Transformative Education through Critical Approach
Lesson 6: Jürgen Habermas: Knowledge,
Human Interests, and Communicative Action
(+) Sign of the cross
Saint Clare, you are the patron saint of television. Join me in praying for all
those that work as actors, writers, directors, and all those who work on
television programs. Help them to use their talents to produce programs that
give people hope and encourage respect for others. Pray for me that I may
choose wisely what I watch on television. Amen.
(+) Sign of the cross
Source: Daughters of St. Paul. (2014). Prayers for young Catholics. Boston: Pauline Books &
Media.
Introduction
This module will introduce you to Jürgen Habermas's thoughts on the relationship between knowledge and
human interests and his theory on communicative action. Habermas was a German philosopher considered
by many as one of the most influential contemporary philosophers.
At the end of the module, the students will be able to:
(1) identify and describe the current technical interests of his or her discipline
(2) identify three scenarios where strategic action is the best course of action and two scenarios where
communicative action is the best course of action
Topic 1: Knowledge and Human Interests
Habermas's philosophy can be seen as a criticism of positivism. Positivism views "scientific inquiry as to
the sole paradigm of knowledge" (Cherem, Nd). Scientific knowledge is about facts, causes and effects, and
laws of nature. It is generated using the methods of observation and experimentation. According to
Williamson (2002), positivists look at the world as a "collection of observable events and facts which can
be measured." Positivists advocate that both natural and social sciences should generate scientific
knowledge using the same methods.
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According to Habermas, the positivistic view consists of three claims:
(a) scientific knowledge is knowledge of cause and effects that can be used as an explanation
(b) scientific knowledge is knowledge of facts about nature
(c) scientific knowledge is about what is/exists, not about what should be (Cherem, N.d.)
Knowledge can be used as a tool to advance social goals. In scientific knowledge, it can be utilized to control
nature and produce materials needed for human survival. Habermas says that knowledge of scientific and
social progress is guided by three types of "knowledge constitutive interests"—technical, practical, and
emancipatory (Cherem, N.d.). Human interests drive the pursuit of knowledge.
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Technical interest. This human interest to generate knowledge that can be used to predict and
control the natural environment. Meteorological knowledge is required to predict the behavior of
weather systems. Understanding the nature of the SARS Cov-2 virus enables scientists to develop
health management protocols to control infection in the population and treat patients. Hydrologists
study water systems (e.g., rivers, lakes, creeks) and use the knowledge they gain to build dams and
harness water's energy to power communities. The ability to control nature is necessary for the
survival of the human species. It is produced through observation and experimentation, that is,
testing of hypothesis.
Technical interest is connected with labor. Labor involves the production of materials needed by
the human species. The smartphone or computer you are using to read this sentence is the
consequence of pursuing a technical interest. According to Cherem (N.d.), "humans use tools and
technologies to manage nature for material accommodation."
2. Practical interest. This human interest to generate knowledge aims to "secure and expand
possibilities of mutual and self-understanding in the conduct of life" (Bohman & Rehg, 2014).
Controlling nature is not the only thing necessary for the survival of humankind. We also need to
understand each other to avoid conflicts. Understanding is a requirement for social coordination
so that we can work together to pursue our interests. Understanding depends on our competencies
to interpret the meaning of utterances. And language acts as a medium for coordinating our actions
(Bohman & Rehg, 2014).
According to Cherem (N.d.), practical interest is in the social reproduction of human communities
through intersubjective norms of culture and communication. Human social life requires members
who can understand each other, share expectations, and achieve cooperation.
The knowledge that emerges from technical and practical interest is kept and disseminated through
social institutions, such as family, schools, churches, state, etc.
3. Emancipatory interest in freedom and autonomy. For Habermas, the labor of material
reproduction (technical interest) and the interaction norms of social reproduction (practical
interest) require, in a weak sense, psychosocial mechanisms to repress or deny basic drives and
impulses that would destroy material and social reproduction. For instance, labor requires delayed
gratification (meaning, work first before receiving compensation), and social interaction requires
internalized notions of obligation, reciprocity, shame, guilt, and so forth (for example, making a
promise requires sincerity and obligation to fulfill what one promises). Psychosocial mechanisms
of control are often used far more than they need to secure material and social reproduction. Those
in power may find psychosocial mechanisms useful. If women are falsely taught, there are natural
laws of gender relations such that the dominant patterns of marriage and domestic work that
consistently disadvantage them are the best they can hope for; this is an ideological mechanism of
social control (Cherem, N.d.)
Habermas posits a human interest in using self-reflection and insight to combat ideologically veiled,
superfluous social domination to realize freedom and autonomy. It is the limitation of freedom and
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autonomy for no purpose other than domination, and it "functions" through systematically distorted
communication. He calls for the exercise of critical reflection on self and society to unveil and dissolve
internalized oppressive power structures that betray one's real interests.
Topic 2: Theory of Communication Action*
Habermas characterizes human society as a system that integrates material production (work) and
normative socialization (interaction) processes through linguistically coordinated action. Habermas made
a distinction between two modes of action: work and interaction. These modes point to the "enduring
interests of the human species" (Bohman & Rehg, 2014). Work is a mode of action based on the "rational
choice of efficient means," a form of instrumental and strategic action. Interaction is a form of
communication action where the "actors coordinate their behaviors based on the consensual norm. Labor
is an action type that aims at technical control to achieve success. Interaction is an action type that aims at
mutual understanding embodied in consensual norms.
To better understand communicative action, we need to examine first strategic action to compare it with
communicative action.
In strategic action, actors are not so much interested in mutual understanding as in achieving the individual
goals they each bring to the situation. Actor A, for example, will thus appeal to B's desires and fears so as to
motivate the behavior on B's part that is required for A's success. As reasons motivating B's cooperation,
B's desires and fears are only contingently related to A's goals. B cooperates with A, in other words, not
because B finds A's project inherently interesting or worthy, but because of what B gets out of the bargain:
avoiding some threat that A can make or obtaining something A has promised (which may be of inherent
interest to B but for A is only a means of motivating B).
In communicative action, speakers coordinate their actions and pursue individual (or joint) goals based on
a shared understanding that the goals are inherently reasonable or merit-worthy. Whereas strategic action
succeeds insofar as the actors achieve their individual goals, communicative action succeeds insofar as the
actors freely agree that their goal (or goals) is reasonable and merits cooperative behavior. Thus,
communicative action is an inherently consensual form of social coordination in which actors "mobilize the
potential for rationality" given with ordinary language and its telos of rationally motivated agreement.
Communicative action can be seen as a practical attitude or way of engaging others that are highly
consensual, and that fully embodies the inbuilt aim of speech: reaching a mutual understanding.
Habermas distinguishes weak and strong communicative action. The weak form is an exchange of reasons
aimed at mutual understanding. The strong form is a practical attitude of engagement seeking fairly robust
cooperation based on a consensus about a shared enterprise's substantive content. This allows solidarity to
flourish. In either form, communicative action is distinct from "strategic action," wherein socially
interacting people aim to realize their own individual goals by using others like tools or instruments (indeed,
he calls this type of action "instrumental" when it is solitary or non-social).
A key difference between strategic and communicative action is that strategic actors have a fixed, nonnegotiable objective in mind when entering the dialogue. The point of their engagement is to appeal, induce,
cajole, or compel others into complying with what they think it takes to bring their objective about. In
contrast, communicatively acting parties seek a mutual understanding that can serve as the basis for
cooperation. In principle, this involves openness to an altered understanding of one's interests and aims in
the face of better reasons and arguments.
Another contrast between communicative and strategic action mainly concerns how an action is pursued.
Indeed, while these action orientations are mutually exclusive when seen from an actor's perspective, the
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same goal can often be approached in either communicative or strategic ways. Strategic action is about
eliciting, inducing, or compelling others' behavior to realize one's individual goals. This differs from
communicative action, rooted in the give-and-take of reasons and the "unforced force" of the best argument
justifying an action norm.
References
Bohman, J., and Rehg, W. (2014). Jürgen Habermas. Retrieved from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/
Cherem, M. (N.d.). Jürgen Habermas. Retrieved from Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
https://iep.utm.edu/habermas/
Williamson, K. et al. (2002). Research Methods for Students, Academics and Professionals (2nd Ed.).
Chandos Publishing.
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