Wireless Networks (2021) 27:2595–2613
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11276-021-02579-1
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Smart grid cyber-physical systems: communication technologies,
standards and challenges
A. V. Jha1 • B. Appasani1 • A. N. Ghazali1 • P. Pattanayak2
•
D. S. Gurjar2 • E. Kabalci3 • D. K. Mohanta4
Accepted: 23 February 2021 / Published online: 30 March 2021
The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2021
Abstract
The recent developments in embedded system design and communication technologies popularized the adaption of the
cyber-physical system (CPS) for practical applications. A CPS is an amalgamation of a physical system, a cyber system,
and their communication network. The cyber system performs extensive computational operations on the data received
from the physical devices, interprets the data, and initiates effective control actions in real-time. One such CPS is the smart
grid CPS (SG-CPS) consisting of physical devices with diverse communication requirements, and intermediate communication networks. Thus, reliable communication networks are paramount for the effective operation of the SG-CPS. This
paper is an elaborate survey on the communication networks from the perspective of the SG-CPS. This paper presents the
state-of-art communication technologies that can meet the communication requirements of the various SG-CPS applications. The communications standards and communication protocols are also comprehensively discussed. A systematic
mapping among communication technologies, standards, and protocols for various SG-CPS applications has been presented based on an extensive literature survey in this paper. Furthermore, several challenges, such as security, safety,
reliability and resilience, etc., have been addressed from SG-CPS’s perspective. This work also identifies the research gaps
in the various domains of the SG-CPS that can be of immense benefit to the research community.
Keywords Communication technologies Cyber-physical systems Smart grid Resilience and reliability Challenges in smart grid communications Resilience Reliability
1 Introduction
The term ‘‘cyber-physical systems’’ (CPS) refers to modern
systems that provide combined computational as well as
physical capabilities through interaction, processing, computation, and control [1]. They are controllable and
& P. Pattanayak
prabina.pattanayak@ieee.org
1
School of Electronics Engineering, KIIT Deemed to be
University, Odisha 751024, India
2
Department of Electronics and Communication Engineering,
National Institute of Technology Silchar, Assam 788010,
India
3
Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering,
Nevsehir Haci Bektas Veli University, Nevsehir 50300,
Turkey
4
Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Birla
Institute of Technology, Ranchi 835215, India
observable systems that integrate physical devices such as
sensors, actuators, hardware, etc., with cyber systems
having computational capabilities. The CPS’s physical unit
comprises various data collection and sensing devices that
interact with the cyber system. The cyber system processes
the data received from these devices, analyses the data,
performs computations, and generates an actuating signal
that is communicated to the physical system over communication networks. These cyber and physical systems
must be properly integrated to ensure secure, safe, reliable,
and continuous service availability. Thus, the communication networks are the backbone of the CPS and are also
referred to as cyber networks. A typical cyber-physical
system is illustrated in Fig. 1, where the communication
infrastructure interconnects cyber systems and physical
systems to exchange data.
The most comprehensive survey on various aspects of
CPS is presented by Zhou et al. [2]. Particularly, a lot of
research has gone into design and analysis of the
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Fig. 1 A cyber-physical system
communication networks for CPSs. These works can be
broadly segregated into the following categories:
•
•
•
•
CPS
CPS
CPS
CPS
security
safety
reliability and
resilience
According to the Scopus database, the statistics for the
year-wise research articles published in the context of the
CPS cyber networks are illustrated in Fig. 2. It can be
observed that research has been focused on addressing the
security and safety issues in CPS. However, not much
research has been found on the reliability of the cyber
networks.
The rapid development and standardization of devices
such as sensors, actuators; advancement in the technologies
such as machine-to-machine (M2M), Internet-of-Things
(IoT); evolvement in networking such as wireless sensor
networks (WSN), vehicular area network (VANET),
mobile ad-hoc network (MANET); and exponential
improvement in the computing algorithms and processing
capabilities have together transformed the way we communicate, control and monitor the parameters in various
domains of practical application. The CPS is also a
Fig. 2 Publication statistics on cyber networks
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consequence of such developments that encompasses several recent technologies, including the burgeoning IoT,
artificial intelligence, machine learning, etc. [3]. CPS’s
potential applications sprawled over various domains,
ranging from agriculture to industries, from entertainment
to critical information sharing, from critically evolved
infrastructure to assistive living, and many more [4].
Surveillance, autonomous cars, automated insulin delivery
pumps in healthcare, home automation, smart grid, etc., are
key applications under the CPS paradigm [5–9]. The CPS
technologies in several domains have been intensively
explored in the past. The CPS technologies in agriculture
management, environmental monitoring, industrial
automation, smart transportation, aviation, logistic management, smart grid, telemedicine, healthcare, etc. are well
explored by the experts from the academia and industries
[10, 11]. The smart grid is one such CPS, which is rapidly
evolving due to its pervasive heterogeneous applications
such as synchrophasor measurement, wide area monitoring
systems (WAMS), advanced metering infrastructure
(AMI), vehicle-to-grid (V2G) networks, home area network (HAN), etc. The smart grid cyber physical system
(SG-CPS) envisages modernizing the smart grid by
enabling efficient, effective, secure, and reliable operations
across all its phases, including data sensing, processing,
computing, analyzing, storing, and exchanging.
2 Related work and motivation
Despite of having numerous research articles on the CPS,
there are very few articles that envisage the smart grid as
the CPS. This fact can be corroborated from Fig. 3, where,
Fig. 3a represents the number of research articles that are
published in the Scopus database from the years 2000 to
2009 and Fig. 3b represents the articles published from the
years 2010 to 2019 respectively. From these statistics, it
can be concluded that in the latter decade, the smart grid
from the perspective of CPS has received impressive
Fig. 3 Published works on SG as CPS a 2000–09 b 2010–19
Wireless Networks (2021) 27:2595–2613
attention (19% publication on SG-CPS) compared to the
previous decades (only 2% publication on SG-CPS). Thus,
a survey on the smart grid as a CPS is vital to identify
technical bottlenecks and challenges that hinder the SGCPS efficacy. To realize the next generation SG-CPS
applications with the capability to monitor, control, and
operate efficiently in real-time without or little human
interference, it is pertinent to discuss the existing research
and their suitability to SG-CPS.
Even though there exists extensive survey on the CPS in
literature, the survey of CPS from the SG perspective is
limited. Moness et al. have presented a survey in the
domain of wind energy conservation application of the
CPS [12]. Jia et al. have considered the vehicular cyber
physical system to present the most comprehensive survey
which discusses platoon management, clustering, coordinating, and cooperative adaption vehicular-to-vehicular
communication, and other such issues for CPS based
vehicular application [13]. A panoramic survey on big data
technology and its extension to CPS was presented by Atat
et al. [14]. It is a nice overview of different aspects, such as
data handling, processing, computing, cybersecurity, etc.
Understanding the significance of data analysis in SG CPS,
the most comprehensive review is done by Rossi et al. [15].
Unlike previous works with similar themes, Rossi et al.
have reviewed the data analytics for all the smart grids
domains such as smart meter, energy management, distribution, demand-load, consumer, markets, etc. A different
approach has been adopted by Xu et al. in [16], where
authors have given an excellent survey on Industrial
Internet of Thing (I-IoT) from the perspective of CPS.
Moreover, the survey was fascinating from the technological aspects of I-IoT CPS. Particularly, three technological
domains have been covered, namely, networking, computing, and control. In [17], authors have discussed different testbeds that can be used to design and validate
CPS’s model. The survey is rich in its content, but it is
focused on the evolution of testbeds and interrelated
technological efforts. Furthermore, since the authors
intended to survey the testbeds for smart grid CPS, some of
the critical issues such as security, safety, reliability, and
resilience in SG-CPS domain were not discussed. In He
et al. [18], have realized the complexity of the smart grid
CPS and related potential threats. Even though several
security challenges and defense strategies have been
reviewed systematically, the smart grid CPS network’s
security perspective was less explored in this paper. For
clarity and better understanding, some of the prominent
surveys and their research domains have been summarized
in Table 1. In a nutshell, to the best of our knowledge, none
of the existing papers review the smart grid cyber-physical
system from the perspective of enabling communication
technologies, standards, protocols, security, safety,
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reliability, and resilience. Thus, the state-of-art review on
all these issues and provisioning methodologies seems to
be of paramount interest. The motivation for this work is to
present these topics comprehensively.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Sect. 3
presents the SG from CPS’s perspective. A pragmatic
review on architectural overview, key characteristics, and
domains of SG-CPS have been presented in this section. Different communication technologies, standards, and
protocols of the smart grid cyber-physical system are discussed in Sect. 4. Considering the complexity due to several domains of the SG-CPS, the state-of-art review on
various communication protocols and standards have been
presented in this section along with their scope. For a better
comprehension, a systematic mapping between communication technologies, protocols, standards, and application
domains for the SG-CPS has also been presented in Sect. 4.
Furthermore, some of the critical responsibilities of the
communication networks are also elaborated in this section. A panoramic review of the different challenges such
as security, safety, reliability, and resilience; and their
countermeasures are presented in Sect. 5. Besides, the risk
assessment standards for both security and safety in the
context of a typical CPS is also discussed in this section. Finally, the paper is concluded in Sect. 6, identifying
the potential research gaps in various domains of the SGCPS paradigm.
3 Smart grid cyber physical system
We begin this section by presenting the smart grid from the
perspective of the CPS. The conventional power grid was
not designed as a flexible grid to incorporate future demand
such as smart metering, smart monitoring, control, incorporation of renewable energy sources, etc. SG transforms
the existing grid into a flexible grid, an amalgamation of
many disciplines, including generation, transmission, distribution, consumer, operation, markets, etc., that envisages
the real-time monitoring and control of the grid’s health
status. Such, typical cyber-physical system based SG is
depicted in Fig. 4.
The SG-CPS aims to integrate computational components with physical components to embed monitoring,
processing, and control capabilities in real-time. The SGCPS is the effective integration of the physical systems and
the cyber system. In SG-CPS, power network infrastructures and sensors correspond to the physical system, while
the controlling and monitoring entities correspond to the
cyber system. SG from the CPS perspective is different
from the traditional automation based application pyramid
[42]. SG-CPS is primarily based on decentralization,
whereas traditional automation applications focus on the
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Table 1 List of surveys on SG-CPS
Survey domain
Contents
Publication
year
References
Communication
technologies, standards and
protocols
Different communication technologies, standards, and protocols focusing
smart grid and other CPS oriented applications
[2010–2013]
[19–23]
Testbeds for SG-CPS
Realization of testbeds for SG-CPSs to facilitate real-time implementation of
the SG-CPSs with improved performance and reduced cost
[2014–2017]
[24–27]
SG-CPS security
Security issues of cyber and physical components
[2012–2020]
[18, 28–36]
SG-CPS privacy
Privacy concerns of smart grids and legal frameworks; several approaches to
handle privacy issues such as anonymization, trusted computing,
cryptographic, perturbation, verifiable computation, etc.
[2012–2019]
[30, 32–34]
Reliability
Reliability challenges and countermeasures in the smart grid communication
networks
[2015–2020]
[35, 37–39]
Resiliency
Resiliency analysis of smart grid, and SG-CPS in response to natural and
unnatural threats/attacks
[2019–2020]
[35, 36, 40, 41]
Fig. 4 Smart grid cyberphysical system
hierarchical structure [43]. The SG-CPS typically exhibits
the following characteristics [44]:
• Systematic dynamic integration of the virtual world
components with the real-world components.
• Capable to dynamically integrate the various sources of
energy such as coal, nuclear, thermal, solar, wind, etc.
to the mainstream for maximum and efficient utilization
of the resources.
• Dynamically processing the inputs fed from the SGCPS’s physical components, analyzing them, and
responding in real-time.
• The interactions between the SG-CPS’s physical and
cyber components in a dynamic environment over
communication or cyber networks (e.g., infrastructure
network, ad hoc network, hybrid networks, etc.).
• The real-time exchange of the data with minimum
delay.
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• The real-time integration of grid with the distribution
system such as microgrid, mini-grid, etc., in a dynamically varying environment.
• The capability to adapt, organize, learn, and respond
automatically to several challenges such as faults,
attacks, and emergencies to make the SG safer, secure,
reliable, and resilient.
• Perform parallel computations to achieve timely decisions and ensure SG’s efficient operation across all the
layers of the CPS such as transient, scheduling and
distribution layers.
There has been some pioneering research in SG-CPS,
including physical systems, communication networks,
standards, protocols, security, safety, privacy, cloud computing, etc., as discussed in [45]. The modeling and simulation of SG-CPS are essential to understand its efficacy.
The dynamics of SG in the context of CPS was carried out
in [46]. A control system approach was adopted to simulate
the interaction and its dynamics between real and physical
Wireless Networks (2021) 27:2595–2613
units of the SG-CPS. The issues of design, simulation, and
modeling of SG-CPS have been presented in [24, 47–52],
respectively. Furthermore, the seminal work by authors in
[53] corresponds to modeling and assessment of the power
system from the perspective of CPS. They have also outlined the significance of the energy management system
and the Internet of energy. Further, knowing the widespread adoption of the hierarchical control system
approach for the power system operation, authors in [54]
have extended the hierarchical control systems modeling to
the cyber-physical power system. The SG’s highly complex and interdependent nature requires an extensive
experimental simulation that can meet the real implementation requirements. So far, the researchers have mainly
focused on a simulation-based result for the SG [55, 56].
To address the real-world challenges in implementing the
SG-CPS, a testbed for the prototype implementation is the
present requirement. Moreover, the testbeds to implement
the smart grid CPS prototype are the fastest way to confirm
the degree of truthfulness for researchers and serve as an
educational platform for the student working in different
smart grid domains. An extensive survey is presented by
Cintuglu et al. in [57] for the SG testbeds.
According to NIST [58], the SG comprises of seven
domains that are interconnected. These domains include
customer domain, market domain, service provider
domain, operational domain, bulk generation domain,
transmission domain, and distribution domain. These
domains include various physical and cyber components
such as sensors, actuators, intelligent electronic devices
(IEDs), smart meter, distributed energy resources (DERs),
etc. The physical components are interconnected to
exchange the data through cyber components such as
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software, communication networks, and infrastructures.
Figure 5 indicates different domains of the SG-CPS and
their functional dependencies.
• Generation system The different generation sources of
the power system include traditional sources such as
coal, thermal, nuclear, hydrothermal, etc. Despite these,
the small-scale non-traditional sources of the generation
include renewable sources such as wind, solar,
geothermal, biomass, etc. Smart grid cyber-physical
system aims to integrate traditional and renewable
generation sources, which could be one way to tackle
the depletion issue of traditional energy sources. The
SG-CPS envisages putting a roadmap for systematic
integration of the distributed generation system and
paves the way for incorporating the energy sources at a
small scale. E.g., energy generated by the individual
consumers can also be integrated into the main grid.
• Transmission system The energy generated from various sources at the generation systems is transmitted
over transmission lines. Thus, the interaction between
the generation system and transmission lines becomes a
critical parameter for the smart grid CPS. The SG-CPS
connects the dispersed generation system to the distribution system using the critical transmission system
power infrastructure to supply electricity to the loads or
microgrids.
• Distribution system The large-scale voltage carrying
through the transmission lines is reduced to the
substations’ distribution voltage. Thus, the distribution
system bridges the gap between the transmission system
and the consumer system. The various components of
the distribution system include a smart metering
system, DERs, and other loads. The use of microgrids
Fig. 5 NIST defined domains of
SG-CPS
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•
•
•
•
can improve the efficiency and efficacy of the SG
system.
Operation This is one of the most critical SG-CPS
domains, responsible for the uninterrupted flow of
electricity. Further, the operation domain is primarily
responsible for the maintenance of the health of the
power system. The operation domain handles the smart
grid’s five core functionalities, namely, detect, respond,
recover, identify, and protect. Thus, it is regarded as the
manager of the SG-CPS.
Service provider The service provider domain is
responsible for providing services to the customers
and other utilities. The different aspects of cybersecurity have to be incorporated in this domain to make the
system resilient to cyber-attacks and any other threats.
Market This domain includes various operators, customers, and other participants. This domain’s prime
responsibilities are to build a competitive market for the
SG-CPS, which caters to several advantages such as
affordable cost, solution, security measures, remove
monopoly, and other SG-CPS services.
Customer In general, the customers are the end-user
entity, which consumes the electricity. However, in SGCPS, a customer may also generate (renewable
sources), manage, and store the electricity, integrated
into the mainstream of the SG-CPS. Thus, it will
undermine the customer as only a consumer of the
electricity in SG-CPS. Traditionally, the customers are
grouped into three main categories based on their
domain: industrial, commercial, and residential.
Wireless Networks (2021) 27:2595–2613
packet drop, more reliability, high resilience, better scalability, high availability, etc. in addition to the requirements
of typical cellular-based commercial applications [60]. A
comprehensive survey of CPS communication infrastructure and its requirements is presented in [61]. Some of the
other prominent surveys in this direction is also summarized in Table 1. One can deduce that the communication
network infrastructure is sparsely explored in the context of
SG-CPS [62].
A. Communication technologies The communication technology for the smart grid CPS is broadly classified into
two main categories: wired and wireless as shown in
Fig. 6. The wired communication technology includes
power line communication, and fibre optic communication. Microwave, cellular and satellite-based communication fall in the wireless category.
(i)
Power line communication
The power line communication (PLC)
technology utilizes the existing power line
transmission media to exchange the data
between the substation and the control centre
[63]. This communication technology uses the
existing infrastructure and thus, its implementation requires less additional cost. The PLC
technologies include narrowband PLC (NBPLC) and broadband PLC (BB-PLC). The
NB-PLC is used for low data rate applications,
4 SG-CPS communication network:
technologies, standards and protocols
Many essential functionalities of the SG-CPS heavily
depend on communication infrastructures or cyber networks [59]. Some of the critical responsibilities of the
communication network include:
• Real-time monitoring and control of the grid in a
dynamic environment.
• Exchanging the data pertaining to grid health among the
various entities of the SG in a real-time.
• To provide uninterrupted, reliable, safe and secure
service.
• Protection of various key elements of the SG including
generation,
transmission,
and
distribution
infrastructures.
The requirements of the communication infrastructure for
SG-CPS are different from the typical communication
requirements. For e.g., the SG-CPS requires less delay, less
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Fig. 6 SG communication network technologies
Wireless Networks (2021) 27:2595–2613
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
and the BB-PLC communication technology
supports high data rate applications. For the
smart grid applications, which is a missioncritical, the BB-PLC would be a better choice
supporting data rates of 2-3 Mbps typically.
However, due to the fading effect, the signal to
noise ratio (SNR) degrades. Further, it
becomes difficult to model the PLC-based
channel for signal analysis due to the presence
of heavy background noise. Thus, PLC technologies are only a limited choice for most of
the SG CPS applications.
Fibre optic communication
The fibre optical communication (FOC)
supports long-distance data communication
with high security as well as a high data rate.
Extensive research has successfully reduced
the cost of optical fibre-based communication
systems. At the same time, the signal quality
in terms of SNR has witnessed significant
improvement. Therefore, the optical fibre’s
adoption seems to be the best choice for
mission-critical applications in SG-CPS [64].
Several applications such as substation
automation, tele-control and protection, etc.,
already utilize the optical fibre-based communication infrastructures. Even though, optical
fibre is seen as the best choice for communication infrastructure in SG-CPS, however, due
to wired nature, it is plagued with many issues
such as high installation cost, scalability,
significant installation time, etc.
Microwave communication
The demand for mission-critical applications can be fulfilled using microwave-based
wireless communication [65], which is
referred to as a microwave communication
(MWC). As a result of technological advancement, the data rate has increased to many folds
to meet most of the communication requirements of the SG-CPS applications. It has
various advantages compared to wired communication technologies, such as support a
high data rate (up to several Gbps), less
installation time, low installation cost, and
easy connectivity to remote places where a
wired connection is not feasible, etc. Data
reliability and security are significant
concerns.
Cellular communication
Cellular communication provides another
viable alternative for communication in SGCPS [66, 67]. The technological advancement
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(v)
in this field has paved the way to achieve a
data rate of up to 100 Gbps using cellular
technologies and evolving continuously. Cellular technology provides a higher data rate
with minimum communication delay, making
it one of the best choices for several applications. Network availability and security issues
plague its utility.
Satellite communication
Satellite communication has seen tremendous growth in a few past decades, including
the data rate, transmission efficiency, communication delay, etc. Despite achieving a higher
data rate, the delay incurred in satellite
communication is much higher than all other
wireless technologies [68]. Thus, today’s
satellite communication technology can cater
to the demand of some of the SG applications,
however, the choice is not optimum with
respect to the delay in the context of missioncritical SG-CPS.
B. Communication standards and protocols SG-CPS
involves a wide range of devices that exchange data
catering to different applications. Several standards
have been developed to ensure the smooth operation of
the smart grid through the combined efforts of different
standard developing organizations (SDOs) such as the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE), International Standards Organizations (ISO),
International Electrotechnical Commissions (IEC), the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), etc. In
an SG, Phasor measurement units (PMUs) are important sensors responsible for monitoring various aspects
of the grid. Their prominence and practical utility led
to their wide-scale deployment in the last few decades.
These are known as synchrophasor devices, and the
applications involving these devices are known as
synchrophasor applications. The IEEE has devised a
standard to felicitate the connectivity and data transfer
among these devices manufactured by various manufacturers. The IEEE standards for the synchrophasor
applications were originally documented in IEEE Std.
1344-1995 [69]. The various shortcomings of this
standard were rectified, and it was reaffirmed in the
year 2001 and was replaced in the year 2005 with IEEE
Std. C37.118-2005 [70]. This standard mostly concentrated on source coding aspects but did not discuss the
communication channel’s transmission aspects in
depth. The revised standard modified the original
frame structure defined for carrying the synchrophasor
data. This standard has given explicit methodologies to
distinguish the communication requirements and
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Wireless Networks (2021) 27:2595–2613
measurement requirements. Further, IEEE has sliced
this standard into two parts for its wider adoption,
which are: (1) IEEE Std C.37.118.1 [71, 72], and (2)
IEEE Std. C.37.118.2-2011 [70, 73]. The later standard
specifies the communication requirement whereas, the
IEEE Std C.37.118.1 specifies the measurement
requirements for the synchrophasor applications.
Another important application of the SG-CPS is
substation automation. IEC 61850 and its subsequent
variants such as IEC 62351-6 (with enhanced security
features) are considered as the de-facto standards for
communication between substations with intelligence
capability, lower cost and seamless connectivity [74].
IEC 61850 [75] standard defines the communication
protocols for exchanging the data between intelligent
electronic devices (IEDs) at the electrical substations
for automation. Initially, this standard was defined for
communication within a substation, which is now
evolved to support inter substation communication
over wide area networks. The substation communication architecture using IEC 61850 standard is as shown
in Fig. 7.
The advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) is another
vital application in the SG-CPS, primarily responsible for
exchanging energy consumption-related data between enduser and service providers. IEC 62056 and ANSI C12 are
the two most widely used standards for AMI applications.
Initially, IEC 61107 was developed for direct load data
exchange, which was further succeeded by IEC 62056
standards [76] for communicating the smart metering data.
The efficacy of the IEC 62056 has been improved through
various successive developments in the recent past. The
most recent development is documented in IEC 62056-84:2018, which specifies the PoweRline Intelligent Metering
Evolution (PRIME) communication profiles using the
OFDM modulation techniques as recommended in ITU-T
G.9904:2012 [77, 78]. PRIME incorporates state-of-the-art
methodology for enhancing security through advanced
encryption standards for communication (AES-COM) 128
Fig. 7 IEC 61850 substation automation architecture
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bytes encryption technology and other authentication and
password management techniques. Similar to the IEC
62056 standard, the ANSI C12 is used in AMI applications
in North America. However, the former is widely adopted
to use in European countries.
A comprehensive summary of these communications
standards are summarized in Table 2 along with other
standards for various SG-CPS applications. Moreover, key
features of these standards and their suitability make it
handy for the readers to design, test, and validate the SGCPS based applications.
The SG-CPS protocols are the means to exchange
information supported by the cyber network infrastructure.
A large geographical distance separates the generation
station and consumers. The various physical components
belonging to generation and consumer systems are interconnected to one another and to control centers over
communication networks. The communication networks
encompass different private and public domain networks.
The communication network of the SG-CPS can be
designed with several wired protocols such as Ethernet
(IEEE 802.3); or wireless protocols such as Wi-Fi (IEEE
802.11), WiMAX (IEEE 802.16), ZigBee (IEEE 802.15),
Mobile-Fi (IEEE802.20) [79], etc.
Moreover, communication networks are generally
hybrid in nature, involving both wired and wireless networks. E.g., IEC 61850 standards use Ethernet protocols
for substation automation in the power system [80]. Independent work for requirements and applications of some of
these standards in relation to the smart grid is carried out by
Appasani et al. [81].
The SG-CPS is a complex system that integrates a wide
range of devices. Hence, the communications system needs
to handle voluminous data to cater to the diverse demand of
the SG-CPS in real-time. Thus, selecting one communication technology among many is a complicated task. The
appropriate communication technology depends upon
many factors such as the type of application, the scope of
applications, standards, deployment challenges, the openness of applications, use cases, etc. For e.g., some of the
mission-critical applications of the SG-CPS, such as synchrophasor communication, require a minimum delay to
work properly. Suppose the data is exchanged between
PMU and phasor data concentrator (PDC) without error,
but with a significant delay, it may result in the disruption
of the service, or degrade the performance of the system, or
even can result in a power blackout.
On the other hand, SG-CPS’s advanced metering
application is not concerned with the delay in data
exchange. But, data integrity is of utmost priority. Consequently, it is very hard to predict the correct combinations
of communication technologies, communication standards,
and protocols for the SG-CPS. However, it was believed
Wireless Networks (2021) 27:2595–2613
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Table 2 Some of the notable communication standards and their scope in SG-CPS
Standards
Key features
Applications
IEEE Std.
1344-1995
Defines synchrophasor communication parameters.
Synchrophasor communication
IEEE Std. C37.1182005
It defines the data communication protocols with both
source coding aspects and transmission channel coding
aspects.
Synchrophasor communication
IEEE Std
C.37.118.1-2011
Includes measurement requirement
Synchrophasor communication
IEEE Std.
C.37.118.2-2011
Includes communication requirement
Synchrophasor communication
IEC 61850
Defines communication protocols for IED at substations
Communication for electrical substation automation
IEC 62351-6
Enhanced security features for communication
To enhance security features in IEC 60870, IEC 61850, IEC
61970 and IEC 61968
IEC 62056
It standardizes the device language message specification
(DLMS) and companion specification for energy
metering (COSEM) specifications
AMI
ANSI C12
Emphasis on accuracy and performance parameters for
electricity meters
AMI
IEC 60870-5
Incorporates communication profile for exchanging basic
telecontrol data between two systems through directly
connected permanent data circuits connecting the systems
Power system automation and telecontrol
IEC 60870-6
Incorporates ISO standards and ITU-T recommendations
for exchanging basic telecontrol data
Power system automation and telecontrol
IEC 60834
Includes performance requirement and testing methodology
for teleprotection equipment of command type
Teleprotection equipment of power system
IEC 61970
Provides appropriate data exchange interfaces across
existing and new systems
An application program interface for energy management
system
IEC 61968
Defines interfaces for all key components of the
distribution management systems interface architecture
Communication between the electrical distribution system
SAE J2836
It standardizes the communication protocols between an
electric vehicle and the power grid for energy and other
application-related data.
Electric vehicle to utility grid communication
PRIME
It incorporates PLC standards, uses OFDM technology for
efficient physical layer connectivity, improves security
and authentication through AEC-COM 128 bytes
encryption
Advance metering, grid control and asset monitoring
IEEE 1815-2012
(DNP3)
IEEE 2030
It is compliant with IEC 62351-5.
SCADA system
It envisages a reference model for interoperability in smart
grid applications
Guide to smart grid interoperability
IEEE 1901
Coexistence of inter-system protocol and supports CSMA/
CA and TDMA multiple access technologies.
Over power line broadband communication
Open Automated
Demand Response
(OpenADR)
IEC approved OpenADR as publically available
specification (PAS) to be included in IEC international
standards
Energy management system
HomePlug
Specification for PLC-based applications
Communication between in-home electrical system and
appliances
M-bus
Based on European standards EN 13757-2 for physical and
link layers, EN 13757-3 for application layer
Meter reading application
BACnet
Compliance with ASHRAE, ANSI and ISO 16484-5
standards
Building automation and control networks
Utility Smart
Network Access
Port (U-SNAP)
It is a modular communication interface which is
independent of protocol
In-home communication of any home area network (HAN)
or demand response standards. Protocol independent
communication of smart grid utility with HAN.
IEC 62055
Application layer protocols for payment systems based on
standard transfer specification
Electricity metering
123
2604
that there exists a strong correlation between standards,
applications, and communication technologies. In this
paper, an extensive literature survey has been conducted to
analyze different communication technologies, standards,
and protocols in the SG-CPS domain. Based on the
extensive literature survey, a state-of-art framework is
presented to establish a correlation between communication technologies, standards, and protocols for different
applications of SG-CPS. This correlation is shown in
Wireless Networks (2021) 27:2595–2613
Fig. 8. Nevertheless, this is not an exhaustive mapping. For
e.g., for EMS application, the PRIME standard can be used
over satellite or optical fibre technology. Thus, it is better
to accept that this complex correlation is not an exhaustive
representation and further correlations are feasible.
Fig. 8 Communication technologies, standards and application correlation
123
Wireless Networks (2021) 27:2595–2613
5 Security, safety, reliability and resilience
The CPS is different from the conventional computational
information sharing system as its architecture includes
heterogeneous technologies for physical, computational,
and cyber components. The challenges related to the
security, safety, reliability and resilience of communication
network in the SG-CPS may result in adverse consequences. Some of these adverse consequences system are
reported in [82, 83].
Another important challenge in this direction is the
integration of traditional information technology (IT) systems with operational technology (OT) systems. OT systems differ from traditional IT systems with respect to the
target, purpose, computing components, communication
technologies, and interfaces as well as ownership and
management.
We now present some of the prominent work with key
findings related to SG-CPS. In later sections, we analyse
the standards for different challenges and then finally, we
present some methodologies to evaluate the system performance in response to these challenges.
A. SG-CPS security Like all other applications, the
intrusion can disturb the normal performance of the
SG-CPS. The physical or cyber intrusions may disrupt
services, degrading the quality of service, or even
power blackout conditionally. If the SG-CPS is not
secured, then any of these events can result in
substantial economic losses. Thus, cybersecurity
becomes an essential aspect in the case of SG-CPS to
avoid any form of intrusion. Moreover, domain-specific strategies must be employed instead of existing
cyber-security solutions for SG-CPS, making it less
vulnerable to cyber-attacks [84]. This has motivated
the experts to design the specific protocols to make
smart grid domains secure w.r.t intrusion. Tan et al. in
[32], has presented an extensive survey of the security
characteristics of sensor data in the SG through its
various life stages involving generation, acquisition,
processing, and storage. The most comprehensive
survey on privacy, in addition to security, has been
presented in [34]. Giraldo in [31] has presented a
survey of the CPS from the perspective of both:
security and privacy.
(i)
2605
components: Confidentiality, Integrity, and
Availability. These security-related fundamental components are popularly referred to as the
CIA triad [86]. The SG-CPS, an industrial
control system (ICS), differs from the traditional information technology (IT) systems in
that SG-CPS needs all the IT systems’ security
requirements. But, security analysis of the SGCPS must consider the complexity of the smart
grid physical layer. The smart grid cyber
physical system’s physical components are
composed of many electrical networks spanning over large geographical area covering
several kilometers that carry very high voltages
that require monitoring, control, and maintenance on a real-time basis. Thus, the security
measures in SG-CPS required additional features and the security measures of IT systems.
Moreover, the data between the SG-CPS’s
cyber and physical components are exchanged
over the Internet, which is an open application
to the public. Therefore, it adds a further risk of
vulnerability to the SG-CPS. Nevertheless, the
CIA triad’s priority levels in IT system changes
to the AIC triad when it focuses on ICS
applications such as SG-CPS, which is as
shown in Fig. 9. Many research problems have
been identified in the SG literature to ensure
integrity, confidentiality, availability, authentication, etc., which can be found in [87, 88]. The
special publication (SP) 800-82 of NIST [89]
provides comprehensive security requirements
in ICS and IT systems. It also provides
approaches for securing ICS with unique performance, reliability, and safety requirements.
The implementation guidance for NIST SP
800-53 controls is also standardized in NIST
800-82. The SG-CPS’s critical infrastructure
can be made resistive to the cyber-attacks based
Security assessment standards
ISA 99 [85] states that security or cybersecurity envisages protecting the cyber environment of the organization or individual user
including, networks and network resources:
both software and hardware. As defined by
ISO, security comprises three fundamentals
Fig. 9 Priority indicator for SG-CPS
123
2606
Wireless Networks (2021) 27:2595–2613
(ii)
on the framework outlined in the cybersecurity
framework (CSF) [90]. The standards ISA 99 or
IEC 62443 devise the mechanism to analyze
the cyber risks and paves the way to countermeasure the security challenges at several
stages of the SG, including design, testing,
installation, maintenance, and inspection. IEC
62351 [91] overcomes the shortcoming of its
predecessor IEC 61850 by adding the security
measures. Moreover, distributed network protocol (DNP 3.0), IEEE Std. C37.118 and
Modbus are some other standards that adopt
the security measures in exchanging the synchrophasor data in the SG-CPS [92].
Security assessment methodology for SG-CPS
The assessment of an SG-CPS from the
perspective of security analysis is very important. The vulnerability threat control framework
based methodology protects the system and its
assets from security threats. Several methodologies exist in the literature for security risk
analysis; few of them are listed in Table 3. It is
worth noting that each assessment technologies
are unique in how they are implemented to
evaluate the security measures. The system
designer can adopt appropriate technologies
based on their application requirements of the
SG-CPS.
B. SG-CPS safety
Safety analysis is essential in two folds- first human
safety and second capital safety. Safety risks are
caused by an interaction between the dynamic environment and SG-CPS components. Like in every
industry, safety analysis is essential in SG-CPS as
well. The safety in the SG-CPS incorporates software
safety, functional safety, and operational safety.
(i)
Safety risk assessment standards
The HARA (hazard analysis and risk assessment) is the fundamental approach to analyse
the safety risk in the industries [102]. The IEEE
Table 3 Security risk assessment technologies
Security risk assessment technologies
References
Attack tree analysis
[93, 94]
Cyber-physical security
[95]
STPA-sec
[96, 97]
Traditional security technology
[94]
Bayesian network approaches
[98–100]
Block-chain
[101]
123
(ii)
3000-series standards are developed on the
HARA approach for the safety analysis in the
SG. The other standards such as the U.S
Department of Energy DOE-Std 1170-2007
are also based on the HARA approach for the
SG, particularly involving nuclear-based generation systems. The safe failure function (SFF)
is defined in IEC 61508 Standard along with the
safety integrity level (SIL) to confirm the level
of safety in deployed components of the SG.
The HARA is the basic approach for SIL for
the majority of the safety standards [103]. The
standards also set the guidelines for analysing
the safety performance of the system. Further,
the IEC 61506 is viewed as the basic guideline
for maintaining the safety standards that are
applicable to all kinds of industries. Thus, it can
also be utilized to set the safety standards for
SG-CPS. Moreover, some of the process-specific safety standards such as ISA 84, IEC 61511,
ISO 26262, etc. can also be incorporated while
measuring the SG-CPS’s safety performance.
Safety risk assessment methodology for SGCPS
According to 99/IEC 62443, risk assessment
and management cover three features: physical
safety, functional safety, and cybersecurity
[104]. The issue of physical safety covers the
different causes that may be natural or unnatural. The natural causes responsible for physical safety issues are fire, earthquake, heavy
rain, tsunami, accidents, etc. The unnatural
causes for the interruption in the service may be
the consequences of political, social, or criminal activities. Functional safety involves protecting, safeguarding, and monitoring the
devices from accidental failures [105]. The
safety risk assessment methodology primarily
intends to identify the risk, analyze the risk, and
estimate the risk’s impact with respect to the
safety challenges in the SG-CPS. The safety
risk assessment methodologies are primarily
based on the HARA discipline. The HARA
methodologies for the safety assessment are
composed of two parts: first those which
analyze the malfunctioning of the physical or
cyber components; and second those which
indicate the level of risk and measure it in terms
of SIL. Some of the common safety assessment
methodologies for CPS are listed in Table 4.
Interestingly, the HARA based safety assessment methodologies would be the better choice
for the SG-CPS.
Wireless Networks (2021) 27:2595–2613
2607
Table 4 Safety risk assessment technologies
Safety risk assessment technologies
References
Fault tree analysis (FTA)
[106]
Failure modes and effects analysis
[107–109]
Hazard and operability methodology
[110–112]
Model-based engineering
[113]
Goal tree-success tree and master logic diagram
[114, 115]
System theoretic process analysis
[116]
C. SG-CPS reliability
The SG-CPS’s reliability measures the system
performance in terms of service availability and
trustworthiness [117]. The success of SG-CPS applications heavily relies on the reliability of various key
components of the physical as well as the cyber
systems, and the connecting cyber networks. Some of
the key components of the SG-CPS, whose reliability
analysis is of supreme importance, are enumerated
below:
•
•
•
•
Embedded hardware
Control center
Communication networks
Software
Most of the reliability analysis methods were directed
towards the synchrophasor application in SG. The
reliability estimation of the physical sensors like the
PMUs was thoroughly discussed in [118]. The earliest
work in the direction of reliability of communication
networks between the PMUs and the control center was
carried in [119] by Liu et al. In this, the reliability
analysis of the IEEE 14 bus system was analyzed using
the series-parallel methodology. Overall reliability
analysis of PMU and its communication networks has
been carried out by the authors in [120] through proper
modeling. The reliability analysis for the underlying
communication network infrastructure of the SG for
various applications was investigated in [121, 122].
The reliability analysis of the SG based on the Markov
chain model was investigated in [123, 124]. The reliability performance was measured in terms of packet
loss probability, where the communication links were
designed as cyclic polling queuing system. The reliability analysis was carried out in [125, 126] based on
the fault tree analysis approach. A redundancy system
for the smart grid is another alternative to make the
SG-CPS reliable to the faults. Such reliability analysis
was proposed in [127]. Each source-destination pairs
are connected with two disjoint paths of which one is
wired, and the other is wireless, to enhance the
reliability.
D. SG-CPS resilience
According to [128], network resilience is defined as
the capability of a communication network to provide
an acceptable level of service and to maintain the
quality of service in dynamic environments even in
response to various faults and challenges. The
resilience should be given paramount importance in
SG-CPS as the faults in the infrastructure are
inevitable. Further, resiliency analysis measures the
system’s overall performance through security, safety,
reliability, etc. during normal operation and even under
various threats. Resilience can be divided into two
disciplines: challenge tolerance that focuses on network design parameters, and trustworthiness that
focuses on the network’s performance measure [129].
A comprehensive classification of resiliency discipline
is shown in Fig. 10. Further, the challenge tolerance
and trustworthiness together represent the robustness of
the SG-CPS network infrastructure. Challenge tolerance is composed of disruption tolerance and traffic
tolerance. Disruption tolerance includes several natural and unnatural factors. The natural disruptive
tolerance includes dynamic environmental behavior
such as earthquakes, rain or even natural disasters.
Unnatural disruptive tolerance includes the failure of
network infrastructure components, bugs in the software, malfunctioning of the hardware, disruption in
energy supply, etc. The traffic tolerances include the
factors responsible for sudden traffic injection into the
networks, which may be legitimate resulting from
heavy traffic during the peak hour of operation or
illegitimate such as the distributed denial of service
(DDoS) resulting from cyberattacks. However, resiliency to DDoS is the network’s ability to reject the
Fig. 10 SG-CPS resilience discipline
123
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Wireless Networks (2021) 27:2595–2613
request identified as a malicious request. Trustworthiness comprises three fundamental measurable characteristics: reliability, safety, and security [128].
Moreover, trustworthiness is a measurable characteristic that defines the system’s assurance to deliver the
service as expected under all conditions and with
minimum delay [117]. As discussed in the earlier
section, the availability, integrity and confidentiality
(AIC triad) is the priority (CIA triad for IT system) for
the SG-CPS.
6 Conclusion
The research on the SG-CPS and its implementation need
further development and improvement. The following
research gaps have been identified in this regards:
• The proper choice of network technologies, standards,
and protocols are still unavailable for generic SG-CPS
applications. It varies depending upon the feature and
scope of applications. To a certain extent, a concise
framework to establish a correlation between communication technologies, standards and protocols for
different SG-CPS applications was presented in this
paper based on an extensive literature survey. This may
be used as a reference in designing the generic SG-CPS.
• The testbeds for SG-CPS emulating the real-world
characteristics are yet to be developed. The various
testbeds that have been discussed in this paper may be
used as a reference to further explore in this regard.
• Lack of appropriate algorithms, which can resolve
security and safety issues. The existing works rarely
provide quantitative or qualitative conflict resolution
algorithms. This paper has given an overview of
security and safety challenges. These challenges have
been analyzed systematically. The security and safety
standards and assessment methodologies from the
existing research body have been comprehensively
analyzed in this paper. This can help the researchers to
further bridge the existing gaps in this direction for SGCPS.
• The universal safety and security measurement technologies are still lacking. The researchers can design
technologies to countermeasure security and safety
issues, the efficacy of which can be evaluated based on
the methodologies presented therein in this paper.
• The reliability assessment methodology of an SG-CPS
is not yet explored in the literature for different
applications. Understanding the importance of reliability, we have introduced several approaches to assess the
123
reliability, providing some guidance to the researchers
in this direction.
• Resilience analysis methodology for SG-CPS needs to
be explored to ensure its serviceability and availability
under dynamic environmental conditions. The discussion presented in this work can be used to design
resilient SG-CPS.
The SG-CPS is a very complex system where cyber and
physical systems are tightly integrated. Understanding SGCPS’s complexity, its various domains must be explored
systematically. Moreover, one needs to address the gaps
mentioned above to design such complex SG-CPSs.
Moreover, this is the need of the hour since the cyber
components and physical components must be intertwined
more effectively and efficiently.
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Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to
jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
A. V. Jha has completed his
Bachelor of Engineering in
2012 from University of Pune,
India and Master of Technology
in 2015 from IIT Guwahati,
India. Currently, he is pursuing
PhD from KIIT-DU, India. His
research interest includes cyber
physical systems and Internet of
Things. He has authored many
publications in his area of
interests.
123
B. Appasani received his B.E,
M.E and PhD degree from Birla
Institute of Technology, Ranchi,
India. He is currently working
as an Assistant Professor in
School of Electronics Engineering, KIIT-DU, India. His
research interests include Smart
Grid communication system and
Evolutionary Computation.
A. N. Ghazali received his PhD
degree from Birla Institute of
Technology, Ranchi, India. He
is currently working as an
Assistant Professor in School of
Electronics Engineering, KIIT
University, India. His research
interests include design of ultrawide band filters for space
applications.
P. Pattanayak received the Ph.D
degree in 2017 from Indian
Institute of Technology Patna,
India. He was awarded M.Tech
degree in Electronics and Communication Engineering (Wireless
Communication
Technology) and B.Tech degree
in Electronics and Telecommunication Engineering from Biju
Patnaik University of Technology, Rourkela, India,in 2012
and 2007 respectively. He
worked as Lead Engineer at
HCL Technologies Ltd, India
from 2007 to 2010. He was with the National Institute of Science &
Technology from 2010 to 2013. He has served as Assistant Professor
in the School of Electronics Engineering of Kalinga Institute of
Industrial Technology (KIIT) Deemed to be University, Bhubaneswar
from 2017 to 2018. He is serving as Assistant Professor in the
department of Electronics and Communication Engineering at
National Institute of Technology Silchar, India from 2018 to till date.
He received the Gold Medal for M.Tech and best poster presentation
in the Research Scholar Day at IIT Patna. He is the recipient of High
Value Ph.D Scholarship during his Ph.D tenure. His current research
interests include multiuser MIMO communications, multi carrier
MIMO communications, soft computing techniques, massive MIMO,
NOMA, cross-layer scheduling, and Smart Grid Communication
Systems. He is fellow of IETE India, a senior member of IEEE and
member of IEEE Communications Society, the IEEE Information
Theory Society, and the IEEE Vehicular Technology Society. He is
an active reviewer in various international journals.
Wireless Networks (2021) 27:2595–2613
D. S. Gurjar received the B.
Tech. degree in electronics and
communications
engineering
from Uttar Pradesh Technical
University, Lucknow, India, in
2011, the M. Tech. degree in
wireless communications and
computing from the Indian
Institute of Information Technology Allahabad, India, in
2013. He received the Ph.D.
degree in electrical engineering
from the Indian Institute of
Technology Indore, India, in
2017. He was with the department of electrical and computer engineering, University of Saskatchewan, Canada, as a Postdoctoral Research Fellow. Currently, he
is working as an Assistant Professor in the department of electronics
and communication engineering, National Institute of Technology
Silchar, Assam, India. He is recipient of Alain Bensoussan Fellowship-2019 from European Research Consortium for Informatics and
Mathematics (ERCIM). He has numerous publications in peer-reviewed journals and conferences. His research interests include
MIMO communication systems, cooperative relaying, device-to-device communications, smart grid communications, physical layer
security, and simultaneous wireless information and power transfer.
He is a member of the IEEE Communications Society and the IEEE
Vehicular Technology Society.
E. Kabalci
(M’09, SM’18)
received the B.S. and M.S.
degrees in Electronics and
Computer Education from Gazi
University, Ankara, Turkey, in
2003 and in 2006 respectively.
He received the Ph.D. degree
from Gazi University, Ankara,
Turkey, in 2010 with the thesis
on implementing an enhanced
modulation scheme for multilevel inverters. From 2005 to
2007, he was with Gazi
University as a lecturer. He is
currently with the Department
of Electrical and Electronics Engineering Department since 2010,
2613
Nevsehir HBV University, where he became an Assistant Professor in
2011; an Associate Professor in 2013, and full Professor in 2019 on
power plants and power electronics-drives; and is Head of Department. Dr. Kabalci is an Associate Editor of several international
indexed journal on Power Electronics and Renewable energy sources.
His current research interests include power electronic applications
and drives for renewable energy sources, microgrids, distributed
generation, power line communication, and smart grid applications.
He is IEEE Member since 2009, and senior-member since 2018.
D. K. Mohanta received the
Ph.D. (Engg.) degree from
Jadavpur University, Kolkata,
India. He was an Electrical
Engineer with the Captive
Power Plant, National Aluminium Company (NALCO),
Angul, India from 1991-1998.
He is currently a Professor with
the Department of Electrical and
Electronics Engineering, BIT,
Mesra, Ranchi. He has more
than 20 years of teaching experience in addition to his industrial experience of 8 years. He
has been a Senior Member of IEEE(USA), Member of IEEE PES
RRPA subcommittee, Life Member of ISTE and a Fellow of Institutions of Engineers (India). He is an Editor of Power Components &
Systems (Taylor & Francis Publications); Associate Editor of IEEE
Access as well as of IET Proceedings on Generation, Transmission &
Distribution.
123