. PEOPLE
Facts:
The petitioner, Martinez, was charged with violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal
Code. The petitioner gave a fake P 500.00 bill to Francis de la Cruz to buy a bottle of soft
drink from the Manila City Jail bakery but was refused because it was found out that it was
fake. So, Francis de la Cruz reported the matter to jail officers. Consequently,the jail
guards conducted a surprise inspection and found out 23 more fake 500 bills in the wallet
of the accused. The defense of the accused was the defense of frame up.
Issue:
Whether all the elements of the crime of Illegal possession and use of false treasury or
bank note in this case are present
Held:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
In this case, the Supreme Court, citing People v. Digoro, reversed and set aside the findings
of the lower courts and acquitted petitioner of the crime of Illegal possession and use of
false bank notes defined and penalized under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. In
Digoro, possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a
criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the
possession must be with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes. In the case at bar,
the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he
intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly
gave the fake P500 bill to buy soft drinks, was not presented in court. According to the jail
officers, they were only informed by Francis dela Cruz that petitioner asked the latter to
buy soft drinks at the Manila City jail bakery using a fake P500 bill. In short, the jail
officers did not have personal knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz to use the
P500 bill. Their account, however, is hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge.
HOW FORGERY IS COMMITTED
HERNANDEZ V. HERNANDEZ
Facts:
PMRDC entered through its president into various agreements with co-respondents Home
Insurance & Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), in
connection with the construction of the Isabel Homes housing project in Batangas and of
the Monumento Plaza commercial and recreation complex in Caloocan City. PMRDC
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby it was given the option to buy
pieces of land owned by petitioners. Petitioners insist that the obligation of PMRDC to
deliver back the TCTs arises on its failure to exercise the option to purchase the lands
according to the terms of the MOA, and that the deliberate refusal of PMRDC to perform
such obligation gives ground for the rescission of the MOA. This thesis is perched on
petitioners argument that the MOA could not have possibly been novated by the DAC
because Demetrios signature therein has been forged
Issue:
Whether or not there was forgery in this case
Held:
No. Firmly settled is the jurisprudential rule that forgery cannot be presumed from a mere
allegation but rather must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence by the
party alleging the same. The burden to prove the allegation of forgery in this case has not
been conclusively discharged by petitioners because first, nothing in the records supports
the allegation except only perhaps Demetrios explicit self-serving disavowal of his
signature in open court.
TAMANI V. SALVADOR
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Facts:
On July 29, 1986, a complaint for quieting of title was filed by respondents spouses Roman
Salvador and Filomena Bravo against petitioners Tamani et, al. over a 431 sq. m. parcel of
land located at Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. They were co-ownders of an undivided land. On
August 17, 1959, Tamani allegedly sold the disputed property to Milagros Cruz. RTC
rendered decision ruling in petitioner’s favour. Court of Appeals issued a decision ruling in
favour of the respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not court of appeals erred in overturning the factual findings of RTC.
Held:
Yes, even though the discussion of CA is binding, they are recognized exceptions, among
which is when the findings of the trial court and appellate court is conflicting. The CA was
thus correct when it declared that the judge must conduct his own independent examination
of signature. While it was improper for the RTC to solely rely on Sorra’s credentials. Her
superior credentials, compared to that of Albacea, give added value to her testimony.
Wherefore, premises considered, the petition is granted.
FALSIFICATION BY PUBLIC OFFICER, EMPLOYEE, NOTARY PUBLIC OR
ECCLESIASTICAL MINISTER
GUILERGAN V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Petitioner Guillergan, a Lieutenant Colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
directed Master Sergeant Edna Seclon (Seclon), Chief Clerk of the Comptrollers Office, to
cause the preparation of the payrolls of their civilian intelligence agents (CIAs) with
supporting time record and book. Each time the processing unit returned the payrolls for
lack of signatures of the payees, Guillergan would direct Technical Sergeant Nemesio H.
Butcon (Butcon), the Budget and Fiscal Non-Commissioned Officer, to affix his initial on
the Remarks/Sig column of the payrolls to complete the requirements and facilitate the
processing of the time record, book, and payrolls.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of falsification of public document
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Held:
Yes. The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 are: 1) the
offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage
of his official position; 2) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171; and 3) the falsification was committed in a public or official or
commercial document.All of the foregoing elements of Article 172 are present in this case.
Guillergan was a public officer when he committed the offense charged. He was the
comptroller to the PC/INP Command in Region 6. His work as comptroller did not include
the preparation of the appointments and payrolls of CIAs. Nor did he have official custody
of the pertinent documents. His official function was limited to keeping the records of the
resources that the command received from Camp Crame.
GALEOS V. PEOPLE
Facts:
On February 14, 1994, in the Municipality of Naga, the accused, a former Municipal
Mayor and Construction and Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, in
such capacity, falsified a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and
Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification
of Relatives In the Government Service, as of December 31, 1993, filed by accused
Rosalio S. Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein
accused made it appear therein that they are not related within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when
in truth and in fact, accused very well k[n]ew that they are related with each other, since
accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of
consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos [being] the sister of the mother of
accused Paulino S. Ong.
Issue:
Whether or not Galeos is liable of publication of public document.
Held:
YES. Petitioners were charged with falsification of public document under Article 171,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. Such crime is committed in any of the following
acts: 1.) Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric; 2.) Causing it to
appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate; 3.) Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding
statements other than those in fact made by them; 4.) Making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts. The elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows: (a)
the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b)
he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts
narrated by him are absolutely false.26
In addition to the afore-cited elements, it must also be proven that the public officer or
employee had taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification. In
falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his
official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he
falsifies.27 Likewise, in falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that
there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the
falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the public faith and
the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.28
All the elements of falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements have
been established by the prosecution.
GONZALUDO V. PEOPLE
Facts:
In 1985, Ulysses Villaflor took one Rosemarie Gelogo as her mistress into his house in
Bacolod City. After Ulysses’ death, said mistress offered to sell the 2-storey for P80,000.00
to herein petitioner Gonzaludo but the petitioner was not interested so he introduced
Gelogo to Spouses Canlas. Gelogo ang Gregg Canlas executed a Deed of Sale and it was
witnessed by Gonzaludo. Gelogo represented herself as the lawful owner of the house by
using the name of Rosemarie Villaflor.
Issue:
Whether or not of the complex crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document
having conspired with Gelogo
Held:
No. For an accused to be convicted of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public document, all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public
document must exist. To secure conviction for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of
the Revised Penal Code, the Court has time and again ruled that the following requisites
must concur: (1) that the accused made false pretenses or fraudulent representations as to
his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions; (2) that such false pretenses or fraudulent representations were made prior to
or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; (3) that such false pretenses or
fraudulent representations constitute the very cause which induced the offended party to
part with his money or property; and (4) that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage. In this case, the third element is absent. While it may be said that there was fraud
or deceit committed by Rosemarie in this case, when she used the surname "Villaflor" to
give her semblance of authority to sell the subject 2-storey house, such fraud or deceit was
employed upon the Canlas spouses who were the ones who parted with their money when
they bought the house. However, the Information charging Rosemarie of estafa in the
present case, alleged damage or injury not upon the Canlas spouses, but upon private
complainant, Anita Manlangit. Since the deceit or fraud was not the efficient cause and did
not induce Anita Manlangit to part with her property in this case, Rosemarie cannot be held
liable for estafa.
However, petitioner was found guilty of conspiring with Rosemarie to falsify, that is, by
making untruthful statement in the narration of facts in the deed of sale, by declaring
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Rosemarie to be the owner of the house subject of such sale and signing as "Rosemarie
Villaflor" instead of her real name, Rosemarie Gelogo, in order to sell the same to the
Canlas spouses. It is established by evidence beyond reasonable doubt that Rosemarie
committed the crime of falsification of public document.
GARCIA V. CA
Facts:
The accused, being in possession of a receipt for P 5,000 dated January 21, 1991 issued by
one Alberto Quijada, Jr. as partial down payment of the sale of a house and lot to accused,
made alterations on the said receipt and made it appear that it was issued on January 24,
1991 in the amount of Fifty Five Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00) when in truth and in fact,
the said accused fully well knew that the receipt was only for the amount of Five Thousand
Pesos.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of Falsification under Article 171 of the RPC
Held:
: Yes. The elements of the crime of falsification under Article 171 (6) of the Revised Penal
Code are: (1) that there be an alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion) on a document;
(2) that it was made on a genuine document; (3) that the alteration or intercalation has
changed the meaning of the document; and (4) that the changes made the document speak
something false. When these are committed by a private individual on a private document
the violation would fall under paragraph 2, Article 172 of the same code, but there must be,
in addition to the aforesaid elements, independent evidence of damage or intention to cause
the same to a third person. Given the admissions of Avella that she altered the receipt, and
without convincing evidence that the alteration was with the consent of private
complainant, the Court holds that all four (4) elements have been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. As to the requirement of damage, this is readily apparent as it was made
to appear that Alberto had received P50,000 when in fact he did not.
MACHINATION IN PUBLIC AUCTION
OANI V. PEOPLE
Facts:
During the school year 1988-1989, the Panabo High School in Panabo, Davao del Norte,
headed by its Principal, Leopoldo Oani, implemented the free secondary school program of
the government. During the period of November 1, 1988 to December 31, 1989, the high
school received the amount of P648,532.00 from the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) for Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE).[1] Of the said
amount, P551,439.13 was earmarked for the purchase of various supplies, materials and
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
equipment. On March 1, 1990, the DECS Secretary received a letter from the Parents
Teachers Association of the Panabo High School regarding the investigation of Principal
Oani and Bonifacio Roa, the Resident Auditor regarding, among other things, the alleged
overpricing of 12 fire extinguishers for P15,000.00 each. The Regional Office of the COA
then issued Assignment Order No. 90-137 dated March 2, 1990 to a team of auditors,
composed of Jaime P. Naranjo, as Chairman, and Bienvenido Presilda and Carmencita
Enriquez, as members.
The amount of P55,000.00 was certified as available for the purpose. Instead of conducting
a public bidding, Oani decided to purchase the fire extinguishers from the Powerline
Manufacturing Industry (Powerline, for brevity) for P54,747.00. Powerline was owned by
Francisco Cunanan and had its business address at Km. 5, Carnation St., Buhangin, Davao
City. The enterprise was authorized by the Department of Trade and Industry to
manufacture and refill stored pressure type (Light Pink only) mono-ammonium phosphate
for ABC fires.
On June 27, 1989, Oani approved Purchase Order No. 2 for nine units of fire extinguishers
and requested Powerline to deliver the supplies. Upon delivery thereof, Oani approved a
disbursement voucher in favor of the supplier for the amount of P54,747.00. The supplier
acknowledged receipt of the said amount through check.
The members of the Audit Team that conducted a re-canvass for fire extinguishers of the
same brand and features as those supplied by Cunanan discovered that each unit could be
purchased for only P2,970.00, inclusive of 10% allowance. The purchase of the nine units
of fire extinguishers was, thus, overpriced by P23,040.00.
Issue:
Whether or not the guilt of the petitioner was proven beyond reasonable doubt to convict
him of violation of RA 3019.
Held:
Yes. The Certification is dated January 1988, making it appear that it had been issued
before the subject fire extinguishers were purchased on June 27, 1989. However, Cunanan
could not have executed the Certification in January 1988 because paragraph 4 thereof
indicates that it was issued pursuant to COA Circular No. 91-368. It bears stressing that
COA Circular No. 91-368 was issued only on December 19, 1991, long after Cunanan
signed the Certification. In fine, Cunanan could not possibly have issued a certification
pursuant to an administrative circular which did not as yet exist. Hence, no such
certification was issued on June 27, 1989, the most plausible explanation being that it was
executed and signed by Cunanan only after December 19, 1991. Besides, the petitioner
never submitted the certification when the auditing team conducted its investigation. If the
certification was indeed issued as early as January 1988, the petitioner should have
submitted the same to the auditing team. The trial court saw through the petitioners
chicanery and declared in its decision:
Accused Oani submitted for the purpose a Certification dated 10 July 1988 issued by the
Panabo Fire Station, Panabo, Davao and the Certification dated January 1988, issued by a
certain Francisco R. Cunanan, proprietor of Powerline, that the latter is an exclusive
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
distributor of the purchased fire extinguishers and that no subdealer was appointed to sell
the same.
After a careful evaluation of the respective evidences submitted by the parties on this issue,
the Court finds for the People and brushes aside as incredible the claims of the defense,
particularly of the accused Oani. It appears that the theory of the accused that bidding and
canvass may be dispensed with in view of the exclusiveness of Powerline in the
manufacture and distribution of the purchased fire extinguishers, finds no leg to stand on,
at the least, or a mere afterthought, at the most. The penultimate paragraph of the said
certification of Powerline proprietor, Francisco R. Cunanan, states,
THAT, I am executing this Certification pursuant to Article 7, section 442 of the
Government Auditing Rules & Regulations (GAAM Volume I under COA Circular No. 91368 governing the procurement from Duly Licensed Manufacturers and Exclusive
Distributors).
CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER PROHIBITED DRUGS
PEOPLE V. MORALES
Facts:
Roldan Morales was charged in two separate Informations before the RTC with possession
and sale of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The trial court and the Court of
Apelas found Morales guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession and illegal sale
of dangerous drugs.
Issue:
What is the nature of appeal in criminal cases?
Held:
Appeal in criminal cases possess a unique nature. The appeal throws the whole case open
for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in
the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. On the basis of such
review, we find the present appeal meritorious.
Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold that the trial courts findings of fact, especially
when affirmed by the CA, are, as a general rule, entitled to great weight and will not be
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
disturbed on appeal. However, this rule admits of exceptions and does not apply where
facts of weight and substance with direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the
case have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied. After due consideration of the
records of this case, evidence presented and relevant law and jurisprudence, we hold that
this case falls under the exception.The identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. There was likewise a break in the chain of custody which
proves fatal to the prosecution’s case. Thus, since the prosecution has failed to establish the
element of corpus delicti with the prescribed degree of proof required for successful
prosecution of both possession and sale of prohibited drugs, we resolve to ACQUIT
Roldan Morales.
PEOPLE V. PERALTA
Facts:
Elmer Peralta was arrested after the District Drug Enforcement Group (DDEG) staged a by-bust
operation with one police officer (SPO1 Alberto Sangalang) acting as poseur-buyer. An informant
introduced the police officer to Peralta and the former informed Peralta that the police officer was a
dance instructor in need of shabu for himself and his fellow dance instructors so they could endure
the long nights. The police officer gave Peralta a marked P500.00 bill for a sachet of shabu. At a
signal, Sangalang told his informant to go out and buy cigarettes. On seeing the informant come
out of the house, the police back-up team rushed in. They arrested accused Peralta, took the marked
money from him, and brought him to the police station. Meanwhile, the sachet of shabu was
marked "AS-1-210702" and taken to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for testing.
The contents of the sachet tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The
prosecution presented the police officer. He alone testified for the government since it was thought
that the testimonies of the other police officers would only be corroborative. The prosecution also
dispensed with the testimony of the forensic chemist after the parties stipulated on the existence
and due execution of Chemistry Report D-332-02, which showed that the specimen tested positive
for shabu.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution presented ample proof that the police officers involved caught
accused Peralta at his home, peddling prohibited drugs.
Held:
NO. The elements of the sale of illegal drugs are a) the identities of the buyer and seller, b) the
transaction or sale of the illegal drug, and c) the existence of the corpus delicti. With respect to the
third element, the prosecution must show that the integrity of the corpus delicti has been preserved.
This is crucial in drugs cases because the evidence involved—the seized chemical—is not readily
identifiable by sight or touch and can easily be tampered with or substituted. The prosecution must
establish the chain of custody of the seized prohibited drugs. It must present testimony about every
link in the chain of custody of such drugs, from the moment they were seized from the accused to
the moment they are offered in evidence. But here the prosecution failed to show the chain of
custody or that they followed the procedure that has been prescribed in connection with the seizure
and custody of drugs. To begin with, the prosecution did not adduce evidence of when the sachet of
shabu was marked. Consequently, it could have been marked long after its seizure or even after it
had been tested in the laboratory. While the records show that the sachet bore the markings "AS-1210702," indicating that Sangalang probably made the marking, the prosecutor did not bother to
ask him if such marking was his. Sangalang identified the seized drugs in a manner that glossed
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
over the need to establish their integrity. Since the seizing officer usually has to turn over the seized
drugs to the desk officer or some superior officer, who would then send a courier to the police
crime laboratory with a request that the same be examined to identify the contents, it is imperative
for the officer who placed his marking on the plastic container to seal the same, preferably with
adhesive tape that usually cannot be removed without leaving a tear on the plastic container. If the
drugs were not in a plastic container, the police officer should put it in one and seal the same. In
this way the drugs would assuredly reach the laboratory in the same condition it was seized from
the accused. Further, after the laboratory technician has tested and verified the nature of the powder
in the container, he should seal it again with a new seal since the police officer’s seal had been
broken. In this way, if the accused wants to contest the test made, the Court would be assured that
what is retested is the same powder seized from the accused. The prosecutor could then ask
questions of the officer who placed his marking on the plastic container to prove that the suspected
drugs had not been tampered with or substituted when they left that officer’s hands. If the sealing
of the seized article had not been made, the prosecution would have to present the desk officer or
superior officer to whom the seizing officer turned over such article. That desk officer or superior
officer needs to testify that he had taken care that the drugs were not tampered with or substituted.
And if someone else brought the unsealed sachet of drugs to the police crime laboratory, he, too,
should give similar testimony, and so on up to the receiving custodian at the crime laboratory until
the drugs reach the laboratory technician who examined and resealed it.
PEOPLE V. GUTIERREZ
Facts:
At around 5:00 p.m. on June 16, 2003, while on duty at the Drug Enforcement Unit of the
Pasig City Police Force, SPO3 Matias received information via telephone from a
concerned citizen that a certain alias Nick, later identified to be appellant, was peddling
shabu along San Agustin Street, Barangay Palatiw, Pasig City. On the instructions of SPO3
Matias, PO1 Espares and PO1 Mapula proceeded to, and surveilled, the area and confirmed
the information. SPO3 Matias thus formed a buy-bust team, which he headed, with PO1
Espares as poseur-buyer, and PO1 Mapula and PO1 Michael Familara (PO1 Familara) as
members. Five marked twenty-peso bills were given to PO1 Espares as buy-bust money.
The team thereafter went to the target area and met with a confidential asset who was to
assist them in the operation. While the other members of the team were strategically
positioned, the asset, accompanied by PO1 Espares, approached appellant and asked him
Pare, meron ka ba diyan? Bibili kami. Bibili ako ng piso. Apparently not having heard the
entire utterances, appellant replied, Magkano ba bibilhin mo? (How much are you
buying?), to which PO1 Espares replied Piso lang, eto pera at the same time tendering the
buy-bust money which appellant took and placed in his right front pocket. Appellant then
drew from his pants back pocket a black plastic case, opened it and took one plastic sachet
containing a white crystalline substance which he handed to PO1 Espares. PO1 Espares
thereupon executed the pre-arranged signal, apprehended appellant, and confiscated the
black plastic case which appellant was holding. The case yielded a pair of scissors, an
unsealed plastic sachet containing traces of white crystalline substance, and five empty
plastic sachets. Heeding the pre-arranged signal, the other members of the team closed in
to assist PO1 Espares who then marked all the seized items including the plastic sachet
containing the substance subject of the sale. Appellant was brought to the police station
wherein the confiscated items were surrendered to an investigator.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Appellant
was
charged
with
illegal sale of
0.05
gram
of shabu and
illegal possession of paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking . . . or introducing any
dangerous drug into the body by two separate Informations
Issue:
Whether or not accused violated Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
Held:
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant,
Nicolas Gutierrez y Licuanan, is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. At this juncture, the Court notes
another lapse of the members of the buy-bust team their failure to comply with the
procedural requirements of Section 21, Paragraph 1 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165 with
respect to custody and disposition of confiscated drugs. There was no physical inventory
and photograph of the shabu allegedly confiscated from appellant. There was likewise no
explanation offered for the non-observance of the rule. Coupled with the failure to prove
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items adduced were not tainted, the buy bust
teams disregard of the requirements of Section 21 is fatal.
It needs no elucidation that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty must be seen in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the
performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The
presumption, in other words, obtains only where nothing on record suggests that the law
enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in
the law. Otherwise, where the official act in question is irregular on its face, an adverse
presumption arises as a matter of course.
PEOPLE V. QUE MING KHA
Facts:
On May 16, 1997, members Central Police District received a phone call from an
informant that a blue Kia Pregio van with plate number UPN 595 which was being used in
the transport of shabu has been seen within the vicinity of Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon
City. A tem was immediately dispatched to the reported place.
Around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the team spotted the blue Kia van on the opposite
side of the street going toward the direction of Commonwealth Avenue. Before reaching
Commonwealth Avenue, in front of Andok's Litson Manok, the van hit. A concerned
motorist picked up the boy and rushed him to the hospital.
When the police finally intercepted the van, they introduced themselves as police officers
to the driver and passenger of the van and informed them that they committed the crime of
reckless imprudence and asked for his driver's license. The police noted that Go was on the
driver's seat while Que sat on the passenger's seat.
The police peered through the window of the van and noticed several sacks placed on the
floor at the back of the van. They opened one of the sacks and noticed that it contained
several plastic bags containing white crystalline substance.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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The arresting officers thereafter forwarded the seized substance to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination. Each of the nine sacks contained 253 plastic bags which
contained around one kilo of the white crystalline substance. Upon examination, the
substance was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.5
Both Go and Que claim ignorance about the presence of shabu at the back of the van.
Issue:
Whether appellants are guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act
Held:
The Supreme Court found appellant Go guilty of transporting prohibited drugs, but
acquitted appellant Que.
It has been established that Go was driving the van that carried the contraband at the time
of its discovery. He was therefore caught in the act of transporting a regulated drug without
authority which is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Section 15, Article III of the
Dangerous Drugs Act penalizes "any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
dispense, deliver, transport or distributed any regulated drug."
To exonerate himself, Go claimed that he was not aware of the existence of the contraband
at the back of the van. We are not persuaded. The crime under consideration is malum
prohibitum. In such case, the lack of criminal intent and good faith do not exempt the
accused from criminal liability. Thus, Go's contention that he did not know that there were
illegal drugs inside the van cannot constitute a valid defense. Mere possession and/or
delivery of a regulated drug without legal authority is punishable under the Dangerous
Drugs Act
Regarding the criminal liability of appellant Que, the Supreme Court acquitted Que. Que
had nothing to do with the loading and transport of the shabu. Not one reliable eyewitness
pointed to him as having been with Go inside the van when it hit Elmar Cawiling. No less
than the Solicitor General himself entertains doubt on the guilt of Que and recommends his
acquittal. When the prosecution itself says it failed to prove Que's guilt, the Court should
listen and listen hard, lest it locks up a person who has done no wrong.
In People v. Pagaura, the Supreme Court made a cautionary warning that "the court must
be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually
heavy penalties for drug offenses. In our criminal justice system the overriding
consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it
entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
DIRECT BRIBERY
MARIFOSQUE V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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This is a petition for review on certiorari, which assails the September 23, 2002, decision
and the January 3, 2003, Resolution of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner Nazario
Marifosque guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct bribery, defined and
penalized under the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner
averred that said money was not for him but as “reward money” for the police asset who
demanded that he be given 350 pesos per cylinder tank. Petitioner further averred that he
was only collecting on behalf of the police asset and that he already gave an advance of
1,000 pesos to said asset and only collecting the balance of 4,800.
The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision convicting petitioner of direct bribery.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner committed Direct Bribery?
Held:
Yes. Petitioner cannot feign innocence and profess good faith since all the indicia point to
his guilt and malicious intent. Petitioner did not introduce his asset or mention his name to
Yu So Pong or his daughter at the time of the illegal transaction. His claim that he
previously gave 1000 pesos to his asset, which purportedly represented a partial payment
of the reward money, was not corroborated by his asset. One of the arresting CIS officers
testified that petitioner attempted to give back the money to Yu So Pong when they were
about to arrest him, which showed that he was well aware of the illegality of his
transaction because had he been engaged in a legitimate deal, he would have faced
courageously the arresting officers and indignantly protested the violation of his person,
which is the normal reaction of an innocent man. His solicitous and overly eager conduct
in pursuing the robbery incident, even though he was no longer on duty, betrays an
intention not altogether altruistic and denotes a corrupt desire on his part to obtain
pecuniary benefits from an illegal transaction. The petitioner's persistence in obtaining the
monetary reward for the asset although the latter was no longer complaining about the
1000 pesos that he supposedly received earlier.
MANIPON V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
The Sandiganbayan found accused Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., 31, guilty of direct bribery,
dated September 30, 1981. Manipon came to this Court on petition for review on certiorari
seeking the reversal of the judgment of conviction. The Court dismissed the petition, "the
question raised being factual and for lack of merit." 1 However, upon motion for
reconsideration, the Court reconsidered its resolution and gave due course to the petition. 2
Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., a deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City
and Benguet, Branch IV, was assigned to enforce an order of the Minister of Labor.
Pursuant to that assignment, Manipon sent a notice to the COMTRUST garnishing the
bank accounts of Dominguez. The bank agreed to hold the accounts. For one reason or
another, Manipon did not inform the labor arbiter of the garnishment nor did he exert
efforts to immediately satisfy the judgment under execution.
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Manipon's help was sought by Dominguez in the withdrawal of the garnished account.
Manipon told Dominguez that the money could not be withdrawn.
However, when the two met again, Manipon told Dominguez that he "can remedy the
withdrawal so they will have something for the New Year." Dominguez interpreted this to
mean that Manipon would withdraw the garnished amount for a consideration. Dominguez
agreed and they arranged to meet at the bank later in the afternoon. After Manipon left,
Dominguez confided the offer to NISA Sub-Station Commander Luisito Sanchez. They
then hatched up a plan to entrap Manipon by paying him with marked money the next day.
Col. Sanchez and a Col. Aguana were able to put up P700.00 in fifty-peso bills which were
then authenticated, Xeroxed and dusted with fluorescent powder.
Issue:
Whether or not accused committed direct bribery?
Held:
Yes. Manipon maintains that Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge. He said
that in 1978 he and Flora had levied execution against several vehicles owned by
Dominguez, an act which the latter had openly resented.
The defense theory is so incredible that it leaves no doubt whatsoever in the Court's mind
that Manipon is guilty of the crime charged.
It is very strange indeed that for such an important agreement that would modify a final
judgment, no one took the bother of putting it down on paper. Of course Manipon would
have us believe that there was no need for it because he trusted Dominguez and Tabek. And
yet did he not also claim that Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge? And if
there was really an agreement to alter the judgment, why did he not inform the labor arbiter
about it considering that it was the labor arbiter who had issued the order of execution?
Manipon could not give satisfactory explanations because there was no such agreement in
the first place.
The temporary receipt 20 adduced by Manipon, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, is a last-minute fabrication to provide proof of the alleged agreement for the trial
payment of the judgment debt. Contrary to Manipon's claim, it is hard to believe that
Dominguez was not interested in getting said temporary receipt because precisely that was
the proof he needed to show that he had partially complied with his legal obligation.
Indeed, Manipon's behavior at the very outset, had been marked with irregularities. As
early as November 9, 1979, he had already garnished the bank accounts of Dominguez at
Comtrust, but he did not notify the labor arbiter so that the corresponding order for the
payment by the bank of the garnished amount could be made and the sum withdrawn
immediately to satisfy the judgment under execution. His lame excuse was that he was
very busy in the sheriff's office, attending to voluminous exhibits and court proceedings.
That was also the same excuse he gave for not informing the labor arbiter of the novation.
In fact he candidly admitted that he never communicated with the NLRC concerning the
garnishment. He returned the writ unsatisfied only on February 20, 1980 although by its
express terms, it was returnable within thirty days from October 29, 1979. 22 Clearly,
Manipon had planned to get Dominguez to acquiesce to a consideration for lifting the
garnishment order.
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Dwelling on one last point, Manipon has pointed out that the P1,000.00 was illegally
seized because there was no valid March warrant and therefore inadmissible.
The argument is untenable. The rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a
valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to the rule
recognized in this jurisdiction. These are: 1) search incidental to an arrest, 2) search of a
moving vehicle, and 3) seizure of evidence in plain view. This falls on the first exception.
SORIANO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
The City Fiscal of Quezon City lodged a complaint with the accused Thomas N. Tan of
qualified theft. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 82-2964 and assigned for investigation to
the petitioner who was then an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the investigation the
petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for dismissing the case. Tan reported
the demand to the National Bureau of Investigation which set up an entrapment. Because
Tan was hard put to raise the required amount only P2,000.00 in bills were marked by the
NBI which had to supply one-half thereof. The entrapment succeeded and an information
was filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 7393 which reads as follows:
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses LAURO G. SORIANO, for
Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act.
After trial the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding accused Lauro G. Soriano, Jr.,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as Principal in the Information, for Violation of Section
3, paragraph (b), of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act.
A motion to reconsider the decision was denied by the Sandiganbayan; hence the instant
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not accused is guilty of Bribery?
Held:
Yes. The principal issue is whether or not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can
be regarded as a "contract or transaction" within the purview of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No.
3019. On this issue the petition is highly impressed with merit.
The petitioner states:
Assuming in gratia argumenti, petitioner's guilt, the facts make out a case of Direct Bribery
defined and penalized under the provision of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and
not a violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended.
The evidence for the prosecution clearly and undoubtedly support, if at all the offense of
Direct Bribery, which is not the offense charged and is not likewise included in or is
necessarily included in the offense charged, which is for violation of Section 3,
subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The prosecution showed that: the accused
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is a public officer; in consideration of P4,000.00 which was allegedly solicited, P2,000.00
of which was allegedly received, the petitioner undertook or promised to dismiss a criminal
complaint pending preliminary investigation before him, which may or may not constitute
a crime; that the act of dismissing the criminal complaint pending before petitioner was
related to the exercise of the function of his office. Therefore, it is with pristine clarity that
the offense proved, if at all is Direct Bribery. (Petition, p. 5.)
Upon the other hand, the respondents claim:
A reading of the above-quoted provision would show that the term 'transaction' as used
thereof is not limited in its scope or meaning to a commercial or business transaction but
includes all kinds of transaction, whether commercial, civil or administrative in nature,
pending with the government. This must be so, otherwise, the Act would have so stated in
the "Definition of Terms", Section 2 thereof. But it did not, perforce leaving no other
interpretation than that the expressed purpose and object is to embrace all kinds of
transaction between the government and other party wherein the public officer would
intervene under the law. (Comment, p. 8.)
It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither
was it a transaction because this term must be construed as analogous to the term which
precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some consideration as in
credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted
by the petitioner.
In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it was error for the
Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019.
The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal
Code because to do so would be violative of as constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the information which
has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot
claim deprivation of the right to be informed.
INDIRECT BRIBERY
FORMELIZA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Petitioner Leonor Formilleza has been with the government service for around 20
years.She was the personnel supervisor of the regional office of the National
IrrigationAdministration (NIA) in Tacloban City, Leyte since October 1, 1982. Her duties
include theprocessing of the appointment papers of employees.A certain Mrs. Estrella
Mutia was employed with NIA on a project basis and she wasterminated on December 31,
1983. Pursuant to the verbal instructions of the regional directorof the Administration,
however, she continued working.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
According to Mrs. Mutia, she tooksteps
to
obtain
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
either a
permanent
Case Digest
or
at
the least
a
renewed
appointment.
When
sheapproached the regional director about it, she was advised to see the petitioner but the
latterrefused to attend to her appointment unless given some money. On February 27,
1984, Mrs.Mutia reported her problem to the Philippine Constabulary (PC) authorities in
the province.The PC officials, who are colleagues of Mrs. Mutia’s husband, arranged for
an entrapmentwith marked money bills worth P100 as the entrapment equipment. On
February 29, 1984,the petitioner and Mrs. Mutia agreed to meet at the canteen at 9:00am.
Mrs. Mutia thennotified the PC authorities, Sergeants Eddie Bonjoc, Efren Abanes and
Ignacio Labong aboutthe arrangement. At the canteen, petitioner and Mrs. Mutia occupied
a table and were joinedby some officemates – Mrs. Florida Sevilla and Mrs. Dimaano,
while the PC officials occupiedseparate tables. Sergeant Abanes brought along a camera
to document the entrapment.Mrs. Mutia maintains that after taking the snacks she handed
the marked money bills underthe table with her right hand to the petitioner who received
the money with her left hand. Atthat moment, the PC officials approached the petitioner
and held her hand holding the money.Sergeant Abanes took photographs of the sequence of
events. The petitioner was arrestedand was brought to the PC crime where she was found
positive for ultra-violet powder. The respondent court found the petitioner guilty of
Indirect Bribery and sentenced her tofour months of arresto mayor, suspension from public
office, profession or calling, includingthe right of suffrage, and public censure.
The
petitioner elevated the case to the SupremeCourt by way of the Instant Petition for Review.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner accepted the supposed bribe money.
Held:
Petitioner Leonor Formilleza is ACQUITTED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan isSET
ASIDE. An exception to the general rule that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition ofthis character calls for application in this case. There are substantial facts and
circumstanceswhich appear to be favorable to the accused but which were not carefully
considered by theSandiganbayan. The failure to do so is most unfortunate considering that
the Sandiganbayanis the first and last recourse of the accused before her case reaches the
Supreme Courtwhere findings of fact are generally conclusive and binding.
essential
The
ingredient ofindirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal
Code is that the public officerconcerned must have accepted the gift of material
consideration.
There must be a clearintention on the part of the public officer to take the
gift so offered and consider the same ashis own property from then on, such as putting
away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing thesame. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied
by any other sign, circumstances or act to showsuch acceptance is not sufficient to lead the
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court to conclude that the crime of indirect briberyhas been committed. To hold otherwise
will encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up
public officers by simply putting within their physical custody some gift,
money or otherproperty. If the petitioner knew and was prepared to accept the money
from Mrs. Mutia at thecanteen, the petitioner would not have invited her officemates Mrs.
Sevilla and Mrs. Dimaanoto join them. According to Mrs. Sevilla she did not see the
alleged passing of the moneyunder the table. What she was sure was that when they were
about to leave the canteen, twomen approached petitioner, one of whom took pictures and
the petitioner shouted at Mrs.Mutia, “What are you trying to do to me?” The reaction of
petitioner is far from one with a guiltyconscience. Without the standard of certainty, it may
not be said that the guilt of the accusedin a criminal proceeding has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIAL
CHUA vs. NUESTRO
Facts:
Rina V. Chua being the complainant, filed an administrative charge against the respondent
for allegedly delaying the enforcement of the writ of execution in her favor after
demanding and getting from her the sum of 1500 pesos. The court issued a writ of
execution, On September 12, 1988, Chua and counsel asked respondent Deputy-Sheriff
Edgardo D. Nuestro to immediately enforce the writ of execution against the defendant,
and for the purpose, they agreed to give 1000 pesos to the respondent. Respondent received
the amount of 1000 pesos on September 12, 1988; however, the next day, they saw the
respondent talking with counsel of defendant and that the respondent was hesitantin
proceeding to carry out the writ of execution. Respondent even asked for a
additionalamount of P500.00; consequently, in the afternoon of the same day, respondent
went to the premises in question and when he arrived there, but he was told by the judge
not to proceed because a supersede as bond was filed. Nevertheless, he found the premises
locked, and at the insistence of the complainant, they broke the padlock and entered
portion B of the premises. Later, counsel for defendant arrived and showed them the
official receipt of payment of the supersede as bond and so he discontinued the execution
proceedings.
Issue:
Whether Chua and counsel be charged of corruption of public official when they gave to
therespondent the amount of 1500 pesos in consideration of enforcing the writ of
execution.
Held:
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Case Digest
While we cannot fault the sheriff for his hesitance to immediately carry out the writ of
execution because the defendant still had time to file supersedeas bond to stay execution,
we find duly proved by preponderance of evidence that the respondent Deputy Sheriff
Edgardo D. Nuestro received the amount of P1,500.00 from the complainant and her
lawyer as a consideration for the performance of his work. This amount is distinct from the
sheriffs fee and expenses of execution and was not intended for that purpose. It was indeed
a bribe given and received by respondent deputy sheriff from the complainant.
RA 3019 – ANTI GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
CHANG V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Roberto Chang, the Municipal Treasurer of Makati and Pacifico San Mateo, the Chief of
Operations, Business Revenue Examination, Audit Division, Makati Treasurer's Office
found out that GDI has a tax deficiency of P494,000. The Office of the Treasurer then
issued an
Assessment notice to GDI to pay the unpayed taxes. GDI asked for a validation of the
assessment and petitioners asked for a meeting with GDI representatives. On that meeting,
petitioners offered GDI that if they could pay P125,000, the tax would be “settled.”
Thinking that it was the right tax assessment, GDI prepared P125,000 in check. Petitioners
made it clear that it was not the tax due and gave two options: either to pay the petitioners
P125,000 or pay the
Municipality P494,000. GDI then alerted the NBI and the petitioners were caught in an
entrapment operation.
Issue:
Whether petitioners were indeed guilty of corrupt practices by illiciting bribe to fix tax
deficits.
Held:
Yes. The fact that petitioners willingness to meet with GDI representatives despite the
receipt of the latter of deficiency assessments notices to settle tax deficiencies, refusal to
accept of the initial payment of P125,000 for the municipality, and the petitioners' handing
over to GDI representatives the Certificate of Examination on which was annotated "NO
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Case Digest
TAX LIABILITY INVOLVED" establishes that the criminal intent originated from the
minds of petitioners to illicit bribes.
BUSTILOO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner Anuncio Bustillo, then incumbent
mayor of Bunawan, Agusan del Sur, and his daughter Rowena Bustillo in the
Sandiganbayan with Falsification of Official Documents under Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code by making it appear that municipal funds were expended for the purchase of
lumber from Estigoy Lumber when, in truth and in fact, as both accused well knew, said
lumber were actually purchased from Rowena Woodcraft, a single proprietorship owned by
accused Rowena G. Bustillo. In view of the criminal charges against the petitioner,
Sandiganbayan then suspended the petitioner from office for 90 days.
The petitioner argues that Sandiganbayan has no basis to suspend him because he contends
that the Information filed against him and his co-accused is invalid because it failed to
allege the element of gain, the party benefited or prejudiced by the falsification, or that the
"integrity of the [falsified] document was tarnished.”
Issue:
Whether the Information charged against the accused was valid to justify the
Sandiganbayan’s resolution of suspending the accused.
Held:
The information is valid. The allegation of intent to gain, the party benefited or prejudiced
by the falsification, or tarnishing of a document’s integrity, is not essential to maintain a
charge for falsification of official documents. Such charge stands if the facts alleged in the
Information fall under any of the modes of committing falsification under Article 171.
Suspension from office is mandatory whenever a valid Information charges an incumbent
public officer with (1) violation of RA 3019; (2) violation of Title 7, Book II of the RPC;
(3) any offense involving fraud upon government; or (4) any offense involving fraud upon
public funds or property. While petitioner correctly contends that the charge filed against
him and his co-accused does not fall under Title 7, Book II but under Title 4, Book II of the
RPC, it nevertheless involves "fraud upon government or public funds or property.
TEVES V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
That on or about February 4, 1992, and sometime subsequent thereto, in Valencia, Negros Oriental,
Philippines, accused Edgar Y. Teves, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Valencia,
Negros Oriental, committing the crime-herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and
taking advantage of his official functions, and conspiring and confederating with his wife, herein
accused Teresita Teves, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause the issuance
of the appropriate business permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in
favor of one Daniel Teves, said accused Edgar Y. Teves having a direct financial or pecuniary
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interest therein considering the fact that said cockpit arena is actually owned and operated by him
and accused Teresita Teves.
Issue
Whether a public official charged with violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for unlawful intervention,
in his official capacity, in the issuance of a license in favor of a business enterprise in which he has
a pecuniary interest may be convicted, together with his spouse, of violation of that same provision
premised on his mere possession of such interest.
Held:
Petitioner Teresita Teves must, however, be acquitted. Conspiracy must be established separately
from the crime itself and must meet the same degree of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt.
While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the
conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, all taken together, the
evidence must reasonably be strong enough to show community of criminal design. Certainly, there
is no conspiracy in just being married to an erring spouse. For a spouse or any person to be a party
to a conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of the others, it is essential that there be intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design. Except when
he is the mastermind in a conspiracy, it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some
overt act as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be committed.
The overt act must consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or of
moral assistance to his co-conspirators. We find no sufficient evidence that petitioner Teresita
Teves conspired with, or knowingly induced or caused, her husband to commit the second mode of
violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. The acts of petitioner Teresita Teves can hardly
pass as acts in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the violation of the Anti-Graft Law that would
render her equally liable as her husband. If ever she did those acts, it was because she herself was
an owner of the cockpit. Not being a public official, she was not prohibited from holding an interest
in cockpit. Prudence, however, dictates that she too should have divested herself of her ownership
over the cockpit upon the effectivity of the LGC of 1991; otherwise, as stated earlier, considering
her property relation with her husband, her ownership would result in vesting direct prohibited
interest upon her husband.
In criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral certainty of guilt. The burden of proof is upon
the prosecution to establish each and every element of the crime and that the accused is either
responsible for its commission or has conspired with the malefactor. Since no conspiracy was
proved, the acquittal of petitioner Teresita Teves is, therefore, in order.
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS
BAHILIDAD V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Accused Amelia C. Zoleta (Zoleta) and Violeta Bahilidad (Bahilidad), are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Public
Documents under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. In the instant case, petitioner was
found guilty of conspiring with Zoleta and other public officials in the commission of the
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Case Digest
crime of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents. Zoleta
appealed questioning the decision of sandiganbayan regarding the presence of conspiracy.
Issue:
Whether or not sandiganbayan erred in their decision regarding the presence of conspiracy.
Held:
Yes, The Sandiganbayan faulted petitioner for immediately encashing the check, insisting
that she should have deposited the check first. Such insistence is unacceptable.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the
physical acts constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for
it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission
of the crime, all taken together, however, the evidence must be strong enough to show the
community of criminal design. For conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a
conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is the product of intentionality on the
part of the cohorts.
In the instant case, we find petitioners participation in the crime not adequately proven
with moral certainty. Undeniably, petitioner, as a private individual, had no hand in the
preparation, processing or disbursement of the check issued in her name.
WHEREFORE, the
petition
is GRANTED. The
ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt
assailed
Decision
is SET
DAVALOS vs. PEOPLE
Facts:
On January 14, 1988, petitioner Davalos, as supply officer of the Office of the
ProvincialEngineer of Marinduque, received from the provincial cashier a cash advance of
18000 pesos forthe procurement of working tools for a certain “NALGO” project.
Petitioner's receipt of theamount is evidenced by his signature appearing in Disbursement
Voucher No. 103-880-08.Two demand letters were received by the petitioner from the
Provincial Treasurer to submit aliquidation of the 18000 pesos cash advance. The
petitioner failed to do so.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner be held guilty of malversation of public funds; and- Whether the
return of the misappropriated amount extinguish the criminal liability of theoffender.
Held:
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with
whichhe is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie
evidence thathe has put such missing fund or property to personal uses. There can be no
dispute about thepresence of the first three elements. Petitioner is a public officer
occupying the position of asupply officer at the Office of the Provincial Engineer of
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Marinduque. In that capacity, hereceives money or property belonging to the provincial
government for which he is bound toaccount.In malversation of public funds, payment,
indemnification, or reimbursement of fundsmisappropriated, after the commission of the
crime, does not extinguish the criminal liability of the offender which, at most, can merely
affect the accused's civil liability and be considered amitigating circumstance being
analogous to voluntary surrender.
CHAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
The petitioner Pamela Chan seeks a reversal of the Sandiganbayan decision of August 28,
2001 finding her guilty of Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217.
A routine audit examination of the accountability of the petitioner was conducted. The
audit was conducted during the leave of the petitioner. A second audit was conducted,
where the auditor found a shortage in petitioner’s cash accountability. A demand letter was
issued to the petitioner to restitute the missing funds and explain the shortage.
Petitioner was thus indicted before the Regional Trial Court for Malversation of Public
Funds.
Issue:
Whether petitioner is guilty of malversation of public funds.
Held: The burden of proof that the subject audit reports contain errors sufficient to merit a
re-audit lies with petitioner. What degree of error suffices, there is no hard and fast rule.
While COA Memorandum 87-511 dated October 20, 1987[13] (which, as reflected in the
above-quoted Deputy Ombudsman’s Order of July 28, 1997,[14] was cited by COA
Director Alquizalas when he opposed petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation before the Ombudsman) recognizes that a re-audit may be conducted in
certain instances, it does not specify or cite what those instances are.
The auditor thus committed no error when she charged to petitioner’s account the shortage
in the collections actually done by Bas.
Petitioner, nonetheless, could have shown that she was not remiss in her supervision of
Bas, by way of rebutting the disputable presumption in Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code which states:
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with
which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall beprima facie
evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
Petitioner, however, failed to do so. Not only did she omit to report the shortages of Bas to
the proper authority upon her discovery thereof; she even practically admitted to having
assisted Bas in covering up such shortages
TETANGCO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Facts:
On March 8, 2002, petitioner filed his Complaint before the Ombudsman alleging that on
January 26, 2001, private respondent Mayor Atienza gave P3,000 cash financial
assistanceto the chairman and P1,000 to each tano of Barangay. This petition for certiorari
seeks to annul and set aside the Order of public respondent Ombudsman which dismissed
the Complaint of petitioner Amando Tetangco against private respondent Mayor Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code(RPC).
105, Zone 8, District I. Allegedly, onMarch 5, 2001, Mayor Atienza refunded P20,000 or
the total amount of the financialassistance from the City of Manila when such
disbursement was not justified as a lawfulexpense.In his Counter-Affidavit, Mayor Atienza
denied the allegations and sought the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction
and for forum-shopping. He asserted that it was theCommission on Elections
(COMELEC), not the Ombudsman that has jurisdiction over the caseand the same case had
previously been filed before the COMELEC. Furthermore, theComplaint had no
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping. The mayor maintainedthat the expenses
were legal and justified, the same being supported by disbursementvouchers, and these had
passed prior audit and accounting. The Investigating Officer recommended the dismissal of
the Complaint for lack of evidenceand merit. The Ombudsman adopted his
recommendation. The Office of the Ombudsman, through its Over-all Deputy
Ombudsman, likewise deniedpetitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether accused committed a violation of the anti-graft law.
Held:
In this case, the action taken by the Ombudsman cannot be characterized asarbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic. The Ombudsman found no evidence to proveprobable
cause. Probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported
bycircumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that
theperson accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
Here, the Complaintmerely alleged that the disbursement for financial assistance was
neither authorized by lawnor justified as a lawful expense. Complainant did not cite any
law or ordinance thatprovided for an original appropriation of the amount used for the
financial assistance citedand that it was diverted from the appropriation it was intended for.
The Complaint charges Mayor Atienza with illegal use of public funds. On this matter,
Art.220 of the Revised Penal Code provides:Art. 220. llegal use of public funds or
property. – Any public officer who shall apply anypublic fund or property under his
administration to any public use other than that for which such fund or property were
appropriated by law or ordinance shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from one-half to the total of thesum misapplied, if by
reason of such misapplication, any damages or embarrassment shallhave resulted to the
public service. In either case, the offender shall also suffer the penaltyof temporary special
disqualification.If no damage or embarrassment to the public service has resulted, the
penalty shall be afine from 5 to 50 percent of the sum misapplied. The elements of the
offense, also known as technical malversation, are: (1) the offender isan accountable public
officer; (2) he applies public funds or property under hisadministration to some public use;
and (3) the public use for which the public funds orproperty were applied is different from
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
the purpose for which they were originallyappropriated by law or ordinance. It is clear that
for technical malversation to exist, it isnecessary that public funds or properties had been
diverted to any public use other thanthat provided for by law or ordinance. To constitute
the crime, there must be a diversion of the funds from the purpose for which they had been
originally appropriated by law orordinance. Patently, the third element is not present in this
case.
ABDULLA V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Convicted by the Sandiganbayan in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the crime of illegal use of
public funds defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, or more
commonly known as technical malversation, appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now before
this Court on petition for review under Rule 45. On or about November, 1989 or sometime
prior or subsequent thereto, in Jolo, Sulu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused: Norma Abdulla and Nenita P. Aguil, both
public officers, being then the President and cashier, respectively, of the Sulu State
College, and as such by reason of their positions and duties are accountable for public
funds under their administration, while in the performance of their functions, conspiring
and confederating with Mahmud I. DAarkis, also a public officer, being then the
Administrative Officer V of the said school, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, without lawful authority, apply for the payment of wages of casuals, the
amount of P40,000.00, which amount was appropriated for the payment of the salary
differentials of secondary school teachers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice
of public service .Appellant’s co-accused, NenitaAguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both
acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan in its
decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended appellant’s
sentence by deleting the temporary special disqualification imposed upon her
Issue:
Whether there was unlawful intent on the appellant’s part.
Whether the essential elements of the crime of technical malversation is present.
Held:
There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose – payment of the wages
of laborers working on various projects in the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high
priority which laborers’ wages enjoy as claims against the employers’ funds and resources.
Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of the prosecution
and not on the weakness of the defense.
The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of
secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the
crime of technical malversation which requires that the public fund used should have been
appropriated by law, is therefore absent. In fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime
defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus
in order.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
PARUNGAO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
The petitioner, Oscar Parungao, a public officer, was charged of malversation of public
funds for allegedly appropriating to his personal use the amount of P185, 250.00 for the
construction of the Jalung road in Porac, Pampanga. Parungao admitted that he received
the said amount, but was disbursed for the materials to be used and the rest was used to pay
upon the insistence of the municipal mayor of Porac, for the labor of the different
barangays in the municipality. Sandiganbayan acquitted him but convicted him for the
crime of illegal use of public funds. Hence, this appeal. Parungao claims that he cannot be
convicted of a crime different and distinct from that charged in the information.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him for on the violation of Art. 220.
Held:
The accused has the constitutional right that he can only be convicted of the crime with
which he is charged, unless they have both have the same essential elements which are
alleged in the information. Whereas, the elements of the crime of malversation of public
funds and illegal use of public funds are distinct. Hence, the petition was granted. The
decision of Sandiganbayan was reversed. And Oscar Parungao was acquitted.
DEATH UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUSTANCES
PEOPLE V. AYUMAN
Facts:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Brach 19, Cagayan
de Oro City where the accused, Conrado Ayuman, was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of parricide and was sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death
and to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000. On April 22, 1997 at around 10:15 in the
morning, Ermita Ayuman, the wife of the accused, rushed her five-year old son Sugar Ray
to the Emergency Room of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center. When a nurse, took the
child's vital signs, it appeared that he was dead on arrival. Ermita's statement was noted in
the emergency room record. An autopsy was done to the dead body of Sugar Ray. On April
23, 1997, Sugar Ray was buried. The accused was nowhere to be found. Neither did he
report for work from April 23 to May 21, 1997. During the burial, Ermita cried and
shouted, "Dong, forgive your father. Dong, don't leave us." Afterwards, she went to the
precinct and gave a testimony to SPO1 Catulong against her husband for killing their son.
At that time, his son was already buried. The couple then went to the Office of the
Prosecutor to "tell the truth."
Issue:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Whether the accused is guilty of the crime of parricide.
Held:
The decision of the trial court was affirmed with modification and the accused was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim
P50,000 as civil indemnity and P25,000 as exemplary damages. The elements of the crime
of parricide are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the
deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of the accused or
any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse; The key element here is the
relationship of the offender with the victim. All the above elements were sufficiently
proven by the prosecution, specifically on the basis of circumstantial evidence. And also,
the circumstances cited by the trial court, when viewed in their entirety, were as convincing
as direct evidence and as such, negate the innocence of the accused. Otherwise stated, the
prosecution established beyond a shadow of doubt, through circumstantial evidence, that
accused committed the crime of parricide. Here is a father who mercilessly abused his own
son and refused to bring him to the hospital, although on the verge of death, for prompt
medical treatment. Such a heartless conduct is condemnable and is extremely contrary to
human nature. Every father is expected to love his children and shower them with acts of
affection and tenderness.
PEOPLE V. PUEDAN
Facts:
Florencio Ilar, accompanied by his grandson, Reymark, went to the house of appellant
Luceno Tulo to buy a piglet. Luceno was fashioning out a mortar for pounding palay near
his house when Florencio and Reymark arrived. Florencio told Luceno that he wanted to
buy a piglet from him.
Appellant suddenly arrived and stabbed Florencio five times using a sharp pointed knife
locally known as plamingco. Terrified of what he witnessed, Luceno fled towards the
house of his neighbor. Young Reymark ran back to his parents’ house and told his mother,
Erlinda, what transpired.
Erlinda ran swiftly to Luceno’s place but Florencio was already dead, bathed in his own
blood and lying by the side of the rice paddy. The body remained where it had fallen until
the arrival of the police later that day.
Leah, wife of appellant, admitted having an illicit relationship with Florencio. Their
relationship had been going on for two years and was known in their Barangay. In the
morning of February 21, 1995, Florencio came to their house, while she was breastfeeding
her child, and was looking for her husband.
Issue:
Whether the accused is entitled to invoke the defense of death under exceptional
circumstances under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
The Supreme Court ruled that by raising Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code as his
defense, appellant admitted that he killed the victim.
By invoking this defense, appellant waives his right to the constitutional presumption of
innocence and bears the burden of proving the following: (1) that a legally married person
(or a parent) surprises his spouse (or his daughter, under 18 years of age and living with
him), in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he or she
kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious physical injury in
the act or immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the
prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of
the other spouse.
To satisfy this burden, appellant must prove that he actually surprised his wife and the
victim in flagrante delicto, and that he killed the man during or immediately thereafter.
However, all that appellant established was the victim's promiscuity, which was
inconsequential to the killing. What is important is that his version of the stabbing incident
is diametrically opposed to the convincing accounts of the prosecution witnesses.
PEOPLE VS. ABARCA
Facts:
Accused Francisco Abarca has a wife who had an illicit relationship with Khingsley Paul
Koh which started when he was reviewing for the 1983 Bar exam in Manila and his wife
was left in Tacloban.
Upon reaching home, he found his wife Jenny and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual
intercourse. When the wife noticed the accused, she pushed her paramour who got his
revolver. The accused who was peeping above the build-in cabinet ran away.
He went to look for a firearm and got a rifle. He went back to his house but was not able to
find his wife and her paramour so he went to the mahjong session where Khingsley
hangouts. He found him playing and then he fired at him 3 times with rifle. Koh was hit.
Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying the adjacent room of the mahjong room
were hit as well. Koh died instantaneously but the spouses were able to survive due to time
medical assistance. Arnold was hit in the kidney. He was not able to work for 1 and ½
months because of his wounds and he was receiving P1000 as salary. He spent 15K for
hospital while his wife spent 1K for the same purpose.
The lower court found the accused guilty of the complex crime of murder with double
frustrated murder and sentenced him to suffer death penalty. However, considering the
circumstances of the crime, the RTC believes that accused is deserving of executive
clemency, not of full pardon but of substantial if not radical reduction or commutation of
his death sentence.
Issue:
Whether the trial court is correctly convicted the accused of complex crime of murder with
double frustrated murder instead of entering a judgment of conviction under Art. 247
Held:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
The accused is entitled to the defense of death under exceptional circumstance under Art.
247 of RPC. There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour in
the act of illicit copulation.
The foregoing elements of Art. 247 of RPC are present in this case:
legally married surprises spouse in the act of sex with another person; and
that he kills any or both of them in the act or immediately after.
Although an hour has passed between the sexual act and the shooting of Koh, the shooting
must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused.
Articvle 247 only requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity.
But the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse and must
not have been influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of
the accused's rage.
Regarding the physical injuries sustained by the Amparado spouses, the Supreme Court
held that the accused is only liable for the crime of less serious physical injuries thru
simple negligence or imprudence under 2nd paragraph of Article 365, and not frustrated
murder. The accused did not have the intent to kill the spouses. Although as a rule, one
committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, the rule presupposes that
the act done amounts to a felony. In this case, the accused was not committing murder
when he discharged rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances is not murder.
MURDER
PEOPLE V. QUE MING KHA
Facts:
On May 16, 1997, members Central Police District received a phone call from an
informant that a blue Kia Pregio van with plate number UPN 595 which was being used in
the transport of shabu has been seen within the vicinity of Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon
City. A tem was immediately dispatched to the reported place.
Around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the team spotted the blue Kia van on the opposite
side of the street going toward the direction of Commonwealth Avenue. Before reaching
Commonwealth Avenue, in front of Andok's Litson Manok, the van hit. A concerned
motorist picked up the boy and rushed him to the hospital.
When the police finally intercepted the van, they introduced themselves as police officers
to the driver and passenger of the van and informed them that they committed the crime of
reckless imprudence and asked for his driver's license. The police noted that Go was on the
driver's seat while Que sat on the passenger's seat.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
The police peered through the window of the van and noticed several sacks placed on the
floor at the back of the van. They opened one of the sacks and noticed that it contained
several plastic bags containing white crystalline substance.
The arresting officers thereafter forwarded the seized substance to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination. Each of the nine sacks contained 253 plastic bags which
contained around one kilo of the white crystalline substance. Upon examination, the
substance was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.5
Both Go and Que claim ignorance about the presence of shabu at the back of the van.
Issue:
Whether appellants are guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act
Held:
The Supreme Court found appellant Go guilty of transporting prohibited drugs, but
acquitted appellant Que.
It has been established that Go was driving the van that carried the contraband at the time
of its discovery. He was therefore caught in the act of transporting a regulated drug without
authority which is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Section 15, Article III of the
Dangerous Drugs Act penalizes "any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
dispense, deliver, transport or distributed any regulated drug."
To exonerate himself, Go claimed that he was not aware of the existence of the contraband
at the back of the van. We are not persuaded. The crime under consideration is malum
prohibitum. In such case, the lack of criminal intent and good faith do not exempt the
accused from criminal liability. Thus, Go's contention that he did not know that there were
illegal drugs inside the van cannot constitute a valid defense. Mere possession and/or
delivery of a regulated drug without legal authority is punishable under the Dangerous
Drugs Act
Regarding the criminal liability of appellant Que, the Supreme Court acquitted Que. Que
had nothing to do with the loading and transport of the shabu. Not one reliable eyewitness
pointed to him as having been with Go inside the van when it hit Elmar Cawiling. No less
than the Solicitor General himself entertains doubt on the guilt of Que and recommends his
acquittal. When the prosecution itself says it failed to prove Que's guilt, the Court should
listen and listen hard, lest it locks up a person who has done no wrong.
In People v. Pagaura, the Supreme Court made a cautionary warning that "the court must
be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually
heavy penalties for drug offenses. In our criminal justice system the overriding
consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it
entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
PEOPLE V. CORICOR
Facts:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Reclusion perpetua was sentenced to the appellant, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Pedro Lego in the sum of P2, 000, and to pay the costs, having been found by the lower
court guilty of murder committed on September 15, 1941. The evidence was presented on
October 20 and 21, 1941 for the prosecution, and the evidence for the defense on October
21 and 22, 1941. Six witnesses testified for the prosecution.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant committed the crime of murder under Art 248 or death or
physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances under Art. 247 of the RPC?
Held:
A careful weighing of the evidence both of the prosecution and the defense leads us to the
conclusion that appellant's version as to the circumstance under which Pedro Lego was
killed is the more credible. That appellant should have gone to the house of Severino Regis
to invite Pedro Lego and his wife to come to appellant's house so as to advise Isabel,
because she had a paramour, one Saturnino Caaya, as testified to by Catalina Regis,
appears not to tally with the fact that, according to the testimony of the accused, not
contradicted by the same Catalina Regis, he went twice to her to complain about the illicit
relations between Pedro Lego and Isabel, to the extent that appellant manifested to Catalina
that if he should surprise Lego in flagrant copulation with Isabel, he will kill them and
would forget that Lego is his uncle.
The court applied in the case at bar Art 247, the death or physical injuries inflicted under
exceptional circumstances. Conjugal fidelity committed by a married woman and her
paramour is punished, as adultery, by article 333 of the Revised Penal Code with from 4
months to 6 years of imprisonment, and the one committed by a husband and his mistress,
as concubinage, by article 334, with imprisonment from 6 months and 4 years and 2
months for the erring husband and banishment for the mistress. Under article 334, not all
cases of conjugal infidelity committed by a husband is punishable. The great majority of
them are left unpunishable. No fiscal will think of prosecuting the husband who should
indulge in sexual intercourse with discreet mistresses or with prostitutes. For such acts of
conjugal infidelity, some punishable with short terms of imprisonment, others with simple
banishment, and still others not punishable at all, article 247, in effect, confers to the
offended spouse the power to inflict the supreme penalty of death. The banishment
provided for the killer is intended more for his protection than as a penalty. Such a twisted
logic seems possible only in a paranoiac mind. It is high time to relegate article 247 to
where it properly belongs, to the memory of the sins that humanity promised to herself
never to commit again. The majority of the Court, however, opines otherwise.
For all the foregoing, setting aside the appealed decision, appellant is found guilty of the
offense of having killed Pedro Lego as punished by article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
and, accordingly, is sentenced to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of banishment, and to
indemnify the heirs of Pedro Lego in the sum of P2,000.
PEOPLE V. MALLARI
Facts:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
During the basketball game at the barangay basketball court, Joseph and Liza (wife) were
watching as well as Rufino and his brothers, who were then carrying bladed weapons,
arrived and attempted to stab Joseph; but Joseph was able to run away. When they were not
able to catch up with him, Rufino boarded and drove the truck parked near the basketball
court and continued chasing Joseph until the truck ran over the latter, which caused his
instantaneous death.
Appreciating the qualifying circumstance of use of motor vehicle, it convicted Rufino of
murder.
Issue:
Whether or not the use of a motor vehicle is a qualifying circumstance for the crime of
murder?
Held:
The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in pursuing Joseph. Upon
catching up with him, Rufino hit him with the truck, as a result of which Joseph died
instantly. It is therefore clear that the truck was the means used by Rufino to perpetrate the
killing of Joseph.
The case of People v. Muñoz cited by Rufino finds no application to the present case. In
the said case, the police patrol jeep was merely used by the accused therein in looking for
the victim and in carrying the body of the victim to the place where it was dumped. The
accused therein shot the victim, which caused the latter’s death. In the present case, the
truck itself was used to kill the victim by running over him.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who kills another “by means of a
motor vehicle” is guilty of murder. Thus, the use of motor vehicle qualifies the killing to
murder. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death.
In view of the absence of an aggravating circumstance and the presence of one mitigating
circumstance, reclusion perpetua, not death, should be the penalty to be imposed on
Rufino.
PEOPLE VS WHISENHUNT
Facts:
On or about September 24, 1993, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and taking
advantage of superior strength, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of
one Elsa Elsie Santos Castillo by then and there stabbing her with a bladed weapon in
different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of her death and thereafter outraged or scoffed her corpse by
then and there chopping off her head and different parts of her body.
Issue:
1.) Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of abuse of strength is present.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
2.) Whether or not scoffing of the victim's body is to be appreciated in court to qualify the
crime to murder.
Held:
1.) The answer is in the negative. Abuse of superiority is present whenever there is
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of
superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact that the victim was a woman
does not, by itself, establish that accused-appellant committed the crime with abuse of
superior strength. There ought to be enough proof of the relative strength of the aggressor
and the victim.
Abuse of superior strength must be shown and clearly established as the crime itself. In this
case, nobody witnessed the actual killing. Nowhere in Demetrio’s testimony, and it is not
indicated in any of the pieces of physical evidence, that accused-appellant deliberately took
advantage of his superior strength in overpowering Elsa. On the contrary, this Court
observed from viewing the photograph of accused-appellant that he has a rather small
frame. Hence, the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength
was not adequately proved and cannot be appreciated against accused-appellant.
2.) Yes, the other circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the corpse of the victim was
correctly appreciated by the trial court. The mere decapitation of the victims head
constitutes outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim, thus qualifying the killing to
murder. In this case, accused-appellant not only beheaded Elsa. He further cut up her body
like pieces of meat. Then, he strewed the dismembered parts of her body in a deserted road
in the countryside, leaving them to rot on the ground. The sight of Elsa’s severed body
parts on the ground, vividly depicted in the photographs offered in evidence, is both
revolting and horrifying. At the same time, the viewer cannot help but feel utter pity for the
sub-human manner of disposing of her remains.
PEOPLE VS CONTINENTE
Facts:
It appears that appellant Donato Continente and several other John Does were initially
charged with the crimes of murder and frustrated murder in two (2) separate Information
dated June 20, 1989 in connection with the shooting incident on April 21, 1989 at the
corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City which caused the death
of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe while seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. After
the arrest of another suspect, Juanito Itaas, on August 27, 1989 in Davao City, the
prosecution, with prior leave of court, filed two (2) separate amended information for
murder and frustrated murder to include Juanito T. Itaas, among the other accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the element of treachery is present qualifying the crime to murder.
Held:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Yes, the shooting of Col. James Rowe and his driver, Joaquin Vinuya, was attended by
treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which
the offended party might make.[74] The evidence clearly shows that the mode of execution
was deliberately adopted by the perpetrators to ensure the commission of the crime without
the least danger unto themselves arising from the possible resistance of their victims.
Appellant Itaas and his companions, who were all armed with powerful firearms, waited
for the car of Col. Rowe which was being driven by Joaquin Vinuya at the corner of Timog
Avenue and Tomas Morato Street in Quezon City. Without any warning, appellant Itaas
and his companions suddenly fired at the said car upon reaching the said place. Hence, the
crime committed for the killing of Col. James Rowe during the said ambush is murder.
PEOPLE VS ANTONIO
Facts:
On that fateful morning of November 2, 1996, what should have been an amiable game of
cards for the victim, Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles, a former professional basketball player and his
friend turned into a deadly confrontation resulting in the fatal shooting of one by the hand
of the other. Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles succumbed instantaneously to a single gunshot wound
right between the eyes, inflicted with deadly precision by the bullet of a .9mm caliber
Beretta pistol.
Convicted of murder by the trial court as the killer is Alberto Ambet S. Antonio, a one-time
chairman of the Games and Amusement Board (GAB). It was during his stint as such that
he and Tuadles became socially acquainted. They somehow lost touch, but later became
reacquainted when they both started frequenting the International Business Club (IBC),
located along Wilson Street in San Juan, Metro Manila, which houses amenities such as a
dining room, music bar and gameroom. Often, the two would meet with other members
and friends to play cards in the gameroom at the second floor of the club. Their preferred
games were poker or pusoy dos, ordinary poker or Russian poker. Their bets always ran
into the tens of thousands of pesos.
Issue:
Whether or not Treachery is attendant in the case to convict the accused of murder.
Held:
No, Mere suddenness of attack is not enough to constitute treachery where accused made
no preparation or employed no means, method and form of execution tending directly and
specially to insure the commission of a crime and to eliminate or diminish risk from
defense which the victim may take.
A sudden and unexpected attack would not constitute alevosia where the aggressor did not
consciously adopt a mode of attack intended to perpetrate the homicide without risk to
himself. The aggravating circumstance of treachery is not present when decision to attack
was arrived at on the spur of the moment.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
There would be no treachery when the victim was placed on guard, such as when a heated
argument preceded the attack, or when the victim was standing face to face with his
assailants and the initial assault could not have been unforeseen. Even if it could be said
that the attack was sudden, there would still be no treachery. In People v. Chua, we
reiterated our consistent view that: While the killing itself appears to have occurred on
sudden impulse, it was preceded by acts of appellant showing hostility and a heated temper
that indicated an imminent attack and should have put the deceased on guard.
Thus, treachery could not be appreciated where the victim was forewarned and could have
anticipated the aggression of the accused. Since the sudden shooting of Tuadles was
preceded by a heated verbal altercation between Tuadles and appellant Antonio, as
admitted by both prosecution and defense, then it cannot be concluded that the shooting
was committed with treachery.
PEOPLE VS TEEHANKEE
Facts:
Jussi Olavi Leino was taking Maureen Hultman to her home at Campanilla Street,
Dasmarinas Village, Makati, 1991. Roland John Chapman went with them. Upon entering
the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop about a block away from her house, as she
wanted to walk the rest of the way for she did not want her parents to know that she was
going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car and
listened to the radio.
While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car,
driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on the
middle of the road. Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked: “Who are
you? (Show me your) I.D.” When Leino handed his I.D., the accused grabbed and
pocketed the I.D., without bothering to look at it.
Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused: “Why are
you bothering us?” Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired
at him. Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: “Why did you
shoot me?” Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him
but accused ordered him to get up and leave Chapman alone. Accused then turned his ire
on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked: “Do you want a trouble?” Leino said “no” and
took a step backward.
The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses, she became
hysterical and started screaming for help. She repeatedly shouted: “Oh, my God, he’s got a
gun. He’s gonna kill us. Will somebody help us?” All the while, accused was pointing his
gun to and from Leino to Maureen, warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to
sit down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move away. Accused
stood 2-3 meters away from him. Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay
still. She strayed to the side of accused’s car. Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen
circled around accused’s car, trying to put some distance between them. The short chase
lasted for a minute or two. Eventually, accused caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined
her to shut up and sit down beside Leino. Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the
sidewalk.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot
Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose
consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his
head to see what was happening and saw accused return to his car and drive away. Leino
struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least 3 people who saw the
incident.
As a result of the incident, 3 separate criminal cases were filed against accused Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND
CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and wounding of
JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman subsequently died after 97
days of confinement at the hospital and during the course of the trial, the Information for
Frustrated Murder was amended to MURDER.
Issue:
Whether or not there is evident premeditation and treachery in the commission of the
crime.
Held:
No, it has been consistently ruled that mere suddenness of the attack on the victim would
not, by itself, constitute treachery. Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out
swiftly and left him with no chance to defend himself. Even then, there is no evidence on
record to prove that appellant consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to
insure the accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself. It appears to us
that appellant acted on the spur of the moment. Their meeting was by chance. They were
strangers to each other. The time between the initial encounter and the shooting was short
and unbroken. The shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and impetuous
impulse on the part of appellant rather than a deliberate act of will.
As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of Maureen Hultman, we hold that
treachery clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The evidence shows that after
shooting Chapman in cold blood, appellant ordered Leino to sit on the pavement. Maureen
became hysterical and wandered to the side of appellant's car. When appellant went after
her, Maureen moved around his car and tried to put some distance between them. After a
minute or two, appellant got to Maureen and ordered her to sit beside Leino on the
pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the two were gunned down by
appellant. Clearly, appellant purposely placed his two victims in a completely defenseless
position before shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse of time between the killing
of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman — a period which appellant used to
prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the execution of the crime without risk to
himself. Treachery was thus correctly appreciated by the trial court against appellant
insofar as the killing of Hultman and the wounding of Leino are concerned.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
PEOPLE VS. MANERO
Facts:
On the 11th of April 1985, the Manero brothers Norberto Jr., Edilberto and Elpidio, together
with Rodrigo Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño, were
inside the eatery of one Reynaldo Diocades. They were conferring with three others of a
plan to liquidate a number of suspected communist sympathizers. Among their targets are:
Fr. Peter, Domingo Gomez, Bantil, Fred Gapate, Rene alias Tabagac and Villaning." "Fr.
Peter" is Fr. Peter Geremias, an Italian priest suspected of having links with the communist
movement; "Bantil" is Rufino Robles, a Catholic lay leader who is the complaining witness
in the Attempted Murder; Domingo Gomez is another lay leader, while the others are
simply "messengers". On the same occasion, the conspirators agreed to Edilberto Manero's
proposal that should they fail to kill Fr. Peter Geremias, another Italian priest would be
killed in his stead. They later on nailed a placard near the carinderia bearing the names of
their intended victims. Later, at 4:00 pm, the Manero brothers, together with Espia and the
four (4) appellants, all with assorted firearms, proceeded to the house of "Bantil", their first
intended victim, which was also in the vicinity of Deocades' carinderia. After a heated
confrontation, Edilberto drew his revolver and fired at the forehead of Bantil who was able
to parry and was hit at the lower portion of his ear. Bantil tried to run but he was again
fired upon by Edilberto. Though Bantil was able to seek refuge in the house of a certain
Domingo Gomez, Norberto Jr. ordered his men to surround the house so that Bantil would
die of hemorrhage. Moments later, while Deocades was feeding his swine, Edilberto
strewed him with a burst of gunfire from his M-14 Armalite. Deocades cowered in fear as
he knelt with both hands clenched at the back of his head. This again drew boisterous
laughter and ridicule from the dreaded desperados. At 5:00 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived
at Km.125 on board his motorcycle. He entered the house of Gomez. While inside,
Norberto, Jr., and his co-accused Pleñago towed the motorcycle outside to the center of the
highway. Norberto, Jr., opened the gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire and burned the
motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons raved and rejoiced. Upon seeing his
motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But the latter simply stepped
backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. At this point, Edilberto asked the priest:
"Ano ang gusto mo, padre (What is it you want, Father)? Gusto mo, Father, bukon ko ang
ulo mo (Do you want me, Father, to break your head)?" Thereafter, in a flash, Edilberto
fired at the head of the priest. As Fr. Favali dropped to the ground, his hands clasped
against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted Edilberto if that was the only way he knew to kill a
priest. Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body three (3) times,
kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shattered the head of Fr.
Favali, causing his brain to scatter on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to the
terrified onlookers, his brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight of
their comrades-in-arms who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim from possible
assistance. From this judgment of conviction only accused Severino Lines, Rudy Lines,
Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño appealed with respect to the cases for Murder and
Attempted Murder. The Manero brothers as well as Rodrigo Espia did not appeal; neither
did Norberto Manero, Jr., in the Arson case. Consequently, the decision as against them
already became final.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellants can be exculpated from criminal liability on the basis of
defense of alibi which would establish that there is no conspiracy to kill.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Held:
The court did not appreciate the defense of alibi of the Lines brother, who according to
them, were in a farm some one kilometer away from the crime scene. The court held that
―It is axiomatic that the accused interposing the defense of alibi must not only be at some
other place but that it must also be physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission.‖ There is no physical impossibility where the accused
can be at the crime scene in a matter of 15-20 minutes by jeep or tricycle. More important,
it is well-settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of
the authors of the crime by the prosecution witnesses. In this case, there were two
eyewitnesses who positively identified the accused. Contrary to the claim of the Lines
brothers, there is a community of design to commit the crime. Based on the findings of the
lower court, they are not merely innocent bystanders but in fact were vital cogs in the
murder of Fr. Fuvali. They performed overt acts to ensure the success of the commission of
the crimes and the furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. While accused-appellants may
not have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their collective action showed a common
intent to commit the criminal acts. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to
an agreement to commit a crime and decide to commit it.
It is not essential that all the accused commit together each and every act constitutive of the
offense. It is enough that an accused participates in an act or deed where there is
singularity of purpose, and unity in its execution is present. While it may be true that Fr.
Favali was not originally the intended victim, as it was Fr. Peter Geremias whom the group
targeted for the kill, nevertheless, Fr. Favali was deemed a good substitute in the murder as
he was an Italian priest. The accused agreed that in case they fail to kill the intended
victims, it will be suffice to kill another priest as long as the person is also Italian priest
DEATH CAUSED IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY
PEOPLE V. UNLAGADA
Facts:
On January 27, 1989, Danilo Laurel left his house together with Edwin Selda, a visitor
from Bacolod City at around 9:00 in the evening to attend a public dance at Negros
Occidental. After two hours, Danilo asked Edwin to take a short break from dancing to
attend to their personal necessities outside the dance hall. While they were outside, they
decided to have a drink and bought beer.
Not long after, Danilo, halfway on his first bottle, left to look for a place to relieve himself.
According to Edwin, he was only about three meters from Danilo who was relieving
himself when a short, dark bearded man walked past him, approached Danilo and stabbed
him at the side. Danilo retaliated by striking his assailant with half- filled bottle of beer.
Almost simultaneously, a group of men numbering of seven (7), ganged up on Danilo and
hit him with assorted weapons. Edwin, who was petrified, could only watch helplessly as
Danilo was being mauled and overpowered by his assailants. Danilo fell to the ground and
died before he could be given medical attention.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Edwin Selda confirmed the identity of the suspect who was then in the custody of the
police. Thereat, he executed an affidavit and affirmed before the police authorities, that the
man under detention, Anecito Unlagada, was the same man who stabbed his friend Danilo.
The accused assails his conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding Unlagada guilty of murder instead of
tumultuous affray under Art. 251 of the Revised Penal Code?
Held:
Basic is the rule that the defense of alibi should be rejected when the identity of the
accused has been sufficiently and positively established by an eyewitness because alibi
cannot prevail over the positive identification.
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons who
engage in a confused and tumultuous manner, in the course of which a person is killed or
wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. The quarrel in the instant case is
between a distinct group of individuals, one of whom was sufficiently identified as the
principal author of the killing, as against a common, particular victim. It is not, as the
defense suggests, a “tumultuous affray” within the meaning of Art. 251 of The Revised
Penal Code, that is, a melee or free- for- all, where several persons not comprising definite
or identifiable groups attack one another in a confused and disorganized manner, resulting
in the death or injury of one or some of them.
Verily, the attack was qualified by treachery. The deceased was relieving himself, fully
unaware of any danger to his person when suddenly the accused walked past witness
Edwin Selda, approached the victim and stabbed him at the side. There was hardly any risk
at all to accused- appellant; the attack was completely without warning, the victim was
caught by surprise, and given no chance to put up any defense.
Wherefore, the decision of conviction appealed from is affirmed.
PEOPLE VS MARAMARA
Facts:
The evidence shows that a benefit dance sponsored by the Calpi Elementary School PTA of
which accused- appellant is the president, was held in the yard of accused- appellant’s
house in Brgy. Calpi, Claveria Masbate in the evening of November 18, 1991. At about 12
midnight, while Ricardo Donato was dancing with certain Rowena Del Rosario, one Dante
Arce, a friend of the accused- appellant, approached Ricardo Donato and boxed him on the
chest. Frightened, Rowena ran away while Ricardo Donato scampered toward the fence for
safety. Miguelito Donato was about two meters away from where Ricardo stayed at the
fence. Not for long, accused- appellant took his hand- gun tucked in his waist and fired at
the victim Miguelito Donato, hitting the latter at the left breast. Ricardo Donato tried to
help his fallen brother Miguelito but somebody struck Ricardo’s head with an iron bar
which knocked him out for about 3 minutes. When Ricardo regained consciousness, he
hurried home and informed his parents of what happened.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Their father immediately went to the crime scene and rushed Miguelito to the Pio Duran
Hospital where the latter died early in the morning of the next day. Before Miguelito
expired, Regarder Donato, the father, asked who shot him and Miguelito replied that it was
accused- appellant.
The autopsy report revealed that aside from gunshot, the body of Miguelito bore lacerated
wounds. That the wounds could have inflicted by more than two persons.
The trial court ruled against the accused- appellant and was held guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder.
Issue:
Whether or not Maramara should be held liable for tumultuous affray instead of murder?
Held:
There is no merit in the accused- appellant’s position that he should be held liable only for
death caused in a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code. It was in
such situation that accused came at the scene and joined the fray purportedly to pacify the
protagonists when Miguelito attacked him causing four (4) stab wounds in different parts
of his body- two on the stomach, one on the left nipple, and one on the left arm. Then
accused- appellant with his hand- gun shot Miguelito.
Assuming that a rumble or a free- for- all fight occurred at the benefit dance, Article 251 of
the Revised Penal Code cannot apply because prosecution witness Ricardo and Regarder
Donato positively identified accused- appellant as Miguelito’s killer.
While accused- appellant himself suffered multiple stab wounds which, at first blush, may
lend verity to his claim that a rumble ensued and that victim Miguelito inflicted upon him
these wounds, the evidence is adequate to consider them as a mitigating circumstance
because the defense’s version stands discredited in light of the more credible version of the
prosecution as to the circumstances surrounding Miguelito’s death.
Wherefore, the Court modifies the judgment appealed from. The Court finds Cresenciano
Maramara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.
SISON VS. PEOPLE
Facts:
Amidst tension and strong hostility between Cory loyalists and Marcos loyalists broke into
violence. On July 27, 198, it resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known
“Coryista.”
On July 27, 1986, the prosecution established that, a rally was scheduled to be held at the
Luneta by the Marcos loyalist. They applied a permit to hold a rally but it was denied.
Despite this setback, three thousand gathered at the Rizal Monument led by Oliver Lozano
and Benjamin Nuega. No ticket could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres gave them ten
minutes to disperse. Atty. Lozano turned towards his group and said “gulpihin ninyo ang
lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators.” The police pushed the crowds and used tear gas to disperse
them.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
At about 4:00 pm, a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden. Annie
Ferrer was there and they informed her of the dispersal and Ferrer angrily ordered them
“gulpihin ninyo ang mga Cory hecklers!” A few minutes later, she was arrested by the
police. Somebody then shouted “kailangan gumanti tayo ngayon!” a commotion ensued
and Renato Banculo, cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking the persons in yellow.
The man in yellow t- shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists.
Thay caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and mauled him. He was hit on various parts of
his body. Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so he could extricate Salcedo from them but
the maulers pursued Salcedo. Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo but Billosos emerged
from behind Sumilang as another man boxed Salcedo on the head. De Los Santas, Tan
boxed Salcedo while Pacadar. Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw, Sision repeatedly
boxed him.
Salcedo managed to get away but accused Tan, Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in
the process. Salcedo pleadfed for his life. The mauling resumed at the Rizal monument and
continued along Roxas Boulevard until Salcedo collap[sed and lost consciousness.
Sumilang with a help of traffic enforcer brought Salcedo to Medical Center Manila but was
refused admission. So they took him to PGH where he died upon arrival.
The trial court rendered decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard De
Los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by
treachery. Ferrer was convicted as an accomplice.
The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court by acquitting Ferrer but
increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused except for Tamayo. The court convicts
Tamayo of homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the crime committed is murder
and not death caused in a tumultuous affray?
Held:
For Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code to apply; it must be established that: (1) there be
several persons; (2) that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose
of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarreled and
assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner;(4) someone was killed in the
course of the affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (6)
that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence be
can be identified.
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they
engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or
wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct group
and one individual. Confusion may have occurred because of the police dispersal of the
rallyists, but this confusion subsided eventually after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa
Street. It was only a while later after said dispersal that one distinct group identified as
loyalists picked on one defenseless individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in
inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous
quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
As the lower courts found, the victim’s assailant’s were numerous by as much as fifty in
number and were armed with stones with which they hit the victim. They took advantage
of their superior strength and excessive force and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to
escape and free himself. Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they ignored his pleas until he
finally lost unconsciousness. The deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a
defenseless victim qualifies the killing of murder.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed and modified.
DISCHARGE OF FIREARMS
DADO V. PEOPLE
Facts:
On May 25, 1992, in order to intercept cattle rustlers from Barangay Laguinding, Sultan
Kudarat, the Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police Station formed three teams, which
composed of petitioner SPO4 Geromino Dado and CAFGU members Francisco Eraso,
Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo Alga. Alfredo Balinas and Rufo Alga were both armed with
M14 armalite rifles, while petitioner was armed with a caliber .45 pistol and accused
Francisco Eraso was carrying an M16 armalite rifle. The team saw somebody approaching
who was half-naked. When he was about 5 meters away from the team, Balinas told Eraso
to wait, Eraso fired his M16 armalite rifle at the approaching man before Balinas could
beam his flash light. Thereafter, petitioner fired a single shot from his .45 caliber pistol.
Petitioner admitted that when he heard the rapid gun burst, he did not turn to face the
source thereof and instead fired his .45 caliber pistol in front of him purposely to
demoralize their enemy.
The victim turned out to be Silvestre "Butsoy" Balinas, the nephew of Alfredo Balinas and
not the cattle rustler the team were ordered to intercept. Accused Eraso embraced Alfredo
Balinas and told him that it was not intentionally done and it was merely an accident.
Silvestre Balinas died as a result of the gunshot wounds he sustained.
Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor, who conducted the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of
Silvestre Balinas testified that the fatal wound that caused the death of the victim was the
one inflicted on the mid-inner thigh. The bullet pierced through and injured the organs in
the pelvic region where she found three irregularly shaped metallic fragments. She added
that the position of the victim at that time of the shooting was higher than the assailant
considering that the trajectory of the bullets was upwards.
Upon examination by NBI Ballistician Elmer Nelson D. Piedad, the three metallic
fragments recovered from the fatal wound of the victim turned out to be fragments of a
5.56 mm jacketed bullet. However, on cross-examination, he declared that he is not sure
whether the 2 other metallic fragments recovered from the fatal wound of the victim are
indeed parts of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
The trial court convicted petitioner and accused Eraso of the crime of homicide which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Accused Eraso filed a Petition for Review but was denied by CA; on the other hand
petitioner, filed this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding the petitioner guilty
of homicide.
Held:
The Court sustains the finding of the trial court that petitioner fired his .45 caliber pistol
towards the victim. However, it appears that there is no evidence to prove that petitioner
had intent to kill the victim. The prosecution witnesses did not see whether petitioner
aimed to kill the victim. Intent to kill cannot be automatically drawn from the mere fact
that the use of firearms is dangerous to life. Intent to kill must be established with the
same degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of
intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such
intent beyond reasonable doubt.
Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner should be held liable
for the crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code.
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at
another person; and (2) that the offender has no intention to kill that person.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the conviction of petitioner for the crime
of homicide is set aside and petitioner is acquitted of the crime charged on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
However, petitioner Geronimo Dado is guilty of the crime of illegal discharge of firearm.
UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION
PEOPLE V. SALUFRANIA
Facts:
Filomeno Salufrania by boxing and strangling MARCIANA ABUYO-SALUFRANIA, his
lawfully wedded wife and who was at the time 8 months on the family way, caused upon
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
her injuries resulting in her instantaneous death and the death of the child who was still in
its maternal womb. Thus Filomeno was charged with the complex crime of parricide with
intentional abortion committed. The lower court found Filomeno guilty as charged and
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. Hence, the automatic review of the case by
the Supreme Court. Filomeno alleges that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of the
complex crime of parricide with intentional abortion, as there is no evidence to show that
he had the intention to cause an abortion.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of the accused for the complex crime of parricide with
intentional abortion is proper?
Held:
No. Filomeno Salufrania should not be held guilty of the complex crime of parricide with
intentional abortion but of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion.
The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been
expelled therefrom.
It has been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to eight (8) months
pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily exerted upon her by her
husband Filomeno; and (c) that, as a result of said violence, Marciana Abuyo died together
with the fetus in her womb. The abortion was caused by the same violence that caused the
death of the wife, Marciana Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily exerted by Filomeno
upon her. However, the intent to cause the abortion has not been sufficiently established.
Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim in
a fight, is not sufficient proof to show intent to cause an abortion. In fact, Filomeno must
have merely intended to kill his wife but not necessarily to cause an abortion.
PEOPLE V. GENOVES
Facts:
Soledad Rivera tried to take back by force from Genoves a yoke of a plow she claims she
owned. Genoves however, repeatedly struck Soledad with his fist causing her to fall to the
ground several times. During which time, Soledad was heavy with child. Soledad by such
fall suffered pains in the abdomen. According to testimony deceased was in good health
the day before. From the time of the incident there was hemorrhage and pain, which were
symptoms of premature delivery. Soledad remained in said condition for days until it
culminated in the painful and difficult premature delivery of one of the twin babies that she
way carrying, but the other baby could not be delivered. Soledad and both babies died.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Genoves was then charged and convicted by CFI Occidental Negros of the complex crime
of homicide with abortion.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of the complex crime of homicide with abortion is proper?
Held:
No, the abortion in this case is unintentional abortion denounced by article 257 of the
Revised Penal Code. It is generally known that a fall is liable to cause premature delivery,
and the evidence shows a complete sequel of events from the assault to Soledad’s death.
Genoves must be held responsible for the natural consequences of his act.
AGUIRRE VS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
Facts:
On June 11,2002 petitioner Gloria Aguirre instituted a criminal complaint for the violation
of Revised Penal Code particularly Articles 172 and 262, both in relation to Republic Act
No.7610 against respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and several
John/Jane Doe alleging that John/Jane Doe upon the apparent instructions of respondents
Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz and Pedro Aguirre actually scouted, prospected, facilitated
solicited and/or procured the medical services of respondents Dr. Pascual and Dr. Agatep
on the intended mutilation via bilateral vasectomy of Laureano Aguirre. Olondriz denied
that the prospected, scouted, facilitated, solicited and/or procured any false statement
mutilated or abused his common law brother, Laureano Aguirre. She further contends that
his common law brother went through a vasectomy procedure but that does not amount to
mutilation. Dr. Agatep contends that the complainant has no legal personality to file a case
since she is only a common law sister of Larry who has a legal guardian in the person of
Pedro Aguirre. He further contends that Vasectomy does not in any way equate to
castration and what is touched in vasectomy is not considered an organ in the context of
law and medicine.The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the facts alleged did not amount
to mutilation, the vasectomy operation did not deprived Larry of his reproductive organ.
Gloria Aguirre then appealed to the Secretary of the DOJ but Chief State Prosecutor
dismissed the petition stating that the Secretary of Justice may motu propio dismiss
outright the petition if there is no showing of any reversible error in the questioned
resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents are liable for the crime of mutilation
Held:
No, the court held that Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
Art. 262. Mutilation. “The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either
totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction.”
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium and
maximum periods.
A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the elements of mutilation
under the first paragraph of Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a
castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the mutilation
is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of some essential
organ for reproduction. According to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not
amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and penalized above, i.e., the vasectomy
operation did not in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still
very much part of his physical self.
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES AND MALTREATMENT
LI V. PEOPLE AND CA
Facts:
Petitioner Li was charged before the RTC of Makati with the crime of homicide for the
death of Christopher Arugay. The prosecution alleged that Arugay was watching television
at home with his sisters Cristy and Baby Jane, his girlfriend dela Camara and Baby Jane’s
boyfriend, Tan. They suddenly heard a noise outside. Peering through the window, they
saw Li and a certain Eduardo Sangalang taking a bath completely naked. The two were
facing the house of the Arugays. Enraged, the deceased shouted something to Li and
Sangalang. Then petitioner Li shouted back. An incensed Arugay went out the house where
he was met by petitioner carrying a baseball bat. Li struck Arugay on the head with the bat,
causing Arugay to fall. Li ran back to his house. The witnesses Tan and dela Camara
assisted Arugay and were trying to drag him back to his house when Li re-emerged, this
time with a knife. Li then stabbed Arugay once. Immediately thereafter, they were able to
see Sangalang stab Arugay at least once.
Petitioner Li denies killing Arugay. He contends that he hit first with a baseball bat
Christopher Arugay hitting the latter not on the head but at the right arm which is near the
shoulder. The deceased who is armed with a bolo, retaliated by hacking Li on the head,
causing him to lose his hold on the baseball bat and fell semi-unconscious or unconscious.
In such a condition, it is highly improbable that he was capable of inflicting the fatal stab
wounds on Arugay.
After trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1)
day of Prision Mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of Reclusion
Temporal. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Aggrieved, Li filed a
petition for review, seeking the reversal of his conviction for the crime of homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should be convicted for the crime of slight physical injury
instead of homicide?
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It ruled that the only injury attributable to Li is
the contusion on the victim’s right arm that resulted from Li striking Arugay with a
baseball bat. In view of the victim’s supervening death from injuries which cannot be
attributed to Li beyond reasonable doubt, the effects of the contusion caused by Li are not
mortal or at least lie entirely in the realm of speculation. When there is no evidence of
actual incapacity of the offended party for labor or of the required medical attendance, the
offense is only slight physical injuries.
What transpired during the dawn hours of was an artless, spontaneous street fight devoid of
any methodical plan for consummation. It arose not because of any long-standing grudge
or an appreciable vindication of honor, but because the actors were too quick to offense
and impervious to reason. Yet, however senseless this lethal imbroglio is, a judicious
examination of the circumstances must be made to avoid leaps into hyperbole. Careful
scrutiny of the evidence reveals that the criminal culpability of Li in the death of Arugay
was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Unfortunately, the person who is responsible
for the death apparently remains at large.
RAPE
PEOPLE V. OGA
Facts:
August 10, 1998, Ignacio and his wife were awakened by the loud banging of corrugated
GI sheet coming from the barracks of his co-construction worker which was about 3 meters
away at around 2:00 a.m. Ignacio and his wife proceeded in haste to investigate but they
were surprised and disarrayed to see his co-worker, herein appellant, naked on top of their
daughter, Irene, who was also naked.
Irene testified that at around 10:00 p.m. of August 9, 1999, the appellant summoned her to
his barracks. Thinking he had the usual errand for her she approached him. However,
appellant suddenly pulled her and laid her on a wooden bed (papag). The appellant then
took off her pants and panty, as well as his clothes. He inserted his penis into her vagina.
It was only at around 2:00 a.m. that she was able to finally kick the galvanized iron sheet
that enclosed the appellant’s barracks.
Appellant did not deny that he had several intercourse with Irene but interposed
“sweetheart story”.
Issue:
Whether or not force and intimidation are attendant in this case?
Held:
Neither was intimidation employed against her. Even if she was pulled down to the bed,
she was not threatened with bodily or physical harm by a knife, bolo or any object or
instrument that the appellant could have employed so as “to create a real apprehension of
dangerous consequences or serious bodily harm”. Irene’s overall deportment during her
ordeal defies comprehension and the reasonable standard of human conduct when faced
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
with a similar situation. It is unnatural for an intended rape victim, as in the case at bar, not
to make even a feeble attempt to free herself despite a myriad of opportunities to do so.
This constrained us to entertain a reasonable doubt on the guilt of the appellant.
PEOPLE VS AGSAOAY
Facts:
on or about July 15, 1997, at Barangay Malokiat, municipality of Pozorrubio, province of
Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with a bolo with intent to have sexual intercourse with his own daughter, Josephine
Ferrer Agsaoay, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with JOSEPHINE AGSAOAY, a 17
years old minor and accused’s own daughter, against her will and without her consent, to
the damage and prejudice of said Josephine F. Agsaoay. Furthermore, the victim was again
raped by the accused 2 days after using a bolo to scare and threaten the said victim.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority.
Held:
Yes.The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her
will or without her consent.35 Consequently, for the charge of rape to prosper, the
prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman and (2) he
accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or when she is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or when she is under 12 years of age or is demented.
The sole important issue in a rape case is the credibility of the victim’s testimony, in view
of its nature in which only two persons are normally involved. Hence, in adjudicating such
issue, jurisprudence has established the following guidelines: (1) the victim’s testimony
must be scrutinized with extreme caution since an accusation of rape can be made with
facility, but difficult for the accused to disprove it; and (2) when her testimony meets the
test of credibility, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof.
In the case at bar, we find Josephine’s account of her ordeal in the hands of appellant
forthright and credible.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated November 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 46, Urdaneta Pangasinan, in Criminal Cases Nos. U-9332 and U-9333,
finding appellant Santiago Agsaoay, Jr. guilty of the crimes of qualified rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of DEATH in each case, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in the sense that he is ordered to pay the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages in each case. Additionally, appellant is
ordered to pay P25,000.00 as exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. U-9332.
PEOPLE VS JALOSJOS
Facts:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Romeo G. Jalosjos as the accused-appellant, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is
now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two
counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant
filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
Issue:
Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under
law by reason of the “mandate of the sovereign will”.
Held:
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws.” this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated
alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the
“mandate of the people” are multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality.
The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to
regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded. Here, election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane
to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Hence, the
performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison.
Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been
granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege
cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel
absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more
than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow
accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or
more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to
his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that
of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
PEOPLE VS CAMPUHAN
Facts:
On April 25, 1996 4 pm: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of 4-year old Crysthel
Pamintuan, went to the ground floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her
2 children. There she met Primo Campuhan, helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of
Corazon, who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in
the freezer located at the second floor. Then she heard Crysthel cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" so
she went upstairs and saw Primo Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling before
Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his
short pants were down to his knees and his hands holding his penis with his right hand.
Horrified, she cursed "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He
evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside who she tried to block
his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting Vicente, her brother, a
cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound, to chase the Campuhan who
was apprehended. They called the barangay officials who detained.
Physical examination yielded negative results as Crysthel ‘s hymen was intact.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused committed a consummated statutory rape
Held:
The records reviewed failed to show the proof whether Primo’s penis was able to penetrate
Chrystel’s vagina. Failure to prove such penetration, even the slightest one, cannot be
considered consummated rape, however, only attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
Also, there were no physical signs of injuries on the witness’ body to conclude a medical
perspective that a penetration has taken place. In rape cases, it is important that a valid
testimony and medical certificate complements each other, for relying alone on testimonial
evidence may create unwarranted or mischievous results. It is necessary to carefully
establish a proof that the penis, in reality, entered the labial threshold of the female organ
to accurately conclude that the rape was consummated.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court on convicting Campuhan guilty of statutory rape
is modified. Hence, convicted of attempted instead.
PEOPLE VS ECHAGARAY
Facts:
The Supreme Court rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the
accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been
committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659,
commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was
inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the
sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false
accusation of rape against the accused. This was dismissed.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R.
Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal
Assistance Group of the Philippines.
A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accusedappellant.
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1)
mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged
incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
Issues:
1.) Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority.
2.) Whether or not the crime is punishable by death penalty.
Held:
1.) Yes. In the case at bar, all that the accused-appellant offered as defenses mainly
consisted of denial and alibi which cannot outweigh the positive identification and
convincing testimonies given by the prosecution. Hence, the affidavit of desistance, which
the victim herself intended to disregard as earlier discussed, must have no bearing on the
criminal prosecution against the accused-appellant, particularly on the trial court's
jurisdiction over the case.
2.) Yes, under R.A. No. 7659, the mandatory penalty of death is imposed, among others, if
the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1
when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent or the victim.
2
when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3
when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children
or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4
when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old
5
when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
6
when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.
7
when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent
physical mutilation." (Sec. 11 )
KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION
PEOPLE VS TAN
Facts:
On the 17th of September 1997, appellants were charged with the crime of kidnapping for
ransom in an Information the accusatory portion of which reads: That on or about
September 8, 1997 in the evening of Barangay Mamatid, Cabuyao, Laguna and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused conspiring, confederating,
mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together, did then and there, by
force and intimidation, and use of high powered firearms, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously
take, carry away, and deprive Ruiz Saez-Co y Lim of his liberty against his will for
purposes of extorting money as in fact a demand for money was made as a condition for
his release but before any ransom can be paid, the victim was rescued after eight (8) days
in captivity.
Based on the victims account, the ordeal he had gone through can be divided into three
distinct segments, namely: (1) the forcible taking, (2) the asportation, and (3) the protracted
detention. The first segment was the Mamatid (in Cabuyao, Laguna) episode where he was
held by armed men at gunpoint and forcibly boarded in a car. The second segment covered
the entire forced journey of the victim from Mamatid to the detention house in Taytay,
Rizal. And the third segment was the Taytay episode. It covered the full length of the
victims involuntary confinement spanning eight (8) days until his stirring rescue. There is
no doubt that the victim was deprived of his liberty throughout all the episodes.
On arraignment, appellants entered their plea of not guilty. Trial ensued.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal liability of the appellants in each and every episode established
beyond reasonable doubt to be guilty for kidnapping or illegal detention.
Held:
We agree with the OSG that the participation of the appellants in the forcible taking and
journey of the victim was not clearly established. There were no eyewitnesses who testified
on the abduction. While the victim testified on the three episodes, he failed to see and
identify any of his captors until he was rescued as he was blindfolded most of the time
during his captivity. He did not see the face of the persons who abducted him in Mamatid
and those who formed the entourage which brought him to Taytay. To conclude that those
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
who were captured during the rescue operation were also participants in the forcible taking
and asportation is to lower the level of evidence required for conviction.
The third episode, however, is different. The criminal participation of the appellants therein
was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The OSG correctly recommended that they should
be held liable therefor.
The unexplained presence of appellants in the house where the victim was held captive
leads to no other conclusion than that they participated in his illegal detention. Not a single
appellant could convincingly explain his presence at the crime scene.
PEOPLE V. RODRIGO
Facts:
Oliver Caparas, then 13 years of age, forcibly seized by four men and boarded him into a
car wherein he was blindfolded and taken to Baguio while waiting for a ride to school on
the 10th of September 1996. The next day, Eleazar Caparas received a call from the
kidnappers asking for Php 10 Million ransom in exchange for the release of his son, Oliver.
In the meantime, the kidnappers went to Bonitas Resort in Pangasinan. After three days of
negotiation, the kidnappers agreed to lower the ransom money to Php 1.7 Million. Through
Oliver’s uncle, the kidnapper were able to receive the money. Then, they brought Oliver to
a Petron Gas Station in Meycauayan Highway, gave him money and told him his uncle
inside a canteen in the gas station would fetch him. After the kidnapping incident, an
investigation was conducted by the Intelligence Section of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) in Malolos, Bulacan, through SPO2 Epafrodito Aliling and SPO2 Antonio
Chungtuyco. It appears that one of the suspects was a member of an NPA rebel returnee
group headed by Armando Rodrigo, Jr. Upon the killing of Bert Liwanag, his girlfriend,
dela Cruz, who was a suspected member of the group, was invited for questioning. On that
occasion, she admitted her participation in the kidnapping of Oliver Caparas and
implicated appellants.
Issue:
Whether or not elements constituting the crime of kidnapping are present to convict
appellants of the said crime.
Held:
Yes. Under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of Kidnapping is committed
with the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) that the offender is a private
individual; (2) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of
his liberty; and (3) that the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) that in
the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are present: (a) that the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than five days; or (b) that it is committed simulating
public authority; or (c) that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) that the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female or public officer. It is evident from the testimonies of the
witnesses that the essential elements of kidnapping were present. First, appellants are
private individuals. Second, Oliver was abducted by four armed men. Third, he was
detained in a house in Pangasinan against his will. Fourth, the detention lasted for seven
days. Fifth, Oliver Caparas was a minor at the time of the kidnapping incident.
MADSALI, ET AL. V. PEOPLE
Facts:
After a confrontation between the victim and her aunt Inon Dama while fetching water, the
appellant (Maron) and his father (Sajiron) appeared suddenly in the victim’s house with a
gun and told the victim to come with them. When she refused, Sajiron and Maron tied her
hands behind her back, covered her mouth with a piece of cloth, and brought her to the
forest. There, Sajiron had carnal knowledge with the victim against her will while Maron
stood guard and watched them. They left the forest and brought the victim to the house of
Egap, where she was detained in a room. Sajiron instructed Egap to guard the victim and to
shoot her if she would attempt to escape. A day after, the victim’s mother came to get her;
unfortunately Egap refused and threatened to kill her daughter if she would report the
matter to the authorities. Out of fear of losing her daughter, she went home and did not
report the incident to the police authorities. Egap asked the victim if she wanted to marry
Sajiron, but she refused. She was then forced to sign an unknown document, which she
was not able to read. Nine days after she and Sajioron were married by Imam Musli
Muhammad. After the marriage, she and Sajiron lived in the house of Egap. While
detained, she did not try to escape because her house was very far from the place where she
was held captive, and her captors threatened to kill her and her family if she would attempt
to escape. Months after the marriage, Sajiron and Egap were arrested by the police.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime committed was kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
Held:
Yes. Further perusal of the allegations in the information appears that the crime charged
was actually the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and
rape, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime of
serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also of
detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. For there to be kidnapping, it
is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Its essence is the actual
deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the
accused to effect such deprivation. In this case, although the victim was not actually
confined in an enclosed place, she was clearly restrained and deprived of her liberty,
because she was tied up and her mouth stuffed with a piece of cloth, thus, making it very
easy to physically drag her to the forest away from her home.
PEOPLE V. SILONGAN
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Facts:
For automatic review is the decision of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 103, convicting
appellants Abdila Silongan, Macapagal Silongan, Akmad Awal, Rolly Lamalan, Sacaria
Alon, Jumbrah Manap and Ramon Pasawilan of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with
Serious Illegal Detention and sentencing them to suffer death penalty. Appellants,
conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Alexander Saldana, America Rejuso, Jr., Ervin Tormis
and Victor Cinco for the purpose of demanding ransom in the amount of Php 12 Million,
detaining and depriving Alexander Saldana of his personal liberty.
Issue:
Whether or not the guilt of the appellants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt that
kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom.
Held:
Yes. The essence of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and
penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is the actual deprivation of the victim’s
liberty coupled with proof beyond reasonable doubt of an intent of the accused to effect the
same. It is thus essential that the following be established by the prosecution: (1) that the
offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner
deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and
(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances enumerated in Article
267 be present. But if the kidnapping was done for the purpose of extorting ransom, the
fourth element is no longer necessary. The prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt that the kidnapping was committed “for the purpose of extorting ransom” from
Alexander, as to warrant the mandatory imposition of the death penalty. It is not necessary
that there be actual payment of ransom because what the law requires is merely the
existence of the purpose of demanding ransom.
PEOPLE V. SURIAGA
Facts:
On the 22th of February, 1995, an information was filed with the RTC charging Ruben
Suriaga, Rosita Dela Cruz and Joel Isidera with kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal
detention committed as follows: That on January 22, 1995, accused Ruben Suriaga, Rosita
Dela Cruz, conspiring together, kidnapped and took away Nicole Ramos, a two-year old
female child, without the consent of her parents, for the purpose of extorting ransom from
the latter, and thereafter, detained her and deprived her of her freedom and liberty up to and
until 4:30 in the afternoon of the following day. Joel Isidera, having learned of the
kidnapping and without having participated therein as principal or accomplice, took part by
assisting the principal accused to profit by the effects of the crime by accompanying and
driving for accused Ruben Suriaga to the place where the pay-offs was made and receiving
the ransom money in the amount of Php 100,00.
Issue:
Whether or not Ruben Suriaga is guilty of kidnapping for ransom.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Held:
Yes. The essence of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled
with indubitable proof of the accused’s intent to effect the same. And if the person detained
is a child, the question that needs to be addressed is whether there is evidence to show that
in taking the child, there was deprivation of the child’s liberty and that it was the intention
of the accused to deprive the mother of the child’s custody. Undoubtedly, the elements of
kidnapping for ransom have been sufficiently established by the prosecution considering
the following circumstances: 1) appellant, a private individual, took the young Nicole
without personally seeking permission from her father; 2) appellant took the girl and
brought her to a shanty where Rosita’s sister lived, without informing her parents of their
whereabouts; 2) he detained the child and deprived her of her liberty by failing to return
her to her parents overnight and the following day; and 4) he demanded a ransom of Php
100,000 through telephone calls and gave instructions where and how it should be
delivered.
SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION
PEOPLE V. LLAGUNO
Facts:
Together with two others, Appellant Judy Reyes, was charged in an Information with the
following: that said accused, armed with firearm, conniving and confederating together and
mutually helping with one another, with deliberate intend, did then and there kidnap and
detain one Bienvenido Mercado, and while under detention, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there suddenly and unexpectedly shot
said Bienvenido Mercado with said firearm, hitting him on the vital part of his body,
thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries as a consequence of which he died a few days
later. Although appellant, was charged with kidnapping with murder, the trial court
convicted him only of murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. The trial court did not, however, find him liable for serious illegal detention
under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code because the victim was detained only for one
day.
Issue:
Whether or the trial court is erred in not finding accused liable for illegal detention.
Held:
Yes. The totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficiently proves beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of the crime of slight illegal detention under
Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code. The evidence presented by the prosecution, which
was sustained by the trial court, clearly established that appellant had in fact detained the
victim without authority to do so. Banzon testified that he witnessed the victim hanging by
the arms in appellant’s room. Banzons testimony significantly jibes with the physical
evidence showing that the victim sustained multiple abrasions in both arms. Furthermore,
Dr. Ceniza narrated that several employees called her up in the morning of February 5,
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
1987 asking for permission to go home because there was a man hanging at the back in one
of the buildings of GF International. Dr. Cenizas testimony was unrebutted. All these
ineludibly prove beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was deprived of his liberty by
appellant.
It must be emphasized that appellant was charged with the special complex crime of
kidnapping with murder, not of two independent charges of kidnapping and murder. In a
complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only
one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. Hence, in
deciding this appeal, the Court is not confined to the conviction for murder; rather, the
scope of its review encompasses the offense charged in the information, which the
prosecution sought to prove. It is a well-settled doctrine that an appeal throws the whole
case wide open for review and empowers (even obligates) the appellate court to correct
such errors as may be found in the appealed judgment even if they have not been assigned.
When an accused appeals, he stands for a new trial of the whole case. Since the
information charged the complex crime of kidnapping with murder, the acts constituting
slight illegal detention were necessarily included in the information, and may thus be
validly taken into account in the resolution of the present appeal. Manifestly, appellant was
fairly apprised of the nature of the crime of slight illegal detention and granted a fair
opportunity to defend himself. At this juncture, we deem it significant to reiterate that the
trial court merely made a finding that appellant could not be convicted of serious illegal
detention for the sole reason that the victim’s detention did not exceed five days. The
court a quo, however, found that appellant illegally detained the victim for at least one
day, which act by itself constitutes slight illegal detention. Besides, the trial court
appreciated the act constituting slight illegal detention as a qualifying
circumstance, i.e., employing means to weaken the defense. While we find no proof
beyond reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction for murder, the records indisputably prove
culpability for slight illegal detention
PEOPLE V. DADLES
Facts:
Appellant Narito alias Naring Dadles was charged in two separate informations, to wit:
That on or about 24th of May 1989, in the Municipality of Binalbagan, Province of Negros
Occidential, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the first
above-named accused, in company of his five other co-accused, whose true names are still
unknown and herein designated only as Ka Morito, Ka Willy, Ka Dindo, Ka Mike and Ka
Juanito, who are still at large, aremed with assorted firearms of unknown calibers,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, by means of force, violence
and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, kidnap,
detain, and keep Alipio Tehidor and Dioniso Tehidor and bring them somewhere in the
hinterlands of said municipality, under restraint and against their will, without proper
authority thereof, thereby depriving said victims of their civil liberties since then up to the
present. The trial court rendered a decision convicting the appellant of two counts of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
Issue:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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Case Digest
Whether or not trial court erred in convicting appellant with kidnapping and serious illegal
detention.
Held:
Yes. Based from the evidence presented during the trial, the appellant is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of kidnapping the victims. However, since none of the circumstances
mentioned in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (kidnapping with serious illegal
detention) was proved and only the fact of kidnapping was established, we find that the
crime committed is slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code.
PEOPLE V. ROLUNA
Facts:
Kidnapping with murder were charged to eight person, including accused Roluna.
Witnesses claimed that they saw victim Anatalio Moronia stopped by accused and several
others. The victim was alleged to have been threatened with firearms and hand bound
behind his back. The accused claimed that he was taking care of an ill relative at the time
of the kidnapping. The RTC found Roluna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of Kidnapping with murder. The accused raised that the body of the victim has not
surfaced and that the unexplained disappearance cannot be blamed on him as there is all
possibility that the victim may still be alive.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of the victim is sufficiently proved and the accused be held liable
for it.
Held:
The Rules of Court provides that the death shall be presumed if a person who has been in
danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four
years. However, the Supreme Court decided that there were insufficient circumstances to
hold the accused responsible for the death of the victim. The testimony of the witnesses
stating that the victim’s hands were bound by a companion of the accused is not enough to
prove that the accused killed him. “The conviction of accused-appellant for the serious
crime of kidnapping with murder cannot be allowed to rest on the vague and nebulous facts
established by the prosecution. As discussed earlier, the evidence presented by the
prosecution surrounding the events of that fateful day are grossly insufficient to establish
the alleged liability of accused-appellant for the death of Moronia”. The SC thus decided
that “Since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
(kidnapping with serious illegal detention) was proved and only the fact of kidnapping of
Anatalio Moronia was established, we find that the crime committed is slight illegal
detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR
PEOPLE VS PASTRANA
Facts:
A domestic helper in Canada, Erma Postejo, the mother of Jenny, Doroteo, Aresola and 9year old Willy Garpen, Jr. her son by a common-law relationship. She was introduced to
accused-appellant Rubi-Rose who offered to work on the processing of Willy’s travel
documents to Canada. Rubi-Rose asked for P 18,300.00 as processing fee. Later on,
accused-appellant informed Erma that Willy was suffering from bronchitis. Erma sent P
5,610.00, P 3,000.00 to be given to Doroteo and the remaining balance should pay for
Willy’s medical treatment. Then on March 16, 1997, accused-appellant fetched Willy and
Aresola from their home in Caloocan and brought them in Tondo. Aresola went home and
Willy was left in Tondo. Accused-appellant was asking Erma for sums of money which
Erma refused to transmit.
March 27, 1997, accused-appellant informed Doroteo that Willy was missing and that he
was last seen playing inside her apartment. Erma returned to the Philippines to look for
her son. Erma found out that Willy was never treated for any illness. Accused-appellant
vehemently denied the charges against her but the trial court found her guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270
of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused the crime of kidnapping and
failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
No, the Court ruled that Kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the
Revised Penal Code has two essential elements, namely: (1) the offender is entrusted with
the custody of a minor person; and (2) the offender deliberately fails to restore the said
minor to his parents or guardians. What is actually being punished is not the kidnapping of
the minor but rather the deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter
to his parents or guardians. The word deliberate as used in Article 270 must imply
something more than mere negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly
daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.
In the final analysis, the issue posed here is the credibility of witnesses. As consistently
ruled by the Court, we will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining
the credibility of witnesses unless there appears on record some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted. Factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of
witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect. This is so because the trial court has the
advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
falsehood. In the instant case, there is no reason for us to disregard the trial court’s finding
that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are entitled to full faith and credit.
PEOPLE V. TY
Facts:
Accused -Appellants Ty owns, administers and manages St.John's Clinic in Caloocan. In
1987, a sick baby Arabella Somblong was confined by her mother Johanna but since she
had no money and no one to leave the child at home, they agreed to keep the baby in the
extension building as a boarder for 50 pesos a day. The baby was visited only once in 5
years by the mother and the father. The baby was put up for guardianship to a relative of
the Ty's. After five years, Johanna came back to claim the child. The guardians meantime
had the child baptized and named Cristine Neri and would not return the child to the
mother. It so happened that there were many babies left behind that time and the attending
Pediatrician had in that five years relocated abroad. A complaint was filed for kidnapping
and failure to return a minor to her parents. The Ty's were convicted by the RTC and
subsequently appealed.
Issue:
Was an abandoned child by mother still be claimed as being kidnapped as in Art 270 RPC?
Held:
The efforts taken by the accused-appellants to help the complainant in finding the child
(among the many they took care of and put up for guardianship)clearly negate the alleged
deliberate refusal or failure on their part to restore the child to her mother. It is noteworthy
that they were motivated by nothing more than an earnest desire to help the child and high
regard for her welfare and well-being. The child turned out to be not the same child as
claimed by Johanna to be hers. From the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and set aside. The accused-appellants Vicente and Carmen Ty are hereby acquitted.
PEOPLE V. MENDOZA
Facts:
Angelina Mendoza y Ramos alias "Rosalinda Quintos' was convicted of the crime of
kidnapping and failure to Return a minor as defined in Article 270 of the Revised Penal
Code, for wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and illegally kidnap and carry away EDWARD
POLICARPIO, a one year and three months old baby boy, for the purpose of selling him
and separating him from his mother, Mrs. EUGENIA T. POLICARPIO, carrying him away
without the knowledge and consent of his said parents, and deliberately failing to return
him to his mother.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting her of the crime of
Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor as defined and penalized under Article 270 of
the Revised Penal Code, as it was not proven that the custody of the minor victim Edward
Policarpio had been entrusted to her and that she deliberately failed to return or restore said
minor to his parents or guardians.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of kidnapping and
failure to return a minor under article 270 of the revised penal code.
Held:
Yes, it has been established by the clear, strong and positive evidence of the prosecution
that the taking of the minor child Edward was without the knowledge and consent of his
parents. Said criminal act was perpetrated while Mrs. Policarpio had her back turned to the
child and accused-appellant and while Mr. Policarpio was temporarily away from the
group. An essential element that the offender must be entrusted with the custody of a minor
person is lacking in the case and the accused-appellant Angelina Mendoza is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
GRAVE COERCION
PEOPLE V. SANTOS
Facts:
On 10 December 1996, at six o'clock in the morning, Leonida de la Peña was at home in
Barangay Resurreccion, Umingan, Pangasinan, with her eight-year old niece, Christine
Lovely Mae Delanos, when a passenger jeepney arrived. Five decently dressed men
stepped down from the vehicle and entered the house. The first, who was attired in a
business suit, introduced himself as Rocky Alberto and his companions as agents of the
Criminal Investigation Service ("CIS").[1] Alberto asked Leonida about her unpaid
obligation to Josephine Santos. Leonida answered that she had already paid the debt
before the barangay captain of Umingan. Moments later, another vehicle, a brown colored
car, stopped in front of the house. Henry Salimbay (the barangay captain of Umingan),
Josephine Santos, Manny Baltazar and two unidentified males and one unidentified female,
alighted. Leonida rushed to confront Salimbay, telling him that Josephine had sent the CIS
agents to demand payment of her debt and that it was Josephine who should instead be
accosted. Sensing an escalating tension between the two women, the barangay captain
decided to leave, telling the parties that it was best for both of them to just amicably settle
their differences.
Issue:
Is the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of grave coercion?
Held:
The circumstances that have surfaced instead warrant a conviction for grave coercion.
Grave coercion carries the penalty of prision correccional and a fine not exceeding P6,
000.00. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be
imposed in its medium term. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law the minimum that
can be imposed is anywhere
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and
from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction under review is MODIFIED. Appellants
Josephine Santos and Manny Baltazar are ACQUITTED of the crime of Kidnapping;
instead, said appellants are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave
coercion, and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years and six (6) months of prision correccional
medium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3, 000.00. Costs de oficio.
PEOPLE V. VILLAMOR
Facts:
On or about and during the period beginning 7:00 a.m. of June 5, 1993 to 9:00 a.m. of the
same day, in Barangay Cabalantian, Municipality of Bacolor, Province of Pampanga,
accused, MARILYN RAFAEL-VILLAMAR, suspecting that Maria Luz Cortez would not
return her daughter Jonalyn Villamar whom she entrusted to said Maria Luz Cortez, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously surreptitiously enter the house of Maria
Luz Cortez and by means of force and intimidation and with threats to kill take said Maria
Luz Cortez, a woman of 20 years old as the latter entered her house whom said accused
detained and kept locked inside the house from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. of June 5, 1993 or a
period of two (2) hours, more or less, under restraint and against the will of the said Maria
Luz Cortez and said accused during the period of detention maltreated and refused to
release said Maria Luz Cortez until her demand for a sum of money and a getaway vehicle
was given to her and on the occasion thereof, accused with evident premeditation and with
intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and
strike with a deadly weapon to wit: a knife and a chisel, one Maria Luz Cortez who as a
result thereof, suffered various lacerated wounds on the head which ordinarily would cause
the death of the said Maria Luz Cortez, thus performing all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of her will, that is, by the timely arrival of the
authorities who rescued Maria Luz Cortez which prevented her death.
Marilyn Villamar was charged with the crime of illegal detention and frustrated murder.
Insisting on her innocence, Villamar has interposed the instant appeal.
The focal point of Villamar's thesis is that she cannot be guilty of serious illegal detention
since
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in finding accused-appellant Villamar guilty of serious
illegal detention.
Held:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Yes, Under the law, as presently worded, it is essential that the kidnapping or detention was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom.[9] In the instant case, there is no showing
whatsoever that Villamar wanted to extort money from Cortez prior to their confrontation.
The act merely constituted grave coercion, as provided in Article 286 of the Revised Penal
Code. The crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by
another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against
his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by
violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and,
consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who
restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so; in other words, that the
restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right
Contrary therefore to the prosecution's assertions, the court are of the opinion that Villamar
had no intention to kidnap or deprive Cortez of her personal liberty. This is clearly
demonstrated in the testimony of Villamar herself. The appeal is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. Appellant is convicted only for grave coercion and is sentenced to six (6)
months of arresto mayor.
PEOPLE V. ASTORGA
Facts:
Appellant Arnulfo Astorga appealed the court’s decision on Criminal Case No. 8243
wherein appellant was charged with violation of Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code or the kidnap and detention of a minor.
Astorga insisted that the inconsistencies and the contradictions of the prosecution’s
witnesses should be deemed incredible and that the delay in the filing of the accusation
weakened the case. Astorga claimed that he had no motive to kidnap the 8-year-old Yvonne
Traya which should’ve been apparent and proven upon conviction. He claimed that the
court erred in convicting him despite the fact that he had not detained nor locked Yvonne
up which is an important element in kidnapping.
Issue:
1.)
Whether or not the prosecution’s witnesses were credible.
2.) Whether or not the lack of motive by the appellant is significant in the court’s
decision.
3.)
Whether or not it was kidnapping or coercion.
Held:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
1.) The delay in the making of the criminal accusation does not necessarily weaken the
credibility of the witnesses especially if it had been satisfactorily explained. In the case,
one week was reasonable since the victim was a resident in Binaungan and that the case
was filed in Tagum, Davao.
2.) The court found it irrelevant to identify the motive since motive is not an element of
the crime. Motive is totally irrelevant when ample direct evidence sustains the culpability
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Besides, the appellant himself admitted having
taken Yvonne to Maco Central Elementary School.
3.) The court agreed with the appellant’s contention. The evidence does not show that
appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her. Appellant’s
forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual
confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no “lock up”. Accordingly,
appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Rather, the felony committed was grave coercion under Article 286 of the same code.
LIGHT COERCION
VALEROS V. PEOPLE
Facts:
About 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13 December 1991 in Manila Renato
“Chito” Baleros forcefully covering the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of
cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commenced the commission of rape by lying on top of her with the intention to
have carnal knowledge with her but was unable to perform all the acts of execution by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, said acts
being committed against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice.
Chito made an appeal to the CA only to be denied. He moved for a reconsideration but to
no avail. He thus made an appeal to the SC arguing that:
1
2
3
4
5
There was not enough evidence to find him guilty of the crime
Prosecution failed to satisfy all requisites for conviction
Circumstances relied on to convict him were unreliable, inconclusive and
contradictory.
There was no motive.
The awarding of damages to complainant was improper and unjustified.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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TECSON, Mary Joie S.
6
Case Digest
In failing to appreciate in his favour the constitutional presumption of innocence
and that moral certainty has not been met, he should be acquitted on the basis that
the offense charged has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
1. Whether the evidence adduced by prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of the petitioner for the crime of attempted rape
2. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape
Held:
1. No. The court’s decision was merely based on speculations.
2. Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and modifies the decision of the CA, acquitting Chito
of attempted rape. He is adjudged guilty of light coercion and is ordered to serve 30 days
of arresto mayor and pay PHP 200.
Art. 335 of the RPC, rape is committed by a man who has carnal knowledge or intercourse
with a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1
2
3
By using force or intimidation
When woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious
When woman is under 12 years of age or demented
Art. 6 of the RPC defines attempted rape when offender commences the commission of
rape directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.
The attempt which RPC punishes is the act that has logical connection to the crime that
should it have been successful, the attempt would lead to the consummation of rape.
However, there was no carnal knowledge in the case. The pressing of a chemical-soaked
cloth while on top of Malou did not necessarily constitute an overt act of rape. Moreover,
the petitioner did not commence any act that was indicative of an intent to rape Malou. The
petitioner was fully clothed; there was no attempt to neither undress her nor touch her
private part.
In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential requisite. Therefore for an attempted rape,
accused must have commenced the act of penetrating but for some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration was not completed. Thus petitioner’s
act of lying on top of her, embracing and kissing her or touching her private part do not
constitute rape or attempted rape.
ONG CHIUN KWAN V. CA
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Facts:
Crazy Feet is a business establishment owned by Mildred Ong. On April 24, 1990,
Wilfredo Infante was ordered by Ong Chiu Kwan to relocate Crazy Feet's telephone,
electric and water lines without a permit from appropriate authorities. Mildred Ong filed a
case against Ong Chiu Kwan for unjust vexation and the Trial Court found Ong Chiu
Kwan guilty of unjust vexation under Article 287, second paragraph. The Court declared
Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust vexation hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust vexation.
Held:
The court ruled that petitioner is liable for unjust vexation. Having admitted that he
ordered the cutting of electric, water and telephone lines without the permit to relocate
such, he caused the annoyance and vexation of Mildred Ong. To add, the electric, water
and telephone interruption happened during the operation of the business.
ROBBERY
PEOPLE V. REYES
Facts:
On October 12, 1997, at 2:00 a.m., PO1 Eduardo C. Molato of Station 4, Western Police
District, Sampaloc, Manila was on his way home on board a passenger jeepney. When he
alighted at the corner of Lapu-lapu Street and Northbay Boulevard South he saw the victim
being held up by two persons. The one in front of the victim forcibly took his wristwatch
while the other one stabbed him at the back. He fired one warning shot which caused the
three to run towards Phase I, Lapu-lapu Avenue. He chased them but when he saw the
victim, he hailed a tricycle and asked the driver to bring the victim to the nearest
hospital. He continued chasing the suspects up to Phase II until he reached Agora, but the
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
suspects were gone. The incident happened swiftly but PO1 Molato had a good look at the
face of the one who stabbed the victim as he was about 8 to 10 meters away from them.
The accused-appellant was the only one arrested. Regional Trial Court of Malabon found
Danilo Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime Robbery with homicide. The
accused-appellant filed an appeal saying that the court erred in convicting the him
notwithstanding the fact that his guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt
and that the court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimony and identification
made by PO1 Molato.
Issue:
Whether or not regional trial court erred in convicting Danilo Reyes for the crime of
Robbery with homicide.
Held:
No, court of appeals affirmed the decision of regional trial court finding Danilo Reyes
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime robbery with homicide. A conviction for
robbery with homicide requires proof of the following elements: (a) the taking of personal
property with violence or intimidation against persons or with force upon things; (b) the
property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking be done with animus lucrandi (intent to
gain); and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, homicide in its generic
sense was committed. The offense becomes a special complex crime of robbery with
homicide under Article 294 (1) of Revised Penal Code if the victim is killed on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery.[4]
The positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent and without any
ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and
denial. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defenses are negative,
self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law
PEOPLE V. SUELA
Facts:
On July 26, 1995, between 11:00 P.M. and 12:00 midnight, private complainant
Director Nilo L. Rosas was at the masters bedroom located at the second floor of his
townhouse in Quezon City. He was watching television thereat, together with his adopted
son, Norman Rosas, and his former co-teacher and good friend, Geronimo Gerry Gabilo,
who at that time was engaged in the real estate business. Suddenly, three persons sporting
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
ski masks, bonnets and gloves, brandishing handguns and a knife, barged into the room.
Court
finds
the
accused Nerio Suela y Hembra and
Edgar Suela y Hembra and Edgardo Batocan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide. Appellants appealed in Court of appeals saying that RTC
erred in convicting them of the said crime.
the assigned errors boil down to four: (1) whether the extrajudicial confessions of
appellants are admissible in evidence; (2) whether the wristwatch and the letter
(of NerioSuela) are admissible in evidence; (3) whether appellants can be convicted of
robbery with homicide; and (4) whether Edgar Suela is guilty of robbery for
demanding P200,000 as payment for information on the robbery-slay case.
Issue:
1
Whether the extrajudicial confessions of appellants are admissible in evidence.
2
Whether the wristwatch and the letter of Nerio Suela are admissible in evidence.
3
Whether appellants can be convicted of robbery with homicide
4
Whether Edgar Suela is guilty of robbery for demanding P200,000 as payment for
information on the robbery-slay case.
Held:
1
In People v. dela Cruz, we stated that a confession made in an atmosphere
characterized by deficiencies in informing the accused of all rights to which he is
entitled would be rendered valueless and inadmissible, perforated, as it is, by noncompliance with the procedural and substantive safeguards to which an accused is
entitled under the Bill of Rights and as now further implemented and ramified by
statutory law.[23]
The extrajudicial confessions of all three appellants are thus inadmissible in evidence.
2
Clearly, the watch was taken without a search warrant and not as an incident of a valid
arrest. The seizure was irregular. There is also no evidence on record that it was taken
under any of the exempting circumstances where a warrantless seizure is permissible. It
was not shown if the girlfriend voluntarily and validly consented to the taking
x x x. Lacking such evidence, no presumption of regularity can be assumed.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
The wristwatch is clearly a fruit of a fruit of a poisonous tree. As such, it should not
have been admitted and appreciated against the accused.
3
Without the wristwatch and the uncounseled extrajudicial confessions, pieces of
evidence sufficiently prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime of
robbery with homicide.
4
There was no showing that appellant Edgar Suela had exerted intimidation on him so
as to leave him no choice but to give the money. Instead, what is clear was that the
giving of the money was done not out of fear but because it was a choice private
complainant opted because he wanted to get the information being offered to him for
the consideration of P200,000.00 (TSN, November 4, 1996, pp. 5-17; ibid., Decision,
p. 15). In fact, the money was delivered not due to fear but for the purpose of possibly
having a lead in solving the case and to possibly bring the culprit to justice (ibid.). As
such, the elements of simple robbery have not been established in the instant case,
hence, appellant Edgar Suela should be acquitted of that charge
PEOPLE V. ROSARIO
Facts:
On September 26, 1992, at about 8:10 in the morning, Emelita Paragua and a companion, a
Delia Aquino, left their house at 1657 Balic-Balic, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City to go to the
formers stall in the public market. Raquel Lopez, the 11-year old niece of Paragua, was left
behind as she had no classes that day, a Saturday.
Notified of the news that their house was on fire, they went home.
Paragua saw that the sala set, their merchandise (stuffed toys that they sell at the public
market), and the cassette were burned. When she entered the kitchen, she saw her niece
lying on her stomach with a raincoat covering her head and her neck and arms tied with
CATV wire. Parts of her hand and her thigh were burned. Raquel Lopez was already dead
when her aunt discovered her. The total value of the burned properties was around Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). Emelita Paragua likewise discovered that six pieces of her
jewelries were missing.
Court finds the accused Donato del Rosario guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide. Accused-appellant Donato del Rosario contends that it is essential
to prove the intent to rob and that the intent to rob must come first before the killing
transpired. He is of the impression that not all the essential requisites of the crime of
robbery with homicide were proven.
Issue:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Whether or not it is erroneous and illogical for the trial court to convict appalent when the
elemental requisites of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide are not present.
Held:
In the offense of robbery with homicide, a crime primarily classified as one against
property and not against persons, the prosecution has to firmly establish the following
elements: (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation
against a person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is
characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery
or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was
committed.
Animus lucrandi, or intent to gain, is an internal act which can be established through the
overt acts of the offender. Although proof as to motive for the crime is essential when the
evidence of the theft is circumstantial, the intent to gain or animus lucrandi is the usual
motive to be presumed from all furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another,
unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the
perpetrator. xxx (T)he intent to gain may be presumed from the proven unlawful taking.
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
PEOPLE V. HIPONA
Facts:
AAA was found dead on the morning of June 12, 2000 in her house in Isla Copa,
Consolation, Cagayan de Oro City. She was raped, physically manhandled and strangled,
which eventually led to her death. Her furniture and belongings were found strewn on the
floor. AAA’s necklace with two heart-shaped pendants bearing her initials and handbag
were likewise missing. Upon investigation, the local police discovered a hole bored into
the lawanitwall of the comfort room inside AAA’s house, big enough for a person of
medium build to enter. The main electrical switch behind a “shower curtain” located at the
“back room” was turned off, drawing the police to infer that the perpetrator is familiar with
the layout of AAA’s house. SPO1 Bladimir Agbalog of the local police thus called for a
meeting of AAA’s relatives during which AAA’s sister BBB, who is appellant’s mother,
declared that her son-appellant had told her that “Mama, I’m sorry, I did it because I did
not have the money,” and he was thus apologizing for AAA’s death. BBB executed an
affidavit affirming appellant’s confession.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime Robbery with Homicide?
Held:
Yes, for circumstantial evidence to suffice to convict an accused, the following requisites
must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
The Court gathers, however, that from the evidence for the prosecution, robbery was the
main intent of appellant, and AAA’s death resulted by reason of or on the occasion thereof.
Following Article 294(1) and Article 62(1)1 of the Revised Penal Code, rape should have
been appreciated as an aggravating circumstance instead.
PEOPLE V. HERNANDEZ
Facts:
On December 19, 1994, Cesar Yuzon, a forty-four-year-old sweepstakes ticket vendor, saw
his cousin-in-law, the appellant,4 and Catapang dragging his seventy-two-year-old auntie,
Natividad Yuzon Mendoza, in the direction of a forested area where there were also mango
and coconut trees.Cesar shouted, "Hoy, bakit ninyo kinakaladkad ang aking tiya?"
Catapang and the appellant approached and told him not to interfere. Cesar followed them
and concealed himself behind a mango tree about ten arm’s length away, and saw them
forcibly taking money, a pair of earrings and a necklace from the bag of his aunt, who was
lying prostrate on the ground. That afternoon, Natividad’s son, Nemensio Mendoza, had
already started looking for his mother. Cesar joined the search at 5:00 p.m. together with
the barangay captain and some of the barangay folks. The cadaver of Natividad was found
at about 11:00 p.m.
The trial court rendered its decision finding the accused Lito Hernandez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of complex crime of robbery with homicide. Hernandez appealed
contending that the trial court erred in convicting him of the said crime.
Issue:
1
Whether or not the lower court gravely erred in holding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the robbery with homicide despite the uncorroborated,
inconsistent and contradictory testimony of the alleged eyewitness Cesar Yuzon.
2
Whether or not the lower court gravely erred in appreciating against him the generic
aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength, disregard of age and sex of the
victim.
3
Whether or not the lower court gravely erred in failing to appreciate in accusedappellant’s favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Held:
1
Fear of reprisal and the natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in a criminal
case are sufficient explanations for a witness’ delay in reporting the crime to the
authorities. Such failure in making a prompt report to the proper authorities does not
destroy the truth per se of the complaint. Likewise, the natural hesitance of the
witnesses in this country to volunteer information about a criminal case, and their
unwillingness to be involved or dragged into a criminal investigation is common, and
has been judicially declared not to affect their credibility
2
Moreover, the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and disregard of
age and sex cannot be appreciated as no evidence was presented to prove the same. To
establish the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, there must be a
deliberate intent on the part of the malefactors to take advantage of their greater
number.
3
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is not present in the case at bar. A
surrender is said to be voluntary when it is done by the accused spontaneously and
made in such manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender
unconditionally to authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to
save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture.
PEOPLE V. REYES
Facts:
At around 11:00 p.m. on June 11, 1998, Barangay Captain William Magpantay received a
radio report from barangay kagawad that someone managed to gain entry into the house of
Dr. Aurora Lagrada, and that she had shouted for help. Magpantay, a barangay councilman
and a barangay tanod responded and proceeded to the house of the doctor. The policemen
passed by the garage and opened the door. They saw the bloodied Lagrada, naked from the
waist up, sprawled sidewise on the floor opposite the sink near the kitchen
Court finds the accused ANTONIO REYES, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT, as PRINCIPAL of the offense of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE. Antonio Reyes
appealed saying that the court erred in convicting him of the said crime.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Issue:
1
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence.
2
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of robbery with homicide.
Held:
1
The Court rejects the appellants claim that his signature on page 3 of his extrajudicial
confession is a forgery and that he affixed his signature on a blank paper, which is now
on page 1 of the said confession The extrajudicial confession of the appellant was
notarized by Atty. Wilfredo O. Paraiso who certified that he had personally examined
the appellant and that he was satisfied that the latter had voluntarily executed the
same. The notary publics certification belies the appellants claim that he was forced by
the police officers to affix his signature on page 1 of his confession. Atty. Paraiso is an
officer of the court. He is presumed to have regularly performed his duties as such
notary public.
2
To sustain a conviction of the accused for robbery with homicide, the prosecution was
burdened to prove the essential elements of the crime, viz:
(a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a
person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by
intent to gain or animus lucrandiand (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason
thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was
committed.
The accused must be shown to have the principal purpose of committing robbery, the
homicide being committed either by reason of or on occasion of the robbery. The
homicide may precede robbery or may occur thereafter. What is essential is that there is
a nexus, an intrinsic connection between the robbery and the killing. The latter may be
done prior to or subsequent to the former. However, the intent to commit robbery must
precede the taking of the victims life. Furthermore, the constituted crimes of robbery
and homicide must be consummated
PEOPLE V. DANIELA
Facts:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
At around 2 am of March 31, 1996, Manuel, armed with a .38 caliber gun and holding
fluorescent lamp, entered the bedroom or Ronito and Maria Fe. They ransacked the room
and divested Maria Fe of her necklace, rings and earrings. Manuel Daniela ordered Jose
Baylosis to kill Ronito while Daniela was raping the house maid. Apellants Manuel
Daniela and Jose Baylosis were convicted of robbery with homicide, sentencing them to
death and directing them to pay to the heirs of the victims. Manuel and Jose assail the
decision of trial court and insist that the court erred in convicting them for it was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant are guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Held:
Yes, OSG contends that the prosecutor mustered the required quantum evidence to prove
the constitutive elements of robbery with homicide. The evidence on the record shows that
the object of the appellants was to rob the victim of their money and personal properties
and kill Ronito on the occasion of robbery. A conviction for robbery with homicide
required certitude that robbery is the main purpose and objective of the malefactor and the
killing is merely incidental to the robbery. However, the law does not require that the sole
motive of the malefactor is robbery and commits homicide by reason or on the occasion
thereof. In People vs. Tidula, The court ruled that even if the malefactor intends to kill and
rob another, it does not preclude his conviction for the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide. A conviction for robbery with homicide is proper even if the homicide is
committed before, during, or after the commission of the robbery.
PEOPLE V. NAPALIT
Facts:
On or about April 3, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, Ricardo Napalit, conspiring
with others, whose true names, real identities and present whereabouts are still unknown
and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, all armed
with unknown caliber firearms, with intent of (sic) gain and by means of force, violence
and intimidation, to wit: by then and there barging inside Tondo General Hospital located
at Honorio Lopez Blvd., Tondo, announcing a hold-up, ordering the people/employees
thereat to lie down on the floor, grabbing the cashier and ordering him to open the vault
and filing cabinets and once opened, take, rob and carry away the following, to wit:cash
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
money consisting of unions collection, professional fees, patients fees, cash advances and
salaries of employees amounting to, more or less --- P1,300,000.00
Accused-appellant was found guilty of robbery in band with homicide defined and
penalized under Article 294 (as amended by R. A. 7659). In his brief, accused-appellant
ascribes the following errors to the trial court: The trial court erred in finding the accusedappellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and even granting that
accused-appellant was a co-conspirator in the plan to commit robbery, the trial court,
nonetheless, erred in attributing to him and holding him liable for the crime of homicide
which happened on the occasion of the robbery.
Issue:
Whether or not court erred in deciding the case.
Held:
No, when the issue of credibility is involved, appellate courts generally do not disturb the
findings of the trial court since the latter is in a better position to pass on it, having heard
the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying, unless it
is shown that it overlooked certain facts or circumstances of substance that, if considered,
could affect the outcome of the case
In the case at bar, the trial court found the testimony of witnesses Santos and Saclolo to be
worthy of credence. From the transcripts of the stenographic notes of their testimonies, this
Court finds that, indeed, they merit credence. They are straightforward and consistent
Direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not indispensable in conspiracy.
It may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or
inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interest.[32]
From the time accused-appellant and his companions entered the hospital and announced a
holdup up to the time they fled, in the course of which security guard Gomez was shot,
there can be no other conclusion than that they hatched a criminal scheme, synchronized
their acts for unity in its execution, and aided each other for its consummation.
PEOPLE V. CAMPOS
Facts:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
On August 16, 1989, at around 10:00 in the evening, Felicidad and Mercelina prepared to
sleep. Their bedroom and the kitchen were located inside the mini mart. Felicidad turned
off all lights in the store except the kitchen light. Mercelina laid on the bed with her twoyear old son, Christopher, while Felicidad laid on the floor beside them.
At around midnight, Felicidad roused from her sleep and stood up. Suddenly, someone
stabbed her on her left arm. She started to shout as her assailant continued to stab her. She
was hit on her abdomen, left arm, and left side. She fell to the floor in a sitting position and
she looked at the person who stabbed her. She recognized accused Alejandro Campos, who
worked at the neighboring gravel and sand area and frequented their store to buy gas. She
also noticed accused Renato dela Cruz standing near the door of the room. She knew
accused dela Cruz because they used to work together in the Cefel's General Merchandise
Store, a hardware store adjacent to the mini-mart.
Suddenly, accused Campos moved towards Mercelina and started stabbing her. Mercelina,
still lying on the bed, woke up and shouted for help. Accused Campos kept stabbing her.
Thereafter, the two accused left hurriedly, exiting through the storeroom of the minimart.
Court finds the accused Alejandro Campos y Armado and Renato dela Cruz y Borac guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide with Frustrated Homicide as charged
and hereby sentences each accused to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Only accused-appellant Renato dela Cruz contended that the trial court erred in convicting
him because his participation in the crime was not clearly established.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of Robbery with Homicide
Held:
In order to be convicted of robbery with homicide, four (4) elements are necessary: (a) the
taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against the person; (b)
the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain
or animus lucrandi; and, (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof the crime
of homicide was committed.
Court finds insufficient evidence to show that accused-appellant dela Cruz was
guilty of the first three elements of robbery with homicide. In robbery with homicide cases,
the robbery itself must be proved as conclusively as any other essential element of the
crime.
Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch
124, convicting accused-appellant Renato dela Cruz y Borac of robbery with
homicide. Accused-appellant Renato dela Cruz is hereby ACQUITTED on reasonable
doubt and is ordered released immediately from confinement unless he is held for another
case.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
ROBBERY WITH RAPE
PEOPLE V. VERCELES
Facts:
On October 19, 1996 at around 2:00 in the morning, Maribeth Bolita was awakened by a
man fondling her breast and other private parts. She tried to resist and fight back but her
strength proved too weak against her aggressor. She later identified her aggressor as
Mamerto Soriano. While she was being ravished, she saw two men standing at the door,
whom she identified as accused Mario Verceles and Felix Corpuz. Soriano undressed her
then kissed her on the body and fondled her breasts for five minutes. There he removed his
pants and laid her on the floor and tried to insert his penis inside her vagina. Maribeth lost
consciousness and when she came to, her private part was very painful and the three
accused were gone.
The Court hereby finds accused Felix Corpuz and Mario Verceles guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape.
Accused Felix Corpuz and Mario Verceles interposed the instant appeal. They alleged that
the trial court erred in discharging Jerry Soriano as a state witness, in appreciating
conspiracy among the accused, in not considering as mitigating circumstance the voluntary
surrender of Mario Verceles, and in awarding damages to the private complainants.
Issue:
Whether or not the appeal lacks merit.
Held:
The appeal lacks merit. The trial court did not err in discharging Jerry Soriano to be
utilized as a state witness. First, the testimony of Jerry Soriano was absolutely necessary as
the prosecution has no direct evidence to prove the identity of the malefactors Mamerto
Soriano, Felix Corpuz, Mario Verceles and Pablo Ramos. Second, Jerry Sorianos
testimony was corroborated in its material points by other prosecution witnesses and
physical evidence. These are: (a) the testimony of Maribeth Bolito that there were three
malefactors, one of whom sexually abused her and two of whom just stood at the door; (b)
the testimony of Rosita Quilates that her properties were stolen; and (c) the testimony of
SPO2 Renato Solomon that they were able to recover the stolen properties from a certain
Andres Tirano who bought them from accused Mamerto Soriano. Lastly, Jerry Soriano
does not appear to be the most guilty for he was not a co-conspirator in the robbery with
rape. He merely accompanied the accused and received three hundred pesos as his share in
the proceeds of the sale of the stolen properties. Besides, the question of whether Jerry
Soriano appears to be the most guilty is a factual issue.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever a rape is committed as a consequence, or on
the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as principals of the
crime of robbery with rape, although not all of them took part in the rape.
For the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the accused must
satisfactorily comply with three requisites: (1) he has not been actually arrested; (2) he
surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is
voluntary.
PEOPLE V. TAMAYO
Facts:
On or about the 29th day of March 1998, Nelson Tamayo, by means of force, violence
against, and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the
room and residence of one Mary Anne Guazon, and once inside, poked a fan knife on her
throat, covered her mouth and inserted his penis into the mouth of the said victim, held her,
undressed her, pulled down her shorts and panty and succeeded in having sexual
interoucrse with her against her will and consent. Tamayo, with intent to gain, took and
carried away cash money amounting to P500.00 belonging to the said victim.
Tamayo was charged with the special complex crime of robbery with rape. Tamayo
appealed insisting that the lower court erred in finding accused appellant guilty of special
complex crime of robbery with rape despite his guilt not having been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in finding Tamayo guilty of the crime charged.
Held:
The court maintains that the trial court did not err in handing down a judgment of
conviction. However, it posits that the crime comiitted is not the special complex crime of
robbery with rape under Article 294, but two separate crimes of rape and robbery. For a
conviction of crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be shown that the rape was
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
committed by reason or occasion of a robbery and not the other way around. It
contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to
gain, personal property belong to another and rape is committed on occasion thereof as an
accompanying crime. If the original design was to commit rape but the accused, after
committing rape, also committed robbery because the opportunity presented itself, the
criminal acts should be viewed as two distinct offenses.
PEOPLE V. DOMINGO
Facts:
Complainant Raquel Indon and her minor children Melissa, Michelle, Marvin and Jeffer
were sleeping inside their house when she was awakened by the sound of appellant kicking
their door open. She immediately recognized the accused, since the kitchen light
illuminated his face. Armed with a screwdriver and a kitchen knife, appellant cut the cord
of the mosquito net and repeatedly stabbed her, using the six-inch screwdriver. When she
tried to escape from the room, four-year-old Marvin rushed towards her. She then grabbed
him and ran towards the gate. However, before reaching the gate, she fell down and
appellant stabbed her right leg. The appellant then proceeded to stab Marvin, hitting the
latter twice on the arm and twice on his left chest. Marvin died on 3 April 2000 as a result
of these injuries. After stabbing Marvin, appellant returned back to the house, towards
Raquel’s two daughters Michelle and Melissa. Melissa died because of the stab wounds
that the appellant inflicted on her; while Michelle, who was able to hide under
the papag merely sustained serious physical injuries. The appellant also attacked twoyear-old Jeffer by striking him on the head with the screwdriver, but the latter managed to
run to the house of Raquel’s sister-in-law. Raquel got up and ran for help, but the appellant
followed her. Their neighbor, Ronaldo Galvez, came to their rescue and tried to subdue the
appellant.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime committed is murder
Held:
Raquel Indon, Michelle Indon, Melissa Indon, Marvin Indon, and Jeffer Indon were merely
sleeping inside their bedroom and had not even given the slightest provocation when
appellant attacked them without warning. Furthermore, the killing of Marvin Indon and
Melissa Indon, both minors who could not be expected to defend themselves against an
adult, was considered treacherous, and would sustain a conviction for murder. The
penalties imposed were adjusted accordingly. Appellant’s conviction for frustrated
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
homicide in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000 was affirmed, since prosecution failed to
prove appellant’s treachery or evident premeditation in his assault against Rolando Galvez,
who came to the scene of the crime to subdue the appellant.
Qualifying circumstance of treachery was firmly established. Marvin Indon and Melissa
Indon were both minors when they were killed by the appellant. The killing by an adult of
a minor child is treacherous. Moreover, the victims in this case were asleep when appellant
barged into their house and attacked their family. The attack was clearly unprovoked, and
they were defenseless against him.
PEOPLE V. LAGO
Facts:
Accused Reyderick Lago testified that accused Cozette Aragon who was his classmate in
English approached him and asked him to accompany him to the house of his uncle to get a
project and collect his salary. Aragon also invited Lisbog to go with them. Thereafter, he
came to know that Diadid also proceeded to the house of Aragon’s uncle at the back of
Don Bosco in Kalentong.
Upon entering the gate of the house, Aragon opened the jalousie window with the use of a
‘beinte nueve’ balisong and unlocked the door. Aragon let them in. Lisbog was instructed
to wait outside. While he was seated on the sofa, Aragon and Diadid went inside the room.
Suddenly, he heard somebody was groaning from the room. Afraid, he immediately left the
place and went to the house of his grandmother in Mandaluyong who advised him not to
leave the place anymore.
On cross-examination, he testified that Cozette Aragon was his classmate in one of his
back subjects at Jose Fabella Memorial School. Lisbog was also his classmate. He did not
know personally Jayson Diadid and Dennis Sison. He admitted that when he heard the
groaning inside the room, he did not bother to verify what was happening. He went out of
the house immediately and did not attend his classes anymore. He stopped schooling.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide.
Held:
Although Aragon avers that it was only Diadid who did the stabbing, the latter’s act is
deemed to be the act of all. This Court has ruled that whenever a homicide has been
committed as a consequence or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals in the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide, even if they did not all actually take part in the homicide; that is,
unless it appears that those who did not do so endeavored to prevent the homicide.
The elements of this special complex crime are the following: (1) the taking of personal
property is committed with violence or intimidation against a person; (2) the property
taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of
the robbery or on occasion thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) is committed.
The records and the pleadings show that all the above-mentioned elements are present in
the case at bar. Appellant and his cohorts broke into the house of Aragon’s uncle took the
victim’s wallet and cash, wrist watch and several pieces of jewelry amounting
to P67,000 and, in the course of the robbery, stabbed and killed the victim.
PEOPLE V. SULTAN
Facts:
One evening she was on her way home from a visit to her cousin she was accosted by
someone, later identified as accused-appellant Fernando L. Sultan, who pointed a sharp
instrument at her neck and announcing it was a "hold-up." He grabbed her and brought her
to his house along where he, through threat and intimidation, had carnal knowledge of her.
After satisfying his lust, he ordered her to put on her bra and panty, tied her hands and went
out of the room to smoke. After ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes, he came back, untied her,
and once again with threat and intimidation sexually abused her. Thereafter, he tied her
hands and told her that he loved her and that he would answer for what he had done to her.
In her effort to release herself from his clutches she "agreed" to elope with him. Perhaps
convinced that she was going to run away with him, he allowed her to go home at noon to
get her things. She immediately reported the abuse to her sister, who immediately reported
the same to his friend, a police officer. The accused was arrested the next morning and
brought to the police headquarters for further interrogation.
Issue:
a. Whether or not the accused is guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with rape.
b. Whether or not in being raped twice, every count of rape should be treated as
aggravating circumstance.
Held:
A. YES. Accused-appellant might not have employed force in committing the rape but he
definitely used intimidation which was sufficient to make complainant submit herself to
him against her will for fear of life and personal safety. Intimidation is subjective so it must
be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime, and not by any hard and fast rule. It is enough that it produces
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fear, as in the present case, fear that if the complainant does not yield to the bestial
demands of accused-appellant something would happen to her at that moment or even
thereafter.
The record shows that the prosecution has established that he committed both robbery and
rape with the intent to take personal property of another preceding the rape. Under Art.
294, par. (1), of the Revised Penal Code, "x x x [a]ny person guilty of robbery with the use
of violence against or intimidation of persons shall suffer: 1. The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death, x x x when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape x x x x"
B. Complaining witness Juditha Bautista was raped twice on the occasion of the robbery.
The Court realized that there was no law providing for the additional rape/s or homicide/s
for that matter to be considered as aggravating circumstance. It further observed that the
enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code is
exclusive, unlike in Art. 13 of the same Code which enumerates the mitigating
circumstances where analogous circumstances may be considered, hence, the remedy lies
with the legislature. Consequently, unless and until a law is passed providing that the
additional rape/s or homicide/s may be considered aggravating, the Court must construe
the penal law in favor of the offender as no person may be brought within its terms if he is
not clearly made so by the statute. Under this view, the additional rape committed by
accused-appellant is not considered an aggravating circumstance.
THEFT
LAUREL V. ABROGAR
Facts:
On or about September 10-19, 1999, or prior thereto in Makati City, the accused,
conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone (PLDT), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and use the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting
International Simple Resale (ISR), which is a method of routing and completing
international long distance calls using lines, cables, antenae, and/or air wave frequency
which connect directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where the
call is destined, effectively stealing this business from PLDT while using its facilities in the
estimated amount of P20,370,651.92 to the damage and prejudice of PLDT, in the said
amount.
Issue:
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Whether international long distance calls and the business of providing telecommunication
or telephone services are considered as personal properties subjected to theft.
Held:
In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various
equipment or apparatus to private respondent PLDTs telephone system, through which
petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long distance calls using respondent
PLDTs facilities constitutes all three acts of subtraction mentioned above.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
Order issued by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, which
denied the Motion to Quash (With Motion to Defer Arraignment) for theft, is
AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the trial court and the Public Prosecutor of Makati
City is hereby DIRECTED to amend the Amended Information to show that the property
subject of the theft were services and business of the private offended party.
GABLOIA V. PEOPLE
Facts:
The RTC convicted Alfonso Gaviola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified theft. On September 6, 1997 at 7:00 AM, Jovencio Mejarito, a nephew of Cleto
Mejarito, and a barangay councilman saw Gavino Gaviola, Rodrigo Gaviola and Domingo
Caingcoy climbing the coconut trees and deliberately took, harvested and gathered 1500
coconuts thru the supervision of Alfonso and Leticia Gaviola from the plantation of Cleto
Mejarito without his authority and consent. The said accused admitted that the coconuts
were taken upon his instruction but insisted that the trees were planted from the lot he
inherited from his father.
Issue:
Whether or not the said accused is guilty of qualified theft.
Held:
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code states that theft is committed by any person, who
with intent to gain but without violence, against or intimidation of neither persons nor
force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter‘s consent.
Theft is likewise committed by: (1.) Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail
to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner; (2.) Any person who, after
having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits
or objects of the damage caused by him; and (3.) Any person who shall enter an enclosed
state or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the
consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals or other
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forest or farm products. Thus, the elements of theft are: 1). That there be taking of personal
property; 2) that said property belongs to another; 3) that the taking be done without the
consent of the owner and 5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. According to Article 310: Qualified
theft - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degree than
those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail
matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish
taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake,
typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
For one to be guilty of theft, the accused must have intent to steal (animu furandi) personal
property, meaning the intent to deprive another of his ownership/lawful possession of
personal property which intent is apart from but concurrent with the general criminal intent
which is an essential element of a felony of dolo. Thus, petitioner‘s claim of good faith in
taking the coconuts from private complainant‘s land is a mere pretense to escape criminal
liability.
LUCAS V. CA
Facts:
Herminigildo Lucas was charged with theft before the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan,
Br. 69, Rizal, together with Wilfredo Navarro and Enrique Lovena. The
Information[1]alleged that on or about 8 June 1990 the three (3) accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously stole and carried away one stereo component, a 14-inch colored TV, an
electric fan, twenty-three (23) pieces of cassette tapes, one (1) box of car toys, four (4)
pieces of Pyrex crystal bowls, cash ofP20,000.00 and jewelry worth P10,000.00, valued
at P100,000.00 all belonging to Luisito Tuazon.
The accused made an appeal to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner Lucas alleges that it was
impossible for conspiracy to have existed among the accused. He claims he did not know
his co-accused Navarro and Lovena; neither did they know him on or before 8 June 1990
Issue:
Whether or not conspiracy is essential to make the petitioners liable of committing the
crime of theft.
Held:
No, Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the
crime. It may be deduced from the concerted acts of the accused, indubitably
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demonstrating their unity of purpose, intent and sentiment in committing the crime. It is
enough that the accused acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense and
that they had the same purpose or common design, and that they were united in its
execution.
To sustain a conviction for theft, the following elements must be present: (1) personal
property of another person must be taken without the latter's consent; (2) the act of taking
the personal property of another must be done without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things; and, (3) there must be an intention to gain
from the taking of another person's personal property.
The Court of Appeals which affirmed their conviction and even raised the period of their
imprisonment to from six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to seventeen (17)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum
PEOPLE V. MANERO
Facts:
At 5:00 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his motorcycle. He entered
the house of Gomez. While inside, Norberto, Jr., and his co-accused Pleñago towed the
motorcycle outside to the center of the highway. Norberto, Jr., opened the gasoline tank,
spilled some fuel, lit a fire and burned the motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the
felons raved and rejoiced.
Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But the latter simply
stepped backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. At this point, Edilberto asked the
priest: "Ano ang gusto mo, padre (What is it you want, Father)? Gusto mo, Father, bukon
ko ang ulo mo (Do you want me, Father, to break your head)?" Thereafter, in a flash,
Edilberto fired at the head of the priest. As Fr. Favali dropped to the ground, his hands
clasped against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted Edilberto if that was the only way he knew
to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body three (3)
times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shattered the head of
Fr. Favali, causing his brain to scatter on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to
the terrified onlookers, his brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight of
their comrades-in-arms who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim from possible
assistance.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a conspiracy on the part of all of the accused, hence guilty of the
crime of murder, attempted homicide and arson.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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Case Digest
Held:
YES. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a
crime and decide to commit it. It is not essential that all the accused commit together each
and every act constitutive of the offense. It is enough that an accused participates in an act
or deed where there is singularity of purpose and unity in its execution is present.
From the foregoing narration of the trial court, it is clear that appellants were not merely
innocent bystanders but were in fact vital cogs in perpetrating the savage murder of Fr.
Favali and the attempted murder of Rufino Robles by the Manero brothers and their
militiamen. For sure, appellants all assumed a fighting stance to discourage if not prevent
any attempt to provide assistance to the fallen priest. They surrounded the house of
Domingo Gomez to stop Robles and the other occupants from leaving so that the wounded
Robles may die of hemorrhage. Undoubtedly, these were overt acts to ensure success of the
commission of the crimes and in furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. The appellants
acted in concert in the murder of Fr. Favali and in the attempted murder of Rufino Robles.
While accused-appellants may not have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their
collective action showed a common intent to commit the criminal acts.
ABUNDIO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
On October, 1985, in Virac, Catanduanes, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, a public officer, being then the District Engineer of the
Department (then Ministry) of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Office, Virac,
Catanduanes, and as such have access and control of the motor pool of the DPWH,
committing the offense in relation to his duties, and taking advantage of his official
position, with intent to gain and with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and steal, without the consent of the government,
the chassis of Willys Jeep valued at P15,000.00 in the Inventory and Inspection Report of
Unserviceable Property dated December 2, 1982, of the DPWH, Virac, Catanduanes, to the
damage and prejudice of the government.
The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of qualified theft.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner was properly convicted of qualified theft.
Held:
No. It is universally recognized that the crime of theft implies an invasion of possession,
and this doctrine is well accepted in both the common-law and civil law jurisdictions. It
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Case Digest
follows therefore, that there cannot be theft when the owner has voluntarily parted with the
possession of the thing. A felonious taking characterizes the crime of theft. The facts
clearly show that there was no furtive taking or unlawful asportation, in the criminal sense,
of the chassis. The physical and juridical possession of the subject chassis was transferred
to the petitioner, at his request, with the consent of the Motor Pool Officer, Engineer
Alberto. The delivery of the chassis to the petitioner was properly documented. A taking
which is done with the consent or acquiescence of the owner of the property is not
felonious. Lack of malice or criminal intent on the part of petitioner was sufficiently
established in this case.
Since the prosecution failed to prove that theft was committed by Abundo, it is
unnecessary to discuss whether the theft was simple or qualified.
PEOPLE V. SALVILLA
Facts:
The accused were armed with homemade guns and a hand grenade. When they entered the
establishment, they met Rodita Hablero an employee thereat who was on her way out for
her meal break and announced to her that it was a hold-up. She was made to go back to the
office and there Appellant Salvilla pointed his gun at the owner, Severino Choco, and his
two daughters, Mary and Mimie the latter being a minor 15 years of age, and told the
former that all they needed was money. Hearing this, Severino told his daughter, Mary, to
get a paper bag wherein he placed P20,000.00 cash and handed it to Appellant. Thereafter,
Severino pleaded with the four accused to leave the premises as they already had the
money but they paid no heed. Instead, accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and
wristwatch of Severino after which the latter, his two daughters, and Rodita, were herded
to the office and kept there as hostages.
UItimatums were given but the accused did not budge. Finally, the police and military
authorities decided to launch an offensive and assault the place. This resulted in injuries to
the girls, Mimie and Mary Choco as well as to the accused Ronaldo and Reynaldo
Canasares. Mary suffered a "macerated right lower extremity just below the knee" so that
her right leg had to be amputated. The medical certificate described her condition as "in a
state of hemorrhagic shock when she was brought in to the hospital and had to undergo
several major operations during the course of her confinement from April 13, 1986 to May
30, 1986."
Issue:
Whether the crime of robbery was consummated or was merely attempted.
Held:
The crime of robbery in this case was consummated. There is no question that in robbery, it
is required that there be a taking of personal property belonging to another. This is known
as the element of asportation the essence of which is the taking of a thing out of the
possession of the owner without his privity and consent and without the animus
revertendi.
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Case Digest
Those factual allegations of the appellant that while the "giving" has been proven, the
"taking" has not, are contradicted by the evidence. Rodita, the lumberyard employee,
testified that upon demand by Appellant, Severino put P20,000.00 inside a paper bag and
subsequently handed it to Appellant. In turn, accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet
and wristwatch of Severino. In respect of the P50,000.00 from Mayor Caram, Rodita
declared that the Mayor handed the amount to her after she (the Mayor) had opened the
padlocked door and that she thereafter gave the amount to one of the holduppers. The
"taking" was, therefore, sufficiently proved (TSN, July 1, 1987, pp. 12-13, 15-16, 27-31).
The money demanded, and the wallet and wristwatch were within the dominion and
control of the Appellant and his co-accused and completed the taking.
QUALIFIED THEFT
ROQUE V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Antonio Salazar (Salazar) is a member/depositor of the Basa Air Base Savings and Loan
Association Inc. (BABSLA) as evidenced by his passbook No. 1359. He was made to
sign two ledgers when he opened his savings account. On November 16, 1989, Salazar
made a deposit of P2,000 at the BABSLA; however, he did not make any withdrawal, nor
did he authorize anyone to do the same on that date or on November 17, 1989 or for the
whole month of November of that year. Salazar disclosed that around July 1990 he heard
that the funds of other depositors were missing inside the BABSLA and were supposedly
clandestinely circulating around the base. Prodded by this news, and considering that the
balance in his passbook was P46,000, he went to the BABSLA to withdraw P40,000, but
was informed that his balance at the BABSLA was insufficient to cover the withdrawal.
He was not allowed to withdraw. Rosalina de Lazo, the general manager, informed him
that several withdrawals were made on his account amounting to P30,500, as evidenced by
three (3) withdrawal slips. Included among these withdrawal slips is one with the amount
of P10,000, dated November 16, 1989. Salazar claimed that the signature appearing on
said withdrawal slip was not his signature. He does not personally know who made the
withdrawal ofP10,000. Salazar assumed that the one in control of the funds made the
withdrawal.
Issue:
Whether or not qualified theft may be committed when the personal property is in the
lawful possession of the accused prior to the commission of the alleged felony?
Held:
YES. In the present case, what is involved is the possession of money in the capacity of a
bank teller. In People v. Locson, the this Court considered deposits received by a teller in
behalf of a bank as being only in the material possession of the teller. This interpretation
applies with equal force to money received by a bank teller at the beginning of a business
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Case Digest
day for the purpose of servicing withdrawals. Such is only material possession. Juridical
possession remains with the bank. In line with the reasoning of the Court in the abovecited cases, beginning with People v. De Vera, if the teller appropriates the money for
personal gain then the felony committed is theft and not estafa. Further, since the teller
occupies a position of confidence, and the bank places money in the teller’s possession due
to the confidence reposed on the teller, the felony of qualified theft would be committed.
PEOPLE V. BUSTINERA
Facts:
From the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City finding appellant
Luisito D. Bustinera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft for the unlawful
taking of a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, he comes to this Court on appeal.
In an information dated June 17, 1997, appellant was indicted as follows: The undersigned
accuses Luisito D. Bustinera of the crime of Qualified Theft, committed as follows: That
on or about 25 December up to the 9 January 1997 in Quezon City, the said accused being
then employed as one of the taxi Drivers of Elias S. Cipriano, an Operator of several taxi
cabs in Diliman, Quezon City, and as such has free access to the taxi he drives, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain, with grave abuse of
confidence reposed upon him by his employer and without the knowledge and consent of
the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi with Plate No.
PWH-266worth PHP 303,000.00 belonging to Elias S. Cipriano, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party in the amount of PHP 303,000.00.
Issues:
Whether or not the accused- appellant had intent to gain when he failed to return the taxi to
its garage?
Held:
Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended for the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. However, Article 310 has
been modified, with respect to certain vehicles, by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended,
otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING.
The unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now covered by the anti- carnapping law and not
by the provisions on qualified theft or robbery. The anti- carnapping law is a special law,
different from the crime of robbery and theft included in the RPC. It particularly addresses
the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things. Since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the
anti-carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply as the said
motor vehicle does not fall within the exceptions mentioned in the anti-carnapping law
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Case Digest
PEOPLE V. SALONGA
Facts:
This case was certified to this Court pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the
Rules of Court from a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
NO. 18551 which modified the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati, Branch 142 in Criminal Case No. 33127, by increasing the penalty
imposed on the accused to reclusion perpetua. Abelardo Salonga, Flaviano
Pangilinan, Amiel Garcia and Ricardo Licup were charged with the crime of
Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document in an information
alleging that on or before 23 October 1986, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with one
another and mutually helping and aiding one another, and as such had access
to the preparation of checks in the said Metrobank and Trust Company
(Metrobank), with grave abuse of confidence, intent of gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the total amount of
P36,480.30 by forging the signature of officers authorized to sign the said
check and have the said check deposited in the account of Firebrake Sales and
Services, the supposed payee when in truth and in fact there is no such
transaction between Firebrake and Metrobank, thereby causing the preparation
and use of a simulated check described as Check No. 013702 in the amount of
P36,480.30 making it appear genuine and authorized, through which they
succeeded in its encashment, enabling them to gain for themselves the total
sum of P36,480.30, to the damage and prejudice of Metrobank and Trust
Company in the total amount of P36,480.30. On July 19, 1993, the RTC
rendered its decision finding Salonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document.
Issues:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of qualified theft?
Whether or not the penalty imposed is proper?
Held:
The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the participation of accusedappellant in the crime charged. It was established that accused-appellant was the custodian
of the blank Metrobank cashiers check which was processed and encashed. Arthur Christy
Mariano of the spot audit group testified that the amount of accounts payable for October
23, 1986 as reflected in the proof sheet did not tally with the debit tickets of the same date,
showing that the check was issued without any transaction. Mariano also testified that after
finding basic differences in the signature of bank manager Antonia Manuel appearing on
the subject check with other specimens he conferred with the latter who told him that the
signature appearing therein was not hers. Manager Antonia Manuel likewise testified that
the signature appearing in the cashiers check varies with the way she signs. Significantly,
in a letter dated September 15, 1987 to Atty. Severino S. Tabios of Metrobank, accusedappellant confirmed the statements in his extra-judicial confession and offered to return the
amount of P8,500.00. The crime charged is Qualified Theft through Falsification of
Commercial Document. Since the value of the check is P38,480.30, the imposable penalty
for the felony of theft is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and 1 year of
each additional PHP 10,000.00 in accordance with Article 309, paragraph 1 of the RPC.
However, under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of qualified theft is
punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than that specified in Article 309 of
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Case Digest
the Revised Penal Code. Two degrees higher than prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods. In addition,
forging the signatures of the bank officers authorized to sign the subject cashiers check was
resorted to in order to obtain the sum of P36,480.30 for the benefit of the accused.
Falsification of the subject cashiers check was a necessary means to commit the crime of
qualified theft resulting in a complex crime. Hence, we apply Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, which provides that, where an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the more serious crime in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Considering that qualified Theft is more serious than falsification of bank notes or
certificates which is punished under Article 166 (2) of the Revised Penal Code with prision
mayor in its minimum period, the correct penalty is fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
PEOPLE V. CARIAGA
Facts:
Jonathan Cariaga v. CA June 6, 2001 Gonzaga-Reyes Nature: Petition for review on
certiorari of a decision of the CA affirming RTC decision convicting Jonathan Cariaga of
qualified theft Facts: Luis Aboitiz was the systems analyst of Davao Light & Power
Company (DLPC). He received reports that some private electricians were involved in the
sale of DLPC supplies. He initiated a covert operation to ascertain the matter and catch the
perpetrators. In October 1988, he sought assistance of Sgt. Villasis, Chief of the Theft &
Robber Section of METRODISCOM-Davao. He also hired Florencio Siton as an
undercover agent under the pseudonym “Canuto Duran”. ‘Duran’ became acquainted with
Ricardo Cariaga, a private electrician, and he said that his ‘boss’ needs some electrical
materials to be used in Diwalwal, a gold panning area. Ricardo offered to supply the
materials saying that his cousin can supply the same to him. ‘Duran’ was able to purchase
some wires which came from, as Ricardo said, his cousin named Jonathan Cariaga
(accused). ‘Duran’s undercover work came to an end when Sgt. Villasis ‘apprehended’ him
on February 1989. ‘Duran’ then ‘confessed’ in order to persuade Ricardo and the others
involved to come out with the truth. Ricardo and another person came to the police station
and confessed to their participation as “fence” for Jonathan Cariaga. The prosecution,
however, was unable to present Ricardo as witness as the subpoena cannot be personally
served to him as he was in Sultan Kudarat. Ricardo was able to give a sworn statement
pertaining to the stealing for a labor case between Jonathan and DLPC for the latter’s
alleged illegal dismissal.
Issue:
Whether or not Ricardo’s sworn statement is admissible as evidence; Siton is a credible
witness; guilt beyond reasonable doubt proven
Held:
the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 24, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION (1) Not admissible. The RTC & CA erred when it admitted the sworn
statement of Ricardo as evidence in the instant case. Sec. 47, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence and Sec. 1(f), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure both speak of
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Case Digest
admissibility of a testimony of a witness “unable to testify” in court. In Tan v. CA , the
Court has held that “unable to testify” does not cover cases of witnesses subpoenaed but
did not appear. Ricardo was only subpoenaed once. He was neither dead nor out of the
country. In fact he is in Sultan Kudarat which is merely 4 hours drive away from Davao.
The Court must exercise its coercive power to arrest, but, it did not in the present case. (2)
Credible. (3) Guilty.
QUINAO V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Both accused (Conchita Quinao and Salvador Cases) and private complainant Francisco
Del Monte are claiming ownership over the land in question. Accused-appellant presented
a tax declaration and alleged that the land being claimed by the complainant is different
from the land litigated in Civil Cases No. 3561. Trial Court finds accused guilty of the
crime of Usurpation of Real Rights in Property. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court. Hence, this case.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-petitioner who claims to be owner of the land in question
could be held liable of usurpation of her own property
Held:
Contrary to petitioner's allegation, the decision rendered by the trial court convicting her of
the crime of usurpation of real property was not based on "speculations, surmises and
conjectures" but clearly on the evidence on record and in accordance with the applicable
law under Article 312 of Revised Penal Code.
The requisites of usurpation are that the accused took possession of another's real property
or usurped real rights in another's property; that the possession or usurpation was
committed with violence or intimidation and that the accused had animo lucrandi. In order
to sustain a conviction for "usurpacion de derecho reales," the proof must show that the
real property occupied or usurped belongs, not to the occupant or usurper, but to some third
person, and that the possession of the usurper was obtained by means of intimidation or
violence done to the person ousted of possession of the property.
In Castrodes vs. Cubelo, the Court stated that the elements of the offense are (1)
occupation of another's real property or usurpation of a real right belonging to another
person; (2) violence or intimidation should be employed in possessing the real property or
in usurping the real right, and (3) the accused should be animated by the intent to gain.
Petitioner failed to give any cogent reason for this Court to deviate from this salutary
principle.
SWINDLING (ESTAFA)
ONG V. PEOPLE
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Facts:
Petitioner had for years been buying jewelry from Gold Asia which is owned and operated
by the family of private complainant Rosa Cabuso. While she normally bought jewelry on
cash basis, she was allowed to issue postdated checks to cover the jewelry she bought in
December 1994 up to February 1995, upon her assurance that the checks would be funded
on their due dates. When, on maturity, the checks were deposited, they were returned with
the stamp "Account Closed."
Hence, petitioner was indicted for Estafa. She was likewise indicted for 10 counts of
violation of B.P. 22 before the RTC of Manila. RTC convicted petitioner of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Whether she could be convicted of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code when she was, in the Information, charged of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) of the same Code
Held:
The appeal is impressed with merit. Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution grants
the accused the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. This is to
enable the accused to adequately prepare for his defense. An accused cannot thus be
convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. From
the allegations in an information, the real nature of the crime charged is determined. In the
case at bar, the Information alleged that petitioner issued the questioned checks knowing
that she had no funds in the bank and failing to fund them despite notice that they were
dishonored. These allegations clearly constitute a charge, not under paragraph 2(a) as the
lower courts found but, under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Although the earlier quoted paragraph 2(a) and the immediately quoted paragraph 2(d) of
Article 315 have a common element – false pretenses or fraudulent acts – the law treats
Estafa under paragraph 2(d) by postdating a check or issuing a bouncing check differently.
Thus, under paragraph 2(d), failure to fund the check despite notice of dishonor creates a
prima facie presumption of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act, which is not
an element of a violation of paragraph 2(a). Under paragraph 2(d), if there is no proof of
notice of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed, and unless
there is a priori intent, which is hard to determine and may not be inferred from mere
failure to comply with a promise, no Estafa can be deemed to exist.Notice of dishonor
being then an element of a charge under Article 2(d) under which petitioner was clearly
charged, failure to prove it is a ground for acquittal thereunder. In the case at bar, as priorly
stated, petitioner was charged under paragraph 2(d), but there is no evidence that petitioner
received notice of dishonor of all, except one (Allied Bank Check No. 7600042 for
P76,654), of the questioned checks. Hence, with respect to all but one of the checks, the
prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise. This leaves it
unnecessary to pass on the evidence for the defense. Suffice it to state that petitioner’s
defenses of good faith and lack of criminal intent, defenses to a malum in se like Estafa,
are not difficult to credit. For, on notice of the lack of sufficient funds in her bank account,
to cover the Allied Bank check, petitioner offered to pay in installment, to which the
private complainant agreed, the amount covered by the said check, as well as the others. As
reflected above, the prosecution stipulated that petitioner had made a total payment of
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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Case Digest
P338,250, which amount is almost one-third of the total amount of the ten checks or more
than the amount covered by the P76,654 Allied Bank check. In fine, the prosecution having
failed to establish all the elements of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) under which
petitioner was clearly charged, her acquittal is in order. The judgment bearing on her civil
liability stands, however.
VELOSO V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Shangri-la Finest Chinese Cuisine, at No. 4 Times Street, West Triangle, Quezon City, is a
restaurant owned and operated by the Developers Group of Companies, Inc. Ramon Sy
Hunliong (Ramon) was its president and general manager. Roland Veloso, petitioner,
claiming to be a consultant of then Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco, was an occasional
guest at the restaurant. Before the May 1995 elections, petitioner and then Congressman
Cuenco, while at the said restaurant having dinner, had a conversation with Ramon. This
led to a friendly bet between petitioner and Ramon on whether or not Ferdinand Marcos,
Jr. would win as a Senator. Ramon assured that Marcos, Jr. is a sure winner, but petitioner
claimed otherwise. They both agreed that the loser will host a dinner for ten (10) persons.
After the elections, official results showed that Marcos, Jr. lost in his senatorial bid. Hence,
petitioner won in the bet. On August 22, 1995, Congressman Cuencos secretary called Eva
Anne Nanette Sto. Domingo (Eva), the restaurants assistant dining manager, to reserve a
dinner for one table corresponding to ten persons on behalf of petitioner. Ramon, the loser,
informed Eva that he would pay for one table, his commitment to petitioner. However,
when petitioner arrived at the restaurant on August 23, 1995, he asked that four (4)
additional tables be set, promising he would pay for the same. Hence, Eva had four
additional tables prepared in addition to the one under Ramons account.
The Sales Invoice for the additional four tables amounted to P11,391.00. When the Sales
Invoice was presented to petitioner, he refused to pay, explaining he was a guest of Ramon.
Due to petitioners stubborn refusal to pay, Eva asked him where she should send the bill.
Petitioner instructed her to send it to Congressman Cuencos office as he was always
present there. It turned out, however, that he was no longer reporting at that office. Hence,
the bill was sent to his address at 63 Benefit Street, GSIS Village, Quezon City, but still, he
refused to pay. The lawyer for the restaurant sent a demand letter to petitioner, but to no
avail. Consequently, petitioner was charged with estafa before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 31, Quezon City.
Issue:
Whether or not accused is guilty of estafa
Held:
The court DENIED the petition. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA finding petitioner Roland V. Veloso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of estafa are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. Appellant insists that he is only
civilly liable for an unpaid debt. We reviewed the records very closely and found that
petitioner and his guests, occupying four tables, ate the food he ordered. When asked to
pay, he refused and insisted he was a mere guest of Ramon. It bears emphasis that the
understanding between petitioner and Ramon was that the latter would pay for only one
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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Case Digest
table. We agree with the Solicitor General in his brief for the People that petitioner
employed fraud in ordering four additional tables, partaking of the food ordered and then
illegally refusing to pay, which makes him liable for estafa under Article 315 (2)(e) of the
Revised Penal Code.
BONIFACIO V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Private complainant Ofelia Santos was a businesswoman and a buy-and-sell agent of
jewelry. Sometime in March 1996, petitioner Crisanta Bonifacio was introduced to her. She
expressed interest to see the pieces of jewelry Santos was selling. On March 21, 1996,
petitioner received several pieces of jewelry from Santos. She signed a document
acknowledging receipt of the jewelry and agreeing to sell these items on commission basis.
She also promised to remit the proceeds of the sale or return the unsold items to Santos
within 15 days. Petitioner failed to turn over the proceeds of the sale within the given
period. She, however, returned some of the unsold items at a later date. The value of the
pieces unaccounted for amounted to P154,000. On March 28, 1996, petitioner asked
Santos for new sets of jewelry to sell under the same terms and conditions. Again, on due
date, petitioner failed to account. This time, the value of the unpaid and unreturned items
amounted to P91,500. On April 3, 1996, petitioner once more accepted several pieces of
jewelry and signed an acknowledgment receipt under the same terms and conditions. On
due date, petitioner again failed to pay. The pieces of jewelry left unpaid and unreturned
amounted to P38,500. In a letter dated July 25, 1996, Santos demanded from petitioner the
payment of the total amount of P244,500. Petitioner gave her two checks amounting
to P30,000 as partial payment. The checks, however, bounced for being drawn against
insufficient funds and being drawn against a closed account, respectively.
Issue:
Whether the CA’s decision of rendering judgement of petitioner being guilty of Estafa is
correct
Held:
The petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED. The essence of estafa under Article 315 (1)(b), RPC is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received, to the prejudice of the owner.
The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of
another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different
from that agreed upon. In an agency for the sale of jewelry, it is the agent's duty to return
the jewelry on demand of the owner. The demand for the return of the thing delivered in
trust and the failure of the accused-agent to account for it are circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation. Here, petitioner admitted that she received the pieces of jewelry on
commission. She likewise admitted that she failed to return the items or their value on
Santos' demand. On the other hand, the testimony of her lone witness, Lilia Pascual, failed
to rebut the prosecution's evidence that she misappropriated the items or their
corresponding value. She also never appeared in the trial court to refute the charge against
her. Hence, the trial and appellate courts' conclusion of guilt by misappropriation was a
logical consequence of the established facts.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
RECUERDO V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Petitoner was found guilty in violation of BP 22 where out of the 9 checks she issued as
payment for the jewelry she bought from Yolanda Floro, 5 were dishonored by the bank. A
demand letter was sent to her and upon failure to make payments, a complaint was filed by
which she was found guilty. On petition for certiorari, she contends that BP 22 is
unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not B.P. 22 is unconstitutional?
Held:
A check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended for encashment, has the same
effect like any other check. It is within the contemplation of B.P. 22, which is explicit that
“any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply for an account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank x x x which check is subsequently dishonored x x x shall be punished by
imprisonment. B.P. 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually be
envisioned by the parties, its primordial intention being to instead ensure the stability and
commercial value of checks as being virtual substitutes for currency. It is a policy that can
be easily eroded if one has yet to determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the
terms and conditions for their issuance, before an appropriate application of the legislative
enactment can be made. It is not required much less indispensable, for the prosecution to
present the drawee bank’s representative as a witness to testify on the dishonor of the
checks because of insufficiency of funds. The prosecution may present, as it did in this
case, only complainant as a witness to prove all the elements of the offense charged. She is
competent and qualified witness to testify that she deposited the checks to her account in a
bank; that she subsequently received from the bank the checks returned unpaid with a
notation ‘drawn against insufficient funds’ stamped or written on the dorsal side of the
checks themselves, or in a notice attached to the dishonored checks duly given to the
complainant, and that petitioner failed to pay complainant the value of the checks or make
arrangements for their payment in full within five (5) banking days after receiving notice
that such checks had not been paid by the drawee bank.
GONZALUDO V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Before his death in 1992, one Ulysses Villaflor was a member of the Bacolod
City Police Office. On January 11, 1978, Ulysses married Anita Manlangit in Bacolod
City. Thereafter, the couple stayed with Ulysses’s mother at the latter’s house at Bacolod
City. Later, Ulysses was assigned to Pagadian City. Meanwhile, his wife Anita secured a
teaching job in Catubig, Samar prompting her to leave Bacolod City and live in Samar.
After less than a year in Pagadian City, Ulysses was re-assigned to Bacolod City. And, in
December of 1978, he was able to buy for P1,500.00 a small house located near that of his
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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Case Digest
mother at Purok 5, Mansungay, Bacolod City. Then, in 1985, Ulysses took one Rosemarie
Gelogo as his mistress and brought her into the house. In time, improvements were made
on the house and the house was transformed into a 2-storey structure. After Ulysses’s
demise in January of 1992, his mistress Rosemarie Gelogo offered to sell the 2-storey
house for P80,000.00 to herein petitioner Bienvenido Gonzaludo, a.k.a. Ben Gonzaludo,
who lives just nearby. Since the house was being sold for a cheap price, petitioner
convinced the spouses Gregg Canlas and Melba Canlas, to whom he is related by affinity,
to buy the same. Herein, petitioner introduced the Canlases to Rosemarie Gelogo. In the
Deed of Sale, Rosemarie Gelogo signed as Rosemarie G. Villaflor and represented herself
to be the lawful owner of the 2-storey house. By virtue of the same deed, vendee Gregg
Canlas acquired all of Rosemarie’s rights and interest on the subject house.
Later, upon complaint of Ulysses’s widow Anita Manlangit, an Information dated May 31,
1994 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City charging Rosemarie Gelogo,
alias Rosemarie Villaflor, the spouses Gregg Canlas and Melba Canlas and petitioner with
the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document. The trial court acquitted the
Canlas spouses but convicted petitioner of the crime charged. The appellate affirmed the
trial court’s judgment of conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not Rosemarie Villaflor is guilty of the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of
Public Document as defined and punished under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315, Revised
Penal Code considering that the third element of the crime of Estafa is not present
Held:
The petition is partly impressed with merit. For an accused to be convicted of the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public document, all the elements of the two crimes
of estafa and falsification of public document must exist. There is no question that the first,
second and fourth elements are present: there was false or fraudulent misrepresentation by
Rosemarie Gelogo when she used the fictitious surname "Villaflor"; the misrepresentation
or false pretense was made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; and
private complainant Anita Manlangit’s right to the subject 2-storey house was lost or at the
very least prejudiced when Rosemarie sold it to the Canlases. It is petitioner’s thesis,
however, that there is here an absence of the third element contending that private
complainant Anita Manlangit, who was the offended party in this case, was never induced
to part with any money or property by means of fraud, committed simultaneously with the
false pretense or fraudulent representation by Rosemarie. The Court find merit in
petitioner’s submission. The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the settled
principle that the deceit, which must be prior to or simultaneously committed with the act
of defraudation, must be the efficient cause or primary consideration which induced the
offended party to part with his money or property and rule differently in the present case.
While it may be said that there was fraud or deceit committed by Rosemarie in this case,
when she used the surname "Villaflor" to give her semblance of authority to sell the subject
2-storey house, such fraud or deceit was employed upon the Canlas spouses who were the
ones who parted with their money when they bought the house. However, the Information
charging Rosemarie of estafa in the present case, alleged damage or injury not upon the
Canlas spouses, but upon private complainant, Anita Manlangit. Since the deceit or fraud
was not the efficient cause and did not induce Anita Manlangit to part with her property in
this case, Rosemarie cannot be held liable for estafa. With all the more reason must this be
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
for herein petitioner. The lack of criminal liability for estafa, however, will not necessarily
absolve petitioner from criminal liability arising from the charge of falsification of public
document under the same Information charging the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document.
It is settled doctrine that the conviction of an accused on one of the offenses included in a
complex crime charged, when properly established, despite the failure of evidence to hold
the accused of the other charge is legally feasible. As correctly found by the trial court,
petitioner conspired with Rosemarie to falsify, that is, by making untruthful statement in
the narration of facts in the deed of sale, by declaring Rosemarie to be the owner of the
house subject of such sale and signing as "Rosemarie Villaflor" instead of her real name,
Rosemarie Gelogo, in order to sell the same to the Canlas spouses. It is established by
evidence beyond reasonable doubt that Rosemarie committed the crime of falsification of
public document. Likewise, proof beyond reasonable doubt has been duly adduced to
establish conspiracy between Rosemarie and petitioner who is the brother-in-law of Melba
Canlas, one of the buyers of the house in this case. Petitioner is acquitted of the complex
crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Document, but found guilty of the crime of
Falsification of Public Document.
DELA CRUZ V. PEOPLE
Facts:
That on or about and during the period comprised from the month ofDecember 1994 to
January 1995, inclusive, or thereabouts in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Great Mandarin Villa
Seafoods Village, Inc., and Hock Wan Restaurant Corporation, in the following manner, to
wit: the said accused being then the payroll clerk of said Corporations, existing domestic
corporations primarily engaged in the restaurant business, with principal places of business
at 798 Ongpin St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, and 489 Nueva St., Binondo, Manila, respectively,
and by virtue of her position as such, received from said corporations in trust, during the
said period a total sum of P471,166.11 representing the excess amount paid to the
employees of said corporations as salaries under the obligation of accounting and turning
over the said excess to said corporations, but she did not do so in violation of the trust
relationship existing between her and said corporations, which amount, once in her
possession, far from complying with her obligation aforesaid, went into hiding and failed
and refused, and still fails and refuses to return the same whereby misappropriating,
misapplying and converting the said amount to her personal use and benefit to the damage
and prejudice of the said corporation represented by their common personnel manager
Manuel M. Matammu in the total amount of P471,166.11 Philippine Currency.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented against petititoner is sufficient to convict her guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence as charged in the
information
Whether or not formal demand is essential requisite in the crime of estafa with abuse of
confidence to sustain a judgment of conviction
Held:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
The court premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 May 2001 is
RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The questioned decision is hereby REVERSED.
Accused-petitioner Amelita dela Cruz is ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa defined under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The cash bond for the accused-petitioners provisional liberty is ordered returned to her,
subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures. Ominously, such bait, though
hearsay evidence, was acknowledged hook, line and sinker by the court a quo, and worse,
affirmed by the appellate court. Not even one iota of documentary or object evidence was
presented that would give a semblance of correctness to the actions of the said courts.
In sum, from the totality of evidence presented before the Court, it cannot, with propriety
and due respect for the law, be held that there is sufficiency of competent evidence on
which to base an affirmative finding of guilt in relation to the requisite degree of moral
certainty. Only the checks and acknowledged payroll slips were presented to show the
culpability of the accused-petitioner, and, sadly, said documentary evidence were the only
basis for the theory that there was an over-computation of the payrolls. What the trial court
used to convict the accused-petitioner are documents that had no direct relation to her. It
would have been different had the accused-petitioners computations been used as the basis
for comparing the acknowledged payroll slips. That way, it would be clearly shown that
she had over-computed the salaries due the employees to enable her to misappropriate said
excess.
In other words, the trial court failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accusedpetitioner over-computed the payroll and pocketed the excess money. The Court finds the
testimonies and documents for the prosecution rather weak. While there may be inherent
weaknesses for the defense, at most, the proofs in this case only cast suspicion on accusedpetitioner. The principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench and the bar that in this
jurisdiction, accusation is not synonymous with guilt. While the Court is not inclined to
hold that the evidence is conclusive that she is not guilty, neither is it convinced that she is
so, based on the circumstances of this case. The Court is, thus, under a long standing legal
injunction to resolve the doubt in favor of herein accused-petitioner. Undeniably, the
convergence of the circumstances vis--vis the evidence established by the prosecution,
especially the tenuous testimonies of the witnesses, must ineluctably result in a favorable
verdict for the defense.
PEOPLE V. JULIANO
Facts:
The accused purchased 190 sacks of milled rice from JCT Agro-Development Corporation
and in payment she issued a check for a value of P89,000, knowing at the time of issue that
she did not have funds with the drawee bank for payment of the said check. When
presented for encashment, it was dishonored by the bank for reason of insufficiency of
funds. On the following month the accused issued another check that was again dishonored
by the drawee bank for the same reason, to the damage and prejudice of JCT AgroDevelopment Corporation. The trial court found her guilty of violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) and Estafa. Appellant appealed her conviction for
estafa to the Court of Appeals, but still found her guilty, with intent to defraud and by
means of false pretense, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, committed the offenses.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Issue:
Whether the prosecution able to prove beyond reasonable doubt to convict the appellant for
estafa
Held:
The Court set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court and acquitted Lea Sagan
Juliano for the crime of estafa. The accused could not be found guilty of estafa in the
absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused employed deceit constituting
false pretenses or any fraudulent act. Nevertheless, appellant’s civil liability to JCT
remains, in the amount of P89,000, which is the value of the sack of rice she purchased.
PEOPLE V. CUYUGAN
Facts:
That on or about the 18th day of May 1994, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, Rica G.
Cuyugan, defrauded and deceived private Complainant Norma Abagat in the following
manner to wit: that said accused with intent to defraud and well knowing that her account
with the bank was already closed, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
make out and issue to private Complainant the several checks. in the total amount of
P396,000.00 simultaneous with the receipt by the accused of cash money from private
Complainant also in the total amount of P396,000.00 but which checks when presented to
the drawee bank on their maturity dates were promptly dishonored for reasons of Account
Closed and notwithstanding demands made on her, accused failed and refused and still
fails to redeem or make good the said checks face value thereof, to the damage and
prejudice of the private Complainant in the total aforesaid amount of P396,000.00. That on
or about the 12th day of May 1994, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused defrauded and deceived
private Complainant Norma Abagat in the following manner to wit: that the accused with
intent to defraud and well-knowing that her account with the bank has no sufficient funds,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out and issue to the private Complainant Far
East Bank and Trust Company Check No. 03A058532P postdated June 10, 1994 in the
amount of P150,000.00 simultaneous with, for and in consideration of cash money from
private Complainant in the total amount of P150,000.00 but which check when presented
to the drawee bank on maturity date was promptly dishonored for reason of Drawn Against
Insufficient Funds (DAIF) and notwithstanding demands on her, accused failed and refused
and still fails and refuses to redeem or make good the said check or its value, to the
damage and prejudice of the private Complainant in the total aforesaid amount of
P150,000.00.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is liable for the crime of estafa
Held:
The judgment dated December 20, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch
117, finding appellant RICA G. CUYUGAN, liable for three counts of estafa
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is ACQUITTED, for lack of sufficient
evidence to prove fraud beyond reasonable doubt.However, she is ordered to pay private
complainants the balance of her obligation The transaction between appellant and the
Abagat spouses, in our view, was one for a loan of money to be used by appellant in her
business and she issued checks to guarantee the payment of the loan. As such, she has the
obligation to make good the payment of the money borrowed by her. But such obligation is
civil in character and in the absence of fraud, no criminal liability under the Revised Penal
Code arises from the mere issuance of postdated checks as a guarantee of repayment. We
find appellants allegation, that the Abagat spouses entered into a joint venture agreement
with her for the supply of materials with the AFP, is self-serving. But we also note that the
trial court convicted appellant on a general allegation that all the elements of estafa under
Article 315, 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code had been proved by the prosecution without
making any reference to or giving any proof of the actual fraud that appellant allegedly
committed to make her liable for estafa. It is elementary that where an allegation in the
information is an essential element of the crime, the same must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction. In this case, the prosecution did not establish
specifically and conclusively the fraud alleged as an element of the offenses charged.
PEOPLE V. REMULLO
Facts:
That in or about and during the months from March to May 1993, in the Municipality of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above named accused, falsely representing herself to have the capacity and power to
contract, enlist and recruit workers for job/placement abroad, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously collect for a fee, recruit and promise employment job
placement abroad to the complainants, ROSARIO CADACIO, JENELYN QUINSAAT and
HONORINA MEJIA, without first securing the required license or authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment, thus committing illegal recruitment in large scale
in violation of [Article 38(2) in relation to Article 39 (b) of the Labor Code]. That in or
about and during the months from March to May 1993 in the Municipality of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused, by means of false pretenses and fraudulent representation made
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, with intent to defraud the
complainant JENELYN QUINSAAT to the effect that she would send her abroad for the
purpose of employment and would need certain amount for the expenses in the processing
of papers thereof, which representations the accused well knew was (sic) false and
fraudulent and was only made by her to induce said complainant to give and pay, as in fact
the latter gave and paid to her the amount of P15,000.00 which the accused once in
possession of the said amount, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
appropriate and convert to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice
of the complainant JENELYN QUINSAAT in the aforementioned amount of P15,000.00.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty for large scale illegal recruitment
Held:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch
132, is hereby AFFIRMED. In Criminal Case No. 95-653, for illegal recruitment in large
scale, appellant NIMFA REMULLO is found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P100,000; and in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-654, 95-655 and 95-656 for
estafa, she is declared guilty sentenced in each case to two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) one day of prision mayor,
and to pay by way of restitution P15,000 to each of the private complainants, Jenelyn
Quinsaat, Rosario Cadacio and Honorina Mejia, together with the costs. Anent appellants
conviction for estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-654 to 95-656, we find no error committed
by the trial court. Their conviction and sentence are fully supported by the evidence on
record. For charges of estafa to prosper, the following elements must be present: (1) that
the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (2) that
damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or
third person. In this case, appellant clearly defrauded private complainants by deceiving
them into believing that she had the power and authority to send them on jobs abroad. By
virtue of appellants false representations, private complainants each parted with their hardearned money. Each complainant paid P15,000 as recruitment fee to appellant, who then
appropriated the money for her own use and benefit, but failed utterly to provide overseas
job placements to the complainants. In a classic rigmarole, complainants were provided
defective visas, brought to the airport with their passports and tickets, only to be offloaded
that day, but with promises to be booked in a plane flight on another day. The recruits wait
in vain for weeks, months, even years, only to realize they were gypped, as no jobs await
them abroad. No clearer cases of estafa could be imagined than those for which appellant
should be held criminally responsible
GUINHAWA V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Jaime Guinhawa was engaged in the business of selling brand new motor vehicles,
including Mitsubishi vans, under the business name of Guinrox Motor Sales. His office
and display room for cars were located along Panganiban Avenue, Naga City. He employed
Gil Azotea as his sales manager. On March 17, 1995, Guinhawa purchased a brand new
Mitsubishi L-300 Versa Van and from the Union Motors Corporation (UMC) in Paco,
Manila. Guinhawas driver, Leopoldo Olayan, drove the van from Manila to Naga City.
However, while the van was traveling along the highway in Labo, Daet, Camarines Norte,
Olayan suffered a heart attack. The van went out of control, traversed the highway onto the
opposite lane, and was ditched into the canal parallel to the highway. The van was
damaged, and the left front tire had to be replaced. Josephine Silo filed a complaint for the
rescission of the sale and the refund of their money before the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI). During the confrontation between her and Guinhawa, Josephine learned
that Guinhawa had bought the van from UMC before it was sold to them, and after it was
damaged in Daet. Subsequently, the spouses Silo withdrew their complaint from the DTI.
On February 14, 1996, Josephine Silo filed a criminal complaint for violation of paragraph
1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code against Guinhawa in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Naga City.
Issue:
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Whether or not under the Information, the petitioner was charged of other deceits under
paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code
Held:
The petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. Considering the surrounding circumstances of the case, the petitioner is
hereby sentenced to suffer a straight penalty of six (6) months imprisonment. The
petitioner shall suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. It bears stressing that
Azotea and the petitioner had every opportunity to reveal to the private complainant that
the van was defective. They resolved to maintain their silence, to the prejudice of the
private complainant, who was a garment merchant and who had no special knowledge of
parts of motor vehicles. Based on the surrounding circumstances, she relied on her belief
that the van was brand new. In fine, she was the innocent victim of the petitioners
fraudulent nondisclosure or concealment. The petitioner cannot pin criminal liability for
his fraudulent omission on his general manager, Azotea. The two are equally liable for their
collective fraudulent silence. Case law has it that wherever the doing of a certain act or the
transaction of a given affair, or the performance of certain business is confided to an agent,
the authority to so act will, in accordance with a general rule often referred to, carry with it
by implication the authority to do all of the collateral acts which are the natural and
ordinary incidents of the main act or business authorized.
ARSON
PEOPLE V. BALUNTONG
Facts:
Ferdinand Baluntong set on fire, the house of Celerina Solangon, causing the complete
destruction of the saidhouse and the death of Celerina Solangon and Alvin Savarez, and
inflicting serious physical injuries on JoshuaSavarez, thereby performing all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime of murder as a consequence but which,
nevertheless do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator. The Trial Court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of double murder and frustrated murder. He is sentenced to suffer the supreme
penalty of death. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but in light
of the passage of R.A. 9346, it reduced the sentence from death to reclusion perpetua.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts correct in charging the accused the complex crime of double
murder and frustrated murder
Held:
The Court of Appeals Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE , and a NEW one is
rendered findingappellant, Ferdinand T. Baluntong, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Simple Arson under Sec. 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
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reclusion p er p etua with no eligibility for parole and other civil damages modified. The
assailed CA decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a NEW one is
rendered as follows: Appellant, Ferdinand T. Baluntong, is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Simple Arson under Sec. 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole. Appellant is
ORDERED to pay the damages and other expenses. How Felicitas acquired such
knowledge was not probed into, however, despite the fact that she was cross-examined
thereon. Absent any concrete basis then to hold that the house was set on fire to kill the
occupants, appellant cannot be held liable for double murder with frustrated murder. This
is especially true with respect to the death of Celerina, for even assuming arguendo that
appellant wanted to kill her to get even with her in light of her alleged desire to drive him
out of the neighboring house, Celerina was outside the house at the time it was set on
fire. She merely entered the burning house to save her grandsons.While the above-quoted
Information charged appellant with Double Murder with Frustrated Murder, appellant may
be convicted of Arson. For the only difference between a charge for Murder under Article
248 (3) of the Revised Penal Code and one for Arson under the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 3 (2) of P.D. No. 1613, lies in the intent in pursuing the act. As
reflected above, as it was not shown that the main motive was to kill the occupants of the
house, the crime would only be arson, the homicide being a mere consequence thereof,
hence, absorbed by arson.
When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and
that proved, and the offense charged is included or necessarily includes the offense proved,
conviction shall be for the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
PEOPLE V. MURCIA
Facts:
That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, in the Municipality of Bauang, Province of
La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab with a knife one, Alicia Q. Manlupig inflicting upon the latter stab
wounds, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it be reason of causes
independent of the will; that is, by the timely medical attendance rendered to said Alicia Q.
Manlupig which prevented her death, all to the damage and prejudice of said offended
party. Appellant was the lone witness for the defense. He stated that while he was having a
drinking spree, he saw Felicidad go inside the house to get a glass of water. He followed
her and gave her water. He noticed Felicidad light a gas lamp. He then went back to his
friends and resumed drinking. He got into a heated argument with Herminio. The latter
struck him in the head. He immediately went inside the house to get a weapon. He was
able to get a bolo, went back outside and hit Herminio. The latter ran away and appellant
chased him. Appellant met Alicia and confronted her about the actuations of Herminio. But
Alicia cursed him. Appellant thereafter hit her with the knife. Appellant then fell on the
ground and lost consciousness because, apparently, he was struck by something in the
back. Appellant denied setting the house on fire. On 30 May 2006, decision was rendered
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by the RTC, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson and frustrated
homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of Arson and frustrated homicide
Held:
The appealed decision finding appellant JESSIE VILLEGAS MURCIA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of arson and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant imputes ill-motive on the part
of Herminio. This Court does not discount the fact that there was a fight between appellant
and Herminio which preceded the occurrence of the fire. However, it cannot be presumed
that Herminio will automatically give a false testimony against appellant. His testimony,
having withstood cross-examination, has passed the scrutiny of the lower courts and was
held to be credible. The lower courts found appellant liable under Article 320(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7659. It may not be
amiss to point out that there are actually two categories of arson, namely: Destructive
Arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code and Simple Arson under Presidential
Decree No. 1316. Said classification is based on the kind, character and location of the
property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused. Article 320 contemplates
the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices,
trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial
establishments by any person or group of persons. On the other hand, Presidential Decree
No. 1316 covers houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations,
railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments
PEOPLE V. MALINGAN
Facts:
From the personal account of Remigio Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman in the area, as
well as the personal account of the pedicab driver named Rolando Gruta, it was at around
4:45 a.m. on January 2, 2001 when Remigio Bernardo and his tanods saw the accusedappellant EDNA, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto Separa, Sr., with her head turning
in different directions, hurriedly leaving the house of her employer at No. 172 Moderna
Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila. She was seen to have boarded a pedicab which was driven by
a person later identified as Rolando Gruta. She was heard by the pedicab driver to have
instructed that she be brought to Nipa Street, but upon her arrival there, she changed her
mind and asked that she be brought instead to Balasan Street where she finally alighted,
after paying for her fare. Thirty minutes later, at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay Chairman
Bernardos group later discovered that a fire gutted the house of the employer of the
housemaid. Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods responded to the fire upon
hearing shouts from the residents and thereafter, firemen from the Fire District 1-NCR
arrived at the fire scene to contain the fire. When Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to
the Barangay Hall, he received a report from pedicab driver Rolando Gruta, who was also
a tanod, that shortly before the occurrence of the fire, he saw a woman (the housemaid)
coming out of the house at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila and he received
a call from his wife telling him of a woman (the same housemaid) who was acting
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strangely and suspiciously on Balasan Street. Barangay Chairman Bernardo, Rolando
Gruta and the other tanods proceeded to Balasan Street and found the woman who was
later identified as the accused-appellant. After Rolando Gruta positively identified the
woman as the same person who left No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila,
Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods apprehended her and brought her to the
Barangay Hall for investigation. At the Barangay Hall, Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of
Roberto Separa, Sr. and whose house was also burned, identified the woman as accusedappellant EDNA who was the housemaid of Roberto Separa, Sr. Upon inspection, a
disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellant EDNAs bag. Thereafter, accusedappellant EDNA confessed to Barangay Chairman Bernardo in the presence of multitudes
of angry residents outside the Barangay Hall that she set her employers house on fire
because she had not been paid her salary for about a year and that she wanted to go home
to her province but her employer told her to just ride a broomstick in going home.
Accused-appellant EDNA was then turned over to arson investigators headed by
S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan, who brought her to the San Lazaro Fire Station in Sta.
Cruz, Manila where she was further investigated and then detained
Issue:
Whether or not there is a complex crime of arson and homicide
Held:
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 2 September 2005, in CA G.R. CR HC No.
01139, is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the conviction of accused-appellant EDNA
MALNGAN Y MAYO is concerned. The sentence to be imposed and the amount of
damages to be awarded, however, are MODIFIED. In accordance with Sec. 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 1613, accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION
PERPETUA. In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what
crime/crimes was/were perpetrated ± whether arson, murder or arson and
homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor:(a) if the
main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on
the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson , and the resulting homicide is absorbed;
(b) if, on the other hand, the m ain objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a
building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime
committed is murder only; lastly,(c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person,
and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up
the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed homicide/ murder
and arson.
PEOPLE V. OLIVA
Facts:
August 23, 1993, at around eleven o'clock in the evening, Avelino Manguba (hereinafter
referred to as "Avelino") and his family were sleeping in their house in San Jose, Claveria,
Cagayan. Avelino went out of the house to urinate. He saw Ferigel set the roof of their
house on fire with a lighted match. Awakened by the loud barking of dogs, Avelino's wife
sensed danger and peeped through a hole in their wall. She also saw Ferigel burn the roof
of their house. She shouted, "Perry is burning our house!" and called out to the neighbors
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for help. While the fire razed Avelino's house, Ferigel and three others, Dominador Oliva,
Marcos Paderan and Arnel Domingo watched at a distance of about five (5) meters. One of
the neighbors, Benjamin Estrellon (hereinafter referred to as "Benjamin") went to the
nearby river and fetched water with a pail. As Benjamin was helping put out the fire, he
was shot by Ferigel at close range. Benjamin tried to run, but he slumped and fell to the
ground. The gunshot wound caused Benjamin's death. Avelino, his wife, and Benjamin's
son, Noel, witnessed the shooting since they were only about five (5) to six (6) meters
away from Ferigel when the incident occurred. The place was brightly lit by the burning
roof and visibility was not a problem. On August 24, 1993, a post-mortem report was made
on Benjamin's cadaver, revealing the following: "II POSTMORTEM FINDINGS:
"Cadaver is in a state of rigor mortis and with postmortem lividity at back."Gunshot wound
of entrance 0.9 cm. at left lateral mid-scapular area going medially and anterosuperiorily,
10 cms. deep without exit.""III. CAUSE OF DEATH "Internal Hemorrhage due to gunshot
wound at back."
Issue:
Whether or not that the testimonies should be taken into consideration, same with alibi and
defense
Held:
Whether or not Benjamin was shot while he was on the street or when he was in the act of
pouring water on the burning roof is irrelevant to the crime. We agree with the Solicitor
General that Benjamin could have been on the street while pouring water on the burning
roof. The two testimonies were not inconsistent. Also whether or not Benjamin
immediately fell or tried to run away after he was shot is not important. The fact is that he
was shot; any act of his after he was shot would not change the shooting, which at that
point was fait accompli. Equally insignificant is whether the gun used was a long firearm
or a short firearm. Identification of the weapon only becomes critical when there is doubt
as to the identity of the assailant. In this case, the trial court did not doubt the identity, and
neither would we. There are 2 elements of arson: (1) that there is intentional burning; (2)
that what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Proof of corpus delicti
is indispensable in prosecution for felonies and offense. Corpus delicti is the body or
substance of the crime. It refers to the fact that a crime has actually been committed.
Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime that may be proved by the
testimonies of the witnesses. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the
bare occurrence of the fire and of its having been intentionally caused. The uncorroborated
testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, may be enough to prove the corpus delicti and
to warrant conviction. Here, corpus delicti of the arson and murder was duly proven
beyond reasonable doubt
PEOPLE V. ACOSTA
Facts:
Appellant Raul Acosta y Laygo was a 38-year old mason, married, and a resident of Barrio
Makatipo, Kalookan City, at the time of the offense charged. He used to be a good friend
of Almanzor "Elmer" Montesclaros, the grandson of private complainant, Filomena M.
Marigomen. On February 27, 1996, a few hours before the fire, Montesclaros, in the belief
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that appellant and his wife were the ones hiding his live-in partner from him, stormed the
house of appellant and burned their clothes, furniture, and appliances. Montesclaros lived
in the house owned by said complainant and located at Banahaw St., Mountain Heights
Subdivision, Barrio Makatipo, Kalookan City. It was this house allegedly set on fire by
appellant. At about 4:00 to 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of February 27, 1996, the nephew
of prosecution witness Mona Aquino called the latter, simultaneously shouting that
appellant Raul Acosta, their neighbor, was carrying a stove and a kitchen knife. She went
out of her house and approached appellant who, when asked why he was carrying a stove
and a knife, replied that he would burn the house of complainant Filomena M. Marigomen.
Owing to the fearsome answer of appellant to witness Aquino’s query, she returned
immediately to her house. A few minutes after closing the door, she heard the sound of
broken bottles and the throwing of chair inside the house of complainant. When she peeped
through her kitchen door, she saw appellant inside complainant’s house, which was
unoccupied at that time. Thereafter, appellant poured kerosene on the bed (papag) and
lighted it with cigarette lighter. The fire was easily put off by appellant’s wife who arrived
at the place.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of arson.
Held:
In this case, we find the trial court correctly held that the following circumstances taken
together constitute an unbroken chain of events pointing to one fair and logical conclusion,
that accused started the fire which gutted the house of private complainant. Although there
is no direct evidence linking appellant to the arson, we agree with the trial court in holding
him guilty thereof in the light of the following circumstances duly proved and on record:
First, appellant had the motive to commit the arson. It is not absolutely necessary, and it is
frequently impossible for the prosecution to prove the motive of the accused for the
commission of the crime charged, nevertheless in a case of arson like the present, the
existence or non-existence of a sufficient motive is a fact affecting the credibility of the
witnesses. Appellant had every reason to feel aggrieved about the incident and to retaliate
in kind against Montesclaros and his grandmother. Second, appellant’s intent to commit the
arson was established by his previous attempt to set on fire a bed ("papag") inside the same
house (private complainant’s) which was burned later in the night. Prosecution witness
Mona Aquino testified that at around 5:00 in the afternoon of the same day, she saw
appellant carrying a gas stove and knife
BELTRAN V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Petitioner was married to Charmaine Felix on June 16, 1973. After 24 years of marriage
and having four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on ground of
psychological incapacity. Charmaine on the other hand filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage against petitioner and his paramour. To forestall the issuance of a warrant of
arrest from the criminal complaint, petitioner filed for the suspension of the criminal case
on concubinage arguing that the civil case for the nullification of their marriage is a
prejudicial question.
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Case Digest
Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage under psychological incapacity is a
prejudicial question to the criminal case of concubinage.
Held:
The rationale on the existence of prejudicial questions is to avoid two conflicting issues. Its
requisites are 1) that a civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue in the criminal action and 2) the resolution of the issue determines whether or not the
criminal action will proceed. In the present case, the accused need not present a final
judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of
the nullity of his marriage other than the proof of a final judgment. More importantly,
parties to a marriage should not be allowed to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the competent courts. So long as there is no such final judgment the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore he who
cohabits with a woman not his wife risks being prosecuted for concubinage.
VERA NERI V. PEOPLE
Facts:
: Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Benguet against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo in the City of
Baguio. On November 2, 1982, accused, Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri in the company of Mrs.
Linda Sare and witness Jabunan, took the morning plane to Baguio. Arriving at around
11:00 a.m., they dropped first at the house of Mrs. Vera, mother of Ruby Vera at Crystal
Cave, Baguio City then proceeded to the Mines View Park Condominium of the Neri
spouses. At around 7:00 o' clock in the evening, accused Eduardo Arroyo arrived at the
Neris' condominium. Witness opened the door for Arroyo who entered, he went down to
and knocked at the master's bedroom where accused Ruby Vera Neri and her companion
Linda Sare were. On accused Ruby Vera Neri's request, Linda Sare left the master's
bedroom and went upstairs to the sala leaving the two accused. About forty-five minutes
later, Arroyo Jr. came up and told Linda Sare that she could already come down. Three of
them, thereafter, went up to the sala then left the condominium. Petitioner Arroyo filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' Decision. Petitioner Ruby Vera Neri
also moved for reconsideration or a new trial, contending that a pardon had been extended
by her husband, private complainant Dr. Jorge B. Neri, and that her husband had later on
traded marriage with another woman with whom he is presently co-habiting. Both motions
were denied by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not Dr. Neri’s alleged extra-marital affair precludes him from filing the
criminal complaint on the ground of pari delicto.
Held:
The concept of pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code, but only in Article
1411 of the Civil Code. The Court notes that Article 1411 of the Civil Code relates only to
contracts with illegal consideration. The case at bar does not involve any illegal contract
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Case Digest
which either of the contracting parties is now seeking 171 | P a g e Background image of
page 171 to enforce. In the Guinucud case, the Court found that the complaining husband,
by entering into an agreement with his wife that each of them were to live separately and
could marry other persons and by filing complaint only about a year after discovering his
wife's infidelity, had "consented to, and acquiesced in, the adulterous relations existing
between the accused, and he is therefore, not authorized by law to institute the criminal
proceedings.
ACTS OF LASCIVOUSNESS
AMPLOYO V. PEOPLE
Facts:
: Alvin Amployo was charged with violation of RA 7610 for touching, mashing and
playing the breasts of Kristine Joy Mosguera, an 8 year old Grade 3 pupil without her
consent. Amployo contends that the element of lewd design was not established since: (1)
the incident happened at 7am, in a street near the school with people around; (2) the breast
of an 8 year old is still very much underdeveloped; and (3) suppose h intentionally touched
her breast, it was merely to satisfy a silly whim. He also argues that the resultant crime is
only acts of lasciviousness under Art 336 RPC and not child abuse under RA 7610 as the
elements thereof had not been proved.
Issue:
Whether or not lewd design was established; Amployo violated RA 7610.
Held:
Before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct on a minor
below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 of Rep. Act
No. 7610.The first element is lewd design.
The term ‘lewd is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene;[12] it is
characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an accused is entertaining a
lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a mental process the existence of which can be
inferred by overt acts carrying out such intention,i.e., by conduct that can only be
interpreted as lewd or lascivious. The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from
the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances. What is or what is
not lewd conduct, by its very nature, cannot be pigeonholed into a precise definition.
Lewd design was established. Amployo cannot take refuge in his version of the story as he
has conveniently left out details which indubitably prove the presence of lewd design. It
would have been easy to entertain the possibility that what happened was merely an
accident if it only happened once. Such is not the case, however, as the very same
petitioner did the very same act to the very same victim in the past.
The first element of RA 7610 obtains. petitioner’s act of purposely touching Kristine Joy’s
breasts (sometimes under her shirt) amounts to lascivious conduct.
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Case Digest
The second element is likewise present. As we observed in People v. Larin,[24] Section 5
of Rep. Act No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit,
but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or
intimidation. As case law has it, intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. As to the
third element, there is no dispute that Kristine Joy is a minor, as she was only eight years
old at the time of the incident in question.
PEOPLE V. MONTERON
Facts:
On March 7, 1996, at 12:10 p.m., fifteen year-old Mary Ann Martenez was walking home
from Wangan National Agricultural School, Davao City. While she was walking on a
secluded portion of the road, Mary Ann was hit on the head by a slingshot. She turned to
see where the stone came from, she was hit again on the mouth. She fell down
unconscious.[2] When Mary Ann came to, she found herself lying on the grass naked.
Accused-appellant was lying on top of her, also naked. She struggled but accusedappellant, who was stronger, restrained her.[3] He placed his penis on top of her vagina,
which caused her to feel pain. She frantically grabbed his erect penis and pushed it away
from her. This caused accused-appellant to stand up in pain. Mary Ann ran towards the
road while putting on her clothes. Mary Anns cousin, Arnel Arat, witnessed the whole
incident as he was then walking to Wangan Agricultural School. He met Mary Ann while
the latter was running away and brought her home. When they got home, Mary Ann told
her uncle what happened. Her uncle, in turn, told her mother. That afternoon, upon
complaint of Mary Ann, the Calinan Police Precinct arrested accused-appellant. The
following morning, Mary Ann was brought to the City Health Office of Davao City where
she was examined by Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma. The latter found that Mary Anns hymen was
intact and had no laceration, but her labia minora was coaptated and her labia majora was
gaping.[4] On March 12, 1996, accused-appellant was formally charged with rape. At his
arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty.[5] After trial, the lower court
convicted him of the crime of rape
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape.
Held:
The decision is is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Marianito Monteron y Pantoras is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Rape and is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. Further, accusedappellant is ordered to pay the victim, Mary Ann Martenez, the sums of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P25,000.00 as moral damages. Accused-appellant also contends that it was
unlikely for him to strip naked and commit rape in broad daylight. In this connection,
suffice it to say that lust is no respecter of time and place. It is known to happen in the
most unlikely places such as parks, along roadsides, within school premises or even
occupied rooms. Rape has also been committed on a passageway and at noontime.
While accused-appellant is guilty of rape, the same was committed only in its attempted
stage. Mary Ann clearly testified that accused-appellant only placed his penis on top of her
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vagina. In fact, she was able to grab it and push it away from her, causing accusedappellant to stand up. The pain she felt may have been caused by accused-appellants
attempts to insert his organ into hers. However, the fact remains, based on Mary Anns own
narrative, that accused-appellants penis was merely on top of her vagina and has not
actually entered the same.Accused-appellant has commenced the commission of the rape
directly by overt acts, i.e., that of undressing himself and the victim and lying on top of
her, but he did not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In the case at
bar, it was Mary Anns violent resistance which prevented the insertion of accusedappellants penis in her vagina.
PEOPLE V. PEREZ
Facts:
At about 6:00 A.M. on May 31, 1990, Manuel Perez woke up Jennifer who lying asleep on
the cemented floor of the house. The door and the windows of the house were closed.
Manuel Perez ordered Jennifer to remain lying down on the cemented floor and began
undressing Jennifer. Manuel then kissed the cheeks of Jennifer. He proceeded to kiss and
touch the breasts of Jennifer as well as the upper part of Jennifers body. Manuel, who was
dressed in short pants, did not remove the same but he unzipped the zipper of his short
pants. He pulled the legs of Jennifer apart and placed himself on top of the body of
Jennifer. He then inserted his private part inside the private part of Jennifer. All this time
Jennifer protested and complained of pain but was unable to resist because Manuel
threatened to kill her. After satisfying his lust, Manuel again threatened Jennifer not to tell
anybody about what happened to her. Jennifer left the house after the incident and
proceeded to the nearby house of her aunt, Othelia Marco, who was then out of the
house. Jennifer glanced at the clock in Othelias house and found out that it was 6:00 A.M.
in the morning of May 31, 1990. Jennifer remained outside the house until Manuel called
her later on to clean the bleedings.
It was not until June 3, 1990 that Jennifer disclosed her harrowing experience to a certain
Malou (Marilou Castellano), a kumadre of her mother, who was then staying with
them. Malou promised to help her. She brought her to the Navotas Police Station in order
to report the rape incident. The Navotas police, however, told them to report the matter to
the Malabon Police Station. Malou and Jennifer then proceeded there, but they were
advised that the matter fell under the jurisdiction of the Kalookan City police force. Malou
and the victim, however, did not proceed to the Kalookan City police force as it was
already late in the evening.
The next day, Jennifer reported the incident to her aunts, Othelia Marco and Myrna
Casapao. They then accompanied Jennifer and Malou to the Kalookan City police station,
where Jennifer filed a complaint for rape against appellant. After the police investigation,
Jennifer was advised to go to the then-Philippine Constabulary (PC) Crime Laboratory in
Camp Crame, Quezon City for a physical examination. However, it was only on June 13,
1990, that Jennifer submitted herself to a physical examination.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape
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Decision:
The decision is finding appellant Manuel Perez y Magpantay guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED
WITH THE MODIFICATION that appellant is also ordered to pay the victim, Jennifer
Dimaano y Casapao. Having examined the entire record, we find that the totality of the
evidence presented by the prosecution proves beyond doubt all the elements of rape.
Private complainant testified as to how appellant had carnal knowledge of her. The carnal
knowledge took place under circumstances of violence and intimidation. Her testimony is
supported by the results of the medico-legal examination conducted upon her at the police
crime laboratory. Moreover, she positively pointed to appellant in open court as the person
responsible for her defilement. Against said positive identification, appellants puerile
defense of denial will not hold water, for he does not even deny that he was with the
offended party at the time of the commission of the crime. Moreover, his attempts to cast
ill motive on private complainant or her family for fabricating the charge of rape against
him have no evidentiary weight. It would be most unnatural for a young and immature girl
to fabricate a story of rape by her mothers common-law spouse; allow a medical
examination of her genitalia; and subject herself to a public trial and possible ridicule, all
because her maternal relatives want her mother to separate from her common-law spouse.
Perforce, appellants conviction must stand.
PEOPLE V. COLLADO
Facts:
TO TIE A CHILD of tender years spread-eagled to her bed to abuse her in the privacy of
her home is despicable enough; to encroach on her innocence unashamedly in front of her
younger brother is to descend to the deepest recesses of depravity. Thus the incorrigible
lothario transgressed all norms of decency, morality and rectitude when he molested his
nine (9)-year old victim in the presence of her six (6)-year old brother and severed all
strands of gratefulness to her parents who gave him food, shelter and livelihood for four
(4) years. Messeah is the daughter of Jose Noli Dumaoal, a seaman. His household was
composed of his wife Julie, and their three (3) children, Reggie, Messeah and Metheor. The
accused Jessie Ventura Collado, son of Jose Nolis cousin Benjamin, was living with them
since 1989. While waiting for an opportunity to become a seaman himself like his uncle
Jose, Jessie served as the family driver. Aside from driving Julie, Jessie would also drive
the school service vehicle operated by the Dumaoal spouses. Since Jose was almost always
at sea and having no househelp, their children were oftentimes left in the care of
Jessie. But, instead of taking care of them as their surrogate father, he took advantage of
Messeah by sexually molesting her at home, and worse, even in the presence of her
younger brother. There were four unfortunate occasions that constituted the crime.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape
Held:
The court finding accused-appellant JESSIE VENTURA COLLADO guilty of Statutory
Rape and three (3) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness in is MODIFIED. Messeahs failure to
reveal the sexual abuses to her mother does not taint her credibility. Her silence was
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impelled by both fear for her life and shame for the degradation that had befallen her. It is
not uncommon for a young girl of tender age to be intimidated into silence by the mildest
threat against her life. Silence is not an odd behavior of a rape victim. In fact, the burden of
keeping such a secret took its toll on her health. Jose Noli testified that when he arrived for
a vacation in August 1993, he noticed that his children looked blank and pale, especially
Messeah who looked thin, complained of dizziness and headaches and sometimes threw
up. He and his wife had brought Messeah to several doctors, before one finally diagnosed
Messeah as suffering from nervous breakdown and psychological trauma.
The rule is that affirmative testimony is far weightier than a mere denial, especially when it
comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Jessie's alibi that he was driving the family
car on the disputed occasions cannot stand up to his positive identification as the
perpetrator of the crime by both Messeah and Metheor. Neither can we believe Jessie's
allegation that Julie only wanted him out of their house because she favored her own
relative over him. No mother in her right mind would subject her child to the humiliation,
disgrace and trauma attendant to a prosecution for rape, if she were not motivated solely by
the desire to incarcerate the person responsible for her child's defilement. Furthermore, it is
highly improbable that a rape victim and her family would publicly disclose the incident
and thus sully their honor and reputation in the community unless the charge is true. In
fact, if Julie only wanted Jessie out of her house, then why would the Dumaoal family file
the complaints against him only on 13 April 1994, when it is clear that he had already left
the household as early as 22 October 1993. Neither does this explain why the Dumaoal
spouses felt compelled to change residences in such a short period of time. As Jose Noli
testified, they made the move even before All Saints Day, which shows that they left their
familiar surroundings and uprooted their family all within ten (10) days just so they could
ensure Messeahs safety.
Moreover, we agree with the Solicitor General that the only reason why the Dumaoal
spouses agreed to let Jessie go home to the province instead of filing charges against him
was because they were "torn between seeking justice for their daughter and preserving her
and the familys reputation. There was also the Christian desire to forgive and give a blood
kin a new chance at life knowing the gravity of the penalty that would be meted out to
him. To interpret their actuation any other way would be most unfair to parents who are
equally suffering with what befell their only daughter.
DULLA V. CA
Facts:
On February 2, 1993, Andrea, who was then three years old, came home crying, with
bruises on her right thigh. She told her guardian, Iluminada Beltran, that her uncle, herein
petitioner, touched her private part. In her own words, she said, "Inaano ako
ng uncle ko," while doing a pumping motion with the lower part of her body to
demonstrate what had been done to her. She also said that petitioner showed his penis to
her. The matter was reported to Barangay Councilor Carlos Lumaban who, with the child,
the latter’s guardian, and three barangay tanods, went to the house of petitioner to confront
him. As petitioner’s father refused to surrender his son to Lumaban and his party, Lumaban
sought assistance from the nearby Western Police District (WPD) Station No. 7. It appears;
however, that petitioner took advantage of the situation and ran away. Upon arraignment,
petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge of rape, whereupon trial ensued. In her
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testimony in court, Andrea said that petitioner fondled her organ and showed her his penis.
She said that when petitioner did a pumping motion, she had no panties on and that she
was lying down. Petitioner was also lying down, according to her. The medical report on
Andrea prepared by Dr. Maximo Reyes, who examined the child on February 3, 1993,
showed that hymen of the victim is still intact.
Petitioner, on the other hand, denied the accusation against him. He said that Andrea was
coached by her guardian. He likewise denied that he escaped from Lumaban and his men
on February 2, 1993, and said that he only went away to avoid any trouble that time. The
trial court found petitioner guilty of acts of lasciviousness hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether Andrea is a competent witness.
Held:
The contention has no merit. As a general rule, all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Under Rule 130,
Section 21 of the Rules of Court, only children who, on account of immaturity, are
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them
truthfully are disqualified from being witnesses. In People v. Mendoza, the Court held:
It is thus clear that any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others and of relating
truthfully facts respecting which he is examined.The requirements then of a child’s
competency as a witness are the following:(a) Capacity of observation,(b) Capacity of
recollection(c) Capacity of communication. And in ascertaining whether a child is of
sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing, it is settled that the trial court is called
upon to make such determination.
In the case at bar, Andrea was three years and 10 months old at the time she testified.
Despite her young age, however, she was able to respond to the questions put to her. She
answered "yes" and "no" to questions and, when unable to articulate what was done to her
by petitioner, Andrea demonstrated what she meant. During her interrogation, she showed
an understanding of what was being asked. She was consistent in her answers to the
questions asked by the prosecutor, the defense counsel, and even by the judge.
PEOPLE V. JAVIER
Facts:
Julia Ratunil Javier, a 16-year old girl, was raped three times by her father, Amado
Sandrias Javier, one on October 20, 1994 and sometime on November, 1994 and
December, 1994, which resulted to Julia’s pregnancy.
Three complaints were filed. The trial court found Amado guilty of the crime of incestuous
rape in the first complaint and sentenced to death. Upon failure of the prosecution to prove
the use of force by Amado in the second and third complaints, he was just convicted of
qualified seduction.
Issue:
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Whether or not the conviction for qualified seduction is proper in the complaint for the
crime of rape?
Held:
No. Assuming that the prosecution failed to prove the use of force by accused, the latter
cannot be convicted of qualified seduction. It is only when the complaint for rape contains
allegations for qualified seduction that the accused may be convicted of the latter in case
the prosecution fails to prove the use of force by the accused (People vs. Antido, 278
SCRA 425 [1997]). To do otherwise would be violating the constitutional rights of the
accused to due process and to be informed of the accusation against him. The accused
charged with rape cannot be convicted of qualified seduction under the same information
(People vs. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144 [1976]). Then, too, rape and qualified seduction are not
identical offenses. While the two felonies have one common element which is carnal
knowledge of a woman, they significantly vary in all other respects (Gonzales vs. Court of
Appeals, 232 SCRA 667 [1994]).
PEOPLE V. MANANSALA
Facts:
Jennifer Manansala, a 14-year old girl, was raped eight times by her father, a 44-year old
“taho” vendor, Rodante Manansala, on November of 1991. On direct examination, Jennifer
testified that she was raped eight times in the “taho” factory in Tondo, the workplace of her
father. On cross examination, however, Jennifer changed her statement that the first rape
incident was committed in the “taho” factory in Tondo but the rest of the seven rape
incidents were committed in Tarlac. She also mentioned that her father gave her money
every time they had sexual intercourse. The trial court found Rodante Manansala guilty of
having raped his daughter in Manila but dismissed those committed in Tarlac on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape or quite possibly, the crime of
qualified seduction, taking into account the inconsistencies of the victim’s statement?
Held:
No. SC acquitted the accused, both on the crime of rape and qualified seduction. The
inconsistencies on victim’s testimony for evidence cannot be dismissed as trivial. Trial
courts must keep in mind that the prosecution must be able to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt to justify the conviction of the
accused. The prosecution must stand or fall on its own evidence; it cannot draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. As SC has said: Rape is a very
emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categorical: admiration and
sympathy for the courageous female publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous
violation, and condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters of the law and
dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge without those proclivities, and deal
with it with extreme caution and circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the
natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman decrying her having been sexually
abused, and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the
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anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands justice, judges
should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law.
The prosecution’s evidence is not only shot through with inconsistencies and
contradictions, it is also improbable. If complainant had been raped on November 1, 1991,
the Court cannot understand why she went with her father to Tarlac on November 2 and
stayed there with him until November 14, 1991. She was supposed to have gone through a
harrowing experience at the hands of her father but the following day and for thirteen more
days after that she stayed with him. It is true the medico-legal examination conducted on
November 17, 1991 showed that she was no longer a virgin and that she had had recent
sexual intercourse. But the fact that she had voluntarily gone with her father to Tarlac
suggests that the crime was not rape but, quite possibly qualified seduction, considering the
age of complainant (14 at the time of the crime). This is especially true because she said
she had been given money by her father everytime they had an intercourse.
The fact that she could describe the lurid details of the sexual act shows that it was not an
ordeal that she went through but a consensual act. One subjected to sexual torture can
hardly be expected to see what was being done to her. What is clear from complainant’s
testimony is that although accused-appellant had had sexual intercourse with her, it was not
done by force or intimidation. Nor was the rape made possible because of accusedappellant’s moral ascendancy over her, for the fact is that accused-appellant was not living
with them, having separated from complainant’s mother in 1986.
Considering the allegations in the complaint that the rape in this case was committed “by
means of force, violence and intimidation,” accused-appellant cannot possibly be convicted
of qualified seduction without offense to the constitutional rights of the accused to due
process and to be informed of the accusation against him. That charge does not include
qualified seduction. Neither can qualified seduction include rape.
PEOPLE V. SUBINGSUBING
Facts:
Mary Jane S. Espilan, a highschool student that time, is sixteen years old and unmarried.
While the accused Napoleon Subingsubing is the complainant's uncle, the brother of her
mother and the son of her grandmother. Said accused was then living with his mother and
his niece in the same house. Mary Jane alleged that when she was about to go out to attend
her afternoon classes in school, Napoleon forcibly pulled her to the bedroom of the
grandmother, pointed his Garand rifle at her, then punched her in the stomach as a result of
which the former lost consciousness. When the complainant regained her senses, she
noticed that she was en dishabille and her vagina was bloody. She felt pain in her private
parts and is quite certain she was raped or abused. The accused who was then standing
outside the room warned the complainant not to tell anybody what happened or else he will
kill her. Hence Mary Jane did not report the incident to her grandmother or to anyone for
that matter. The accused did sexually abused her niece in two more incidents.
However, the accused at the trial, denied the charge of rape as narrated above and proferred
a different story - interposing consent on the part of the complainant as a defense. He also
professed that he had only one incident of sexual intercourse with the complainant.
Issue:
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Whether or not the accused Subingsubing is guilty of rape.
Held:
No. The accused is guilty of the crime of Qualified Seduction under Article 337 of the RPC
and not rape.
A careful perusal of the records of the present case reveals, even if were to assume
arguendo that the defense of consent on the part of the complainant was not sufficiently
established, that the evidence for the prosecution cannot, on its own, stand and suffice to
establish the guilt of the accused for the crime of rape beyond reasonable doubt. A perusal
of the records and the testimony of the complainant discloses contradictions and
inconsistencies on vital details which lead one to seriously doubt the veracity of her story.
The Court also cannot help but question the conduct of the complainant after the alleged
incidents of rape. Her behavior after the alleged incidents directly contradicts the normal or
expected behaviour of a rape victim.
As things stand, for failing to meet the exacting test of moral certainty, it is incumbent to
set aside the trial court's judgments of conviction for rape. However, the Court must state
that it finds conclusive evidence (no less than the accused-appellant's admission) that on 25
November 1989, the accused Napoleon Subingsubing had sexual intercourse with Mary
Jane Espilan when she was only 16 years of age. The complainant and the accused were
living in the same house. The accused is the uncle of the complainant, brother of her own
mother.
Qualified seduction is the act of having carnal knowledge of a virgin over 12 years to 18
years of age and committed by any of the persons enumerated in Art. 337 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit: any person in public authority, priest, home-servant, domestic,
guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education
and custody of the woman seduced. Abuse of confidence is the qualifying circumstance in
the offense. Notably, among the persons who can commit qualified seduction is a
"domestic".
PEOPLE V. ALVAREZ
Facts:
A complaint for rape signed by the offended party herself that an information was filed
against appellant Nicanor Alvarez. It is worded thus: "In the City of Naga, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
designs, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rape and have sexual
intercourse with the herein complaining witness, [Loreta T. dela Concepcion], a virgin 13
years of age and sister-in-law of the herein accused, while she was asleep by putting
himself atop of her body, against her will and without her consent." The complainant lived
in the house of the accused as she was taking care of the accused and her sister’s son. At
the hearing, two witnesses testified for the prosecution, a certain Dr. Honesto Marco, who
issued a medical certificate after examining the complainant, fully seven months and
sixteen days after the alleged rape, to the effect that she was in an advanced stage of
pregnancy something rather obvious from her physical condition, 2 and the complainant. It
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was therefore solely on the basis of the testimony of the offended party herself that the
lower court in the decision now on appeal, found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is correctly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape.
Held:
No. The judgment of the lower court is reversed and set aside. He is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Seduction.
Hence, in his capacity as head of the family and master of the house, appellant was, for all
intents and purposes, the custodian of the complainant. But even though he were not
clearly or formally entrusted with the custody of the offended party, it is beyond doubt that,
as the latter was serving in his house or was therein as a domestic — a term embracing
'persons usually living under the same roof, pertaining to the same house, and constituting,
in this sense, a part thereof' ... — the appellant upon taking advantage of his authority and
abusing the confidence and trust reposed on him as master of the house, violated the
provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 337 of the Revised Penal Code."
The seduction of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen years of age, committed by any
of the persons enumerated in Art. 337 'is constitutive of the crime of qualified seduction ...
even though no deceit intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge were voluntary on
the part of the virgin, because in such a case, the law takes for granted the existence of the
deceit as an integral element of the said crime and punishes it with greater severity than it
does the simple seduction ... taking into account the abuse of confidence on the part of the
agent (culprit), an abuse of confidence which implies deceit or fraud.'"
SIMPLE SEDUCTION
PEOPLE V. PASCUA
Facts:
The RTC of Pangasinan finds the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts
of rape. Private complainants Liza and Anna, both surnamed Paragas, are twins aging 12
years old at the time of the crime. The appellant was their neighbor in Calvo, Mangatarem,
Pangasinan. Liza and Anna considered appellant as their grandfather although he was not
related to them.
It was alleged that private complainants were playing near the house of the appellant when
the latter called Liza and instructed her to buy juice at the store. Liza obeyed. After she
returned from the store, the appellant ordered Liza to go inside his house and lie down on
the floor. Appellant then removed Lizas pants and underwear, went on top of her, inserted
his penis into her vagina and made push and pull movements. Liza tried to scream but
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appellant threatened to kill her.
After the sexual intercourse, the appellant gave Liza P10 and warned her not to reveal the
incident to her mother and she remained silent.
The same thing happened again when Liza was called by the appellant as she was passing
by his house. Liza’s twin sister, Anna, suffered the same fate at the hands of the appellant
twice.
The accused was held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape on four counts
as defined and penalized under the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by RA 7659. Insisting on his innocence, the appellant claims in his appeal that he
is not guilty of rape because private complainants voluntarily submitted to his sexual
desires. The appellant even postulates that, if there should at all be any liability on his part,
it should only be for simple seduction.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC correctly held the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape and not the crime of simple seduction.
Held:
Yes. The prosecution was able to prove that force or intimidation was actually employed
by the appellant on the two victims to satisfy his lust.Untenable is the argument of the
Pascuat that, if he is at all liable for anything, it should only be for simple seduction. Under
Article 338 of the RPC, to constitute seduction, there must in all cases be some deceitful
promise or inducement. The woman should have yielded because of this promise or
inducement. In this case, the appellant claims that the acts of sexual intercourse with the
private complainants were in exchange for money. He declared that, prior to every sexual
intercourse with Liza and Anna, he would promise them P20. However, aside from his bare
testimony, the appellant presented no proof that private complainants consent was secured
by means of such promise. As aptly opined by the trial court, the money given by the
appellant to private complainants was not intended to lure them to have sex with him.
Rather, it was for the purpose of buying their silence to ensure that nobody discovered his
dastardly acts. The evidence for the prosecution was more than enough to show that the
element of voluntariness on the part of private complainants was totally absent. Liza and
Annas respective testimonies established that the appellant had sexual intercourse with
them without their consent and against their will. Considering that the victims accounts of
what the appellant did to them were absolutely credible and believable, the trial court
correctly convicted the appellant of several crimes of rape against the 12-year-old twins,
Liza and Anna Paragas.
PEOPLE V. TEODOSIO
Facts:
On that fateful day of December 19, 1985 Elaine and appellant were together from 7:00
o'clock in the morning when they met in front of the Fargo Department Store in Caloocan
City when they attended the Christmas party at the Manila Central University, where
Elaine was enrolled, up to 10:00 A.M. Thereafter, they proceeded to the Luneta where they
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took a stroll. Then they went to the Fiesta Carnival at Cubao, Quezon City and they ate at a
nearby McDonald's restaurant. They later proceeded to Lyceum where appellant took his
examinations at about 2:30 P.M. Then he fetched Elaine at the canteen where she was
waiting. They rode the metropolitan light rail transit at the Central Station up to Doroteo
Jose Street. Upon alighting therefrom, they walked to the Champion Lodging House. After
drinking two glasses of pineapple juice, they had sexual intercourse. They stayed overnight
in the said motel.
It was alleged that the accused, being much older than Elaine, dragged her to the hotel and
took advantage of, deceived and abused the latter sexually by raping her when she was
unconscious on account of her having drunk the drugged softdrink or pineapple juice.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape
Held:
No. The accused was acquitted of the crime of rape neither can he be convicted for simple
seduction. The contradictions in the testimony of Elaine where she attempted to prove that
their coition was involuntary rather than fortify the case of the prosecution, served to
demolish the same.
Firstly, her medical examination did not reveal any contusions on her body showing use of
any force on her. Indeed, if she was under any compulsion, she could easily have escaped
during the many hours they were together going from one place to another, but she did not.
She was enjoying their tryst. Elaine was composed and was not disturbed at all. She did
not show any sign of having had a traumatic experience.
Verily, the foregoing circumstances disproves the theory of force and involuntariness in the
sexual interlude of the two. What is obvious and clear is that these two young lovers,
carried by their mutual desire for each other, in a moment of recklessness, slept together
and thus consummated the fruition of their brief love affair. Appellant cannot be held liable
for rape as there was none committed. It was a consensual affair.
Neither the crime committed by appellant is simple seduction in Article 338 of the Revised
Penal Code. All the elements of the offense are present. Frankly —1. Elaine was over 12
and under 18 years of age; 2. She is single and of good reputation; 3. The offender had
sexual intercourse with her; 4. It was committed by deceit.
Appellant said he planned to marry Elaine and for this reason he successfully persuaded
her to give up her virginity. This is the deceit contemplated by law that attended the
commission of the offense.11
Unfortunately, the essential ingredients of simple seduction are not alleged nor necessarily
included in the offense charged in the information. The only elements of the offense
alleged in the sworn complaint of the offended party is that she is over 12 years of age
when appellant had carnal knowledge of her.
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION
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PEOPLE V. LINING
Facts:
That on or about the 5th day of October, 1997, at 1:00 oclock in the morning, more or less,
in sitio Buho, Barangay Mabuslot, municipality of Pinamalayan, province of Oriental
Mindoro, the accused, conspiring, confederating and acting in common accord, with lewd
and unchaste design, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with threat
and intimidation with use of a deadly weapon, forcibly abduct one Emelina Ornos, a 15year-old girl, towards an unoccupied house and thereat and pursuant to their criminal
conspiracy and motivated with lustful desire, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay with
and had carnal knowledge one after the other of said victim against her will and without
her consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, use of
deadly weapon and abuse of superior strength are attendant.
Accused Lining denied the accusations against him and disputed the findings of the trial
court. He alleged that in the morning of October 4, 1997, his brother-in-law Artemio
Salvacion invited him to attend a barangay dance in Nabuslot. Later that afternoon, he
fetched Ildefonso Magararu and together, they went to the house of Artemio, arriving
thereat at about eight oclock in the evening where they also met Russel Bolquerin, Allan
Salvacion and Lian Salvacion, Lining was not able to attend the dance party because
Artemio requested him to look after the palay in his house. Instead, he and Ildefonso had
some beer and pulutan in the house of Artemio
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding Lining guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of abduction with rape and another crime of rape
Held:
Yes. The accused-appellant could only be convicted for the crime of rape, instead of the
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. Indeed, it would appear from the records
that the main objective of the accused when the victim was taken to the house of Mila
Salvacion was to rape her. Hence, forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape.
Accused-appellant has nothing to offer other than alibi. Further, the testimonies of accusedappellant and the other witnesses for the defense are not consistent on some material
points. The inconsistencies of the testimonies only added doubt on the mind of the Court
regarding the veracity of the statements of the defense witnesses.
Even a woman of loose morals could still be a victim of rape, for the essence of rape is the
carnal knowledge of a woman against her will and without her consent ] Neither the
absence of physical injuries negates the fact of rape since proof of physical injury is not an
element of rape
Finally, it should be stressed that one who clearly concurred with the criminal design of
another and performed overt acts which led to the multiple rape committed is a coconspirator. Therefore, accused-appellant is deemed a co-conspirator for the act of rape
committed by his co-accused Lian Salvacion and should accordingly be penalized therefor.
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PEOPLE V. EGAN
Facts:
Lito Egan alias Akiao, thirty-six (36) years old, was an avid admirer of a twelve (12)-year
old girl named Lenie T. Camad. Both the accused and Lenie were members of the Manobo
indigenous cultural community in Mindanao and residents of Sitio Salaysay, Marilog,
Davao City.
On 6 January 1997 Lenie and her cousin Jessica Silona were fetching water at a deep well
several meters from Lenies house in Sitio Salaysay. In the afternoon, the accused appeared
from nowhere and forcibly dragged and pushed Lenie towards Sitio Dalag, Arakan,
Cotabato. He threatened to kill her if she resisted. Before leaving the site of the deep well,
he likewise terrorized Jessica by brandishing his hunting knife which forced the girl to
scamper for safety. About 5:00 o'clock that same afternoon, Jessica was able to report to
Lenies father, Palmones Camad, the abduction of his daughter. For four (4) months, the
datus attempted a customary settlement of the abduction in accordance with Manobo
traditions. In exchange of the hand of Lenie in marriage, the accused agreed to give 2
horses to the family of Lenie. When the accused failed to fulfill his promise, the father
demanded the unconditional return of his daughter to his custody.
Since the amicable settlement was not realized, Akiao forcibly relocated Lenie to
Cabalantian, Kataotao, Bukidnon, where the latter was successfully rescued. Information
for Forcible Abduction with Rape was filed against the accused and after several warrants
of arrest and attempts to arrest him, he was finally arrested at Arakan, Cotabato.
The accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. During the trial, accused tried to
prove that he and Lenie had actually been living together under Manobo rites in the house
of her father after he has given the family, the dowry. The accused allegedly delivered the
horse to the father, but was again refused when the
latter increased the number of horses from one to two. The accused concluded that because
he failed to deliver two wild horses, the instant case was filed against him.
The trial court rejected the defenses of the accused and convicted him of forcible abduction
with rape. The accused appealed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not Egan is guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape.
Held:
: No. The decision of the court in convicting accused-appellant LITO EGAN alias Akiao
of forcible abduction with rape is modified and Egan is instead declared guilty of Forcible
Abduction only under Art. 342 of the RPC. All the elements of forcible abduction were
proved in this case. The victim, who is a young girl, was taken against her will as shown
by the fact that at knife-point she was dragged and taken by accused-appellant to a place
far from her abode. At her tender age, Lenie could not be expected to physically resist
considering the fact that even her companion, Jessica Silona, had to run home to escape
accused-appellant's wrath as he brandished a hunting knife. Fear gripped and paralyzed
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Lenie into helplessness as she was manhandled by accused-appellant who was armed and
twenty-four (24) years her senior.
The evidence likewise shows that the taking of the young victim against her will
was done con miras deshonestas or in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. The word
lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lascivious, lecherous. It signifies that form of
immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on in a wanton
manner. Such lewd designs were established by the prurient and lustful acts which
accused-appellant displayed towards the victim after she was abducted. This element may
also be inferred from the fact that while Lenie was then a naive twelve (12)-year old,
accused-appellant was thirty-six (36) years old and although unmarried was much wiser in
the ways of the world than she
The logical conclusion is that there was no improper motive on their part, and their
respective testimonies as to facts proving forcible abduction are worthy of full faith and
credit.
Accused-appellant would however insist that he and Lenie had been engaged under
Manobo rituals to marry each other and that her companionship was willful and voluntary.
Proof of this, he said, was the alleged dowry of one (1) horse, two (2) pigs, ten (10) sacks
of palay, and P2,000.00, with two (2) wild horses forthcoming, he had given her father in
exchange for her hand in marriage. In moving from one place to another to look for the
horses which the old man Palmones had demanded, it was allegedly only his intention to
realize his matrimonial aspiration with Lenie.
The testimony of the victim negated this contrived posture of accused-appellant which in
reality is simply a variation of the sweetheart defense. If they were, surely, Lenie would not
have jeopardized their relationship by accusing him of having held her against her will and
molesting her and, on top of it all, by filing a criminal charge against him. If it had been so,
Lenie could have easily told her father after the latter had successfully traced their
whereabouts that nothing untoward had happened between her and the accused. Her
normal reaction would have been to cover-up for the man she supposedly loved and with
whom she had a passionate affair. But, on the contrary, Lenie lost no time in denouncing
accused-appellant and exposing to her family and the authorities the disgrace that had
befallen her. If they had indeed been lovers, Lenie's father would not have shown so much
concern for her welfare and safety by searching for the couple for four (4) months,
desperately wanting to rescue her from captivity and seeking the intervention of the datus
in resolving the matter.
The sexual abuse which accused-appellant forced upon Lenie constitutes the lewd design
inherent in forcible abduction and is thus absorbed therein. The indecent molestation
cannot form the other half of a complex crime since the record does not show that the
principal purpose of the accused was to commit any of the crimes against chastity and that
her abduction would only be a necessary means to commit the same. Surely it would not
have been the case that accused-appellant would touch Lenie only once during her four (4)month captivity, as she herself admitted, if his chief or primordial intention had been to lay
with her. Instead, what we discern from the evidence is that the intent to seduce the girl
forms part and parcel of her forcible abduction and shares equal importance with the other
element of the crime which was to remove the victim from her home or from whatever
familiar place she may be and to take her to some other. Stated otherwise, the intention of
accused-appellant as the evidence shows was not only to seduce the victim but also to
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separate her from her family, especially from her father Palmones, clearly tell-tale signs of
forcible abduction.
PEOPLE V. GARCIA
Facts:
Cleopatra Changlapon, was nineteen years old and a sophomore student of B.S. Physical
Therapy at the Baguio Central University. She left school at 6:30 p.m. to go home to Km.
3, La Trinidad, Benguet. As she was crossing Bonifacio Street, Baguio City, Cleopatra was
pulled by the arms into the van. She struggled as the door closed and the van sped away
and fell unconscious.
When Cleopatra came to, she was inside a room. She was totally undressed and was lying
flat on her back on a bed. In the room with her were four men. The Bombay-looking man
lay on top of her. She tried to push him away but he held her left arm. Another man with
long hair, whom she later identified as accused-appellant Jeffrey Garcia, burned her right
chin with a lighted cigarette. Cleopatra fought back but accused-appellant held her right
arm. While accused-appellant was seated on her right side and holding her, the Bombaylooking man proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her.
After the Bombay-looking man finished having sexual intercourse with Cleopatra,
accused-appellant took his turn and went on top of her. The third man, whom Cleopatra
noted had pimples on his face, went on top of her. The fourth man was next in raping
Cleopatra. By that time, she was feeling helpless and was too tired to struggle. As the
fourth man was having sexual intercourse with her, she saw the Bombay-looking man
burning her panties with a lighted cigarette. She closed her eyes and heard the men
laughing. After the fourth man finished raping her, he got up. She felt dizzy and her private
parts were aching. She opened her eyes and tried to move, but accused-appellant hit her on
the abdomen.
One of the men again sprayed something on Cleopatras face which made her vision
blurred. She heard somebody say that it was 1:30. After that, she blacked out. When she
regained consciousness, she was lying by the roadside somewhere between Tam-awan and
Longlong. It was still dark. She already had her clothes on. She felt pain all over her body
and was unable to move. A taxi passed by and picked her up. Although she was afraid to
ride the taxi, she boarded it just to get home. The taxi brought her to her house. Cleopatra
just kept crying and was unable to talk when asked. After some time, when she was able to
regain her composure, she told them that she had been raped by four men.
The Court finds Jeffrey Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
Forcible Abduction with Rape and likewise of the three (3) crimes of rape in conspiracy
with three (3) others whose identities and whereabouts are yet unknown.
Accused-appellant assails his conviction based on complainants identification. According
to him, the identification was improperly suggested by the police. We are not persuaded.
Based on our own review of the records of this case, we find that complainant was neither
influenced nor induced by the police to point to accused-appellant as one of her molesters.
On the contrary, the transcripts convincingly show that complainant was left to freely study
the faces of the thirty or more inmates on the basketball court below to see whether she
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recognized any of them. There was no suggestion from the police to point to the new
detainee, who had just been arrested on another rape charge.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in convicting Garcia of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape.
Held:
No. The two elements of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised Penal
Code, are: (1) the taking of a woman against her will and (2) with lewd designs. The crime
of forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime that occurs when there is carnal
knowledge with the abducted woman under the following circumstances: (1) by using
force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. In the case at bar, the
information sufficiently alleged the elements of forcible abduction, i.e., the taking of
complainant against her against her will and with lewd design. It was likewise alleged that
accused-appellant and his three co-accused conspired, confederated and mutually aided
one another in having carnal knowledge of complainant by means of force and intimidation
and against her will.
Aside from alleging the necessary elements of the crimes, the prosecution convincingly
established that the carnal knowledge was committed through force and intimidation.
Moreover, the prosecution sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt that accusedappellant succeeded in forcibly abducting the complainant with lewd designs, established
by the actual rape.
Hence, accused-appellant is guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape.
He should also be held liable for the other three counts of rape committed by his three coaccused, considering the clear conspiracy among them shown by their obvious concerted
efforts to perpetrate, one after the other, the crime. As borne by the records, all the four
accused helped one another in consummating the rape of complainant. While one of them
mounted her, the other three held her arms and legs. They also burned her face and
extremities with lighted cigarettes to stop her from warding off her aggressor. Each of
them, therefore, is responsible not only for the rape committed personally by him but for
the rape committed by the others as well.
However, as correctly held by the trial court, there can only be one complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape. The crime of forcible abduction was only necessary for the
first rape. Thus, the subsequent acts of rape can no longer be considered as separate
complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape. They should be detached from and
considered independently of the forcible abduction. Therefore, accused-appellant should be
convicted of one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and three separate acts of
rape.
The penalty for complex crimes is the penalty for the most serious crime which shall be
imposed in its maximum period. Rape is the more serious of the two crimes and, when
committed by more than two persons, is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death under
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. Thus,
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accused-appellant should be sentenced to the maximum penalty of death for forcible
abduction with rape.
PEOPLE V. NAPUD
Facts:
Esmaylita also filed two separate complaints, one for rape and another for forcible
abduction with rape. In Criminal Case No. 44263 for rape, the complaint alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of September, 1994, in the Municipality of Janiuay, Province
of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused Alfredo Napud Jr. conspiring, confederating with Tomas Amburgo to better realize
their purpose and armed with a butchers knife (pinute) with deliberate intent and lewd
design by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned against her will and consent, after
Tomas Amburgo had raped her.
When arraigned in each of the three cases, both Napud and Amburgo pleaded not guilty to
the charges. The third accused, Romel Brillo, has remained at large.
Both Amburgo and Napud raised the defense of denial and alibi. The trial court summed up
Napuds version as follows:
Accused Alfredo Napud, Jr., alleged that in the afternoon of September 20, 1994, he
butchered the ducks of Betty Barato, their neighbor at Brgy. Matag-ub, Janiuay, Iloilo, and
then helped her husband in cooking it; that he and Betty Baratos son, husband, and father,
had a drinking spree inside the latters house from 8:00 oclock that same evening until 2:00
oclock the following morning, September 21, 1994 and chose to sleep at the Baratos house
the rest of the time until he was awakened at about 5:30 oclock in the morning by Betty
Barato informing him that Brgy. Councilwoman Teresita Napud was summoning all male
residents of the barangay to assemble at the basketball court for reasons that he did not
know; That when he and about 20 other male residents were made to form a line-up he saw
Ernesto Benedicto who looked at each of them in the line-up; that after a while all the
others in the line-up were sent home while he was brought to the police headquarters
where he was again presented to Esmaylita Benedicto and Greg Cantiller but both of them
said that he was not the one; that it was only about 11:00 oclock that same morning inside
the cell at the police headquarters, when Esmaylita Benedicto came back, that she
identified him as the one who allegedly robbed their parents house and raped her, in the
early morning of September 21, 1994.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting him of rape by means of force or
intimidation
Held:
Yes. The trial court found that the forcible abduction with rape alleged in Criminal Case
No. 44264 was absorbed by the rape charged in Criminal Case No. 44263. The evidence
for the prosecution shows that Esmaylita was brought by Amburgo and appellant to a
banana plantation some 1-1/2 kilometers away from her house for the purpose of raping
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Case Digest
her. Both men then successively had carnal knowledge of her at said place. Where
complainant was forcibly taken away for the purpose of sexually assaulting her, then the
rape so committed may absorb the forcible abduction. The trial court, thus, correctly held
that the rape charged and proved in Criminal Case No. 44263 already absorbed the forcible
abduction with rape complained of in Criminal Case No. 44264
BIGAMY
MANUEL V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Eduardo Manuel was married to Rubylus Gaa. He met Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City
sometime in January 1996. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student,
while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually,
as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tinas resistance, Eduardo
succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions,
assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet
Tinas parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They
were married before the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61. It appeared
in their marriage contract that Eduardo was single.
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. However, starting
1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a
year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her.
Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he
stopped giving financial support. Tina learned that Eduardo was in fact already married
when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel.
The latter’s defense being that his declaration of “single” in his marriage contract with
Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid
and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first
marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing him
of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount of
P200,000.00 for moral damages.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable
for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and
without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on
the RTC’s decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years.
Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Manuel is guilty of bigamy.
Held:
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Yes. The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical
tie of marriage established by law.[20] The phrase or before the absent spouse had been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings
was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of the
impression that in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of
death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like
annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy. The petitioner is presumed to
have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a
general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution
for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance
of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis
neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse
may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the
presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy;
the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present
spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage.
DIEGO V. CASTILLO
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint against Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo
for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal case and/or rendering
judgment in gross ignorance of the law.
The facts and circumstances of the criminal case are summarized, as follows:a) On January
9, 1965, accused Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr., solemnized
before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City. The couple were both Filipinos. In the
marriage contract, the accused used and adopted the name Crescencia Escoto, with a civil
status of single;
b) In a document dated February 15, 1978, denominated as a Decree of Divorce and
purportedly issued to Jorge de Perio as petitioner by the Family District Court of Harris
County, Texas (247th Judicial District), it was ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the
bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between Jorge de Perio and Crescencia de Perio
are hereby Dissolved, Cancelled and Annulled and the Petitioner is hereby granted a
Divorce.
c) Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, the same Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with
herein complainants brother, Manuel P. Diego, solemnized before the Rev. Fr. Clemente T.
Godoy, parish priest of Dagupan City. The marriage contract shows that this time, the
accused used and adopted the name Lucena Escoto, again, with a civil status of single.[if
After trial of the criminal case for bigamy, respondent Judge promulgated a decision, on
February 24, 1999, the dispositive part of which stated:A careful study of the disputed
decision reveals that respondent Judge had been less than circumspect in his study of the
law and jurisprudence applicable to the bigamy case.
In his comment, respondent Judge stated: That the accused married Manuel P. Diego in the
honest belief that she was free to do so by virtue of the decree of divorce is a mistake of
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Case Digest
fact.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge should be held administratively liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment
Held:
No. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is a criminal offense defined and penalized
under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code. For conviction to lie, it must be proved that
the judgment is unjust and that the judge knows that it is unjust. Knowingly means
consciously, intelligently, willfully or intentionally. It is firmly established in this
jurisdiction that for a judge to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it
must be shown that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the
evidence, and that the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an
injustice.
The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case
submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d) he knew that said judgment is
unjust. This Court reiterates that in order to hold a judge liable, it must be shown that the
judgment is unjust and that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an
injustice. That good faith is a defense to the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment remains the law.
As held in Alforte v. Santos, even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an accused, she
still cannot be administratively charged lacking the element of bad faith, malice or corrupt
purpose. Malice or bad faith on the part of the judge in rendering an unjust decision must
still be proved and failure on the part of the complainant to prove the same warrants the
dismissal of the administrative complaint.
There is, therefore, no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.
PEOPLE V. ABONADO
Facts:
The records show that on September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arceo. Narcisa
left for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines in 1992, when she learned that her
husband was having an extra-marital affair and has left their conjugal home.
After earnest efforts, Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with Fe Corazon
Plato. She also discovered that on January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage
with a certain Zenaida Bias before Judge Lilian Dinulos Panontongan in San Mateo, Rizal.
An annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa. On May 18, 1995, a case for
bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida.
Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955 before a municipal
trial court judge in Concepcion, Iloilo and has four children with her prior to their
separation in 1966. It appeared however that there was no evidence of their 1955 marriage
so he and Zenaida remarried on January 10, 1989, upon the request of their son for the
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purpose of complying with the requirements for his commission in the military.
On May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado of bigamy. On
Appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial court
appreciating the mitigating circumstance that the accuse seventy six years of age then.
He argues that the Information was defective as it stated that the bigamous marriage was
contracted in 1995 when in fact it should have been 1989.
Issue:
Whether petitioner has been sufficiently informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, namely, that he contracted a subsequent marriage with another woman while
his first marriage was subsisting
Held:
No. The statement in the information that the crime was committed in or about and
sometime in the month of January, 1995, was an obvious typographical error, for the same
information clearly states that petitioner contracted a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Bias
Abunado on January 10, 1989. Petitioners submission, therefore, that the information was
defective is untenable.
The general rule is that a defective information cannot support a judgment of conviction
unless the defect was cured by evidence during the trial and no objection appears to have
been raised. It should be remembered that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided
all its elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage
which possesses all the requisites for validity. All of these have been sufficiently
established by the prosecution during the trial. Notably, petitioner failed to object to the
alleged defect in the Information during the trial and only raised the same for the first time
on appeal before the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 26135, finding petitioner Salvador S. Abunado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of bigamy, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED.
MORIGO V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while
but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became
sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in
1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo
married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on
the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy
and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial
question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with
Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good
faith.
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Issue:
Whether or not Lucio Morigo is guilty of bigamy
Held:
No. The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of
the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial
court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the
Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This
simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes,
reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date
of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never
married. The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in
Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia
Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of
a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning.
The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical
conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he
contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a
conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of.
The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
MERCADO V. TAN
Facts:
Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for having
contracted a second marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991
when at that time he was previously united in lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva
on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said first marriage having been legally dissolved.
As shown by the evidence and admitted by accused, all the essential elements of the crime
are present, namely: (a) that the offender has been previously legally married; (2) that the
first marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case the spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he
contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage ha[d] all the essential requisites for validity. x x x
While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited the defense
that his previous marriage ha[d] been judicially declared null and void and that the private
complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of accused.
It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with Ma. Consuelo
Tan on June 27, 1991, accuseds prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting,
no judicial action having yet been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the
nullity of such prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of the nullity
of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of his second marriage, it is clear that
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
accused was a married man when he contracted such second marriage with complainant on
June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly married to his first wife.
Issue:
Whether or not Mercado is guilty of bigamy in spite of the filing the declaration of nullity
of the prior marriage.
Held:
Yes. It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a
defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage. Article 40
of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code Commission believes that the parties to a
marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the
fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they
should be allowed to marry again. x x x.
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have
the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint
charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still
subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his
view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could
simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that
action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.
GARCIA V. CA
Facts:
On 28 August 1991, petitioner Jose G. Garcia filed with the Quezon City Prosecutor's
Office an "Affidavit of Complaint" charging his wife, private respondent Adela Teodora P.
Santos alias "Delia Santos," with Bigamy, Violation of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A.
No. 6085, for being previously united in lawful marriage with REYNALDO QUIROCA,
and without the said marriage having been dissolved, (or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings), did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with JOSE G.
GARCIA, which marriage has [sic] discovered in 1989 and Falsification of Public
Documents. However, in his letter of 10 October 1991 to Assistant City Prosecutor George
F. Cabanilla, the petitioner informed the latter that he would limit his action to bigamy.
The trial court granted the motion to quash and dismissed the criminal case. The court
believes that since the penalty prescribed under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for
the offense of bigamy is prision mayor, which is classified as an afflictive penalty under
Article 25 of the same Code, then said offense should prescribe in fifteen (15) years as
provided in Article 92 of the Code. The complainant having discovered the first marriage
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
of the accused to one Reynaldo Quiroca in 1974 when he was informed of it by one
Eugenia Balingit, the offense charged has already prescribed when the information was
filed in this case on November 15, 1991. The argument presented by the prosecution that it
was difficult for the complainant to obtain evidence of the alleged first marriage, hence, the
prescriptive period should be counted from the time the evidence was secured will not hold
water.
The petitioner then appealed to the CA. He contended therein that: (a) the trial court erred
in quashing the information on the ground of prescription; and (b) the counsel for the
accused was barred from filing the motion to quash the information against the accused. As
to the first, the petitioner argued that bigamy was a public offense, hence "the offended
party is not the first or second (innocent) spouse but the State whose law/policy was
transgressed." The petitioner added that the "interchanging use" In Article 91 of the RPC of
the terms "offended party," "authorities," and "their agents" supports his view that the State
is the offended party in public offenses.
The CA gave credence to the private respondent's evidence and concluded that the
petitioner discovered the private respondent's first marriage in 1974. Since the information
in this case was filed in court only on 8 January 1992, or eighteen years after the discovery
of the offense, then the 15-year prescriptive period had certainly lapsed. It further held that
the quash of an information based on prescription of the offense could be invoked before
or after arraignment and even on appeal, for under Article 89(5) of the RPC, the criminal
liability of a person is "'totally extinguish[ed]' by the prescription of the crime, which is a
mode of extinguishing criminal liability." Thus, prescription is not deemed waived even if
not pleaded as a defense.
Undaunted, the petitioner is now before us on a petition for review on certiorari to annul
and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and to compel the respondent court to
remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the trial court's order
granting the motion to quash the information for bigamy based on prescription.
Held:
No. It is true that bigamy is a public offense. But, it is entirely incorrect to state, as the
petitioner does, that only the State is the offended party in such case, as well as in other
public offenses, and, therefore, only the State's discovery of the crime could effectively
commence the running of the period of prescription therefor. Article 91 of the RPC
provides that "[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which
the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . . ."
It is settled that in bigamy, both the first and the second spouses may be the offended
parties depending on the circumstances.
The petitioner even admits that he is the offended party in Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272.
The information therein, which he copied in full in the petition in this case, describes him
as the "offended party" who suffered "damage and prejudice . . . in such amount as may be
awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code."
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
The distinction he made between public crimes and private crimes relates not to the
discovery of the crimes, but to their prosecution. Articles 344 and 360 of the RPC, in
relation to Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, are clear on this matter.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the challenged
decision of 13 February 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.14324 is
AFFIRMED.
LIBEL
FERMIN V. PEOPLE
Facts:
This is a case for Libel filed by a showbiz couple namely, Annabelle Rama Gutierrez and
Eduardo (Eddie) Gutierrez against Cristinelli S. Fermin and Bogs C Tugas before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Brach 218. The two (2) criminal informations
uniformly read, as follows:
“That on or about the 14th day of June, 1995 in Quezon City, Philippines, the abovenamed accused CRISTENELLI SALAZAR FERMIN, publisher, and BOGS C.
TUGAS, Editor-in-Chief of Gossip Tabloid with offices located at 68-A Magnolia Tulip
St., Roxas District, Quezon City, and circulated in Quezon City and other parts of Metro
Manila and the whole country, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping each other, publicly and acting with malice, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously print and circulate in the headline and lead story of the said
GOSSIP TABLOID issue of June 14, 1995 the following material, to wit:
MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA
NAIWAN DING ASUNTO DOON SI ANNABELLE
IMPOSIBLENG NASA AMERIKA NGAYON SI ANNABELLE DAHIL SA KALAT
DIN ANG ASUNTO NILA DUN, BUKOD PA SA NAPAKARAMING PINOY NA
HUMAHANTING SA KANILA MAS MALAKING PROBLEMA ANG KAILANGAN
NIYANG HARAPIN SA STATES DAHIL SA PERANG NADISPALKO NILA,
NAGHAHANAP LANG NG SAKIT NG KATAWAN SI ANNABELLE KUNG SA
STATES NGA NIYA MAIISIPANG PUMUNTA NGAYON PARA LANG TAKASAN
NIYA SI LIGAYA SANTOS AT ANG SINTENSIYA SA KANYA
when in truth and in fact, the accused very well knew that the same are entirely
false and untrue but were publicly made for no other purpose than to expose said
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ to humiliation and disgrace, as it depicts
her to be a fugitive from justice and a swindler, thereby causing dishonor,
discredit and contempt upon the person of the offended party, to the damage and
prejudice of the said ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ.
CONTRARY TO LAW”
Upon arraignment, petitioner and co-accused Bogs C. Tugas both pleaded not
guilty. After trial on the merits, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 218, in its Joint Decisions
dated January 27, 1997, found petitioner and Tugas guilty of libel. Petitioner and Tugas
appealed to the CA. The appellate court, in its Decision dated September 3, 2002, affirmed
the conviction of petitioner, but acquitted Tugas on account of non-participation in the
publication of the libelous article. The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit in the Resolution dated March 24, 2003. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Tugas and Fermin can be held liable for libel
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court noted that the CA erred in acquitting Tugas. It said that Tugas
cannot feign lack of participation in the publication of the questioned article as was evident
from his and petitioners Joint Counter-Affidavit.
In U.S. v. Taylor, the accused was indicted under Section 6 of Act No. 277 which provides
that: Every author, editor or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial publication is
chargeable with the publication of any words contained in any part of said book or number
of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of the same. However, proof
adduced during the trial showed that accused was the manager of the publication without
the corresponding evidence that, as such, he was directly responsible for the writing,
editing, or publishing of the matter contained in the said libelous article.
In People v. Topacio and Santiago, reference was made to the Spanish text of Article 360
of the Revised Penal Code which includes the verb publicar. Thus, it was held that Article
360 includes not only the author or the person who causes the libelous matter to be
published, but also the person who prints or publishes it.
Based on these cases, therefore, proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication
of the offending article is not required, if the accused has been specifically identified as
author, editor, or proprietor or printer/publisher of the publication, as petitioner and Tugas
are in this case.
Tugas testimony, in fact, confirms his actual participation in the preparation and
publication of the controversial article and his approval thereof as it was written.
Moreover, his alibi, which was considered meritorious by the CA, that he was confined at
the Mother of Perpetual Help Clinic in Angeles City, is unavailing, in view of the
testimony of his attending physician that Tugas medical condition did not prevent him
from performing his work.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
However, the Supreme Court cannot reverse the findings of acquittal by the appellate court
in view of the principle of double jeopardy. As the wordings of the Supreme Court, “But,
of course, we cannot reinstate the ruling of the trial court convicting Bogs Tugas because
with his acquittal by the CA, we would run afoul of his constitutional right against double
jeopardy”.
As regards to the second issue, petitioner Fermin argues that the subject article in the June
14, 1995 issue of Gossip Tabloid is not libelous, is covered by the mantle of press freedom,
and is merely in the nature of a fair and honest comment. The Supreme Court disagrees on
her arguments by analyzing the libelous articles, to wit:
The banner headlines of the offending article read:
“KUNG TOTOONG NAKATAKAS NA SI ANNABELLE
RAMA, IMPOSIBLENG SA STATES SIYA NAGPUNTA!
MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA
SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING ASUNTO DUN
SI ANNABELLE!”
On the first page of the same issue of Gossip Tabloid, written in smaller but bold
letters, are:
“HINDI SIYA MAKAKAPUNTA SA AMERIKA DAHIL
NAPAKARAMI RIN NIYANG ASUNTONG INIWAN
DUN NOON PA, NAKAPAG-ABROAD MAN SIYA, E,
PIHADONG HINDI SIYA SA AMERIKA NAGTULOY, SA
AMERIKA PA KAYA SIYA MAGTATAGO, E, ILANG
TAON NA RIN SIYANG INAABANGAN DUN NG NGA
KABABAYAN NATING NILOKO NIYA, IN ONE WAY
OR ANOTHER?... NAAALALA PA BA NINYO YUNG
MGA MAMAHALING KALDERO NA IBINEBENTA
NILA
NOON
SA
AMERIKA,
DUN
SILA
NAGKAPROBLEMA,
MILYON-MILYON
ANG
INVOLVED, KAYA KINAILANGAN NILANG UMUWI
SA PILIPINAS NOON.”
A libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect,
real or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause
the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead. In determining whether the statement is defamatory, the
words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain and
ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it
appears that they were used and understood in another sense.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
To say that the article, in its entirety, is not libelous disturbs ones sensibilities; it would
certainly prick ones conscience. There is evident imputation of the crime of malversation
(that the complainants converted for their personal use the money paid to them by fellow
Filipinos in America in their business of distributing high-end cookware); of vices or
defects for being fugitives from the law (that complainants and their family returned to the
Philippines to evade prosecution in America); and of being a wastrel (that Annabelle Rama
Gutierrez lost the earnings from their business through irresponsible gambling in casinos).
The attribution was made publicly, considering that Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide
circulation. The victims were identified and identifiable. More importantly, the article
reeks of malice, as it tends to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the
complainants.
Neither can petitioner take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and
of the press. Although a wide latitude is given to critical utterances made against public
officials in the performance of their official duties, or against public figures on matters of
public interest, such criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of
constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a
public officers performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest
involving public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability. While
complainants are considered public figures for being personalities in the entertainment
business, media people, including gossip and intrigue writers and commentators such as
petitioner, do not have the unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity by
indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcast media or
in print, about their personal lives.
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the conviction of petitioner Fermin for libel should be
upheld.
BUATIS V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Yes. The Supreme Court noted that the CA erred in acquitting Tugas. It said that Tugas
cannot feign lack of participation in the publication of the questioned article as was evident
from his and petitioners Joint Counter-Affidavit.
In U.S. v. Taylor, the accused was indicted under Section 6 of Act No. 277 which provides
that: Every author, editor or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial publication is
chargeable with the publication of any words contained in any part of said book or number
of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of the same. However, proof
adduced during the trial showed that accused was the manager of the publication without
the corresponding evidence that, as such, he was directly responsible for the writing,
editing, or publishing of the matter contained in the said libelous article.
In People v. Topacio and Santiago, reference was made to the Spanish text of Article 360
of the Revised Penal Code which includes the verb publicar. Thus, it was held that Article
360 includes not only the author or the person who causes the libelous matter to be
published, but also the person who prints or publishes it.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Based on these cases, therefore, proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication
of the offending article is not required, if the accused has been specifically identified as
author, editor, or proprietor or printer/publisher of the publication, as petitioner and Tugas
are in this case.
Tugas testimony, in fact, confirms his actual participation in the preparation and
publication of the controversial article and his approval thereof as it was written.
Moreover, his alibi, which was considered meritorious by the CA, that he was confined at
the Mother of Perpetual Help Clinic in Angeles City, is unavailing, in view of the
testimony of his attending physician that Tugas medical condition did not prevent him
from performing his work.
However, the Supreme Court cannot reverse the findings of acquittal by the appellate court
in view of the principle of double jeopardy. As the wordings of the Supreme Court, “But,
of course, we cannot reinstate the ruling of the trial court convicting Bogs Tugas because
with his acquittal by the CA, we would run afoul of his constitutional right against double
jeopardy”.
As regards to the second issue, petitioner Fermin argues that the subject article in the June
14, 1995 issue of Gossip Tabloid is not libelous, is covered by the mantle of press freedom,
and is merely in the nature of a fair and honest comment. The Supreme Court disagrees on
her arguments by analyzing the libelous articles, to wit:
The banner headlines of the offending article read:
“KUNG TOTOONG NAKATAKAS NA SI ANNABELLE
RAMA, IMPOSIBLENG SA STATES SIYA NAGPUNTA!
MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA
SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING ASUNTO DUN
SI ANNABELLE!”
On the first page of the same issue of Gossip Tabloid, written in smaller but bold
letters, are:
“HINDI SIYA MAKAKAPUNTA SA AMERIKA DAHIL
NAPAKARAMI RIN NIYANG ASUNTONG INIWAN
DUN NOON PA, NAKAPAG-ABROAD MAN SIYA, E,
PIHADONG HINDI SIYA SA AMERIKA NAGTULOY, SA
AMERIKA PA KAYA SIYA MAGTATAGO, E, ILANG
TAON NA RIN SIYANG INAABANGAN DUN NG NGA
KABABAYAN NATING NILOKO NIYA, IN ONE WAY
OR ANOTHER?... NAAALALA PA BA NINYO YUNG
MGA MAMAHALING KALDERO NA IBINEBENTA
NILA
NOON
SA
AMERIKA,
DUN
SILA
NAGKAPROBLEMA,
MILYON-MILYON
ANG
INVOLVED, KAYA KINAILANGAN NILANG UMUWI
SA PILIPINAS NOON.”
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
A libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead. In determining whether the statement is defamatory, the
words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain and
ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it
appears that they were used and understood in another sense.
To say that the article, in its entirety, is not libelous disturbs ones sensibilities; it would
certainly prick ones conscience. There is evident imputation of the crime of malversation
(that the complainants converted for their personal use the money paid to them by fellow
Filipinos in America in their business of distributing high-end cookware); of vices or
defects for being fugitives from the law (that complainants and their family returned to the
Philippines to evade prosecution in America); and of being a wastrel (that Annabelle Rama
Gutierrez lost the earnings from their business through irresponsible gambling in casinos).
The attribution was made publicly, considering that Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide
circulation. The victims were identified and identifiable. More importantly, the article
reeks of malice, as it tends to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the
complainants.
Neither can petitioner take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and
of the press. Although a wide latitude is given to critical utterances made against public
officials in the performance of their official duties, or against public figures on matters of
public interest, such criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of
constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a
public officers performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest
involving public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability. While
complainants are considered public figures for being personalities in the entertainment
business, media people, including gossip and intrigue writers and commentators such as
petitioner, do not have the unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity by
indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcast media or
in print, about their personal lives.
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the conviction of petitioner Fermin for libel should be
upheld.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Buatis is guilty of libel
Held: Yes. Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a
natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be
defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity;and (d) the victim must
be identifiable.
The last two elements have been duly established by the prosecution. There is publication
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
in this case. In libel, publication means making the
defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person against
whom it has been written. Petitioner's subject letter-reply itself states that the same was
copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the letter to his secretary. It is
enough that the author of the libel complained of has communicated it to a third person.
Furthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbox, was open, not contained in an envelope
thus, open to public.
The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject letter-reply was addressed to
respondent himself.
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in
their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they
would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were
used and understood in another sense.
For the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous, we
laid down the rule in Jimenez v. Reyes, to wit:
In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109 Minn., 341), the court had the
following to say on this point:In determining whether the specified matter is libelous per
se, two rules of construction are conspicuously applicable:(1)That construction must be
adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain
and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand what was uttered.
(2)The published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole.
In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disregard any
subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on being called to account.The
whole question being the effect the publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they
not having been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late
to have the effect of removing the sting, if any there be, from the words used in the
publication.ry
Gauging from the abovementioned tests, the words used in the letter dated August 18, 1995
sent by petitioner to respondent is defamatory. In using words such as 'lousy', 'inutile',
'carabao English', 'stupidity', and 'satan', the letter, as it was written, casts aspersion on the
character, integrity and reputation of respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule.
No evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it. As the CA said, these very words of
petitioner have caused respondent to public ridicule as even his own family have told him:
'Ginagawa ka lang gago dito.
Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory; and, under the general rule
laid down in Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if
it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. Thus, when
the imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need not prove malice on the part of
petitioner (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that petitioner's imputation is
malicious (malice in law). A reading of petitioner's subject letter-reply showed that he
malevolently castigated respondent for writing such a demand letter to Mrs. Quingco.
There was nothing in the said letter which showed petitioner's good intention and
justifiable motive for writing the same in order to overcome the legal inference of malice.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Thus, the Supreme Court find that the CA did not commit any error in affirming the
findings of the trial court that petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel
MAGNO V. PEOPLE
Facts:
This is a case for Libel committed by Dolores Magno on various occasions against Cerelito
T. Alejandro, the former’s neighbor for almost 20 years at PucayVillage, Marcos Highway,
Baguio City.
In the afternoon of March 2, 1991, Cerelito, while at the upper portion of his house, saw
Dolores write on the wall at the back of her garage the following words: 'Huag Burahin
Bawal Dumaan Dito ang Maniac at Magnanakaw ng Aso katulad ni Cere Lito O. Cedring.
Feeling that he was the 'Cere', 'Lito or 'Cedring being alluded to, Cerelito reported the
matter to the local police and filed an affidavit-complaint with the Fiscal's Office.
Subsequently, or on March 9, 1991, at around 4:00 p.m., Rodelito, Cerelito's 16-year old
son, while on his way to buy bread at a nearby store, saw Dolores writing something on her
garage's extension wall with the use of a paint brush and red paint. In full, the writing
reads: "HUAG BURAHIN BAWAL DUMAAN ANG SUSPETSOSA BASTOS AT
MAKAPAL NA MUKHA DITO LALO NA SA MANIAC AT MAGNANAKAW NG ASO
KATULAD NI CERELITO." After reading what was thus written, Rodelito proceeded
with his errand and, upon reaching home, related what he saw to his father.
Again, feeling that he was the maniac and dog thief being referred to, Cerelito lost no time
in filing a complaint with the Baguio City Police (BCP). Pictures were then taken of the
aforesaid writing on the wall. Eventually, the Office of the City Prosecutor in Baguio,
finding, following an investigation, probable cause for libel against Dolores, filed the
corresponding information giving rise to Criminal Case No. 8804-R.
Evidently apprised by the police of the complaint thus filed by Cerelito, Dolores, in the
morning of March 15, 1991, went to the BCP sub-station to deliver her 3-page letteranswer written in yellow pad and addressed to the station sub-commander.
At around 12:20 p.m. of the same day, March 15, 1991, Dolores handed to and instructed
Evelyn Arcartado, Cerelito's sister, to deliver an unsealed white, long, ordinary envelope to
Fe Alejandro, Cerelito's wife.Since Fe was out of the house at that time, Evelyn gave the
unsealed envelope to Cerelito, who immediately read the three (3) separate letters
contained in the envelope. Evelyn followed suit afterwards. Fe read the contents of the
envelope upon reaching home late in the afternoon of March 15, 1991.
The first letter, unsigned and undated and written on yellow pad, was addressed to spouses
Cerelito and Fe Alejandro. Quoted, in part, in the information in Criminal Case No. 8806R, this unsigned letter reads:
“If your husband can't show any proof of his makating dila then comply & if your husband
can't understand this simple English dahil mangmang, dayukdok na galing sa isang kahig
isang tukang pamilya at walang pinagaralan, illiterate, mal educado kaya bastos eh huag na
niya kaming idamay sa kaniyang katangahan na alam na trabaho eh humawak ng grasa sa
Saudi.Kaya iyong pambabastos mo at pagdudumi niya sa pangalan naming at higit pa
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
siyang marumi at putang ina rin niya.Galing siya sa p ng baboy at hindi sa p ng tao.Huag
niyang ikumpara ang pinangalingan niya sa pinangalingan namin.Siya ang magnanakaw at
mandaraya.Malinaw na ibidensiya iyan kinalagyan ng hagdan ninyo, di ba lampas kayo sa
lote ninyo.Pinalakad ninyo ang mojon para lumaki ang lote ninyo.Bago kayo magsalita
mambintang ng kapitbahay ninyo, tignan ninyo muna ang sarili ninyo. Mas mukha pang
magnanakaw ang asawa mo para malinaw.”
The second letter is a photo-copy of the first, but with the following addendum written in
ink at the back page thereof which reads:
“Ang tibay mo rin naman Mrs. Alejandro, makapal pa ang mukha mo at ikaw pa ang
magpapablotter sa akin para pagtakpan mo ang maniac mong asawa. Kailan mo masasabi
na pumasok sa bakuran mo para mamirhuesyo sa inyo. Tanga.”
The third letter, a photocopy of Dolores’ signed letter dated March 15, 1991, to the SubStation 5 Commander of BCP purportedly in reply to the statement given by Fe Alejandro
to the police station on March 3, 1991, reads, in part, as follows:
The Sub Station Commander
Sub-Station 5
Marcos Highway, B.C.
Dear sir:
cralawxxxxxxxxx
Allow me then to explain to you . . . why I call Mr. Alejandro a maniac.Pumasok siya sa
lote ko sa garahe na naging shelter (temporary) namin ng pamilya ko pagkatapos ng lindol
(3 weeks after) ng hatinggabi-lasing na lasing nakapaa, bukas ang zipper ng pantaloon
nakayapak na walang sapin sa paa.Tulog na kami.We were awakened by the constant
barking of my dogs.I have 3 native dogs but 1 was slaughtered by Mr. Cerelito Alejandro
'.He is even a dog-napper. My Manang Louie can relate the incident since we were out of
the country x x x.I don't trust him as my kapitbahay na bantay salakay.In simple tagalog
magnanakaw ng aso para may malamon dahil takaw na takaw at walang maibili.
It is upon the foregoing factual backdrop that Dolores was charged with libel under four
(4) separate informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, docketed as
Criminal Cases No. 8803-R, 8804-R, 8805-R and 8806-R and raffled to Branch 6 of the
court.
Upon arraignment, Dolores, as accused, entered a plea of Not Guilty to each of the
offenses charges in the four informations aforecited. Following a joint trial, the trial court
rendered judgment on September 23, 1993, finding her guilty of libel in both Criminal
Cases Nos. 8804-R and 8806-R and sentencing her to suffer imprisonment and ordering
her to indemnify the offended party a certain sum as moral damages. In Criminal Cases
Nos. 8803-R and 8805-R, however, she was acquitted.
On Appeal, the appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment of conviction of the RTC. The
appellate court likewise denied the motion for reconsideration of Dolores Magno for lack
of merit.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Issue:
Whether or not Magno could be held liable for libel
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that to be liable for libel under Article 353 of the Revised
Penal Code, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the allegation of a
discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication
Publication, in the law of libel, means the making of the defamatory matter, after it has
been written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. If the
statement is sent straight to a person for whom it is written there is no publication of it. The
reason for this is that 'a communication of the defamatory matter to the person defamed
cannot injure his reputation though it may wound his self-esteem. A man's reputation is not
the good opinion he has of himself, but the estimation in which others hold him.
Writing to a person other than the person defamed is sufficient to constitute publication, for
the person to whom the letter is addressed is a third person in relation to its writer and the
person defamed therein. Fe, the wife, is, in context, a third person to whom the publication
was made.
Finally, the Court cannot give credence to Dolores' allegation that she is not the author of
the unsigned libelous letter. It cannot be overstressed that she herself handed the unsigned
letter to Evelyn Arcartado with specific instructions to give the same to Fe Alejandro.
Likewise, the contents of the letters are basically reiteration/elaborations of Dolores'
previous writing on the wall and her letter to the BCP Sub-Station commander. What the
Court of Appeals said on this point is basic common sense and deserving of acceptance.
The Supreme Court finds all the elements of libel to have been sufficiently established.
Accordingly, the ascription of reversible errors on the part of the CA and the trial court in
adjudging Dolores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of libel cannot be
sustained
MACASAET V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court of the Decision entitled, People of the Philippines v. Alfie Lorenzo, et al.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
In an Information dated 10 July 1997, Alfie Lorenzo, Allen Macasaet, Nicolas Quijano, Jr.,
and Roger Parajes, columnist, publisher, managing editor, and editor, respectively of the
newspaper Abante were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
with the crime of libel. The information, which was raffled off to Branch 93 of said court,
reads:
The undersigned accuses ALFIE LORENZO, ALLEN MACASAET, NICOLAS
QUIJANO JR., ROGER B. PARAJES and JORDAN CASTILLO, of the crime of LIBEL,
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1996 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused
ALFIE LORENZO, columnist, ALLEN MACASAET, publisher, NICOLAS QUIJANO
JR., managing editor, ROGER B. PARAJES, editor, respectively of Abante a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines, and JORDAN CASTILLO, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with evident intent of exposing
JOSELITO MAGALLANES TRINIDAD, a.k.a. JOEY TRINIDAD a.k.a. TOTO
TRINIDAD to public hatred, dishonor, discredit and contempt and ridicule, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and maliciously write, publish, exhibit and
circulate and/or cause to be written, published, exhibited and circulated in the aforesaid
newspaper, in its issue of July 13, 1996.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the libel case on the ground that the trial court did not
have jurisdiction over the offense charged. According to petitioners, as the information
discloses that the residence of private respondent was in Marikina, the RTC of Quezon
City did not have jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, to wit:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for
in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance
of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any
of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners' contention that he could only file his libel suit in the City of
Manila where Abante was first published or in the province or city where he actually
resided at the time the purported libelous article was printed is tenable.
Held:
Yes. The law, however, is more particular in libel cases. The possible venues for the
institution of the criminal and the civil aspects of said case are concisely outlined in Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363. It provides:
Art. 360. Persons responsible. - . . .
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as
provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of
First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published
or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer
whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the
action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or
province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public
officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of
the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the
offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
The next question should then be: when does the jurisdiction of the trial court end and that
of the Court of Appeals commence? Happily, the Revised Rules of Court is clear on this
point. Rule 41, Section 9 of the Rules states that (i)n appeals by notice of appeal, the court
loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. [49] When a party files a notice of
appeal, the trial courts jurisdiction over the case does not cease as a matter of course; its
only effect is that the appeal is deemed perfected as to him. [50] As explained by our former
colleague, Justice Florenz Regalado
. . . [I]n the meantime, the trial court still retains jurisdiction over the case. However, where
all the parties have either thus perfected their appeals, by filing their notices of appeal in
due time and the period to file such notice of appeal has lapsed for those who did not do so,
then the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case as of the filing of the last notice of
appeal or the expiration of the period to do so for all the parties.[51]
Applied to the case at bar, we deem it proper that the notice of appeal was filed by the
private and the public prosecutors before the trial court. The Rules cannot be any clearer:
until the filing of the last notice of appeal and the expiration of the period to perfect an
appeal by all the parties, the lower court still has jurisdiction over the case. It is only after
the occurrence of these two incidents when the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals begins
and at which time the OSG is supposed to take charge of the case on behalf of the
government
VASQUEZ V. CA
Facts:
Petitioner Rodolfo R. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore Area. Sometime in
April 1986, he and some 37 families from the area went to see then National Housing
Authority (NHA) General Manager Lito Atienza regarding their complaint against their
Barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo, a public official. After their meeting with Atienza and
other NHA officials, petitioner and his companions were met and interviewed by
newspaper reporters at the NHA compound concerning their complaint. The next day, April
22, 1986, the following exerpts of the news article appeared in the newspaper Ang Tinig ng
Masa. In the article, pulished were supposed allegations by Vasquez that (1)
“nakipagsabwatan umano si Chairman Jaime Olmedo upang makamkam ang may 14 na
lote ng lupa”; (2) ang mga lupa ay ilegal na patituluhan, nagawa ito ni Olmedo sa
pakikipagsabwatan sa mga project manager at legal officers ng NHA; (3) kasangkot din
umano si Olmedo sa mga ilegal na pasugalan sa naturang lugar at maging sa mga nakawan
ng manok. x x x”
Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against petitioner
alleging that the latter’s statements cast aspersions on him and damaged his reputation.
On May 28, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of libel and
sentencing him to pay a fine of P1,000.00. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in
toto.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of libel.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Held:
No. To find a person guilty of libel under Art. 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the
following elements must be proved: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition
concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and
(d) existence of malice.
There was nothing defamatory in the news item. This much was found by the trial court
itself, noting that the published article was merely a factual report about the filing by the
Ombudsman of the charge of corruption against the judge with the Sandiganbayan. Of
course, it does not necessarily mean that if the news article complained of is not libelous
because it is a privileged matter, he who repeats the publication is likewise free from
accountability for the re-utterance. We recognize that a person's liability for libel does not
necessarily proceed from the fact that he was the original publisher of the discreditable act.
The maker of a libelous republication or repetition, although not liable for the results of the
primary publication, is liable for the consequences of a subsequent publication which he
makes or participates in making so long as the elements of libel are satisfied. But in every
case malice must be present, something which has not been shown in the case at bar.
The law presumes that malice is present in every defamatory imputation
VICARINO V. CA
Facts:
ROQUE VICARIO Y MENDEZ was charged with libel by the Provincial Prosecutor of
Catarman, Northern Samar, with Judge Proceso Sidro of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Mondragon-San Roque, Northern Samar, as complaining witness. According to the
Information, the crime was committed when Vicario allegedly distributed and circulated in
the vicinity of the Northern Samar Provincial Hospital in Catarman photocopies of page 7
of the 20 March 1992 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer which contained the following
article:
SAMAR JUDGE WHO POCKETED BOND CHARGED WITH GRAFT
OMBUDSMAN -- Conrado Vasquez yesterday filed with the Sandiganbayan graft charges
against a Northern Samar judge who pocketed the P1,000.00 cash bond posted by a
respondent in one of several cases pending in his sala.
Charged was Judge Proceso Sidro of the Northern Samar municipal circuit trial court in
Mondragon.
Investigation showed that Sidro failed to deposit the cash bond with his clerk-of-court, and
refused to return the money even after the accused who filed the bond was already
acquitted in the case.
Private complainant Sidro alleged that petitioner's act greatly prejudiced his reputation as a
member of the bench and caused him great distress. Petitioner Vicario on the other hand
disclaimed responsibility for the distribution of the alleged libelous article, at the same
time asserting that the libel suit against him was ill-motivated for he had filed a criminal
charge for graft and corruption against Judge Sidro before the Ombudsman and an
administrative complaint for dishonesty with the Supreme Court, both due to the latter's
unjustified refusal and failure to return petitioner's cash bond of P1,000.00.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
After trial, the court a quo found petitioner Vicario guilty of libel and sentenced him to pay
a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The trial court
justified its decision by declaring that while no evidence was presented to show that
Vicario distributed copies of the news article to several persons, at least he gave one
photocopy to prosecution witness Amador Montes which amounted to publication, and that
this act was tainted with malice as it stemmed from Vicario's hatred, as evident from the
manner his testimony was delivered, towards complaining witness Sidro.
Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of petitioner in giving a copy of the Philippine Daily Inquirer to
Amador Montes where the news item was published, constitutes the crime of libel.
Held:
No. Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect,
real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to
discredit or cause the dishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken
the memory of one who is dead. Thus, the elements of libel are: (a) imputation of a
discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of
the person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice.
As found by the trial court, there was no evidence at all to show that petitioner was the
source of the statements contained in the news item published by the Philippine Daily
Inquirer. Indeed, for not only was the news item by itself bereft of this information, the
records also confirmed its absence. This is why it was incorrect for the appellate court to
find that "the news item was patently culled from the Affidavit-Complaint of the appellant
imputing a criminal act on Judge Sidro filed with the Ombudsman (emphasis ours)" when
no basis, factual or legal, exists for so ruling. To be sure, the Affidavit-Complaint was
merely a narration of the facts constituting the cause of action of petitioner. Its contents
never appeared in the news article which spoke only of the filing by the Ombudsman with
the Sandiganbayan of graft charges against Judge Sidro after its investigation of a
complaint that the judge refused to return the cash bond of an accused after the latter's
acquittal in a criminal case. There is no specific reference therein to petitioner nor to his
Affidavit-Complaint. Since it has not been established that he caused the publication of the
subject article nor was the source thereof, it would be inappropriate to conclude that
through the disputed news item he ascribed a criminal act to Judge Proceso Sidro.
Parenthetically, it would have been more accurate for the appellate court to state that the
news article was culled from the resolution of the Ombudsman directing the filing of a
criminal charge based on the results of his investigation of a complaint leveled against the
named judge. But then, if it did, it would have been left with no basis at all to hold, as in
fact it did, that Vicario maliciously imputed a discreditable act to respondent judge, and
there would be no more justification for the finding that the first element of libel was
established
VILLANUEVA V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Petitioner Noel Villanueva was a member of the Municipal Council while private
complainant Yolanda C. Castro was the Municipal Vice Mayor of Concepcion, Tarlac.
Sometime in September 1994, petitioner was filing an application for monetized leave for
the approval of herein complainant. The application was not immediately attended to by
complainant as she was then busy dictating some important matters to her secretary. A
heated argument then ensued between the complainant and the enraged defendant
Villanueva. In the presence of several persons, defendant Villanueva, in a loud voice and
within hearing distance of everyone present, unlawfully, maliciously and feloniously
uttered in a serious and insulting manner the following words: "Nagmamalinis ca, ena ca
man malinis, garapal ca" and "Balamu mansanas cang malutu, pero queng quilib ularan ca,
tictac carinat" (You are pretending to be clean and honest yet you are not clean and honest,
you are corrupt; you are like a red apple, but inside you are worm infested and extremely
dirty).
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is guilty of slight oral defamation
Held:
Yes. Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. The term oral
defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the speaking of base and
defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business
or means of livelihood. There is grave slander when it is of a serious and insulting nature.
The gravity of the oral defamation depends not only (1) upon the expressions used, but
also (2) on the personal relations of the accused and the offended party, and (3) the
circumstances surrounding the case. Indeed, it is a doctrine of ancient respectability that
defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their sense,
grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also
upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the
offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at
the time.
In the case at bar, as a public official, petitioner, who was holding the position of Councilor
at that time, is hidebound to be an exemplar to society against the use of intemperate
language particularly because the offended party was a Vice-Mayor. However, it should be
noted that such scathing words were uttered by petitioner in the heat of anger triggered by
the fact, as found by the Court of Appeals, that complainant refused, without valid
justification to approve the monetization of accrued leave credits of petitioner. The rule
that all possible circumstances favorable to the accused must be taken in his favor. The
slander committed by petitioner can be characterized as slight slander following the
doctrine that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the
part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony.
CANA V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
Petitioner is accused of bringing private complainant Daylinda Cañal, into discredit,
disrepute and contempt when he unlawfully and publicly speak and utter against her the
following insulting words and expressions, to wit: “AYAW MO KAHADLOK SA
TESTIGOS NI DAYLINDA KAY WALAY BANCA-AGAN, NAHADLOK KAW KANG
DAYLINDA, NABUHI ITON SA PANGAWAT, NABUHI ITON SA PANGAWAT” which
if translated in English language will mean (You afraid to the witness of Daylinda who had
no how, why you afraid to Daylinda, she live from stealing, she is a long time thieves) and
other words of similar imports.
The petitioner alleges that the CA gravely erred in sustaining his conviction. He insists that
he was unjustly deprived of his right to adduce evidence in his behalf due to the failings of
his counsel, Atty. Alvizo, who was always absent. He argues that at the MCTC, he was
invariably present and ready to present his evidence; it was his counsel that did him in and
he should not be made to suffer for that. He further alleges that the appellate court failed to
appreciate the true facts of his case.
Issue:
Whether or not the statements of the petitioner constitute oral defamation.
Held:
Yes. To say that Daylinda is a thief is irrefragably grave oral defamation. This imputes to
her a crime that is dishonorable or contemptuous.
The Court affirms the trial courts award of moral damages in favor of the private
complainant. Article 2219(7) of the New Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages
in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. This provision establishes the
right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party
damages for injury to his feelings and reputation.
It must be remembered that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. And
malice may be inferred from the style and tone of publication subject to certain exceptions
which are not present in the case at bar. Indeed, calling Daylinda a thief is defamation
against her character and reputation sufficient to cause her embarrassment and social
humiliation. Daylinda testified to the feelings of shame and humiliation she suffered as a
result of the incident complained of
PADER V. PEOPLE
Facts:
What is before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from a decisionof the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan affirming petitioners
conviction of grave oral defamation by the Municipal Trial Court, Bagac, Bataan.
On April 20, 1995, at about 8:00 p.m., Atty. Benjamin C. Escolango was conversing with
his political leaders at the terrace of his house at Morong, Bataan when petitioner appeared
at the gate and shouted putang ina mo Atty. Escolango. Napakawalanghiya mo! The latter
was dumbfounded and embarrassed. At that time, Atty. Escolango was a candidate for vice
mayor of Morong, Bataan in the elections of May 8, 1995.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
On June 16, 1995 Atty. Escolango filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Bagac, Bataan a
complaint against petitioner for grave oral defamation, to which petitioner pleaded not
guilty.[
After due trial, on October 30, 1997 the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bagac, Bataan
rendered decision convicting petitioner of grave oral defamation.
On appeal, on March 4, 1998, the Regional Trial Court affirmed the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court in toto
Issue:
Whether or not Pader is guiltly of slight oral defamation
Held:
Yes. In resolving the issue, we are guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that
defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their sense,
grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also
upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the
offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at
the time.
Unquestionably, the words uttered were defamatory. Considering, however, the factual
backdrop of the case, the oral defamation was only slight. The trial court, in arriving at its
decision, considered that the defamation was deliberately done to destroy Atty. Escolangos
reputation since the parties were political opponents.
We do not agree. Somehow, the trial court failed to appreciate the fact that the parties were
also neighbors; that petitioner was drunk at the time he uttered the defamatory words; and
the fact that petitioners anger was instigated by what Atty. Escolango did when petitioners
father died. In which case, the oral defamation was not of serious or insulting nature.
In Reyes vs. People, we ruled that the expression putang ina mo is a common enough
utterance in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slender but rather to express
anger or displeasure. In fact, more often, it is just an expletive that punctuates ones
expression of profanity. We do not find it seriously insulting that after a previous incident
involving his father, a drunk Rogelio Pader on seeing Atty. Escolango would utter words
expressing anger. Obviously, the intention was to show his feelings of resentment and not
necessarily to insult the latter. Being a candidate running for vice mayor, occasional
gestures and words of disapproval or dislike of his person are not uncommon.
VICTORIA V. CA
Facts:
Atty. Vivencio Ruiz, a practising lawyer since 1926, one time Justice of the Peace and
member of the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of law and for sometime
president of the Nueva Ecija Bar Association, has been the attorney of petitioner Exequiel
Victorio in certain civil cases from 1953 until 1963 when petitioner decided to hire the
services of another lawyer, Atty. L. Castillo in place of Atty. Ruiz and his collaborator
Judge Alfredo Guiang, then Municipal Judge of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. Exequiel Victorio
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
CRIMINALLAW 2
TECSON, Mary Joie S.
Case Digest
and his wife afterwards filed an administrative charge against Judge Guiang which was
assigned to Judge Ramon Avancena, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, for investigation and disbarment proceedings against Atty. Ruiz, then pending
in the Office of the Solicitor General. Petitioner Daniel Victorio is the son of Exequiel
Victoria.
During the hearing of the administrative case on that particular afternoon of January 9,
1964 in the sala of Judge Avanceña, Atty. Castillo, counsel of the Victorios, presented an
urgent motion to disqualify Judge Avanceña to hear the administrative case, who
apparently taken aback, called down Atty. Castillo and gave him a lecture, while Atty.
Ruiz, as counsel for respondent Judge Guiang in the administrative case, moved that Atty.
Castillo be cited for contempt of court.
After the said hearing and while the two accused were later walking down the corridor
leading to the stairs from the sala of Judge Avanceña, the incident that gave rise to the
criminal prosecution for oral defamation took place. Petitioners were overheard by
Emiliano Manuzon, a policeman of Cabanatuan City and one of the witnesses for the
prosecution, to have uttered the following defamatory words:
Daniel: "Kayabang ng putang-inang abogadong Ruiz na iyan, tunaw naman ang utak,
suwapang at estapador."
Exequiel: "Lastog ta ukinnanata abogado Ruiz, suwapang, estapador, paltogak ta ukinana
ta abogado Ruiz, suwapang ken estapador." (Translated in Tagalog as, Mayabang yang
putang-inang abogado Ruiz na iyan, babarilin ko ang putang inang iyan, suwapang at
estapador.")
The prosecution having proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
the accused, Exequiel Victoria is hereby found guilty of Grave Oral Defamation.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting Daniel Victorio and Exequiel Victorio of
serious oral defamation and not slight oral defamation
Held:
No. There is no dispute regarding the main facts that had given rise to the present case.
Appellant-petitioner in this instant appeal, does not deny that the accused, on the occasion
in question, uttered the defamatory words alleged in the information. Thus, the sole issue
that the Court has to resolve is whether or not the defamatory words constitute serious oral
defamation or simply slight oral defamation.
The term oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the speaking
of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office,
trade, business or means of livelihood (33 Am. Jur. 39). Article 358, Revised Penal Code,
spells out the demarcation line, between serious and slight oral defamations, as follows:
"Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, if it is of a serious and insulting nature, otherwise, the
penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos." (Balite v. People, 18
SCRA 280 [1966]).
To determine whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, the Court
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adopted the following guidelines:
. . . We are to be guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will
fall under one or the other, depending upon, as Viada puts it, '...upon their sense and
grammatical meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of
the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which
might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time: ... Balite v. People, Ibid.,
quoting Viada, Codigo Penal, Quinta edicion, page 494).
Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer when touching on his
profession are libelous per se. Thus, in Kleeberg v. Sipser (191 NY 845 [1934]), it was held
that "where statements concerning plaintiff in his professional capacity as attorney are
susceptible, in their ordinary meaning, of such construction as would tend to injure him in
that capacity, they are libelous per se and (the) complaint, even in the absence of allegation
of special damage, states cause of action." Oral statements that a certain lawyer is
'unethical,' or a false charge, dealing with office, trade, occupation, business or profession
of a person charged, are slanderous per se (Kraushaar v. LaVin, 42 N.Y.S. 2d 857 [1943];
Mains v. Whiting 49 NW 559 [1891]; Greenburg v. De Salvo, 216 So. 2d 638 [1968].
INTRIGUING AGAINST HONOR
IVIER V. SAN PEDRO
Facts:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two
separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal
Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent
Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
(Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce
and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release
in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367
and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner
moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy
of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803).
Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as
a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the
arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. 4
Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend
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proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. 5 Petitioner sought
reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the
dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit.
Petitioner contested the motion
Issue:
Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for
the death of respondent Ponce’s husband.
Held:
Yes. The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction
prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid information. It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in
Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and
Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative
view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The
MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other
does not."
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted
under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365
defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit
any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony,
the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of
arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to
the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount
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equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be
less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person
who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done
maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the
first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next
lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem
proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death
of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act
from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part
of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the
damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the
same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a
valid information.
Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter]
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the
same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that
quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined
and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself
and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such
quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its
various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double
jeopardy as applied to Article 365.
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These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and
simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True,
they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under
Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of
non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the
more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft
Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only
the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts,
whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the
distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under
Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the
effect of this ruling
LONEY V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Petitioners are officers of Marcopper, a corporation engaged in mining in the province of
Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque.
At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It
appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnel’s end. On 24 March 1994,
tailings gushed out of or near the tunnel’s end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had
discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal
Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque ("MTC") with violation of Article 91(B), sub-paragraphs
5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines ("PD 1067"),
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976
("PD 984"), Section 108 of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995
("RA 7942"), and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code ("RPC") for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property.
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the grounds that the Informations were
"duplicitous" as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act.
Issue:
Whether or not the charge of the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs"
the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942
Held:
No. The petition has no merit, The Court had continuously ruled that a single act or
incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law
thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense. The only limit to
this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for "the same offense.
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In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is the
dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River System
without prior permit from the authorities concerned.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the existence of
actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is the
willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to abide by the terms and
conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of the
Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence,
recklessness and imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent damage to property. This
element is not required under the previous laws.
The claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the charges for
violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 must fail, suffice it to say that a mala in se
felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb
mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What
makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the
latter crimes are the special laws enacting them
ABUEVA V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Teofilo Abueva y Cagasan was charged before the RTC of Davao City, in an information of
Reckless Imprudence resulting in homicide for the death of Lourdes Mangruban qualified
by petitioner’s failure to render or lend assistance on the spot to the victim such help as
may be in the hands of the accused to give.
It was alleged that petitioner drove and moved a passenger bus out of the terminal building
even before Lourdes Mangruban, a passenger of said bus, could properly find and safely
take her seat, and that as a direct result of said negligence, recklessness and carelessness,
LOURDES MANGRUBAN fell down to the cemented pavement of the terminal road and
sustained the injuries which caused her death.
The facts showed that the victim, Lourdes Mangruban, fell rather than jumped off the bus.
The claim of the defense that the deceased jumped off the bus is incredible and contrary to
human experience.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is liable for Reckless Imprudence resulting to homicide
Held:
Yes. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that reckless imprudence consists in
voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an
act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration (1)
his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of intelligence; (3) his physical condition;
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and (4) other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Petitioner herein is a professional driver who has been in the employ of the bus company
for 18 years and has undergone training courses and seminars to improve his skills as a
driver. He is expected to be well aware of his responsibilities to his passengers. Not only
must he make sure that they reach their destinations on time, he must also ensure their
safety while they are boarding, during the entire trip, and upon disembarking from the
vehicle.
Having failed to exercise due diligence that resulted in the tragic incident, petitioners
liability for the death of passenger Lourdes Mangruban, as found by the lower courts, must
be sustained.
PEOPLE V. CARMEN
Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC of Cebu City, finding accused-appellants
Eutiquia Carmen @ Mother Perpetuala, Celedonia Fabie @ Isabel Fabie, Delia Sibonga @
Deding Sibonga, Alexander Sibonga @ Nonoy Sibonga, and Reynario Nuez @ Rey Nuez
guilty of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity as well as the costs.
The information against accused-appellants alleged:
That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997 at about 2:00 oclock p.m., in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
conniving and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate
intent, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
inflict fatal physical injuries on one Randy Luntayao which injuries caused the death of the
said Randy Luntayao.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellants can be guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicice even the information filed charges them with murder
Held:
Yes. The accused are all declared guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. In
Samson v. Court of Appeals, the accused were charged with, and convicted of, estafa
through falsification of public document. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment and
held one of the accused liable for estafa through falsification by negligence. On appeal, it
was contended that the appeals court erred in holding the accused liable for estafa through
negligence because the information charged him with having wilfully committed estafa. In
overruling this contention, the Court held:
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in
Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1955, but a distinct
crime in itself, designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said
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that a conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the
commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser
offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged with
willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals
found that in effecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of the checks in
question, appellant did not act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and
adequate means to assure himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary
prudent man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts which charge willful
falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by
the rule when there is a variance between the allegation and proof. . . .
The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with
imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence
submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly,
having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would be incongruous to allege at
the same time that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is
incompatible with the concept of negligence.
In People v. Fernando, the accused was charged with, and convicted of, murder by the trial
court. On appeal, this Court modified the judgment and held the accused liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide after finding that he did not act with criminal intent
PEOPLE V. BEIBES
Facts:
"In the evening of February 16, 1990, appellant Pat. Domingo Belbes and Pat. Jose Pabon
were assigned by the Bacacay Station Commander to maintain peace and order at the
Junior and Senior Prom of Pili Barangay High School, Pili, Bacacay, Albay.
Around 9:00 p.m. while Teacher-In-Charge Mila Ulanca, appellant, Pat. Pabon and Elmo
Bes were watching the dance, two students, Riselle Banares and Juliana Basaysay,
approached Mrs. Ulanca and said "Mam, it seems that there is somebody making trouble."
Appellant and Pat. Pabon, armed with an armalite rifle and a .38 caliber revolver,
respectively, responded forthwith. Moments after the two police officers left, bursts of
gunfire-- "Rat-tat-tat-tat-tat" filled the air. Fernando Bataller, a graduating student of Pili
Barangay High School, was hit on different parts of his body and died.
Moments before the gruesome incident, Fernando Bataller, then drunk, was in the
company of Carlito Bataller and Rosalio Belista. While Fernando was vomiting and
holding on to the bamboo wall of the schools temporary building, the bamboo splits broke.
At this instance, appellant and Pat. Pabon appeared. Without warning, appellant fired his
gun. Fernando slumped on the ground, bathed with his own blood. Appellant and Pat.
Pabon fled from the crime scene.
Fernando was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. As shown in the autopsy report,
Fernando suffered the following gunshot wounds: (1) head, located at the right lower face,
skin, muscles, blood vessels, nerves, bone torn away; (2) chest (front, located at left, antero
lateral approximately 5 cm. below but lateral to the left nipple, another gunshot wound on
the same location with tattooing located at left lateral waistline; (3) chest (back) located at
the middle back at the level of the lowest rib, skin and superficial muscles torn away,
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Case Digest
another gunshot wound located at the left back, lateral level of the lowest rib, with
tattooing.
Issue:
Whether or not Belbes can be convicted of the crime reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide
Held:
No. The appellant is guilty of tbe crime of homicide. The RTC also erred in convicting him
of murder. On one hand, treachery did not attend the commission of the crime as to rule out
murder. Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. For the same to be considered as a qualifying
circumstance, two conditions must concur: (a) the employment of means, method or
manner of execution which would ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or
retaliatory acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being given the latter to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means, method or manner of execution were deliberately
or consciously adopted by the offender. There is no showing that the shooting was
premeditated or that appellant, in shooting the victim, employed means, methods or forms
to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
victim might make. Likewise, mere suddenness of the attack does not necessarily imply
treachery.
On the other hand, the offense is definitely not reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
because the shooting was intentional. Illustrations of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide are: (1) exhibiting a loaded revolver to a friend, who was killed by the accidental
discharge brought about by negligent handling; or (2) discharging a firearm from the
window of ones house and killing a neighbor who just at the moment leaned over the
balcony front; or (3) where the defendant, to stop a fist fight, fired his .45 caliber pistol
twice in the air, and, as the bout continued, he fired another shot at the ground, but the
bullet ricocheted and hit a bystander who died soon thereafter. In this case, appellant
intended to fire AT the victim, and in fact hit ONLY the victim.
We conclude that appellant is guilty only of homicide, mitigated by the incomplete
justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty. The penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal. There being one mitigating circumstance, the maximum of the penalty should be
reclusion temporal in its minimum period, which is 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8
months. Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the minimum of said penalty should be
taken from prision mayor.
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
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