FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 235364, April 26, 2021
MARYLINE ESTEBAN, petitioner, vs. RADLIN CAMPANO, and all persons claiming rights under
him, respondents.
CARANDANG, J.:
NATURE OF ACTION: Complaint for Recovery of Possession
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision dated
January 27, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100994, which dismissed petitioner
Maryline Esteban's (Maryline) complaint for recovery of possession; and the Resolution dated October 20,
2017 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Facts: Elpidio Talactac (Elpidio) and Maryline were married on January 30, 1988. They begot two children.
They owned the following properties, which are the subject matter of the case, to wit: (1) eight-door
apartment built on a 169-square meter lot situated in Philippine National Railway (PNR) Lot, Tramo,
Amaya, Tanza, Cavite; (2) rest house built on a 168-square meter lot, PNR Lot, Tramo, Amaya, Tanza,
Cavite; and (3) pavilion house built on a 288-square meter lot, PNR Lot, Tramo, Amaya, Tanza, Cavite.
Their marriage turned sour. In October 2005, Maryline filed a petition for annulment of marriage with
support pendente lite against Elpidio before the RTC. During the pendency of the proceedings, Maryline
and Elpidio executed a Compromise Agreement dated October 26, 2006, wherein Elpidio relinquished in
favor of Maryline the following properties as part of the liquidation of their property regime: (1) 100-square
meter real property located at Block 11, Lot 24, Springfield Subdivision, Sahud Ulan, Tanza, Cavite; (2)
Mercedes Benz 100 SsangYong Van with plate no. WEL-555; (3) house and lot with an area of 800 square
meters (right only) located at Tramo Road, Amaya, Tanza, Cavite; (4) eight-room apartment (right only)
with an area of 140 square meters located at Tramo Road, Amaya, Tanza, Cavite; (5) Suzuki Dropside
Vehicle with plate no. GJU-448; and (6) one Lifan Motorcycle — 100cc. Elpidio likewise committed to
provide the sum of P200,000.00 for the repair of the house for Maryline and their children. The terms of
the compromise agreement were incorporated in the January 5, 2007 Decision of the annulment court
granting Maryline's petition declaring their marriage null and void. However, when the Sheriff sought to
implement the writ of execution issued in the annulment case, the Sheriff could not enforce the writ over
the eight-door apartment and the house on the 800-square meter lot. Campano, who was in actual
occupation, claimed ownership over the same.
It appeared that Elpidio previously executed three documents denominated as Kasulatan sa Pagsasalin ng
Karapatan ng Lupang Tramo on different dates — December 4, 2004, March 30, 2005, and April 10, 2005
transferring and assigning 169-square meter, 168-square meter, and 288-square meter lots in Tramo,
Amaya, Tanza, Cavite in favor of Campano.
On January 22, 2007, Elpidio executed Pagbawi ng Pagsasalin ng Karapatan ng Lupang Tramo at Paggawa
ng Kapangyarihan (Pagbawi) revoking and withdrawing the assignment of the Tramo properties in favor
of Campano and giving said properties to Maryline as the latter's share in the conjugal property. Elpidio
stated in the Pagbawi that the agreement to transfer the properties in favor of Campano was only temporary,
without any consideration, and not notarized. Elpidio also designated Maryline as his authorized
representative to recover the properties from Campano. Elpidio submitted the document to the annulment
court. Demands to vacate and resort to barangay conciliation proved futile. Hence, Maryline instituted this
complaint for recovery of possession of the properties: (1) eight-door apartment; (2) rest house; and (3)
pavilion house, all situated in PNR Lot, Tramo, Amaya, Tanza, Cavite.
The RTC Ruling
On January 24, 2013, the RTC rendered a Decision granting Maryline's complaint for recovery of
possession and directing Campano and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate and restore to
Maryline the possession of the properties. The RTC held that while Elpidio transferred all his rights over
the properties in favor of Campano when he executed the three documents, Elpidio subsequently revoked
these transfers when he executed the Pagbawi. Further, the RTC declared that the demands were properly
served upon Campano on different dates but these went unheeded. Campano appealed the ruling to the CA.
The CA Ruling:
In its Decision dated January 27, 2017, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and dismissed the complaint for
recovery of possession. The CA ruled that Campano has sufficiently established by preponderance of
evidence his better right of possession over the properties. It explained that (1) Campano acquired the
property from Elpidio by virtue of the three (3) instruments denominated as Kasulatan sa Pagsasalin ng
Karapatan ng Lupang Tramo; (2) Maryline did not refute this fact and even admits the fact of transfer; and
(3) Elpidio cannot unilaterally rescind these instruments; hence, the revocation was without any legal
consequence or effect. The efficacy of the transfers to Campano remains. Maryline moved for
reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution dated October 20, 2017. Hence, Maryline filed this
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE: Whether Campano has the better right to possess the properties.
RULING: No. The petition is meritorious.
Elpidio and Maryline were married on January 30, 1988, hence, the provisions of the Civil Code govern
the couple's property relations. Under Article 119 thereof, the property relations of Elpidio and Maryline is
conjugal partnership of gains. Considering that the properties were acquired during the subsistence of their
marriage, these are conjugal in nature. Since the Civil Code provisions govern the property relations of
Elpidio and Maryline, Articles 166 and 173 should be applied to determine whether the transfer of the
properties without the consent of the wife is void, and not the Family Code provisions.
In the very recent case of Spouses Cueno v. Spouses Bautista, decided by the Court En Banc under the
ponencia of Justice Caguioa, the Court settled the recurring conflict on the proper characterization of a
transfer of conjugal property entered into without a wife's consent as merely voidable and not void. The
Court abandoned all cases contrary thereto and held that the prevailing and correct rule is that "a sale that
fails to comply with Article 166 is not "void" but merely "voidable" in accordance with Article 173 of the
Civil Code." The Court further explained in Spouses Cueno that Article 173 is explicit that the action for
the annulment of a contract involving conjugal real property entered into by a husband without the wife's
consent must be brought (1) by the wife, (2) during the marriage, and (3) within ten years from the
questioned transaction.
After a judicious examination of three Kasulatan dated December 4, 2004, March 30, 2005, and April 10,
2005, the Court finds that Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code do not apply so as to characterize these
three (3) Kasulatan as voidable. From the cases cited in Spouses Cueno, it can be inferred that the
conveyances executed without the consent of the wife were "real transfers of properties with consideration,"
such that without the consent of the wife, these transfers are only voidable consistent with Article 173 of
the Civil Code.
In this case, the Court holds that the three Kasulatan are null and void for being sham transfers done by
Elpidio in anticipation of the annulment of his marriage with Maryline. In addition, these agreements to
transfer the properties in favor of Campano were without any consideration. The three Kasulatan stated no
consideration at all. When a contract of conveyance lacks consideration, it is null and void ab initio.
Campano acknowledged that his right over the properties emanates from the three Kasulatan. Considering,
however, that the three Kasulatan, are null and void, these did not transfer any right in favor of Campano
over the properties. These documents are without force and effect from the very beginning. It gave no right
to Campano to possess the properties. Being null and void, there is even no need for Elpidio to execute the
Pagbawi revoking and withdrawing the assignment of the properties in favor Campano. There is no
revocation to speak of since the three Kasulatan are null and void.
Maryline has a better right to possess the properties. The Court gives due regard to the interest of the family
and validates the rights of Maryline and her children over the properties. Maryline is now enforcing her
right over these properties pursuant to the Compromise Agreement between her and Elpidio as incorporated
in the judgment of the annulment court wherein they amicably settled their property relations, giving the
properties to Maryline. Campano and all persons claiming rights under him should vacate the properties. It
is time for Maryline to enjoy the possession thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 27, 2017 and the
Resolution dated October 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100994 are SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated January 24, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires City, Branch 23,
granting the complaint for recovery of possession, is hereby REINSTATED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 209435, August 10, 2022
ERNESTO LORENZO, MANUEL LORENZO, CONCHITA LORENZO-BRUNO, * ADORACION
SUELEN, ** AVELINA SUELEN, ** and HEIRS OF RODOLFO LORENZO, petitioners, vs.
FORTUNATA D. EUSTAQUIO and children, namely: ANGELITO, JOSE, ALEGRIA, LEONIDA,
TEOFILO, DELFIN, JR., ALEJANDRO all surnamed EUSTAQUIO (HEIRS OF DELFIN
EUSTAQUIO, SR.), respondents.
HERNANDO, J.:
NATURE OF ACTION: Action for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of documents, surrender of
title, and damages.
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the January 31, 2013 Decision and
the September 4, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93647, which affirmed
the June 8, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68 of Camiling, Tarlac, in Civil Case
No. 05-05 in favor of the heirs of Delfin L. Eustaquio (respondents) in an action for quieting of title,
declaration of nullity of documents, surrender of title, and damages.
Facts: The spouses Gregorio Eustaquio and Regina Lorenzo owned Lot No. 2161, a 7,275 square meters
parcel of land situated in Barangay Bacabac, Camiling, Tarlac, and covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 27351. They have three children, namely: Delfin, Trinidad, and Fausta. On June 2, 1942, the
spouses Gregorio and Regina executed a deed of donation propter nuptias (Inventario Matrimonio) in favor
of Delfin and Fortunata, donating a carabao and three parcels of land, among others, in celebration of their
marriage. Included in the donated parcels of land is the subject land. Delfin (17 years old at that time) and
Fortunata issued a receipt to Gregorio showing their acceptance of the donation. Immediately thereafter,
they occupied and took possession of the subject land in the concept of an owner until the unexpected
controversy arose after Delfin's demise on July 4, 1994.
Petitioners, namely: (a) Ernesto Lorenzo (Ernesto), Manuel Lorenzo, Conchita Lorenzo-Bruno, and heirs
of Rodolfo Lorenzo (children of Trinidad); and (b) Adoracion and Avelina Suelen (children of Fausta),
presented a Deed of Succession and Adjudication 9 dated December 31, 1993. The said deed stated that the
subject land was subdivided into three lots: Lot 2161-A, Lot 2161-B, and Lot 2162-C, as per Psd-036903053138 which bore a signature "G Eustaquio" referring to Gregorio. These lots are to be adjudicated among
the heirs of spouses Gregorio and Regina in this wise: a. Lot No. 2161-A — shall belong to DELFIN L.
EUSTAQUIO; b. Lot No. 2161-B — shall belong to ERNESTO, MANUEL, RODOLFO & CONCHITA,
all [s]urnamed E. LORENZO, in equal share; c. Lot No. 2161-C, shall belong to FAUSTA L. EUSTAQUIO
Petitioners, represented by Ernesto, then filed a Petition for issuance of a second owner's duplicate copy of
OCT No. 27351. He averred that he is an heir of the spouses Gregorio and Regina, and was in possession
of the duplicate copy of the title which he lost. The trial court granted the petition; hence, a duplicate copy
of the same was issued to petitioners. The purported false claims of petitioners prompted respondents to
file the instant Complaint for Quieting of Title, Declaration of Nullity of Document and Surrender of Title
with Prayer for the Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order,
which was later on amended.
The RTC Ruling
In its June 8, 2009 Decision, the RTC found the donation void for lack of notarization. Article 633 of the
Old Civil Code provided that a gift of real property must appear in a public instrument to be valid, which
is lacking in the case. Nonetheless, the trial court held that respondents had already acquired ownership
over the subject land through acquisitive prescription. It opined that the spouses Delfin and Fortunata and
their children had been in actual, open, continuous, and adverse possession of the subject land in the concept
of an owner since 1942, the year it was allegedly donated to them.
Further, the trial court ruled that laches had already set in as petitioners failed to assail the validity of the
donation. Neither did they assert their successional rights over the subject land granting that it had been
impaired by the donation in favor of spouses Delfin and Fortunata. Hence, by respondents' uninterrupted
and adverse possession of the subject land for a long period of time, they had already acquired title over the
same outweighing the general rule that prescription does not run against registered lands.
Petitioners appealed before the CA insisting on the validity of the Deed of Succession and Adjudication
and the nullity of the donation.
The CA Ruling: Affirmed the RTC Decision
Anent the substantial merits, the appellate court declared respondents to be the owners of the subject
property by virtue of acquisitive prescription regardless of whether the donation was valid or not. Since
respondents are deemed the owners of the subject land, the CA opined that the Deed of Succession and
Adjudication is void as it was executed only in 1993, or after respondents' possession of the subject land
had already ripened into ownership.
Petitioners sought for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated September 4,
2013. Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether the spouses Delfin and Fortunata are the rightful owners of the subject land (assuming
that despite the fact that the Donation Propter Nuptias was void)
RULING: Yes. The petition is unmeritorious.
Upon a careful examination of the records, the Court agrees with the conclusion of the CA and the RTC
that the spouses Delfin and Fortunata are the rightful owners of the subject land not by reason of acquisitive
prescription, but on the ground of laches.
Donations propter nuptias or donations by reason of marriage are those "made before its celebration, in
consideration of the same and in favor of one or both of the future spouses." Under Article 1328 of the Old
Civil Code, a donation propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property donated
must be specifically described. In other words, such donation must be in a public instrument otherwise it is
void. Thus, pursuant to the aforementioned rule, the Inventario Matrimonio executed in 1942 by the spouses
Gregorio and Regina in favor of the spouses Delfin and Fortunata is indeed void as it was not notarized,
hence, not a public instrument.
This notwithstanding, the donation propter nuptias can still serve as a legal basis of adverse possession sans
noncompliance with the formal requisites. A private document of donation can be the basis of a claim of
ownership if there is clear and convincing evidence of possession, like in the instant case. However,
contrary to the pronouncement of the appellate and trial courts, the Court finds that respondents' possession
of the subject land had ripened into ownership not because of acquisitive prescription but only because of
laches.
The following are the essential elements of laches: (1) conduct on the part of defendant or one under whom
he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (2) delay in asserting complainant's right after he had
knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after he has an opportunity to sue; (3) lack of knowledge or
notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit;
and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant. All these
elements are present in this case.
As early as 1942, the spouses Delfin and Fortunata occupied the subject land upon acceptance of the
donation. Since then, they and their children have been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner.
Delfin and Fortunata constructed their house therein and tilled the land. Their children, together with their
families, also subsequently built their houses therein. Respondents remained in public, exclusive, and
peaceful possession of the subject land for almost 50 years until it was interrupted in 1993 when petitioners
began to occupy portions of the same due to the Deed of Succession and Adjudication.
Indeed, respondents have been in uninterrupted, continuous, public, and adverse possession of the subject
land for 50 years. However, their possession will not ripen into ownership on the ground of acquisitive
prescription as the subject land is a registered land. In any event, the spouses Delfin and Fortunata still
acquired ownership over the subject land on the ground of laches.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit. The January 31, 2013
Decision and the September 4, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93647 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 233365, March 14, 2021
NICXON L. PEREZ, JR., petitioner, vs. AVEGAIL PEREZ-SENERPIDA, assisted by her husband
MR. SENERPIDA, respondent.
CAGUIOA, J.:
NATURE OF ACTION: Annulment of Donation and Title.
Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by petitioner Nicxon L. Perez, Jr. (Nicxon) assailing the Decision dated April 7, 2017 and Resolution
4 dated August 15, 2017 of the Court of Appeals 5 in CA-G.R. CV No. 105393. The CA Decision dismissed
Nicxon's appeal and affirmed the Decision dated February 24, 2015 rendered by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 135-0-2010 for Annulment of Donation and Title
with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The CA Resolution
denied Nicxon's motion for reconsideration.
Facts: Spouses Eliodoro Q. Perez (Eliodoro) and Adelita M. Perez (Adelita) were the registered owners of
a parcel of land in Olongapo City. They were married on December 10, 1975, and had two children, Avegail
and Adonis Perez (Adonis). Before his marriage with Adelita, Eliodoro was married and had several
children, one of whom was Nicxon Perez, Sr. The latter, in turn, is the father of Nicxon L. Perez, Jr.
(Nicxon). Adelita executed a sworn statement denominated as Renunciation and Waiver of Rights (RWR)
in favor of Eliodoro on October 29, 1995, which was inscribed on the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
of the subject parcel of land. Eliodoro donated said land to Nicxon on July 27, 2004. However, the donation
was without the conformity of Adelita. Subsequently, a Real Estate Mortgage was executed by Nicxon in
favor of Rolando Ramos.
On February 1, 2005, Eliodoro filed against Adelita a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code before the Regional Trial Court Branch 73 (RTC-Branch 73). The RTC
declared the marriage void ab initio. Such decision became final and executory as of July 6, 2005 pursuant
to an entry of judgment dated July 11, 2005.
Eliodoro died on June 28, 2008. An Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs with Waiver was executed and
signed by his legitimate and compulsory heirs. On September 30, 2010, Avegail Perez-Senerpida (Avegail)
brought an action for Annulment of Donation and Title against Nicxon. Avegail alleged that she is one of
the children of the late Eliodoro and Adelita and that Deed of Donation solely executed by Eliodoro was
based on the alleged RWR executed by her mother Adelita. She claimed that the RWR and the Deed of
Donation were prejudicial to her interest because it affected her future inheritance or legitime.
Nicxon answered by denying Avegail’s allegation that Adelita is a part owner of the subject land and that
assuming she was, she has no more right thereon when she executed the RWR. Avegail reiterated that
Adelita, was a part owner of the subject property. Furthermore, she countered that RWR was null and void
as it was not supported by any valid consideration.
In the meantime, On July 5, 2011, six years after the Marriage Nullity Decision had become final and
executory, Adelita filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for annulment of judgment (Annulment
of Judgment Petition) against the heirs of Eliodoro, who are the children of Eliodoro by his first marriage,
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person.
With respect to the annulment of judgement petition, the CA, on March 5, 2012, referred the case to the
Executive Judge for assignment to a judge for further reception of evidence. The RTC-Branch 75 received
the respective evidence of Adelita and Nicxon and subsequently ordered the transmission thereof to the
CA.
The RTC Ruling
On February 24, 2015. The RTC-Branch 73 ruled in favor of Avegail and ordered the annulment of the
RWR and the Deed of Donation in favor of Nicxon. It further ruled that the Marriage Nullity Decision
had not yet attained finality at the time of Eliodoro’s death considering that the same has been assigned
for further reception of evidence. Thus, it deemed the marriage between Eliodoro and Adelita to be valid
and subsisting from the time of its celebration up to Eliodoro's death on June 28, 2008.
The CA Ruling: Affirmed the RTC Decision
On September 22, 2015, the CA denied the petition for annulment of judgement. The Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied. The petition for review on certiorari filed by Adelita before the Supreme
Court was also denied.
As to the appeal filed by Nicxon, the same was denied by the CA on April 7, 2017. It ruled that at the time
of the donation, Eliodoro was still legally married to Adelita. As such, Eliodoro should have first secured
the conformity of his wife, Adelita, as expressly required under Article 98 of the Family Code.
As to the RWR, the CA ruled that the RWR is a prohibited waiver because the property regime of Eliodoro
and Adelita was the absolute community property (ACP), there being no marriage settlement between them,
and under Article 89 of the Family Code (FC), which provides that: "No waiver of rights, interests, shares
and effects of the absolute community property during the marriage can be made except in case of judicial
separation of property”.
The CA further agreed with the RTC the RWR partook the nature of a donation or grant of gratuitous
advantage between spouses, there being no material consideration given by Eliodoro to Adelita in exchange
for the execution of the RWR, which consequently is prohibited under Article 87 of the FC which provides:
"every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage
shall be void."
Nicxon contends that Article 147 of the FC applies to the present case. Thus, the RWR is valid on the
ground that Eliodoro and Adelita, being mere co- owners of the subject property, either of them could
donate or waive their respective shares therein provided that the consent of either partner was obtained.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: (1) Whether the property regime of ACP apply to the marriage of Eliodoro and Adelita; (2)
Whether the Deed of Donation valid despite the absence of consent of Adelita.
RULING: The petition is partly meritorious.
(1) No. Since the marriage between Adelita and Eliodoro was judicially decreed to be void ab initio or from
the beginning, the RTC and the CA erred in ruling that the ACP regime governed their property relations.
Even if their marriage was not declared void from the beginning, the RTC and the CA would still have
erred because the applicable property regime should have been the conjugal partnership of gains (CPG).
Pursuant to Article 105 of the Family Code, the provisions of Chapter 4, Conjugal Partnership of Gains,
shall apply to CPG already established before the effectivity of the Family Code, without prejudice to vested
rights.
Since the marriage between Eliodoro and Adelita was celebrated on December 10, 1975 and the CPG was
then the applicable property regime between validly married spouses, absent any contract executed before
the marriage, then that property regime continued.
Consequently, since the property regime is CPG, Article 89 of the FC which provides in part: "No waiver
of rights, interests, shares and effects of the absolute community property during the marriage can be made
except in case of judicial separation of property”, does not apply and it cannot justify the nullification of
Adelita's RWR since Adelita and Eliodoro were not validly married.
(2) No. The Court ruled first ruled that Article 147 of the FC applied which provides:
When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them
through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the farmer's efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or
all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
Since the subject property was registered in the names of Eliodoro and Adelita, as spouses, and there being
no proof to the contrary, the subject property is presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work
or industry, and was owned in equal shares by them pursuant to Article 147.
Under Article 147 of the Family Code, which covers the exclusive cohabitation of a man and woman as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, there is unfortunately no direct
prohibition on donation of any property acquired during the cohabitation by one party without the consent
of the other.
It is true that Article 147 provides that the property acquired during the cohabitation shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership and pursuant to Article 493 of the Civil Code, in a co-ownership: "Each co-owner
shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved; but the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership."
With Article 493 of the Civil Code as basis, Eliodoro could have alienated onerously or gratuitously his
part or share in the subject property to Nicxon without the consent of Adelita.
However, Article 493 of the Civil Code cannot supersede, and must yield to, Article 147 of the Family
Code, which expressly mandates that: "Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or
her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the
other, until after the termination of their cohabitation." The reason for this amendment to Article 144 of the
Civil Code rule, as it is now expressed in the Family Code, is this:
x x x If the parties are allowed to dispose of their shares in said properties like in a true coownership, it will destroy their relationship. The Family Code, as already stated, would like to
encourage the parties to legalize their union some day and is just smoothing out the way until their
relationship ripens into a valid union.
Given the above express prohibition of a party to the cohabitation to encumber or alienate by acts inter
vivos even his or her share in the property acquired during the cohabitation and owned in common, without
the consent of the other party until after the termination thereof under Article 147, then the donation of any
property acquired during the cohabitation by one party without the consent of the other can only be but
void. The rules on ordinary co-ownership cannot apply to vest validity on the undivided share of the
disposing party.
If a disposition of a party's share in the property under special co ownership created by virtue of Article 147
without the consent of the other party is proscribed by law, then, and with more reason, should the
disposition of the entire property under such special co-ownership by a party without the other party's
consent be considered void as well.
While the Court found merit in Nicxon's contention that the lower courts in the present case erred in finding
that the property regime between Adelita and Eliodoro was governed by the ACP as their marriage subsisted
until Eliodoro died, the Deed of Donation to him of the subject property is, nonetheless, void as this is a
prohibited disposition under Article 147 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated April 7, 2017 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 105393 is AFFIRMED for the reasons stated herein. However, the
Decision dated February 24, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case
No. 135-0-2010 is MODIFIED as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the court finds the instant action meritorious, and hereby
orders the following:
1. Nullification of the Renunciation and Waiver of Rights executed by Adelita Perez in favor of
Eliodoro Perez;
2. Nullification of the Deed of Donation executed by the late Eliodoro Perez in favor of Nicxon L.
Perez, Jr.;
3. Nullification of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12547 in the name of Nicxon L. Perez,
Jr.;
4. Cancellation by the Registry of Deeds of T.C.T. No. T-12547 in the name of Nicxon L. Perez,
Jr.; and
5. Issuance of another title over the subject property in the name of Eliodoro Q. Perez and Adelita
M. Perez.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 250774, June 16, 2021
EDGARDO SANTOS, ZENAIDA SANTOS HER ERA, CORAZON SANTOS CANTILERO,
ARMANDO SANTOS, SONIA SANTOS MAGPAYO, CIELITO SANTOS BALMEDIANO,
EVELYN SANTOS NICOLAS, FELIXBERTO SANTOS, MARIA BETTINA DIAZ SANTOS,
REUBEN JOSEPH SANTOS, JEROME SANTOS DE GUZMAN, AND JERICK SANTOS DE
GUZMAN, PETITIONERS, v. MARIA D. SANTOS and/or her Successors-in-Interest,
RESPONDENT.
CARANDANG, J.:
NATURE OF ACTION:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari' under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules),
assailing the Decision2 dated May 3, 2019 and the Resolution3 dated November 26, 2019 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 110870.
Facts: Respondent Maria D. Santos (Maria) was 16 years old when she first met Jose Santos (Jose), a rice
farmer, who was then married to Josefa Santos (Josefa). No romantic relationship materialized even though
they liked each other. Maria married Dominador Mendoza (Dominador) with whom she had seven children.
Dominador died on May 6, 1990.
Jose allegedly had eight children with Josefa, namely: Zenaida Santos Herrera (Zenaida); Edgard Santos
(Edgardo); Corazon Santos Cantilero (Corazon); Armando Santos (Armando); Sonia Santos Magpayo
(Sonia); Nestor Santos (Nestor); Milagros Santos De Guzman (Milagros) and Ruben Santos (Ruben).
Nestor predeceased Jose and is represented by his children, namely: Cielito Santos Balmediano(Cielito);
Evelyn Santos Nicolas (Evelyn); and Felixberto Santos (Felixberto). Milagros also predeceased Jose and is
represented by her children, Jerome De Guzman (Jerome) and Jerick De Guzman (Jerick). Ruben allegedly
died on September 5, 1987 and has two children of his own, namely, Maria Bettina Diaz Santos (Bettina)
and Reuben Joseph Santos (Reuben Joseph) who are both living in the United States. Josefa died on
November 10, 2000.
Jose got involved in an agricultural tenancy dispute with his landlord, the Gaspar family. In Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Case No. 5448 entitled Adelaida Gaspar, et al. v. Jose
Santos, Jose was granted the right to "peaceful possession of the land cultivated and possessed by him for
the past 18 years." The Decision became final and executory on July 9, 2000.
After Jose's wife died, he courted Maria. On March 17, 2001, Jose asked Maria to live with him in a small
but on the land he was cultivating in Barangay Poblacion, Bustos, Bulacan owned by the Gaspar Family.
On April 25, 2002, Jose and Maria got married against the wishes of Jose's children. By then, Jose was 77
years old while Maria was 61 years old.
On May 28, 2002, the Gaspar family, executed three documents denominated as "Deed of Donation"
wherein they gave a total of 6,000 square meters of rice land allegedly as "Disturbance Compensation of
Tenant."' Of the 6,000 square meters given to Jose, he either sold or donated segregated portions of the
property.
On December 4, 2007, Jose executed a Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob Pala's gratuitously transferring in favor
of Maria 805 sqm covered by TCT No. T-242136. The subject portion was further subdivided. As a result,
the subject property now has an area of 694 sqm. It is covered by TCT No. 289268 and is registered in the
name of "Jose L. Santos, Filipino, of legal age, widower, now married to Maria Santos."' He built a concrete
house for himself and Maria, a sari-sari store, and other rental concrete structures. Both parties admit in
their respective pleadings that while the size of the property donated to Maria was 805 sqm, the actual size
of the property left at the time of Jose's death is only 694 sqm covered by TCT No. 289268.
On June I, 2010, Jose died without a will. After Jose passed away, his surviving children and grandchildren
asked Maria to divide the 694 sqm lot into 9 equal portions for distribution to Jose's children and
grandchildren from his first marriage and Maria. Maria opposed, insisting that she is the sole owner of the
subject property by virtue of the Kasulatari rig Pagkakaloob Pala. Thus, on September 1, 2010, Edgardo,
Zenaida, Armando, Sonia, Corazon, Cielito, Evelyn, Felixberto, Jerick, and Jerome (collectively, Edgardo's
group) filed a complaint for Partition, Accounting and Damages against Maria.
The RTC Ruling
For the RTC, the subject property is an exclusive asset of Jose and is not part of the absolute community of
property because it was acquired through gratuitous title by Jose during his marriage to Maria. The phrase
"married to" preceding the name of Maria in TCT No. T-289268 is merely descriptive of the civil status of
the registered owner and does not prove co¬ownership.44 The RTC held that the alleged donation made by
Jose in favor of Maria is null and void and has no legal effect as it violates Article 87 of the Family Code
which, as a rule, prohibits donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses
during the marriage.
The RTC ruled that Maria, as the surviving spouse of Jose, is now co-owners with Jose's children and
grandchildren from his first marriage. Thus, the RTC declared that the property shall be divided in eight
equal portions. The share pertaining to Nestor and Milagros, the children of Jose who predeceased him,
will be inherited by their respective children, which shall divide the 1/8 share pertaining to their respective
parent among themselves.'
The CA Ruling:
The CA ruled that the subject property forms part of Jose and Maria's absolute community of property and
is not his separate property. Upon Jose's death and the dissolution of the absolute community, one-half of
the 694 sqm property belonged to Maria as his wife.
ISSUE: (1) Whether the subject property is excluded from the community property of Jose and Maria.
RULING: Yes.
For marriages that took place after the effectivity of the Family Code, in the absence of any marriage
settlements, property relations between husband and wife are governed by the absolute community property
regime. Since the marriage between Maria and Jose took place on April 25, 2002, the property regime
governing their marriage is the absolute community property regime.
As a general rule, absolute community of property shall consist all the property owned by the spouses at
the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter. According to Article 93 of the Family
Code, “property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the community, unless it is proved
that it is one of those excluded therefrom.” The following are excluded from the absolute community of
property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits as
well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor
that they shall form part of the community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However, jewelry shall form part of
the community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a
former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property.
In the present case, it was already established that the subject property was acquired by Jose by onerous
title during his marriage to Maria despite being denominated as donation. The subject property was acquired
by way of disturbance compensation. Thus, it shall form part of the community property of Jose and Maria
and one-half of the property belongs to Maria.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 3, 2019 and the Resolution dated November
26, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 110870 are SET ASIDE.
The Court finds respondent Maria D. Santos as the owner of one-half portion of the 694-square-meter
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-289268 located in Poblacion, Bustos, Bulacan. In
addition, Maria D. Santos, Zenaida Santos Herrera, Edgardo Santos, Corazon Santos Cantilero, Armando
Santos, Sonia Santos Magpayo, Nestor Santos, Milagros Santos De Guzman, and Ruben Santos shall share
equally in the other one-half portion of the property.
Since Nestor Santos, Milagros Santos De Guzman, and Ruben Santos predeceased Jose Santos, their
respective children shall inherit their corresponding share through right of representation, in accordance
with Article 974 of the Civil Code. Cielito Santos Balmediano, Evelyn Santos Nicolas, and Felixberto
Santos shall divide equally the portion granted to Nestor Santos. Jerome De Guzman and jerick De Guzman
shall divide equally the share belonging to Milagros Santos De Guzman. Maria Bettina Diaz Santos, and
Ruben Joseph Santos shall divide equally the share of Ruben Santos.
The case is REMANDED to the RTC Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 79, for purposes of partitioning the
property in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 246255, February 3, 2021
TERESITA CORDOVA and JEAN ONG CORDOVA, petitioners, vs. EDWARD TY, respondent.
DELOS SANTOS, J.:
NATURE OF ACTION:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which assails
the Decision dated November 15, 2018 and the Resolution dated April 2, 2019 rendered by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 155547. The CA granted respondent Edward Ty's (Ty) appeal and
reinstated the writ of execution issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 27.
Facts: The instant controversy arose from a writ of execution issued to satisfy the civil aspect of the
Decision dated July 27, 2007 of the MeTC for eleven (11) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.)
22 filed by Ty against Chi Tim Cordova (Chi Tim) and Robert Young (Young). Chi Tim is the husband of
petitioner Teresita O. Cordova (Teresita) and the father of petitioner Jean Ong Cordova (Jean; collectively,
petitioners). On July 27, 2007, the MeTC rendered a Decision 7 on the civil aspect of the B.P. 22 case filed
against Chi Tim and Young, finding them jointly and solidarily liable for the amounts of P6,200,000.00
representing the value of the bounced checks and P100,000.00 as attorney's fees and other litigation
expenses.
After the Decision became final and executory, Ty moved for the issuance of a writ of execution which was
granted by the MeTC. The subject properties levied to be sold in a public auction are particularly described
as follows: (1) parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 77973 (TCT No. 77973
property); and (2) condominium unit covered by Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. 4441 (CCT
No. 4441 property; collectively, subject properties).
Petitioners filed a Very Urgent Motion to Exclude their Properties from the Auction Sale before the MeTC.
The MeTC merely noted this motion, which impelled petitioners to file a Petition for Prohibition and
Mandamus with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 32.
The petition before the RTC was anchored on the claim that the liability from the B.P. 22 case was a
corporate obligation and for this reason, Chi Tim should not be held personally liable. As regards the claim
for exemption, petitioners alleged that the TCT No. 77973 property was exclusively owned by Teresita,
which she purchased using funds donated to her by her father; while the CCT No. 4441 property was the
Cordova family home and presently, utilized by Jean as her own family home.
The RTC Ruling
The RTC held that as regards the CCT No. 4441 property: (a) it was registered in the Register of Deeds of
Manila on February 14, 1984 in the name of Cordova Chi Tim, married to Teresita Cordova; (b) it became
a family home by operation of law and thus, exempt from execution; (c) Ty neither disputed that Jean is the
daughter of Chi Tim and Teresita, nor that Jean and her own family reside in the same condominium unit;
and (d) the claim of exempt status was timely raised, that is, before sale at a public auction.
With regard to the TCT No. 77973 property, the RTC found that: (a) the sale was registered on January 20,
1993 at the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City; (b) the Deed of Absolute Sale signed on January 19, 1993
shows that the sole vendee was Teresita; and (c) while Teresita was described as "married to Chi Tim
Cordova," this was added for no other purpose but to describe her civil status.
On November 16, 2017, the RTC rendered a Decision which permanently restrained the sale of the subject
properties. The RTC adopted the discussion in its previous Orders as the ratio decidendi for its Judgment.
Ty sought reconsideration, but was denied.
The CA Ruling: Reversed the RTC Decision
The CA rendered the assailed Decision which granted Ty's appeal. With regard to the TCT No. 77973
property, the CA ruled that the fact that it was acquired during the subsistence of Teresita's marriage with
Chi Tim was sufficient to hold it as conjugally-owned and could be executed to satisfy the latter's civil
obligation. There was no definite proof that Teresita acquired the property using her own funds or that the
conjugal partnership of gains, which governed her property relationship with her husband, had been severed
at the time of the property's purchase. Similarly, the claim of exemption for the CCT No. 4441 property
based solely on the unproven allegation of Jean that it was constituted as a family home, and for this reason,
was not sustained. Petitioners sought reconsideration which was denied in the assailed Resolution dated
April 2, 2019.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: (1) Whether the subject properties may be executed to satisfy the civil liability of Chi Tim arising
from the B.P. 22 case.
RULING: No. The petition is meritorious.
Preliminary to the proper evaluation on whether the subject properties may be executed upon is the
determination of whether the subject properties, are part of the conjugal assets of Chi Tim and Teresita.
Records show that the spouses were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and did not execute
any pre-nuptial agreement; thus, their property relations is governed by conjugal partnership of gains.
Further, under Article 160 of the Civil Code, "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." In Ching
v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that it is not even necessary to prove that the properties were acquired
with funds of the partnership. Even when the manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear,
the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal.
It is undisputed that the TCT No. 77973 property was acquired during the marriage of Chi Tim and Teresita.
The fact that Teresita was identified as the sole vendee and registered owner in the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated January 19, 1993 and a copy of the title respectively, did not destroy its conjugal nature as the
registration of the property is not conclusive evidence of the exclusive ownership of the husband or the
wife. Even if the property appears to be registered solely in the name of either spouse, it has the inherent
character of conjugal property if it was acquired for valuable consideration during marriage.
Petitioners concede that the CCT No. 4441 property is part of the conjugal properties of Chi Tim and
Teresita, because it is their family home. The claim that a property is a family home is not a magic wand
that will freeze the court's hand and forestall the execution of a final and executory ruling. The Court, in
Salazar v. Felias, held that the claim for exemption must be set up and proved, whether the claim for
exemption of the family home is premised under the Civil Code or the Family Code. Here, the Court finds
that the appellate court's determination that the CCT No. 4441 property was not proven to be petitioners'
family home is borne out by the records.
None of the requisites of what constitutes a family home were met by petitioners. Instead, petitioners
attempted to shift the burden to Ty by asserting that he failed to comply with the requisites before a family
home may be validly executed. However, this burden never shifted to Ty inasmuch as the CCT No. 4441
property was not proven to be the family home of petitioners to begin with. Since this essential fact is
wanting in this case, there is no exemption to speak of with respect to the CCT No. 4441 property. In fine,
it being established that the subject properties were purchased during the subsistence of the marriage
between Chi Tim and Teresita, and in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the
presumption of conjugality of the subject properties prevails.
As earlier discussed, Chi Tim and Teresita were married when the Civil Code was still the operative law
on marriages. The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they were married under the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains. However, the subsequent enactment of the Family Code superseded
the terms of conjugal partnership under the Civil Code. Thus, to resolve the issue of whether the subject
properties may be answerable for the civil liability imposed on Chi Tim, the Court must refer to the
applicable Family Code provisions.
Under Article 121 (3) of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for "debts and obligations
contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have
benefited." Prescinding from this provision, petitioners contend that the conjugality of the subject properties
alone does not mean it should automatically be bound to answer for the personal debt of one spouse. Thus,
they allege that Ty must establish that the loans subject of the B.P. 22 case redounded to the benefit of
petitioners' family before the conjugal partnership may be held liable. Petitioners' argument is well-taken.
Notwithstanding Ty's right to enforce the Decision of the MeTC, he cannot obtain satisfaction by executing
upon the subject properties. Settled is the rule that conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal
obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the
conjugal partnership. Article 122 of the Family Code is emphatic:
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the
marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family. x x x
All told, the civil aspect arising from the eleven (11) counts of B.P. 22 cannot be satisfied by executing the
subject properties, which are conjugal properties, absent adequate proof that the loans obtained by Chi Tim
redounded to the benefit of petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 15,
2018 and the Resolution dated April 2, 2019 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 155547
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated November 16, 2017 rendered by the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. R-MNL-17-00658-CV is AFFIRMED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 246445, March 2, 2021
SPOUSES EULALIO CUENO AND FLORA BONIFACIO CUENO, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
EPIFANIO AND VERONICA BAUTISTA, SPOUSES RIZALDO AND ANACITA BAUTISTA,
SPOUSES DIONILO AND MARY ROSE BAUTISTA, SPOUSES ROEL AND JESSIBEL B.
SANSON, AND SPOUSES CALIXTO AND MERCEDITA B. FERNANDO, respondents.
CAGIUOA, J.:
NATURE OF ACTION:
The instant Petition assails the Decision dated October 8, 2018 (assailed Decision) and Resolution 3 dated
March 5, 2019 (assailed Resolution) of the Court of Appeals, Special Twenty-Second Division (CA), in
CA-G.R. CV No. 04862-MIN, which reversed the Decision 4 dated February 1, 2017 of the Regional Trial
Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 16 (RTC) and ordered the dismissal of the complaint filed by Spouses
Eulalio and Flora Bonifacio Cueno (collectively referred to as petitioners).
Facts: Lot No. 2836 was owned by the two sons of Ramon Bonifacio: Luis Bonifacio (Luis) and Isidro
Bonifacio (Isidro), who sold part of their interest to the City of Zamboanga and became co-owners of the
retained lot (subject property). Flora Bonifacio Cueno (Flora) is the daughter of Luis and is married to
Eulalio Cueno (Eulalio). In 1961, Spouses Eulalio and Flora Cueno (Sps. Cueno) bought the pro indiviso
share of Isidro in the subject property as reflected in an Escritura de Venta (first sale), which led to the
issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the names of Luis and Eulalio.
Prior to the issuance of the TCT, Eulalio supposedly sold his and Flora’s share of the lot to Luis without
Flora’s consent as covered by another Escritura de Venta (second sale). The second sale was registered and
another TCT was issued in the names of Luis and Eulalio, which was later cancelled for another TCT issued
solely in the name Luis, married to Juana.
In a Deed of Absolute Sale (third sale), Luis allegedly sold the property to Spouses Epifanio and Veronica
Bautista (Sps. Bautista) leading to the registration of a TCT in their name. Thereafter, the Sps. Bautista took
possession of the property and built improvements on the same. Years later, Sps. Bautista donated the
subject property to their four children: Rizaldo, Dionilo, Jessibel, and Mercedita to which TCTs were issued
in their names. Sps. Cueno filed a complaint in 2008 for recovery of the subject property on the ground that
they were allegedly deprived of their share through fraud. On the other hand, Sps. Bautista claimed that
they acquired the subject property in good faith and for value from the registered owner, Luis, as evidenced
by the third sale.
The RTC Ruling
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the complaint and declared the second sale between Eulalio and
Luis void. Although the fraud and/or forger was not proven, the RTC invalidated the sale for lack of the
spousal consent of Flora.
The CA Ruling: Reversed the RTC Decision
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of the RTC and held that the Sps. Bautista had
a better right over the subject properties.
ISSUE: (1) Whether the second sale void for lack of spousal consent pursuant to Article 166 of the Civil
Code.
RULING: No. The petition is unmeritorious.
Article 166 of the Civil Code indicates that “the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of
the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent” and in relation thereto, Article 173 of the Civil Code
provides that “the wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned ask
the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent.”
Based on various jurisprudence, two conflicting views in the interpretation of the above-mentioned
provisions emerged:
(a) The first view treats such contracts as void:
(i) on the basis of lack of consent of an indispensable party; and/or
(ii) because such transactions contravene mandatory provisions of law; and
(b) The second view holds that the absence of such consent indicated under Article 166 does not
render the entire transaction void but merely voidable in accordance with Article 173 of the Civil
Code.
Here, the Court adopted the second view and declared that the same is the prevailing and correct rule thus
abandoning all cases contrary thereto. The Court held that a sale that fails to comply with Article 166 is not
void but merely voidable in accordance with Article 173 of the Civil Code.
The Court differentiated a void or inexistent contract from that of a voidable contract. On one hand, a void
or inexistent contract is one which lacks, absolutely either in fact or in law, one or some of the elements
which are essential for its validity and is one which has no force and effect from the very beginning as if it
had never been entered. On the other hand, a voidable contract is one where consent is vitiated by lack of
legal capacity of one of the contracting parties or by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or
fraud. Unlike void contracts, voidable or annullable contracts are existent, valid, and binding between
parties. The same may still be ratified and may be barred by prescription.
Contrary to the nature of void contracts, transactions that fail to comply with Article 166 produce effects
and when read with Article 173, said provision leads to the inescapable conclusion that a contract disposing
or encumbering conjugal real property without the wife’s consent is not void but merely voidable. Insofar
as the phrase “lack of consent” under Article 166 is concerned, the same does not give rise to a no contract
situation as such phrase contemplates a situation akin to an incapacity to give consent under Article 1390
of the Civil Code. Hence, contracts falling under Article 166 are considered as a special type of voidable
contract which are deemed valid until annulled.
Applying these principles, the Court held that Sps. Cueno’s claim that the second sale was void and
imprescriptible lacks merit. The Court had previously ruled that the ten-year prescriptive period under
Article 173 of the Civil Code is counted from the execution of the deed of sale of the property. In the present
case, the Escritura de Venta between Eulalio and Luis, which was executed without Flora’s consent, was
on 04 December 1963. Pursuant to Article 1973, Flora’s action to annul the contract accrued upon the
execution of the sale in 1963 and had 10 years or until 1973 to question said transaction. Unfortunately, the
action commenced in 2009 was filed out of time which only meant that Sps. Cueno lacked the right to
question the subsequent sale by Luis in favor of Sps. Bautista. Hence, the Court denied the petition.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 241699, August 4, 2021
DENNIS T. UY TUAZON, WORLD WISER INTERNATIONAL, INC., and JERZON
MANPOWER AND TRADING, INC., petitioners, vs. MYRA V. FUENTES, respondent.
INTING, J.:
NATURE OF ACTION: Declaration of Nullity/Annulment of Contracts of Lease.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision 2 dated April 6, 2018 and the Resolution 3 dated August 1, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 107826. The assailed Decision and Resolution affirmed the Decision dated December 14,
2015 of Branch 260, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 14-0261.
Facts: Dennis T. Uy Tuazon (Tuazon) and Myra V. Fuentes (Fuentes) are the registered co-owners of two
parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 146276 and 146277 located at 2004 F.B.
Harrison corner San Juan Streets, Pasay City where a building is constructed thereon known as DM
Building (subject property).
Pending the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Tuazon and Fuentes lodged as
well in Branch 260, RTC, Parañaque City, the RTC, in a Decision dated August 24, 2012 in Civil Case No.
07-0142, authorized Fuentes to sell the subject property, along with the other common properties of the
estranged spouses, in order to pay for the support pendente lite of Fuentes and their adoptive daughter. The
subject property was then sold to Philippine Coast Guard Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PCGSLAI)
pursuant to the court order.
After the judgment declaring their marriage null and void attained finality on October 31, 2012, the
liquidation of the subject property was included. The subject property was occupied by two companies
owned by Tuazon and his family: World Wiser International, Inc. (World Wiser) and Jerzon Manpower
and Trading, Inc. (Jerzon). On August 8, 2014, Fuentes sent a notice to vacate the subject property to World
Wiser. At that time, Jerzon was already ordered closed by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, and thus, no longer in the subject property.
On September 8, 2014, the RTC approved the contract to sell between Fuentes and PCGSLAI and further
directed the execution of a contract of sale. Subsequently, Fuentes was compelled to file an unlawful
detainer suit against World Wiser for its refusal to vacate the subject property. In its defense, World Wiser
presented the contracts of lease executed by Tuazon in its favor for the period of July 1, 2012 to July 1,
2022. World Wiser further presented contracts of lease between Tuazon and Jerzon.
On account of the presentation of the contracts of lease executed by Tuazon in favor of World Wiser and
Jerzon, Fuentes filed a complaint for declaration of nullity/annulment of contract. For their part, Tuazon,
World Wiser, and Jerzon (collectively, petitioners) raised the affirmative defense that the contracts were
validly executed even without the consent of Fuentes. They countered that because Fuentes no longer
resided in the conjugal home and failed to participate in the administration of their common properties, the
decision of Tuazon, as the husband and co-administrator, should prevail.
The case was referred to mediation, but it was returned to the RTC on the ground of non-appearance of the
parties. Petitioners then requested for referral to a judicial dispute resolution, the RTC denied it. It
ratiocinated that the validity of the questioned contracts of lease cannot be the subject of a compromise
agreement considering that it pertained to properties already covered by a court-decreed liquidation
proceeding.
The RTC Ruling
On December 14, 2015, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Fuentes which declared the contracts of
lease as null and void. Petitioners appealed to the CA disputing the claim of Fuentes that she learned of the
questioned contracts of lease only after petitioners' filing of an answer in the unlawful detainer case.
The CA Ruling: Affirmed the RTC Decision
The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the findings of the RTC. It ruled that Fuentes had always maintained
that she did not enter into any contract of lease with petitioners. The CA noted that the exclusive
administration and possession of the subject property was awarded to Fuentes by the RTC in the nullity of
marriage proceeding on September 8, 2014, and that prior thereto, Fuentes already filed an unlawful
detainer suit against World Wiser.
Further, the CA observed that Fuentes promptly filed the instant case assailing the contracts of lease mainly
on the ground that the required consent of one of the spouses was wanting. Citing Article 96 of the Family
Code of the Philippines (Family Code) and related cases, the CA stated that the contracts of lease executed
by Tuazon without the written consent of Fuentes are considered void. Under the regime of an absolute
community of property, the alienation of common property requires the written consent of the other spouse
or the authority of the court in case of incapacity or inability to participate in the administration thereof,
otherwise, the disposition or encumbrance is void. The CA likewise ruled that a lease of common property
for a period of more than one year is a conveyance and encumbrance requiring the joinder of the wife in
the instrument.
ISSUE: (1) Whether the questioned contracts of lease is void for lack of consent from the other spouse.
RULING: Yes. The petition is unmeritorious.
The law requires that the disposition of common property by the husband as an administrator in appropriate
cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Article 124 of the Family
Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five year,
from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall
be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization
by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
The law requires written consent of the other spouse, otherwise, the disposition of common property is
void. The requirement under the law is clear, categorical, unambiguous, and makes no room for
interpretation.
In the case of Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa, the Court declared the sale of common property as void on the
ground that the written consent of the other spouse must concur regardless of his/her active participation in
the negotiations for being aware of the transaction is not consent.
Similarly, in Alejo v. Sps. Cortez, et al., where the husband demanded compliance with the contract of sale
and required payment of the balance of the purchase price from the seller, despite his lack of written consent
thereof nor knowledge of the transaction entered into by the wife, the Court maintained that the conveyance
is void. The Court pronounced that the law is unequivocal when it states that the disposition of conjugal
property of one spouse sans the written consent of the other is void.
As applied in this case, the lower courts aptly declared the lease contracts executed without the written
consent of Fuentes as void. The subject of the contracts of lease involved common property; hence, for the
contracts to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. It is immaterial whether
Fuentes had knowledge of the questioned transactions as the latter admittedly did not give her written
consent to the contracts. Significantly, Tuazon himself admitted that Fuentes did not participate nor sign
the contracts of lease. Unfortunately for petitioners, knowledge or being merely aware of a transaction is
not consent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 6, 2018 and the Resolution dated
August 1, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 107826 are hereby AFFIRMED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 233217, October 6, 2021
ALBERTO C. HIDALGO, petitioner, vs. CONRADO BASCUGUIN and EVELYN FLAMINIANO
HIDALGO, respondents
LEONEN, J.:
NATURE OF ACTION:
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision 1 and
Resolution 2 reversing the Regional Trial Court Decision and annulling the pacto de retro sale between
Conrado Bascuguin (Bascuguin) and Spouses Alberto C. Hidalgo and Evelyn Flaminiano-Hidalgo
Facts: Alberto C. Hidalgo (Alberto) alleged that during their marriage, he and his wife, Evelyn FlaminianoHidalgo (Evelyn), acquired a house and lot in Lian, Batangas. Alberto worked in Dubai, United Arab
Emirates. When he returned to the Philippines in March 2004, he discovered that Evelyn had sold the house
and lot to Bascuguin for P300,000 without Alberto’s consent. The sale was evidenced by a December 9,
2002 document and denominated as “Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Bahay at Lupa na Muling Mabibili”
(Kasulatan).
On April 22, 2004, Alberto sent a Demand Letter to Bascugion stating that the transaction was null and
void for lack of his consent. He also expressed his willingness to refund the P300,000 purchase price plus
legal interest, if Bascuguin returns the property title. In response, Bascuguin demanded the Hidalgo Spouse
to pay P900,000 and threatened to eject them and consolidate his ownership over the property, should they
refuse to pay. On May 6, 2004, Alberto filed a Complaint for annulment of sale and damages against Evelyn
and Bascuguin. He asserted that he did not consent to the sale and that his signature on the Kasulatan was
forged. He further stated that he only arrived in the Philippines on December 23, 2002, as evinced by his
passport, while the transaction was executed on December 9, 2002. He then sought P100,000 in moral
damages and P50,000 in attorney’s fees.
On May 27, 2004, Bascuguin filed his Answer and alleged that in December 2002, Evelyn begged him to
purchase the property in a sale with right to repurchase, or a pacto de retro sale. He acceded, since the
Hidalgo Spouses were family friends with whom he had previously made similar agreements. Further, it
was agreed that Evelyn would repurchase the property within five months. Thus, Bascuguin argued that he
should not be faulted for the alleged forgery on the Kasulatan, since he only relied on Evelyn’s assurance
that it was properly executed. Further, he was also willing to let the Hidalgo Spouses repurchase the
property.
The RTC Ruling
The Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision ordering the Hidalgo Spouses to reimburse the purchase price
to Bascuguin, with legal interest from the time of the transaction until full payment. It further ordered
Bascuguin to return the property title to the Hidalgo Spouses upon his receipt of the payment and interest.
The trial court held that the true nature of the contract between Evelyn and Bascuguin was that of an
equitable mortgage. As to damages, the trial court found that Alberto failed to present sufficient evidence
to support any award of damages or attorney's fees. Unsatisfied, Alberto moved for reconsideration, but to
no avail.
The CA Ruling: Reversed the RTC Decision
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court Decision and found that the pacto de
retro sale was void for lack of Alberto's consent. The Court of Appeals applied Article 124 of the Family
Code and held that any disposition or encumbrance of a conjugal property made without either spouse's
consent is void. Since the transaction was void, the Court of Appeals found that it was no longer necessary
to determine the contract's true nature. Nevertheless, as a necessary effect of the sale's nullification, the
Court of Appeals directed the return of the purchase price to Bascuguin and of the title to the Hidalgo
Spouses.
On December 8, 2016, Alberto filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. In a May 31, 2017 Resolution,
the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for being filed late. On September 20, 2017, Alberto filed the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari. Thereafter, respondent Conrado Bascuguin filed his Comment.
Petitioner Alberto C. Hidalgo then filed a Reply.
ISSUE: (1) Whether the sale is null and void for lack of consent from either of the spouse.
RULING: Yes.
The sale is null and void. Under Article 166 of the New Civil Code, alienation or encumbrance of a conjugal
property requires the consent of both spouses. Article 173 further states that if the wife did not consent to
the transaction, she may seek its annulment within 10 years. Thus, without the wife's consent, the
transaction is deemed voidable. These provisions are intended to protect the wife against the husband's
illegal alienation of their property. This is in contrast with the Old Civil Code, which gives the husband full
authority to alienate or encumber conjugal property.
Articles 166 and 173 of the New Civil Code were not reproduced in the Family Code, which changed the
rules on disposition and encumbrance of properties. The Family Code clearly states that dispositions or
encumbrances of community or conjugal properties without the other spouse's written consent are void.
The identical paragraphs of Articles 96 and 124 provide:
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without the
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority
or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may
be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
The Court has consistently declared void any disposition or encumbrance without consent of one of the
spouses under the Family Code. In Jader-Manalo v. Spouses Camaisa, this Court held that the sale of a
conjugal property is void for lack of the wife's consent. The petitioner bought a ten-door apartment from
the respondents. However, the wife later changed her mind and did not sign the contract to sell. The
petitioner then filed a complaint for specific performance to compel the wife to sign, but this was dismissed
by the trial court. The dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
In affirming the lower courts' rulings, the Court held that for the sale to be executed, the consent of both
spouses must concur. Considering that the wife refused to give her consent, the contract to sell signed solely
by the husband is void. Even if she was aware of the negotiations and the contract, mere awareness of the
transaction is not consent.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for having shown no reversible error in the assailed decision.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98529 is AFFIRMED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 205743, October 6, 2021
ROSALINDA Z. TURLA AND SPOUSES RICARDO AND MYRNA TURLA, petitioners, vs.
HEIRS OF PATROCINIO N. DAYRIT, NAMELY: HONORINA DAYRIT-VILLANUEVA,
MARGARITA DAYRIT-TIMBOL, LILIBETH DAYRIT, REGINA DAYRIT-CANLAS, CECILIA
DAYRIT-KWONG, PRISCILLA DAYRIT-SOLIS, EMILY DAYRIT-BULAN, AND ANTHONY
DAYRIT, respondents.
CARANDANG, J.:
NATURE OF ACTION:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision dated August
31, 2012 and the Resolution dated January 31, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
94151 which dismissed petitioners' appeal and denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration, respectively.
Facts: Patrocinio N. Dayrit (Patrocinio) was the owner of two parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 40956 and 40967. These properties were registered under his name, "married
to Rita R. Mina."
During his lifetime, Patrocinio executed a Conditional Sale on November 11, 1983 with petitioner Ricardo
Turla (Ricardo), whereby Patrocinio offered to sell the two parcels of land, and a third real property covered
by TCT No. 47382, for the price of P317,000.00. Ricardo shall make a down payment of P50,000.00. A
partial down payment of P20,000.00 was already paid by Ricardo. The balance of P267,000.00 shall be
paid by Ricardo upon the release of his loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) or any
other bank. If Ricardo backs out for whatever reason or the loan was disapproved or he is no longer
interested, the P20,000.00 down payment shall be forfeited in favor of Patrocinio.
Ricardo applied with the DBP, and later with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) for a housing loan in the
amount of P500,000.00. For this purpose, a special power of attorney (SPA) was executed by Patronicio,
in favor of Ricardo and his wife, petitioner Myrna Turla, which authority was annotated on TCT Nos. 40956
and 40967 as Entry No. 1508. A real estate mortgage was subsequently constituted on the two properties,
which were duly recorded on the titles and annotated as Entry No. 1509. In June 1996, the mortgages were
released, per entry No. 8087.
Patrocinio died on December 16, 1991. After Patrocinio's death, his heirs, respondents herein, checked on
the titles of their father's properties and discovered that TCT No. 40956 was already cancelled by TCT No.
104129 in the name of petitioner Rosalinda Z. Turla (Rosalinda), Ricardo's sister. On the other hand, TCT
No. 40967 was replaced by TCT No. 104130 also in the name of Rosalinda. Respondents learned that
Patrocinio's titles was cancelled pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 17, 1979 (Exh. "E")
between Patrocinio, as seller, and Rosalinda, as buyer. Further, there was a different Deed of Absolute Sale
dated January 11, 1991 (Exh. "F"), also between Patrocinio and Rosalinda involving the same properties.
As to the third property covered by TCT No. 47382, respondents alleged that the same is in possession of
petitioners.
Respondents demanded that petitioners reconvey the properties to them. They claimed that they did not
remember their father selling the properties in 1979 and the signature of Patrocinio appeared to be forged
in said deed. They were only aware of the 1983 Conditional Sale, and as far as they know, Ricardo failed
to comply with the terms and conditions thereof. Petitioners refused to heed to their demand. Hence,
respondents filed the complaint praying that the Deeds of Sale dated August 17, 1979 and January 11, 1991
be declared null and void; TCT Nos. 104129 and 104130 in the name of Rosalinda Turla be cancelled, and
that TCT Nos. 40956 and 40967 be reinstated; and for petitioners to pay damages.
The RTC Ruling
On May 28, 2009, the RTC granted respondents' complaint. The RTC ruled that fraud was committed in
the transfer of ownership of the subject parcels of land by virtue of the execution of the spurious Deed of
Sale dated August 17, 1979 which was the basis for the transfer of ownership from Patrocinio to Rosalinda.
Hence, respondents are entitled to the reconveyance of the subject properties in their favor. Petitioners
appealed the Decision to the CA.
The CA Ruling: Affirmed the RTC Decision.
In its Decision dated August 31, 2012, the CA dismissed petitioners' appeal and affirmed in toto the
Decision of the RTC. The CA stated that considering that the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale dated August
17, 1979 between Patrocinio and Rosalinda covering the subject properties is inexistent, it is without legal
effect and it did not give the Register of Deeds the authority to cancel TCT Nos. 40956 and 40967 and to
issue TCT Nos. 104129 and 104130. Necessarily, the new certificates of title in the name of Rosalinda
should be cancelled since the properties remain to be registered in the name of Patrocinio. The CA stated
that petitioners do not dispute that an inexistent deed of absolute sale was the basis for the issuance of the
new certificates of title although they deny any hand in it. Instead, they insist that the new certificates of
title were issued pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 11, 1991 between Patrocinio, as seller,
and Ricardo, as buyer. But this alleged 1991 Deed of Absolute Sale between Patrocinio and Ricardo was
not registered with the Register of Deeds. If this was registered, the new certificates of title should have
been under the name of Ricardo, not Rosalinda.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution dated January 31, 2013. Hence,
this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioners.
ISSUE: (1) Whether the Deed of Sale dated January 11, 1991 in favor of Ricardo is valid and binding
despite the absence of consent of Patrocinio’s wife, Rita.
RULING: Yes. The petition is meritorious.
In the very recent case of Spouses Cueno v. Spouses Bautista, the Court settled the recurring conflict on the
proper characterization of a transfer of conjugal property entered into without a wife's consent as merely
voidable and not void. The Court abandoned all cases contrary thereto and held that the prevailing and
correct rule is that "a sale that fails comply with Article 166 is not "void" but merely "voidable" in
accordance with Article 173 of the Civil Code." Unlike void contracts, voidable or annullable contracts,
before they are set aside, are existent, valid, binding and are effective and are obligatory between the parties.
They may be ratified and the action to annul the same may be barred by prescription.
The Court further explained in Spouses Cueno that Article 173 is explicit that the action for the annulment
of a contract involving conjugal real property entered into by a husband without the wife's consent must be
brought: (1) by the wife; (2) during the marriage; and (3) within ten years from the questioned transaction.
Citing the case of Bravo-Guerrero v. Bravo, the Court also stated in Spouses Cueno that "[u]nder the Civil
Code, only the wife can ask to annul a contract that disposes of conjugal real property without her consent.
The wife must file the action for annulment during the marriage and within ten years from the questioned
transaction."
The subject lands are conjugal real properties of Spouses Patrocinio and Rita Dayrit. The TCTs were issued
in 1975 in the name of Patrocinio N. Dayrit, married to Rita R. Mina. Under Article 166 of the New Civil
Code, the alienation or encumbrance of a conjugal real property requires the consent of the wife. The
absence in this case of the consent of Rita in the subject Deed of Sale dated January 11, 1991 (Exh. "20")
executed by Patrocinio in favor of Ricardo rendered the transaction voidable. However, there is no showing
that Rita, during the marriage and within ten years from the execution of the deed, brought an action for the
annulment of the Deed of Sale entered into by Patrocinio without her consent, as provided under Article
173 of the Civil Code which states:
Article 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without
her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to
defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to
exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of
property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
More so, their marriage had been dissolved upon the death of Patrocinio on December 16, 1991. Not having
been annulled, the Deed of Sale dated January 11, 1991 in favor of Ricardo is valid and binding.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 31,
2012 and the Resolution dated January 31, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94151 are
SET ASIDE. The complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of Sale of 1979 and 1991; Declaration of
Nullity of TCT Nos. 104129 and 104130; and Damages in Civil Case No. 8899 are hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit.