Spouses Garcia vs Santos
G.R. No. 228334 June 17, 2019
Facts:
Spouses Garcia had occupied for 11 years the subject property with a one-storey residential house erected
thereon and was purchased by them from the Spouses Santos in October 1998. At the time of the
purchase of the subject property from the spouses Santos, the one­-storey house was already
constructed. Also, at the time of the acquisition of the subject property, the adjoining lot, Lot 1, which is
owned by the spouses Santos, was an idle land without any improvements. Lot 1 is covered by TCT No. T114137,7 registered under the name of the Spouses Santos. Lot 1 remained empty until the Spouses
Santos started the construction of a two-storey residential house therein on January 24, 2009. Upon
inquiry from the construction workers, Tedy was erroneously informed that Tan was the new owner of
Lot 1. The complaint alleged that the building constructed on Lot 1 is taller than the Spouses Garcia's onestorey residential house. As such, the Spouses Santos' building allegedly obstructed the Sps. Garcia's right
to light, air, and view. The Spouses Garcia bemoaned how, prior to the construction on Lot 1, they received
enough bright and natural light from their windows. The construction allegedly rendered the Spouses
Garcia's house dark such that they are unable to do their normal undertakings in the bedroom, living room
and other areas of the house without switching on their lights. The Spouses Garcia likewise alleged that
the said structure constructed on Lot 1 is at a distance of less than three meters away from the boundary
line, in alleged violation of their easement. Furthermore, the Spouses Santos allegedly m de excavations
on Lot 1 without providing sufficient lateral support to the concrete perimeter fence of the Spouses
Garcia.
Issue:
Whether the Spouses Garcia have acquired a positive easement of light and view with respect to Lot 1
owned by the Spouses Santos.
Ruling:
Yes. There is positive easement. Under Property Laws, Easement of light and view is a positive one if the
window or opening is situated in a party wall, while it is a negative one if the window or opening is thru
one's own wall, thru a wall of the dominant estate. However, even if the window is on one's own wall, still
the easement would be positive if the window is on a balcony or projection extending over into the
adjoining land. Spouses Garcia have acquired an easement of light and view by title despite the lack of
any formal notice or prohibition made upon the owner of the servient estate. The easement in this
particular case was positive, because it consisted in the active enjoyment of the light. "Active" used in the
decision quoted in classifying the particular enjoyment of light referred to therein, presupposes on the
part of the owner of the dominant estate a right to such enjoyment arising, in the particular case passed
upon by that decision, from the voluntary act of the original owner of the two houses, by which he
imposed upon one of them an easement for the benefit of the other.
Cortez vs Yu Tibo
G.R. No. 911 March 12, 1903
Facts:
House No. 65 Calle Rosario, easement disputed is the easement of light and view. Plaintiff’s wife has
certain windows on her property which open on the adjacent lot. It has been established that the plaintiffs
haven’t done any formal act prohibiting the owner of the house of the adjacent house prohibiting them
to make any improvements. Plaintiff claims that period of prescription started when those windows were
made and acknowledge by the owner of the adjacent lot. Defendant however claims that there should be
a formal act prohibiting them from doing a certain act to trigger the prescriptive period.
Issue:
Whether or not plaintiffs have acquired the easement through prescription
Ruling:
No. Part owner can, without the consent of the other, make in a party wall a window or opening of any
kind. The very fact of making such opening in such a wall may be the basis for acquisition of a prescriptive
title without the necessity of any active opposition because it always presupposes the express or implied
consent of the owner of the wall, which in time, implies a voluntary waiver of the right to oppose. When
the windows are not opened on the neighbor's side, there is need of a prohibition from exercising that
neighbor's right to build on his land or cover the closed window on the party wall.
The period of prescription starts to run from such prohibition if the neighbor consents to it.
Note: The law refers to all kinds of windows, even regulation windows. According to article 528, windows
with "similar projections" include sheds. The exception applies in this case because what is concerned is
a party wall; there was no prohibition on Yu-Tibo to build anything that would cover the Cortes' window,
Yu-Tibo wanted to raise his roof which would in effect cover half of the window.
Severina Choco vs Santamaria
G.R. No. 6076 December 29, 1911
Facts:
Severina and Flora Choco are the owners of the land on both sides of the defendant's house, erected as
stated, both on Calle Pescadores and Calle P. Rada, that the defendant in the building of his house has
made several openings and windows in the walls of the house on both sides overlooking then property of
Santamaria. Santamaria was building his house, and the windows and the openings were being made, the
plaintiffs protested, and later on and in the year 1905 made written protest and demand. It was likewise
established that the entrance to the defendant's house is in Calle Pescadores, and taking it as the front of
his house he has put a large window in its upper story, on the balcony of said house, the law provides that
the owner of a wall which is not a party wall, adjoining another's estate, may make in it windows or
openings to admit light at the height of the ceiling joist, or immediately under the ceiling, thirty
centimeters square, with an iron gate embedded in the wall and a wire screen.
Issue:
Whether or not the perpetual closing of the large window opened in the balcony of the back part of the
appellee's house and that it prejudices their easement to light and view.
Ruling:
Yes. To judge from the photographic views, it opens on the boundary line between the said lot and that
the appellee and is situated perpendicularly above a part of the wall that belongs to the appellants. This
opinion is corroborated by the testimony of the defendant's witness who took the said photographs, in
so far as he said that "a part of the window in question is in front of the plaintiffs' property, since between
it and the plaintiffs' property there does not intervene the distance required by law — that of two meters
in the first case, and 60 centimeters in the second, therefore, its opening is a manifest violation of the
provisions of article 582 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:
“Windows with direct views, or balconies or any similar openings projecting over the estate of the
neighbor, cannot be made if there is not a distance of, at least, 2 meters between the wall in which they
are built and said estate. Neither can side nor oblique views be opened over said property, unless there
is a distance of 60centimeters.” Because of the lack of the distance required by law, the window in
question must be closed, and consequently the judgment appealed from should be modified in this sense,
as regards this window.
Soriano vs Sterberg
G.R. No. 15628 November 18, 1920
Facts:
Oscar Sternberg owns a parcel of land with a two storey-house which was built in 1905. The said house
has windows overlooking the adjacent lot belonging to Soriano. The windows were built on the wall of
the house which has a 1.36 m. distance from the dividing line between the two lots. Thereafter, Soriano
filed an action to compel Sternberg to close the windows because it is less than 2 meters from the division
line between the two lots and hence, a violation of Article 582 (now Article 670) of the Civil Code. The law
provides that "No windows or balconies or other similar projections which directly overlook the adjoining
property may be opened or built without leaving a distance of not less than 2 meters between the wall in
which they are built and such adjoining property. Sternberg argues that the action of Soriano has already
prescribed. It must be noted that there is no annotation in the Torrens title of the parties involved.
Issue:
Whether or not the right of action to enforce Article 582 (Now 670) is applicable in this case.
Ruling:
No. Art. 670. No windows, apertures, balconies, or other similar projections which afford a direct view
upon or towards an adjoining land or tenement can be made, without leaving a distance of two meters
between the wall in which they are made and such contiguous property.
Neither can side or oblique views upon or towards such conterminous property be had, unless there be a
distance of sixty centimeters. The nonobservance of these distances does not give rise to prescription. In
this case, Sternberg has never prohibited Soriano from building any wall on his own land. Soriano’s cause
of action only arose in 1905 when Sternberg built the offending edifice (building). Nevertheless, the
windows complained of were permitted to be open for thirteen years (1918) without protest from
Soriano. Soriano must, consequently, by reason of his own laches, be considered to have waived any right
which he may have had to compel the windows to be closed.
Masongsong vs Flores
G.R. No. 36048 September 24, 1932
Facts:
Alejandro Masongsong is the owner of a lot situated in Manila. Felipe Cruz, the husband of Victoria Flores,
is the owner of an adjoining lot. On the lot of Victoria Flores is a house which was begun to be constructed
on July 3, 1925, and was completed on November 10, 1926. This house has windows overlooking the
adjoining property of Masongsong, leaving a distance of less than two meters between the two houses.
Separating the two houses is an alley, denominated a public alley. Masongsong property extends over this
alley. When Masongsong, on June 22, 1928, applied to the city engineer for a permit to construct a house
on his property, he bound himself to the following conditions: (1) That the building shall abut or face on
the officially approved private alley as shown on the location plan; and (2) that this approved private alley
shall be opened to the public and with its approved width preserved (3 m.) shall be maintained and kept
in good repair by the grantee of this permit, his heirs, executors and assigns and shall never be closed by
any person so long as there is a building or structure, abutting, facing or having access to said private alley.
Issue:
Whether an alley constructed in accordance with the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila, and open
to the public, falls within the provisions of article 584 of the Civil code, making codal article 582 concerning
easements of light and view inapplicable to buildings separated by a public thoroughfare.
Ruling:
Yes. Private alley open to the public, under the circumstances of this case, falls within the exception
provided by article 584 of the Civil Code to article 582 thereof, and that accordingly the plaintiff has no
legal cause of action. Article 582 of the Civil Code provides that "no windows or balconies or other similar
projections which directly overlook the adjoining property may be opened or built without leaving a
distance of not less than two meters between the wall in which they are built and such adjoining
property." Article 584 of the Civil Code makes the provisions of article 582 inapplicable "to buildings
separated by a public thoroughfare (una via publica).
Alolino vs Fortunato Flores
G.R. No. 198774 April 4, 2016
Facts:
Alolino is the registered owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land. Alolino initially constructed a
bungalow-type house on the property. In 1980, he added a second floor to the structure. He also extended
his two-storey house up to the edge of his property. There are terraces on both floors. There are also six
(6) windows on the perimeter wall: three (3) on the ground floor and another three (3) on the second
floor. Spouses Fortunato and Anastacia (Marie) Flores constructed their house/sari sari store on the
vacant barrio road immediately adjoining the rear perimeter wall of Alolino's house. The structure is only
about two (2) to three (3) inches away from the back of Alolino's house, covering five windows and the
exit door. The respondents' construction deprived Alolino of the light and ventilation he had previously
enjoyed and prevented his ingress and egress to the municipal road through the rear door of his house.
Respondents on their part argued that they had occupied their lot where they constructed their house in
1955, long before the plaintiff purchased his lot in the 70s. They further alleged that plaintiff only has
himself to blame because he constructed his house up to the very boundary of his lot without observing
the required setback. Finally, they emphasized that the wall of their house facing Alolino's does not violate
the latter's alleged easement of light and view because it has no window.
Issue:
Whether or not Alolino has acquired easement of light and view.
Ruling:
No. Alolino does not have an easement of light and view or an easement of right of way over the
respondents' property or the barrio road it stands on. Articles 649-657 governs legal easements of right
of way. None of these provisions are applicable to Alolino's property with respect to the barrio road where
the respondents' house stands on.
Spouses Garcia vs Santos
G.R. No. 228334 June 17, 2019
Facts:
Spouses Garcia has a one-storey residential house erected thereon and was purchased by them from the
Spouses Santos in October 1998. At the time of the purchase of the subject property from the Spouses
Santos, the one­-storey house was already constructed. Also, at the time of the acquisition of the subject
property, the adjoining lot, Lot 1, which is owned by the Spouses Santos, was an idle land without any
improvements. Lot 1 remained empty until the Spouses Santos started the construction of a two-storey
residential house therein on January 24, 2009. Upon inquiry from the construction workers, Tedy was
erroneously informed that Tan was the new owner of Lot 1. The building constructed on Lot 1 is taller
than the Spouses Garcia's one-storey residential house. As such, the Spouses Santos' building allegedly
obstructed the Spouses Garcia's right to light, air, and view. The Sps. Garcia bemoaned how, prior to the
construction on Lot 1, they received enough bright and natural light from their windows. The construction
allegedly rendered the Sps. Garcia's house dark such that they are unable to do their normal undertakings
in the bedroom, living room and other areas of the house without switching on their lights.
Issue:
Whether the Spouses Garcia have acquired an easement of light and view with respect to Lot 1 owned by
the Spouses Santos.
Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 670 of the Civil Code, which provides that no windows, apertures, balconies, or other
similar projections which afford a direct view upon or towards an adjoining land or tenement can be made,
without leaving a distance of two meters between the wall in which they are made and such contiguous
property." This Article is to be read in conjunction with Article 671 as the latter provides the mechanism
by which the two-meter distance is to be measured, to wit, the distances shall be measured in cases of
direct views from the outer line of the wall when the openings do not project, from the outer line of the
latter when they do, and in cases of oblique views from the dividing line between the two properties.
Hence, under Article 670, which is the general rule, when a window or any similar opening affords a direct
view of an adjoining land, the distance between the wall in which such opening is made and the border of
the adjoining land should be at least two meters. In this case, Spouses Garcia have acquired an easement
of light and view.
Cabacungan vs Corrales
G.R. No. L-6629 September 30, 1954
Facts:
Plaintiff-Appellants, are sisters and, together with three other sisters, being co-heirs and co-owners of a
piece of land. The two of their sisters, co-heirs and co-owners - Sofia Hidalgo Soria and Carmen Soria Abad
- had sold their undivided shares in said land to defendant Quintin Corrales, an outsider, and wishing to
be subrogated to the rights of the buyer, plaintiffs, on the 10th of the same month, approached the said
Quintin Corrales and his wife and co-defendant Catalina V. Corrales and rendered them P600 for that
purpose, but the tender was refused. Plaintiffs, therefore, pray that defendants be ordered to allow them
to exercise their right of legal redemption. Being owners of a lot contiguous to the land here in question,
constructed a building on said lot with balcony and windows less than three meters distant from said land
and with roof that drains rain water into it in violation of Article 670 and 674, respectively, of the New
Civil Code. Plaintiffs, therefore, pray that the said balcony and windows be ordered closed and the roofs
constructed in such a way that rain water would not fall on plaintiffs' land.
Issue:
Whether or not the right to easement of light and view is present in this case.
Ruling:
Yes. Easement is not extinguished by the acquisition of a share in property held in common. The owner of
a building shall be obliged to construct its roof or covering in such a manner that the rain water shall fall
on his own land or on a street or public place, and not on the land of his neighbor, even though the
adjacent land may belong to two or more persons, one of whom is the owner of the proof.
Ngo Sin Sing vs Li Seng Giap
G.R. No. 172596 November 28, 2008
Facts:
Spouses Ngo Sin Sing and Ticia Dy Ngo owned a lot. They decided to construct a 5-storey concrete building,
the NSS Building. Adjacent to their lot is a semi-concrete building known as the Li Seng Giap Building (LSG
Building), owned by Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc. During the construction of the NSS Building, the respondent,
through its general manager, John T. Lee, received complaints from their tenants about defects in the
building. There were cracks appearing on the floors, the steel door was bent, and concrete slabs of the
walls were falling apart. An inspection of the premises revealed that the excavation made by Contech on
petitioners’ land was close to the common boundary, exposing the foundation of the LSG Building. As a
gesture of goodwill to their neighbors, the petitioners assured the respondent that repairs would be
undertaken by their contractor. In December 1979, Contech announced that it had completed repairs on
the LSG Building. Notwithstanding this assurance, more defects in the LSG Building appeared, i.e., tilted
floors, cracks in the columns and beams, distorted window frames. Apparently, the LSG Building was
continuously sagging and the respondent felt that it was no longer safe to occupy the building.
Issue:
Whether there was sufficient lateral and subjacent support provided on the adjoining lot when the
excavation was commenced?
Ruling:
No. The lower courts found that there was insufficient lateral or subjacent support provided on the
adjoining lot when excavation was done on petitioners' land. While there were wood sheet piles placed
along the sides of the excavation, they were not properly braced to prevent a failure wedge. Such failure
can only be accounted to the contractor, which is no other than Contech. Although the trial court stated
that petitioner as land owner had every right to excavate on his own land, such right is not absolute as to
deprive the adjacent owner sufficient lateral support pursuant to Article 684, New Civil Code, which states
that, No proprietor shall make such excavation upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or building
of sufficient lateral or subjacent support.
Castro vs Monsod
G.R. No. 183719 February 2, 2011
Facts:
Castro is the registered owner of a parcel of land located on Garnet Street, Manuela Homes, Pamplona,
Las Piñas City. Monsod, on the other hand, is the owner of the property adjoining the lot of petitioner,
located on Lyra Street, Moonwalk Village, Phase 2, Las Piñas City. There is a concrete fence, more or less
two meters high, dividing Manuela Homes from Moonwalk Village. The adverse claim was filed without
any claim of ownership over the property. Monsod was merely asserting the existing legal easement of
lateral and subjacent support at the rear portion of his estate to prevent the property from collapsing,
since his property is located at an elevated plateau of fifteen (15) feet, more or less, above the level of
petitioner’s property.
Issue:
Whether the easement of lateral and subjacent support that exists on the subject adjacent properties
may be annotated at the back of the title of the servient estate.
Ruling:
No. An annotation of the existence of the subjacent and lateral support is no longer necessary. It exists
whether or not it is annotated or registered in the registry of property. A judicial recognition of the same
already binds the property and the owner of the same, including her successors-in-interest. Otherwise,
every adjoining landowner would come to court or have the easement of subjacent and lateral support
registered in order for it to be recognized and respected. Article 684 of the Civil Code provides that no
proprietor shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or building of
sufficient lateral or subjacent support. An owner, by virtue of his surface right, may make excavations on
his land, but his right is subject to the limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land or building of
sufficient lateral or subjacent support. Between two adjacent landowners, each has an absolute property
right to have his land laterally supported by the soil of his neighbor, and if either, in excavating on his own
premises, he so disturbs the lateral support of his neighbor’s land as to cause it, or, in its natural state, by
the pressure of its own weight, to fall away or slide from its position, the one so excavating is liable.
North Negros Sugar vs Hidalgo
G.R. No. 42334 October 31, 1936
Facts:
Plaintiff is the owner of a sugar central and also its adjoining plantation Hacienda Begona. He constructed
a road adjoining the “mill site” and the provincial highway. Plaintiff allows vehicles to pass upon paying
toll charge of P0.15 for each one, pedestrians are allowed free passage. Defendant owns the adjoining
Hacienda Sangay wherein he has a billiard hall and a tuba saloon. The road of the plaintiff is the only
means of access to get to Hacienda Sangay. At one point, plaintiff stopped defendant from using the said
road. Hence, instead of taking the road to get to his Hacienda Sangay, defendant passed through Hacienda
Begona in a passageway used by the carabaos. Plaintiff applied for injunction to restrain the defendant
from entering/passing through his properties.
Issue:
Whether or not Voluntary Easement should be granted.
Ruling:
Yes. In the case at bar, on mode of acquiring easements, the road was constructed by the plaintiff on his
own land and it made this road accessible to the public, regardless of class, group of persons, entities. This
is a voluntary easement constituted in favor of the community. Indeed, the plaintiff may close the road at
its pleasure as no period has been fixed when the easement was constituted, but while the road is still
open, he may not capriciously exclude defendant from its use. Having the road devoted to the public in
general, the road is charged with public interest and while so devoted, the plaintiff may not establish
discriminatory exceptions against any private person. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing its use,
but so long as he maintains it, he must submit to the control. Furthermore, there exists a forcible right of
way in favor of the defendant because those living in Hacienda Sangay have no access to the provincial
road except through the road in question. Hence, voluntary easement shall be granted.
Trias vs Araneta
G.R. No. L- 20786 October 30, 1965
Facts:
Trias sought to cancel the annotation that disallows to built factories on her land. That such cancellation
is not for the purpose of erecting a factory thereon, but merely to facilitate approval of a loan she had
applied for; that the restriction was illegal, because it impaired the owner's dominical rights; and that it
was a mere surplusage anyhow, because there are zoning ordinances prohibiting establishment of
factories in that district.
Issue:
Whether the imposition was valid.
Ruling:
Yes. The prohibition is an easement validly imposed under Article 594 (Now 688) which provides that
every owner of a piece of land may establish easements he deems suitable and not in contravention to
the law, public policy and public order. The court ruled that the easement existed to safeguard the peace
and quiet of neighboring residents. The intention is noble and the objectives benign. In the absence of a
clash with public policy, the easement may not be eroded. The contention of surplusage is also immaterial.
Zoning regulations may be repealed anytime, allowing the erection of factories. With the annotation, at
the very least, the original intent to bar factories remains binding.
Rivera vs IAC
G.R. No. 74249 January 20, 1989
Facts:
Rivera and its agents and representatives willfully closed, obstructed, prevented and refused to the
petitioners and to the general public or vehicular traffic the use of or free access to Mangyan Road, a 15meter wide road located in the La Vista Subdivision, one half (1/2) of which is owned by Maryknoll College
in violation of the said ordinance. The Court issued an order granting the writ of preliminary injunction to
prohibit La Vista Association from preventing the petitioners and the general public from the use of the
Mangyan Road. The trial court stated that the petitioners are entitled to the relief sought in the light of
Ordinance No. 7613 and that the closure of the Mangyan Road has caused great and irreparable damage
to the petitioners and the public.
Issue:
Whether or not the Voluntary Easement is Valid.
Ruling:
Yes. Considering that the petitioners do not have a clear right over the one-half portion of the Mangyan
Road, then the issuance of the questioned writ of preliminary injunction was improper. Notwithstanding
the existence of a city ordinance, the petitioners do not have an unquestioned right over the one-half
portion of the Mangyan Road.
La Vista Vs CA
G.R. No. 95252 September 5, 1997
Facts:
Mangyan Road is the boundary between the La Vista Subdivision on one side and Ateneo and Maryknoll
(Miriam) on the other. The road extends to the entrance gate of Loyola Grand Villas. The area comprising
the 15-meter wide roadway was originally part of a vast tract of land owned by the Tuasons. The Tuasons
sold to Philippine Building Corporation a portion of their landholdings. The Philippine Building Corporation
transferred, with the consent of the Tuasons, the subject parcel of land to Ateneo. The Tuasons developed
a part of the estate adjoining the portion sold to Philippine Building Corporation into La Vista Subdivision.
La Vista seeks the issuance of a writ of injunction to finally enjoin private respondents Solid Homes, Inc.,
developers of Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision, the latter’s predecessor-in-interest, Ateneo, and the
residents of the said subdivision from enjoying an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road. La Vista
contends that mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its the easement of
right-of-way basis.
Issue:
Whether or not La Vista may withhold from the private respondents the use of the Mangyan Road.
Ruling:
Yes. There was agreement and are certainly indubitable proofs that the parties concerned had indeed
constituted a voluntary easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road and, like any other contract, the
same could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant
estate. The argument of petitioner that there are other routes to Loyola Grand Villas from Mangyan Road
is meritless. The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory
easements, not voluntary easements. That there is no contract between La Vista and Solid Homes, Inc.,
and thus the court could not have declared the existence of an easement created by the manifest will of
the parties, is devoid of merit. The predecessors-in-interest of both La Vista and Solid Homes, Inc., the
Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation, respectively, clearly established a contractual easement
of right-of-way over Mangyan Road.
Unisource vs Chung
G.R. No. 173252 July 17, 20019
Facts:
Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the registered owner of a parcel of land. The title
contains a memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement which has been carried over from the
OCT of Encarnacion S. Sandico. As Sandico’s property was transferred to several owners, the
memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement in favor of Francisco M. Hidalgo was consistently
annotated at the back of every title covering Sandico’s property until TCT was issued in petitioner’s favor.
On the other hand, Hidalgo’s property was eventually transferred to respondents Joseph Chung, Kiat
Chung and Cleto Chung. On May 26, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of
Voluntary Easement of Right of Wayon the ground that the dominant estate has an adequate access to a
public road which is Matienza Street.
Issue:
Whether or not there was voluntary easement between the parties.
Ruling:
Easement is a real right on another’s property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter
must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property, for the
benefit of another person or tenement. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the
owner. The former is called legal, and the latter, voluntary easements. In this case, petitioner itself
admitted that a voluntary easement of right of way exists in favor of respondents. In its petition to cancel
the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way, petitioner alleged that the easement is personal.
It was voluntarily constituted in favor of a certain Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico, the owner of [the lot]
described as Lot No. 2, Block 2650. It further stated that the voluntary easement of the right of way in
favor of Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico was constituted simply by will or agreement of the parties. It was
not a statutory easement and definitely not an easement created by such court order because the Court
merely declares the existence of an easement created by the parties. In its Memorandum dated
September 27, 2001, before the trial court, petitioner reiterated that the annotation found at the back of
the TCT of Unisource is a voluntary easement.