PALGRAVE STUDIES IN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
Policies and Politics
Under Prime Minister
Edward Heath
Edited by
Andrew S. Roe-Crines
Timothy Heppell
Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership
Series Editors
Ludger Helms
University of Innsbruck
Innsbruck, Austria
Gillian Peele
Department of Politics and
International Relations
University of Oxford
Oxford, UK
Bert A. Rockman
Department of Political Science
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN, USA
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Andrew S. Roe-Crines • Timothy Heppell
Editors
Policies and Politics
Under Prime Minister
Edward Heath
Editors
Andrew S. Roe-Crines
Department of Politics
University of Liverpool
Liverpool, UK
Timothy Heppell
Politics and International
Studies (POLIS)
University of Leeds
Leeds, UK
Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership
ISBN 978-3-030-53672-5 ISBN 978-3-030-53673-2
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53673-2
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Edward Heath, as the new Prime Minister, arriving at No 10 Downing Street for the first
time, after going to Buckingham Place to see the Queen. June 1970.
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Acknowledgements
The editors and contributors would like to thank the Politics and History
specialist group of the Political Studies Association (PSA) for financing the
conference that we held at the University of Liverpool in July 2018, which
resulted in this edited collection. We would also like to thank the editorial
team at Palgrave for their help and guidance throughout.
March 2020
Andrew S. Roe-Crines
Timothy Heppell
v
Praise for Policies and Politics Under Prime Minister
Edward Heath
“This exciting and innovative new collection examines Edward Heath and
his impact on the leadership of the Conservative Party. The book benefits
substantially from contributions by a wide range of experts on the ideology, leadership, membership and support base of the Conservative Party.
We learn much about Heath’s importance and significance as a major
player in British politics through outstandingly thorough archival research
and rigorous analysis by leading political scientists. This is essential reading
for anyone with an interest in party politics.”
—Jon Tonge, Professor of Politics, University of Liverpool, UK
Contents
1The Heath Premiership: Existing Academic Perspectives 1
Andrew S. Roe-Crines and Timothy Heppell
2The Conservative Party Leadership Election of 1965 19
Thomas McMeeking
3Modernising Conservatism in Opposition Under Heath 41
Mark Garnett
4The 1970 General Election 63
Martin Farr
5Competition and Credit Control, Monetary
Performance, and the Perception of Macroeconomic
Failure: The Heath Government and the Road to Brexit 87
James Silverwood
6Industrial Relations: Reappraising the Industrial
Relations Act 1971115
Sam Warner
7Social Security Policy141
Ruth Davidson
ix
x
Contents
8The Heath Government and Local Government
Reform165
David Jeffery
9Northern Ireland189
Shaun McDaid and Catherine McGlynn
10Entry into the European Communities211
Peter Dorey
11Party Management239
Philip Norton
12Heath, Powell and the Battle for the Soul of the
Conservative Party261
Gillian Peele
13The Labour Party in Opposition293
Timothy Heppell
14Edward Heath: Leadership Competence
and Capability317
Christopher Byrne, Nick Randall, and Kevin Theakston
15Who Governs? The General Election Defeats of 1974355
Andrew S. Roe-Crines
16The Conservative Party Leadership Election of 1975377
Emily Stacey
17Margaret Thatcher and the Heath Premiership:
Recent History Re-written399
Antony Mullen
18The Heath Premiership: A Transitional Era?421
Timothy Heppell and Andrew S. Roe-Crines
Index443
Notes on Contributors
Christopher Byrne is Lecturer in Politics at Leeds Beckett University.
He is the author of Neo-liberalisms in British Politics (2018) and the co-­
author of Disjunctive Prime Ministerial Leadership in British Politics: From
Baldwin to Brexit (Palgrave, 2020, with Kevin Theakston and Nick
Randall).
Ruth Davidson is a visiting research fellow at King’s College London.
Her research interests focus on gender, activism and social policy in
twentieth-­century Britain, and her articles have appeared in leading journals such as Twentieth Century British History.
Peter Dorey is Professor of British Politics at Cardiff University. He has
authored or co-authored 12 books on post-war British politics, including
British Conservatism and Trade Unionism 1945–1964 (2008); British
Conservatism: The Politics and Philosophy of Inequality (2010); From Crisis
to Coalition: The Conservative Party 1997–2010 (Palgrave, 2011, with
Mark Garnett and Andrew Denham); The British Coalition Government
2010–2015: A Marriage of Inconvenience (Palgrave, 2016, with Mark
Garnett); and The Political Rhetoric and Oratory of Margaret Thatcher
(Palgrave, 2016, with Andrew Crines and Timothy Heppell).
Martin Farr is Senior Lecturer in Contemporary British History at
Newcastle University. He is the co-editor (with Michael Cullinane) of
Presidents and Prime Ministers: From Cleveland and Salisbury to Trump
and May 1895–2019 (Palgrave, 2019), and Margaret Thatcher’s
World (2021).
xi
xii
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Mark Garnett is Senior Lecturer in Politics at Lancaster University. He
is the author of Whatever Happened to the Tories? (1997, with Ian Gilmour);
Keith Joseph: A Life (2001, with Andrew Denham); Splendid! Splendid!
The Authorised Biography of Willie Whitelaw (2002); From Crisis to
Coalition: The Conservative Party 1997–2010 (Palgrave, 2011, with Peter
Dorey and Andrew Denham); and The British Coalition Government
2010–2015: A Marriage of Inconvenience (Palgrave, 2016, with
Peter Dorey).
Timothy Heppell is Associate Professor of British Politics at the
University of Leeds. He is the author of The Tories from Winston Churchill
to David Cameron (2014), the co-author (with Andrew Crines and Peter
Dorey) of The Political Rhetoric and Oratory of Margaret Thatcher
(Palgrave, 2016), and the author of Cameron: The Politics of Modernisation
and Manipulation (2019).
David Jeffery is Lecturer in British Politics at the University of Liverpool.
He is the co-editor (with Antony Mullen and Stephen Farrall) of
Thatcherism Today: The Social and Cultural Legacy of Thatcherism in the
21st Century (Palgrave, 2020).
Shaun McDaid is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of
Huddersfield. He is the author of Template for Peace: Northern Ireland,
1972–75 (2013), co-author of Radicalisation and Counter-radicalisation
in Higher Education (2018) and is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society.
Catherine McGlynn is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of
Huddersfield. Her publications include Abandoning Historical Conflict?
Former Paramilitary Prisoners and Political Reconciliation in Northern
Ireland (with Peter Shirlow, Jonathan Tonge and James W. McAuley)
published by Manchester University Press, which was the Political Studies
Association of Ireland Book of the year in 2011. She is co-author of
Radicalisation and Counter-radicalisation in Higher Education (2018).
Thomas McMeeking is Teaching Fellow in British Politics at the
University of Leeds. He is the author of The Political Leadership of Prime
Minister John Major (Palgrave, 2020).
Antony Mullen recently completed his doctorate in the Department of
English Studies at Durham University. He is the founder and convener of
the Thatcher Network and the co-editor (with David Jeffery and Stephen
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
xiii
Farrall) of Thatcherism Today: The Social and Cultural Legacy of Thatcherism
in the 21st Century (Palgrave, 2020).
Philip Norton is Professor of Government and Director of the Centre
for Legislative Studies at the University of Hull. He is author, co-author
or editor of 30 books, including most recently Reform of the House of Lords
(2017), and Parliament in British Politics (Palgrave, 2013). He was
elevated to the peerage in 1998, and he was the first Chairman of the
House of Lords Constitution Committee. He has been described in
The House magazine—the journal of both Houses of Parliament—as ‘our
greatest living expert on Parliament’.
Gillian Peele is Emeritus Professor in Politics and Tutorial Fellow, Lady
Margaret Hall, at the University of Oxford. Her articles have appeared
extensively on British and American politics, and her most recent publications are The Regulation of Standards in British Public Life: Doing the
Right Thing? (2016) with David Hine and David Cameron and
Conservative Renewal: The Limits of Modernisation? (2016, edited with
John Francis).
Nick Randall is Senior Lecturer in British Politics at Newcastle University.
He is the co-author of Disjunctive Prime Ministerial Leadership in British
Politics: From Baldwin to Brexit (Palgrave, 2020, with Kevin Theakston
and Christopher Byrne).
Andrew S. Roe-Crines is Senior Lecturer in British Politics at the
University of Liverpool. He is the (co)-author/editor of over ten books
including The Political Rhetoric and Oratory of Margaret Thatcher
(Palgrave, 2016); Democratic Orators (Palgrave, 2016); Republican
Orators (Palgrave, 2017) as well as publishing in leading national and
international journals such as the Journal of Common Market Studies,
Parliamentary Affairs, British Journal of Politics and International
Relations, amongst others. He also recently won the PSA Richard Rose
Prize for distinctive research.
James Silverwood recently completed his PhD at the University of Hull
and is now Lecturer in Emerging Markets at Coventry University. His
research interests focus on British macroeconomic policymaking, and his
articles have appeared in Political Quarterly.
Emily Stacey is a teaching fellow within the Department of History at
Oxford Brookes University. Her doctoral research focused on the
xiv
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Conservative Party leadership of Margaret Thatcher in the opposition era
of 1975–1979.
Kevin Theakston is Professor in British Government at the University of
Leeds. He is author of ten books, including Winston Churchill and the
British constitution (2004) and After Number 10: Former Prime Ministers
in British Politics (Palgrave, 2010). He co-authored William Armstrong
and British Policy Making (Palgrave, 2017, with Philip Connelly) and
Disjunctive Prime Ministerial Leadership in British Politics: From Baldwin
to Brexit (Palgrave, 2020, with Nick Randall and Christopher Byrne).
Sam Warner is Associate Lecturer of Politics at the University of
Manchester. His research focuses on the management of British capitalism, especially with regard to the politics of depoliticisation. His articles
have appeared in leading politics journals such as the British Journal of
Politics and International Relations and British Politics.
List of Tables
Table 1.1
Table 2.1
Table 2.2
Table 5.1
Table 5.2
Table 5.3
Table 5.4
Table 5.5
Table 11.1
Table 14.1
Table 14.2
Table 14.3
Table 16.1
The electoral record of the conservative party (1945–2019)
3
Leadership preferences and aversions in the parliamentary
Conservative Party, 1963
25
Candidate support in the conservative party leadership
election of 1965
31
Inflation performance of the Heath and Thatcher
Governments101
Economic growth and unemployment during the Heath
Government105
Public expenditure and public sector net borrowing
during the Heath Government
106
Imports and exports during the Heath Government
107
Balance of Payments during the Heath Government
107
Government rebellion rates in the House of Commons
(1945–1997)249
Skowronek’s typology of leaders, regimes and patterns of
politics319
Heath’s attitude towards the regime, 1965–1970
321
Twenty most frequent word-stems in Heath speeches,
by period
336
Candidate support in the Conservative Party Leadership
election ballots of 1975
391
xv
CHAPTER 1
The Heath Premiership: Existing Academic
Perspectives
Andrew S. Roe-Crines and Timothy Heppell
In post-war British politics, there have been four periods of Labour Party
governance: 1945–1951 under the leadership of Clement Attlee;
1964–1970 under the leadership of Harold Wilson; 1974–1979 under the
leadership of Wilson again and then James Callaghan; and the 1997–2010
period under the leadership of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. There have
also been four periods of Conservative governance, and three of those
periods have lasted a decade or more: 1951–1964 under the leadership of
Winston Churchill; Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan and Alec Douglas-­
Home; 1979–1997 under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher and John
Major; and the period since 2010 under the leadership of David Cameron,
Theresa May and Boris Johnson. The fourth period of Conservative governance was the 1970–1974 premiership led by Edward Heath and it
A. S. Roe-Crines
University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK
e-mail: a.s.crines@liverpool.ac.uk
T. Heppell (*)
University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
e-mail: t.heppell@leeds.ac.uk
© The Author(s) 2021
A. S. Roe-Crines, T. Heppell (eds.), Policies and Politics Under
Prime Minister Edward Heath, Palgrave Studies in Political
Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53673-2_1
1
2
A. S. ROE-CRINES AND T. HEPPELL
holds an unwarranted distinction—it is the only post-war premiership to
be removed by the voters at the first opportunity.
All of the aforementioned eras involved some form of re-election for
the governing party. The Attlee premiership that entered office in 1945
(majority 146) did secure re-election in 1950 (majority six) before losing
office in 1951; the Wilson premiership of 1964 (majority four) secured
re-election in 1966 (majority 99) before being defeated in 1970; and the
second Wilson era entered office as a minority premiership in March 1974
and secured a small majority (of three) at the General Election of October
1974. The Blair era would involve three successive election victories
and majorities of 179 (in 1997), 167 (in 2001) and 66 (in 2005). The
three long-serving eras of Conservative governance saw the party securing
stronger parliamentary performances when seeking their first re-election.
They re-entered office in 1951 with a parliamentary majority of 17 and
their majority increased to 59 in 1955 (and increased again to 100 in
1959). The victory that the Conservatives secured at the General Election
of 1979, with a majority of 44, was followed by three further victories—in
1983 with a majority of 144; in 1987 with a majority of 102; and then a
majority of 21 in 1992. Their return to office in 2010 as a coalition with
the Liberal Democrats was followed by three further General Elections in
the next decade, all of which resulted in the Conservatives holding onto
power—in 2015, they secured a majority of 12 under Cameron; in 2017,
they failed to secure a majority but held onto office as a minority premiership (under May); and finally, they held a majority of 80 under the leadership of Johnson in late 2019 (see Cowley and Kavanagh 2018; Cutts
et al. 2020).
What must have been distressing for Heath personally was the performance of the Conservatives while he was their party leader, relative to
their performances before and after his party leadership tenure. As
Table 1.1 demonstrates, he led the Conservatives into four successive
General Elections between March 1966 and October 1974 and he led
them to three defeats alongside one victory at the General Election of
June 1970. The four General Elections prior to him being leader of the
Conservative Party (1951–1964) involved them winning three out of
four, and the four General Elections after he was leader of the Conservative
Party involved them winning all four (1979–1992). The 1951–1959 era
saw the Conservative vote base oscillate between 13.1 and 13.7 million.
Between 1979 and 1992, their vote base peaked at 14.0 million (in 1992)
and was at its lowest in 1983 at 13.0 million, when ironically they secured
1
THE HEATH PREMIERSHIP: EXISTING ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES
3
Table 1.1 The electoral record of the conservative party (1945–2019)
Election
Elected
Conservatives
Percentage
share of vote
Total votes
received
Government and majority
1945
1950
1951
1955
1959
1964
Heath
era
1966
1970
1974 F
1974 O
1979
1983
1987
1992
1997
2001
2005
2010
213
299
321
345
365
304
39.8
43.5
48.0
49.7
49.4
43.4
9,577,667
12,502,567
13,717,538
13,311,936
13,749,830
12,001,396
Labour
Labour
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Labour
146
5
17
59
100
4
253
330
297
277
339
397
376
336
165
166
198
307
41.9
46.4
37.9
35.8
43.9
42.4
42.3
41.9
30.7
31.8
32.4
36.1
11,418,433
13,145,123
11,872,180
10,464,817
13,697,923
13,012,315
13,763,066
14,092,891
9,602,957
8,357,622
8,772,473
10,726,555
2015
2017
2019
330
317
365
36.9
42.4
43.6
11,334,226
13,636,684
13,966,565
Labour
Conservative
Labour
Labour
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Labour
Labour
Labour
Conservative-­
Lib
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
97
31
Minority
3
44
144
101
21
179
167
66
Dem
Coalition
12
Minority
80
Source: Adapted from Cowley and Kavanagh (2018) and Cutts et al. (2020)
a landslide parliamentary majority of 144 caused by the nature of the
fragmentation of the Labour (27%) and Social Democratic Party (SDP)/
Liberal Alliance vote (25%) (Butler and Kavanagh 1984). When the
Conservatives lost power at the General Election of 1964, their vote fell to
12.0 million (down by 1.7 million from the 13.7 million secured five years
earlier), but that decline did occur at the end of a 13-year period in office.
Their vote base when losing office in 1964 (at 12.0 million) was larger
than the vote base that the Conservatives secured in February 1974 after
only three and half years in office—11.8 million—and the vote share in
1964 was significantly larger (at 43.4%) than the vote share in February
1974 (at 37.9%). That the electorate was sceptical of the merits of the
Heath premiership was confirmed by their performance in the second
4
A. S. ROE-CRINES AND T. HEPPELL
General Election of 1974, when their vote share fell further (to 35.8%) at
a vote base of 10.4 million (Butler and Kavanagh 1974, 1975). Between
the General Elections of 1970 and October 1974, the Conservatives lost
2.7 million votes and they experienced a vote share reduction of 10.6
percent. That was the Heath effect and, much to his chagrin, the Thatcher
effect was just as pronounced but in the opposite direction. Between the
October 1974 and May 1979 General Elections, the Conservatives gained
3.2 million votes and increased their vote share by 7.9% (Butler and
Kavanagh 1980). That the Heath era seems a failed era for the
Conservatives—the so-called self-­proclaimed party of government—is evident from the fact that the General Election victory of 2019 was their 8th
General Election victory out of 11 General Elections since his era.
The re-election of the Johnson premiership, in what became known as
the Brexit General Election of 2019, has ensured that the United Kingdom
will leave the European Union. That the year of exiting will occur on the
50th anniversary of the General Election of 1970 and the beginning of the
Heath premiership carries a certain irony. That is because the greatest
policy achievement, and thereby governmental legacy of the Heath premiership, was securing entry into what was then known as the European
Community1 (Kitzinger 1973; Lord 1993; see also Crowson 2007; Wall
2013). This provides the rationale for political historians to reassess the
Heath premiership. If the most significant legacy of that era is now being
reversed, as voters reject the benefits of integration within Europe, then
does that impact upon how we interpret the Heath premiership? Or to put
it another way, do we need to reassess the validity of the two rival perspectives that exist vis-à-vis the Heath premiership, that is, the critical perspective and the contingencies or circumstances-based perspective?.
The Critical Perspective of the Heath Premiership
The critique of the Heath premiership is multifaceted. The dominant critique is the view expressed by those on the free market or economically
liberal wing of the Conservative Party (who would later become defined
1
The European Communities were comprised of three entities: the European Economic
Community, European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy
Community (Euratom). It was the first of these that was most prominent—often referred to
as the ‘Common Market’—and the main focus of the UK application to join. However, for
the sake of consistency and to avoid confusion, we will refer to it as the European Community
(or EC) throughout this book.
1
THE HEATH PREMIERSHIP: EXISTING ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES
5
as the Thatcherite dries). They argue that the policy review process that
was conducted in the opposition era under Heath (between 1965 and
1970), and which informed the construction of their 1970 manifesto, had
established what an incoming Conservative administration for the 1970s
(and beyond) should be seeking to achieve.2 That programme appeared to
be a challenge to the consensus politics of the post-war era (Kavanagh and
Morris 1994; Dutton 1997).
Heath wanted to modernise the British economy. His strategy for promoting economic growth involved reducing state intervention in the
economy,3 making the case for lowering both taxation and public expenditure, advancing competition and promoting efficiency. Initiating this
plan for economic modernisation required entry into the European
Economic Community and trade union reform, increasing selectivity in
terms of the allocation of welfare entitlements and the rejection of formal
prices and incomes policies (Kavanagh 1996: 366). Furthermore, his commitment to this new approach seemed to be clear from the language used
in the Conservative Party manifesto of 1970, as Heath argued that:
I want to see a fresh approach to the taking of decisions. The Government
should seek the best advice and listen carefully to it. It should not rush into
decisions, it should use up to date techniques for assessing the situation, it
should be deliberate and thorough … once a decision is made, once a policy is
established, the Prime Minister and his colleagues should have the courage to
stick to it … courage and intellectual honesty are essential qualities in politics, and in the interests of our country it is high time we saw them again.
(Quoted in Campbell 1993: 271)
2
In an overt piece of pre-election campaigning, Prime Minister Harold Wilson contributed to the impression of Heath as a hard-faced economically liberal and socially authoritarian Conservative. Naming Heath as ‘Selsdon Man’—after the Selsdon Park Hotel where the
Conservatives held a policy review session in January 1970—Wilson argued that Heath had
‘an atavistic desire to reverse the course of 25 years of social revolution; what they are planning is a wanton, calculated and deliberate return to greater inequality’ (Campbell
1993: 265).
3
This commitment to reducing intervention in the economy was reinforced by the rhetoric of John Davies, President of the Board of Trade, in November 1970. He said that the
Heath premiership was determined to make ‘industry stand on its own two feet or go to the
wall’ and that the ‘consequence of treating the whole country as lame ducks was national
decadence’ (HC Debates, Vol. 805, Col. 1211–8, 4th November 1970).
6
A. S. ROE-CRINES AND T. HEPPELL
That commitment seemed to be reaffirmed in the speech that Heath
gave to the Conservative Party Annual Conference of late 1970, just a few
months after entering Downing Street after the General Election of June
that year. Dubbed the ‘quiet revolution’ speech, Heath argued that:
This then is the task to which your Government is dedicated: to give to all
our people both freedom and responsibility. That is the challenge and from
it will come opportunity. Opportunity to take our destiny, the destiny of the
nation, once again in our own hands. If we are to achieve this task we will have
to embark on a change so radical, a revolution so quiet and yet so total, that it
will go far beyond the programme for a Parliament to which we are committed
and on which we have already embarked; far beyond this decade and way into
the 1980s. For it is the task of building something of style, of substance, and
worth; something so important to the life and the future of this country of
ours. We can only hope to begin now what future Conservative Governments
will continue and complete. We are laying the foundations, but they are the
foundations for a generation. (Heath 1970)
The rhetoric used appeared to be long term and left little room for
ambiguity. After an initial attempt to begin the process of implementing
their agenda, the evidence that it could work was not immediately forthcoming. Not only was inflation increasing, but what was more problematic was the increases in unemployment, which hit the one million mark in
the winter of 1971–1972, a figure that Heath feared was politically unacceptable (i.e. re-election would not be possible at this level) (Kavanagh
1996: 373). As a consequence, Heath engaged in a process of policy reappraisal that he thought represented pragmatic adjustments, but his right-­
wing critics thought smacked of betrayal (Bruce-Gardyne 1974; Holmes
1982, 1997). The belief in a hands-off approach to industry and to not
bail-out failing companies was backtracked on as they intervened to
nationalise Rolls Royce and then rescued Upper Clyde Shipbuilders. They
were forced to accept that their attempt at trade union reform, via the
1971 Industrial Relations Act, had failed—their new approach proved to
be inoperable after the Trade Union Congress decided that they would
expel any trade union that registered under the act. Having previously
committed to cuts in public expenditure they did the exact opposite in
1972. They attempted to boost output and stimulate growth by reflationary methods, in what became known as the ‘Barber Boom’, after the
Chancellor, Anthony Barber, which in itself was said to be the cause of the
inflationary pressures that developed thereafter. They also contravened
1
THE HEATH PREMIERSHIP: EXISTING ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES
7
their initial claims by intervening to impose an incomes policy (Bruce-­
Gardyne 1974; Holmes 1982, 1997). However, what did remain consistent was their focus in securing entry into the European Economic
Community (Lord 1993).
To his critics on the free market/economically liberal wing of the
Conservative Party, Heath had backed away from their agenda. Thatcher
would speak of the ‘poisoned legacy of our U-turns’ which she said
stemmed from the fact that Heath had ‘no firm principles’ (Thatcher
1995: 240). A similar view was expressed by Norman Tebbit, later a key
ally of Thatcher, who described the abandonment of the free market
agenda that they had agreed in opposition, as a ‘retreat into corporatism’
and a ‘climbdown’ that was characterised by a ‘mish-mash of ill-­considered
centralist and socialist hand to mouth devices with no intellectual nor
political cohesion’ (Tebbit 1988: 105, 124). Bruce-Gardyne concluded
that the U-turn led to a fatal combination of (a) a statutory incomes policy
that created conflict with the trade unions and (b) an expansionary financial policy, which served to increase inflation (Bruce-Gardyne 1974; see
also Holmes 1982, 1997). The right-wing critique, or betrayal thesis,
would thereby ‘precipitate the birth of Thatcherism’ (Gamble 1988: 69).
However, the critique of the Heath premiership is not solely limited to
the disappointment of economic liberals who berate him for abandoning
their agenda due to his lack of ideological backbone. The U-turns provoked considerable disquiet within Conservative parliamentary ranks, and
a clear critique would emerge of Heath as a party manager (see Critchley
1973; Norton 1978; Franklin et al. 1986). Parliamentary rebellion rates
were significantly higher than in previous Conservative governments of
the post-war era. The overall parliamentary rebellion rate was 18% across
the 1970–1974 Parliament (including a 29% in the 1970–1971 parliamentary session), as compared to the following rebellion rates across the
1951–1964 period: 0.8% in the 1951–1955 Parliament, 1.4% in the
1955–1959 Parliament and 11.8% in the 1959–1964 Parliament (Norton
1978: 208). Despite being a former Chief Whip with experience of the
challenges of ensuring discipline, Heath adopted an inflexible approach to
party management. That reluctance to compromise and offer concessions
flowed from his determination to secure his legislative objectives
‘unchanged’ and left little outlet for backbenchers to exert influence upon
policy, thus fuelling dissent (Seldon and Sanklecha 2004: 55; see also
Heppell and Hill 2015).
8
A. S. ROE-CRINES AND T. HEPPELL
Alongside the critiques of Heath for his policy U-turns and his difficulties in terms of party management, it is important to identify the problems
that his administration had in terms of demonstrating governing competence. In a damning verdict, Kavanagh identified how the Heath era was
associated with a ‘record number of work days lost due to strikes, some of
which severely dislocated life for millions of ordinary people’ as they suffered ‘states of emergency, double digit inflation, a three-day working
week, blank television screens, lawlessness and vandalism’ (Kavanagh
1996: 360). In economic terms, Heath was left bemused as ‘inflation and
unemployment continued to defy the textbook by rising together’ (Heath
1998: 343). These difficulties in terms of economic performance, which
ran parallel to their failure to improve industrial relations (Moran 1977),
contributed to the image of the decade as ‘disconnected, quarrelsome,
unsteady, ineffective and self-defeating’ (Beer 1982: 1; see also Whitehead
1985; Fry 2005; Beckett 2009; Sandbrook 2010; Black and
Pemberton 2013).
Ultimately, the cumulative effect of perceptions of leadership failure
and ideological inconsistency, internal party disunity and governing
incompetence was electoral rejection—their vote base collapsed from
13,145,123 to 11,872,180 between the General Elections of 1970 and
1974, and their vote share fell from 46.4 to 37.9% (Butler and Pinto-­
Duschinsky 1971; Butler and Kavanagh 1974). It is also the case that all
accounts of the history of the Conservative Party make reference to some
or all of the themes identified above (see, for example, Ramsden 1996,
1998; Evans and Taylor 1996; Blake 1998; Charmley 2007; Bale 2012;
Heppell 2014).
The Contingencies or Circumstances Perspective
of the Heath Premiership
Alongside the critique of the Heath premiership, there is the revisionist
perspective. This is based primarily on identifying the difficult circumstances that the Heath premiership faced, with Seldon arguing that it
is this contingencies perspective which ‘provides the fairest judgement’
(Seldon 1996: 19). In this context, Seldon asks political historians to
acknowledge the constraints that Heath was forced to operate under.
The economic circumstances of the times would create challenges for
any political party or prime minister, being as it was an era associated with
1
THE HEATH PREMIERSHIP: EXISTING ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES
9
notions of economic decline and the ungovernability or overload thesis4
(see King 1975; Tomlinson 2000). Concerns about increases in inflation
and unemployment predominated, and it is worth noting that both the
preceding and successor Labour administrations would also struggle to
overcome the same issues (see Ponting 1990; Coopey et al. 1993; Dorey
2006, 2019; O’Hara and Parr 2006 on the 1964–1970 era; and Holmes
1985; Harmon 1997; Hickson and Seldon 2004; Hickson 2005a and
Shepherd 2013 on the 1974–1979 era). Linked to the difficulties in terms
of economic performance was the perception of increasing trade union
power. It is evident that the dysfunctional relationship between government and the trade unions was a contributing factor in the downfall of the
Heath administration that is, the non-viability of the 1971 Industrial
Relations Act, the 1972 Miners’ Strike, the 1973–1974 Miners’ Strike and
the imposition of the three-day week leading to the ‘Who Governs’
General Election of February 1974 (see Seldon 1988; Taylor 1996; Butler
and Kavanagh 1974; see also Moran 1977; Dorey 1995, Chap. 5; Phillips
2006, 2007). However, Taylor suggests that the problem was that the
Trade Union movement was structurally and ideologically incapable of
securing an agreement with the Heath premiership, or working with them
to create the modern European social market economy that Heath envisaged (Taylor 1993: 218). Moreover, as Barnes and Reid (1980) observed,
trade union power and influence had been a significant factor in the fall of
three successive prime ministers, as either side of Heath, Wilson had been
undermined by the failure of In Place of Strife, and Callaghan was undermined by the Winter of Discontent (Shepherd 2013; Dorey 2019).
Furthermore, the constraints that Heath was operating under were not
limited to those associated with the economy and industrial relations. He
was also constrained by the escalating conflict within Northern Ireland,
the suspension of the Stormont Parliament and the imposition of direct
rule from Westminster (Arthur 1996; Smith 2007; McDaid 2013).
Political historians who adopt the contingencies or circumstances perspective on the Heath Premiership argue that, once the difficult operating
environment is acknowledged, more nuanced arguments can emerge.
4
The Heath premiership also coincided with destabilising international economic circumstances. The ending of the Bretton Wood system of fixed exchange rates intensified the
uncertainty, and the weakened British economy of the early 1970s was ill prepared to deal
with the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War between Israel and Arab states (October 1973),
which ‘led to the quadrupling of oil prices by OPEC countries’ (Kavanagh 1996: 380).
10
A. S. ROE-CRINES AND T. HEPPELL
First, given that the Heath premiership possessed a healthy parliamentary majority (at 31), they did manage to deliver—in a legislative sense—
what they claimed were their main objectives when entering office, even if
some of these were reversed by the successor Labour administrations of
1974–1979; for example, they did secure their primary objective of negotiating their entry into the European Economic Community and they
gained parliamentary approval for this. They also delivered in legislative
form in the following areas: reforming taxation, housing finance and
industrial relations, and they also recognised health care, central and local
government and they ended mandatory comprehensive education
(Kavanagh 1996: 362). Second, if we acknowledge the difficult economic
environment, then their policy changes should be seen as being pragmatically driven rather than the abandoning of principles. As such, the betrayal
thesis perpetuated by the Thatcherite right vis-à-vis the U-turns is an
‘exaggeration’ (Seldon 1996: 13). Seldon argues that the significance of
the Selsdon agenda and the Conservative Party manifesto of 1970 was
overstated because Heath was ‘never a believer in laissez faire, but was a
traditional Tory who saw the state as an essential deliverer of economic
and social policy’ (Seldon 1996: 14). As such some of the policies that
they had advocated at the 1970 General Election, for example, the rejection of an incomes policy and tax and spending cuts, were driven by ‘instrumentalism and opportunism, not ideology’ (Seldon 1996: 14). Kavanagh
endorses this scepticism, arguing that Heath was ‘consistent about ends,
flexible about means: he was a pragmatist, concerned with pursuing the
best means to achieving economic growth and greater personal freedom’
(Kavanagh 1996: 367).
Between Critique and Contingencies/Circumstances:
The Heath Premiership
and a Transitional Perspective
Having identified the two existing perspectives on the Heath premiership—the critical and the contingencies/circumstances perspectives—the
aim of this book is to advance an alternative perspective. This perspective
involves acknowledging the failures and difficulties that the Heath premiership experienced and thus accepting that there is validity to both
existing perspectives. But rather than subscribing to one perspective or the
other, it is credible to see the Heath premiership as a transitional
1
THE HEATH PREMIERSHIP: EXISTING ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES
11
government. By that we mean that although the ability of the Heath premiership to pursue a new policy agenda was compromised by difficult
circumstances—which creates the evidence of policy failure—their policy
legacy and political impacts were more pronounced than might be initially
assumed.
To help us in our reassessment of the Heath premiership, we shall structure the book around the dimensions of the statecraft model. The statecraft model is associated with the work of Jim Bulpitt (1986)5 and it
represents a useful analytical framework6 for us when examining the only
post-war government that failed to secure re-election.
Statecraft refers to the method(s) by which political parties attempt to
win office (the politics of support) and then govern competently (the politics of power). When assessing its value to our understanding of
Conservative Party politics, Hickson has argued that ‘statecraft should be
viewed as an examination of how the Conservative Party has sought when
in power to insulate itself from social, economic and international pressures’ and then ‘how it has sought to manipulate them in order to maintain some degree of governing competence’ (Hickson 2005b: 182).
Statecraft has the following interconnected dimensions (which should be
seen as cyclical ending in re-election if pursued effectively, with the determinant of effectiveness being relative to the Labour Party):
(1) A Winning Electoral Strategy
Whatever policy platform the leadership decides to construct, it
has to be perceived as viable (i.e. achievable) so that it can secure a
sufficient level of voter support to provide the basis for a parliamentary support. That process may involve compromises in order
to maximise their potential vote base, but those compromises have
to be tempered by the need to retain the support of their own
activist base (Bulpitt 1986; Stevens 2002; Hickson 2005b; Taylor
2005; Buller and James 2012)
(2) Evidence of Governing Competence
Flowing from the policy platform that was (a) constructed in
opposition and then (b) secured enough electoral support to win
5
For academic discussions on the strengths and limitations of the statecraft approach, see
Stevens (2002: 119–150); Buller (1999: 691–712); and Buller (2000: 319–327).
6
Marsh has acknowledged that statecraft theory is a key approach through which to understand British government and politics (Marsh 2012: 48–49).
12
A. S. ROE-CRINES AND T. HEPPELL
power, the (new) governing party now have to demonstrate that
they can provide governing competence, especially in the sphere of
economic management (Bulpitt 1986; Stevens 2002; Hickson
2005b; Taylor 2005; Buller and James 2012)
(3) Political Argument Hegemony
Linked to the above theme on governing competence, the governing party will use power to (a) deflect blame on any policy failings onto the predecessor government, and (b) by doing so, they
will seek to delegitimise the views of their Labour opponents so as
to establish that it would be a risk to return to a Labour government at the next General Election. Bulpitt defines this as gaining
dominance of elite debate so as to ensure that as the governing
party they can push their values and agenda up the political agenda,
whilst simulatenously pushing down the political agenda the values
and agenda of their (Labour) opponents (Bulpitt 1986; Stevens
2002; Hickson 2005b; Taylor 2005; Buller and James 2012).
(4) Effective Party Management
This acknowledges the importance of internal cohesion in terms
of how voters perceive the Conservative Party relative to their
Labour opponents.7 Historians of the Conservative Party have
often emphasised how, in the pre-Heath era, the Conservatives
were known for their parliamentary unity in the division lobbies,
their emphasis on loyalty to their leader and their rejection of ideological dogmatism in preference for political pragmatism or adaptability (Ball 1998; Blake 1998; Charmley 1996; Davies 1996;
Evans and Taylor 1996; Gilmour and Garnett 1998; Ramsden
1995, 1996, 1998).
The aim of this book is to make the case for viewing the Heath premiership from a transitional perspective. To do this, we split the book into
three parts. Part one of the book—entitled from opposition to office—is
devoted to the first dimension of the statecraft model—the construction
of a winning electoral strategy. It will offer an assessment on the key developments within the Conservatives in the opposition era of 1964–1970. In
7
Writing in 1964, Richard Rose concluded that the Labour Party were a party of factions,
involving stable, cohesive and organised groups that sought to advance specific policies and
leaders. The Conservative Party, in contrast, were a party of non-aligned tendencies, based
on fluctuating alignments amongst parliamentarians, but these were transient alignments
that lacked the cohesiveness of the more factional Labour Party (Rose 1964: 33–46).
1
THE HEATH PREMIERSHIP: EXISTING ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES
13
Chap. 2, Thomas McMeeking identifies how and why Heath won the
Conservative Party leadership election of 1965, which was the first democratic leadership election in the history of the party. In Chap. 3, Mark
Garnett examines how and why the Conservative Party’s policy agenda
was amended in the opposition era. In Chap. 4, Martin Farr analyses the
General Election campaign of 1970, where the Conservatives secured
what was seen to be at the time an unexpected victory.
For the second dimension of the statecraft model, governing competence, part two of the book—entitled policy implementation—re-examines
the central policy objectives of the Heath premiership. Part two considers
the coherence, contradictions, failings and impact of their policies. In
Chap. 5, James Silverwood reconsiders the economic performance of the
Heath premiership. In Chap. 6, Samuel Warner reappraises the record of
the Heath premiership vis-à-vis industrial relations, via a case study analysis
of the failure of the Industrial Relations Act of 1971. In Chap. 7, Ruth
Davidson evaluates the approach of the Heath premiership towards social
security reform. In Chap. 8, David Jeffery examines the significance of the
local government reforms of the Heath premiership. Chapter 9 sees
Catherine McGlynn and Shaun McDaid re-examine the difficulties that
the Heath premiership experienced in relation to the politics of Northern
Ireland. In our final policy-based chapter (Chap. 10), Peter Dorey examines the primary policy success of the Heath premiership—seeking and
securing entry into the European Economic Community.
The third and fourth dimensions of the statecraft model—political
argument hegemony and party management—are considered within part
three of the book—entitled political debates. In this section on wider political debates, we consider the following. In Chap. 11, Philip Norton reconsiders how effective Heath was at managing relations within the
Conservative Party in terms of the wider organisation and the parliamentary party. Chapter 12 sees Gillian Peele reconsider the difficulties caused
by Enoch Powell and the politics of Powellism. Chapter 13 sees Timothy
Heppell place the Heath era within the context of wider party politics by
re-examining the developments of the Labour Party in opposition.
Following on from this, Chap. 14 sees Chris Byrne, Nick Randall and
Kevin Theakston offer a new leadership interpretation on the performance
of Heath as prime minister.
Ultimately, an effective statecraft strategy will see the governing party
being re-elected and, as such, Bulpitt sees his model as being cyclical, that
is, the fifth and final dimension involves securing re-election and then
14
A. S. ROE-CRINES AND T. HEPPELL
starting the cycle again. As such, in Chap. 15. Andrew Roe-Crines reassesses the fateful decision to call the General Election of February 1974.
Then, in Chap. 16, Emily Stacey charts how and why, when in opposition,
Heath was removed from the leadership of the Conservative Party. To
broaden the debate out, in Chap. 17, Antony Mullen locates the Heath
premiership within the context of consensus politics and how it has been
interpreted (and exploited) by Thatcher and the post-1979 Conservative
premierships.
By structuring the book around the statecraft model, this provides us
with a new way of assessing the Heath premiership. In Chap. 18, Andrew
Roe-Crines and Timothy Heppell argue the case for moving beyond the
prevailing perspectives on the Heath premiership, that is, the critique or
the contingencies/circumstances perspective, as they make the case for the
Heath premiership being seen as a transitional era in British politics.
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CHAPTER 2
The Conservative Party Leadership
Election of 1965
Thomas McMeeking
The defeat that the Conservative Party suffered at the General Election of
October 1964 brought an end to 13 years in government under four different prime ministers. Winston Churchill had brought them back into
power after securing a parliamentary majority of 17 at the General Election
of October 1951 (Butler 1952; Seldon 1981). Anthony Eden replaced
Churchill in April 1955 and then increased that parliamentary majority to
59 in the General Election of May 1955, before he was replaced by Harold
Macmillan in January 1957 in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis (Butler
1956; Ramsden 1995). Macmillan then propelled the Conservatives to a
third successive victory in the General Election of October 1959, with a
landslide parliamentary majority of 100 (Butler and Rose 1960; Ramsden
1996). The Macmillan era would represent the high watermark of one-­
nation conservatism, enabling the party to reap electoral rewards as the
economic climate gradually improved throughout the 1950s (Bogdanor
and Skidelsky 1970; Boxer 1996; Black and Pemberton 2004).
T. McMeeking (*)
University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
e-mail: T.I.McMeeking@leeds.ac.uk
© The Author(s) 2021
A. S. Roe-Crines, T. Heppell (eds.), Policies and Politics Under
Prime Minister Edward Heath, Palgrave Studies in Political
Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53673-2_2
19
20
T. MCMEEKING
Their ability to present themselves as the party of governing competence and rising living standards was compromised in their fourth term,
with their governing degeneration demonstrating the exhaustion of their
one-nation approach to statecraft (Evans and Taylor 1996: 121). A series
of events would erode their governing credibility between 1961 and 1964,
including relative economic decline (Pemberton 2001), their failed
attempt to secure membership of the European Economic Community
(Stennis 1998), the botched Cabinet reshuffle of 1962 dubbed ‘The
Night of the Long Knives’ (Alderman 1992) and the Profumo scandal
(Knightly and Kennedy 1987). By the time they faced the voters at the
General Election of October 1964, their ability to secure re-election was
compromised further by (a) the fact that they had been in office for so
long (Heppell 2008a) and (b) the fact that, in the shape of Harold Wilson,
the Labour opposition had a young, dynamic and credible alternative candidate to be prime minister (Dorey 2012). Wilson was to expose the leadership limitations of Alec Douglas-Home (formerly Lord Home), who
had replaced Macmillan in controversial circumstances in October 1963
(for consistency, we shall refer to Home as Douglas-Home throughout
this chapter).
The cumulative effect was a gradual decline in the appeal of the
Conservatives in the early 1960s and, by the time of the General Election
of 1964, their vote share fell from 49.4% in 1959 to 43.4. Their overall
vote also dropped from 13,749,830 in 1959 to 12,001,396, as their parliamentary representation fell from 365 to 304 (Butler and King 1965).
When assessing why they had lost, the Conservatives convinced themselves that ‘voters were not so much objecting to our policies as objecting
to our faces’ and, as a consequence, ‘we must start thinking very hard now
of the bright new image—in terms of personalities—that we wish to present to the public’ (CPA CRD 2/48/85, ‘Thoughts on a Close Election’;
23 October 1964; CPA CRD 2/48/86, ‘The Next General Election’, 19
October 1964). The dominant personality that they would turn to, and
would dominate the next decade, was to be Edward Heath.
The General Election defeat of October 1964 was to be the first of four
electoral rejections that the Conservative Party would experience in a ten-­
year period up to October 1974. It was a decade in which the Conservatives
would ‘struggle to construct a new statecraft strategy that would enable
[them] to win elections (the politics of support) and govern competently
(the politics of power)’, and these events ‘coincided with the leadership
2
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 1965
21
tenure of Heath’ (Heppell 2014: 39). A decade under his leadership influence would see their electoral return fall from 12,001,396 votes and 43.4%
vote share to 10,464,818 votes and a 35.8% vote share (Butler and
Kavanagh 1974). If the Heath electoral impact was to be so negative, it
lends the question: how and why was he made the leader of the
Conservative Party?
The aim of this chapter is to consider how and why Edward Heath
emerged as the first democratically elected leader of the Conservative
Party in July 1965. The chapter can be categorised into the following
clearly defined component parts. First, the chapter considers the significance to of the leadership succession crisis of October 1963 the
Conservative Party, in which Harold Macmillan was replaced as party
leader by Douglas-Home in controversial circumstances. Second, the
chapter considers the consequences of losing the General Election
of 1964 for the Conservative Party in terms of the leadership position of
Douglas-Home. Built into this part of the chapter is a discussion on the
changes that Douglas-Home initiated in opposition to ensure that no
future leader of the Conservative Party should have their legitimacy questioned in the way that he suffered. Third, the chapter examines the
Conservative Party leadership election of 1965, which took place after
Douglas-Home decided to resign shortly after he had established new
democratic rules for selecting the next leader. The subsequent analysis
involves profiling the respective candidates—Heath, Reginald Maudling
and Enoch Powell—as well as offering explanations as to why Maudling
(who was expected successor) was defeated by Heath by 150 to 133 votes,
with Powell left third on 15 votes.
The rationale for engaging in this stems from the fact that whereas the
era of democratic leadership elections within the Conservative Party has
spawned a wealth of academic insights on specific contests, the first of
their democratic leadership elections has been largely neglected within the
academic literature (see, for instance, on the 1975 leadership election,
Wickham-Jones 1997; Cowley and Bailey 2000; on the 1990 leadership
election, Alderman and Carter 1991; Cowley and Garry 1998; on the
1995 leadership election, Alderman 1996; on the 1997 leadership election, Alderman 1998; Heppell and Hill 2008; on the 2001 leadership
election; Alderman and Carter 2002; Heppell and Hill 2010; on the 2005
leadership election, Denham and Dorey 2006; on the 2016 leadership
election, see Jeffery et al. 2018; Quinn 2018).
22
T. MCMEEKING
Selecting Douglas-Home: The Conservative Party
Succession Crisis of October 1963
By 1963, Macmillan had been leader of the Conservative Party and prime
minister for six years. Given that he was 69 years old and the Conservatives
would have to contest a General Election by late 1964, this created a
conundrum. If Macmillan did lead the Conservatives into a 1964 General
Election and was successful, speculation would immediately begin about
the succession, given his age. That being the case then, should the
Conservatives have dealt with the question of the succession before seeking their fourth term in office? In attempt to address this dilemma, the
Party Chair, Lord Poole, asked Macmillan to make his intentions clear, so
that they could end the speculation and plan ahead with some certainty
(MS. Macmillan dep c. 962, Lord Poole to Harold Macmillan, 28 August
1963). Macmillan appeared to want to lead the Conservatives into the
next General Election in 1964 and govern for a couple of years thereafter
(MS. Macmillan dep c. 962, Harold Macmillan to Lord Swinton, 12
August 1963). However, those plans were to be undone, as ill-health
forced him to offer his resignation in early October 1963 (Lamb
1995: 491).
When the moment of resignation came, events would move with
remarkable swiftness as Macmillan manipulated what he himself described
as the ‘various proper methods of communications’ (Stark 1996: 16) to
secure his preferred outcome (Churchill 1964). The ‘discreet, flexible and
expert’ processes in 1963 lasted ten days in all between Macmillan becoming ill on 8 October and Douglas-Home being called to the Palace to be
offered the chance to form a new government on 18 October (Punnett
1993: 262).
In order to fully understand the events of those ten days, it is first
important to define exactly how the Conservative Party organised the
leadership succession in that era, that is, what we mean when talk of the
so-called magic circle (Macleod 1964). The system worked on the basis of
elites within the Conservative Party engaging in discussions through
which an agree candidate would emerge. These discussions could involve
assessing opinion within the parliamentary party, although this would not
be quantified (Bogdanor 1996). The system tended to work well: nine
leadership transitions occurred between 1902 and 1957 without significant disputation within the party, although the successions of 1911, 1923
and 1957 were not as clear cut as the other six successions—1902, 1921,
1922, 1937, 1940 and 1955 (Fisher 1977: 198).
2
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 1965
23
Prior to stepping down—in July 1963—Macmillan had informed the
1922 Executive Committee of backbenchers that he recognised that there
was ‘not an heir apparent’ (Goodhart 1973: 189). This may have been the
view of Macmillan, but it was not necessarily shared by all. Some assumed
that the obvious successor was R. A. Butler. Not only was Butler regarded
as the leading intellectual figure of post-war Conservatism, but he had
served as Chancellor, home secretary and deputy prime minister and had
previously acted as acting prime minister when ill-health impacted upon
Eden. He had been considered for the succession back in 1957, only for
the customary processes of consultation to determine that Macmillan was
a preferable option (Evans and Taylor 1996: 128; Blake 1998: 278).
In the aftermath of the war of the Macmillan succession, Iain Macleod
argued that ‘at all times, from the first day of his premiership to the last’,
Macmillan had been ‘determined that Butler, although incomparably the
best qualified of the contenders, should not succeed him’ (Macleod 1964).
Why? It can be argued that Macmillan held three issues against Butler.
First, he feared that Butler, who was regarded as being located on the
outer-left of Conservatism, would be unacceptable to the right-wing and
would thus undermine party unity. Second, he feared that Butler might
lack electoral appeal and might struggle to win the next General Election
for the Conservatives—Macmillan felt that Butler was a ‘dreary figure’
who would struggle to appeal to ‘floating’ voters (MS. Macmillan dep c.
962, ‘Memorandum by the Prime Minister—for the Queen’, 18 October
1963). Finally, having outmanoeuvred Butler in the 1957 succession, he
had concluded that Butler was indecisive and lacked the strength of character to be both leader of the Conservative Party and prime minister
(Horne 1989: 471; Watkins 1998: 69–70). Those were the political reasons for Macmillan working to prevent Butler from securing the leadership. But it could be that two non-political reasons may have existed. First,
Macmillan simply disliked Butler (Pearce 1997: 116), with Watkins recalling a conversation between the two of them in late 1962, in which
Macmillan told Butler: ‘I don’t see why I should make way for you, old
cock’ (Watkins 1998: 70). Second, it would be alleged that Macmillan had
predetermined that he thought Butler was not acceptable as a leadership
option—after all, Major John Morrison, Chair of the 1922 Executive
Committee, would tell Butler months before Macmillan stepped down
that he would not succeed Macmillan as ‘the chaps won’t have you’
(Bogdanor 1996: 77). It was from this assumption that Macleod would
construct his conspiracy theory in which the magic circle was a stitch-up
24
T. MCMEEKING
process orchestrated by the Etonian Macmillan to advance the Etonian
Douglas-Home at the expense of the non-Etonian Butler (Macleod 1964).
In terms of alternatives to Butler then, the next best option appeared to
be the Chancellor, Reginald Maudling. Aged 46, he was from the next
generation of Conservatives, but Macmillan also had reservations about
his prime ministerial capabilities (Horne 1989: 531). The other next-­
generation contenders included two figures who would threaten party
unity: Macleod (aged 50) who was too aligned to the left and would be
unacceptable to the right, and Enoch Powell (aged 51) who was regarded
as excessively right-wing and would be unacceptable to the left (Powell’s
resignation as a Treasury minister in 1958 established his reputation for
individualism and divisiveness; Schofield 2015: 114–121; see also Green
2000). Macmillan appeared to be discounting Heath as an option at this
stage on the basis that he lacked the experience and profile at this time
(Fisher 1977: 151).
In his determination to find an alternative, Macmillan was to benefit
from circumstances. Just a few months earlier, a parliamentary bill had
passed permitting hereditary peers to (a) renounce their peerages and then
(b) stand for election to the House of Commons (Blake 1998: 290–291).
These changes meant that Macmillan suddenly had the opportunity to
look beyond the next generation and turn back to his own generation for
a non-Butler alternative successor. This brought into the equation Lord
Hailsham (Lord President and Minister for Science) and Lord Home
(Foreign Secretary) (Shepherd 1994: 304). The Peerage Act was clearly
unhelpful to Butler (Stark 1996: 88). He was concerned that piloting in a
prime minister from the House of Lords would involve having to find a
safe parliamentary constituency for them and that this may have a ‘psychological impact’ upon voter perceptions of the Conservative Party (Fisher
1977: 107).
Macmillan discounted this, and the processes of consultation would
commence in the knowledge that Hailsham and, conceivably, Douglas-­
Home could be considered. We say conceivably due to how those processes of consultation were initially devised. The Cabinet had convened
and the Lord Chancellor, Lord Dilhorne, suggested that because he would
not be a candidate, he would be willing to lead the processes of consultation within the Cabinet. Lord Douglas-Home announced that he would
assist Dilhorne, thus suggesting that he did not see himself as a candidate
(Hailsham had already announced his willingness to be considered
(Gilmour and Garnett 1998: 189)). Alongside assessing opinion within
the Cabinet, it was agreed that (a) the Chief Whip, Martin Redmayne,
2
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 1965
25
would determine opinion amongst junior ministers and the backbenchers;
(b) Lord Poole, Party Chair, would canvass opinion amongst constituency
chairs; and (c) Earl St Aldwyn would identify opinion amongst the peers
(Punnett 1992: 40–41).
Consultations amongst the peers were uncontroversial, and they advocated the still Lord Douglas-Home, followed by Butler, then Hailsham
with Maudling last (MS. Macmillan dep c. 962, Lord St. Aldwyn to
Harold Macmillan, 15 October 1963). Amongst the constituency chairs,
Poole concluded that their preference was for Hailsham. The view of the
activists, which was easiest to discount, was that they tended towards Lord
Douglas-Home, and that they were concerned about the unifying capability of Butler (Punnett 1992: 40–41). However, it was the way in which
Redmayne assessed opinion within the parliamentary ranks that created
the most controversy. Perhaps he may have been influenced by this claim
by former Conservative backbencher, Humphrey Berkley. He claimed that
Macmillan told Redmayne: ‘I want Douglas-Home’, so ‘somehow or
another you have got to devise a way so that I can say that the party wants
Douglas-Home’ (Stark 1996: 18). To aid this objective, Redmayne was
not really interested in giving equal weighting to the findings of parliamentarians. He preferred to consider those ‘whose opinion one would
more strongly rely on than others’ (Redmayne 1963). Conservative parliamentarians were therefore asked three questions: (a) their first preference,
(b) their second preference and (c) who they would object to? (Bogdanor
1996: 76).
Table 2.1 provides the details of the Redmayne findings. Through
this process, it could be said that Douglas-Home had the highest number
Table 2.1 Leadership preferences and aversions in the parliamentary Conservative
Party, 1963
Candidate
First preferences
Second preferences
Definite aversions
87
89
30
86
65
48
12
10
69
39
66
18
17
48
78
6
1
1
Lord Home/Alec
Douglas-Home
R. A. Butler
Lord Hailsham/Quintin Hogg
Reginald Maudling
Ian Macleod
Edward Heath
NB These figures do not include members of the Cabinet and are based on junior ministers and
backbenchers
Source: Adapted from Baston (2004: 208)
26
T. MCMEEKING
of first preferences. This was also true of the second preferences. Douglas-­
Home also had the least definite aversions amongst the three leading candidates. These findings would lead Redmayne to conclude that
Douglas-Home was best positioned to unify (MS. Macmillan dep c. 962,
Martin Redmayne to Harold Macmillan, 16 October 1963). Macleod
would later admit to being ‘neither impressed nor surprised’ by the findings (Macleod 1964). Redmayne also asked parliamentarians an additional
hypothetical question based on the idea of deadlock between Butler and
Hailsham. The question was whether parliamentarians would be willing to
accept Douglas-Home as a compromise candidate (Bogdanor 1996: 76).
This may have had a distorting effect upon the findings; for example, Jim
Prior would recall that his actual preferences were as follows: first preference, Butler, second preference, Hailsham, and although not explicitly
allowed to have a third choice, it would have been Douglas-Home.
However, he did say yes to the issue of would he accept Douglas-Home as
a compromise candidate in a deadlock situation between Butler and
Hailsham, whereupon he subsequently found out that he had been
recorded as a Douglas-Home vote (Prior 1986: 32–33). During these
consultations, Heath informed Macmillan that Douglas-Home would be
best equipped to unify the parliamentary party, whilst either Hailsham or
Butler would further intensify internal divisions (MS. Macmillan dep c.
962, ‘Note for the Record’, 15 October 1963).
Macleod would say that the level of ‘error’ within the findings ‘must
have been enormous’, with this applying to the calculations not only
within the Cabinet but also amongst junior ministers and backbenchers
(Macleod 1964). Macleod calculated that from within the Cabinet, there
were 11 members ‘from my personal knowledge’ who opposed DouglasHome, but Dilhorne told Macmillan that 10 Cabinet ministers endorsed
Douglas-­Home, 3 endorsed Butler, 4 Maudling and, finally, 2 for Hailsham
(MS. Macmillan dep c. 962, Lord Dilhorne to Harold Macmillan, 15
October 1963). Macleod described these findings as ‘simply impossible’
(Macleod 1964). What might back Macleod up is the idea that Edward
Boyle (Minister of Education) who was widely seen as a ‘card-carrying
Tory left winger’ had abandoned Butler to make Douglas-Home his first
preference (Shepherd 1994: 326).
Macmillan used these (distorted) processes of consultation to draft his
memorandum to the Queen, recommending she send for Douglas-Home
to be appointed the new prime minister. Fearing that Macmillan was
attempting to bounce the monarch into appointing Douglas-Home with
undue haste, a number of senior Cabinet members, including Butler,
2
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 1965
27
Hailsham, Macleod, Powell and Maudling, attempted to stall the process.
They discussed the possibility of jointly refusing to serve under Douglas-­
Home, thus reopening the succession process on the basis that Douglas-­
Home had been unable to form an administration—a fact that
Douglas-Home later acknowledged would have worked (Home 1976:
185). Whilst Macleod and Powell carried out their threat, the others
agreed to serve Douglas-Home, thus enabling Macmillan to secure his
objective. Butler could not bring himself to activate the Macleod plot,
given the damage it might cause to the unity and electoral prospects of the
Conservative Party (Cosgrave 1981: 141–143). However, a perception
existed that the selection of Douglas-Home was ‘unfair’ and that it had
‘damaged’ the image of the Conservatives (CPA, CCO 20/39/3, Norman
St. John-Stevas to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 24 November 1964).
From Magic Circle to Parliamentary Ballot:
October 1963–February 1965
It is worth remembering the position of Heath in the Redmayne findings.
He was the first preference of only 10 parliamentarians and yet, within two
years, he would have won the first democratic election for the leadership
of the Conservative Party with 150 votes (Heppell 2008b: 33–49). So,
what factors helped to improve his position so much between October
1963 and July 1965?
First, it can be argued that the events surrounding the Conservative
Party leadership succession crisis were damaging to all of the other candidates in different ways. The victor, Douglas-Home, was to be permanently
scarred by the manner in which he had acquired the premiership. But it
was not just a failure of process, that is, the discrediting of the magic circle,
it was also a failure of outcome—Douglas-Home had significant limitations as political leader, most notably in presentational terms (Campbell
1993: 139; see also Leonard 2003). The disappointment that came with
being passed over for the leadership again and the subsequent defeat at the
General Election of October 1964 prompted Butler to leave frontline
politics, and he accepted the post of Master of Trinity College, Cambridge
(Jago 2015: 405–409). The credibility of Hailsham was undermined not
only by the scale of aversions to him becoming party leader when
Redmayne consulted Conservative parliamentarians, but also because a
number of cabinet members had made it clear that they would not want
to serve under him (MS. Macmillan dep c. 962, ‘Note for the Record’, 14
October 1963). Doubts about Maudling emerged with regard to the
28
T. MCMEEKING
rather tepid speech that he delivered at the Conservative Party Annual
Conference of October 1963, which had coincided with the succession
race. Macleod created an impression of himself as a divisive figure by his
refusal to accept the outcome and the selection of Douglas-Home
(Campbell 1993: 139). Three of the six contenders for the throne in
1963—Douglas-Home, Butler and Hailsham—would be out of the way
in the next contest; Macleod had damaged his credentials and Maudling
had failed to seriously advance his. As such Heath, by his loyalty and his
inexperience, relative to the other candidates, had managed to come last
but had done the least damage to his reputation.
Second, it can be argued that Heath enhanced his reputation within the
parliamentary ranks of the Conservative Party during the Douglas-Home
premiership. He was appointed to a super-ministry that gave him the
catch-all title Secretary of State for Industry, Trade and Regional
Development and President of the Board of Trade (Cummings cartoon
depicted the promotion, with Heath carrying a large briefcase with
‘SOSFITARDAPOBOT’ marked on it—Butler’s was small by contrast
and had simply ‘FO’ on it). This position increased the profile of Heath as
he set about abolishing resale price maintenance (RPM) (Campbell 1993:
147–150). Although this was seen by some as an essential safeguard for
small shopkeepers and protected them from being undercut by new supermarkets, it was felt by free market Conservatives to be an anachronism and
an obstacle to the free market (Campbell 1993: 151). Although it was
controversial, it may have aided Heath over the longer term. It allowed
Heath to project himself as the architect of a piece of reforming legislation
that symbolised Conservative modernisation (Heath 1998: 266–267). In
the course of its implementation, Heath displayed the qualities—conviction, resolution and steadfastness under fire—that the Conservatives
might be looking for in any post-Douglas-Home scenario (Campbell
1993: 155–156). Furthermore, given that the impression of the
Conservatives was that they had run out of ideas by late 1964, the reforming zeal of Heath made him seem like an exception (CPA, CRD, 2/48/86,
‘The Liberal Revival’, 30 October 1964).
Third, developments as the Conservative Party entered opposition
worked to the advantage of Heath and the disadvantage of Maudling, who
was seen to be at that time the leading candidate to succeed Douglas-­
Home. Having been Chancellor when they were in office, Maudling was
moved across to shadow Foreign Secretary in opposition, and Heath was
appointed shadow Chancellor (Campbell 1993: 168). This constituted a
2
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 1965
29
significant promotion for Heath. Not only did it provide him with a platform to showcase his leadership credentials—like leading the opposition
to the new government’s Finance Bill—but it also marginalised Maudling
from frontline domestic political debate (Gilmour and Garnett 1998:
217). The perception that Douglas-Home favoured Heath over Maudling
(Douglas-Home did in fact vote for Heath in the subsequent leadership
ballot, Roth 1971: 156) was confirmed when Douglas-Home appointed
Heath to replace the retiring Butler as Chair of the Advisory Committee
on Policy (Campbell 1993: 170–171). Heath used this new position to
advance his own leadership credentials and to undermine Maudling—he
even went so far as forbidding the Research Department from sending
Maudling copies of the policy papers that were emerging from the committee (Campbell 1993: 172). Heath also benefitted at this time from the
choices Maudling made in the initial opposition period. Maudling decided
to accept a number of lucrative directorships, which certainly raised eyebrows amongst Conservative colleagues at Westminster (Baston 2004:
247–249).
Fourth, Heath was to benefit from the decision to end the traditional
magic circle system of leadership succession and the introduction of formal internal democracy (if we accept the idea that the more senior
Maudling would have more likely to be chosen by the old magic circle).
Having recognised that the disputed nature of his acquisition of the party
leadership had left him devoid of legitimacy, Douglas-Home decided to
make sure that no future leader of the Conservative Party should suffer the
same fate. A committee was set up and all parts of the Conservative Party
were consulted and discussed how to select their leader in the future
(Butler and King 1966: 47). Debate focused on how wide the electorate
should be. Ultimately, the idea of membership participation was rejected
on the basis of being too complex and the agreed a new process of multiple parliamentary ballots (CPA, CRD 3/47/6, James Douglas, ‘Selecting
a Leader’, 19 November 1963; CPA, CCO 20/39/3, Norman St. JohnStevas to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 24 November 1964; CPA, CRD
3/47/6, James Douglas, ‘Selection of the Party Leader’, 5 February
1965). On the issue of whether a simple majority of parliamentarians was
sufficient, the committee also devoted considerable attention. They concluded that it was important that the newly elected party leader had a
strong mandate to lead, to ‘preclude the emergence of factions of determined opposition’ and, as a consequence, they added the majority and the
15% extra requirement (CPA, CRD 3/47/6, James Douglas to Michael
30
T. MCMEEKING
Fraser, 16 November 1963; CPA, CRD 3/47/6, James Douglas, ‘Possible
Methods for Selecting a Leader of the Party’, 20 November 1963). Having
determined the electorate and the margin for victory, the committee also
added in two other significant provisions. First, that candidates could also
enter at the second ballot stage; and, second, that these new procedures
only applied for vacancies created either by resignation or death of the
incumbent—there was no means by which the democratically elected
leader could be challenged (CPA, CRD 3/47/6, Conservative Central
Office, ‘Procedure for the Selection of the Leader of the Conservative and
Unionist Party’, 19 February 1965; see also CPA, LCC, 1/2/1 Shadow
Cabinet Minutes, 8 February 1965).
Having created these new democratic procedures, Douglas-Home had
three options. Option one was that he could resign immediately. Option
two was that he could have chosen to submit himself to the procedures—
securing their approval against an alternative candidate would have provided him with the legitimacy that he had been lacking since October
1963. Option three was to try to continue and argue that these new procedures would apply for the future but that they did not need to be activated now. Douglas-Home attempted to pursue the third option.
However, after a few months, his position started to be openly questioned.
A heated meeting of the 1922 Executive Committee of backbenchers
involved supporters of Maudling demanding that Douglas-Home resign
(Baston 2004: 253). Backers of Heath were also pushing for his resignation (Campbell 1993: 176). The ability of Douglas-Home to continue
was becoming a source of continued press speculation (e.g. see Rees-­
Mogg 1965). One complicating factor was the possibility of a snap General
Election, remembering that the Labour government only had a small
majority. The Conservatives did not want to be activating their new election procedures if a General Election was about to be called. The complicating factor had been decision of Wilson to announce (in June 1965) that
he would not be calling a General Election in 1965 (Pimlott 1992: 395).
Following on from consultations with the Chief Whip, William Whitelaw,
Douglas-Home decided that he should resign (Butler and King 1966: 51).
Electing Heath: The Conservative Party Leadership
Election of July 1965
The first democratic election to determine the leadership of the
Conservative Party would involve three contenders: first, representing the
traditional one-nation left was Maudling; second, advancing the cause of
2
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 1965
31
the free market right was Powell; and, positioned between them, but
closer to Maudling and the one-nation left was Heath. All three candidates
transcended the traditional elitist backgrounds that were normally associated with successions under the old magic circle. That system would have
favoured older candidates such as the Etonians Hogg and the former
Chancellor, Peter Thorneycroft. But, they had calculated that they would
lack the necessary support within the new succession system (as did the
former Chancellor and Foreign Secretary, but non-Etonian, Selwyn
Lloyd1) (Thorpe 1989: 395; Campbell 1993: 177).
The candidature of Powell was justified (by him) on the grounds of laying down a marker for the future (Shepherd 1996: 293). He knew that he
stood no chance of winning, but he wanted to inject new ideas into what
he perceived to be an ideology-free contest (Evans and Taylor 1996: 145).
As Powell was not regarded as a candidate who could actually win, this
meant that most Conservative parliamentarians saw voting for him as a
waste of their vote (Stark 1996: 101). Viewed as an irritant by standing,
Powell was to receive only 15 votes or 4.9% of the votes (see Table 2.2)
(Shepherd 1996: 293–294).
Although there were three candidates, it was, in effect, a two-horse race
between Heath and Maudling, and the questions were (a) who would win
and (b) would it require two ballots or one? On the first question, it was
widely assumed that Maudling would win (Clark 1998: 409). Maudling
was regarded as being senior to Heath and held a higher profile (Blake
1998: 298). His highest office was Chancellor (1962–1964), and he had
entered the Cabinet in 1957, whereas Heath entered the Cabinet two
Table 2.2 Candidate
support in the conservative
party leadership election
of 1965
Candidate
First ballot
votes
Percentage
150
133
15
6
49.3
43.8
4.9
2.0
Edward Heath
Reginald Maudling
Enoch Powell
Abstentions
Source: Heppell (2008b: 40)
1
Having returned to the frontbench when they entered opposition, Macleod did contemplate standing and was believed to have the backing of potentially 40 Conservative parliamentarians. However, as he was widely perceived to be divisive due to his conduct in the
aftermath of the succession crisis, he calculated that he would be unable to emerge victorious
(Shepherd 1996: 291).
32
T. MCMEEKING
years later and reached his most senior office—President of the Board of
Trade—in 1963, with this being a post that Maudling had already held
himself between 1959 and 1961. Maudling was also identified as the candidate that voters preferred—amongst known Conservative supporters, he
was preferred to Heath by a margin of 48% to 31%, and amongst the wider
electorate, he was preferred by 44% to 28% (Roth 1971: 185). It was
assumed that Conservative parliamentarians would be influenced by these
aforementioned factors. Added to these was the awareness that Maudling
had secured more backers in the consultation processes of October 1963.
Maudling had 48 first preferences and 66 second preferences, whereas
Heath had 10 first preferences and 17 second preferences. Given that
Maudling was ideologically aligned to Butler and Macleod, it was assumed
that their preferences—Butler had 86 first preferences and Macleod had
12—would tend towards Maudling more so than Heath2 (Baston
2004: 208).
The question of whether it would take one ballot or two was too difficult to call—remembering that if all voted, then 173 (or a lead of 45 voters) was assumed to be the hurdle for winning on the first ballot. The
Maudling camp believed that they had 154 supporters and that Heath had
100—they could not accurately predict how many of the remaining 50
Conservative parliamentarians were backing Powell and how many were
undecided (Campbell 1993: 183). The Heath camp believed that they had
approached 160 potential backers, which was significantly higher than the
number that the Maudling camp believed that their opponent would have
(Gilmour and Garnett 1998: 220). So, the assumption was that a second
parliamentary ballot would be required.
The predictions of the Heath camp turned out to be far more accurate
than those of the Maudling camp. Heath had won the first parliamentary
ballot by a margin of 17 voters, but because his percentage lead over
Maudling was only 5.5%, Maudling was entitled to proceed to a second
parliamentary ballot (Punnett 1992: 60). The dilemma for Maudling was
where would the necessary second ballot votes come from? It was highly
unlikely that all of the abstainers and all of the Powell supporters
2
The October 1963 consultations were conducted based on the parliamentary Conservative
Party from the 1959 to 1964 Parliament (n = 365), and the Redmayne findings do not
include all parliamentarians. Also, the 1965 parliamentary Conservative Party was smaller
after the General Election defeat of 1964 (n = 304), accounting for retirement and defeats in
1964, and the new intake of 1965 would have changed the composition of the electorate
somewhat.
2
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 1965
33
gravitated to him—Heath was more likely to appeal to the freed up
Powellite vote and thus, it was seen as inevitable that Heath, with the
momentum behind him, would annex the party leadership in a hypothetical second parliamentary ballot. Maudling admitted that his first parliamentary return had been a ‘bitter blow’ and, as he felt that the first
parliamentary ballot had been ‘quite decisive’, he withdrew his candidature, thus handing the leadership to Heath without the need for an additional parliamentary ballot (Maudling 1978: 134, 136). Although the
press had largely backed Maudling, the newly elected leader took pleasure
in the positive response that they showed to his election: Heath was praised
as a ‘man of change’, a ‘rough rider’ and ‘the tiger in the tank’ (CPA, PPB
12, 1964–65, 26 July 1965).
What went wrong for Maudling or, to put it another way, what went
right for Heath. We have to start with the issue of their respective
approaches to campaigning and seeking support. Maudling adopted an
approach that can best be described as ‘amiable indolence’ with regard to
active campaigning, having concluded that one should not ‘irritate’ experienced parliamentarians who were more than capable of making their
own minds up (Campbell 1993: 179). Conservative backbencher, Philip
Goodhart, described the Maudling campaign as ‘the worst organised leadership campaign in Conservative Party’, adding that it was a ‘total shambles’ (Baston 2004: 256). The contrast with the Heath campaign team
was clear. They were professional, organised and energetic, and most significantly they openly canvassed for votes (Roth 1971: 183–184; Fisher
1977: 125). In his memoirs, Heath was fulsome in his praise for the campaign that was run on his behalf, describing it as ‘magnificent’ in part due
to their ‘checking and double checking’ of every pledge and the emphasis
on persuading waverers to back Heath and not Maudling (Heath
1998: 268).
The approach that Maudling adopted reflected doubts that existed
about his temperament. Consider the recollections of Jim Prior: ‘Reggie is
a very agreeable man, and I was very fond of him, but he was not the stuff
of which Prime Ministers are made’ (Prior 1986: 37–38). Whereas
Maudling thought it was beneath him to engage in consultations to persuade Conservative parliamentarians to back him, possibly on the back
promises with regard to shadow ministerial appointments, others thought
it smacked of complacency. Whoever the Conservatives selected would be
opposing Wilson and a perception grew that Maudling lacked the dynamism and energy needed to oust Wilson in a General Election campaign
34
T. MCMEEKING
(Roth 1971: 185; Campbell 1993: 179; Baston 2004: 255). That he
lacked the necessary drive to lead and succeed would upset Maudling. In
his memoirs, he would argue that he did ‘resent’ the accusation that he
failed to win because he was ‘too lazy to work hard enough for it’
(Maudling 1978: 136–137).
This was a perception that had consequences. Even though Maudling
was perceived to be the establishment candidate, he actually lost the support of key elites. He had hoped to give his campaign momentum by gaining the public backing of Douglas-Home, but the departing leader
deliberately kept his own counsel throughout (and made no reference to
how he voted in his memoirs, Douglas-Home 1976).3 He also failed to
gain the backing of his ideological soulmate, Macleod, who backed Heath
instead. In addition, most of his potential backers also switched their support to Heath (Campbell 1993: 181; Shepherd 1994: 400–403; Watkins
1998: 186). It was also becoming clear that three quarters of the shadow
Cabinet were coming out in support for Heath. That this was being discussed may have had an impact on junior shadow spokespeople and backbenchers, making it easier for the organised Heath campaign to persuade
soft Maudling supporters to switch their allegiances (Fisher 1977:
125–127). One example of this type of lost vote was Margaret Thatcher.
She had originally planned to vote for Maudling (which retrospectively
seems like an ideologically incongruous choice for her), but she switched
her allegiance to Heath, as did Keith Joseph (Thatcher 1995: 135–136).
Of the new processes, Thatcher described them as having gone ‘very
smoothly and calmly’ and, of the outcome, she said she looked forward to
‘working hard and happily’ under Heath whom she described as a ‘tough
taskmaster’ but one who will ‘drive others as hard as he drives himself’
(Thatcher 1965).
Conclusion
Having won the leadership of the Conservative Party in July 1965, Heath
would remain in position until February 1975. Nearly two-thirds of his
tenure as leader of the Conservative Party would be in opposition (July
1965–June 1970 and March 1974–February 1975), and he would serve
3
Maudling was convinced that the failure of Douglas-Home to endorse him contributed
to his defeat. He was rumoured to have commented, in the aftermath of his rejection, that
‘it was Alec who did for me’ (Baston 2004: 256).
2
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 1965
35
as a Conservative prime minister for only three years and eight months
(between June 1970 and February 1974). He was only removed from the
leadership of the Conservative Party in February 1975 after an amendment to the leadership elections to permit a challenge to him (Quinn
2012: 37).
The rationale for that amendment was that he would not resign (Fisher
1977: 152–153). The assumption was that a leader who was damaging to
the interests of the Conservative Party—repeatedly losing General
Elections—would voluntarily step aside. As Fisher argues, the rule makers
in 1965 did not think that ‘a leader who had lost the confidence of a substantial section of the party would wish to continue in office’ (Fisher 1977:
147–148). Moreover, when constructing their new democratic procedures, the aim was to create an outcome in which there was no disputing
the authority or legitimacy of the newly elected party leader—as Douglas-­
Home stated, ‘once the party had elected a leader that was that’
(Hutchinson 1970: 138). The period between March 1974 and February
1975 would showcase the limitations of the new system of internal democracy that the Conservative Party had constructed in opposition in
1964–1965 (Fisher 1977; Bogdanor 1996).
However, when their new system was first used in July 1965, the
Conservatives felt vindicated and were very self-praising. Heath was seen
to be a legitimate new leader of the Conservative Party whose authority
was undisputed—a sharp contrast to the immobilising impact that the disputed leadership succession of October 1963 had on Douglas-Home
(Fisher 1977; Bogdanor 1996; Stark 1996). Furthermore, after a succession of party leaders either drawn or married into the aristocracy, the
Conservatives had selected a ‘grammar school boy to replace the Old
Etonian’, as the ‘man to take on Wilson’ (Prior 1986: 38).
The very best of Heath as a political operator was evident in the period
between October 1963 and July 1965. He outmanoeuvred his main rivals
from his own generation—Maudling and Macleod—to significantly aid his
chances of winning the party leadership after Douglas-Home. Given that
he seemed to be behind them in the pecking order for the succession in
October 1963, this represents a significant achievement. He achieved this
in three ways. First, in the midst of the succession crisis of October 1963,
while he remained uncontroversial and loyal by backing the eventual winner, Maudling alienated himself from Douglas-Home somewhat, and
Macleod established for himself a reputation for disloyalty by his refusal to
serve. Second, having secured the backing of Douglas-Home, he was able
36
T. MCMEEKING
to exploit his patronage, securing for himself significant promotions,
which expanded his influence and enabled him to showcase his leadership
credentials. Third, once the first democratic election for the leadership of
the Conservative Party was initiated, he was simply better prepared and
more organised than Maudling. Now ensconced as the new leader of the
Conservative Party, it was his responsibility to initiate a process of reform
and renewal that would enable them to regain office.
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Gilmour, I., & Garnett, M. (1998). Whatever Happened to the Tories: The
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Heppell, T., & Hill, M. (2010). The Voting Motivations of Conservative
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Quinn, T. (2012). Electing and Ejecting Party Leaders in Britain. Basingstoke:
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CHAPTER 3
Modernising Conservatism in Opposition
Under Heath
Mark Garnett
The idea that, as leader of the Opposition from 1965 to 1970, Edward
Heath was engaged in a self-conscious effort to ‘modernise Conservatism’
immediately encounters two well-founded objections. First, from the perspective of 2020, the word ‘modernisation’ in the context of British political parties cannot escape association with the successive and overt attempts
by Tony Blair and David Cameron to make their parties seem more relevant to the contemporary context (see Smith 1994; Dommett 2015).
Although both of these projects involved policy changes, the main purpose was to update a party’s image, chiefly for electoral purposes. When
they became leaders of their respective parties, both Blair and Cameron
believed that their most urgent task was to ‘detoxify’ their ‘brands’ (Wring
2005: 137–147; Bale 2010: 283–362). There is no evidence that Heath
felt the same way about the Conservative ‘brand’, which he inherited after
the leadership election of 1965. In any case, he was contemptuous of
political imagery as it related to either parties or leaders, seeing no reason
to modify his wooden public persona from the time he became Conservative
M. Garnett (*)
Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
e-mail: m.garnett@lancaster.ac.uk
© The Author(s) 2021
A. S. Roe-Crines, T. Heppell (eds.), Policies and Politics Under
Prime Minister Edward Heath, Palgrave Studies in Political
Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53673-2_3
41
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M. GARNETT
leader to his retirement from the House of Commons in 2001 (Garnett
2015: 304–305; Ziegler 2010: 184–188, 231–232).
If it seems wrong to include Heath among those who have sought to
‘modernise’ their parties, it can also be disputed whether he deserves to be
associated with ‘Conservatism’—or indeed with any kind of ‘ism’ (Gamble
1974: 91). True, in his memoirs, Heath wrote that on becoming leader, ‘I
now had the chance to stamp my brand of Conservatism on the party’, but
in the absence of real evidence of a desire to change the existing approach,
that phrase has the ring of a self-justifying cliché (Heath 1998: 269). At
the end of successive chapters which deal with this period, Heath insists on
his ‘One Nation’ credentials, but this broad approach had been prevalent
under Macmillan and survived the brief interlude on Home, who would
probably have liked a shift to the ‘right’ on domestic matters but carried
little weight on domestic matters (Heath 1998: 296, 324). As we shall see,
within a few months of winning the party leadership, Heath was criticised
for an excessively empirical approach to political questions. As Enoch
Powell put it in a typically vivid phrase, Heath ‘would immediately become
angry and go red in the face’ if anyone started to talk about ideas
(Contemporary Record 1990: 37). While Powell’s was a retrospective and
jaundiced view, it is undeniable that many ardent Conservatives were disappointed from an early stage by Heath’s lack of interest in abstract ideas.1
It is more surprising, indeed, that they ever hoped for anything else from
Heath, who had never shown any interest in philosophical speculations
(despite his respectable performance in PPE at Oxford) (Ziegler
2010: 17–34).
Thus, Heath can scarcely be seen as a ‘moderniser’ of his party, to rank
alongside Blair or Cameron, and he was not interested in re-defining
‘Conservatism’. Nevertheless, these themes provide useful keys to his conduct and fortunes as Opposition leader between 1965 and 1970 (Denham
and O’Hara 2007). Heath felt that it was unnecessary to ‘modernise’ his
party, and in itself, this is an interesting reflection on his outlook since the
Conservatives had looked increasingly ‘out of touch’ prior to their electoral defeat in 1964. As Gamble notes, Heath felt that ‘to be an effective
political force, had to turn its back on the past and become a party of
progress’ (Gamble 1974: 91). Equally, although Heath did not feel
1
To illustrate this point, Heath is not included in an edited collection on the key contributors to the political thought of the Conservative Party in the post-war era (see Garnett and
Hickson 2009).
3
MODERNISING CONSERVATISM IN OPPOSITION UNDER HEATH
43
compelled to set out his personal understanding of ‘Conservatism’, this is
also instructive since he did hold clear views but was too ready to assume
that this basic framework of principle, shared with the overwhelming
majority of senior politicians of both main parties—‘One Nation’
Conservatives and Labour’s ‘social democratic’ wing—reflected a kind of
‘common sense’ which was not vulnerable to any rational challenge. It was
only during the 1980s, when this elite ‘consensus’2 was swept aside by
Thatcherite populism, that Heath made more explicit his rival understanding of ‘Conservatism’. By that time, it proved all too easy for his opponents to accuse him of ‘sour grapes’ against Thatcher, his supplanter
(Kavanagh 2005).
Nevertheless, the label of ‘moderniser’ is undoubtedly appropriate to
Heath because he was determined to ‘modernise’ the country, in tandem
with what he hoped would be a successful negotiation of British entry to
the European Economic Community (EEC), and he believed that this
could only be achieved under the stewardship of a Conservative Party
which was fully committed to this course, discarding illusions based on
outdated assessments of Britain’s global status. In these senses, at least, it
is true that Heath saw his task as leader between 1965 and 1970 in terms
of ‘modernising Conservatism’.
Stage I: Heath as Leader of the Opposition,
July 1965 to March 1966
The timing of Home’s resignation as Conservative Party leader had been
influenced by the knowledge that the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson,
would not be calling a General Election in 1965 (Pimlott 1992: 395). The
Conservative opposition could thus contemplate a change in the summer
of 1965, in the expectation that their new party leader would have time to
consolidate their position before having to face an election campaign.
That said, Wilson’s wafer-thin majority meant that the next contest could
not be long delayed (Pimlott 1992: 396).
Thus, for the first months of his leadership, Heath was like a student
knowing that a crucial examination was imminent, but that he would have
to sit the paper on a day to be chosen by someone who was desperate for
him to fail.
2
On the debates that surround consensus politics, see Kavanagh and Morris (1994) and
Dutton (1997).
44
M. GARNETT
Even in the short period before Wilson called the election for 31 March
1966, Heath had been given an unpleasant introduction to the pressures
of leadership. Following Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence, in November 1965, the House of Commons voted on the imposition of oil sanctions against the illegal regime of Ian Smith. Although
Wilson’s government was acutely discomfited by the crisis (Coggins
2006), this was not an issue which played to Heath’s personal strengths,
since he was inclined to regard the Empire (and indeed the Commonwealth)
as a legacy from a by-gone episode in Britain’s history. However, Rhodesia
evoked conflicting passions among many of his parliamentary colleagues.
Although instructed to abstain by Heath, the parliamentary party would
actually split in three directions: alongside the abstainers were 50
Conservatives who voted against sanctions and 31 who voted to support
the Wilson government (Stuart 2002). Labour took comfort in the difficulties that Heath was experiencing. Wilson suggested that Heath had
advocated abstaining in an effort to secure some semblance of party unity,
and yet not only had he failed to do so, but he had sacrificed his principles
in the process (Campbell 1993: 204). Tony Benn recorded that the
Conservatives are ‘splintering before our eyes’ and Heath looks like a
‘pathetic figure, kicked this way and that’ and ‘incapable of giving firm
leadership’ (Benn 1987: 354).
The Rhodesian question did little to dent public expectations that the
Labour Party would win a forthcoming General Election. Shortly after
Heath was elected as the new leader of the Conservative Party, they
secured the ‘usual boost in the polls that occurs in such occasions’ (Bale
2012: 106). The Conservatives took an opinion lead with the Gallup poll,
which placed the Conservatives on 49% of the vote compared with Wilson
and Labour’s 41%, as of August 1965 (King and Wybrow 2001: 9). By
October 1965, that opinion polling lead had been lost as the Labour Party
acquired an eight-point lead (49–41%), and they still had an eight-point
lead (50–42%) by February 1966 when Wilson decided to call the General
Election (King and Wybrow 2001: 9). On the question of leadership satisfaction, 60% of voters were satisfied with the performance of Wilson as
prime minister, and although Heath had begun his leadership of the
Conservative Party with a high satisfaction rating of 64% (as of August
1965) this had fallen to 40% by February 1966 (King and Wybrow 2001:
188, 206).
In a by-election of January 1966, Labour retained the previously marginal seat of Hull North with a comfortable majority, despite a mass influx
3
MODERNISING CONSERVATISM IN OPPOSITION UNDER HEATH
45
of Conservative canvassers and visits by prominent party figures (Butler
and King 1966: ix). Wilson needed no further prompting before calling a
General Election (Wilson 1971: 259). During the Hull North by-election
campaign, the government had announced that a bridge over the River
Humber, which had been projected before the Second World War but
held back through lack of funds, would now go ahead. It was a vivid, if
somewhat cynical echo of the title chosen by the Conservatives for their
1966 election manifesto, showing that Wilson could also appreciate the
political importance of Action Not Words. The document of that name—
which included more than a hundred separate policy pledges, to the detriment of any vote-winning themes—probably had little effect on the 1966
national result, but could not have made life any easier for grass-roots
Conservatives trying to persuade wavering voters. The voters gave Labour
an overall majority of 98, with a tally of 364 compared to 253 returning
Conservatives (Butler and King 1966). For Tory supporters, the misery of
the night was compounded by the fact that their party failed to gain a
single constituency (Ramsden 1996: 261–267).
After the General Election defeat, supporters of Heath in the media
quickly deployed the kind of coherent narrative that the party had sorely
lacked in the campaign itself. They absolved Heath himself from blame
and there was ‘only limited discernible criticism’ of him (Rhodes James
1972: 99). In fact, they argued that he had performed with considerable
credit as he went about his thankless task (Campbell 1993: 210). In hindsight, even impartial observers would find it difficult to deny this verdict.
Heath did oversee a well-organised campaign, and his own contributions
were effective, not least in helping to shape the battlefield for the next
contest. In particular, his repeated claim that this would be a ‘vote now,
pay later’ election allowed him to fight in 1970 in the knowledge that he
had issued well-founded warnings back in 1966 (Rhodes James
1972: 98–99).
The concerted effort of Heath’s well-wishers to rally around him after
the 1966 General Election was understandable, given the precipitous task
he had faced and the fact that, from an impartial perspective, it was difficult to convict him of any avoidable mistakes during the campaign itself
(Campbell 1993: 210–211). However, it was an inescapable fact that he
had secured more than half a million fewer votes than the party had won
in 1964, under the over-promoted and anachronistic Douglas-Home. Of
course, some of the 1966 ‘swing’ from the Conservatives to Labour could
be explained by a feeling that Wilson should be given a fair chance (an
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M. GARNETT
attitude that was confirmed by the Conservatives’ private polling: see
Ramsden 1996: 262). But, it can be argued that the 1964 Conservative
vote was shored up at least to some extent by two considerations which
did not apply to Heath: first, the fact that Douglas-Home was fighting as
an incumbent prime minister, and second, that, as a hereditary aristocrat,
he could count on the support of ‘deferential’ members of the working
class—the ‘Angels in Marble’ identified by Benjamin Disraeli and still sufficiently important to attract academic analysis a hundred years later
(McKenzie 1968). A reduction of half a million votes between 1964 and
1966 could easily be attributed—among academic observers, at least—to
the party’s loss of incumbency and social deference (Ball 2005: 17).
However, Heath had not been chosen as party leader in order to furnish
plausible explanations for a more resounding Conservative defeat than the
1964 setback. Although he retained his position after the 1966 General
Election without any obvious rival in sight, Heath had good reason to
expect that he would come under irresistible pressure to vacate the leadership if he lost his next electoral encounter with Wilson (Campbell 1993,
Chaps. 11, 12, and 13).
Stage II: Heath as Leader of the Opposition,
March 1966 to June 1970
On the eve of the General Election of June 1970, senior Conservatives
were steeling themselves for the task of persuading Heath to step down
(Ziegler 2010: 219). Only one of five national polling organisations found
a (wafer-thin) Conservative lead, and a survey conducted just a few weeks
before the poll found that 56% of voters expected a Labour victory, compared to just 26% who thought that the Conservatives would prevail
(Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky 1971: 172).
However, these doleful tidings did not entirely quench the enthusiasm
as Conservative candidates, many of whom were receiving more positive
responses on the doorstep. The possibility of a late swing towards the
Conservatives in June 1970 was entirely consistent with surveys of public
opinion after 1966, which suggested that voters were more volatile than
ever before. According to Gallup, for example, the Conservatives were in
the lead throughout 1968 and 1969, but their margin varied between 28
and 3.5 points (King and Wybrow 2001: 9–10). The widespread expectation of a comfortable Labour win in June 1970 also conflicted with real
3
MODERNISING CONSERVATISM IN OPPOSITION UNDER HEATH
47
results since 1966. Between November 1967 and June 1968, for example,
the Conservatives beat government candidates in eight consecutive by-­
elections, of which five were Opposition gains (McKie 1973: 223–263).
However, even though the Conservatives led the Labour Party by 28
points in one opinion poll in May 1968, only 31% of voters were satisfied
with Heath as leader of the Conservative Party (King and Wybrow 2001:
10, 206). The safest conclusion from these data was that the Conservatives,
and their leader in particular, were failing to make a positive impression,
that is, that their putative support was soft and heavily dependent on the
fortunes of the Wilson government (Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky
1971: 174).
In this respect, Wilson arguably proved to be a more potent electoral
weapon for the Conservatives than Heath. For example, the run of
Conservative by election victories began in November 1967, which was
the same month in which (a) Wilson gave up his protracted battle to prevent a devaluation of sterling (Bale 1999), and (b) France’s President de
Gaulle vetoed Britain’s second attempt to join the European Community
(Parr 2006). In combination, these humiliations should have made the
Conservatives near-certainties for victory at the next General Election.
Wilson had set his face against a voluntary devaluation of the currency,
despite considerable evidence that this would help the prospects for the
British economy, precisely because he thought that this would deal a devastating blow to his chances of winning the next General Election
(Cairncross and Eichengreen 1983). Panic-stricken in the wake of devaluation, Wilson compounded the problem with his notorious ‘pound in
your pocket’ broadcast, which made him look ‘economical with the truth’
as well as being an economic bungler, for all his boasted expertise in the
subject (O’Hara 2006).
Problems in Opposition
Although the economic situation would stabilise thereafter, it is quite possible that devaluation would indeed have dealt a deadly blow to the government’s chances of re-election. However, the Conservatives were
perfectly capable of inflicting savage injuries on their own electoral prospects. The most infamous illustration of this was the intervention of Enoch
Powell in April 1968 on the likely impact of mass immigration from the
new commonwealth. His ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech (Powell 1968) is one of
the best-known orations of the post-war period and continues to attract
48
M. GARNETT
attention more than 50 years after it was delivered (for recent accounts see
Crines et al. 2016; Hickson 2018).
The complex interrelationship between Heath and Powell and the politics of Powellism is considered in detail by Gillian Peele (in Chap. 12), but
a few observations are worth noting here in terms of consequence. First,
long before his outburst on immigration, Powell’s pronouncements on
defence had been a persistent problem for Heath, whose emotions on
hearing of the ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech probably included a leaven of
relief, since he could now correct his initial mistake by sacking Powell and
replacing him with a more orthodox defence spokesperson. Heath justified his decision by arguing that the speech was ‘inflammatory and liable
to damage race relations’ (Heffer 1999: 461). In addition, by consulting
most of his colleagues before taking the decision, Heath ensured that his
team was united against Powell on the subject of immigration and, by
implication, against the politics of Powellism in all of its manifestations.
He had a largely sympathetic reception from his most senior colleagues
regarding the difficulties of dealing with Powell. This implication was not
lost on the shadow cabinet’s small Powellite group, especially Keith Joseph
who was clearly dismayed that Powell’s liberal views on economics were
not mirrored by a laissez-faire approach to race and immigration (Denham
and Garnett 2001: 172).
Second, the sacking of Powell did nothing to silence backbenchers who
shared his views on immigration (on the Powellites, see Schoen 1977).
The proximate provocation for ‘Rivers of Blood’ was Labour’s Race
Relations Bill, which was essentially a liberal fig leaf for a government
which was restricting settlement rights for non-white Commonwealth citizens (Dean 2000). The Shadow Cabinet, including Powell, agreed on a
reasoned amendment which, it was hoped, would allow Conservatives to
oppose the Bill without seeming to endorse racist views (Whitelaw 1991:
81)—that is, they sought to accept the principle of the legislation but
wanted to reject it on the basis that it could not be effectively implemented
(CPA, LLC minutes (68), 23rd meeting, 10 April 1968). This expedient
succeeded in concealing the most serious divisions in opposition ranks on
the second reading of the Bill. However, on the third and final reading,
Conservative parliamentarians tabled their own amendment in order to
register disapproval of the legislation. This was supported by 44
Conservatives after furious exchanges in Parliament with their Home
Affairs spokesman, Quintin Hogg (Alexander and Watkins 1970: 96–97).
Right-wing Conservatives noted how Heath had a relaxed attitude to
3
MODERNISING CONSERVATISM IN OPPOSITION UNDER HEATH
49
leftish Conservatives who rebelled against the official line, including the
Shadow Chancellor Iain Macleod and the spokesperson on Education,
Edward Boyle (Ziegler 2010: 206).
Powell would generate considerable press attention for his intervention, and the extent to which it influenced public opinion and Conservative
support in the General Election of 1970 has been a source of academic
conjecture (Deakin and Bourne 1970; Studlar 1974, 1978). Heath and
his supporters preferred to regard the Conservative recovery between
1966 and 1970 as a by-product of their policy review.
This is not the place for a detailed recapitulation of the policy exercise,
which has been discussed at length elsewhere (Ramsden 1980: 233–285;
Garnett 2005: 205–211). The scale of the operation was clearly inspired
by the programme of policy renewal led by Butler after the defeat at the
General Election of 1945 (Hoffman 1964). However, the context in 1964
was very different or, at least, Heath himself thought that the precedent
was inexact. In 1945, it was widely believed, especially by younger
Conservatives like Butler and Hogg, that the Conservatives had been punished for their alleged inaction in the face of social deprivation during the
1930s (on the defeat at the General Election of 1945, see Kandiah 1995).
Thus, a radical reappraisal of Conservative policies was indicated after
1945, and since Labour enjoyed massive parliamentary majority of 146, it
was all but inevitable that the opposition would have plenty of time in
which to reflect (on their recovery after 1945, see Ramsden 1987;
Willetts 2005).
By contrast, as we have seen, the outcome of the General Election of
1964—with a small Labour majority of four—made it very likely that the
voters would be asked for a new verdict in the near future. In any case,
Heath did not feel that a period of deep reflection was necessary. In his
view, the Conservatives had simply run out of steam after 13 years in
office, and although their record was obviously far from perfect, its general approach particularly under Harold Macmillan between 1957 and
1963 had been sound and as such, their policies needed updating, but not
on the basis of a fundamental rethink (on the record of the 1951–1964 era
see Boxer 1996). Indeed, if a more modern approach was necessary, a
precedent was already in place, thanks to Heath himself (Caines 2017:
11–95). As mentioned in Chap. 2, despite some concerted opposition
among Conservative backbenchers and grassroots members, Heath had
enhanced competition within the retail sector by forcing through the
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M. GARNETT
abolition of Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) during his brief tenure as
president of the Board of Trade (Findley 2001).
However, not all Conservatives shared this view. In January 1966—that
is, barely six months after Heath became leader—the shadow spokesperson for the colonies, Angus Maude, wrote an article for The Spectator
magazine in which he claimed that the party’s own supporters were
‘divided and deeply worried…while to the electorate at large the
Opposition has become a meaningless irrelevance’ (Maude 1966a). After
a few days’ hesitation, Heath relieved Maude of his front-bench duties.
Maude was a very seasoned journalist—indeed, in 1958, he had resigned
from parliament to edit The Sydney Morning Herald for three years—and
these were clearly not off-the-cuff comments. The remainder of his article
elaborated on his arresting first paragraph and included the warning that
‘for the Tories simply to talk like technocrats will get them nowhere’. The
situation facing the Conservatives, Maude thought, was ‘desperately dangerous’, because even moderate grass-roots members were becoming
increasingly ‘restive’ and ‘the radical wing of the party’ was increasingly
attracted by the economic views being expressed by Powell. To underline
the sense of urgency, after his sacking, Maude wrote another Spectator
article in which he claimed that his initial diatribe had attracted a very
positive response from Conservative Party members (Maude 1966b).
Heath supporters began to suspect an element of collusion between
Maude and Powell. After all, they were long-standing associates, having
helped to found the backbench One Nation Group back in 1950 (on one
nation Conservatism, see Seawright 2010).
Maude was one of the most interesting and enigmatic figures in the
post-war Conservative Party, whose idiosyncratic ideas were expressed in a
substantial tract published before the General Election of 1970 (Maude
1969; Garnett and Hickson 2009). In a later article, previewing the 1966
Conservative conference, he made his position more explicit, arguing that
his party was in danger of falling between two stools—alienating older
voters by ‘carrying the politics of consensus to a point at which they
become indistinguishable from their opponents’, but failing to enthuse
younger voters. Making the fatal political mistake of thinking way ahead of
most of his contemporaries, Maude was working towards the idea that
material ‘satisfaction’ was (or should be) far less important than the quality
of one’s life (Maude 1966c). Not surprisingly, given his eclectic ideas,
Maude was anxious to deny that he was calling for a shift of party policy
to the ‘right’—a term which he strongly disliked—and he bemoaned the
3
MODERNISING CONSERVATISM IN OPPOSITION UNDER HEATH
51
prospect that ‘the rational voice of genuine disquiet may well be drowned
in the dreary old shouts for capital and corporal punishment’
(Maude 1966c).
In effect, Maude was arguing that Heath had drawn the wrong lessons
in the art of opposition from the experience of 1945–1951. In the wake of
their landslide parliamentary defeat, Conservatives at all levels had to
accept that the electorate had taught them a lesson and that they should
reach some kind of accommodation with the Attlee settlement if they
wanted to return to power (Hoffman 1964). By contrast, the General
Election of 1964 had left the Wilson administration in a precarious parliamentary position. Far from preparing for a long haul back into office, the
Conservatives should be straining every sinew to make life uncomfortable
for a government whose tenure was likely to prove temporary (Caines
2017: 25–56).
Thus, Maude was suggesting a two-pronged approach to opposition:
parliamentary wrecking-tactics, combined with a philosophical rethink.
The problem for Heath was that he had little taste for either elements of
this strategy. Apart from his general satisfaction with the policies and
approach of the Macmillan era, he seemed to dislike the sort of parliamentary firebrands who would be required for a guerrilla-style resistance to the
Wilson government. Thus, for example, on becoming their new party
leader, he had dropped from his shadow team John Boyd-Carpenter,
whose ever-present thirst for parliamentary combat had earned him the
nickname ‘Spring-Heeled Jack’ (Aitken 2014: 98). In this respect, and in
others, Heath based his strategy on the assumption that voters would be
much more impressed by rational discussion rather than pugilistic gestures
or ideological soul-searching.
Progress in Opposition
Two barometers of progress in opposition that can be identified relate to
changes in the public face and the public policy platform of the
Conservatives (Bale 2012: 103–107, 124–129). Heath’s clear preference
was for serious-minded politicians characteristic of the left-leaning Bow
Group. His real mission, as the difficult period of opposition unfolded,
was to avoid the Conservative Party becoming ‘toxified’ by shifting too far
to the right. As such, he was particularly sensitive to attempts that were
being initiated to deselect moderate Conservative parliamentarians such as
Nigel Fisher, Terence Higgins and Edward Boyle (Rhodes James 1972:
52
M. GARNETT
213). His desire to place the Conservatives on a centrist course would
have been much easier if the right-wing challenge had been launched by
someone other than Powell, who had the uncanny ability to give the
appearance of putting principle above personal interest while maintaining
a steely eye on self-advancement (see Heffer 1999).
Despite his deep dislike of Powell and his ideas, Heath could not ignore
him completely. Prior to his modification of their position on immigration
after ‘Rivers of Blood’, Heath had delivered a speech at Carshalton in July
1967 on another favoured Powellite theme—prices and incomes policy.
Powell himself was pleased to learn that Heath had condemned a compulsory approach on this subject as ‘not only impracticable, but unfair, undesirable and an unjustifiable infringement on the freedom of the individual’
(Heath 1967). A similar language found its way into their manifesto for
the General Election of 1970, despite the fact that both Heath and his
Shadow Chancellor, Iain Macleod, were agnostic on the issue.
Such episodes showed that Heath could not insulate his policy review
from events in the outside world. Nevertheless, he persevered in the view
that the most effective form of opposition is to forge his team into a
government-­in-waiting (Caines 2017: 71–94). This strategy culminated
in the holding of a gathering of front-benchers at the Selsdon Park Hotel,
Croydon, at the end of January 1970, purportedly to put the finishing
touches to the long process of policy formulation. Instead, as the minutes
of the meeting reveal, the discussions merely uncovered the extent of the
work which remained to be done. As a result, it was difficult to come up
with any sound bites for the media, which had been encouraged to think
that the closing press conference would be like a de-briefing after a Cabinet
meeting. So, they came up with some suitably tough remarks about law
and order (Gilmour and Garnett 1998: 242).
This publicity stunt seemed to worry Wilson and less than a week later,
he coined the phrase ‘Selsdon Man’ to characterise the Conservatives,
alleging that they were driven by ‘an atavistic desire to reverse the course
of twenty-five years of social revolution. What they are planning is a wanton, calculated and deliberate return to greater inequality’ (Wilson 1971:
954). However, Wilson had been alerting wavering Conservatives of all
kinds to the heartening possibility that their party might have come up
with something ‘calculated and deliberate’, as Campbell concludes:
‘Selsdon Man’ was a brilliant phrase, but it rebounded on Wilson, first
because it lent the opposition’s earnest catalogue of humdrum policies pre-
3
MODERNISING CONSERVATISM IN OPPOSITION UNDER HEATH
53
cisely the cloak of philosophic unity and political impact that they had hitherto lacked, and second because it turned out that the electorate was at least
as much attracted as repelled by them. At a stroke Wilson had succeeded, as
Heath and all his advisors had consistently failed to do, in sharpening the
Tories’ image and opening up the appearance of a clear political choice
between Labour and Conservative. (Campbell 1993: 265)
That their policy formulation process exposed gaps in their thinking
carries with it a certain contradiction. That is because the Heath opposition era is often cited as an example of an opposition frontbench and
leader of the opposition who was better prepared for entering government
than others (Heppell et al. 2015: 13–14). For those who have argued that
Heath proved to be no better, and perhaps even as worse as prime minister,3
then the standard response for Heathite defenders has been to argue that
he successfully negotiated British entry into the European Community
(Lord 1993). However, that is scarcely counted as an achievement in the
eyes of those who emerged as Conservatives Eurosceptics in the decades
that would follow—thus showing the failure of Heath to sell the pro-­
Europeanist cause within his own party (Crowson 2007: 105–126). This
critique is dependent ideologically upon where people stand on the
European question. An alternative way of viewing Heath with regard to
the European question is to see it through lens of an objective confirmed
in opposition and delivered in government (Kavanagh 1996). Having
made this his personal priority, he would, once in office, oversee the process with considerable skill (see Chap. 10), even if Holmes argues that the
real credit for the parliamentary passage of the European Communities
Act belonged to pro-European rebels, rather than Heath (Holmes
1997: xviii).
In retrospect, it is possible that studies of Heath in opposition have
overlooked the European issue because they knew (or thought they knew)
that this story had ended happily for him, so the more interesting task was
to identify the roots of his multiple failures in government (e.g., see
Lindsay and Harrington 1974: 236–262). The other reason why relatively
little attention has been paid to the development of Conservative policy
towards Europe in these years is that the policy didn’t really develop at all
3
Amongst performance-based rankings of post-war prime ministers, Heath was ranked
ninth out of 12 amongst British prime ministers between 1945 and 2010 (Theakston and
Gill 2011).
54
M. GARNETT
between 1965 and 1970, and the relevant policy group was a desultory
affair. However, directing more attention towards this issue does cast a
rather different light on the policy process as a whole. After all, Heath saw
membership of the European Community as the cornerstone of his strategy for Britain’s revival from post-war lethargy (Young 1998: 214–256).
The European issue would provide opportunities for Heath to show
both his abilities and his shortcomings. In May 1967, he ensured that the
parliamentary Conservative Party was relatively united in backing the
Wilson government in their renewed bid for entry into the European
Community. Only 21 Conservatives, as compared to 34 Labour parliamentarians, voted against; the list of Conservatives who supported the
government included the pre-Damascene Powell (Baker et al. 1999: 78).
More impressive than these bare figures was to be Heath’s speech, in
which he landed a few gentle jibes on Wilson but made it clear that he was
not prepared to play politics with such an important issue (HC Deb, Vol.
746, Col. 310–332; 2 May 1967). If some of his contemporaries, and successors, who decided to take sides on the European question had followed
his example, Britain might have made a greater success of its membership,
whether or not this proved to be short-lived (George 1990; Gowland and
Turner 1999). Nevertheless, while more tribal Conservatives might have
excused the occasional spasm of constructive opposition, they must have
found it galling that Heath seemed to make his most effective debating
points against Wilson in a speech which supported government policy.4
The debate on Wilson’s application came a few months after three lectures on Britain’s place in Europe and the world, which Heath delivered
in March 1967. Once again, these highlighted Heath’s ability to transcend
his image as a stickler for petty details, and to display an enviable grasp of
global developments. He accused early opponents of European Community
membership of ‘thinking of Britain’s position in terms of the 1920s and
1930s, indeed in terms of our history during the period of development of
the nation state’ and implied that the time was ripe for a rethinking of the
concept of national ‘sovereignty’, which would include the acceptance of
interdependency and the concept of ‘pooled’ sovereignty (speech at
Harvard cited in Heath 1970). This was a very plausible argument. But it
was typical of Heath that it should be set out in such clear and
4
Possibly this precedent was in the minds of Conservative strategists when they decided,
mistakenly, to oppose In Place of Strife (see Dorey 2019), whose proposals they supported
no less than Wilson’s strategy on seeking membership of the European Community.
3
MODERNISING CONSERVATISM IN OPPOSITION UNDER HEATH
55
dispassionate terms before an academic audience rather than a gathering
of voters hoping to be convinced—and not at Oxford or Cambridge, but
at Harvard, where he was even less likely to encounter disapproval for the
idea that Britain was now ready to acknowledge global developments since
the interwar period. Furthermore, in this setting, Heath felt free to assure
his listeners that
opinion in Britain has changed. The understanding of Britain’s comparative
power in the modern world is more realistic … there can be no doubt that
the belief in interdependence, so skillfully fostered by Mr. Macmillan, and
the recognition that Britain can best achieve her purpose in the modern
world as a member of a larger grouping has the support today of a majority
of British people. (Heath 1970: 19–20)
If he had consciously been trying to explain his lack of success as an
opposition leader in a single passage, Heath could hardly have done better.
The unmerited tribute to Macmillan, who in truth had tried to smuggle
Britain into the European Community without explaining the underlying
rationale to the general public, provides us with one clue (on the first
application, see Ludlow 1997). Unlike Powell, who was prepared to subject Macmillan’s legacy to clinical (if coded) criticism, Heath continued to
idolise his former mentor. More seriously, Heath showed a willingness to
detect signs of modernised thinking among British voters even when
empirical evidence was lacking. Whatever the reasons for the temporary
rise in support for EEC membership leading up to Wilson’s 1967 application, it is highly doubtful that they had much to do with a new appreciation of Britain’s place in the world. The idea that Britain should throw off
the illusions of the 1920s and 1930s would have caused consternation and
alarm among most of the voters who supported ‘Brexit’ in 2016, let alone
the British public of 1967. The pro-market mood turned sour after de
Gaulle’s second veto; according to one poll in February 1970, just 18% of
voters favoured entry, compared to 72% against (Zakheim 1972: 233).
When he announced his conversion to Euroscepticism in 1969, Enoch
Powell must have been relieved to discover that on this issue, like so many
others, he was in tune with national opinion.
This overestimation of the acumen of the average British voter explains
why Heath could remain confident that the tide of opinion would turn his
way, in respect of Europe and of domestic policy. However, it does not
take a pronounced streak of cynicism to apply to Heath the familiar
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M. GARNETT
argument that businessmen rarely fail if they make a more realistic assessment of public intelligence. Heath duly went out of business in 1974; the
wonder, and the cruelty, lies in the fleeting moments when he was allowed
to dream that his approach could ever prosper.
Conclusion
The record of Heath as Leader of the Opposition between 1965 and 1970
is a fascinating case study in the influence of historical hindsight under the
influence of events (Garnett 2005, 2012). After the unexpected General
Election victory in 1970, it was natural for scholars to seek out the secret
of his success, and equally predictable that they would exaggerate the
importance of his policy review. This tendency survived his fall from office
and his replacement by Thatcher. On this version of revisionism, Heath
had won in 1970 because he had been persuaded to present the electorate
with a consensus-busting programme based on the Selsdon Park conference, where he had adopted at least some elements of the Powellite prospectus. On the influence of Powell on the General Election of 1970,
academics have argued that the Conservatives might have benefitted from
their tougher approach on immigration policy: it was estimated that their
lead on immigration equated to a swing of 1.3% or 1.5%, from Labour to
Conservatives (see Studlar 1978; Miller 1980).
However, according to his critics, once in office, Heath betrayed the
sacred principles of Selsdon Park and received his well-deserved comeuppance; the only shame was that the rest of the country was made to suffer
as a result of his inadequacies (Bruce-Gardyne 1974; Holmes 1982, 1997;
see also Thatcher 1995). This Thatcherite revisionism only deserves serious notice because it has retained its currency, partly because so many
Conservatives accepted it as the truth during the triumphalist 1980s. It
was answered very effectively by John Campbell, in his magnificent unauthorised biography of Heath, in which he exposed the flaws of Selsdon
Man perspective (Campbell 1993: 265–267). Nevertheless, Campbell’s
account bore some imprint of Thatcherite revisionism in the extent to
which it accused Heath himself, rather than media commentators and
maverick shadow ministers like Keith Joseph, of moving party policy to
the right at the time of Selsdon Park, and at least tacitly accepting the idea
that Heath performed an ideological U-turn once in office (Hennessy
2000: 356).
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57
Many loyalist ministers from the Heath era dispute the accusation of
betrayal and avoid the rhetoric of U-turn, as does Heath himself—Heath
1998; see, for example, Pym 1985; Prior 1986; Walker 1991. The defence
case that they try to present on behalf of Heath suggests that he deserves
credit for his refusal to surrender to the forces of right-wing populism,
which was gaining momentum within British Conservatism within the
mid- to late 1960s. Prior concludes that, in this ideological squabble,
Heath was actually ‘struggling to retain control’ throughout the whole of
his time as Leader of the Opposition between 1965 and 1970 (Prior 1986:
55). Although Heath was ultimately successful in his primary statecraft
objective for the Conservatives—regaining power—contemporary
accounts of his conduct as Leader of the Opposition were not particularly
positive (Alexander and Watkins 1970). Of his limitations, Lindsay and
Harrington argued that:
The main function of an Opposition is to discredit the Government and to
win the next election. This requires political flair, showmanship and an eye
to the main chance. Heath, for all his qualities, was not this kind of man.
Consequently, his leadership of the Opposition was not a happy time for
him. (Lindsay and Harrington 1974: 250)
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King, A., & Wybrow, R. (2001). British Political Opinion 1937–2000: The Gallup
Polls. London: Politicos.
Lindsay, T., & Harrington, M. (1974). The Conservative Party 1918–1970.
London: Macmillan.
Lord, C. (1993). British Entry to the European Community Under the Heath
Government, 1970–74. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
Ludlow, P. (1997). Dealing with Britain: The Six and the First UK Application to
the EEC. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McKenzie, R. (1968). Angels in Marble: Working-Class Conservatives in Urban
England. London: Heinemann.
McKie, D. (1973). By Elections in the Wilson Government. In C. Cook &
J. Ramsden (Eds.), By-Elections in British Politics. London: Macmillan.
Maude, A. (1969). The Common Problem. London: Constable.
Miller, W. (1980). What Was the Profit in Following the Crowd? British Journal of
Political Science, 10(1), 22–38.
O’Hara, G. (2006). “Dynamic, Exciting, Thrilling Change”: The Wilson
Government’s Economic Policies, 1964–70. Contemporary British History,
20(3), 383–402.
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Parr, H. (2006). Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community, 1964–1967
Harold Wilson and Britain’s World Role. Abington: Routledge.
Pimlott, B. (1992). Harold Wilson. London: Harper Collins.
Ramsden, J. (1980). The Making of Conservative Party Policy: The Conservative
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Ramsden, J. (1987). A Party for Owners Or a Party for Earners? How Far Did the
British Conservative Party Really Change After 1945? Transactions of the Royal
Historical Society, 37, 49–63.
Ramsden, J. (1996). The Winds of Change: Macmillan to Heath, 1957–1975.
London: Longman.
Rhodes James, R. (1972). Ambitions and Realities: British Politics 1964–1970.
London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Roth, A. (1971). Heath and the Heathman. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
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Seawright, D. (2010). The British Conservative Party and One Nation Politics.
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Smith, M. (1994). Understanding the Politics of Catch-up: The Modernization of
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Stuart, M. (2002). A Party in Three Pieces: The Conservative Split Over Rhodesian
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Studlar, D. (1974). British Public Opinion, Colour Issues and Enoch Powell: A
Longitudinal Analysis. British Journal of Political Science, 4(3), 371–381.
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Ziegler, P. (2010). Edward Heath: The Authorised Biography. London: Harper Press.
CHAPTER 4
The 1970 General Election
Martin Farr
Arranging
In the prelapsarian spring of 1968, one of the authoritative five main polling companies reported that ‘the Government has broken all records for
unpopularity’, while the Conservative party had achieved, at 23.4%, the
largest lead ever recorded.1 By the autumn, the Conservatives had settled
on their campaign strategy, one made possible by a party machine much
larger and better funded than that of the government: there were over 400
salaried professional agents, halls were already booked and printing presses
1
NOP (National Opinion Polls) Bulletin, May 1968, [1]; NOP Bulletin, April 1968, [1].
Abbreviations used in references: CPA, Conservative Party Archives, Bodleian Library,
Oxford; LPA, Labour Party Archives, People’s History Museum (PHM), Manchester; LPP,
Liberal Party Papers, British Library of Political and Economic Science (BLPES), London;
CAC, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge; TNA, The National Archives, London;
GNMA, Guardian News and Media Archive, London; MS Wilson, Harold Wilson papers,
Bodleian Library; Jeremy Thorpe papers, British Library, London. Edward Heath’s papers at
the Bodleian were not open for consultation.
M. Farr (*)
Newcastle University, Newcastle, UK
e-mail: martin.farr@newcastle.ac.uk
© The Author(s) 2021
A. S. Roe-Crines, T. Heppell (eds.), Policies and Politics Under
Prime Minister Edward Heath, Palgrave Studies in Political
Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53673-2_4
63
64
M. FARR
prepared.2 An unexpected boost for the government came with the
Balance of Payments moving into surplus, a boon not least as it was then
effectively the principal criterion for judging the state of the economy. It
followed that Labour had a greater feeling of confidence than at any time
since before devaluation. A general election had to be held by April 1971,
but decimalisation would by then just have been introduced, and the inflationary consequences of the abandonment of the income policy might
well be felt. The Conservative Party Deputy Chairman Sir Michael Fraser
thought that a spring 1970 election possible because ‘they are on a short
term recovery but not necessarily a long term one’.3 Whenever the election came, his party’s task was to persuade one million Labour voters not
to vote and half that many to switch: those ‘rarely educated beyond fifteen, heavy viewers of TV, and readers of The Mirror, The People, and
The News of the World, and politically illiterate’.4
Labour’s Campaign Committee had only been instituted in July 1969,
and Harold Wilson placed himself on it in August.5 It was at the apex of a
more shoestring affair: only 128 constituencies had full-time organisers as
election agents.6 Meeting fortnightly in the prime minister’s room at the
House of Commons, the Committee made much of the importance of
television, and of the targeting of younger women. The new voters, those
in their ‘late teens’, were also the quarry of the Conservatives—with
Tomorrow—Newspaper of the 70’s—and Edward Heath, with his thoughts
of a fashion magazine on their future.7 A memorandum on ‘the Young
Voter’—‘Getting Through’—was sent to all Conservative candidates
(‘AVOID … Trying to be “with it” (especially when one is “without
it”)’).8
It was a group of middle-aged men and one woman, who met at a hotel
in Croydon in January 1970, to draw together the Conservative manifesto. The party commissioned research into public reaction to the Selsdon
2
Brendan Sewill, Conservative Research Department (CRD) Report on the 1970 General
Election, 17 July 1970, 1, CPA, CRD 3/9/95; Minutes of a General Election Meeting, 6
November 1969, Michael Wolff papers, CAC, WLFF 3/5/12.
3
Sir Michael Fraser to Heath, 13 October 1969, CRD 3/9/91.
4
James Douglas to Sir Michael Fraser [copy], 30 May 1970, Wolff papers, WLFF 3/5/6.
5
Harry Nicholas to NEC, 1 August 1969, Campaign Committee, LPA, ‘General Election
1970’ box.
6
General Election 1970, Report by the General Secretary, n.d., LPA, ‘General Election
1970’ box.
7
Edward Heath, ‘Britain in the Seventies’, Queen, 17 September 1969, 53-5.
8
Richard Sharples to all candidates, May 1970, Viscount Hailsham papers, CAC, HLSM
2/43/10/4.
4
THE 1970 GENERAL ELECTION
65
Park conference, and policy predominated in voters’ minds; two in particular, and as intended: lower taxes and stronger law and order.9 The
leader’s election tour was finalised in February, with highly detailed,
printed, day-by-day itineraries.10 Fraser privately expressed his hostility
towards ‘determinists’ who felt that victory was a matter of course.11
Almost as if having invited contradiction, two days later, at the Bridgewater
by-election, on 12 March, the first time those in their late teens could
vote, there was an 8.6% swing to the Conservatives, which translated to a
general election would mean a Commons majority for Heath of 150.
April brought ‘Attacking to Win’, Labour’s new publicity campaign,
overseen by its principal advertising professional David Kingsley, which
included ‘Yesterday’s Men (They failed before!)’ whereby six of the
middle-­aged men were rendered in plasticine for plastering on hoardings
for two, pre-campaign, weeks.12 April also brought the 20th iteration of
the Conservatives’ Campaign Guide, while the Conservative Steering
Committee, chaired by Heath, ‘agreed that the autumn still seemed the
most likely date’ for an election and that the summer ‘must be filled with
activity’.13 A report to Labour’s National Executive Committee (NEC)
warned that an early election ‘will be very much a “Do it Yourself campaign”’, and only a later one would allow the party’s full plans to materialise.14 Even in the event that ‘there is an election in October’, the Labour’s
Voluntary Publicity Group warned, ‘we have only six months left of our
campaign’.15 The widespread expectation remained for October.16 The
Conservatives were spending heavily on newspaper advertising, particularly in Labour-leaning national tabloids, which contrasted with Labour’s
Opinion Research Centre (ORC), A Snap Survey of Reactions to The Weekend
Conference at the Selsdon Park Hotel, 2 February 1970, CRD 3/9/93.
10
Minutes of a General Election Meeting, 16 February 1970, CRA, CCO 500/24/288;
CCO 500/24/289.
11
Sir Michael Fraser, quoted by Hugo Young, 10 March 1970, Conversations 1969-1976,
Hugo Young papers, GNMA, HJSY 2/2.
12
A document prepared for the Voluntary Publicity Group, 14 April 1970, MS Wilson. c.
1401. The Current Publicity Campaign, 17 May 1970, Peter Shore papers, WHL,
Shore 8/35.
13
Steering Committee Minutes, 13 April 1970, Wolff papers, WLFF 3/2/83.
14
Progress Report on the Pre-General Election Campaign, 20 May 1970, LPA, NEC
Minutes & Papers, December 1969-July 1970.
15
Voluntary Publicity Group, 14 April 1970, MS Wilson. c. 1401.
16
Financial Times, 23 April 1970, 1, 36; Guardian, 23 April 1970, 1; Alastair Burnet to
Denis Healey [copy], 17 February 1970, MS Wilson c. 1070.
9
66
M. FARR
budget-restricted spend in the cheaper provincial press.17 The Liberal
Research Department was charged with the third party’s preparation,
something ‘easier said than done’, its Director thought, in a party that
‘seems often to regard a General Election as secondary to the pastime of
setting up more committees, [or] revising the Constitution’.18 The May
local elections saw a swing of 10–15% to Labour compared with 1969
which translated to a general election would mean a Commons majority
for Wilson of 50.
Spring betokened renewal and rebirth, even for George Wigg, who told
Wilson that with economic travails apparently behind them, it was ‘blossom time’ for Labour’.19 Their sap rising, parliamentary colleagues, too,
were free with advice to their leader. Hugh Jenkins advised that ‘A bird in
the hand in June is worth two in the bush in October’.20 Barnett Janner
advised not going in October, owing to the number of Jewish Holydays.21
Brian Walden advised delay: the party machine needed more time, and the
World Cup would distract ‘the hesitant, somewhat indifferent last 5% of
voters who may poll’.22 Eric Moonman advised that ‘too long a gap before
the General Election may well dissipate this present feeling of confidence’.23
That present feeling of confidence was buoyed by the Balance of
Payments figures, and the necessarily time-limited electoral asset of the
generous wage increases the government had been affording working-­
class voters. The holiday season would begin in June with 650,000 more
Conservative than Labour voters away; newly moneyed workers would
still be at home, but not for long: Wakes weeks in 17 northern towns
would begin on 25 June, with 16 on 2 July, 31 on 9 July and 26 on 16
July.24 Summer violence around the South Africa cricket tour and in
Northern Ireland was expected. There were millions of new, young, and
Labour-inclined voters. ‘Immigrant groups’ would be voting in large scale
17
David Kingsley, Labour Party Voluntary Publicity Group, Report to Campaign
Committee, 17 November 1969, LPA, ‘General Election 1970’ box; Allocation of Press
advertising, 14 April 1970, MS Wilson c. 1401.
18
Ron Arnold, Research Department, General Election 1970, 18 June 1970, LPP, GE,
9/13/90.
19
George Wigg to Wilson, 2 April 1970, TNA, PREM 13/3423.
20
Undated, unsigned, note, MS. Wilson c. 1401.
21
Barnett Janner to Wilson, 17 April 1970, MS Wilson, c. 1401.
22
Brian Walden to ‘Bob’, 23 April 1970, MS. Wilson c. 1401.
23
Eric Moonman to Wilson, 11 May 1970, MS Wilson c. 1535/138.
24
Sunday Times, 26 April 1970, 2; Election memorandum, 11 May 1970, TNA PREM
13/3173.
4
THE 1970 GENERAL ELECTION
67
for the first time. Polling stations would be open an hour later until
22.00 in potentially fine weather on virtually the longest day of the year,
thereby encouraging traditionally relatively low-polling groups, such as
working-class voters (as the Conservatives had noted25). Constituency
boundaries had been allowed advantageously to be out of date. With pollsters uniformly proclaiming a Labour win, John Harris, special assistant to
Chancellor of the Exchequer Roy Jenkins, urged 11 June, in case the 15
June trade figures were bad, but Fred Peart, leader of the House of
Commons, said he needed another week to process parliamentary business; on 13 April Wilson decided.26 On 17 May Wilson confided, to a
‘council of war’—of the NEC and Cabinet—at 10 Downing Street where
Labour’s ‘Strategy for the Seventies’ was scrutinised.27 The following day,
the prime minister asked the Queen to dissolve Parliament, and sent identical letters to Edward Heath and Jeremy Thorpe, informing them that the
election would be on 18 June.28 One day after he had told Richard Nixon.29
For all the sense of the country having been in pre-election ‘limbo’, the
announcement still surprised.30 ‘Announced fairly suddenly (fortunately)’,
Tony Crosland diarised, ‘so no time for elaborate pre-planning’.31 ‘This
election has come earlier than many of you expected’, Liberal candidates
and agents were told. ‘Some are still recovering from hard-fought local
elections’.32 Perhaps for this reason, and for all the auguries, there remained
uncertainty. Andrew Roth concluded his parliamentary survey ‘All in all,
this is one of the elections any sensible analyst would like to skip’.33
Without further comment, some on the Labour left noted that election
day was also the anniversary of Waterloo.34
25
Conservative and Unionist Central Office, General Election Memorandum No. 12, 16
June 1970, 1.
26
Joe Haines, Glimmers of Twilight (London, 2004), 26; Roy Jenkins, A Life at the Centre
(London, 1991), 297; Joe Haines to David Butler [copy], 6 November 1970, MS Wilson
c. 1070.
27
Harry Nicholas to NEC Cabinet members, 14 May 1970, Shore Papers WHL,
Shore 8/35.
28
Wilson to Heath, 18 May 1970, [copy]; Wilson to Thorpe, 18 May 1970, Thorpe
Papers, ADD MS 89073/3/101.
29
Wilson to Richard Nixon, n.d. [17 May 1970], [copy] TNA PREM 13/3173.
30
Sunday Times, 17 May 1970, 12.
31
Tony Crosland, ‘1970 Election’, Crosland papers, WHL, CROS 7/7/18.
32
General Election Bulletin No. 1, 20 May 1970, LPP, GE 9/13/97.
33
Andrew Roth, General Election Forecast, 1970 Edition (London, 1970), 8.
34
Denis Cobell, Socialist Leader, 30 May 1970, 3.
68
M. FARR
The timing of the election was at one with Heath’s central critique, and
with which he introduced the Conservative manifesto: Wilson’s was ‘a
cheap and trivial style of government’.35 Further, it was the Conservative
programme which was published first, quite an achievement, its author
thought, ‘especially as our Manifesto contained substantial and detailed
policy proposals and their’s did not; and as our’s was printed and their’s
was only duplicated’.36 A Better Tomorrow promised resolute leadership,
repudiated statutory income policy and further government intervention
in the industry and the economy, and committed to controlling inflation
and immigration. Ministers required to prepare ‘a political critique and
analysis’ of A Better Tomorrow in their fields found it ‘a catalogue of bromides and generalities’ both ‘trivial and unworthy’.37 The menace of
Selsdon Man—Wilson’s aborigine of Croydon who had ‘escaped from the
jungle and roams the market-place, appealing to people’s worst instincts
and prejudices’38—dissuaded the Conservatives from adopting more
dynamic manifesto and instead to stress ‘the integrity of government’.39
Notwithstanding such circumspection, as Douglas Hurd, Heath’s private
secretary, put it, ‘There runs through it a note of genuine puritan protest’.40
Labour’s manifesto was an altogether more cavalier affair. Two days
before it was adopted, the Defence Secretary suggested ‘there ought
somewhere to be emphasis on increasing the growth rate of the economy’.41
Wilson waived the constitutional provision for a meeting with the parliamentary party, and the NEC alone considered it; the document was still
being produced, effectively as a part work, and ferried, in a pantomime of
taxis and elevators, to a roomful of increasingly impatient journalists awaiting its launch at Transport House.42 That launch revealed that Labour was
short only of resources. ‘This will be, for us, the election of long slogans!’
The Voluntary Publicity Group had proposed ‘an achievements plus future
A Better Tomorrow: the Conservative programme for the next 5 years, 1970, 1.
Sewill, CRD Report, 17 July 1970, 1, CRD 3/9/95.
37
Michael Stewart to Peter Shore, [copy], 8 June 1970; Denis Healey to Shore, 4 June
1970 [copy], TNA PREM 13/3116.
38
Labour Party, ‘Today’, 17 June 1970, 6.
39
Fraser to Heath, 25 May 1970 [copy], CRD 3/9/79; Press Conference to Launch
Conservative Manifesto, 26 May 1970, CCO 4/10/127.
40
Hurd, An End to Promises (London, 1979), 14.
41
Denis Healey to Harry Nicholas, n.d. [25 May 1970], LPA, ‘General Election
1970’/‘Healey’.
42
Special Meeting of the National Executive Committee, 27 May 1970, LPA, NEC
Minutes & Papers, December 1969-July 1970; Times, 28 May 1970, 10.
35
36
4
THE 1970 GENERAL ELECTION
69
benefits idea: “NOW BRITAIN’S STRONG, LET’S MAKE IT GREAT
TO LIVE IN”—VOTE LABOUR’, a mouthful that became the manifesto title. Inelegant as that was, it was still not What a Life! Show ‘em You
care!, the Liberal programme, so titled, the party explained, as to be
‘understandable and relevant’.43
After the adverse reaction to Attacking to Win, Labour shifted to the
‘personal, human, natural’.44 ‘When it comes down to it, aren’t Labour’s
ideals yours as well?’ was only marginally shorter, empathetically asked of
voters by ‘Labour’s Team’ whose beatific countenances were in stark contrast to those of the inert Yesterday’s Men.45 Tony Benn had suggested to
Wilson having the Cabinet photographed in session as part of the pre-­
election campaign—‘it would re-inforce the idea that we are a team’; the
idea developed into an image of Wilson standing in front of a group of
middle-aged men and one woman arrayed around a vast oval table in a
sepulchral space.46 Labour’s ideals were bolstered by the improbable duo
of Humphry Berkeley and Selsdon Man, the former, a former Tory MP
now very publicly voting Labour, and the latter seen as Wilson’s ‘missing
link’ in his hopes of re-election.47 Implicitly highlighting the reason for
that special feeling of confidence, 450,000 ‘when it comes down it’
leaflets—more than twice as many as for any other minister—were printed
of a Roy Jenkins solicitously, if improbably, standing outside a factory.48
Co-opted celebrities ran the gamut from Jackie Charlton to Sybil
Thorndike, only one of whom could influence the next stage: ‘we are
experimenting with substituting for “ideals” words such as “aims” or
“goals” (according to our performance in the World Cup) to harden the
quotation later on’.49
Irrespective of the team, a general view was that on voting day ‘the
decisive issue will be Harold Wilson’.50 The prime minister was the biggest
News from the Liberal Party, 28 May 1970, LPP 9/13/177.
Campaign, 15 May 1970, 2; a document prepared for the Voluntary Publicity Group,
14 April 1970, MS Wilson. c. 1401.
45
Voluntary Publicity Group, Election Slogan, 17 May 1970, General Secretary’s File,
Book 1, LPA, ‘General Election 1970’ box.
46
Benn to Wilson, 16 August 1969, MS. Wilson c. 1401; Times, 19 September 1969, 3.
47
Humphry Berkeley, Guardian, 15 May 1970, 14; Economist, 13 June 1970, 10.
48
With the exception of Ted Short. Literature Issued during the 1970 General Election,
LPA, ‘General Election 1970’ box.
49
Percy Clark, ‘The Current Publicity Campaign’, 17 May 1970, Cabinet/NEC meeting,
Shore papers, 8/35.
50
Economist, 23 May 1970, 13.
43
44
70
M. FARR
electoral asset for both parties. (A Tory staffer asked, ‘Why don’t we always
say Mr Wilson’s Government, instead of the Labour Government?’51)
Labour’s presidential campaign intended to narrow the choice between
Wilson and Heath (the Liberal Party’s Operation Poster Plaster, in winnable seats, met the challenge of differentiation: ‘Which twin is the
Tory?’52) whose mutual antipathy was evident. Wilson sought to radiate
calm, intending Heath thereby to sound strident. ‘One must admire the
self-confidence which enables a man…to assert that his main virtue is that
his opponent is worse’, the Economist confessed. ‘In the last analysis that
is the argument for Mr Heath, too, but he would never have the self-­
confidence to do it’.53
Heath was expected personally to be blamed for his party’s apparently
now-inevitable defeat: ‘The Scapegrocer’.54 A man more of government
than party, predilections could be laid bare, Hurd privately admitted, ‘in a
personal contest for which Ted has no taste and little aptitude’.55 Some
shadow ministers worried that Heath as Prime Minister may similarly be
‘inflexible, even imperious’, supplied, Hugo Young predicted, ‘with an
endless stream of the highest-class paperwork in the land, he will be able
at last to relegate the chores of party politics to their proper station’.56
Chores such as the journalists’ daily facilitated pilgrimage from the Labour
press conference in Smith Square to the Liberal press conference near
Smith Square (the party having been priced out of Smith Square), to the
Conservative press conference in Smith Square. Location provided another
third-party squeeze, prompting fear of the Liberals being sidestepped, literally, altogether.57 They were offered a room in No. 34: ‘The fact that we
were in “the Square” may be the paramount consideration’.58
Locations, however, had been superseded by communications: theroom in 34 Smith Square ‘proved unsatisfactory for the television
people’.59 They were further dissatisfied when, having invited the three
Keith [Britto] to Douglas [Hurd], 7 June [1970], Wolff papers, WLFF 3/5/6.
Bill Pearson to Thorpe, 1 May 1970, Thorpe Papers, ADD MS 89073/3/101.
53
Economist, 23 May 1970, 14.
54
After William Holman Hunt: William Rushton, Private Eye, 22 May 1970, 14.
55
Hurd, quoted by Young, 5 November 1969, Young papers, HJSY 2/2.
56
Hugo Young, Sunday Times, 17 May 1970, 13.
57
Francis Flavius, Tribune, 5 June 1970, 3.
58
[Unclear] to Thorpe, 10 April 1970, Thorpe Papers, ADD MS 89073/3/101.
59
Lord Byers to Anthony Barber, 26 May 1970, quoted in News from the Liberal Party,
n.d., LPP 9/13/176.
51
52
4
THE 1970 GENERAL ELECTION
71
leaders to participate in a new type of programme where voters would
question them on air, each summarily refused.60 Politicians and broadcasters met secretly at 12 Downing Street, where the parties declined any
involvement in programmes involving audience participation: both means
and ends marking what Thames Television’s Jeremy Isaacs described as ‘a
mastery of news management’.61 Liberals needed as much publicity as they
could get, as Harold Evans acknowledged by proudly informing Jeremy
Thorpe that his Sunday Times had assigned a journalist to the Party.62
Despite that present feeling of confidence, there remained the question as
to whether the preceding three years would, or could, be forgotten.
Neither Heath nor Wilson could point out that devaluation was the cause
of an apparently improving economy, because neither had believed in the
policy, though Wilson alone was injured by it. Conservative ‘critical seats’
polling had demonstrated economic matters as being overwhelmingly the
most important to voters, particularly the cost of living and rising prices.63
For Reginald Maudling, privately, the swing to Labour had a simple explanation: ‘wage inflation’.64 Expectations of the outcome of the election
uniformly had been reversed in the space of a few months. The
Conservatives were left depending on their voters regarding the election
as being more important than would Labour voters, and therefore be
more likely to turn out than Labour voters, abetted by much better organisation. The sudden reversal of apparent fate was the greatest challenge to
both Wilson and Heath. ‘How they react to it over the next few weeks will
not only help to decide the nature of the next government’, the Economist
thought, ‘but could also fashion the politics of the next decade’.65
Campaigning
For viewers of TV, heavy or not, only one candidate for prime minister
could be watched on the BBC discussing the World Cup on Sportsnight,
and on ITV singing ‘Cockles and Mussels’ with the cast of Coronation
60
Isaacs to Wilson, 14 May 1970, MS Wilson c. 401; Isaacs to Thorpe, 14 May 1970,
Thorpe Papers, ADD MS 89073/3/101.
61
Jeremy Isaacs, Listener, 18 June 1970, 822.
62
Harold Evans to Thorpe, 20 May 1970, Thorpe Papers, ADD MS 89073/3/101.
63
Opinion Research Centre (ORC), A Survey on Critical Seats (Summary), AprilSeptember 1969, CCO 180/11/4/1.
64
Reginald Maudling, quoted by Young, 28 May 1970, Young papers, HJSY 2/2.
65
Economist, 16 May 1970, 13.
72
M. FARR
Street at the Sun Television awards.66 Harold Wilson wanted a ‘happy
election’.67 Smiling and waving in the sunshine, his regal walkabouts were
modelled on those of the Queen on her recent tour of Australia.68 The
Conservatives privately noted that ‘Wilson is trying to fight quiet campaign’, ‘intended to hide lack of material in his speeches and avoid talking
about Labour’s record’.69 For Wilson, in campaigning as in governing,
change meant convulsion. Compared, variously, to Baldwin, or Macmillan,
the Sunday Express discerned ‘the smug look of a man who has discovered
the secret of perpetual power’.70
‘For a common man’, as he by contrast appeared to Newsweek, the
leader of the opposition ‘displays little in the way of common touch’.71 It
was to the rectification of which that journalists found themselves at a café
on the A1 near Newport Pagnell to watch Edward Heath and Sir Edward
Boyle eat egg and chips; ‘ocular proof that the Leader of the Opposition,
being of like clay as us, stops when he is hungry on the motorway, and eats
egg and chips like any other man’.72 Heath was photographed holding a
tray. For those who took the prospect seriously, there were prefigurements
of a governing style. His ‘presidential aeroplane’ failed to fulfil journalists’
hopes of it since the leader sat at the front and ignored those at the back
(he had been, Hurd admitted, ‘reluctant to allow the Press to travel in his
aeroplane’73). ‘It would be wrong to pretend that some of his revealed
faults would not be serious drawbacks in No 10 Downing Street’, the
Economist noted. ‘Even in his politics he makes no concessions. It has
sometimes seemed as if he would rather be right than prime minister’.74
One staffer adjudged Heath’s campaigning ‘Appalling’ and its effect on
poll ratings ‘disastrous’.75 Selwyn Lloyd contributed to the air of collegiality by commenting that ‘Mr Heath happens to be leader of the party at the
Daily Telegraph, 15 May 1970, 1; Guardian, 25 April 1970.
Sunday Telegraph, 14 June 1970, 7.
68
Joe Haines, The Politics of Power (London, 1977), 170-1.
69
Office Luncheon Meeting No. 1, 1 June 1970; Office Luncheon Meeting No. 2, 2 June
1970, CCO 500/24/293.
70
Sunday Express, 14 June 1970, 1.
71
Newsweek, 29 June 1970, 15.
72
Insight, Sunday Times, 7 June 1970, 13.
73
Hurd to Sir Michael Fraser [copy], 4 August 1969, Wolff papers, WLFF 3/5/12.
74
Economist, 30 May 1970, 15.
75
Miles Hudson to Sewill, 18 June 1970, CRD 3/9/95.
66
67
4
THE 1970 GENERAL ELECTION
73
moment’.76 ‘Covering Heath’, complained one reporter, ‘is like covering
El Salvador in the World Cup’.77
Organisationally, the contrasts were equally, though conversely, evident, particularly in parties’ provision for postal votes.78 Each party had its
daily briefings for candidates and agents of snippets from speeches and
interviews, theirs and their opponents’. Labour produced ‘Today’, the
Conservatives colour-printed and bound 7500 copies of their ‘Daily
Notes’, edited by Oliver Stebbings and Chris Patten; the Liberal Party had
its typed, Xeroxed, and stapled ‘General Election Bulletin’. Changing
demographics manifested themselves in Labour highlighting
‘Commonwealth citizens’ for special treatment, and in London alone
sending 10,000 letters in Urdu, 10,000 in Bengali and 7000 in Hindi,
stressing the Race Relations Act and the Community Relations
Commission, committing Labour against repatriation, but deciding not to
mention the Commonwealth Immigration Act.79 The changing franchise
manifested itself in Josephine Hobson, 18, being crowned Miss New
Voter 1970.80
Presentationally, the contrasts were similarly pronounced. Wilson was
always amongst people, strolling and waving in the sunshine, to and from
committee rooms which the party stipulated should be situated in wide
streets or new housing estates; molluscs notwithstanding, ‘We do not,
repeat not, wish to visit committee rooms of the Coronation Street type’.81
The Tories had noted early on that ‘Heath’s quiet interview voice was
more popular than public hall speaking voice’, yet persisted with public
hall events.82 An ‘A Better Tomorrow’ standard design unit had been constructed as background for television broadcasts, press conferences and
halls around the country, but its centred, concentric, circles made Heath
look as if he were being viewed down a gun barrel, or in front of a plug
hole, or under a vortex up which he was in danger of disappearing; it also
Guardian, 17 June 1970, 7.
Quoted in Time, 29 June 1970, 17.
78
Ian Waller, Sunday Telegraph, 31 May 1970, 8; Tom Normanton to John Cope, 29 July
1970 [copy], CCO 500/24/294.
79
Harry Nicholas to regional organisers, 1 June 1970, General Secretary’s File, Book 1,
LPA, ‘General Election 1970’ box; Hindi + Urdu letters, LPA, GE 1970 box.
80
Daily Express, 17 June 1970, 7.
81
Ron Hayward to regional organisers, 21 May 1970, General Secretary’s File, Book 1,
LPA, ‘General Election 1970’ box.
82
Office Luncheon Meeting No, 1, 1 June 1970, CCO 500/24/293.
76
77
74
M. FARR
made it look as if, despite being on an ostentatiously national tour, he was
always speaking from the same place.83 Specially commissioned standard
music was played before each meeting, though not the national anthem,
which, on practical grounds ‘Mr Heath agrees reluctantly’ should be
dropped.84 His own team despaired of him ‘appearing alone on the stage
backed by a pale copy of an advertisement for Omo with the net result that
he seemed to be a voice from outer space with all the remoteness but none
of the mystery of such apparitions’.85
More successful were Geoffrey Tucker’s Party Election Broadcasts,
which pretended to be News at Ten, complete with pretend commercial
break and pretend newsreaders, while a real News at Ten newsreader privately offered Heath communications advice.86 ‘Breakfast-time television’—‘a barbarity’—was introduced by the BBC with Good Morning
Britain, which was essentially a television studio full of newspaper journalists.87 TV coverage would culminate, as the head of BBC current affairs
put it, with ‘the most complex technical operation ever undertaken in
Television Centre’.88 Computers and colour-coded results meant that, as
the producer, Richard Francis, put it, ‘the days of pretty girls running
information around the studio are numbered’.89 Francis, who oversaw
three years of planning, cited as its model the BBC’s coverage of Apollo
13.90 More auspiciously, ITV based its election night programme on its
coverage of Apollo 11.91
Despite such excitements to come, the campaign remained comatose.
As William Hardcastle put it, ‘this is not good lethargy-shaking weather’.92
The Conservatives privately were worried that ‘the level of public interest
in the Election is low’, and a low poll benefitted them only when seeking
to retain, rather than win, power.93 Ministers were confident, perhaps
83
Andrew Alexander and Alan Watkins, The Making of the Prime Minister 1970 (London,
1970), 173.
84
Geoffrey Tucker to Central Office Agents, 26 May 1970, CCO 4/10/127; Hurd to
Richard Webster, 24 November 1969, CCO 500/24/288.
85
Hudson to Sewill, 18 June 1970, CRD 3/9/95.
86
Reginald Bosanquet to Heath, 4 June 1970, Wolff papers, WLFF 3/5/12.
87
John Whale, Sunday Times, 14 June 1970, 14.
88
John Grist, Listener, 2 July 1970, 4.
89
Richard Francis, Ariel, July 1970, 14.
90
Radio Times, 11 June 1970, 15.
91
TV Times, 13 June 1970, 10.
92
William Hardcastle, Listener, 18 June 1970, 819.
93
Douglas to Fraser, 30 May 1970, WLFF 3/5/6.
4
THE 1970 GENERAL ELECTION
75
overly: Barbara Castle thought her colleagues, Wilson apart, ‘lackadaisical’94 (‘Today I took a complete rest. It has been one of the easiest campaigns I’ve known’.95). Even less appeared to be happening when there
were no newspapers to read, a result of a national three-day strike over a
25% pay demand, which might have reminded voters of the salience of
wage inflation and industrial relations, but was the one dispute that denied
the Conservatives the chance to remind them. More generally, Heath
needed the press, which was largely supportive, to be printing, and the
strike, which might have reminded voters of the salience of wage inflation
and industrial relations, was the one dispute that denied the Conservatives
the chance to remind them.
Wilson had reason to duck as well as wave. Eggs, some hard-boiled,
some double-yolked, impacted on the campaign, and several on the prime
minister, eliciting a less-common witticism from the leader of the opposition. Since his tours were not announced in advance, Heath said, with
mock-solemnity, it meant ‘that there are men and women in this country
walking around with eggs in their pockets on the off-chance of seeing the
Prime Minister’.96 Wilson soon had his own repertoire of egg jokes, such
as their very abundance being proof of how stable the cost of living was.
‘We have not tried to rival the Tories in egg-throwing’, Harry Nicholas,
Labour’s General Secretary, more seriously, told all candidates and agents.
‘In the long run public opinion is bound to turn against
egg-throwing’.97
Given that ‘there is a limit to the sunshine shots that even the most
inventive television cameraman can take’, with little else to report, personalities and polls came to dominate.98 After Wilson and Heath, the most
prominent personality by far was Enoch Powell. As did George Brown,
Powell attracted large retinues and larger audiences, the difference being
that Brown’s whistle-stop tour was—perhaps surprisingly—conspicuously
in support of his leader, whereas Powell was widely thought to have much
to gain from the defeat of his. Powell seemed almost to monopolise attention, conversation, and Heath’s daily press conference, with incendiary
Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70 (London, 1984), 804 (28 May 1970).
R. H. S. Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol.3, Secretary of State for Social
Services, 1968-70 (London, 1977), 944 (14 June 1970).
96
Alexander and Watkins, Prime Minister, 177.
97
Harry Nicholas to all candidates and agents, 6 June 1970, General Secretary’s File, Book
1, LPA, ‘General Election 1970’ box.
98
Economist, 13 June 1970, 15.
94
95
76
M. FARR
speeches invoking traitors and immigrants, communists and anarchists, in
a Britain ‘under attack’.99 Devon North was also under attack and could
only be defended, Jeremy Thorpe, another prominent, if contrasting, personality, told his adjutants, provided that ‘I am in the Division for the
greater part of the campaign’.100
‘The one issue of overwhelming interest which has so far emerged’, it
seemed to one political expert, is ‘simply which side will win’.101 Leached
of any countervailing narrative, the end became the story. ‘There can be
little doubt’, Hardcastle felt, ‘that the polls have generated what little tension this election has provided’.102 Tribune felt that the polls were ‘being
used as a means of changing public opinion’, with journalists reduced to
the role of ‘fortune-tellers studying tea leaves in the bottom of a cup’.103
In addition to its own weekly national poll, the Sunday Times offered ‘a
scientifically-­consolidated index of the current findings of the other five
national polls’.104 Even Campaign thought them ‘newspaper gimmicks’,
part of the ‘new marketing’, the equivalent of sponsored sport, giving
‘back to the newspapers a political power they once had, but lost’.105
Seeing a gap in the market, Punch had ‘decided to become the first journal
which is not printing a half-hourly opinion poll’.106
Yet both parties found the findings as contradicted by their experiences.
‘I can’t help thinking there is something funny about the Polls’, the
Conservative MP Gilbert Longden noted, ‘especially as they run counter
to the impression gained by many canvassers’.107 His party was ‘baffled’,
and diagnosed a depressive effect on party workers.108 ‘There are 19
chances in 20 that the Polls Index is within 2 per cent of a totally accurate
reading’, the Sunday Times maintained, which meant a Labour lead of 100
seats over the Conservatives: ‘it would require a political miracle actually
99
Office Luncheon Meetings No 9. 11 June 1970 and No. 11, 15 June 1970, CCO
500/24/293.
100
Thorpe to Lord Byers, Mrs Gorky, Mrs Prowse, Eric Lubbock, Ted Wheeler, James
Isaac, n.d. (for 13 May 1970 meeting), Thorpe Papers, ADD MS 89073/3/101.
101
Alan Ryan, Listener, 4 June 1970, 738.
102
Hardcastle, Listener, 18 June 1970, 820.
103
Tribune, 5 June 1970, 1.
104
Sunday Times, 24 May 1970, 1.
105
Campaign, editorial, 5 June 1970, 13.
106
William Davis, Punch, 3 June 1970, 812.
107
Gilbert Longden, F & G. P. Meeting, 21 May 1970, Agenda, WHL, Longden Papers,
3/10; George Brown, In My Way (London, 1971), 262.
108
Daily Telegraph, 15 June 1970, 1.
4
THE 1970 GENERAL ELECTION
77
to obliterate the advantage Labour had won’.109 ‘It is just remotely possible’, that the polls were wrong, the Sunday Times’s Ron Hall conceded,
‘because in sampling everything is remotely possible. But the odds are
more than 100,000 to one against’.110 ‘The outcome is already certain’,
the veteran political correspondent Robert Carvel informed Londoners.
‘Labour has victory in the bag’.111
‘We are going to lose this General Election if we cannot raise the political temperature’, Heath’s campaign staff was told two days later.112 The 7
June meeting at Heath’s apartment at Albany was immediately dubbed a
‘council of despair’. As the Conservatives’ Director of Research Brendan
Sewill’s ‘mid-course assessment’ put it, ‘We can go on banging away at the
Labour record but on each point we come up against the almost subconscious answer—“yes, but they have got the balance of payments right”’.113
The Conservatives had to choose between stressing Labour’s economic
record, or issuing prophesy. They decided on the latter, but to shift from
likely crisis to likely troubles—a more plausible possibility and therefore
more powerful message. After all, ‘Wilson must have had a decisive reason
for wishing to call a June Election and for not waiting until the Autumn’.114
On 9 June, Roy Jenkins announced a record Balance of Payments surplus.
Four days later, National Opinion Polls (NOP) gave Labour a 12.4 lead.
Headlines had Labour winning by 140.115
The Conservative response was to ‘take offensive’.116 Heath, tanned
and actively engaging in smiling, went on his own walkabouts in the sunshine, waving much more regally than Wilson ever did; messages were
simultaneously sharpened and hammered. Then, in the last five days of the
campaign, a sudden, aberrant, infamous, concatenation of circumstances:
the weather, briefly, broke; West Germany came from behind to knock
England out of the World Cup; Heath prohibited any further discussion
of Powell in his press conferences; and adverse trade figures were
announced. Having made so much of having got the Balance of Payments
Sunday Times, 14 June 1970, 1, 19.
Ron Hall, Sunday Times, 7 June 1970, 9.
111
Robert Carvel, Evening Standard, 4 June 1970, 21.
112
James Douglas to Fraser, Sewill, Hurd, and Wolff, 6 June 1970, Wolff papers,
WLFF 3/5/12.
113
Sewill, 1970 General Election, mid-course assessment, 3 June 1970, CRD 3/9/95.
114
Norman Collins, Campaign Strategy No, 2, 3 June 1970, Wolff papers, WLFF 3/5/12.
115
Evening News, 13 June 1970, 3.
116
Office Luncheon Meeting No 4. n.d. [4 June 1970], CCO 500/24/293.
109
110
78
M. FARR
right, the latter, especially, were devastating, even more so for coinciding
with the end of the newspaper strike. Inopportune economic news had
threatened that present feeling of confidence since the beginning of the
campaign, with the inflation figures and Jim Callaghan’s dissimulation
about a wage freeze. Conservative researchers had been urged to include
in all their outputs price increases, taxation, unemployment, strikes, and
interest and mortgage rates; Labour noted that the Tories were hammering the cost of living.117 The strategy was supported by Aims of Industry,
which launched a press and postal campaign, building on Lords Cromer,
and, more awkwardly, Kearton, embarrassing the government on
Panorama. On 16 June, Wilson drew attention to a Conservative Research
Department paper on a ‘further devaluation’, but for him even to have
uttered the word was to have reminded the electorate of the preceding
three years.118 On 17 June, Wilson made a poor, partisan, and Heath a
positive, everyman, final television appearance. What Iain Macleod called
‘Wilson’s joyless strip-tease’ reached its grisly dénouement on polling day
when record unemployment figures were released.119
The evening of the first midsummer election for over a century was party
time in town. Hundreds dined and danced at the Savoy although Rab
Butler was in no mood for the latter, telling Humphry Berkeley ‘that we
are in for an evening of disaster’.120 At 10.25, the giant screen in the ballroom displayed BBC Election 70, the first election night programme
broadcast in colour, featuring complexions as brown as the suits and the
set. It began with Nicholas Harman’s novel exit poll at Gravesend which
revealed a 4.4% swing to the Conservatives, shortly followed by indications of a 6% downturn in turnout. Then came the first declaration. After
the second Robert McKenzie, fumbling with his swingometer, said ‘This
is sensational’.121
117
Sewill to All Research Department officers, 28 May 1970, CRD 3/9/83. Harry
Nicholas to all candidates and agents, 3 June 1970, General Secretary’s File, Book 1, LPA,
‘General Election 1970’ box.
118
Financial Times, 17 June 1970, 10.
119
Macleod, quoted in James Douglas, ‘The Public Opinion Polls in the 1970 General
Election’, 19 November 1970, CCO 180/11/4/7.
120
Humphry Berkeley, Crossing the Floor (London, 1972), 87; Tatler, July 1970, 18.
121
Robert McKenzie, Election 70, BBC 1, 18 June 1970.
4
THE 1970 GENERAL ELECTION
79
Explaining
The outcome was known in minutes. It would still have been sensational
had it been eked out into the morning. But it was immediate. McKenzie’s
appendage had to be extended, on air, by a man with a pot of paint and a
brush. General discombobulation amidst the most complex technical
operation ever undertaken in Television Centre was rendered hysterical
when Monty Python—who had been working for Wilson—later that year
parodied BBC Election 70 (‘this is largely as I predicted, except that the
Silly Party won. I think this is mainly due to the number of votes cast’.).122
With the biggest swing since 1945, the election was the first time a working majority for one party changed to a working majority for another since
1906. It was the lowest turnout, and, not coincidentally, Labour’s lowest
share of the vote, since 1935. One million Labour voters had, indeed, not
voted, despite wheezes and gerrymandering: 16-year old boundaries
meant a variation in size of constituency from Billericay with 124,215 to
Glasgow Kelvingrove with 19,019; 16 seats had more than 100,000 voters, and 12 had fewer than 30,000.123 Of the 77 seats with electorates of
under 45,000, Labour won 58; of the 90 seats with more than 80,000
electors, the Conservatives won 70. But while it took 39,718 to elect a
Conservative, and 42,305 for a Labour MP, 351,536 were required for a
Liberal.124 One was Jeremy Thorpe, who successfully, if barely, defended
Devon North, but his sequestration in the West Country injured his party,
which lost half its MPs.
The journalists’ explanation was that they had been ‘wiling dupes of the
polls’, as George Gale fumed; the result ‘both confounds and disgraces all
of us who have reported the election campaign’.125 One correspondent
blamed the press for there having been a surprise in the first place. BBC
Election 70 may have pioneered regional opt-outs, but Sir Edwin Leather
reported of ‘itinerant writers who rushed in and out of five constituencies
a day to send their reports to Fleet Street’, and not speaking to party
workers.126 Certainly, much of the reporting was about polling, to Heath’s
122
Peter Davis to Marcia Williams, 13 April 1970, MS. Wilson c. 1403; Monty Python’s
Flying Circus, BBC 1, 3 November 1970.
123
Election Expenses: Return to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons Dated
21st July 1970, HMSO, 23 March 1971, 58, 92.
124
1970 General Election, LPP, 9/13/442.
125
George Gale, Evening Standard, 19 June 1970, 9.
126
Ted Leather, letter, Economist, 27 June 1970, 4.
80
M. FARR
disadvantage. For those campaigning, ‘the outcome would not have been
at all surprising if it had not been for the unrealistically high expectations
to which the opinion polls gave birth’.127 ‘In a way not experienced
before’, David Wood, political editor of the Times reflected, ‘the campaign
was dominated by the polls’.128 Hurd recalled that they were ‘hypnotic’.129
The pollsters’ explanation was keenly anticipated, given that for the first
time both parties had relied on external publicity professionals, and by
their own admission, ‘The people have made fools of us all’.130 Thus,
agencies immediately were called on to explain themselves.131 The Market
Research Society appointed a committee to discover what had gone
wrong.132 ‘There have always been two things which scare the hell out of
pollsters’, said the only pollster whose polls had been correct. ‘One is late
swing, and the other is differential turnout. In this election we had
both’.133 Gallup, privately, blamed the former; NOP agreed, and added
the latter; the Opinion Research Centre (ORC) alone—‘because we were
running more scared than any “of the other polls”’—re-interviewed people.134 ‘Don’t blame the polls’, Political Quarterly cautioned, ‘only those
who are governed by them’: two academic investigations determined that
it was not the polls that were the problem so much as the uses made of
them: since they had been commissioned by newspapers, pollsters were
inclined to be newsworthy in their presentation of findings.135 Polling near
major cities to facilitate the delivering of packages to head office in London
also over-represented Labour—more sampling and a greater margin of
error were common suggested remedies, as even was a ban on polling during a campaign. But the Labour bandwagon the Conservatives accused
Socialist Commentary, July 1970, 1.
George Clark, ‘The Election Campaign’, Times Election Guide, 26-30; 26.
129
Douglas Hurd, Memoirs (London, 2004), 187.
130
Clive Irving, Campaign, 26 June 1970, 16.
131
Admap, June 1970, 198-200.
132
Public Opinion Polling on the 1970 Election, British Market Research Society, 1972, 6.
133
Humphrey Taylor, quoted in Sunday Times, 21 June 1970, 10.
134
Gallup Political Index, Report No. 121, June/July 1970, 88; NOP Political Bulletin,
The Polls and the 1970 General Election, n.d., 1-2; June/July 1970, 1-4’; Survey Research
Centre, Occasional Paper No 7, ‘The Polls and the 1970 Election’, University of Strathclyde,
1970, 41, CCO 180/11/4/7.
135
‘The Election in Retrospect’, Political Quarterly, October 1970, 373-374. Ian Lloyd,
‘Opinion Polls and the British General Election of June 1970’, The Parliamentarian,
October 1970, 270-274; Mark Abrams, ‘The Opinion Polls and the 1970 British General
Election’, The Public Opinion Quarterly, 34:3 (1970), 317-24.
127
128
4
THE 1970 GENERAL ELECTION
81
the pollsters of having created may actually have benefitted the Tories: by
presenting a Labour victory as a matter of fact rather than of doubt, ‘the
whole exercise becalmed the electorate’ a Labour staffer thought; ‘at least,
those who were Labour voters’.136 On BBC Election 70 minutes after the
second declaration a grim David Kingsley found himself face to face with
his Yesterday’s Men manikins. He revived a few weeks later, telling Harry
Nicholas, ‘Well, that’s democracy for you, I guess’.137
The Conservatives’ explanation was that ‘the decisive issue was the
strength of the economy’, both generally and, Brendan Sewill thought,
specifically: the adverse trade figures provided ‘tangible proof that the
economy was not as strong as Labour claimed’, and the record unemployment figures ‘must have done a good deal to keep Labour voters at home
on Polling Day evening’.138 Conservative private polling said the message
about the economy had been getting through, and ‘when the eggshell of
credibility cracked large numbers returned to the views they had a few
months earlier’, with a final movement in the last four days of the campaign ‘unprecedented’ in size, speed and lateness, amongst those some
might consider politically illiterate and coinciding with the end of the
newspaper strike.139 Conservative spending in those Labour-leaning titles
had borne fruit. The hypothesis that campaigns have only marginal effect,
that longer-term trends implied that intuition was sounder than psephology, was not contradicted by ‘late swing’. ‘We won’, the Conservative
Research Department’s James Douglas told Sir Michael Fraser, ‘because at
the grass-roots level Conservative supporters were much more determined
to get the Labour Government out than Labour supporters were to keep
the Labour Government in’.140
The Labour explanation began with Wilson himself on BBC Election
70: it was a ‘low poll’.141 One Labour MP told another ‘When we knew it
was only a 64% poll I thought “that’s it”, lets go home’.142 ‘I think the
trade figures were unfortunate’, Bob Mellish told Wilson, ‘and I am certain there was a backlash of Powell in abstention of many Labour
David Warburton, Tribune, 26 June 1970, 9.
David Kingsley to Harry Nicholas, 15 July 1970, LPA, ‘General Election 1970’ box.
138
Sewill, CRD Report, 17 July 1970, 13, CRD 3/9/95.
139
‘Public Opinion Polls’, 19 November 1970, CCO 180/11/4/7.
140
James Douglas to Sir Michael Fraser, [copy], 26 June 1970, CRD, 3/9/95.
141
Wilson, Election 70, BBC 1, 19 June 1970.
142
Eric Ogden to Robert Sheldon, Sheldon papers WHL, Sheldon 6/3.
136
137
82
M. FARR
voters’.143 Tribune blamed Labour’s record more than the campaign and
the lack of substance behind the long slogans: the manifesto was ‘a rushed
job’; better to have gone in October.144 Others blamed the fetish made of
the trade figures.145 An organisational report felt that the manifesto lacked
detail and that the campaign peaked a week before polling day; the final
Conservative offensive went unchallenged.146 Not getting out the postal
vote cost Labour 19 seats, and organisation in the marginals was ‘the usual
mixture of ad-hoc-ery and dedicated enthusiasm to scenes of unbelievable
panic at being faced with a June election’.147 Equal Pay alone meant
women should have voted Labour, Betty Lockwood, editor of Labour
Women, thought, but they were scared off by campaigning on the cost of
living and rising prices: the price of bacon outweighed comprehensive
education and non-selective healthcare.148 Labour MPs gave their views at
a Parliamentary Labour Party meeting in July where all possible explanations were given, and the following day, there was such disorder when the
shadow cabinet convened that Michael Foot thought ‘a few meetings like
this will take years off my life and theirs’.149 The feeling was greater for
almost no one having expected the result. ‘Up to last Sunday I was certain
of Victory and over 40 majority’, Mellish admitted.150 For Tony Benn the
result ‘was a complete surprise in that I thought we would be back with a
working majority’.151 ‘The arguments against a June election turned out
to be right, but they were largely based on superstition’, Roy Hattersley
felt. ‘The arguments in favour proved wrong, but they were based on the
best evidence then available’.152 Confrères consoled the leader of the
opposition. ‘Don’t blame yourself’; ‘Your timing of the election was most
welcome to the Parliamentary Party before the Election’; ‘You had to go
Bob Mellish to Wilson, 20 June 1970, MS Wilson c 1535/87.
Richard Clements, Tribune, 26 June 1970, 1, 5.
145
Catalpa, Socialist Commentary, July 1970, 12.
146
Interim Organisational Report on the General Election, 18 June 1970, LPA, ‘General
Election 1970’ box.
147
Alan Lee Williams, Socialist Commentary, August 1970, 4.
148
Betty Lockwood, Labour Woman, July/August 1970, 103.
149
Minutes of a Party Meeting, 15 July 1970, NEC Minutes & Papers, December 1969July 1970; Notes on Shadow Cabinet meeting, 16 July 1970, Michael Foot Papers,
PHM, MF/C1.
150
Mellish to Wilson, 20 June 1970, MS Wilson c 1535/87.
151
Tony Benn to Sir Richard Clarke, 23 June 1970, Clarke Papers, CAC, 4/3/3.
152
Roy Hattersley, New Statesman, 31 July 1970, 114.
143
144
4
THE 1970 GENERAL ELECTION
83
in June’.153 There was one exception. ‘I cannot forbear to point out that I
did sound the warning’, George Brown told Wilson. Despite his belligerence at his declaration that he had only lent his constituency, Brown had
come to the view during the following four days that ‘I do not think it
would be of any value to anybody for me to seek to come back to the
House’, and asked for a peerage.154
There had also to be an explanation for what, on the morning after the
election, Wilson described as ‘the infection from Wolverhampton’; to
American ears ‘Britain’s new household word’: Powellism.155 Powell ‘thoroughly disrupted the campaign of his own party’, Douglas Hurd reflected;
‘He seemed determined that we should lose, and lose badly’.156 A paperback book was rush-produced, which, appropriately, began in conception
as an investigation into the election with reference to Powell and Powellism
and ended up a book about Powell and Powellism with reference to the
election: predictably it maintained that Powell was critical.157 His finalweek speeches convinced many it was a pitch for the leadership once Heath
had lost; when Heath won for others it was those speeches that had been
material.
‘No one will be able to say for a long time that election campaigns do
not change people’s minds’, the Economist concluded.158 Wilson’s was
unsustainable for more than a fortnight. The Conservatives managed to
break through ambivalence to underlying areas of disquiet.159 Trends from
1969 proved to be a better indicator than the polls during the campaign:
indeed, what was surprising was not the result, but that, ‘after five and a
half years of Labour Government which even impartial observers would
recognise as dogged by failure and unpopularity, we so nearly lost’; the
reason adduced was general identification with Labour ideals, ‘so that the
public turn to the Conservatives in time of trouble but do not think of us
153
Mellish to Wilson, 20 June 1970; Robert Maclennan to Wilson, 23 June 1970, MS
Wilson c. 1535/323; Terence Lancaster to Wilson, 25 June 1970, MS Wilson. c.1411.
154
Brown to Wilson, 24 June 1970, MS Wilson c. 1524/101.
155
‘The Nation Decides’: Interview with Harold Wilson by David Frost, Transmitted 19
June 1970, MS Wilson c. 1259/291; Time, 29 June 1970, 19.
156
Hurd, End to Promises, 22.
157
John Wood (ed.), Powell and the 1970 Election (London, 1970); Nicholas Deakin and
Jenny Bourne, ‘Powell, the Minorities, and the 1970 Election’, Political Quarterly, 41:4
(October 1970), 399-415.
158
Economist, 20 June 1970, 9.
159
James Douglas to Hurd [copy], 10 December 1970, CCO 180/11/4/7.
84
M. FARR
as their Party’.160 The Tories noted that half of voters had changed their
vote since 1964 and most of their net gains were direct conversion of
Labour voters, albeit ones of a ‘fragile’ allegiance.161 ‘We must at all costs
continue to show a very compassionate image’, a colleague told Brendan
Sewill. ‘I have no doubts that we shall be an extremely competent
Government but I do still have certain reservations as to whether we shall
be able to convince people that we care about ordinary human problems’.162 Sewill averred, ‘To put this right must surely be the major task of
the Conservative Government and the Conservative Party between now
and the next election’.163 As to the unfancied leader, by common accord
‘only one man has really won this election, and that man is Mr Heath’.164
So consistent was the swing that it was a nationwide verdict. ‘The victory
is his. The party is his’; ‘it was, in a particular and personal sense, his own
triumph’.165 ‘There need not be another election for five years’, the Sunday
Times assured its readers. ‘A government is installed which has an adequate majority to deal with any crisis’.166 There had, after all, been no
single-term Conservative government since 1929.
The outcome and legend of the election were in stark contrast to a campaign ‘marked by brilliant sunshine and an almost total absence of events
other than an earthquake in Peru’.167 For the histories of the Wilson and
Heath governments it tended to serve as a placeholder for complacency
and opportunity respectively. More than most general elections, it featured
in the memoirs and diaries, and then the biographies, of ministers and
shadow ministers. More than most elections it featured in histories of the
parties, of the two governments, and of the period, of the decade ending
and the decade beginning.168 More than most it attracted free-­standing
studies: supplements, articles, and chapters; and books, one amusingly so,
in the sense of how wittily it was written, and also how it had hastily to be
Sewill, CRD Report, 17 July 1970, 17, CRD 3/9/95.
Conservative Central Office, ‘1970 General Election’, CCO 150/11/4/4.
162
Charles Bellairs to Sewill, 17 June 1970, CRD 3/9/95.
163
Sewill, CRD Report, 17 July 1970, 17, CRD 3/9/95.
164
Richard Rose, ‘Voting Trends Surveyed’, Times Election Guide, 31-32.
165
Economist, 20 June 1970, 9; Sunday Times, editorial, 21 June 1970, 12; Daily Express,
Heath’s Election: How the Tories Took Britain (London 1970), 4.
166
Sunday Times, editorial, 21 June 1970, 12.
167
Sewill, CRD Report, 17 July 1970, 11, CRD 3/9/95.
168
Most notably Robert Rhodes James, Ambitions and Realities: British Politics
1964-1970, 217-37.
160
161
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THE 1970 GENERAL ELECTION
85
re-written.169 Publication of the Nuffield study gave scope for the green-­
fingered to take lapsarian pleasure at the embarrassment of the lab-coated
horticulturists who had apparently supplanted them. For David Wood,
ruminating in his potting shed at the Times, ‘Something vital has always
escaped analysis or defied the slide rules’.170 Peter Preston did not know for
whom to feel sorrier: Harold Wilson or David Butler.171 Barbara Castle
lumped together psephologists and pollsters. ‘The human element has
defeated them’, she sniffed. ‘So it is back to the humble historian after all’.172
For all the sun-drenched clarity of its circumstances, there remained an
opacity to the 1970 General Election. ‘No one will ever be sure how the
victory occurred’, recalled one who was at the centre.173 The election
repays study in its own right. It evoked that of 1945 in the unexpectedness, of its outcome, but was the greater surprise given, as was thought,
much more sophisticated electoral intelligence. Circumstances were
unusually propitious for the government because the government had
engineered them. Yet their differences in organisational culture meant that
the party in power, which had called the election, was less prepared than
was the opposition. Labour seemed to be hoping for little more than that
the public was willing to accept some more Labour Government. Wilson
had indeed identified an, as it proved, short-term recovery and not a longterm one. Haste in arranging was followed by leisure in campaigning.
Labour’s somnambulance was surmounted by a Conservative campaign of
discipline and, eventually, intensity. Irregular though its outcome may
have been, the election nevertheless revivified the platitudes that governments lose elections and that, as someone once said, a week is a long time
in politics. For all the longer-term trends, had the election been on 11
June, there would never have been a Heath government. Fred Peart was
an unlikely, and unacknowledged, Tory auxillary. So it was that the
169
Alexander and Watkins, Prime Minister. Sarah Hogg, Election 1970: the Way Heath Won
(London, 1970). Steven Fielding, ‘The 1970 General Election’, in Steven Fielding and John
W. Young (eds), The Labour Governments 1964-1970: Labour and Cultural Change (MUP,
2003), 217-235.
170
David Butler and Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, The British General Election of 1970
(London, 1971); David Wood, ‘Psephology thrown on the defensive’, The Times, 19 April
1971, 13.
171
Peter Preston, Guardian, 15 April 1971, 12.
172
Barbara Castle, New Society, 15 April 1971, 641.
173
Hurd, End to Promises, 25.
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M. FARR
government of Edward Heath came about through the arranging, and
campaiging, of Harold Wilson. A Prime Minister with a working majority
had called a snap election and lost it. It would not be the last time.
For once decadists were vindicated: 1970 as the end of one era and the
beginning of another. It may have been known that the 1960s were over,
but not that 1970’s would be the last general election of a United Kingdom
governed by a sovereign parliament. In this context the election also
repays the study for what it portended. Heath won against expectation,
despite his party, despite his critics, and despite the press. Some speculated
that the experience may prove consequential in how he might conduct his
premiership. But if Heath wanted a new style of government, he had
started with an old trope: the hostage to fortune. So much was there in A
Better Tomorrow, that there was much to hold against it, tomorrow; but,
for today, on the cloudless morning of Friday 19 June 1970, there could
be no doubt as to who ran Britain.
CHAPTER 5
Competition and Credit Control, Monetary
Performance, and the Perception
of Macroeconomic Failure: The Heath
Government and the Road to Brexit
James Silverwood
Views about economic management by the Heath Government seem
fairly well entrenched. The lofty ambition with which the Heath
Government entered office to revitalise British capitalism through the
injection of a new competitive ethos claimed to have quickly floundered in
a quagmire of ineptitude, policy U-turns and a retreat to the safety of
Keynesianism. Whilst it is not the intention of this chapter to ride to the
rescue of the Heath Government’s reputation for competence in economic management it does challenge some established perceptions.
Importantly, the chapter registers the ripples through British capitalism
emanating from the 1971–1973 monetary experiment of Competition
and Credit Control (CCC), the impulses from which ultimately led to the
maelstrom of the global financial crisis and facilitated Brexit.
J. Silverwood (*)
Coventry University, Coventry, UK
e-mail: ac5068@coventry.ac.uk
© The Author(s) 2021
A. S. Roe-Crines, T. Heppell (eds.), Policies and Politics Under
Prime Minister Edward Heath, Palgrave Studies in Political
Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53673-2_5
87
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J. SILVERWOOD
The chapter is structured around a reappraisal of three prevailing perspectives on the Heath Government’s economic management available in
the literature. The chapter begins with an evaluation of twin charges. First,
that the Heath Government betrayed the move towards liberal economics
encapsulated in the Selsdon Declaration1 through a series of policy U-turns
that ensured the perpetuation of the Keynesian consensus. Second,
that economic management by the Heath Government is not worthy of
much more than a footnote in British economic history. This charge
is rebutted through a discussion of CCC, which is found to be an important milestone in the disintegration of the post-war Keynesian consensus
on economic management. The CCC also retains an enduring legacy into
the contemporary period beginning a process in which economic management became increasingly depoliticised and the financialisation of the
British economy was accelerated. The unbalanced and unequal growth
model created by this policy regime combined with the technocratic policy
responses to the global financial crisis fuelled public resentent against
political elites contributed to the populist backlash that culminated in
the vote for Brexit. The United Kingdom exiting the European Union
(EU) is an unfortunate epitaph for Edward Heath, a committed Europhile,
given that it was his administration that had secured entry to the European
Community in the first place back in 1973.
The chapter then considers the accusation that the Heath Government
was too timid in its efforts to tackle inflation. The chapter deems this
indictment unfair with comparative analysis of monetary performance by
the Heath and Thatcher Governments finding the national myth that the
latter defeated inflation to be an exaggeration. Indeed, monetary management between the two governments exudes rather more continuities than
it is likely either would have cared to imagine. Where there were differences between the two governments in terms of monetary policy, particularly in the use of unemployment to reduce inflation, they are found
indicative of the wider structural change of British capitalism initiated by CCC.
The final consideration is the claim that economic management by the
Heath Government failed when measured against a myriad of macroeconomic objectives it established for itself during its time at the apex of the
British political establishment. The findings, here, largely confirm the
1
The ‘Selsdon Declaration’ emerged from a meeting of the Conservative shadow cabinet
held in February 1970 at the Selsdon Park Hotel, Croydon.
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negativity within the existing literature, albeit with some important contextualisation of disappointing macroeconomic performance highlighted.
The conclusion notes how undue attention on these macroeconomic failures risks missing the broader picture delineated in this chapter as to the
role economic management by the Heath Government has played in the
trajectory of contemporary British capitalism.
The Perpetuation of Keynesianism? Competition
and Credit Control, 1971–1973
Indelibly linked to the notorious ‘Selsdon Declaration’, and sometimes
erroneously classed as a proto-Thatcherite agenda for economic reform,
the Heath Government entered Downing Street on a manifesto that
sought to restore prominence of the market mechanism through a reduction of government expenditure, decrease of industrial interventionism,
reform of industrial relations and avoidance of income policy. For a small
but committed group of Conservative members of parliament, the election victory in 1970 on this economic platform seemed to offer the chance
to radically change the direction of post-war British capitalism. Tory party
grandee, Peter Carrington (cited in Ziegler 2010: 215), described the
Selsdon Declaration as entailing a ‘fairly assertive restatement of the virtue
of capitalism and the benefits of free enterprise’. Arch-Thatcherite,
Norman Tebbit (cited in Ziegler 2010: 215, 218) went further by positing that the Selsdon Declaration involved the ‘repudiation of the post-war
Buskellite consensus’ and that, by the election in 1970, ‘Ted Heath was
committed to the end of … [the post-war Keynesian] consensus and to the
new liberal economics’. When the Selsdon Declaration was abandoned in
a plethora of economic policy U-turns in 19722 it was considered tantamount to a betrayal by such Conservative members of parliament, illustrative of a supposed political cowardice in the Heath Government’s approach
to economic management and represented a wasted opportunity to arrest
economic decline by saving the British economy from the clutches of state
control.
2
Two economic policy U-turns, in particular, are cited as examples. The adoption of
Keynesian fiscal policy at the 1972 Budget to secure a higher economic growth rate and the
Industry Act 1972, which allowed the Heath Government to provide an unprecedented level
of financial assistance to British industry.
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Elsewhere he Heath Government’s place in accounts of post-war British
economic history is often given a rather dull caricature as having inspired
only minor alterations in economic management in an increasingly desperate and futile rear-guard action in defence of the Keynesian paradigm
(Hall 1993: 290). The Heath Government often found worthy of only
brief mention in discussion of post-war trajectory of British political economy (Gamble 1994: 121–126). Commonly, it is other events of the 1970s
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan crisis (Burk and
Caincross 1992) or the election of Margaret Thatcher (Dutton 1997) that
are selected for intense scholarly examination with both events being
located as the stimuli for significant change in post-war British capitalism.
Neither the accusation of cowardice or minor alteration in economic
management should be levelled at the Heath Government. The introduction of CCC in September 1971, which remained in operation until
December 1973, been described as the ‘most radical overhaul of UK monetary policy since the Second World War’ (Needham 2014: ix). Importantly,
CCC can be identified not only as an important act in the breakdown of
Keynesian economic management of the British economy, but also in
terms of its influence in guiding us towards the contemporary conjuncture
of British capitalism.
The Heath Government were undoubtadly compliant bystanders in the
implementation of CCC. The intellectual development of the monetary
experiment was firmly located within the Bank of England—the driving
force behind the monetary experiment, which since the 1967 Devaluation
Crisis had been using unpublished targets in an attempt to bring monetary
growth into line (Needham 2014). Nevertheless, the Heath Government,
or at the very least key personnel within the Cabinet, such as Anthony
Barber (Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1970 to 1974), were aware of
the CCC and its implications for the British economy. Importantly, the
Heath Government could also have stopped this monetary innovation in
its tracks had it wanted. That the Heath Government did not may have
had something to do with how CCC was sold to Heath as a means to
stimulate competition in the British economy, which left Heath as the least
able to grasp the monetary repercussions of CCC of any member of his
government (Needham 2014: 55, 62, 70). Nevertheless, the CCC was
not a Bank of England monetary project pushed on a recalcitrant Heath
Government and Treasury, as the latter was fully briefed on what the CCC
would entail and had its own reasons for supporting its implementation
(Copley 2017).
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CCC swept aside the plethora of quantitative controls on credit initiated in the post-war era. Henceforth, ‘bank lending would be controlled
on the basis of cost’ (Needham 2014: 3), with interest rates providing
price signals to the market. In other words, the disbursement of credit was
to fall upon supply and demand. In order to prioritise transition to monetary control via cost of credit the CCC promoted competition between
British banking institutions. The removal of significant restrictions on
credit creation allowed banks to aggressively compete over the expansion
of their customer bases. CCC also abolished the cartel arrangement
between clearing banks, in which they agreed between themselves a range
of interest rates, including those for bank lending. Consequently, CCC
constituted a significant act of financial liberalisation, which directly challenged key principles of post-war Keynesian economic management: that
financial capital should be held in abeyance constrained by institutions
rooted within the nation-state that promoted full employment, industrial
investment and equitable distribution of economic growth.
Government influence on credit creation was excercised under CCC
through three monetary policy instruments: the Bank Rate, Open-Market
Operations (OMOs) and special deposits. The Bank of England’s frustration at Heath’s intransigence in his refusal to countenance increases in the
Bank Rate led to its replacement in October 1972 with the Minimum
Lending Rate (MLR),3 which was set at 0.50% higher than the average
rate for Treasury bills rounded to the nearest 0.25%. In principle, the
3
Monetary policy instruments have undergone several iterations since experimentation
with the CCC. Bank Rate, at the outset of the post-war era, established the rate at which the
Bank of England would lend to the banking system in exchange for security. Bank Rate was
replaced in October 1972, with the introduction of the MLR. After 25 May 1978, the MLR
was set by an ‘administrative decision’ by the Chancellor of the Exchequer akin to the postwar Bank Rate. The MLR was then suspended on 20 August 1981 and was replaced with the
Minimum Band 1 Dealing Rate—the minimum rate at which the Bank of England would
deal in Open-Market Operations (OMOs) for securities that fell within band 1 (maturity of
1–14 days). In total, there were four bands, and the bank ‘influenced interest rates by its
reactions to offers’ from discount houses, aiming for a specific level. Falling largely outside
of the scope of this chapter was the move to a Repo Rate in 1996, before the arrival of the
Official Bank Rate in 2006 (Bank of England 2019a). Notwithstanding the various technical
differences involved in these monetary policy instruments, the intention of each was to wield
indirect influence over credit creation by manipulating short-term market interest rates.
Although not historically accurate, in the interests of simplicity and to avoid confusion, the
chapter uses Bank Rate in its discussion of monetary policy prior to October 1972 and MLR
thereafter.
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MLR was established by the market mechanism alone, but the government retained an indirect influence over its level through its call for special
deposits from the banking system and open-market operations (Needham
2014: 60, 62–64, 71). Meanwhile, the Bank of England sought control
over the money supply via OMOs, through which the Bank supplied
liquidity of the British financial system. Nevertheless, ‘control afforded
over short-term interest rates was…far less extensive and effective’
(Caincross 1996: 127). CCC therfore purposefully removed many post-­
war direct controls over credit creation, with only an indirect influence
preserved on the banking system via interest rates. A key principle of CCC
was to cede macroeconomic governance to the market mechanism, with
the CCC beginning a process by which British economic management
became increasingly depoliticised. This delivered yet another direct challenge to a nostrum of post-war Keynesian consensus that economic management should be socialised within political institutions whose first duty
was to deliver economic stability.
The Legacy of Competition and Credit Control:
Financialisation of the UK Economy
‘Financialisation’ is defined here as a ‘process whereby financial markets,
financial institutions and financial elites gain greater influence over economic policy and economic outcomes’ (Palley 2007: 2 cited in Davis and
Walsh 2016: 667). Identifying when the process of financialisation of the
British economy began has recently undergone something of a revival. A
common critical juncture in the financialisation of British capitalism is
identified in the election of Thatcher and the Conservative Party in 1979,
who is said to have entered office with a plan to promote the international
competitiveness of the City of London (Coakley and Harris 1992).
Elsewhere, specific policies implemented by the Thatcher Governments
are implicated, including the abolition of exchange controls (Wade 2013:
53–54), the 1981 Budget and the refutation of fiscal policy as a tool of
demand management (Needham 2014: ix), the introduction of ‘Right to
Buy’ in the 1980 Housing Act, the deregulation of financial services in the
‘Big Bang’ reforms of 1986 (Kirkland 2015) and 1986 Building Societies
Act (Boddy 1989). Scholars are also beginning to identify earlier genesis
of financialisation in the 1976 IMF loan crisis (Davis and Walsh 2016) or
deregulation of the London Stock Exchange in the same year (Ohren and
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COMPETITION AND CREDIT CONTROL, MONETARY PERFORMANCE…
93
Blyth 2018). Although not explicitly stated why, Jessop (2017: 135) has
mooted 1975 as the provenance of financialisation, possibly because it was
in the budget of that year that a Labour government eschewed full employment in favour of the macroeconomic objective to defeat inflation through
deflationary economic policy (Silverwood 2015).
Another event proposed as the progenitor of financialisation is
CCC. Copley (2017) found that financialisation of the British economic
growth model was one of the impetuses behind the implementation of
CCC. Belief had arisen within the Treasury that Keynesian economic management was failing to deliver rising prosperity, which had reached its limits under the repetitive strain of stop-go economic crises. A new regime for
capital accumulation was therefore deemed required and policymakers
chose finance-capital as its engine. Once free from the shackles of post-war
quantitative monetary control British financial services used its new-found
freedom to engage in an orgy of lending. Reid (2003: 43–67) provides an
imperious account of this in her book on the ensuring secondary banking
crisis of 1973–1975. By the time the CCC was brought to an end in
December 1973, total Sterling advances to UK residents had risen by
148% and lending by clearing banks had climbed by 112%. Amongst the
steepest rise in lending was from secondary banks ascending from
£395 million to £3.4 billion in just two years. It is the flow of this lending
that is instructive. The 24 months prior to November 1973 saw loans to
the property and financial sector quadruple to £6.4 billion; a stock of capital more than that delivered to manufacturing and coming largely from
the secondary banking system that lay outside the Bank of England’s regulatory system. This was problematic as many of the features of an economic boom we now consider common were in evidence. The banking
system discarded its critical faculties and abandoned prudence in the allocation of credit, the belief became entrenched that ‘this time was different’
and the economic boom would last forever, and the value of property rose.
Indeed, the average price of a new house had soared by a staggering 52%
in the years from June 1972 to 1973, but as economic boom turned into
recession, house prices crashed and so did the secondary banking system
leaving the Bank of England no option but to organise a financial bailout.
It is argued here that the CCC was not the origin of financialisation in
the post-war period. The roots of financialisation of the British economy burrow deep into the late seventeenth century and, in any case, can
be traced in the post-war period to the deregulation of financial markets
begun by the Conservative government of Harold Macmillan in 1958
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J. SILVERWOOD
(Reid 2003: 23–24). The rapidity with which the banking system under
CCC funnelled capital into speculative property investment, rather than
building the capacity of industrial production, illustrates the precious little
long-term impact the Keynesian revolution in economic management had
on the role of finance in the British economy. The historical orientation of
the British economy has nearly always pointed towards services with distribution, transport, communication and financial services being the dominant suppliers of gross domestic product (GDP) and employment growth
throughout the majority of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Lee
1986: 10–12). At the epicentre of this service economy was the City of
London, which, despite the rise in provincial banks, had subjugated
English financial markets as early as 1700 (Lee 1986: 60), not because of
entrepreneurial dynamism in free markets, but because of consistent state
support since the English financial revolution of 1694 (Lee 2017;
Silverwood and Woodward 2018).
The confluence of finance and state agency was further entrenched
within British capitalism by the imperialism of the British Empire. This
positioned the City of London as the premier global financial centre of the
world economy, rendering to it enormous structural power and informal
influence and having a momentous bearing upon the development of the
world economy (Strange 1994). The post-war biography of the City of
London by Knayston (2001) makes it clear that the City shed none of its
global pretensions after the Second World War. Evidently having learnt
nothing from the interwar period, the City was obsessed with returning to
its preeminent position within overseas finance. The repetitive stop-go
crises of the post-war period therefore the logical outcome when economic activity was constrained by the City’s overseas accumulation strategy, which required Britain to maintain the illusion that Sterling was a
global currency. The post-war era therefore saw the City eschew the humdrum activity of funnelling capital to industry. Eventually, the City found
an outlet for its frustrations when it provided a tax haven for the emerging
Eurodollar market (Burn 1999).
The point of this historical sojourn is to identify that financialisation is
not something particularly new for the British economy, it having been its
default position for the entirety of the modern period since the seventeenth century. If CCC is not the origin of financialisation it is certainly
the point in the contemporary period in which it accelerated. The CCC
cut financial services loose from some of the shackles placed on it by the
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post-war control of credit creation and cut a key sinew of the Keynesian
consensus on economic management. The orgiastic dispensation with
which British banks greeted this freedom in a wave of lending that led to
secondary banking crisis sadly did not herald a salutary lesson for policymakers. Successive Conservative and Labour governments accelerated
financialisation further via all-encompassing deregulation and liberalisation of financial markets, deeply altering the shape of the British economy
by increasing the share of financial services in economic activity and laying
the foundations for a global financial crisis in the opening decade of the
twenty-first century (Kirkland 2015).
The CCC should therefore be considered as a second English financial
revolution in our economic history—a point at which state agency formed
a ‘developmental market’ (Lee 2018) that saw state power directed
towards and management of the British economy subordinated to the
promotion of the City of London as a global financial centre. Perpetuation
of this accumulation strategy by successive British governments since CCC
has led to the British economy suffering from a finance curse (Christensen
et al. 2016). Sharing a conceptual similarity with the resource curse suffered by some developing economies, the finance curse is said to occur
when the financial sector of an economy plays too large a role in the generation of economic activity, leading to the misallocation of resources and
dubious distribution of economic rewards. A recent econometric study of
the finance curse calculated that it cost the British economy between 1995
and 2015 approximately £4.5 billion, close to 2.5 years of annual GDP. Of
that sum, £2.7 billion was found to have arisen from the misallocation of
resources (Baker et al. 2018).
The finance curse has delivered deleterious consequences for the British
economy by quickening deindustrialisation, exacerbating spatial imbalances in economic growth, sustaining high levels of inequality of income
and wealth (Berry and Hay 2016), and driving the emergence of a new
precariat class, as work in the gig economy has taken on a new insecure
and less predictable form (Hunt and McDaniel 2017). Public resentment
at this state of economic affairs has only grown in the decade since the
global financial crisis and contributed to the vote to leave the EU in the
referendum on 23 June 2016. Rising anger at the inequities of the British
economic growth model by those communities and individuals who feel
left behind (Goodwin and Heath 2016) and let down (Watson 2018)
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J. SILVERWOOD
created a malleable political constituency that populist politicians could
attract to the Brexit cause by what turned out to be increasingly a nationalistic, xenophobic and racist rhetoric (Standing 2014).
The Legacy of Competition and Credit Control:
The Depoliticisation of Economic Management
from Competition and Credit Control
to Inflation Targeting
A critical component of the Keynesian consensus on economic management in the post-war period was that economic activity should be sheltered from oscillations in the economic cycle by politicised institutions
whose first duty was to deliver economic stability. Traditional indirect
tools of monetary control remained after the Second World War within
the arsenal of macroeconomic policymakers in the Bank Rate and open-­
market operations, but they were increasingly supplemented by a panoply
of policy instruments, such as liquidity ratios and hire purchase controls
(used with increasing frequency as the 1950s wore on), formal requests
and ceilings on bank lending, and special deposits (Needham 2014:
14–18) that were formulated and implemented from within the Treasury.
This politicisation of British economic management was short-lived
and began to unravel after the introduction of CCC, with a number of
scholars now classifying its implementation as part of an explicit statecraft
strategy of depoliticisation (Burnham 2011; Copley 2017).
‘Depoliticisation’ is defined here in its simplest form as ‘involv[ing] placing the character of decision-making at one remove from the central state’
(Wood 2017). Copley (2017: 693) has identified the Treasury’s acceptance of CCC as resting on its role in serving to ‘depoliticise the state’s
role in managing crisis’ and devolve ‘the enforcement of financial discipline to the price mechanism’. The CCC dismantled the politicised monetary system of ‘administrative guidance’, through which the British state
had exerted a direct influence on credit creation in the post-war period
(Lee 2018: 56) and replaced it with the indirect influence on credit creation offered by the MLR and open-market operations (OMOs). CCC
thus allowed the Treasury the opportunity to abrogate some of its key
responsibilities for economic management built up after the Second World
War to liberalise the British economy. Henceforth, the market would take
a much greater role in the determination of credit creation, with the
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97
Treasury relying on price signals, entrepreneurial constraints and increasingly special deposits to have a suitably expansionary or chastening effect
on economic activity.
CCC was only the beginning of depoliticisation of economic management with successive British governments experimenting with various systems of macroeconomic governance. Whilst these systems may have
regularly changed since the end of CCC they have neverthelessrevolved
around an important continuity inaugurated by the CCC that the best
route to economic stability was through a depoliticised rules-based order
for economic management that constrained ministerial discretion. This
underpinning notion has remained the same as British governments and
policymakers have experimented with monetarism, shadowing the
Deutschmark and membership of the Exchange-Rate Mechanism before
resting on the current inflation target system.
In each of these systems of monetary governance policy was deemed to
reside within the domain of technocracy it being the job of officials in the
Treasury or Bank of England to exert only an indirect influence on credit
creation via the MLR and OMOs in such a way that previously announced
targets for monetary policy could be achieved and price stability secured.
Fiscal policy underwent a similar move towards rules-based governance.
The underlying motif was that it plays a supportive role to monetary policy either by directly reducing monetary growth or because budgetary
orthodoxy maintained the confidence of global financial markets keeping
interest rates low. The depoliticisation of economic management contributed to the liberalisation of the British economy and was the means by
which politicians could displace responsibility for macroeconomic strategy
from the British state onto a logic of ‘no alternative’.
This trend towards depoliticised economic management (inaugurated
by the CCC) survived the global financial crisis helping to fuel the public’s
dissatisfaction with political elites; a key driver in the vote for Brexit The
fiscal rules of the Conservative-Liberal Coalition government ushered in
an age of austerity (continued by later Conservative governments) that
was premised on the logic that there was ‘no alternative’ but to satisfy and
secure economic credibility with international bondholders to avoid the
national shame of economic default. The price was to take a swinging axe
to public spending and decapitate investment into public services, causing
not only public satisfaction in their quality to fall, but also an environment
where unscrupulous populist politicians can link the problems public services have in maintaining supply in the face of rising demand pressures to
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anti-immigrant rhetoric. Meanwhile, the implementation of the monetary
policy of quantitative easing (QE) itself is really just another form of OMO
(Brittan 2013), which has helped support economic growth only through
rising asset prices that benefit the rentier class and exacerbate entrenched
wealth inequality (Partington 2019). These technocratic responses to the
greatest financial crisis in our living memory, in lieu of widespread economic and social reform, and widely suspected as being aimed at the resurrection of the pre-crisis socio-economic status quo, have only antagonised
the anger of the ‘let-down’ and ‘left-behind’, further powering the sense
of alienation felt by the sections of the British populace that voted to
leave the EU.
The Heath Government and Inflation:
A Comparative Reappraisal of Monetary Performance
with the Thatcher Government
Already noted was the contentiousness and divisiveness within the
Conservative Party of the Heath Government’s macroeconomic policy
reversals away from the Selsdon Declaration towards Keynesian fiscal policy and statutory price and incomes. The post-war consensus on Keynesian
economic management was never accepted entirely within the Conservative
Party, with many of its members still clinging to beliefs pertaining to free
markets and the moral principle that extension of the state into society and
economy threatened individual freedom (Wade 2013). These principles
were rejuvenated by the nascent emergence of monetarism that prioritised
‘sound money’ (price stability) as the only macroeconomic objective that
should be pursued by the government.
The alleged rejection of these dogmas in the macroeconomic policy
U-turns of 1972 was an abhorrence to those Conservative members of
parliament who considered themselves to be monetarists (Campbell 1993:
480–481, 524; Glynn and Booth 1996: 186, 313–314; Wade 2013: 105).
For those Conservative politicians with monetarist sentiments macroeconomic policy U-turns by the Heath Government, leading to rising public
expenditure and government borrowing, were associated with the explosion of monetary growth and prices in the early 1970s.4 The Heath
4
The assertion that public expenditure and government borrowing drives monetary
growth was a peculiarity to what would become the British rational expectations’ school of
monetarism (Jackson 2012). Reducing public expenditure as the means to balance the bud-
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Government was therefore cast as commiting a major crime against competent economic management in its unwillingness to take the difficult
decisions necessary to curtail monetary growth and conquer inflation
(Seldon 1996: 6–9). For example, one historian of post-war Conservative
economic thought has argued that monetary excess between 1971 and
1973 had ‘clear inflationary consequences’ and the Heath Government
should have done ‘what was required’, meaning to raise interest-rates, ‘in
order to slow the growth of credit and thereby bring both increase in the
money supply and the rate of inflation back under control’ (Wade
2013: 53–54).
However, such interpretations are necessarily structured, whether consciously or not, with the supposed determination and record of the
Thatcher Government in conquering Britain’s inflationary problem. In
sharp contrast to the existing monetary narrative detailed in the previous
paragraph, comparative analysis of the monetary record under the Heath
Government shows that performance in this area is comparable with that
of the Thatcher Government, where many more continuities than might
be expected exist.
Causes of monetary growth between 1970 and 1974 were myriad
ranging from the residual impact of the 1967 devaluation crisis to expansionary domestic policy in the United States and the militancy of trade
unions (Woodward 1991: 197–198). Another culprit in significant growth
of the money supply during the Heath Government was most certainly the
eruption of lending by the British banking system within the newly liberated financial markets created by the monetary reform of the CCC. The
broad money supply grew before December 1973 by an astonishing 72%
(Needham 2014: 3), and whilst growth of narrower £M3 measure of
money was slower, £M3 also rose by 28% per annum in both 1972 and
1973 (Tomlinson 1990: 273). Lamentable control of the money supply
under Heath was echoed in the performance of £M3 under the Thatcher
Government after 1979, which grew well above the target rates for monetary growth, established in the medium-term financial strategy (Middleton
2000: 115).
Failure to exert control over the money supply was the main reason
why experimenting with CCC was discarded by the Bank of England and
Treasury eventually being replaced late in 1973 with the special deposits
get and lower national debt would become the cornerstone of the Thatcher Government’s
medium-term financial strategy to defeat inflation and secure price stability.
100
J. SILVERWOOD
supplementary scheme (otherwise known as the corset). The Bank of
England was left bruised by the experiment with CCC left feeling that
Heath had personally torpedoed its potential success in curtailing monetary growth in his reluctance to raise the MLR to the levels necessary to
contract the money supply (Needham 2014: 50, 53, 55–58, 65, 70).
Barber, fully conversant that curtailment of monetary growth under CCC
would require a sharp rise in interest rates, often found himself under pressure from Heath to avoid that very action (Needham 2014: 55, 62, 70).
As a consequence, the MLR never reached the eye-watering levels of
the first Thatcher Government after its election in 1979. The new-found
flexibility of the MLR saw an increase between October and December
1972 from 7.25% to 9%, without countervailing action ordered by Heath
to halt the rise (Needham 2014: 60). Following relaxation of MLR from
that figure to 7.5% in June 1973, MLR then raised sharply to 13% in
November 1973 (Bank of England 2019b).5 Heath’s averseness to a
higher MLR to combat growth in the money supply was twofold. The first
was that higher interest rates were contradictory to the expansionary fiscal
strategy of stimulating industrial investment and the Heath Government
was subjected to a ‘considerable and largely successful lobbying attempt
by industry to persuade the government not to put up interest rates’
(Wade 2013: 53). The second was that higher interest rates directly
afflicted a core political constituency of the Conservative Party: homeowners, by raising the costs of mortgages (Campbell 1993: 529).
It is certainly correct to say that Heath was unwilling to countenance
higher interest rates, but economic management in this regard does not
differ that much from Thatcher. The ‘Iron Lady’ persona cultivated by
Thatcher could not have provoked a more distinctive legacy when it came
to national myths pertaining to monetary performance. Thatcher was
thought to have been unwilling to take prisoners from established interests who might seek to divert her from her mission of defeating inflation
in the British economy through strangulation of the money supply. The
problem is that such a description is too simplistic with Thatcher as equally
worried as Heath about the impact of interest rates on British businesses
and homeowners. After winning the 1979 General Election on 3 May
1979, the MLR was raised in successive steps from an inherited level of
5
All subsequent figures for the minimum lending rate are taken from the same Bank of
England data set.
5
101
COMPETITION AND CREDIT CONTROL, MONETARY PERFORMANCE…
12% to 17% by 15 November 1979, helping to catapult the British economy into its deepest economic recession since the 1930s.
After this initial increase in the MLR it turned out that the ‘lady was for
turning’ (Needham 2014: 1) after all, and with monetary growth running
above target levels, the Thatcher Government embarked upon a reversal
of monetary policy (Needham 2014: chapter five). The MLR fell in three
stages to 16% on 3 July 1980, 14% on 25 November 1980 and 12% on 11
March 1981 to ease the liquidity squeeze faced by British firms for credit
and to help price their exports more competitively in world trade. A further stake driven through the heart of Thatcher’s perceived reputation for
intransigence towards special interests was her willingness to carouse
homeowners into voting Conservative through the provision of government subsidies (Lee 2010: 625).
Comparative similarities exist in other areas of monetary policymaking
beyond monetary growth and the Bank Rate. Table 5.1 provides the
respective inflation performance of both Conservative prime ministers. It
shows that inflation performance in the periods of Heath and Thatcher’s
respective premierships was not as divergent as one might have expected if
the prevailing narrative about economic mismanagement of the Heath
Government is accepted wholesale. For example, average annual inflation
during the Heath Government was 9.3%, as opposed to the 8.116%
per annum achieved by Thatcher. Furthermore, it was only in 1974, a year
in which the Heath Government served only until 4 March, that the inflation rate reached double figures. In contrast, inflation reached double figures in three years (1979–1981) of the Thatcher Government—a period
in which performance against the aforementioned monetary targets was
terrible, and attempts to deflate the British economy through macroeconomic policy ensured it entered a recession.
Table 5.1 Inflation performance of the Heath and Thatcher Governments
Government
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
Heath
Thatcher
5.9%
8.6%
6.4%
8.4%
17.2%
1983
Thatcher (cont.) 4.6%
1984
5.0%
1985
6.1%
1986
3.4%
1987
4.2%
1979
1980
1981
1982
13.4%
1988
4.9%
18.0%
1989
7.8%
11.9%
1990
9.5%
8.6%
Source: Twigger (1999: 16–17). All inflation rates in this chapter are taken from
this source
102
J. SILVERWOOD
Differences do exist in other areas of monetary policy, where monetary
performance by the Thatcher Government can be said to have outperformed the Heath Government is in future expectations about inflation.
The ignition in monetary growth that took place upon experimentation
with CCC, alongside the utilisation of income policies that often only
have a transitory beneficial impact upon the fight again inflation, meant
that the Heath Government left an inflation time bomb in the British
economy that detonated after the Labour government of Harold Wilson
entered office, with inflation rising exponentially to 17.2% in 1974 and
24.2% in 1975. Table 5.1 similarly shows inflation rising rapidly towards
the end of the final Thatcher administration, reaching 9.5% in 1990.
However, there was never the feeling that inflation had once again become
‘hardwired’ (Needham 2014: 19) into the economic system as it had during the Heath Government. Instead, inflation towards the end of
Thatcher’s reign as Prime Minister was transitory and was the result of
economic mismanagement by the Thatcher Government after the 1987
General Election that exacerbated, rather than abated, an economic boom.
Here more similarities are evident with economic management by the
Heath and Thatcher Governments both showing the startlingly analogous
characteristics of an ill-timed expansionary macroeconomic strategy
bequeathing to their successors a legacy of escalating inflation and recessionary crisis in the British economy.
The readiness of the Heath Government to rely on statutory incomes
policies to quell inflation6 and the willingness of the Thatcher Government
to use mass unemployment as a counter-inflationary tool were also significant differences in monetary policy between the two governments. Herein
lies the main monetary difference between the two governments—the
Conservative government under Thatcher elevated the defeat of inflation
and achievement of price stability to the primary goal of British macroeconomic policy in a way that the Heath Government would never countenance. Indeed, the descent into statutory incomes policy by the Heath
Government was less an inflationary policy and more a way to ensure that
the proceeds from the ‘dash for growth’ fiscal strategy was channelled into
6
The Counter Inflation (Temporary Provisions) Bill was given successive readings in
Parliament throughout November 1972 before receiving Royal Assent and passing into law
on 30 November. The outcome of the Counter Inflation Act has been described as ‘an
unprecedented peacetime expansion of government intervention into the British economy’s
basic price mechanism’ (Wade 2013: 113).
5
COMPETITION AND CREDIT CONTROL, MONETARY PERFORMANCE…
103
industrial investment and the creation of jobs rather than pay increases.
The willingness to use unemployment to defeat inflation was indicative of
the wider impulses within British capitalism towards financialisation and
depoliticisation, which had been set in motion by CCC. The Thatcher
Government’s aim to conquer inflation and secure price stability was of
direct benefit to the rentier and capitalist classes. The prioritisation of price
stability above all other macroeconomic objectives is of itself part of a
strategy to financialise the British economy and the fact that the Thatcher
Government was willing to sacrifice a significant human cost to achieve
this through unemployment, and in so doing create vast inequities between
peoples and regions of Great Britain, would have been an abomination to
Heath and his government.
A Failure on its Own Terms: Macroeconomic
Management by the Heath Government
Analysis of economic management by the Heath Government has been
overwhelmingly critical with a positive appraisal of its performance in this
area having dwindled to a loyal band of supporters of the erstwhile Prime
Minister including Heath himself (Seldon 1996: 2–6). More often, the
Heath Government is castigated for its stewardship of the economy on its
own terms been described as having ‘failed in several of its major objectives’ and leaving in its wake a ‘charge of incompetence’; an indictment
albeit mitigated by the acceptance that the ‘misfortune of the Heath
Government was to have presided over the British economy at a time of
major international change’ (Gamble 1988: 78–79). Specific ire is often
directed at the ‘dash for growth’ instigated at the 1972 Budget. The stimulus to aggregate demand injected over too short a period, causing currency depreciation and skills shortages in the economy (Woodward 1991:
201–202). Furthermore, along with vast credit creation after financial liberalisation by CCC, it helped deliver a boon to property speculation,
which caused a financial crisis that necessitated a rescue of the secondary
banking system to the tune of £100 million (Reid 2003).
In order to assess whether economic management under the Heath
Government failed on its own terms, it is necessary to establish its macroeconomic objectives. The Conservative Party fought the 1970 general
election on a manifesto that stated ‘in implementing all our policies, the
need to curb inflation will come first … for only then can our broader
104
J. SILVERWOOD
strategy succeed’. This came to appear immoderate once Heath and his
ministers left the public office. The 1970 election manifesto was similarly
stringent about the need to control public expenditure, stating that cuts
to taxation would only be possible because of a reduction in ‘unnecessary
government spending’.
The opening Queen’s speech of the Heath Government on 2 July 1970
therefore identified its ‘first concern’, which was to ‘strengthen the economy and curb inflation’, with only the ‘greatest importance’ attached ‘to
promoting full employment and an effective regional policy’ (HC Deb,
Vol. 311, Col. 9–13, 2 July 1970). A reordering of these macroeconomic
objectives was already evident by the time of the Queen’s speech in the
House of Lords on the 2 November 1971. It was now the ‘first care’ of
the Heath Government ‘to increase employment by strengthening the
economy and promoting the sound growth of output’; the curbing of
inflation relegated to an ‘aim’ alongside ‘increased efficiency’ and a ‘strong
balance of payments’ (HC Deb, Vol. 325, Col. 1–5, 2 November 1971).
It is 1972, however, that is often recognised as being a turning point in
the macroeconomic strategy pursued by the Heath Government. The year
1972 was a year when the various pledges signalled in opposition fell by
the wayside, having failed to withstand pressure from a myriad of economic events and an embarrassment of macroeconomic policy U-turns.
By the time of the Queen’s speech on 31 October 1972, it was now the
Heath Government’s ‘overriding concern’ to achieve a ‘high and sustained
rate of economic growth’ and ‘establish effective means of enabling a
faster growth of national output and real incomes’ consistent with ‘a
reduction in the rate of inflation’ (HD Debs, Vol. 845, Col. 1–5, 31
October 1972). In the Queen’s speech of 30 October 1973, even this
aspiration had been downgraded; the Heath Government’s ‘primary concern’ was now ‘to sustain the expansion of the economy while achieving
the necessary improvement in the balance of payments’, with the pledge
to merely ‘continue their efforts to counter inflation’ (HC Deb, Vol. 863,
Col. 1–5, 30 October 1973). With the exception of inflation, which was
the focus of the previous section, the chapter now evaluates the performance of the Heath Government against the other macroeconomic objectives that it set for itself in terms of economic growth, employment and a
strong Balance of Payments.
The British economy had been performing relatively well when the
Heath Government entered office. It had even begun to be hoped that the
1967 devaluation crisis had gone some way towards resolving the
5
COMPETITION AND CREDIT CONTROL, MONETARY PERFORMANCE…
105
repetitive ‘stop-go’ crises that had blighted post-war British capitalism,
where economic growth conjoined with decreasing inflation and a surplus
in the Balance of Payments prior to the 1970 general election. This fortuitous economic inheritance was not to endure. Unemployment and inflation began to rise in tandem, with unemployment continuing its inexorable
progress towards the politically sensitive one million mark that had begun
in the mid-1960s.
The first sign of change in the macroeconomic strategy came in the
form of fiscal policy, which is an arena of economic policymaking where
tension had slowly ratcheted since the first days that Heath entered
Downing Street. The 1971 Budget presented by the Chancellor of the
Exchequer (1970–1974), Barber, was a relatively dull affair fixating on tax
reform; the centrepiece of which was the replacement of purchase and
selective employment tax with value-added tax. However, the continued
steady upswing of unemployment during the latter half of the 1960s continued in the first year of the Heath Government and was the spectre
haunting all macroeconomic policy deliberations. The increase in unemployment from 964,000 in 1970 to 1.058 million in 1971 meant that
unemployment had broached the politically sensitive level of one million
(Bank of England 2019c).
The Heath Government responded by adopting an expansionary fiscal
strategy at the 1972 Budget. A target rate for economic growth was set at
5% per annum, with a reduction in unemployment aimed at half a million.
When considered against this duopoly of macroeconomic objectives,
Table 5.2 gives the appearance that the ‘dash for growth’ inaugurated at
the 1972 Budget was successful. The British economy underwent a period
of economic expansion, during which economic growth surpassed the
stated objective of 5% set at the 1972 Budget. However, economic growth
did not secure the reduction in unemployment the Heath Government
Table 5.2 Economic growth and unemployment during the Heath Government
Years
Economic growth (yearly)
Unemployment (yearly) (% of
working population)
1970
1971
1972
1973
2.7%
3.5%
4.3%
6.5%
3.75%
4.14%
4.34%
3.65%
Unemployment
(yearly) (volume)
9,640,000
1.058 m
1.116 m
9,460,000
Sources: Bank of England (2019c); HM Treasury (2010: 59); Keep (2019: 5); ONS (2019a)
106
J. SILVERWOOD
had aimed for. Indeed, Table 5.2 demonstrates how performance against
this supplementary macroeconomic objective was poor. At best, expansionary fiscal policy can be said to have halted the worrying upward trend
of unemployment beyond the politically unacceptable post-war level of
one million persons.
What Table 5.2 does not show clearly is how illusory the macroeconomic gains under the Heath Government really were, with the ‘dash for
growth’ generating an economic boom that was simply unsustainable.
Structural flaws within British capitalism meant that economic growth was
not delivered through increased industrial investment as intended but via
the propagation of a vast housing boom. When this asset price bubble
burst, the ‘Barber Boom’ (the name given to economic expansion in this
period) descended into a maelstrom of financial crisis in the secondary
banking system and economic recession from 1974 to 1975.
Table 5.3 vividly expresses the various other macroeconomic costs
attached to the Barber Boom. Public sector net borrowing rose to a level
hitherto unexperienced in the post-war period, both in terms of volume
and as a percentage of GDP. Farce turned to tragedy when the Keynesian
growth strategy adopted by the Heath Government in its 1972 budget
coincided with uncoordinated fiscal expansion by other countries across
the global economy. The result was an upward surge in world commodity
prices that raised the cost of imports. Higher domestic prices led to a fresh
outbreak of industrial unrest, which eventually led to the instigation of a
three-day working week. As if the maelstrom of global economic events
had not already been enough to contend with, the first Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) shock of the decade in 1973 saw
oil prices quadruple.
Table 5.3 Public expenditure and public sector net borrowing during the Heath
Government
Years
1970/1971
1971/1972
1972/1973
1973/1974
Public
expenditure
(£billion)
Public expenditure
(% of GDP)
£17.4
£19.8
£22.4
£26.4
32.7%
33.4%
33.2%
35.0%
Sources: HM Treasury (2010: 59); Keep (2019: 5)
Public sector net
borrowing (£billion)
−0.3
0.6
1.9
3.4
Public sector net
borrowing (% of
GDP)
−0.6%
1.0%
2.6%
4.1%
5
COMPETITION AND CREDIT CONTROL, MONETARY PERFORMANCE…
107
Table 5.4 Imports and exports during the Heath Government
Years
Imports
(annual
growth rate
%)
Exports
(annual
growth rate
%)
Goods
imports
(annual
growth rate
%)
Goods
exports
(annual
growth rate
%)
1970
1971
1972
1973
4.9%
5.4%
9.9%
11.1%
5.3%
7.2%
1.3%
12.6%
5.7%
4.7%
11.3%
13.7%
4.2%
6.1%
−0.2%
13.3%
Services
Services
imports
exports
(annual
(annual
growth rate growth rate
%)
%)
2.1%
7.6%
5.6%
3.2%
8.4%
9.8%
5.0%
10.7%
Sources: ONS (2019b, 2019c, 2019d, 2019e, 2019f, 2019g)
Table 5.5 Balance of Payments during the Heath Government
Years
Current account
(% of GDP)
Trade balance in goods
and services (% of GDP)
1970
1971
1972
1973
1.3%
1.6%
0%
−1.5%
0.6%
1.1%
−0.2%
−2.2%
Trade balance in Trade balance in
goods (£million)
services
(£million)
−94
120
−829
−2676
443
602
703
883
Sources: ONS (2019a, 2019h, 2019i, 2019f)
The final nail in the coffin was the implosion of imports into the British
economy caused by the ‘dash for growth’ as shown in Table 5.4, which
proved fatal to the objective of securing a strong Balance of Payments. By
the end of 1973, imports had grown by more than half in total. The
majority of that growth came from the import of goods, in part led by
building and associated trades, as the speculative boom in property in the
British economy channelled economic resources into the construction
industry.
Table 5.5 shows how surplus in the trade balance of goods and services was squandered with a significant deficit emerging. The value of
the surplus in the trade of services almost doubled, but it failed to compensate for the dramatic deterioration of the trade balance for goods.
This corroborates the story shown in Table 5.4 of how the positive
export performance of services was not enough to counteract the
108
J. SILVERWOOD
deterioration in the performance of goods. This downturn in trade performance had a significant impact on the current account in Table 5.5,
which developed an inchoate deficit that has continued into the contemporary period.
Blaming the Heath Government solely for this nadir in economic management would be unfair. Behind the scenes, in Whitehall, the Heath
Government had been placed under significant pressure to implement
expansionary fiscal policy. The Treasury reported to the Heath Government
that it considered high levels of unemployment and space capacity in the
British economy ‘to constitute a large-scale waste of resources’ (Wade
2013: 111), and thus that the Heath Government should seek to moderate this. The financial press was also supportive of the measures taken to
boost aggregate demand and employment.
Nevertheless, the U-turn to Keynesian fiscal strategy was intimately
linked to Heath, who was a key driver of its adoption within Whitehall,
such that it is difficult not to contemplate what might have been were it
not for the sad passing of Iain Macleod only weeks into the Heath
Government. Macleod had served as Shadow Chancellor, and all too
briefly Chancellor, until his death. Not only was Macleod’s personality
described as ‘powerful and independent minded’, he was also committed
to seeing a reduction in government expenditure (Seldon 1996: 4–5).
He was also generally regarded as being the intellectual equal of Heath.
This was in stark contrast to Barber, Macleod’s successor as Chancellor
of the Exchequer, who was far more genteel and conciliatory a character.
The loss of Macleod, who would have operated from within the Treasury
as a countervailing force to the Prime Minister, gave Heath much more
latitude to interfere with economic management. This made departures
from the vision of economic management sketched out in opposition
more likely once the Conservative Party entered government. The switch
to expansionary fiscal policy that began in the summer of 1971 was at
the instigation of Heath, whereas Barber was sceptical as to the scope
and efficacy of reflation planned through fiscal policy, but he ultimately
acquiesced in the implementation of expansionary fiscal policy after the
registration of only muted remonstrations (Ziegler 2010: 333, 355, 357).
5
COMPETITION AND CREDIT CONTROL, MONETARY PERFORMANCE…
109
Conclusion
It was never the intention of this chapter to salvage the reputation of the
Heath Government for competent economic management, nor has it
done so. The chapter has catalogued how the Heath Government performed against the evolving array of macroeconomic objectives it set for
itself during its period and finds its performance was often quite poor.
The best-known example being the ‘dash for growth’ at the 1972 Budget,
which surpassed its objectives for economic growth, but only at the cost
of an unsustainable economic boom that descended into financial crisis,
economic recession and a deterioration of the Balance of Payments.
Undue fixation on these macroeconomic failures, however, risks missing the broader trends in British economic history that this reappraisal of
the Heath Government’s economic management has sought to identify through its challenge to some established perceptions in section one
and two. The national myth that the Conservative government of Thatcher
defeated or conquered inflation does not stack up to a comparative analysis of monetary performance with the Heath Government, which showed
several important continuities in economic management, but also an integral difference in the role played by unemployment in the reduction of
inflation.
The different approaches to unemployment taken by the Heath and
Thatcher Governments matter because they are indicative of the impulses
established in the British economy by the monetary experiment of
CCC. This monetary experiment was an important first step in the breakdown of the Keynesian consensus starting a process in which economic
management became depoliticised and the economy financialised. Built
on by future governments, financial deregulation and liberalisation eventually led to the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. The technocratic
managerial response to this crisis has failed to deliver substantial economic
or social change designed to re-constitute the pre-crisis socio-economic
status quo. This limp response to the greatest political and economic crises
of our age fed into dissatisfaction with political elites, which has fuelled
political support for populists, the vote for Brexit and the consequent
cheapening and coarsening of our democracy thereafter. In this regard, we
may consider the CCC as being both the beginning and the end of the
current epoch in British capitalism. Either way, the Heath Government
can no longer be bypassed as a relatively uninteresting or unimportant
moment in British economic history.
110
J. SILVERWOOD
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CHAPTER 6
Industrial Relations: Reappraising
the Industrial Relations Act 1971
Sam Warner
That the Industrial Relations Act failed is beyond question. As Stephen
Abbot, one of the architects of the Conservative Party’s approach to
reform in the 1960s, noted, at best, it was a ‘non-event’ and at worst
‘positively harmful’ (CPA CRD 3/7/12/1, Abbot to Douglas, 9
December 1973). The so-­called trade union ‘problem’ (Taylor 1982)
was left anything but resolved. In February 1974, the Conservative
Party lost a General Election on a ‘who governs Britain?’ ticket, as a
second miners’ strike in two years brought the government to its knees.
But this only tells us part of the story. Policy failure is seldom black and
white. It is instead characterised by shades of grey (McConnell 2010).
Periodic reappraisal on the basis of new evidence is, therefore, always
important.
The Act provided a framework of rules, rigidified by a range of punitive
measures and institutions, to regulate collective bargaining practices at
S. Warner (*)
University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
e-mail: samuel.warner@manchester.ac.uk
© The Author(s) 2021
A. S. Roe-Crines, T. Heppell (eds.), Policies and Politics Under
Prime Minister Edward Heath, Palgrave Studies in Political
Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53673-2_6
115
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arm’s length. However, this ‘depoliticised’ approach1 became swamped by
informal modes of rank-and-file resistance that risked undermining the
Rule of Law (Warner 2019a, 2019b). The industrial relations landscape
shifted as unofficial wildcat strikes in the private sector gave way to nationwide disputes, often within the ‘commanding heights’ of the British economy (Davies and Freedland 1993: 327). The Act was effectively out of
date no sooner had it been enacted, ultimately being repealed by an
incoming Labour government after just three years on the Statute Book.
However, in presenting policymaking as a form of learning, Kavanagh
(1991: 494) persuasively argues that ‘the most important influence [on
policymakers] is likely to be past policy and its consequences’. For this
reason, in reappraising the Act, its impact on the ‘successful’ trade union
legislation of subsequent years must be taken seriously.
Despite much comment on the Heath government, study of the dayto-­day operation of the Act and its implications has received scant academic attention. This is surprising, given the availability of a considerable
amount of archival material. In this chapter, I reflect on several strategic
failings regarding the Act’s implementation. I argue that associating the
Act too closely with the Heath government’s infamous U-turns risks
obscuring its lingering significance. In this respect, I discuss continuity in
Conservative Party industrial relations policy, as the crisis of Keynesianism
was superseded by neoliberal approaches in the management of British
capitalism. Drawing on themes from the existing literature, including failures in planning, flawed assumptions and strategy, I demonstrate how the
Act informed a wounded Conservative Party’s commitment to ‘step-bystep’ reform while solidifying a steely resolve among key reformers to
make their efforts ‘stick’ second time around. In short, much of the contemporary industrial relations landscape bears the hallmark of this shortlived Act.
1
By depoliticisation, I refer to the work of Burnham (2001) who describes a process of
‘placing at one remove the political character of decision making’ and that of Flinders and
Buller (2006) who identify rules-based, institutional and preference shaping forms of the
strategy.
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Reconfiguring the Relationship Between Trade
Unions and the Law
The need to reform British industrial relations permeated the minds of
Conservative politicians throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Driven by
unofficial, wildcat strike activity, the number of working days lost soared
as the state had few answers to rank-and-file militancy and spiralling wage
claims. Trade union leaders were said to have lost control of their membership, while employers repeatedly succumbed to rank-and-file demands
(Coates 1989: 45–46). Trade unions found themselves in a position of
relative strength, as their membership numbers swelled in response to
everyday economic challenges associated with rising prices, low wages and
the threat of unemployment (Wrigley 1996: 278). Leading figures within
the Labour and the Conservative Parties argued that British industry
needed discipline. Trade unions became the ‘favourite political scapegoat’
for economic decline (Gamble 1994: xvi; Taylor 1980: 455–456). A Royal
Commission led by Lord Donovan (HMSO 1968), the Conservative
Party (Conservative Political Centre 1968) and the Labour Party through
In Place of Strife (HMSO 1969) all concluded that it was necessary to
reconfigure the relationship between trade unions, employers and the
state. The Labour Party’s climb down in the face of trade union resistance
to reform did little to alter this mindset (Dorey 2019). As one Department
of Employment (DE) official noted, despite their differences, all three
approaches ‘were preoccupied with the need to reduce unofficial stoppages and irresponsible activities at a local level which were regarded as a
crippling burden on the economy and a serious nuisance to most of the
workers affected’ (TNA LAB 10/3928, Barnes to Edwards, 1 May 1973).
Before 1971, British industrial relations was characterised by voluntarism, known for the ‘absence of state regulation’ from collective bargaining practices (Hyman 2003: 41). Leading industrial relations lawyer, Otto
Kahn-­Freund (1954: 44), argued that there was ‘no country in the world
in which the law has played a less significant role in shaping [industrial]
relations than in Great Britain’. Yet this shrouds as much as it reveals. Lord
Wedderburn (1972: 270), for example, acknowledges:
a clearly enunciated legal framework for British industrial relations, a structure so intimately related to the social institutions engaged in bargaining
and conflict that “framework” suggests too remote a character for laws that
grew as threads inherent in the social web.
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Rather than presenting an absence of the law, it is more accurate to
characterise post-war British industrial relations as a system of negative
rights or immunities that removed legal obstacles to collective action
(Hyman 2003: 39). While the state did intervene, generally, this was only
in areas like health and safety, protection of vulnerable groups and social
security (Clegg 1979: 290–291; Wedderburn 1972: 271).
For the analysis that follows, this is important because immunities won
through years of struggle secured a voluntarist settlement, in which direct
state intervention was minimal. When it happened, controversy followed,
for voluntarism implied ‘not so much a distrust of legislation but of the
courts of law’ (Flanders 1974: 354). As Clegg (1979: 289) notes, ‘the
part played by the state in British industrial relations has always been considered as intervention from outside’. Judicial interest in the affairs of
trade unions, while not unheard of, was still an alien concept to those
schooled in a tradition suspicious of legal intervention (Flanders 1974:
363). Nonetheless, Conservative politicians like Geoffrey Howe (1994:
48) staunchly believed that ‘disorderly chaos’ was able to fester in the
vacuum created by the absence of a codified legal framework to regulate
collective bargaining practices.
Herein lies the first major problem. The Conservative Party’s reformers
were acutely aware of their reputation as ‘the Party of “the bosses”’, noting that ‘when [a Conservative] speaks of “trade union reform” the reaction is akin to that of a lawyer who hears a shop steward demanding
transformation of the Legal Establishment’ (CPA CRD 3/17/21,
PG/20/66/58, 17 November 1967: 5). If the ‘pluralism’ of voluntarism
reflects the ‘ignoble social myth’ that social power can be wielded equally
in collective bargaining (Fox 1973: 231), it becomes easy to see how
attempts to tame trade unions could be perceived as a ‘state licence’ on
their activities (Hyman 1975). The ‘neutral aims’ of the Act obscured the
Conservative Party’s commitment to curb trade union power by re-forging the system of industrial relations, not simply tinkering at the edges
(Weekes et al. 1975: 5). Given the divisive nature of the task, Keith Joseph
even argued that unless reform was even-handed, trade unionists would
become ‘political victims or martyrs in a class war’ (CPA CRD 3/17/20,
Matters for further consideration, 11 January 1966: 12).
The Act did contain collectivist elements, but its restrictive clauses
clearly embedded the view that trade unions were an impediment to the
free market (Marsh 1992: 12). It professed to further collective bargaining
but did so by strengthening individual rights and empowering trade union
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leaders (Weekes et al. 1975: 220–221). This reflects the view, held by
many, that individual trade unionists were being swept along by a militant
minority, and that trade union leaders needed to reassert control over their
membership. Heath believed that, privately, trade union leaders welcomed
this opportunity (TNA CAB 128/47, CM (70) 12th Conclusions, 3
September 1970: 12). This, however, betrayed a misunderstanding of
trade unions and, indeed, employers. Hyman (1989) points to the twoway nature of power within trade unions that beholds leaders to their
members, something Conservative politicians neglected at the time.
Through a system of registration, the Act sought to bring trade unions
within its framework by offering certain immunities to those who played
by its rules. However, by creating a National Industrial Relations Court
(NIRC) to adjudicate disputes—a decision with intuitive appeal—the Act
contained a fragility in that the Rule of Law became a key battleground
(Warner 2019b).
In summary, the Act that was contradictory, poorly drafted and driven
by fundamental misunderstandings. Moreover, identifying trade unions as
the ‘problem’ risked a head-on collision between trade unions and the
state. In what follows, I trace how these strategic errors were codified at
the heart of this novel system of law.
The Failure to Consult
The link between a lack of consultation and policy failure has been long
understood (King and Crewe 2013: 652). This was certainly the case with
the Industrial Relations Act. The Conservative Party entered office with
detailed plans (Taylor 1996: 164), but while the policy document Fair
Deal at Work (Conservative Political Centre 1968) presented a blueprint
for a legal framework, it also shrouded both tension and compromise
between hardliners and pragmatists within the party (Dorey 2006: 50–51).
Furthermore, despite its calls for ‘a fair, relevant and sensible framework of
law’ designed to ‘exert stabilising pressures and help raise general standards in the way men do business’ (Conservative Political Centre 1968:
10), the policy work remained ‘insulated from the main interest groups in
industrial relations’ (Moran 1977: 61). This insular approach continued
once in office. The Act became a ‘closed’ document, both in terms of its
complexity and the time made available for discussion between affected
parties (Silkin 1973: 437). As its legislation was marched towards the statute book, the government succumbed to a serious case of the ‘fastest law
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in the west’ syndrome (Dunleavy 1995), with haste favoured over rigour
in drafting.
When Robert Carr, the Secretary of State for Employment, first met
Vic Feather, President of the Trades Union Congress (TUC), full consultation was offered with the reassurance that ‘it was certainly not the government’s intention to rush forward legislation’ (TNA LAB 10/3559,
Meeting with Carr, Feather and Greene, 23 June 1970). Within the government’s inner circle, the picture was very different. Carr informed
Cabinet that a prolonged, TUC-led challenge was likely and that the
Confederation of British Industry (CBI), too, would not relish the prospect of reform (TNA CAB 129/151, CP (70) 30, 28 July 1970). The key
message, however, was that the major provisions of the proposed Bill
would be devised without consultation and only minor additions on points
of detail should be expected. For ministers, speed was of the essence if the
Bill was to receive its Second Reading by December 1970, as intended
(TNA CAB 129/151, CP (70) 30, 28 July 1970). Carr was convinced
that ‘whatever the political battle or the industrial action that might
ensue…when [the Bill] reached the Statute Book, it would promote an
improvement in industrial relations and would offer better prospects for
industrial peace’ (TNA CAB 128/47, CM (70) 10th conclusions, 30 July
1970: 15).
As Middlemas (1990: 317) correctly observes, the government’s haste
ensured that the Bill’s inconsistencies ‘were set quickly and immutably
into a document from which the Party itself ensured there would be no
derogation’. The failure to consult, therefore, has been described as a
‘serious political misjudgement’ (Moran 1977: 61), and one that the
archival record suggests was avoidable. On the same day that Feather
informed the General Council that Heath was ‘open to argument’ on the
legal framework (MRC MSS.292D/20/3, GC 14th meeting, 3 September
1970: 133), Carr reassured the Cabinet that the passage of the Bill ‘was
not being delayed by the need for formal consultation’ (TNA CAB
128/47, CM (70) 12th conclusions, 3 September 1970: 8–9). The problem resulting from this rushed approach, as Carr would later admit, was
that even he did not fully understand the sheer complexity of the Bill
(Whitehead 1986: 71; Charmley 2008: 199). Similarly, a junior official
recalled that ‘we went through the legal aspects and there were chunks I
didn’t understand’ (cited in Holmes 1997: 32). The government had
given the trade unions false hope of consultation and, in doing so, risked
a muddled Bill.
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Unsurprisingly, this antagonised an already disgruntled TUC leadership. Feather argued that ‘haste seems to me to be inconsistent with the
emphasis that the Prime Minister himself has laid on the need to make
important changes to the policy only after careful thought and the fullest
examination of all the considerations’ (TNA LAB 10/3559, Feather to
Carr, 5 October 1970). However, when the parties met, the principle of a
legal framework was held sacrosanct. Carr defended the government’s
position on the grounds that the proposals were entirely necessary, had
been in the public domain for some time, and that limiting consultation
would extend the time available for scrutiny in Parliament (TNA LAB
10/3559, Note of meeting with F&GPC, 13 October 1970). Similar discontent was expressed by the CBI on viewing the Consultative Document,
noting that ‘no concessions has been made’ following their recommendations (MRC MSS.200/C/3/EMP/3/17, L.337.70, December 1970),
leaving Leonard Neal, then responsible for presenting the CBI view, ‘personally disappointed that all the work of the CBI committees and the
representations to officials and Ministers had made so little impact on the
Minister’s intentions to date’ (MRC MSS.200/C/3/79, C.1.71—
Minutes of Council of CBI, 16 December 1970: 7).
None of this was news to officials and ministers. Before the Consultative
Document was even released, one DE official expressed concern that ‘the
chance that, as introduced, it will be a well-considered Bill are bound to
be seriously diminished’ (TNA LAB 43/600, Krusin to Burgh, 23
September 1970). Another official described ‘the timetable as uncomfortably tight, both in relation to the substance of work on the Bill and the
credibility of the consultation process’ (TNA LAB 43/600, Burgh to
Smith, 24 September 1970). In correspondence with William Whitelaw,
Lord President of the Council, Carr acknowledged that such a complex
Bill would normally go through as many as ten prints before publication
(TNA PREM 15/466, Carr to Whitelaw, 10 November 1970). In this
case, only one draft was made available for comments. Arguing the case for
delay, a senior DE official suggested that the legislation was ‘like a rock
rather than like a diamond’, while the passage through Parliament was
now expected to be damaging (TNA LAB 43/600, Burgh to Smith, 6
November 1970). Carr ignored what he described as ‘a very real risk that
some of the major concepts of the Bill will be found to be imperfectly
fashioned’ (TNA PREM 15/466, Carr to Whitelaw, 10 November 1970),
and the Bill hit the Statute Book by August 1971. As events unfolded, the
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consequences of favouring haste over precision haunted the government
for the remainder of the Parliament.
Immediate Trouble for the Act
The Act’s credibility was under pressure soon after it was enacted. The
cumulative effects of industrial unrest throughout the ‘glorious summer’
of 1972 (Darlington and Lyddon 2001) fractured the government’s
arm’s-­length approach to industrial relations. Tripartite talks with the
TUC and CBI secured no agreement as the country lurched towards the
statutory incomes policy the government had rejected. It is important not
to confuse the aims of the Act and counter-inflation policy, but neither can
be considered in isolation of the other. Ministers had hoped that the Act
would assist in holding down wage settlements, even if in the short-term
confrontation with the unions made matters worse (TNA PREM 15/314,
Note on inflation, November 1970: 5). The reality was that, despite the
government’s message of disengagement from collective bargaining, ministers micromanaged and feared the consequences of inflamed tensions
caused by the Act. When a major dispute with the miners began in January
1972, DE officials warned of a ‘trial by strength’ if the Act’s emergency
provisions were used (TNA PREM 15/986, Miners’ Pay Dispute
1971–72, n.d.). Behind the scenes, the government was heavily involved
in negotiations, with Carr meeting representatives of the National Union
of Mineworkers (NUM), National Association of Colliery Overmen and
Shotfirers and the National Coal Board (TNA PREM 15/984, various).
Writing to Heath towards the end of December 1971, John Davies,
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, lamented the failure of the disengagement strategy, recalling a conversation with a nationalised industry
chairman who ‘had never [had] to deal with a more determinedly interventionist government’ (TNA PREM 15/411, Davies to Heath, 29
December 1971).
The miners won a vastly improved pay offer, setting the scene for the
prolonged resistance to the Act that came to a head in two major disputes.
When the railwaymen began working to rule in defence of their wage
claim, the government applied for a cooling-off period under the Act’s
emergency provisions. It was granted and the NIRC was adhered to.
However, when a ballot was forced, the railwaymen backed a wage settlement that was considered unacceptable by ministers. In a parallel set of
disputes, waves of industrial action swept across the docks as individual
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trade unionists flouted the law. When the Transport and General Workers’
Union (T&GWU) was held vicariously liable for the actions of its shop
stewards, the risk of unlimited fines focused the minds of senior figures
within the TUC. While trade unions were now permitted to defend themselves before the court and fines were paid, the unofficial activities of shop
stewards continued. When the Court of Appeal overturned the NIRC’s
decisions, there was little option other than to commit five dockers to
prison for contempt of court. Only a game of legal wrangling secured their
release by the House of Lords. It was unsurprising that judges were perceived to be acting politically (Darlington and Lyddon 2001; Lindop
1998a, 1998b; Warner 2019a).
After these events, the government turned to a retrenched form of corporatism to devise a joint strategy for economic management, especially
controlling inflation. However, despite there being some evidence of a
willingness to get around the negotiating table, the government and TUC
were at a standstill over the Act, as neither side was willing to show its
hand. When discussions on amendment commenced, Macmillan was clear
that if changes to the Act were made, it must be ‘without weakening its
prime purpose’ (TNA PREM 15/1678, Macmillan to Heath, 9 August
1972). When a working group of officials was established, led by Denis
Barnes, this principle often governed the agenda. In its preliminary meeting, the group recorded that its task was ‘to make the Act work better—
not water it down’ (TNA LAB 10/3929, Holland to Barnes, 17 August
1972). Discussions ranged across all aspects of the Act, although a general
theme was that any concessions on controversial provisions like registration would have to be met with further restrictions on secondary action
and trade union immunities (TNA LAB 10/3929, various). Incidentally,
these would become two of the flagship concerns of Thatcher and her
acolytes. After the first round of discussions, Barnes confirmed that his
group’s efforts had ‘not identified any worthwhile changes which the
Government might contemplate as an early unilateral move to influence
public opinion and union moderates’ (TNA LAB 10/3929, Barnes to
Holland, 11 September 1972: 3).
As tripartite negotiations ratcheted up, Maurice Macmillan, Carr’s
replacement at the Department of Employment, demonstrated the government’s resolute commitment to the Act, stating it was non-negotiable
(TNA PREM 15/972, Macmillan to Heath, 20 October 1972). This
reflected his view that talks with the TUC were unlikely to lead to ‘an
agreement which will be acceptable to all three Parties and creditable
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either abroad or to the general public at home’ (TNA PREM 15/972,
Macmillan to Heath, 20 October 1972: 7). Similarly, Heath was only willing to discuss a negotiating package that included the Act if there was
movement on controlling prices and incomes (TNA PREM 15/972, Note
for the record, 27 October 1972). The reality was that the parties never
came close to an agreement on the economy, let alone the Act. When
Barnes’ working group published its report the following day, the impasse
was confirmed. The group concluded that the Act must be warranted with
given a reasonable trial period and not judged on ‘causes celebres’. In
addition, it had to be accepted that repeal or putting the Act on ice was an
‘impossible concept’, even if the government would show restraint by only
using the emergency procedures as a matter of last resort. A joint working
party to review the Act would only be possible if the principle of a legal
framework was accepted (TNA CAB 130/600, GEN 117 (72) 74, 31
October 1972).
The talks eventually broke down, with the parties deadlocked over how
to control prices and incomes. When the Cabinet met on 2 November, the
day the talks ended, it was agreed that the Act would not be abandoned,
with militants rendering it largely inoperable through the TUC’s non-­
cooperation policy. The conclusions state:
It would be unwise to sacrifice the support of the more moderate elements
in the unions by appearing ready to compromise on the principles of a statute which the Government had deliberately enacted in an attempt to create
a more equitable and orderly structure of industrial relations. (TNA CAB
128/50/49, CM (72) 48th Conclusions, 2 November 1972: 6)
What became an immediate 90-day freeze on wages, prices, rents and
dividends sparked a three-phase statutory approach to counter-inflation.
But this hardly speaks of a straightforward U-turn, given the staunch
defence of the Act. Moreover, in a meeting with Feather with Heath in the
days following the breakdown, Vic Feather claimed the freeze was secretly
welcomed by all but the militant ‘nuts’ on the TUC General Council
(TNA PREM 15/973, Meeting with Feather and Heath, 13
November 1972).
If the Act was designed to depoliticise the role of government in industrial relations, statutory intervention on wages and prices achieved the
opposite. The latter was a U-turn in that the government had committed
to avoiding a statutory incomes policy in its manifesto. Furthermore, it
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confirmed that the government’s intention to disengage from collective
bargaining was over. However, the government remained committed to
the principles behind industrial relations reform. The CBI acknowledged
this tension, distinguishing between a ‘managerial’ and ‘governmental’
approach. The former, represented by the Industrial Relations Act,
involved rational management and free collective bargaining supported by
civil law. The latter, represented by the counter-inflation proposals, put
the government centre stage in deciding wage and price levels, with the
ultimate sanction of criminal law in place (MRC MSS.200/C/3/
EMP/3/84, Review of the Industrial Relations Act, 22 March 1973: 1).
In terms of policy implications, given that an incomes policy weakens collective bargaining, amendment to strengthen the punitive aspects of the
Act became less important, while measures to increase cooperation
between both sides of industry and the government came to the fore.
Indeed, the CBI concluded that any suggestions on amending the Act
must now consider how the government’s incomes policy would be supported (MRC MSS.200/C/3/EMP/3/84, Review of the Industrial
Relations Act, 22 March 1973: 2).
Once a statutory incomes policy was in place, irrespective of the government’s ongoing commitment to industrial relations reform, it had
effectively undermined its own strategy. Senior officials noted that amendment of the Act must now reflect the new context and, crucially, the trade
unions’ response to the government’s statutory incomes policy (TNA
PREM 15/1678, W. Armstrong to R. T. Armstrong, 26 March 1973).
The Act had been subjugated to a supporting role, as a very different
framework to regulate collective bargaining developed. This was confirmed by the TUC General Council, who recorded: ‘The IR Act was not
so important now in regard to collective bargaining rights because the
Government’s incomes legislation restricted those rights and was achieving what the IR Act set out to do in this regard’ (MRC MSS.292D/20/6,
GC 15th meeting, 23 May 1973: 132). With this in mind, it is important
to look more closely at the Act’s final days and whether it is appropriate to
argue it was abandoned.
One of Heath’s U-turns?
For Seldon (1996: 7), the government’s actions after the summer of 1972
position the Act among Heath’s U-turns. More commonly, it is argued
that the Act was tacitly abandoned (Ball 1996: 329) but ‘just one step
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S. WARNER
short of a complete U-turn’ (Holmes 1997: 31). In agreement with this,
a variety of expressions used are broadly accurate, referring to the Act
being placed in ‘cold storage’ (Taylor 1993: 200) or ‘put on the back
burner’ (Whitehead 1986: 79) or even in ‘suspended animation’ (Thomson
and Engleman 1975: 126). Of course, the Act was not repealed and only
limited suggestions for amendment featured in the Conservative Party’s
February 1974 manifesto (Bale 2012: 163; Dorey 2006: 73–75; Dorfman
1979: 65; Taylor 2007: 164). The archival evidence adds nuance to the
U-turn narrative, revealing that supportive attitudes hardened in defence
of the Act, even if minor amendments might be conceded. For example,
in January 1973, Robert Keith, President of the Registrar of Trade Unions
and Employers’ Associations (RTUEA), was informed by senior members
of Barnes’ working group that amendment to the Act was ‘on the shelf
and likely to remain there pending a General Election, unless matters take
an unexpected turn requiring fresh legislation’ (TNA NF 1/5, Note of
meeting on 24 January, 25 January 1973). In an accompanying footnote,
it states that ‘pre-election amendment [was] obviously controversial, timeconsuming and tactically weak’ (TNA NF 1/5, Note of meeting on 24
January, 25 January 1973).
To get a sense of the practical effects of the Act after the summer of
1972, a fruitful avenue of investigation is the work of its institutions. In a
short chapter this cannot be an exhaustive exercise, but nevertheless,
important details of the day-to-day life of the Act can be revealed. The
RTUEA, for example, ran down its time by cutting corners to avoid disputes, a policy it styled ‘tactical procrastination’ (TNA LAB 10/3610,
RTUEA rules work: General policy, 15 February 1973). This was to try
and play for time, given that under the Act, just 11% of trade union membership was covered, down from 75% under the previous system (TNA
LAB 10/3928, Three briefs on registration, 26 April 1973). Support
from employers had also eroded. A CBI report concluded that ‘[t]he idea
of using registration for disciplining purposes had not proved effective’,
with an accompanying handwritten note proposing ‘it should be abandoned’ (MRC MSS.200/C/EMP/3/84, Registration—CBI view, n.d.).
The Commission on Industrial Relations (CIR) had effectively been
frozen out for some time as a result of non-cooperation. Trade unions
were boycotting the CIR’s decisions, even when it found in their favour.
By the end of 1972, senior officials concluded that referring disputes over
trade union recognition to the CIR was pointless while the TUC noncooperation policy was in place (TNA LAB 0/3688, Cox to Barnes, 31
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October 1972). The DE was in a difficult position. In correspondence,
senior figures acknowledged that ‘since the CIR is the Government’s
agency for reforming industrial relations it cannot very well allow the CIR
to rust away through a lack of references caused by the TUC boycott and
employers resistance’ (TNA LAB 10/3688, Secretary of State’s references
to the CIR, 13 November 1972). This situation was never truly resolved,
as references were always deemed controversial and seldom won ministerial support.
Despite its difficult start, the NIRC achieved some positive results outside of the major disputes that hampered its early work. This was, at least
in part, driven by the fact that it adopted a less confrontational approach
(Weekes et al. 1975: 198). Following the disputes in the docks, the TUC
permitted trade unions to appear before the NIRC in self-defence. In
December 1972, the first TUC-affiliated trade union applied to the NIRC
directly, prompting the secretary of the court to note that ‘[t]he doctrine
of self-defence had come a long way’ (Hills 1973: 278). Donaldson not
only believed that the controversy surrounding the court was dissipating
as trade union attention shifted to incomes policy (TNA J 120/3,
Donaldson to Dobson, 28 March 1973: 2), but he was left exacerbated by
the lack of a government defence of its work (TNA PREM 15/1678, Carr
to Heath, 4 October 1973). The 1973 CIR Annual Report also makes for
interesting reading. The number of days lost was down from 23.9 million
to 7.2 million, even if stoppages overall had increased (HMSO 1974: 18).
For the likes of Jim Prior, this pointed to a need to distinguish between
‘politically controversial provisions’ and those that ‘have made a substantial contribution to the improvement of industrial relations in this country’ (TNA PREM 15/1654, Prior to Hailsham, 20 November 1973).
This is perhaps one of the more curious aspects of the government’s
strategy. Outside of the controversial cases that made national headlines,
the Act was operating, albeit below capacity. Ministers remained totally
committed to reform but were extremely cautious about defending the
Act in public. Internal discussions often turned to strengthening the provisions of the Act, even providing the precursor to later reforms. When
Heath, Macmillan, Carr and Howe formed a working group to personally
discuss the Act, it was swiftly concluded that any commitment to amendment would simply discredit it further and empower the government’s
opponents (TNA CAB 130/697, GEN 181 (73) 1, 3 July 1973). It was
common knowledge that the TUC was by now looking towards the next
government and complete repeal if the Labour Party won (TNA PREM
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15/1674, Note for the record, 10 July 1973). When tripartite talks commenced once again in June 1973, the Act barely featured. In discussions
over Stage III of counter-­inflation policy at Chequers in August, only Jack
Jones, President of the T&GWU, mentioned the Act. No one else on the
TUC, CBI or government side pursued the point (TNA LAB 10/3910,
Lawman to Carr, 12 September 1973).
As Moran (1977: 144) puts it, the Act ‘continued to haunt political and
industrial life like a malign spirit’. A key point, as noted earlier, is that the
‘strike problem’ that the legal framework was designed to inhibit had
changed. This is most obviously demonstrated by the fact that another
dispute with the miners was fermenting in the background. While key
figures, notably Howe, were willing to defend ‘the basic rightness of the
Industrial Relations Act’ (TNA PREM 15/1654, Howe to Hailsham, 30
October 1973), much damage had already been done. Robin Chichester
Clarke, Minister of State for Employment, rather missed the point when
he mounted a defence some days later: ‘Most of the cases coming before
the court have been settled to the satisfaction of both parties without difficulty. The work has gone largely, indeed almost totally, unpublicised,
quietly and unspectacularly’ (HC Debate, Vol. 863, cc. 491–492, 2
November 1973). With the industrial relations landscape shifting, however, the fact that these cases were dealt with out of the limelight did little
to change the negative perceptions associated with the Act.
When the miners commenced an overtime ban out in pursuit of
improved pay and conditions, Heath was informed by Macmillan that any
attempt to use the legal provisions of the Act would only make matters
worse (TNA PREM 15/1680, Macmillan to Heath, 21 November 1973).
The government was stuck between a rock and a hard place. The Act
could not be used, nor could it be reformed or suspended. In the final
policy document on the matter, Macmillan wrote at length about why the
principle of a legal framework must be retained:
Although the sanctions provided by the Act have so far been of limited practical use, the principle that there should be such restraints must certainly be
maintained in any revision of the legislation. To jettison it would put the
clock back to the continuously deteriorating situation which forced the present Government and its predecessor to abandon traditional concepts of a
mainly voluntary system of industrial relations and to resort to the law as a
brake on industrial power. (TNA CAB 130/697, GEN 181 (73) 3, 30
November 1973: 1)
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If anything, there was a growing sentiment that if the Act was to be
amended, decoupling trade union immunities from registration, for example, further restrictions would be needed (TNA CAB 130/697, GEN 181
(73) 3, 30 November 1973: 1). In a potentially conciliatory move, DE
officials discussed a ‘hypothetical Bill’ to extend immunities to unregistered trade unions (TNA LAB 10/3910, Barnes to Stainton, 13 December
1973), although following the advice of Parliamentary Counsel, they
decided that such an attempt may well open up ‘a pretty wide range of
controversial issues’ (TNA LAB 10/3910, Edwards to Dawe, 20
December 1973). All that can be concluded from the 18 months of backand-forth on amendment is that commitment to limiting trade union
power remained strong. Central Policy Review Staff officials summarised
the position well, arguing that ‘though a certain amount of water can be
thrown away, the baby must at all costs be kept safely in the bath’ (TNA
CAB 184/150, Industrial Relations Act: The feasible options, 28
January 1974).
The dispute with the miners soon looked like an unwinnable battle. On
5 February 1972, the NUM called an all-out strike to commence four
days later. Attention quickly shifted towards a General Election. Two of
the Act’s staunchest defenders, Robert Carr and Geoffrey Howe, made
one final plea to use its emergency procedures. If the government called
for a 60-day cooling-off period, they informed Heath, public pressure
would be applied, even if the NUM ignored it (TNA PREM 15/2128,
Carr to Heath, 6 February 1974). Although this was rejected by officials,
it remains an important footnote in the life of the Act. Both men were
conscious that victory in any General Election would require an endorsement of the Act with only minor amendments (Howe 1994: 684–685).
The letter concluded: ‘We feel that people will say that if we are not prepared to use the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act to attempt to
deal with a crisis of this magnitude, it is unlikely that we should ever make
use of it and the whole thing is therefore a dead letter’ (TNA PREM
15/2128, Carr to Heath, 6 February 1974). Perhaps this is the most
accurate summation of the life of this Act. Despite the government’s
enduring committment to reform, events had overtaken the Act and it was
rendered impotent. However, while it became a ‘dead letter’ in the eyes of
many, it left deep wounds in the Conservative Party, the scars of which
remain to this day. It is to this legacy that the chapter now turns.
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S. WARNER
The Enduring Legacy of the Act
A good way to frame a reassessment of the Act’s legacy is to borrow a
phrase of Sir John Donaldson, President of the NIRC, who described it as
a useful ‘pilot experiment’ (TNA PREM 15/1678, National Industrial
Relations Court, 4 October 1973), which, like all experiments, involved
trying ‘to find out what works and what does not’ (TNA PREM 15/1678,
National Industrial Relations Court, 4 October 1973: 20). As part of the
legacy of this failed experiment, it is unsurprising that an ‘overriding conviction’ to get the job done emerged among Conservative politicians
(Taylor 1996: 189). As Marsh (1991: 293–294) argues:
If Mr. Heath became the spectre at the feast, the trade unions remained the
devil to be invoked and held responsible for the failure of both the 1970–74
Conservative government and its Labour successor. As such, to negotiate
with the unions would have been to sup with the devil.
Yet this was not the only lesson learnt. While the idea of negotiating
with trade unions was unthinkable to many Conservatives, taming the
trade unions would require more subtlety than the unwinnable outright
confrontations that characterised the 1970s (Taylor 1996: 163). Thus, the
experience of the Act fermented two, seemingly, incompatible mindsets,
and it is these that can be traced into the Thatcher governments.
A closer look at the Conservative Party’s work in opposition reveals this
tension. Reflecting the growing sense that Britain had become ungovernable (King 1975), an Authority of Government Policy Group was established in September 1975. Although not limited to matters of industrial
relations, the failure of the Industrial Relations Act and the state’s relationship with trade unions dominated early discussions. Figures like Lord
Jellicoe—a Cabinet Minister under Heath—and Ian Gilmour—a wellknown ‘wet’ throughout the Thatcher years—acknowledged that a loss of
public support was driven by deficiencies in the Act and dislike of the
government’s economic policy. This was coupled with a ‘lamentable lack
of contact and understanding’ between the Tories and trade unionists, and
when the government enjoyed a small majority, such dramatic reforms
would always have been a challenge. One take-home message, as articulated by Lord Carrington, was that ‘it was easy to do unpopular things
when the Government was popular’ (GYA PG/40/75/1, AG Policy
Group, Minutes of 1st meeting, 10 September 1975). In the midst of
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almost constant economic crisis, the Heath government could hardly
claim popularity.
The following year, once a more a forensic approach to these discussions had commenced, Conrad Heron, a senior Civil Servant at the
Department of Employment when amendment was discussed in 1973,
informed the group that, in his view, ‘the basic mistake [of the Act] had
been to try [...] to put through with what historically was not a very large
majority a vast blue-print covering a whole mass of highly sensitive areas in
one go’ (GYA PG 40/75/14, AG Policy Group, Minutes of 12th meeting, 21 July 1976: 1–2). The ‘incrementalism’ advocated by Heron was
far removed from Robert Carr’s rejection of CBI requests for a ‘step-bystep’ approach because he feared battles with trade unionists after every
‘step’ (MRC MSS.200/C/3/EMP/22/2, Note of Meeting, 5 August
1970: 3–4). In evidence of a shift of attention towards trade union leaders
as the ‘problem’, George Younger argued that the leadership was ‘captured by an articulate left-wing’ and that more should have been done to
inform the rank-and-file of the individual freedoms the Act would have
afforded them (GYA PG 40/75/12, AG Policy Group, Minutes of 12th
meeting, 21 July 1976: 2). Such attitudes certainly carried weight among
those captured by the ideological individualism beginning to set the
agenda within the Conservative Party.
The trade unions might not have been the sole cause of the economic
malaise, but they represented something government could tackle in a sea
of imponderables. This reflects the view of those who had either been
involved with the Act directly or the infamous ‘Stepping Stones
Programme’. This programme, devised in opposition, was designed to
discredit the trade union movement in the minds of the public and, in
turn, damage the Labour Party as their allies. This, it was hoped, would
secure the terrain for radical reforms (Dorey 2016). In essence, it was
intended to attack trade union power as the bedrock of ‘a sea-change in
Britain’s political economy’ (THCR 2/6/1/248, Stepping Stones Report,
14 November 1977). Despite compelling evidence that Thatcher was cautious about this approach, it shaped the thinking of key protagonists—
namely John Hoskyns and Geoffrey Howe—about what should be done
even though the pragmatism of Thatcher and others focused on what
could be done (Dorey 2016: 116). The ‘Winter of Discontent’ was the
final piece of the jigsaw required to blunt the Labour Party’s greatest
weapon—that they alone could manage the trade unions (Taylor
2007: 177).
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S. WARNER
When the Conservative Party returned to power in May 1979, the well-­
known ‘step-by step’ approach to reform followed. While Marsh (1991:
297) is correct to note that the ‘step-by-step’ strategy does not necessarily
suggest coherence in the government’s approach, the Act’s dual legacy is
reflected in it as two competing perspectives that emerge. These two positions—caution and strength—united in what became a ‘successful’
approach to reform. Prior was the main advocate of the former, informing
Thatcher that ‘it would be fatal to follow the 1970 pattern and rush things
too much’, confirming that the government ‘must live up to our promises
to consult’ (TNA LAB 10/3939/2, Prior to Thatcher, 14 May 1979).
For Prior, it was ‘more important to minimise opposition as far as we can
and to finish up with legislation that sticks’ (TNA LAB 10/3939/2, Prior
to Thatcher, 14 May 1979). This is a far cry from the days of worrying
about how aspects of the Act would function in practice only once enacted.
As Prior confirmed to the CBI, this was not a case of taking a soft approach,
but instead his aim was to ‘demolish once and for all the old argument that
the law could not be brought into industrial relations’ (TNA LAB
10/939/2, Meeting with CBI, 18 May 1979).
The government would not leave itself open to the accusation that it
failed to consult. Thatcher herself reassured Len Murray, President of the
TUC, that reforms would be ‘small and moderate and would not follow
the paths of 1971’ (TNA PREM 15/69, PM’s meeting with Mr Murray,
1 June 1979). However, Murray warned ‘that some people would be
looking to make martyrs of themselves, including getting themselves into
prison’ (TNA PREM 15/69, PM’s meeting with Mr Murray, 1 June
1979). Senior officials remembered well that ‘[t]he history of 1970–74
points to the dangers of a head-on assault’ (TNA PREM 19/70, Hunt to
Thatcher, 18 June 1979). Given such warnings, Prior’s stated approach—
to ‘advance cautiously, step by step, and take care that the unions had no
cause for complaint over lack of consultation’ (TNA CAB 134/4335, E
(79) 3rd Meeting, 19 June 1979)—was not without merit. Back in 1972,
officials refused to consider curbing sympathetic action when they were
struggling to make existing restrictions ‘stick’ (TNA LAB 10/3929,
Barnes—Possible changes to the Act, 25 October 1972). Similarly, writing
about trade union immunity in a letter to the President of the Law Society,
Thatcher stated:
there is no doubt that a total ban on secondary action would directly conflict
with the strong tradition of sympathetic action and would give rise to a real
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danger of a concerted campaign to make the Bill unworkable. Nothing is
more likely to bring the law into disrepute than for it to be flagrantly disobeyed or if the remedies it provides are not used by those people it is
designed to help, as happened with the 1971 Act. (TNA PREM 19/264,
Draft letter, July 1980: 3)
Thatcher’s caution was evidently informed by her party’s previous failure. She did, of course, want stringent restrictions on trade union immunities, but ‘for tactical and Parliamentary reasons’ agreed to follow Prior
(TNA PREM 134/4442, E (80) 1st Meeting, 15 January 1980: 5). If
Thatcher was ‘trapped in moderation’ (Moore 2013: 772), this, in large
part, was a consequence of the long shadow of the Act.
The legacy of the Act, as Dorey (2016) details, also solidified a hardline bolster to Prior’s incrementalism. In addition to the cautious ‘step-bystep’ approach, familiar figures advocated a harder line. For example,
Leonard Neal, formerly the chairman of the CBI working group on the
Industrial Relations Bill and latterly President of the CIR, argued that
Prior’s pragmatic approach risked adding ‘to the mythology surrounding
the 1971 Act—that the law cannot be used to constrain the present
excesses of the picket line’ (TNA PREM 19/263, Neal to Prior, 12 March
1980). Like Neal, and in contrast to Prior, senior figures within the
Thatcher government expressed the view that more had to be done to
attack trade union funds (Dorey 2016: 179–180). Writing to Howe,
Hoskyns drew on the experience of the Act directly for two reasons:
first, from the point of view of lessons learnt from past efforts; and, second,
because this is the main objection from gun-shy colleagues who may have an
alarming feeling of déjà vu. This is where the carefully built up mythology
that the 1971 legislation (which so nearly worked and would have done if
there hadn’t been the February 1974 election) was a disaster from start to
finish, is so paralysing in its effect. (TNA PREM 19/261, Hoskyns to Howe,
29 January 1980)
The Act lingered in the minds of both groups, albeit producing different conclusions in terms of strategy. For the hardliners, putting trade
union funds at risk reflected the political deftness that Prior’s cautious
‘step-by-­
step’ approach lacked. Writing to Prior, Howe expressed his
concerns:
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S. WARNER
It is often argued that there are dangers of trying to proceed too quickly in
reforming industrial relations, and there obviously are. But in my view there
are equally great risks in not moving fast or far enough at a time when major
structural change in the economy will inevitably put pressure on existing
industrial relations machinery and institutions, and when we may have, perhaps, the best opportunity for constructive change for some time to come.
(TNA PREM 19/491, Howe to Prior, 8 December 1980)
In his comments on Prior’s draft Green Paper, Howe argued that it was
‘fairly clear that the [Industrial Relations] Act was put into operation in
circumstances rendered unusually confused and testing by certain decisions of the courts at crucial moments’ (TNA PREM 19/491, Howe to
Prior, 10 December 1980).
The principles embodied in the Act remained as salient to Howe in
1981 as they had in 1971. As Chancellor, he argued for the 1981 Green
Paper, Trade Union Immunities (DE 1981), to include the phrase: ‘The
long run history of the 1971 legislation might have been different if it had
not been prematurely and precipitately repealed’ (TNA PREM 19/491,
Wiggins to Dykes, 16 December 1980). Despite protestations from officials, he even advocated a strengthened version, suggesting ‘it is not possible to come to a final judgement about what would have been the
long-term effectiveness of the Act had it been allowed a better chance to
prove itself’ (TNA PREM 19/491, Tolkien to Fahey, 6 January 1981).
What appeared in the final document is softened, but the sentiment
remains. Howe became a key member of the group, pushing to shackle
the trade unions permanently, arguing for the need ‘to impose upon trade
union funds some financial responsibility for the consequences of action
taken by or on behalf of the union’ (TNA PREM 19/491, Howe to Prior,
30 July 1981). Indeed, the attack on trade union funds had come so close
to destabilising trade union resistance to the Act in 1972. Prior’s cautious
approach had served its purpose. The Prime Minister noted via her
Principal Private Secretary, Clive Whitmore, that ‘[m]any people had not
forgiven the previous Conservative Government for surrendering the right
to strike to essential public services’ (TNA PREM 19/491, Whitmore to
Dykes, 2 September 1981). She moved to change personnel, replacing
Prior with Norman Tebbit to pursue the 1982 Employment Act.
This Act was important because it achieved what many had hoped for,
removing trade union immunities in tort law and, therefore, making them
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liable in civil courts. The significance of these reforms, as Tebbit informed
Parliament, was that the government had:
not sought to transform the whole framework of industrial relations law.
Nor have we fallen for the error assuming good industrial relations can simply be legislated into existence. We have not attempted root and branch
reform on the lines of “In Place of Strife”, not the 1971, 1974 and 1976
Acts. (HC Debate, Vol. 17, Col. 738, 8 February 1982)
Thatcher and Tebbit’s shrewd political calculation would avoid the failures of yesteryear, while achieving the long-desired aim of disciplining the
trade unions. The approach, however, contained a distinctive characteristic. In contrast to the creeping interventionism of 1970–1974, this
approach limited the government’s exposure by becoming ‘less actively
involved’ (Marsh 1992: 73). The 1982 Employment Act allowed for
employers to challenge trade unions in the civil courts, ending their hardwon immunities for the first time since 1906. Without the need of the
criminal law, collective bargaining was shifted from the immediate purview
of government, as employers now possessed the weaponry they required
(Dorey 2016; Warner 2019a). An analysis of Thatcher’s reforms is well
served by taking the influence of the Industrial Relations Act seriously.
Lessons were learnt, mistakes corrected and the aim of empowering
employers achieved. This made adding further restrictive layers in 1984,
1988, 1990 and 2016 comparatively straightforward.
Conclusion
That the Industrial Relations Act was a failure is not in doubt. It achieved
little other than making matters worse. The relationship between government and trade unions was severely damaged, and whatever void had been
created between trade union leaders and the Labour Party following the
In Place of Strife saga was re-forged in their alliance to get the Act repealed.
One generous reading might be that ‘Heath’s intention was not to marginalise the unions but to ensure their responsible participation in the
political status quo as recognised social partners’ (Taylor 2007: 178). This
reflects the muddled realities of the Act, aptly described by Margaret
Thatcher (1995: 204) as ‘in part corporatist and in part libertarian’. In
contrast, Davies and Freedland (1993: 427) are right to characterise
Thatcher’s strategy as an attempt to ‘de-politicise the trade unions’
136
S. WARNER
through a ‘reversal of corporatism’. Driven in large part by ideological
individualism, the Thatcher governments’ reforms reflected ‘a modulated
rejection of collectivism’ (Wedderburn 1986: 83).
For Thatcher, the conflicting pragmatism and reforming zeal of competing perspectives united into a workable strategy. There would be no
mistakes or harassed parliamentary draftsmen, but complex legal issues,
such as vicarious liability, were ‘carefully considered’ (Wedderburn 1986:
60). Wedderburn (1986: 76) summarises the position well, arguing that
by drawing on the ‘ordinary’ courts of law, the Conservative Party ‘called
up the ghosts of judge-made common law by stripping unions of “privileged” statutory protection against it’. This quickly became the new legal
status quo. It is also worth noting that the Advisory, Conciliation and
Arbitration Service, despite being proposed by the TUC as a form of independent conciliation in 1972, was seen by officials to be a success of the
Act (TNA LAB 43/710, Briefing: Reaction to TUC/CBI Agreement on
Conciliation, n.d.). It remains an important feature of contemporary
industrial relations.
Writing in 1966, Alan Fox (1966: 33) described how trade unions
were often seen by employers as ‘invaders of a private realm’ that disrupted a ‘natural pursuit of a common purpose’ and ‘rational managerial
authority’. Such attitudes, coupled with the anti-collectivism of the
Conservative Party, are now commonplace. When the first Conservative
majority government for 17 years was elected in 2015, it came as little
surprise that trade union legislation was back on the agenda, presented as
‘the latest stage in the long journey of modernisation and reform’ (HC
Debate, Col. 761, 14 September 2015). Ford and Novitz (2016: 277)
describe the 2016 Trade Union Act as ‘a sudden acceleration’ in the
incremental approach of the Conservative Party, amounting to ‘unprecedented controls on trade union activity for more pragmatic economic
reasons’ (Ford and Novitz 2016: 291). Others see this broader process as
a move ‘beyond neoliberal’ and into ‘anti-liberal’ territory (Bogg 2016).
In 1965, the Conservative Party devised its approach to reform in the
context of a ‘sellers’ market’ for labour, arguing that ‘those special privileges granted in the days of [trade union] weakness should be put to new
tests of public interest’ (CPA CRD 3/17/21, PG/20/65/51, 14 July
1965). No such argument could be applied in 2016, but the supposedly
market-distorting implications of trade unionism remain deeply embedded within contemporary Conservative ideology.
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Flinders, M., & Buller, J. (2006). Depoliticisation: Principles, Tactics and Tools.
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CHAPTER 7
Social Security Policy
Ruth Davidson
The 1970s were not solely a difficult decade of economic woes and social
dislocation (Beckett 2010: 1–6). Whilst there were undoubtedly serious
issues, this characterisation of these years has been revised by historians
who argue that declinist narratives have been overstated. They point to the
way ‘modernizing state investments were bearing fruit’, that income
inequality fell to its lowest point of the century and that the welfare state
was at its peak (Edgerton 2018: 403; Thane 2018: 301). It was a moment
where progress towards a more inclusive society, with the impact of a raft
of 1960s equality legislation becoming more evident, saw more overt
challenges to the institutional status quo. Further, as Andy Beckett (2010:
3) notes, the 1970s were a period with a flourishing popular culture in
television, pop music and fashion. Hugh Pemberton and Lawrence Black,
using Peter Hall’s ‘marketplace for ideas’, consider one of the features of
the 1970s as being the ‘breadth of the “battle for ideas”’. They question
whether the decade was, when taking account of social and cultural change
as well as economic, ‘so bad?’ (Black and Pemberton 2013a: 14–16). But
despite these necessary correctives, the 1970s was a decade where
R. Davidson (*)
King’s College London, London, UK
e-mail: ruth.davidson@btinternet.com
© The Author(s) 2021
A. S. Roe-Crines, T. Heppell (eds.), Policies and Politics Under
Prime Minister Edward Heath, Palgrave Studies in Political
Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53673-2_7
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something ‘profound and unsettling did happen…and Britons have been
living with the consequences ever since’ (Beckett 2010: 4).
In the sphere of social policy, it was becoming increasingly evident that
the post-war welfare settlement was problematic. The ‘rediscovery of poverty’ was used by some on the left to question ‘technocratic, expert-led
approaches’ (Robinson et al. 2017: 272). The Institute for Economic
Affairs (IEA), founded in 1955, became, during the late 1960s and 1970s,
a strong advocate of a neo-liberal approach. Ben Jackson has argued for
neo-liberalism as a philosophy of social welfare in as much as it endorsed
some significant state functions for welfare, although the neo-liberal vision
of the state’s role differed markedly from ‘universalist’ social policy academics (Jackson 2019a: 148). The significance of these ideas, Jackson
argues, caused Richard Titmuss to engage far more seriously than the rest
of the left with the neo-liberal challenge (Jackson 2019a: 149). In analysing the different facets of these debates, Jackson concludes that ‘Titmuss’s
rhetorical style left space for neo-liberals to claim the mantle of economics
and to popularize a different…vision of the welfare state: not as an inclusive form of social insurance, but as a safety net for the weak and
vulnerable’(Jackson 2019a: 161). Neo-liberal theories were part of
Conservative policy debates from the mid-1960s. While there were no
formal ties between the IEA and the Conservative Party, it was a nonpartisan think tank, a small handful of Conservatives, Enoch Powell,
Geoffrey Howe and John Biffen, joined during the 1960s (Jackson 2012:
57). Further, as Jackson demonstrates, the IEA pursued an ‘elite’ strategy,
as they sought to build support amongst intellectuals and within the media
and business communities, all of which was to secure them ‘a dominant
position in the marketplace of ideas’ (Jackson 2012: 61). After 1959, the
Conservative government began to consider policies that would increase
selectivity, albeit that there was some nervousness about making such
changes (Bridgen and Lowe 1998: 120–123). Nevertheless, records of the
Conservative Research Department (CRD) outline the breadth of ideas
that were being seriously considered as part of manifesto preparations
before 1970.
Despite the relative brevity of the Heath administration, there were
some significant social security initiatives, which was, in part, the result of
the stability and energy of the ministerial team (Raison 1990: 72). But
what this legislation indicates in terms of any underlying intent has been
debated. It has been argued that Heath remained embedded in the
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‘consensual’ approach adopted by Conservatives and Labour in the years
before 1979 (Dorey 2011: 92–93). For others the Heath era in social
policy represents a significant failure from the promises made in opposition. This period, Robert Lowe argues, might have been a ‘focus for bold
experiments in selectivity’. But he concludes that in the end, it represented
‘dishonesty and incompetence in the handling of child poverty and an
ambitious but unconsummated attempt to reform pensions’ (Lowe 1996:
199). Peter Dorey suggests that if the radicalism of the Conservative party
Selsdon programme of 1970 has been overstated the policy shifts after
1972 could be considered a pragmatic response to circumstances rather
than a U-turn from a neo-liberal moment (Dorey 2011: 92–93). A perspective, as Tim Bale also notes, that could be seen as ‘simply departures
from the previous line—innovations arrived at in office rather than signalled in opposition’ (Bale 2016: 164).
The idea of consensus has some merit. There was some overlap in policy and approach with the previous and subsequent Labour governments.
The pressures of increased demands on the system and spiralling budgets
affected Labour and Conservative administrations alike and caused both
to seek ways to contain costs. Robert Page notes that as ‘Labour grappled
with such changes, their ideological differences with the Conservatives
were more observable at the level of theory, rather than in practical policy
making’ (Page 2007: 70). However, the Heath administration’s social
security policy was also reflective of the deeper scepticism of universalism
within the wider party. By focussing on the range of changes to social
security under the Heath administration, there is a discernible pattern that
was distinctive from the Labour approach. This chapter considers this
moment as one of a more overt challenge to the post-war settlement from
the neo-liberal vision of welfare as a ‘safety net’. Selectivity and self-provision were central to this vision, and many of the policies were consistent
with these principles, even if not all were implemented. Margaret Thatcher
denigrated the Heath era. The Labour government in 1974 overturned
some of Heath’s social security policies. Nevertheless, the influence of the
changes to social security between 1970 and 1974 were, and remain, significant. The fact that so many initiatives from this era have echoes in current policy should highlight the importance of the Heath government in
being a catalyst for the future trajectory of social security.
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Social Security and the Conservatives Before 1970
Beveridge and the Conservative Party
In 1942, Sir William Beveridge published his report, Social Insurance and
Allied Services. The principles underpinning the report framed subsequent
political and public discourse around social security policy. The Beveridge
scheme was based on a contributory insurance scheme. This fund would
cover unemployment, sickness and pensions, and one central scheme
would replace the mix of insurance provisions previously in existence.
Beveridge was explicit that his insurance scheme could not be maintained
without a national health service, a state commitment to encourage full
employment and a universal family allowance (Timmins 2001: 11–25).
For Beveridge, the contributory principle was important, as it encouraged
thrift and self-reliance, and he favoured a universal approach, as no one
went about their work in isolation from the rest of the economy (Renwick
2017: 223–224). The idea of a national minimum level was essential to
provide a ‘safety net’ through which none would fall. Finally, he felt
means-tests were intrusive and inefficient (Renwick 2017: 225). The 1946
National Insurance Act universalised National Insurance to cover all
employees and the wives of insured men (Thane 2018: 198). It was funded
by flat-rate contributions from employees and employers. For those uninsured, a National Assistance Board (NAB) was set up. This scheme saw the
end of the Poor Law and it was intended to be less stigmatising. It was also
hoped that this part of the system would be a subordinate part. Overall, as
Thane notes, this settlement covered more people with higher benefits
than before the war; however, these soon slipped behind other west
European countries and Beveridge was disappointed with ‘the continued
salience of means-testing’ (Thane 2018: 199).
Work was central to the operation of this scheme. During the 1950s
and early 1960s—with employment rates high—the system functioned
with few major problems. As Nicholas Timmins notes, between 1951 and
1964, social security other than pensions was one of the least controversial
parts of the welfare system, and the NAB was believed by its supporters to
be delivering a humane and effective service (Timmins 2001: 192–193).
However, Harriet Jones has argued that the debates within Conservatism
after 1942 were so intense and sustained that they must question the idea
of consensus. She notes that the dislocation of war impacted the party’s
ability to respond to the rapid transformation of public opinion regarding
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social policy (Jones 1992: 387–388). By the 1950s, the party’s ideas were
gaining a new coherence through the impact of a younger generation of
Conservative policymakers. In a 1952 article, Iain Macleod and Enoch
Powell defended the use of personal insurance and the means-test as the
basis of welfare: ‘why should any social service be provided without a test
of need?’ (Jones 1992: 48). Indeed, as Jones notes, Macleod and Powell
reasserted traditional Conservative principles. These included the view
that social policy should act as a ‘safety net’ for a ‘free enterprise economy’, focussed on means-tested benefits that targeted the poor (Jones
1992: 389). Aled Davies has argued, in the context of Conservative postwar housing policy, that consensus was not a fixed institution but a ‘product of contextual pressures’ and that whilst there was, within Conservatism,
an ‘ideological attachment to building a “property-­owning democracy”’,
these proposals were constrained by what was deemed possible’ (Davies
2013: 423). He concludes that it was only in the 1970s when the ‘economic and social foundations, which formed these constraints began to be
eroded that the idea of mass privatization was liberated and able to gain
greater salience’ (Davies 2013: 423). These arguments can also be applied
to the progression of Conservative policies regarding social security.
Before the mid-1960s, the Conservative Party recognised that state welfare was popular. Indeed, whilst greater affluence might have enabled
people to ‘accept responsibility for their own welfare’, collective provision
was recognised as cost-effective and in the national and individual interest
(Bridgen and Lowe 1998: xiv). This acted as a constraint on Conservative
administrations. However, the mid-1960s were to challenge this with new
evidence from pressure groups of failings within the welfare state, increased
rights-based challenges and political and public concerns over increased
costs and tax rises.
The Challenges of the 1960s
The mid-1960s saw the launch of a wave of pressures groups, each of
which highlighted how social security policy was failing those in need. The
Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG), launched in 1965, exposed significant levels of poverty amongst working families. Shelter, the Disablement
Income Group (DIG) and Help the Aged were also prominent groups
that campaigned against inadequacy within housing and on behalf of the
disabled and the elderly, respectively, and there were many others. These
new pressure groups, with their use of empirical data and contacts within
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Whitehall and the media, created a wave of publicity around these issues
which governments were under pressure to respond to. This was accompanied by increased activism at the grassroots. As Robinson et al. (2017:
273) have argued, the 1970s saw the rise of popular individualism and a
politics of equality, which was manifest in the range of social movements
organised around a variety of causes and identities. At a local level, community-based activism, most especially led by Claimants Unions, was challenging social security decisions. Moreover, as Jackson notes, changing
family patterns and increased numbers of working women or single-parent
families were challenging the types of services needed, something that
even Conservative commentators recognised (Jackson 2019b: 298). All of
this was undermining the social security status quo.
However, not all external pressures came from groups arguing for
expanded universal services. Ewen Green has highlighted the hostility
amongst rank-and-file Conservatives to excessive welfare spending dating
back to the 1950s (Green 2006: 38). As noted above, right-wing think
tanks, such as the IEA, were considering a more selective approach. They
wanted services to be purchased on the open market, supported by state
subsidies if necessary. There was also growing scepticism within the
broader public about social security. Research by the Conservative Party in
1968 noted a belief that the Labour party gave too much money in benefits, especially family allowances and unemployment benefit (CPA, CCO
180/30/1/1, Opinion Research Centre Report, 6 May 1968, point 11).
The research highlighted the perception that people worked less hard
because of social services and that three-quarters of the electorate thought
that people who were unemployed should not get benefit unless they were
prepared to do any job that was available. It also found that two-thirds of
the electorate felt that means-tests were acceptable for rents and family
allowances and half felt they were acceptable for prescriptions (CPA, CCO
180/30/1/1, Opinion Research Centre Report, 6 May 1968, point 12).
For the Conservative Party, these trends provided an intellectual and popular fillip for their long-­standing preference for selectivity within social
security.
Policy Preparation Before 1970
The period between 1965 and 1970 was one of intense policy preparation.
Brendan Sewill, director of the Conservative Research Department
between 1964 and 1970 recalls that this was because it was Heath’s prime
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interest. But he also notes that the Conservative Party wanted to dispel the
view that they had run out of steam after 13 years in government (Sewill
2009: 55). The CRD was at the heart of this, with different sub-groups
charged with policy formulation. The Social Priorities Working Group was
set up with Sewill as Chairman. This group was influenced by the Bow
Group, an independent body set up in 1951 as a counter to the Fabian
Society (Page 2015: 63). The emphasis from these groups was on increased
selectivity, albeit couched in progressive terms, which ‘was of little comfort’ to more ideological neo-liberal Conservatives (Page 2015: 64). From
the right, there was dissent. Sewill noted Powell wanted large cuts but was
opposed by Reginald Maudling (Sewill 2009: 59). And pressure was
brought from the IEA who were keen to look at a massive reduction in tax
and welfare spending, reliance on market forces, increased means-testing
and vouchers schemes to allow ‘customers’ to choose social services
(Deacon and Bradshaw 1983: 56–61). However, despite the general stress
on a more selective approach, the precise mechanisms for achieving such
selectivity remained under debate.
The rhetoric of selectivity was part of the 1966 Conservative manifesto,
although there was little in the way of concrete policy to back this up
(Timmins 2001: 273). In the Conservative Party’s mid-term manifesto
drafted for the 1969 party conference, Make Life Better, Heath stressed
that they aimed to concentrate extra help where it was needed (Timmins
2001: 273–274). By 1970, there had been some crystallisation on the
policy front. Before the election, Charles Bellairs, who worked in the CRD
Home Affairs Section, argued that they needed to concentrate on social
services that had public sympathy. This meant they should not focus on
family poverty, which would require an increase in family allowances, and
public opinion was that people should not have children they can’t afford.
Rather, they ought to concentrate on support for ‘sympathetic’ groups
such as the old and disabled (CPA, CRD 4/7/3, Bellairs to Cosgrove, 28
April 1970). There were also discussions around a more marketised social
security policy. In 1967, the Report of the Working Group on Selectivity
and Private Provision in the Social Services concluded that they needed to
emphasise that the party looked with more approval on those who look
after themselves. This might be through becoming homeowners or purchasing private pensions and healthcare insurance. It concluded that they
rejected vouchers but would welcome an approach based around tax reliefs
(CPA, CRD 4/7/74, Report of Working Group on Selectivity and Private
Provision in the Social Services, 14 July 1967, 30–32). This report also
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noted that they had emphasised selectivity since 1966 and that they were
under pressure from organisations such as the IEA to return more aspects
of social services to the market (CPA, CRD 4/7/74, Report of Working
Group on Selectivity and Private Provision in the Social Services, 14 July
1967, 1). In 1968, Sewill noted the difficulty in developing a general
manifesto theme around restricting the role of the state as it might be
argued such an approach necessitated an increased emphasis on private
education and health. This latter emphasis, Sewill concluded, might be
approved of by Powell (and he thought both of them), but he wasn’t sure
that Edward Boyle, who co-ordinated policy formation after 1966, and
Ted Heath would agree (CPA. CRD 4/7/77, Sewill to Bellairs, 1
November 1968). Other indications of this move towards self-provision
can be seen in a 1969 speech by Heath, drafted by the CRD, which noted
that they wanted to encourage councils to sell housing and allow councils
to provide mortgages. The speech concluded that they believed it was
essential that those who were able should provide for themselves (CPA,
CRD 4/7/3, Notes for speech from Heath on Social Services, 4 December
1969, 1–14).
A comparison between the Conservative Party’s 1966 manifesto and
that of 1970 illustrates the development of these themes. Both had an
emphasis on selectivity, encouraged wider ownership and economic prudence: ‘We intend to revitalise our Welfare State so that those most in
need get the most help and so that our money is used sensibly and fairly’
(Conservative Party 1966). But the policies, other than for housing, were
loosely drawn in 1966. The 1970 manifesto, by comparison, was more
detailed. The emphasis on selectivity remained alongside some much more
specific promises on changes to pensions, National Insurance (NI) contributions and a new negative income tax to help tackle family poverty. The
move towards the sort of dismantling of the Beveridge ideals that were to
be seen under later Conservative governments was also indicated with
mentions of the promotion of private provision, firm action against abuse
of the system by ‘shirkers and scroungers’ and the proposed sale of council
houses (Conservative Party 1970). As Timothy Raison, Conservative
Member of Parliament (MP) for Aylesbury 1970–1992 notes, the social
security policies in the 1970 manifesto were of some significance (Raison
1990: 70).
One key assessment of the Heath government has been that of a U-turn
on the radicalism of Selsdon. In January 1970, Heath and his shadow
cabinet held a brainstorming session at the Selsdon Park hotel in Surrey.
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Harold Wilson sought to use this meeting against Heath, arguing that it
indicated a turn away from the centre towards a more market-driven economic policy and increased selectivity in the social services. Contemporaries
and commentators have, however, considered that continuity was more
evident than change (Deakin 1987: 59; Dorey 2011: 92). As John
Campbell comments, the idea of ‘Selsdon man’ rebounded on Wilson as
it gave the ‘humdrum’ policies a ‘cloak of philosophical unity’ (Campbell
1993: 265). The perspective that an embryonic neo-liberal approach
‘failed’ under Heath only to be successfully implemented under Thatcher
has been part of the valorising of Thatcherism from the right and it has
suited subsequent administrations to neglect the importance of the Heath
government (Black and Pemberton 2013a: 256). However, there was an
element of truth in Wilson’s observations. There had been a gradual
increase in Conservative rhetoric around selectivity before 1970 which
indicates the degree to which the idea of selectivity had developed within
the party (Timmins 2001: 264–5). Overall, by 1970, the Conservative
focus was on more generous treatment for those in need alongside greater
conditionality and self-provision for those who were deemed ‘less-deserving’ or could provide for themselves. The next sections consider the degree
to which these aims were realised.
Family Poverty, 1970–1974
The first, and arguably the most controversial, social security issue for this
government was how to resolve the issue of family poverty, most especially
amongst families of the working poor. The launch of CPAG had shone a
light on the failings of the welfare state and the constant political and
media pressure meant politicians could not shy away from this issue. For
CPAG, the solution was to increase family allowances as these were not
subject to the work disincentives associated with means-tested benefits
and were simple to administer. This solution was problematic for politicians, in part because to pay a universal family allowance at a level that
would impact poverty would be expensive, but also because family allowances were unpopular. The Conservative Party was aware of this unpopularity. As noted above, in 1968, they commissioned a survey on the social
services, which highlighted that the public felt that Labour were inclined
to give too much on family allowances and that more than a third of the
population would like them to be abolished (CPA, CCO 180/30/1/1
Opinion Research Centre, ‘Cost of Living and Family Allowances’, 6 May
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1968, point 10). Equally, the Conservatives had watched the Labour
Party’s struggles over family poverty. Labour had settled on an improved
family allowance scheme funded by ‘clawback’; this took money from tax
allowances paid to the husband to fund increased family allowances which
were paid to the mother. This scheme, which saw the transfer of funds
from the ‘wallet to the purse’ and from higher earning families to lower,
was controversial. Within the Labour Party, there had been formidable
voices against the ‘clawback’ scheme including the Chancellor, James
Callaghan. Callaghan had argued for a means-tested family supplement
and was concerned about wider public concern over social spending
(Banting 1979: 94–99). His concerns were reflected more widely within
the party during 1968, as Labour MPs noted that family allowances were
an unpopular policy and often raised by constituents (Banting 1979:
106–108).
This scepticism was shared by Conservatives. Sewill noted to Bellairs in
1968 that he did not feel it was part of the function of the state to transfer
money from husbands to wives (CPA, CRD 4/7/77, Sewill to Bellairs, 1
November 1968). At the Selsdon Park meeting in January 1970, there
was some support for increases in family allowances, with Keith Joseph
seeing them as the quickest way of tackling child poverty. But Thatcher
argued that they tended to ‘increase the number of the poor’ and Iain
Macleod said he wanted to abolish family allowances, reduce taxes and
increase supplementary benefit. It was clear, as Raison notes, that more
work was needed (Raison 1990: 69). In correspondence before the election, members of the CRD discussed the options available, reaching no
clear conclusion. In March 1970, Barney Hayhoe, who became an MP in
1970 but had previously worked in the CRD, noted to Sir Michael Fraser,
then Deputy Chair of the Conservative Party, that Make Life Better had
stated they were working on plans for family allowances to go to families
in need. He also he noted that this was broadly agreed at Selsdon and that
his feeling was that they might agree with CPAG that family allowances
were the only immediate way of helping the working poor (CPA, CRD
4/7/3, Hayhoe to Fraser, 3 March 1970). But in April, Bellairs, as noted
above, argued that policies such as family allowances to alleviate family
poverty did not have public support (CPA, CRD 4/7/3, Bellairs to
Cosgrove, 28 April 1970). In the light of these concerns, it might be considered surprising that Macleod announced that if returned to government, the Conservative Party would increase family allowances by clawing
back child tax allowances (Deacon and Bradshaw 1983: 78). Macleod’s
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sudden death shortly after the election meant a reversal of this decision
and instead the new Secretary of State, Keith Joseph, introduced a new
means-tested benefit, Family Income Supplement (FIS) (Sloman 2016:
226–227). It remains a matter of speculation whether Macleod would
have honoured his family allowance commitment. His Selsdon views in
January were not supportive of family allowances and, as indicated above,
Selsdon did not represent a clear endorsement of family allowances as a
long-term solution. Rodney Lowe has argued that Macleod’s promise to
CPAG was explicitly short term and that he had already begun to reexamine a negative income tax (NIT) as a solution (Lowe 1996: 201).
Nevertheless, the introduction of FIS was an important moment in terms
of the Conservative approach to social security policy.
There were many, such as CPAG, who were critical of the means-tested
route. Yet, if viewed from the perspective of the policy discussions within
Conservatism, FIS was entirely consistent with their approach to social
security. There was a genuine commitment to tackle what they saw as
pools of poverty, but not at the expense of the general taxpayer. For opponents, the problems with FIS were significant. It brought into being what
became known as the ‘poverty trap’, where work is disincentivised by making people better off on benefits (Thane 2018: 307). It could also be criticised for subsidising low wages rather than addressing them directly, as
David Vincent argues it was the ‘first direct subsidy of full-time earnings
since the 1834 Poor Law had brought the Speenhamland system to an
end’ (Vincent 1991: 166). Moreover, the problem of take-up, which was
a feature of means-­tested benefits, was significant with FIS. FIS, despite
being heavily advertised, failed to reach more than 50% of those eligible
(Thane 2018: 307). Yet, notwithstanding strong opposition from many in
the poverty lobby, and opposition from Labour, who were keen to characterise the Conservatives as means-testers, this benefit was retained by the
1974–1979 Labour administration. It was only replaced under Thatcher
with Family Credit in 1986, a similar, albeit more generous, means-tested
benefit (Timmins 2001: 399). FIS, therefore, affirmed the importance of
means-tested benefits within the social policy mix for the long-term
(Deacon and Bradshaw 1983: 96). Michael Hill notes that Frank Field,
CPAG’s Director, argued that ‘one of the most significant lasting “achievements” of the Heath government was to institutionalise the “poverty
trap”’ (Hill 1993: 97). A further problem for the Conservatives with FIS
was that, as Peter Sloman notes, it contributed to an impression of the
government as hard, efficient and soulless (Sloman 2016: 228). Their
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concerns can be seen in a memo in 1970. Bellairs wrote to Joseph stating
that they should not be apologetic over FIS, as it was the first time help
had been given to one-child families, that their long-term aim was to concentrate help on poorer families and that FIS was an attempt to tackle the
wage stop issue (CPA, CRD 4/7/74, Bellairs to Joseph, 26 October
1970). But FIS remained problematic as Joseph noted: ‘I have never suggested that FIS was ideal’ (Timmins 2001: 283).
A feature of the pre-1979 governments was the seriousness with which
they considered the issue of relative poverty. Both Labour and Conservative
governments ‘flirted with integrating tax and benefit systems’ (Gladstone
1999: 65). In opposition, the Conservatives had considered a NIT as an
‘elegant solution to the Tory desire to reduce taxation and concentrate
benefits only on those in need’ (Sewill 2009: 62). However, practical
problems with a NIT and the criticisms of FIS led them to look at a tax
credit scheme. By trying to merge the tax and benefit system, this scheme
aimed to overcome the downsides of means-tested benefits without the
cost of universal payments. Arthur Cockfield at the Inland Revenue
devised this scheme, which would use tax credits to be offset against workers’ tax liability or (where they exceed this level) paid in cash (Sloman
2016: 228–230). The Chancellor announced it as the most ambitious plan
for the reform of taxation and social security together that had ever been
put forward and emphasised how it was essential to simplify the system but
also noted its utility in aiding pensioners and low earners (CPA, CCO
170/5/61, Statement by Chancellor, 19 July 1973). As Sloman has
argued, Joseph also saw ‘very great attractions from social security point of
view’ in reducing means-­testing and alleviating the poverty trap (Sloman
2016: 230). CPAG took these proposals very seriously, hiring an extra
staff member, Molly Meacher, to manage their response (LSE, CPAG
62(305), 27 April 1973, 2). Despite significant areas of concern, CPAG
did not dismiss the proposals out of hand, particularly as there was the
potential for tax credits to be developed into an effective weapon against
poverty (LSE, CPAG 62(305), Tax Credits Mark II, 10 May 1973, 2).
However, the flaws became more apparent in terms of costs, loss of monies to mothers and issues over working wives (Sloman 2016: 233–234).
There was also a degree of scepticism about the ability of tax credits ever
to be set at such a level that they would work as a poverty alleviation level
as early as July 1973; after the Select Committee report, CPAG resumed
their ‘efforts to increase family allowances’ (LSE, CPAG 62(305),
Executive Committee Minutes, 19 July 1973, 3). In the event, the
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Conservative defeat in 1974 saw this proposal shelved, although the fact
that Tax Credit remained in the 1974 manifesto indicated that the government remained committed to finding a workable solution. Indeed, in
September 1974, Heath wrote to Field and reiterated his commitment to
the scheme explicitly because the Conservatives believed ‘it to be the most
effective and forward-­looking anti-poverty programme proposed in the
country at this time…Together we must use the Tax Credit scheme
remorselessly to remove poverty and fear from our national way of life’
(LSE, CPAG 54, Heath to Field, 24 September 1974). Tony Lynes argued
that tax credits were not a remedy for poverty but a ‘rationalisation of
existing taxation and social security arrangements’ and that other mechanisms, such as adequate social security benefits designed to meet the needs
of particular beneficiaries, would be cheaper and more effective if poverty
elimination was the priority (Lynes 1974: 93). In his exploration of the tax
credit scheme, Sloman concludes that this period represented the end of
an era when governments were trying to look creatively at social policy,
but that this was undone by the 1973 fiscal crisis and the hardening of
public attitudes towards welfare and redistribution (Sloman 2016: 241).
Hill also argues for this being an interesting period in the evolution of
social policy, but for Hill (1993: 90), at the centre of this was a search for
ways in which to improve ‘targeting’ of social policy more effectively.
Social Security and Means-Tested Benefits,
1970–1974
Significant parts of the social security budget were directed to those who
were unable, through circumstances such as sickness, unemployment, caring responsibilities or disability, to work to support themselves. For some,
this situation was a temporary phase as they moved between jobs or recovered from illness. For many others, it was a long-term predicament. How
these groups of recipients were categorised and treated began to undergo
some subtle, and not so subtle, changes under the Heath administration.
Pre-election policy work and the Conservative manifesto had argued that
they wanted to alleviate poverty amongst those whom they believed were
deserving of help but were more stringent towards undeserving claimants.
Means-testing and a focus on ‘scroungers’ were key elements to this
approach and, whilst there were notable exceptions of generosity, these
need to be recognised as part of more overt attack by the Conservative
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party on the principle of universalism. An approach that presaged the
1980s onslaught on social security benefits, and the welfare state more
broadly, under Thatcher.
The core premise of Beveridge’s National Insurance scheme was that
benefits were set at a flat rate, and contributory. In 1948, a National
Assistance scheme was introduced for those who were not supported in
any other way. This system was intended to be a secondary system and
envisaged as a minor form of support (Alcock 1999: 206–207). By the
mid-1960s, it was clear that the balance had shifted. Research by campaigners such as CPAG had identified many cohorts who were living in
poverty. National Assistance had grown enormously. In 1966, it was
replaced by Supplementary Benefit (SB) and the Supplementary Benefits
Commission (SBC) was introduced (Alcock 1999: 208). By the late
1970s, four million people, with increasing numbers of unemployed, were
on SB. By 1976, there were 45 means-tested schemes, a significant drift
towards selectivity (Alcock 1999: 208–209).
Whilst rhetorically the Conservatives were comfortable with an increase
in selectivity, their 1966 manifesto had ‘few signs of tougher or more
selective policies’ (Raison 1990: 61). However, work in the years running
up to 1970 saw a firmer line being taken. As Bellairs noted to Hayhoe in
1968, a consistent theme running through their policy, both social and
economic, was to restrict the activity of the state. He argued that framing
it as restricting the state’s role was a better phrasing than selectivity and
that they should encourage people to provide for themselves (CPA, CRD
4/7/77, Bellairs to Hayhoe, 29 October 1968, 1). Indeed, Bellairs continued that given the positive response they had received for home ownership and occupational schemes in pensions, he would like to see this
principle extended to health and to incentivise people to provide for themselves (CPA, CRD 4/7/77, Bellairs to Hayhoe, 29 October 1968, 3).
The first Barber budget in 1970 began to limit state support when it introduced a range of cuts including state sickness benefit, which would only
commence after the first three days; welfare milk was to be abolished;
school milk restricted for those aged 8–11; higher charges for prescriptions, dentistry, spectacles and school meals (Timmins 2001: 280).
Unemployment benefit qualifications were also tightened. As Lynes notes,
selectivity operated both by denying the unemployed benefits conferred
on other beneficiaries and by imposing deterrent penalties on those suspected of being ‘voluntarily unemployed’ (Lynes 1974: 76). In 1971,
unemployment benefit was removed for the first three days and, once on
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SB, disqualification could start after four weeks if claimants were unable to
demonstrate that they were seeking work. Finally, the long-term unemployed were denied the enhanced benefits that other long-term claimants
had been allowed after 1966. Cumulatively, this reflected a ‘popular prejudice’ that unemployment was the fault of the individual (Lowe 2005: 166).
Housing was a significant issue. There were issues around the quality
and quantity of housing stock, something highlighted by campaign groups
such as Shelter. There were also issues to be addressed regarding housing
benefits. In 1968, Bellairs commented positively about their proposals for
housing subsidies because these would become much more selective. He
was in favour of future local authority building programmes being
restricted to slum clearances or support only for those with special needs,
such as the elderly and disabled. He concluded that the emphasis for those
falling outside these categories would be on home ownership (CPA, CRD
4/7/77, Letter from Bellairs to Hayhoe, 29 October 1968, 1). Home
ownership, which had long been a favoured Conservative policy, was given
more emphasis, although, in the 1970 manifesto, it was not a firm policy.
By 1974, the Conservative manifesto included a clear commitment to
‘Right to Buy’. Make Life Better had stated that they wanted a fair rent
system and to assist private tenants. Policy discussions before 1970 indicated the difficulty in switching systems. Joseph and Peter Walker, the
Minister for Housing, were in favour of a national fair rent scheme, with
those councils incurring a deficit because of this scheme getting a payment
from the Treasury. However, there were also concerns about local authorities becoming monopoly landlords and that there was felt to be a need to
help poorer tenants in private rental accommodation. Both Joseph and
Walker favoured taking the function of rent-fixing away from councils,
although not all the shadow cabinet agreed (CPA, CRD 4/7/77,
Outstanding Policy Issues paper, 13 October 1969: 1–2).
These discussions took their final form in the 1972 Housing Finance
Act, an attempt to be more selective in state aid, and to bring help to those
who had not received it before. As Hill notes: ‘The Heath government
took the first…steps towards transforming the…subsidy for low-income
house-­holders from…subsidies for public tenants and rent control for private tenants to…“targeting” help to individuals by way of means-tests’
(Hill 1993: 100). Previously subsidies had been managed by local authorities who were given a generalised housing subsidy, which they could use
to keep rents down or reduce rates. Walker’s scheme nationalised the rent
rebate schemes by making them mandatory, and at the same time, rebates
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were introduced for private tenants in the form of rent allowances
(Timmins 2001: 302–303). The Act caused mass protests amongst tenants whose rents had increased and local authorities whose power was
diminished. The Conservatives, however, argued this was a fairer system as
poorer private rental tenants were getting help for the first time at the
expense of the rich council tenant who had received a subsidised rent. All
of this, however, meant an increase of those on means-tested benefits. The
Labour government repealed the rent increases in 1974, only to reinstate
them in 1976. However, from the outset, Labour accepted means-tested
rate rebates (Deacon and Bradshaw 1983: 91–2). This meant that a range
of means-tested benefits were firmly fixed as part of the housing element
of social security provision, regardless of which government was in power.
But the Heath administration was not entirely focussed on means-­
testing. In opposition, they had been resolute that those who were able to
help themselves should, but that the government, ought to offer help to
those were unable to support themselves. This approach saw them more
generous in the area of disability benefits. In 1967, as part of the policy
process, Bellairs wrote to Sewill that the key aim was to concentrate help
on the neediest rather than offer equal benefits across the board. His view
was that they would restrict their offer to a chronic disability pension for
disabled wives and an extension of the attendance allowance (CPA, CRD
4/7/77, Bellairs to Sewill, 29 December 1967, 1). But they were thinking more broadly about how to help those who could not participate in
contributory schemes. In 1969, they considered how they could go further than Crossman by developing a national disability pension which
would treat all forms of disability alike as this seemed right in principle,
albeit there were concerns about cost (CPA, CRD 4/7/77, Outstanding
Policy Issues paper, 13 October 1969, 5). The 1970 National Insurance
(Old Person’s and Widow’s Pensions and Attendance Allowance) Act
1970 introduced Attendance Allowances (Glennerster 2000: 103). These
payments were made for those who needed care at home during the day
and night. Also introduced were a new invalidity benefit for the long-term
sick and a higher child allowance for those claiming invalidity allowance.
Much of this, as Timmins notes, was bipartisan. Pauline Thompson at
DIG noted that they had negotiated with one lot and saw the proposals
implemented by the other (Timmins 2001: 285). This was also reflected
in the Labour response to Conservative thinking on disability benefits.
Jameel Hampton concludes that if they had been elected, the Conservatives
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in 1974 would have introduced disability cash benefits little different to
those that created by Labour (Hampton 2016: 243).
The Heath government, whilst being generous to some groups of benefit claimants, saw a period of tightening up of both benefit levels and
increased conditionality for claimants. This was also a moment that saw
Beveridge’s principles undermined in another way. Central to the
Beveridge scheme was a flat minimum. However, budget constraints saw
Joseph increase pensioner and invalidity benefits more than sickness and
unemployment benefits; the unemployed were also cut out of the longterm rate no matter how long they were unemployed. This in effect
brought a sharp distinction between long-term and short-term benefits.
Timmins has argued there was a logic to this as it was felt those on longterm benefits had the greatest need and those moving back into employment at some point could afford to subsidise a period of lower benefits
(Timmins 2001: 286). This move, however, breached the Beveridge principles and, in some respects, reintroduced the idea of the ‘deserving’ and
‘undeserving’ poor. Moreover, this principle was underpinned by an
increased focus on rooting out abuse in the system, as had been indicated
in the 1970 Conservative manifesto. In 1971, a committee on the Abuse
of Social Security Benefits, the Fisher Committee, was set up by Joseph.
Despite this committee finding no evidence of widespread abuse, it concluded that ‘substantial sums of money are misappropriated each year’
(Golding and Middleton 1982: 235). Lynes, writing in 1974, discussed
this increased focus on abuse and whilst he noted the findings of the Fisher
Committee were moderate, he concluded that: ‘few people will read the
report, compared with the very large numbers who will have seen the
appointment of the Committee as confirmation of the belief that abuse of
the system is rife’ (Lynes 1974: 79). This emphasis on ‘scroungerphobia’,
alongside media campaigns exposing abuse, only served to stigmatise
those on benefits and contributed to increasingly negative attitudes
towards social security benefits. As Peter Golding and Sue Middleton
(1982: 229) note, in 1968, 78% thought people worked less hard because
of ‘too many social services’ and, by 1975, 34% of people thought unemployment benefit was too high, twice the number that thought it was too
low. They conclude that that the welfare consensus had never really taken
deep root and it was therefore relatively easy to dislodge by ‘the return of
an incisive neo-liberal rhetoric’. This is a rhetoric which they argue was
deeply rooted within Conservatism (1982: 229–231). Whilst negative
views of welfare recipients were only to get worse after 1979, this period
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was notable as the start of a phase where government policy began to
more overtly undermine positive conceptions of the social security part of
the welfare state.
Pensions, 1970–1974
The one area of social security policy that saw governments exercise much
thought between 1948 and 1970 was pensions policy. As Pemberton
notes, the Atlee government, rather than following Beveridge’s recommendations for a funded scheme and gradually introducing the new pension over 20 or so years, chose to pay pensions immediately (Pemberton
2006: 44–45). The consequence was that the idea of national insurance
was essentially a fiction and the pension this scheme was able to deliver was
inadequate as it had to be set at below subsistence. In practice, this meant
that National Assistance had to be used to target the needy (Pemberton
2006: 45). During the period of full employment and labour shortages
during the 1950s and 1960s, it made sense for employers to set up generous occupational pensions which guaranteed workers’ loyalty. By 1967, as
Pemberton notes, 53% of workers had these pensions and they became
central to the system (Pemberton 2006: 48). But pensioners without
occupational schemes remained an issue. A new graduated scheme was
enacted in the 1959 National Insurance Act, with subsequent upratings in
1961 and 1963, but these measures failed to lift many pensioners off
means-tested benefits (Hill 1993: 59). The inability of the Conservative
Party to construct a state graduated scheme to deal with these problems
before 1964 has been ascribed to a number of factors, including powerful
vested interests, ideological opposition within Conservatism to state
involvement in pension provision and the constraints imposed by the complex system they had inherited (Pemberton 2006: 49–53). The
Conservative preference for self-provision can be seen in a 1965 pamphlet
In Place of Beveridge written by Geoffrey Howe, Chairman of the backbench committee on social services. Howe argued for expansion of private
schemes and cast doubt on the state graduated pension scheme. He also
called for tax relief of 15% of gross remuneration if an individual saved for
their retirement and legislation to make pensions portable. The overall
aim was a system of ‘self-provision’ (Raison 1990: 58).
Despite pensions policy being a significant issue within internal party
policy discussions, the Labour Party made little progress until Richard
Crossman was reappointed Minster in 1968 (Glennerster 2006: 69–70).
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During the 1960s, Labour in opposition had worked on a National
Superannuation Scheme. The difficulties they faced in implementing this
were not only a consequence of the private pension lobby, but also trade
unions who were concerned that their members might lose their hardearned occupational schemes. As Glennerster notes, a ‘universal compulsory scheme would have destroyed such schemes or heavily curtailed
them’ (Glennerster 2006: 69). The Crossman scheme would have phased
in a gradual increase in pensions to reduce recurrent demands for increases
in pensions. The Crossman White Paper was passing through Parliament
when Wilson called the 1970 election. By 1970, therefore, pensions were
a problematic area with structural issues and vested interests which constrained action, but also with pressing issues that needed to be resolved.
There were some immediate issues that the new Conservative Secretary
of State addressed regarding pensions. One group who were especially in
need were the over 80s, who had fallen outside the scope of the 1948 Act.
This anomaly was rectified in the 1971 National Insurance Act, which
gave all pensioners over 80 a special addition with no means-test (Raison
1990: 73). A second initiative was the introduction in 1972 of a £10
Christmas bonus. Introduced as a temporary palliative this payment, in a
modified form, exists today, another long-term legacy of the Heath era.
Finally, as Bale notes, pension levels were improved and a ‘range of new
benefits…doled out to the deserving, particularly the elderly. The latter,
the manifesto reminded people, had received a 55 percent rise in their
basic pension since 1970 as well as a regular £10 Christmas bonus’ (Bale
2012: 163). Bale further observes that, in 1970, only 10% of Conservative
candidates mentioned pensions in their election leaflet, by February 1974,
83% did.
In terms of their longer-term strategy for pensions, the Heath government set out a plan that was to be, as Howard Glennerster notes, a harbinger of the future. The Pensions White Paper of 1971, Strategy for Pensions,
and the subsequent 1973 Social Security Act, saw the employer and not
the state, as the main pension provider (Glennerster 2000: 103). It was a
move towards the marketisation of pensions that was to occur under the
Thatcher government. In opposition, CRD documents indicate that the
Conservatives would alter the Crossman scheme in government if, as they
believed, the terms of contracting-­out would be unfair to occupational
schemes (CPA, CRD 4/7/77, Outstanding Policy Issues paper, 13
October 1969, 5). The Conservative White Paper placed more emphasis
on self-provision. Contributions to the state scheme would be
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wage-related, but payments after retirement would be at a flat rate and so
it would only be redistributive for the lowest earners. Most people would
have to rely on occupational schemes to make their pensions up to a reasonable level and they would be encouraged, but not compelled, to set up
occupational schemes (Denham and Garnett 2001: 209). The electoral
defeat of the Conservatives meant this scheme was not instituted and
Barbara Castle repealed it to introduce the State Earnings Related Pension
Scheme (SERPS) (Page 2016: 160). The Joseph scheme signalled the
increased emphasis on self-provision, which was part of the Heath philosophy and was to be fully realised under Thatcher. Further, despite the 1973
Act being revoked, it presaged the 1986 Social Security Act which, as
Denham and Garnett argue, bore some resemblance to Joseph’s scheme,
albeit with one crucial difference; in 1986, there was no insistence on
minimum standards which ultimately led to pensions mis-selling (Denham
and Garnett 2001: 209).
Conclusion
It is useful to consider this moment, as Black and Pemberton do, as a
moment of change that drew on both older ideas and new directions: ‘the
1970s were not just a bridging point but simultaneously the sequel to the
1960s and the prequel to neo-liberalism’ (Black and Pemberton 2013b:
258). The social security policy of the Heath administration reflects this
sense of a liminal moment. Davies has argued, in the context of ‘Right to
Buy’, that whilst there was a long-standing ideological support within the
party for property ownership, it was only from the late 1960s that the
Conservatives saw the ‘mass disposal of properties’ as ‘tenable’ (Davies
2013: 438). This, he argues, became ‘tenable’ in the context of socioeconomic changes in the post-war decades not simply as a result of a
Thatcherite break with post-war Conservatism (Davies 2013: 438). The
same can be argued of social security policy. Selectivity and self-provision
had long been part of Conservative thinking and had strong grassroots
support and some key proponents within the central party. But the popularity of the post-war welfare settlement meant that before 1970,
Conservative governments felt constrained in the degree to which they
could implement these policies. By 1970, there was a new ‘market of
ideas’ one which, at an elite level, positively promoted rolling back the
state. Alongside this was an increased public recognition of the cost of
state services, less willingness to fund the more unpopular social security
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benefits and an ‘individualism’ that rejected technocratic solutions. This
facilitated a Conservative manifesto in 1970 that more explicitly prioritised private provision, promoted targeted benefits and aimed to address
so-called shirkers and scroungers (Conservative Party 1970). In office,
they attempted to carry out these promises. As Hill suggests, the ‘main
social policy legacy of the Heath government…[were] the early experiments in the extension of means tests for assistance to the working poor’
(Hill 1993: 104). If their rhetoric was more ambitious than their achievements, it can be argued that, in this respect, the Heath administration was
not much different to other governments in the area of social security
policy. The Labour years of Wilson and Callaghan, for all their positive
welfare measures, failed to deliver a ‘fundamental reformulation…[of]
social policy’ (Page 2016: 162–163). Overall, whilst the measures introduced under Heath were less innovatory and radical than some might
have wished, cumulatively this programme was a ‘catalyst’ in the growth
of means-testing in Britain (Deacon and Bradshaw 1983: 96). Heath foreshadowed the Thatcher era and many of the policies implemented here
were remarkably durable. There was, in broadest terms, a clear direction
of travel and that was towards a more residual and less costly ‘safety net’
welfare state and the resurgence of a rhetoric that was stigmatising. In this
sense, 1970–1974 should be regarded as a critical moment in recalibrating
the shape and direction of Britain’s social security system.
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CHAPTER 8
The Heath Government and Local
Government Reform
David Jeffery
If somebody came from the moon and created a new place called
Britain and they recommended for us a system of local government
as it is today, we would certainly consider that they needed their heads
looking at.
—Peter Walker (1969, in Chandler 2013)
It is axiomatic that anyone who speaks on local government reform
who does not have to wants his head examining.
—Harold Wilson (HC Deb 6 July 1972, vol 840, col 899)
The Local Government Act 1972 is not explicable in terms of
democratic idealism, nor of professional realism, nor of administrative
efficiency or convenience, nor yet of political manipulation and party
dogma, nor even of Anglo-Saxon muddle headedness, though, of course,
it owes much to all of these. The fact is that it has a Past.
—Arnold-Baker (1973: 1)
D. Jeffery (*)
University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK
e-mail: D.Jeffery@liverpool.ac.uk
© The Author(s) 2021
A. S. Roe-Crines, T. Heppell (eds.), Policies and Politics Under
Prime Minister Edward Heath, Palgrave Studies in Political
Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53673-2_8
165
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Introduction
The Local Government Act 1972 is ‘one of the few innovations of the
Heath Government which has lasted; it also remains among the most
unpopular’ (Campbell 2013: 379). Although the reform outlasted the
main constitutional legislation passed during the Heath government—the
European Communities Act 1972—it has slowly been unpicked by consecutive governments who saw the reforms as suboptimal.
This chapter explores three interrelated issues: why reform of local government was necessary in the first place, what the Heath government’s
reforms achieved, and how they were justified. For some, the Local
Government Act 1972 was held as ‘a radical and progressive reorganisation of the antiquated structure of local government in England and
Wales’, and the ‘first major systematic and comprehensive measure which
Parliament has placed on the Statute Book in the field of local democracy
in this country’ (Jones 1973: 154). On the contrary, John Silkin argued
from the Labour opposition that the Act was ‘blurred and tepid. It has
soaked up from everywhere ideas and suggestions, often conflicting, as it
has gone along. It is a great big sponge … it illustrates the principle of the
uninhabitability of the halfway house’ (HC Deb 16 November 1971, vol
826, col 250).
This chapter instead argues that the reform of local government undertaken by the Heath government—or more specifically by Environment
Secretary Peter Walker, given the general lack of interference by Heath or
the cabinet on the process—was driven more by party-political considerations than the stated concerns of moving power closer to local communities, rationalising local government and empowering local authorities.
Instead, in a political context where the need for reform of local government was broadly accepted, but a previous unitary system recommendation had been poorly received by Conservative grassroots, the Local
Government Act 1972 represented a party-political opportunity to restrict
the power of the Labour Party over non-metropolitan Britain whilst also,
in some cases, extending the power of the centre over the local—reflecting
one of the oldest struggles in British (and its predecessors’) political history (Wilson and Game 2011: 53–54).
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A Brief History of Local Government in the UK
The history of local government in the UK, until the Heath government
at least, is largely one of evolution rather than revolution; local government typically evolved over time, with areas engaged in a constant struggle
for powers and control with the centre, and cities and urban areas in conflict with their rural environs.
The principle of multifunctional, elected local self-government was
established with the Municipal Corporations Act 1835, even if this could
not be considered a system of local government, given the range and variation in local bodies delivering services across the nation (Wilson and Game
2011: 57). The 1835 Act reformed the majority of municipal boroughs—178—in England and Wales (Stoker 1991: 1)1, which were found
to ‘exist independently of the communities among which they are found’
(Royal Commission on Municipal Corporations 1835, 2002), often acting as vehicles to return members of parliament (MPs) to the House of
Commons and many being closed shops, filled with self-appointed ‘representatives’. The Act required these new municipal boroughs to be governed by town councils that would be elected by ratepayers—this was
standardised across boroughs, replacing the various qualifications or
requirements provided in old charters. These municipal boroughs were
responsible for a range of functions, and being directly elected, thus shared
key characteristics of modern local government (Stoker 1991: 1).
Whilst the 1835 Act represented the first step in replacing the ‘maze of
parishes, commissions and other public bodies’ which governed on a local
level with a more familiar set-up of ‘multi-functional local authorities’,
there remained work to be done (Elcock 1994: 18). Across Britain, there
was still ‘nothing approaching a “system”’ (Wilson and Game 2011: 55);
instead, there was a ‘tangle’ of local government (Hollis 1989: 2–3). The
municipal boroughs existed alongside over 15,000 parishes (with largely
unpaid officers) and counties, which were run by Justices of the Peace,
appointed by the Crown, and which had both an administrative role (e.g.
for highways, bridges, weights and measures and oversight of the parishes)
and a judicial role through county quarter sessions. However, the challenges facing local government as a result of the rapid pace of the Industrial
Revolution, such as overcrowding, disease, crime, poor sanitation and
1
Similar reforms were carried out in Scotland with the Burgh Reform Act 1833, and in
Ireland under the Municipal Reform Act 1840.
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poverty, made this tangle of literally thousands of appointed and elected
bodies, of both single- and multipurpose authorities, unsustainable. There
were consistent and urgent calls for reform (Wilson and Game
2011: 55–58).
This reform came in the late nineteenth century, with a series of acts of
parliament which ‘achieved a constitutional mini-revolution’, surviving for
three-quarters of a century and, according to Wilson and Game, attempted
‘to try to square a circle: to create a two-tier structure of elected local
government, without destroying the independence of the boroughs’
(Wilson and Game 2011: 58).
The first of these acts was the Local Government Act 1888, which created all-purpose, directly elected county councils—or in towns and cities
where the population passed 50,000, county borough councils were
established, outside of county control. This was followed by the Local
Government Act 1894, which, outside of the County of London, established urban and rural district councils wherever a municipal borough
council did not already exist. Together, these urban and rural district
councils would sit below county councils and form the lower tier of local
government.2 The 1894 Act also created civic parish councils, which represented a third tier of local government. The final act in this mini-revolution was the London Government Act 1899, which created 28 metropolitan
borough councils in London, which formed the lower tiers within the
London County Council.
By the turn of the twentieth century, Britain enjoyed a rationalised system of local government for the first time in its history. Although there
was not one uniform system throughout the country, as in France, the UK
had a dual system of local government—outside of London, the largest
urban areas had their own, all-purpose county boroughs (or burghs in
Scotland), whilst the rest of the country had a two- or three-tier system,
with various powers split between county, district and parish councils. The
system was neither neat nor harmonious (Wilson and Game 2011: 58),
and according to Cross, this dual system ‘was scarcely satisfactory at the
time of its creation’ (Cross 1973: 351). Although the actual powers and
2
These acts applied to England and Wales; Scotland underwent similar reforms under the
Local Government (Scotland) Act 1889 and the Town Councils (Scotland) Act 1900, which
also created a two-tier county-district structure, but with the four largest burghs—Glasgow,
Edinburgh, Dundee and Aberdeen—becoming all-purpose counties of cities, equivalent to
English county boroughs (Wilson and Game 2011: 58).
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functions available to localities waned from the so-called golden age of
local government in the 1930s, this dual structure remained up until the
Heath government’s reforms in the early 1970s.
Why Reform Local Government?
Harold Wilson made few contributions to the parliamentary debate on
local government reform, but his opening remarks in a 1972 debate make
are striking:
It is axiomatic that anyone who speaks on local government reform who
does not have to wants his head examining. Any Government embarking on
local government reform are [sic] likely to make more enemies than friends,
both within their own party and on the opposite side of Parliament. (HC
Deb 6 July 1972, vol 840, col 899)
Why, if this is the case, did the Heath government embark on such a
drastic and wide-ranging reform of local government at all?
Firstly, there were long-term issues which had been bubbling away
since the mini-revolution of the late nineteenth century. This involved a
system of local government which was increasingly poorly suited to the
areas it was supposed to represent, with boundaries drawn in the nineteenth century increasingly outdated by the final quarter of the twentieth
century, and the sheer number of separate councils—as many as 14,000
(Wood 1976: 177). Elcock highlights the mismatch of the system by
the 1960s:
In 1961, the largest county borough, Birmingham, had over a million
inhabitants while there were thirty-three county boroughs with populations
below 100,000. Again, the largest county council, Lancashire, had 2.2 million residents, while Rutland, the smallest county, had a mere 23,000. The
smallest municipal borough in the country was Bishop’s Castle in Shropshire,
with only 800 inhabitants but nonetheless possessing a mayor, a bench of
aldermen, a mace and more important, the full range of municipal borough
functions. (Elcock 1994: 19)
Chandler notes how ‘the largest and most widely recognised authorities, in many cities reinforced by Labour majorities, aspired to run almost
all their services in-house’, and this often had a knock-on effect for smaller
local authorities, who also wanted to deliver services in-house as a point of
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principle, pride, or ego (Chandler 2013: 221). Many of the smaller councils were, however, ‘clearly unviable as deliverers of efficient services’ and
the sheer number of councils, coupled with a complex division of powers,
led to ‘immense duplication, confusion and waste’ (Campbell 2013: 379).
Consequently, public engagement with, and understanding of, local government was limited.
It was a Conservative government which first grasped the nettle of local
government reform, but focused solely on London. Although they ‘had
entered office in the 1950s with no strong modernising agenda’, they ‘left
power having initiated a major root-and-branch reform of local government in London’ (Chandler 2013: 192). In many ways, this was a test run
for subsequent reform of local government. The ground was laid by a
Royal Commission review, which eventually led to the London Government
Act 1963. The legislation replaced the County of London with the conurbation of Greater London and the London County Council with the
Greater London Council. It also created 32 London boroughs which sat
under the Greater London Council and which replaced 82 former boroughs and urban districts (although the City of London Corporation
remained unchanged). Those boroughs which were formerly under
London County Council were termed ‘Inner London’, and the other 20
‘Outer London’ (a dichotomy which exists to this day).
The division of powers between the two tiers was also cleared up—the
Greater London Council was given strategic functions including fire and
ambulance services, main roads and refuse disposal, whereas the 32 boroughs held responsibility for were allocated the bulk of services—housing,
social services, non-metropolitan roads, libraries, leisure and recreation
and refuse collection (Wilson and Game 2011: 60). However, also present
was the ‘muddle’ prevalent in local government reform. London County
Council had a strong reputation for education provision, which the Inner
London boroughs wanted to maintain. Thus, a fudge was concocted.
Inner London education provision was administered by a new Inner
London Education Authority, whilst the remaining other boroughs took
responsibility for education themselves.
Although reaction to the reforms was mixed, the reform showed how
the existing system of local government could be rationalised—merging
smaller councils together to create larger lower tier authorities and more
clearly delineating the responsibilities between the two tiers, whilst being
willing to grease the wheels somewhat with a fudge or two. As Wilson and
Game note, ‘whatever its merits or defects, the reform had demonstrated
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that wholesale change was possible without services being totally dislocated. It also established the principle that an entire conurbation—in this
case, the biggest of them all—should be governed as a single unit’ (Wilson
and Game 2011: 60). The London Government Act 1963 provided a
blueprint of how to address the long-term issues with local government
and what an eventual ‘modern’ system of local government could look like.
This, however, does not explain the short-term factors for reform,
which allowed the central government to overcome ‘the powerful coalitions of resistance that built up whenever change was proposed’ (Elcock
1994: 21). For this, we must go back to the election of the Labour government in 1964. This government was committed to administrative
reform and appointed Richard Crossman as Minister of Housing and
Local Government—‘In his own mind, at any rate, Mr Crossman was a
man of action’—who was backed up by Dame Evelyn Sharp, ‘a powerful
and experienced civil servant known to support reform in principle’.
However, scope for government action was severely limited under the
restrictions of the Local Government Act 1958, necessitating further legislative reform (Wood 1976: 177).
Following the example of the London Government Act 1963, Crossman
began by setting up a Royal Commission, which was chaired by Lord
Redcliffe-Maud. The Commission had a remit to consider the whole of
England—except for the recently reformed Greater London—but not to
consider the relationship and division of powers and functions between
central and local government. A similar committee was set up to consider
local government in Scotland, under the Chairmanship of Lord Wheatley,
a senior Scottish judge. In Wales, however, the newly set up Welsh Office
‘explained that it was already preparing for reform; it was agreed that the
Welsh Inquiry should continue alongside, but distinct from, the English
Inquiry’ (Chandler 2013: 197).
The Redcliffe-Maud Report
The Redcliffe-Maud Commission produced two reports. The first, representing a majority of the Commission, argued for a system of unitary
authorities across the country which would sit under eight non-executive
provincial councils for planning and strategy. Most of England would be
covered by 58 unitary authorities, with populations ranging from 250,000
to just over a million, with an average of around 400,000. Parish councils
would be retained too—they would typically be former village or town
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D. JEFFERY
council areas, which would not provide many services but would rather be
a local voice and promote local interests to the new, larger authorities
(Chandler 2013: 198).
The only exceptions to this unitary system would be in the West
Midlands, Merseyside and (what we now call) Greater Manchester, where
a two-tier system of metropolitan county authorities sitting above metropolitan districts would exist, akin to Greater London (Jones 1973: 156).
A single dissenter, Derek Senior, argued for a more complex ‘multi-tier
system of provincial [regional] councils, city regions, district and local
councils’ (Wilson and Game 2011: 61). Both reports, however, accepted
the ‘basic assumption that the existing map of local government should be
torn up and replaced by a much smaller number of larger units that
embraced town and country as a single unit’ (Chandler 2013: 198).
For Scotland, the Wheatley Commission’s recommendations looked
more similar to Senior’s dissenting report than the Redcliffe-Maud
report—it argued that Scotland should have a dual-tier system, split
between 7 regions and 37 districts, with community (parish) councils acting as an ultra-local body to provide a voice to residents. In Wales, the
recommendations were for 5 counties and 36 districts, with an advisory
Council for Wales (Chandler 2013: 199). Although the Scottish and
Welsh proposals were similar to what was eventually enacted, the RedcliffeMaud’s recommendations were ignored by the Heath government.
Although well-thought out, Redcliffe-Maud’s recommendations ran
aground on the treacherous coast of politics. For Jones, the argument for
unitary authorities across England was strong: the system was simpler and
easier to understand; it would allow for the development and delivery of
interrelated services to be overseen by a single body, and the larger, stronger local authorities would be a stronger check on the power of Westminster
(Jones 1973: 156–157). However, the acceptance of a dual-tier system for
just three areas represented a ‘fatal mistake’ in the Commission’s argument—if the dual-tier system was good enough for some areas, why was it
not in others? As Jones argues
The force of the argument for the unitary authority was thus broken. If a
two-­tier system could be justified in one context, why, it was argued, would
it not be relevant elsewhere. The Commission itself had provided ammunition for its opponents with its advocacy of the two-tier metropolitan system,
even without Derek Senior’s memorandum of dissent urging a two-tier system over the whole country and the Wheatley Royal Commission on Local
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Government in Scotland proposing another type of two-tier system. (Jones
1973: 156)
In the case of Wales, reform of which was designed through the Wales
Office, the two-tier system was met with annoyance from the Ministry for
Housing and Local Government, which ‘objected to the idea on the
grounds that if the two-tier system was possible in rural Wales it would
provide a strong argument for rural areas in England to seek a similar
arrangement’. However, following a cabinet discussion, it was concluded
that both Wales and Scotland were sufficiently different for a two-tier
structure to be acceptable (Chandler 2013: 199).
Similarly, Arnold-Baker argues that the report followed an ‘admirable’
formula of unitary authorities, strategic regional councils above, combined with a ‘parish council type untrammelled by ultra vires, to provide
representative thickening below’. The problem was, however, that the
complete reorganisation ‘offended nearly everyone’, especially when it
came to Redcliffe-Maud’s attack on the counties, which ‘have a special
position in English life, representing diversities which are not merely traditional’ (Arnold-Baker 1973: 3–4). It is ironic then that under the Heath
government’s reforms, as we shall see, the main element of RedcliffeMaud that survived was the attack on the counties!
Those opposed to single-tier authorities also began to mobilise, with
the Rural District Councils Association launching a publicity campaign
under the title ‘Don’t Vote for R. E. Mote’ (Arnold-Baker 1973: 4). The
County Councils’ Association, which was initially supportive of single-tier
authorities, joined with the Rural and Urban District Associations to also
oppose the move (Chandler 2013: 200).
Despite this rising opposition, the Labour Government began to put
together a bill in early 1970, which saw Redcliffe-Maud largely unchanged,
apart from the creation of two new metropolitan county areas in West
Yorkshire and South Hampshire. This support for unitary authorities from
Labour was not surprising. For Jones, it represents
an extension of the county borough system where Labour was politically
strong; it could be resented as an urban take-over of the counties and as
ensuring that solutions to urban problems, the most pressing in Labour’s
eyes, would not be impeded by rural and suburban areas. (Jones 1973: 157)
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On the other hand, although the Conservative Party’s response to
Redcliffe-Maud was initially muted opposition to the reforms was building within the party, which was unsurprising given the Conservative’s
strength in the shires (Jones 1973: 158). This opposition did not, however, reach all the way up to Peter Walker, at that point the Shadow
Minister for Housing and Local Government. Walker was seen as ‘in the
vanguard of the new generation of business-minded Conservatives … a
break from the traditional landowning leadership cadre of the party’, and
before the 1970 general election met with a series of Conservative council
group leaders, where he urged them to consider Redcliffe-Maud ‘not
from a parochial point of view or because of sectarian support for a specific
type of authority, but from a strategic stance on the overall future of local
government’. He was not successful in his endeavours, and in his closing
speech, Walker ‘berated them for their insular approach’. A speech in support for the Redcliffe-Maud reforms was also met with hostility at the
1969 Conservative Party Conference (Chandler 2013: 201).
Struck by rank-and-file support for the two-tier system, Walker changed
tact and instead argued that Conservative reorganisation of local government would involve a two-tier system, but with the proviso that smaller
boroughs, rural and urban districts would be merged into larger, more
economically viable units. As Chandler argues, Walker’s ‘concession to
grassroots Conservatives’ was that ‘lower tier authorities outside the metropolitan area’ should be retained ‘to discharge such functions as can more
democratically and without loss of efficiency and confusion be discharged
on a smaller scale’ (Chandler 2013: 202). Similarly, a further party-political advantage baked into Walker’s proposals was that whilst the metropolitan two-tier areas suggested by Redcliffe-Maud were to be retained, they
were to be more tightly drawn and thus prevent urban cores encroaching
on ‘predominantly rural Conservative hinterlands’ (Chandler 2013: 202).
Thus, as Wilson and Game argue, the Conservative Party’s rejection of
Redcliffe-Maud was ‘partly on philosophical grounds, but partly also
because most county councils were dominated by the government’s own
party members and sympathisers’ (Wilson and Game 2011: 61). Through
apathy—rather than enthusiastic backing—Walker managed to gain
shadow cabinet approval for a ‘sensible measure of local government
reform’, which included keeping a lower tier of district councils across the
country. This formed part of the Conservatives’ 1970 manifesto, alongside a commitment to modernising government more broadly (Wood
1976: 179–180).
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The Local Government Act 1972
Thus, the 1970s started with a new Conservative government with a mandate for local government reform, an energetic minister in Peter Walker
willing to push through big changes, and the threat of Redcliffe-Maud’s
unitary authorities hanging over the heads of recalcitrant Conservative
councillors, which meant any two-tier proposals were received much more
favourably as the lesser of two evils.
Local government reform was very much a creature of Peter Walker’s
ambition, rather than that of Heath’s or the government’s contribution in
general. We can see an outline of and a ‘commitment to an alternative set
of proposals’ in Walker’s response to the Labour government’s White
Paper in February 1970, a response which was ‘very much the work of Mr
Walker himself rather than the outcome of lengthy collective discussions
by shadow ministers’. Local government reform was Walker’s ‘baby’
(Wood 1976: 97–99).
Walker’s choice to act constructively in Opposition, and to take the
pulse of the grassroots, meant that once he was made Secretary of State for
the Environment, and had the power of a department behind him and
ministers under him, he could quickly produce detailed reforms which
were acceptable to the party at large. Indeed, the Conservative’s 1971
White Paper came just one year after Labour’s own attempt.
The specifics of the reform—maintaining the county-district system,
but with larger districts where necessary—chimed with the Heath government’s approach to modernisation of central government, which was
based on the idea that ‘bigger means better’ from an administrative point
of view. As Wood notes, ‘Walker was applying the same doctrine to the
structure of local government, though with care’, and thus was not going
against the grain of Heath’s thinking (Wood 1976: 109). Finally, the proposals broadly reflected the structure of reforms Labour would have introduced in Wales and Scotland, so the Opposition was hamstrung in terms
of the extent they could criticise the reforms for England. As such during
the passage of the bill through parliament, it was the case that
The Government would be prepared to make concessions on what it
regarded as points of detail, and would stand firm only on broad principles.
The Opposition would not launch a major assault on the Bill, but would
content itself with harassment and with attempting to embarrass the
Government. (Wood 1976: 138)
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When it came to specifics, Walker showed himself to be guided by more
than philosophical feelings towards local government’s ideal form—naked
partisanism also played a role. A South Hampshire metropolitan area was
dropped, amid fears it would undermine Conservative-held Hampshire,
whilst the Labour strongholds of South Yorkshire and Tyneside were to
become metropolitanised. Even county boundaries would be sacrificed for
political gain, with the county boroughs of Teesside and Bristol being
absorbed into new counties—these were formerly strong Labour areas,
which now sat within new Conservative counties (Chandler 2013: 203).
This was noted by MPs at the time, such as the Labour MP Denis Howell,
who said the treatment of metropolitan areas had ‘the stench of party
political gerrymandering’ for naked ‘party-political advantage’ (HC Deb
17 November 1971, vol 826, col 564).
Other issues around specifics which arose were easily dealt with by
Walker, with very little input from Heath. Although many Conservative
MPs were fond of the idea of retaining aldermen—councillors who were
elected by other councillors, rather than by voters—in an attempt to get
expertise on the council and to smooth out violent changes in a council’s
party makeup, the cabinet approved the removal of aldermen on the
grounds of ‘democratic sensibilities’. The cabinet (and civil servants) were
also uneasy about giving councils the general power of competence, as it
could be used to undermine central government policy—and thus it was
not included in the White Paper (Chandler 2013: 204). Thus, despite
Walker’s claims that these reforms would represent a shift in power in the
British state, from Westminster to the council chamber, in reality they did
very little to reduce local authorities’ dependence on the centre.
Despite a long, complex and arduous passage through the House of
Commons, the provisions of the bill remained largely intact—if not the
specific geographical boundaries- and the number of authorities was cut
from 1210 to 377. MPs, however, did manage to secure a number of concessions and amendments. For example, Jones argues that the main substantive change was the strengthening of the districts at the expense of the
county (Jones 1973: 158–159).
Thus, the road to the Local Government Act 1972 was long and winding. Unlike the Redcliffe-Maud report, the act did not represent a principled attempt at constitutional reorganisation to meet some considered,
theoretically informed or preferred outcome. It was, instead, often nakedly
partisan. For Chandler, the Act (and its Scottish counterpart) was ‘the
culmination of continuous pressures throughout the twentieth century for
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change in terms both of the size of local authorities and of their inclusivity
and professionalism’, dating back as far as the 1920s (Chandler 2013: 220).
Reforms in Scotland and Wales
Unlike the Redcliffe-Maud report for England, the process of local government reorganisation was less controversial in Scotland and Wales. The
two-­tier proposals arising from the Wheatley Commission and the Wales
Office fell firmly in line with Walker’s ideas for England, and in the case of
Scotland, which pre-reform had a proportionately larger number of small
authorities than England or Wales, the case was seen as even more urgent.
The reforms in Scotland merged 431 counties, cities, burghs and districts into 9 regions, 53 districts and 3 ‘all-purpose’ authorities for the
islands of Orkney, Shetland and the Western Isles. This desire for ‘biggeris-better’ was arguably taken too far in the case of Scotland, with the largest region, Strathclyde, having a population of more than 2.5 million
people—half of Scotland’s population and the largest local authority in
Western Europe at the time—and the Glasgow district having a population of 850,000. Thus, whilst the desire for a two-tier system was met, any
pretence of closeness to the voters was lost (Elcock 1994: 26).
In the end, Strathclyde ‘eventually had to establish non-elected sub-­
regional councils for administrative convenience’. The least remote part of
local government—community councils—‘had no statutory powers and a
lower status than even parish councils’ and thus could not realistically fulfil
the democratic thickening role prescribed to English parish councils
(Wilson and Game 2011: 62).
In Wales, the two-tier system was also accepted. The government
rejected the Wales Office’s suggestion for a unitary system for Glamorgan,
and for Cardiff, Newport and Swansea to remain county boroughs. Instead
the two-tier system was pushed throughout the principality. As Elcock
notes, ‘These new Welsh counties were much criticised as making neither
geographic nor economic sense’ (Elcock 1994: 26). Thus, as with
Scotland, the ideological push for a two-tier system trumped practical
considerations.
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Reforms in Northern Ireland
Reform of local government also took place in Northern Ireland. Since
1898, the structures of local government had been similar to those of the
mainland—6 counties had a two-tier system, with 55 urban and rural districts beneath them, whilst Belfast and Londonderry governed as an allpurpose county borough. However, sectarian gerrymandering had resulted
in the Unionist population—which made up the majority of Northern
Ireland—drawing boundaries in such a way as to ‘give them control of
most councils and exclude the Republican parties from any significant
influence’. This was an obvious source of grievance, and in 1969 the
Macrory Commission reported on prospects for reform. It argued for a
‘scaled-down two-tier model, with most services being provided by
regional councils and a greatly reduced number of districts’ (Wilson and
Game 2011: 63).
The Local Government (Northern Ireland) Act 1972 was intended to
create this two-tier model but ‘with the suspension of the Stormont government in the same year and the introduction of direct rule from
Westminster, the proposed elected regional tier did not materialise’.
Instead, Northern Ireland was left with 26 single-tier district councils,
elected by single transferable vote in an attempt to restrict sectarian gerrymandering, but the reforms also placed significant powers (e.g. over
social services, education, planning, housing) in the hands of ‘various nonelected boards, agencies and departments of the Northern Ireland Office’.
As a result of these reforms, local government’s annual spending amounted
to less than 4% of total public spending in Northern Ireland, and ‘policy
power effectively remained at Westminster’ (Wilson and Game 2011: 63).
The Consequences of the Heath
Government’s Reforms
In the build-up to pushing the Local Government Bill through the House
of Commons, Peter Walker outlined four key objectives the government
sought to achieve in reforming local government. The first was to move
powers down to the closest level to the citizen possible, ‘to encourage a
vigorous local democracy by ensuring that initiative and responsibility are
exercised as locally as possible’ (HC Deb 16 February 1971, vol 811, col
433W). The Redcliffe-Maud proposals would, it was argued, ‘be very
remote from the people concerned was not the proper basis on which to
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reform local government’ (HC Deb 16 November 1971, vol 826, col
228), whilst Walker’s system will ‘have strengthened local democratic
institutions so that they operate more successfully and efficiently and have
a greater impact on their localities’ (HC Deb 16 November 1971, vol
826, col 230).
The second was to ensure a rigorous new structure which would represent ‘a rational system of local government with which to meet the problems of the twentieth century’ (HC Deb 16 November 1971, vol 826, col
228). The reforms would produce ‘a new, clear-cut system of local government. All the difficulties of one authority being answerable to another will
come to an end’ (HC Deb 16 November 1971, vol 826, col 249).
Thirdly, the government aimed to empower local authorities with these
reforms by reducing ‘the number of specific individual controls exercised
by central Government over local government’, and with Walker boasting
of having ‘already identified 400 such controls’ to abolish (HC Deb 16
November 1971, vol 826, col 233).
Moving Power to Communities
The first area for evaluation is the effectiveness of the Act in terms of moving power closer to communities. For Wood, this aim sits at the heart of a
tension in the local government reform project between democracy and
efficiency. ‘Dominant during the reform process was the view that the two
were incompatible—democracy implied small areas and authorities, efficiency demanded large ones’ (Wood 1976: 187). From the enacted
reforms, it is clear efficiency won out.
Walker’s stated opposition to the unitary authorities of Redcliffe-Maud
was that while they had advantages of efficiency, ‘for many of the services
vital to local communities it would be too remote’ (HC Deb 19 May
1971, vol 817, cols 1281). Anthony Crosland, the Shadow Secretary of
State for the Environment, counted this with the claim that the current
system was worse than Labour’s proposal, which was more clearly rooted
in Redcliffe-Maud:
Labour’s 51 unitary authorities have given way to 38 Tory counties. In
consequence, both the size and population of the counties are substantially
greater than was the case under our proposals and their headquarters are
normally further away from the bulk of the population. (HC Deb 19 May
1971, vol 817, cols 1296–1297)
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This critique is only partially fair—although powers which county
councils hold under the reforms would obviously be held further away
from citizens compared to if they were held in unitary authorities, those
powers held by district councils would be held more closely to people than
under Labour’s proposals.
That is not to say, however, that these powers would be held more
closely to the people than they were prior to the reform. As Arnold-Baker
notes, at ‘the district level the reduction in the number of councillors has
been drastic. There are now about 5,000 district councillors where there
were 18,000 before’. As a result of this widening of the remit of councillors, they were ‘responsible for a less detailed field of work than before and
might be expected to leave more of the details to officers’ (ArnoldBaker 1973).
Thus, relative to the pre-1974 regimes, citizens saw power move further away from them (albeit in some cases not as far as it would have been
under Labour’s reform) and with their elected representatives also being
further removed from the ‘on-the-ground’ reality of council decisions.
Power was moved away from the citizens and away from the councillor.
Or, as Jones puts it, ‘each councillor will serve on an authority covering a
bigger area; his constituency will be larger and he will have more people to
represent. There will be less contact between the citizen and his councillor. Local government will be more remote’ (Jones 1973: 165).
Additionally, as noted by Cross, county borough councils—that is,
those borough or cities independent of county council control—lost
‘powers which they have exercised for a very long time’ (Cross 1973:
357). In the case of Merseyside, the county borough of the City of
Liverpool became a metropolitan district under the metropolitan county
of Merseyside, whereas the two county boroughs of Wallasey and
Birkenhead, and the two urban districts of Hoylake and Wirral, and the
municipal borough of Bebington, were merged to make the metropolitan
district of Wirral, also within the metropolitan county of Merseyside.
Thus, unlike in Liverpool were only some powers had been moved
away from the citizen (since the whole county borough of Liverpool
became a metropolitan district and kept some powers for itself) for those
in Wallasey, which had run itself since 1913, power had now been moved
further away from the citizen twice over—firstly from the old county borough to the metropolitan borough of Wirral and secondly to the metropolitan county of Merseyside. It is thus easy to see the argument of Denis
Howell, the MP for Birmingham Small Heath, who argued that ‘The Bill
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is a complete sell-out of almost every large city and town. On almost every
point of importance the Government have given way to the counties,
instead of taking the views of the towns and cities’ (HC Deb 17 November
1971, vol 826, col 561).
Rationalising Local Government
The second area to assess the reforms is on whether they achieved the
promised rationalisation of local government. One of the undoubted
advantages of Redcliffe-Maud’s reforms was that with all local government powers concentrated in a unitary authority, it would be clear for the
individual where power lay. In contrast, in the two-tier system produced
by the 1972 Act, there were numerous criticisms regarding the balance of
powers and the split between the two different tiers.
Jones argues that the new system was ‘hard for the citizen to comprehend’. Provisions for concurrent powers, sharing functions, enabling the
staff of one authority to serve another and agency arrangements (whereby
one authority can agree with another to operate its functions) blurred
responsibility and contradicted the Commission’s and the government’s
intention of allocating functions on a clear-cut and intelligible basis (Jones
1973: 161).
It is also important to note that the powers assigned to first- and
second-­tier authorities in the metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas
were not equal. In metropolitan areas, district councils were responsible
for most services, with metropolitan county councils having a more strategic role. In contrast, in non-metropolitan areas, the county council was
given responsibility over most major powers; for example, education and
social services were responsibilities of metropolitan districts, but in non-­
metropolitan areas they were the responsiblity of non-metropolitian
counties.
Elcock notes how ‘metropolitan county councils were responsible for
about 20 percent of local government spending in their areas’, leaving
about 80% to metropolitan district councils, whilst non-metropolitan district councils ‘controlled only some 15 percent of local government spending’ (Elcock 1994: 23–25). It is hard to see how this muddled system
could be described as more rational or easier for the citizen to understand.
Furthermore, it is not clear that the 1972 Act was successful in rationalising powers either. In the case of planning, public transport, roads and
waste collection the powers were split between the two tiers. For example,
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D. JEFFERY
with public transport, counties had responsibility for planning provision of
public transport, whilst the districts provided the actual facilities. With
roads, some were in the hands of the counties while others were district
responsibilities (Jones 1973: 161). A similar split was seen with planning
policy, with county councils having overall responsibility for planning, and
development control resting with the district (Jones 1973: 162).
The agency concept also added an element of confusion into the mix.
This allowed for an authority to arrange for another authority to carry out
some of their mandated functions, which although introduced flexibility
for local authorities it also introduced confusion in terms of accountability.
Thus, when it comes to the claims that the 1972 Act provided an element of rationality, it is hard to find evidence. Instead, Jones’ measured
claim that the new system represented ‘a tangled complexity’ is hard to
refute (Jones 1973: 161). Less considered, and certainly more partisan,
but no less correct, is the claim made by John Silkin, (Labour MP for
Deptford) that unlike the Redcliffe-­Maud reform, which was ‘clear-cut
and decisive’, the 1972 Act has ‘soaked up from everywhere ideas and suggestions, often conflicting, as it has gone along. It is a great big sponge of
a Bill’ (HC Deb 16 November 1971, vol 826, col 250).
Empowering Local Authorities
The third area of analysis is the idea that the reforms empowered local
communities, either through increased powers or reduced controls. Walker
himself outlined at the dispatch box how
there are over a thousand sanctions that central Government has taken over
local government … I hope that we will be able to remove from our legislation many of those sanctions and powers of central Government over local
government with the result that there will be less interference from Whitehall
in local affairs than has been the case previously. (HC Deb 19 May 1971, vol
817, cols 1292)
However, the real consequence was to neither increase the powers
granted to local government nor realistically remove key restrictions on
their behaviour.
As noted by Cross, all councils were at that time subject to the doctrine
of ultra vires, that is, they ‘may do not only those things for which there
is express or implied authority, but also whatever is reasonably incidental
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183
to the doing of those things’ (Cross 1973: 353). This doctrine of ultra
vires is heavily restrictive (and uncommon in much of Western Europe’s
local government systems, bar Austria) (Arnold-Baker 1973: 11). The
Redcliffe-Maud committee noted that
ultra vires as it operates at present has a deleterious effect on local government because of the narrowness of the legislation governing local authorities’ activities. The specific nature of legislation discourages enterprise,
handicaps development, robs the community of services which the local
authority may render, and encourages too rigorous oversight by central government. It contributes excessive concern over legalities and fosters the
ideas that the clerk should be a lawyer. (Committee on the Management of
Local Government 1967, para. 283)
Instead, the report recommended that ‘that all main authorities should
have a general power to spend money for the benefit of their areas and
inhabitants’, with the only limit being ‘the wishes of the electors and such
restrictions placed on local government expenditure in the interests of
national policy’ (Cross 1973: 353).
Despite this, no powers of general competence were granted to local
government and Section 111 of the 1972 Act instead moved the restriction of ultra vires from common law to statute law. However, the government did introduce what became known as the ‘free penny’ provision,
which was the idea that local authorities could spend a given amount on
‘any purpose which, in the opinion of the authority, is in the interests of
the area or the inhabitants, provided that the object of the expenditure is
not the subject of other statutory provision’ (Cross 1973: 354). The level
was set at the hardly transformative rate of 2p. This represented a missed
opportunity to empower local government, especially since it continued
the requirement that local authority decisions had to be linked to a statutory requirement.
Similarly, in the area of finance, we can see power being shifted away
from local authorities via other routes. The Housing Finance Act 1972
removes from local authorities the power to determine the rents of their
council houses (Jones 1973: 164) and, as noted by Crossland at the dispatch box, the issue of free school milk shows how government commitment to local authorities' freedom is not backed up by action:
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D. JEFFERY
The Chancellor of the Exchequer has said that he proposes to withdraw this
provision, but at the moment it is legally possible for a local authority to
provide free milk and pay for it out of rates. Two Labour-controlled authorities, Merthyr Tydfil and Manchester, wish to do this. However, we are told,
despite all that is said about Tory freedom for local authorities, that if
Manchester and Merthyr Tydfil proceed, the Secretary of State for Education
and Science will introduce a Bill forbidding them to do so. In the light of
that, what are we to make of the right hon. Gentleman's words last year
about democratically elected councillors making their own decisions, about
how interference is a great discouragement, and so on and so forth? Never
have so many words been eaten so quickly after a General Election. Never
has the hypocrisy of Tory freedom been so dramatically manifest. (HC Deb
19 May 1971, vol 817, cols 1304)
Finally, there is the broader point of the role of central government visà-­vis local government. For Jones, there are two interrelated issues. The
first is that the ‘continued fragmentation of local government into competing authorities will prevent the emergence of a powerful united local
authority association to stand up against the central government’—
although it is not clear why the reformed system, with fewer councils
across the board, would be in a weaker position than the pre-1972 regime.
Secondly, the conflicts between and within local government could
increase the role of central government as an adjudicating body, specifically individual secretaries of state (Jones 1973: 164). This can be seen in
issues of planning, where ‘in the absence of any provincial or regional level
the crucial decisions on the regional framework or strategy of land use will
be in the hands of central government civil servants’ (Jones 1973: 159) as
will disagreements over new agency arrangements, or failures to agree new
agency schemes following the commencement of the bill, which would
result in the Secretary of State being called in to arbitrate (Jones 1973: 162).
Thus, on the claim of empowering local authorities, the evidence is
generally lacking—there is no evidence of meaningful powers of competence but rather giving statutory footing to ultra vires, there is an increased
role for central government when it comes to oversight and adjudication
and no clear evidence that the net reduction on controls over local government was even achieved. What the government gave with one hand, it
took with the other.
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Conclusion
The Local Government Act 1972, and the comparative acts for Scotland
and Northern Ireland, were major pieces of constitutional legislation for
the Heath government, second only to the European Communities Act
1972. Despite rejecting his committee’s own recommendations, RedcliffeMaud stated that the Act ‘will rank as the first major systematic and comprehensive measure which Parliament has placed on the Statute Book in
the field of local democracy in this country’ (Jones 1973: 154). Systematic
and comprehensive, however, are not synonyms for empowering, effective
or rational. It is undeniable that the reforms enacted by the Heath government—or more accurately by Peter Walker with the blessing of the cabinet—were comprehensive in their scope and systematic in their application
of a two-tier system across Great Britain, even when this was not suited to
the urban or economic geography of certain areas. What is debatable is
whether the reforms met the government’s own stated aims.
It is to go too far to claim, like Silkin did, that ‘there is no general logical principle underlying the Bill...it remains an untidy compromise, a massive compromise but still a compromise, and it suffers from all the
disadvantages of compromise’ (HC Deb 16 November 1971, vol 826, col
250). The government did have stated aims, which have been examined
above and shown to be unachieved—there is little evidence that the
reforms did move power closer to local communities, nor did it rationalise
local government, nor empower local authorities. In this sense, it is not
hard to agree with Jones that ‘it is a far from radical measure, and that it
seriously damages urban government’ (Jones 1973: 154). There is nothing conservative about reforms which overturned, in the case of some
cities, ‘up to eight centuries of local self-government, when … they were
“reorganised”’ (Wilson and Game 2011: 54).
Instead, the strength of the two-tier system for the Conservative government was that it was not a unitary system, where urban areas—increasingly Labour areas—would have undue power over suburban and rural
areas. The two-tier system was essentially a fudge, a way to hem in urban
areas and placate Conservative councillors (Wood 1976: 96). This permeated through the bill, with urban metropolitan districts taking in ‘less of
their rural hinterland so as to confine Labour-controlled industrial areas
within tightly drawn boundaries that prevented them from dominating
predominantly rural Conservative hinterlands’ (Chandler 2013: 202).
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D. JEFFERY
Ultimately, the Conservative’s general election victory in 1970 saw the
alignment of not only ‘long- and short-term factors’, as argued by Wood,
but also medium-term factors (Wood 1976: 179–180). The long-term
factor was a widely perceived need for local government reform, coupled
with the short-­term need for Peter Walker to show his reforming zeal. The
medium-term factor, which in the case of England was of vital importance,
was the Conservative grassroot pressure to avoid the unitary system proposed by Redcliffe-Maud. To have such a proposal which was so threatening to Conservative strength in many non-urban areas meant that the
party was much more willing to go along with any two-tier system proposed by one of their own.
Ultimately, the Local Government Act 1972 took the shape it did not
because the unitary system proposed by Redcliffe-Maud was bad, or
poorly thought out—in fact, it was very considered and reflected the work
of some of the sharpest minds of the time. It was that the unitary system
was rendered unviable by party political considerations. Instead, the Local
Government Act 1972 was a creature of real(party)politik dressed up in
grandiose claims of moving power down, rationalising local government
and empowering local authorities—of which there is scant evidence of success. The Local Government Act 1972 may have been one of the Heath
government’s longest-lasting constitutional reforms, but it certainly was
not one of its proudest.
Bibliography
Published Primary Sources
Committee on the Management of Local Government. (1967). Report of the
Committee on the Management of Local Government. London: HMSO.
House of Commons Parliamentary Debates (HC Deb).
Royal Commission on Municipal Corporations. (1835, 2002). Defects in
Constitutions of Municipal Corporations. Retrieved March 6, 2020, from
http://www.victorianweb.org/history/muncorp.html.
Books, Chapters and Articles
Arnold-Baker, C. (1973). The Local Government Act 1972. London: Butterworths.
Campbell, J. (2013). Edward Heath: A Biography. London: Random House.
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THE HEATH GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM
187
Chandler, J. A. (2013). Explaining local government. Manchester: Manchester
University Press.
Cross, C. (1973). The Local Government Act 1972. Anglo-American Law Review,
2(3), 351–362.
Elcock, H. (1994). Local Government: Policy and Management in Local Authorities
(3rd ed.). London: Routledge.
Hollis, P. (1989). Ladies Elect: Women in English Local Government, 1865-1914.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Jones, G. W. (1973). The Local Government Act 1972 and the Redcliffe-Maud
Commission. Political Quarterly, 44(2), 154–166.
Stoker, G. (1991). The Politics of Local Government (2nd ed.). Basingstoke:
Macmillan.
Wilson, D., & Game, C. (2011). Local Government in the United Kingdom (5th
ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Wood, B. (1976). The Process of Local Government Reform, 1966-74. London:
Allen & Unwin.
CHAPTER 9
Northern Ireland
Shaun McDaid and Catherine McGlynn
This chapter analyses the Northern Ireland policy of the Heath government between 1970 and 1974. After providing an overview of the key
Conservative Party figures involved, it focuses on four key areas of
Northern Ireland policy, which have witnessed considerable academic
debate: security policy, the relationship between London and Dublin,
attempts to form a power-­sharing government in Northern Ireland and
economic management in the region, within the context of Heath’s reputation for economic U-turns. In so doing, the record of the Heath government will be contrasted with that of the Wilson administration, to ascertain
strengths and weaknesses, as well as elements of continuity and change
in policy.
The chapter bases its findings on the analysis of primary archival sources,
especially government papers held at the National Archives in London.
These official documents, many of which remain under-studied, are combined with the analysis of official inquiries, such as the Report of the
Bloody Sunday Inquiry, which also contains official records of government discussions and policy during Heath’s tenure. Information from
S. McDaid • C. McGlynn (*)
University of Huddersfield, Huddersfield, UK
e-mail: s.mcdaid@hud.ac.uk; c.e.mcglynn@hud.ac.uk
© The Author(s) 2021
A. S. Roe-Crines, T. Heppell (eds.), Policies and Politics Under
Prime Minister Edward Heath, Palgrave Studies in Political
Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53673-2_9
189
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S. MCDAID AND C. MCGLYNN
these sources is triangulated through engagement with sources such as
memoirs from key political figures, information gleaned from published
parliamentary debates, and secondary sources by other researchers. This
provides the ability to bring a fresh perspective to the Heath government’s
policy on Northern Ireland, which is grounded in rigorous historical
research methods. This is true not only in terms of its appraisal of British
security policy, but also in international relations, through engagement
with the development of bilateral relations between the United Kingdom
and the Irish republic during this crucial period.
In assessing the Heath Government’s approach to Northern Ireland,
we acknowledge the multiple constraints that put limits on whatever government was installed at Westminster at the time could achieve and we
chart the evolution in the Heath government’s approach to Northern
Ireland as regards the centrality of an ‘Irish dimension’ to any lasting settlement. However, we show that poor and avoidable decisions, notably in
the area of security policy, made the difficult task of managing a situation
that had prompted Home Secretary Reginald Maudling’s exasperated
description of a Northern Ireland as a ‘bloody awful country’ (accompanied by a request for a large whisky) even more difficult (quote from
Sunday Times Insight Team 1972: 213). The chapter also challenges some
of the (counter-factual) claims of some authors that power-sharing in
Northern Ireland would have survived had Heath remained in power.
Northern Ireland and the Cabinet
When Heath took power in 1970, there were grounds to feel hopeful that
the situation in Northern Ireland had stabilised. The overreaction of security forces in the region to civil rights protests by nationalists looking to
challenge discrimination overseen by the devolved parliament at Stormont
in Belfast had led to riots and disorganised street violence as well as the
re-­emergence of paramilitary forces. As Labour’s Home Secretary, James
Callaghan had been judged to have handled the situation well, and his
decision to send in the British Army and protect nationalist families from
violent action, including people being forced out of areas by house burning, received cross-party support (McGlynn and McDaid 2016). Key
reforms in areas such as housing allocation and local government voting
registration were being enacted and, although the situation was fragile,
there was scope for optimism.
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Stabilising Northern Ireland and managing political reform was important for the incoming Cabinet as a priority in its own right, but it also has
to be viewed in the context of Heath’s cherished aim of membership of
the European Economic Community (EEC). Heath saw the entry of both
the UK and the Republic of Ireland as something that would aid the
return of peace, as the European Economic Community was ‘a body
whose very raison d’etre was to bring former enemies together in co-operation and mutual interests’ (Heath 1998: 423). He was also aware that
two states seeking membership would need to show that they were dealing
effectively with a violent conflagration at the border between them.
The assumption had been that the shadow Home Secretary Quintin
Hogg would be the one to take up that portfolio and with that Northern
Ireland if the General Election of 1970 went in Heath’s favour. To that
end, Hogg had had regular meetings and briefings from Callaghan and
had utilised the ability to approach communities who were not natural
Conservative bedfellows that he had demonstrated in his ‘flat cap’ tour of
industrialised constituencies affected by rising unemployment in 1963.
His memoirs record his time behind nationalist barricades in what was
deemed by the security forces to be a no-go area in Derry, being treated
to chicken sandwiches and beer while the residents ‘aired their grievances,
imaginary and real’ (Hogg 1990: 373). However, in the end, Heath
decided he needed Hogg as Lord Chancellor and so the post of Home
Secretary went to Maudling.
Maudling’s handling of Northern Ireland has received significant criticism. Jeremy Smith (2007) offers a rare note of praise in claiming he took
a radical, constructive and long-term approach to this particular brief, but
the view of J. Bowyer-Bell (1973) that his approach was one of languor
and drift is more common. Maudling’s biographer Lewis Baston (2004)
captures his fatalistic attitude and inertia when faced with the growing
evidence that neither the army nor the unionist political elite’s securitybased focus was working. His inability to hit the right tone either publically or with individual groups and actors was conveyed by a Private Eye
cover entitled ‘Maudling’s Grief’ in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday (discussed below) that showed him grinning broadly (Private Eye 1972).
When Stormont was suspended in March 1972, Maudling was replaced
by William Whitelaw, who took up the new position of Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland, reflecting the fact that the situation was too serious
to be dealt with as part of a basket of other policy responsibilities.
Judgements of Whitelaw, who had held the position until Heath moved
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him to Employment in December 1973 (with Francis Pym holding the
Northern Ireland brief for the short period before the General Election)
are far more positive and he was ‘unquestionably the right man for the job’
(Campbell 1993: 343). Unlike Maudling, he was prepared to take risks
(such as meeting leaders from the Irish Republican Army [IRA] after the
brokering of a temporary ceasefire) and difficult decisions and listen to a
range of views. And, much like Heath himself, his views and understanding of the conflict, both in what had caused it and how it should be
addressed, evolved in a way that demonstrates a capacity for critical selfreflection (Garnett and Lynch 2002). As it turned out for all involved, the
move away from a security-focused approach would be a steep learning curve.
Security Policy: Sticking with Stormont
The outbreak of widespread civil unrest in August 1969, and the worsening levels of violence between then and the spring of 1971, posed a severe
challenge to the Government of Northern Ireland, which was dominated
by an Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), which was still taking the Conservative
Whip in Westminster at this time. Two prime ministers, Terence O’Neill
and his distant cousin James Chichester-Clark, had fallen during this
period. By March 1971, the office was held by Brian Faulkner, who also
held the post of Home Affairs minister, with something of a reputation as
a hardliner within the UUP, and opponent of reform during the civil rights
protests. Faulkner had been the man responsible for security in Northern
Ireland between 1959 and 1963. During that time, the Irish Republican
Army (IRA) launched an ill-­fated campaign to end partition by attacking
security installations on the frontier. This was the so-called border campaign (codenamed Operation Harvest).
To stifle the campaign, internment was introduced in Northern Ireland,
with up to 400 republican suspects arrested. Crucially, however, internment was also introduced in the Republic of Ireland, which increased the
pressure on the IRA. But the context during the 1970s was very different.
In December 1969, the IRA split into Official and Provisional wings, following the unrest of the summer, and the authorities were unable to keep
pace with these changes in terms of intelligence. Of equal importance, a
unified security approach with the Dublin government was much more
difficult after the violence of the summer of 1969, and the perceived
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partiality of the security forces in Northern Ireland against the nationalist
community, most of whom were citizens of Ireland.
Faced with the outbreak of a fresh campaign of violence, Faulkner
turned to the solution that had worked before, without regard for this
changed political context. His memoirs (Faulkner 1978) show a stubborn
refusal to acknowledge that that was a mistake, and he maintained to the
end that internment had stemmed the growing tide of violence. His biographer and former cabinet colleague David Bleakley, on the other hand,
summed up the disastrous nature of this position by entitling the chapter
on internment, ‘Miscalculation Supreme’ (Bleakley 1974).
Despite being initially wary, when Faulkner made his case, and against
the reservations of both the Chief of the General Staff, Sir Michael Carver,
and the General Officer Commanding (GOC) in Northern Ireland, Harry
Tuzo, Heath acquiesced with Faulkner’s request to introduce internment
provided that there was a complete ban on all marches and processions in
Northern Ireland.
Internment was seen by the Heath government as a last chance to
resolve the security situation before direct rule. Whilst the government’s
reluctance to implement direct rule was understandable, with hindsight, it
was a strategic mistake. Stormont was beyond saving at this stage, and it
was an error of judgement on Heath’s part to persevere with it, much less
engage the Army in a futile and provocative military exercise, that would
further undermine nationalist confidence in his government.
Internment was a disaster in both security and public relations terms.
The rounding up of suspects began on the morning of 9 August, with a
total of 342 people arrested. Only two non-Catholics were arrested, both
of whom were either associated with the civil rights movement or republican groups (Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry (BSI), 2010). Worse,
the vast bulk of those arrested had no links to paramilitary activity whatsoever, and even those arrested who had were often old men last active during the 1920s, as the intelligence was hopelessly out of date. Adding injury
to insult, some of those who were interned suffered ‘interrogation-indepth’ at the hands of the British Army, involving the notorious ‘five techniques’. These were hooding, sleep deprivation, exposure to noise,
deprivation of refreshment and standing in stress positions (Compton
Report 1971; McGuffin 1974; Faul and Murray 2016; Duffy 2019).
Following the publication of the Parker Report (1972) into interrogation
procedures in 1972, Heath informed parliament that these methods
would be discontinued (HC Deb, Vol. 832, Col. 743-4, 2 March 1972).
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What slivers of remaining goodwill towards the British state that may
still have existed among the nationalist community were destroyed by
internment. Serious rioting followed, exacerbating tensions between both
communities through the remainder of the year. Worse was to follow on
Bloody Sunday, 30 January 1972. An event that may not have happened
had internment not been introduced in the first place.
The Road to Bloody Sunday
It is impossible to discuss the Heath government’s Northern Ireland policy without reference to Bloody Sunday in Derry, 30 January 1972. The
events of the day need only be recalled briefly. In the course of an illegal
demonstration organised by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association
(NICRA) against internment, soldiers from First Battalion, The Parachute
Regiment (1 Para) opened fire on civilians during a riot sparked by a confrontation with the security forces. Thirteen unarmed demonstrators were
killed on the day; another died of their injuries a month later. Central to
academic debates about Bloody Sunday has been the question of government sanction for the actions of the troops. Archival evidence can help us
understand the policy environment at the time. The picture that emerges
does not suggest that the actions of 1 Para were approved at government
level, but they do hint at dysfunction within the security forces, for whom
the government was ultimately responsible. And Heath’s handling of the
aftermath of the affair has cast shadows over his record in Northern Ireland
as a whole.
Bloody Sunday was not the only security controversy to besmirch the
record of the security forces in Northern Ireland, under Heath’s tenure.
The twin debacles of the Falls Road Curfew, imposed for 36 hours in June
1970 was an Army decision, not a political one, but it occurred on Heath’s
watch, even if this was early in his premiership and when he may not have
been paying as much significant attention to Northern Ireland matters as
he might have been (Warner 2006). Likewise, the killings of 11 civilians
by 1 Para in the Ballymurphy area of Belfast in August 1971 was a further
dark chapter during Heath’s term of office (Wing 2010). The Ballymurphy
incident might, and perhaps should, have made the government think
twice about the deployment of the Parachute Regiment in Northern
Ireland, a few months before the Derry killings, but no such restrictions
were put in place. That is not to say, however, that there is evidence that
what happened in Derry in January 1972 was pre-planned. But, at this
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remove, it is pertinent to ask if it may have been foreseeable, given the past
actions of the regiment in question.
In the months prior to Bloody Sunday, there was much discussion
about what to do about security policy in Derry. Initially, Heath appeared
to take a hard line regarding the approach to dealing with the IRA. A
meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Northern Ireland (GEN47) on 7
October 1971 heard that the prime minister noted that ‘the first priority
should be the defeat of the gunmen using military means and that in
achieving this we should have to accept whatever political penalties were
inevitable’ (BSI 2010). However, a more conciliatory tone regarding the
situation in Derry is apparent in both political and security circles closer to
the end of the year.
The Army had made good headway in Belfast, but were still largely
absent from the main Catholic neighbourhoods on the west side of Derry,
including the Bogside and the Creggan Estate, home to some 33,000
people. A December 1971 document compiled by the Commander of
Land Forces (CLF) in Northern Ireland, Major General Robert Ford, set
out the advantages and disadvantages of the military options available to
the security forces. These were continuing with the current policy of containment from the periphery but adopting a more offensive approach
(Course 1), preserving the current policy of undertaking major operations
without a permanent presence (Course 2), or establishing a permanent
military presence in the areas (Course 3).
Ford was clear that Course 3 was the best military solution, but that it
was so politically disadvantageous that ‘it should not be implemented in
the present circumstances’. Instead, Course 1 was recommended as the
best solution for the particular circumstances of Derry. The thinking of
senior ministers in Heath’s government chimed with that of the military.
The Home Secretary, Maudling, discussed the situation in Derry with the
GOC at Thiepval Barracks, Lisburn. Maudling is recorded as saying that
he had ‘no doubt the military judgement was right and that it would be
wrong to provoke a major confrontation at this stage’ (TNA, DEFE,
24/210, ‘Future Military Policy for Londonderry. An Appreciation of the
Situation by the CLF’, 14 December 1971).
Shortly after the CLF’s appraisal was circulated, a meeting of the
Defence Northern Ireland Policy Group noted that any attempt to reestablish a presence in the Bogside could, in the worst-case scenario,
require drastic action up to and including redrawing the UK border. A 22
December meeting recorded that any attempt to ‘take control of the
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remainder of Londonderry would lead to a fight against the people and
would set back hopes of a political solution. One solution to this particular
problem would be to re-draw the border along the line of the River Foyle’
(TNA, DEFE 24/210, ‘Meeting of Defence Northern Ireland policy
group’, 22 December 1971). The archival evidence, therefore, suggests
that the action taken on Bloody Sunday was the opposite of what the government, and senior Army personnel, desired in policy terms.
Nevertheless, some hardening of attitudes in political terms can be
detected from Heath’s utterances in the days preceding the demonstration. At the GEN47 Committee on 27 January 1972, it was recorded that
the meeting:
[A]greed that the Londonderry marchers must be prevented from leaving
the Creggan and Bogside areas; and criticism for the security forces for not
entering those areas must be countered by pointing out that it was a matter
of military judgement to choose the best place for achieving the aim of preventing the march from reaching its destination.
Crucially, however, the minutes also record that ‘[m]aximum publicity
should also be secured for arrests and court proceedings following the
marches’ (BSI 2010: 381-387). Thus, it seems likely that what was envisaged at political level was a propaganda victory, to be achieved through
arresting and convicting a considerable number of illegal demonstrators.
If there had been a plan to shoot unarmed civilians, then there could be
little benefit in seeking ‘maximum publicity’. Heath, however, could have
made more of an effort to differentiate between those who planned to
attend the march who were connected to paramilitary groups and those
who were not. At the meeting, he claimed that the ‘official wing of the
IRA were no doubt seeking through NICRA to exploit the difficulties of
the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Mr Faulkner’. This might have
created the impression that NICRA was a front organisation for the IRA,
thus colouring the perceptions of some in the political and military establishment towards the marchers, although this perception had no foundation in reality (see Purdie 1988). Nevertheless, it does not, on its own,
suggest that there was a plan to ‘make an example’ of them.
The government’s handling of the aftermath of Bloody Sunday, however, has attracted some criticism. This is partly explained by its association
with the establishment of the Widgery Tribunal, which inquired into the
deaths on 30 January 1972. The Widgery Report, for the most part,
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197
exonerated the Army for its approach on the day. Widgery concluded that
there was ‘no reason to suppose that the soldiers would have opened fire
if they had not been fired upon first’. However, the report did note that
‘none of the deceased or wounded [was] proved to have been shot whilst
handling a firearm or bomb’. There was only, according to him, ‘strong
suspicion’ that some had ‘handled’ these items (Widgery Report 1972).
Introducing the report in the House of Commons, Heath stated his
regret for the casualties ‘whatever the individual circumstances’, but went
on to argue that events such as those on 30 January could:
[O]nly be avoided by ending the law-breaking and violence which are
responsible for the continuing loss of life among the security forces and the
public in Londonderry and throughout the Province, and by a return to
legality, reconciliation and reason. I hope I may have the support of the
House in a renewed appeal for a combined effort to prevent any repetition
of circumstances such as led to this tragedy. (HC Deb, Vol. 835, Col. 521-2,
9 April 1972)
Opposition parties took similar views—regret about the loss of life, but
sympathy for the situation soldiers found themselves in where fast judgements had to be made. That said, the Liberal leader, Jeremy Thorpe, had
expressed concern that the Widgery report was hindered from the start by
the fact that the government had given its own view of what happened on
30 January before he had the chance to examine these events (Murray 2011).
Opposition parties were also, overall, more circumspect about the utility of deploying troops, or at least having such troops perform arrest operations of the sort carried out on Bloody Sunday. This was true of Labour’s
Northern Ireland spokesman, Jim Callaghan, and of Thorpe (HC Deb,
Vol. 835, Col. 521-2, 9 April 1972; Bloch 2014). Labour also became
more vocal in its opposition to internment, with its disproportionate
impact on the nationalist community (McGlynn and McDaid 2016).
Harold Wilson made the case for a transfer of security powers to London
and political discussions (Aveyard 2016: 14). All parties recognised the
need for a political initiative, if there was to be any hope of progress. Such
initiative would inevitably mean participation from nationalist politicians
and at least a consultative role for the Irish government.
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Salami Tactics: The Heath Government
and the Sunningdale Agreement
Heath’s reluctance to abolish Stormont was a stumbling block to a political solution throughout late 1971. From that year, he had been open to a
role for the Dublin government in the political process. Initially, however,
he informed the Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, that he ‘couldn’t consider anything that meant constitutional change’ (TNA, PREM, 15/478,
‘Transcript of Prime Minister’s telephone conversation with Mr Lynch’,
12 August 1971). This meant sticking with Stormont, to the exclusion of
nationalists from power. This was to change as the year wore on, and perhaps predated Bloody Sunday and the prorogation of Stormont in the
spring of 1972. In this, Heath’s thinking, or at least the policy of his government, may have been influenced by Northern Ireland’s top civil servant, Sir Ken Bloomfield, who engaged in secret correspondence with
Philip Woodfield, later Permanent Undersecretary of State at the Northern
Ireland Office, in late 1971.
Bloomfield’s proposals envisaged a new kind of administration for
Northern Ireland, ‘community government’, which meant ‘a share in governmental power’ for representatives of the nationalist community (TNA,
DEFE 24/210, ‘For Woodfield from Smith’, 20 December 1971). Even
more radically, for the time, Bloomfield suggested that the government
should increase co-­operation with the Republic of Ireland, and not stand
in the way of Irish unity if there came a time when the majority in Northern
Ireland desired this, via what might be termed ‘plebiscitary salami tactics’1:
To begin with, committees or councils for co-operation in certain fields [sic]
should be set up: If these proved useful, a referendum would be held after
several years on a proposal to extend the field of co-operation and perhaps
deepen its nature: and so on step by step: The progression might [sic] lead
in the end to the final question of unification.
However, he cautioned that publicising such a policy might provoke
strong ‘Protestant opposition’, which could further destabilise the security
situation. Furthermore, Bloomfield recognised that his proposal for ‘community government’ could not come from within Northern Ireland itself.
1
The term ‘salami tactics’ is attributed to Hungarian communist Mátyás Rákosi and usually refers to a piecemeal strategy, where one’s opponent doesn’t realise what has happened
until it is too late.
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The unionists could not ‘bring themselves to offer it’, and the nationalists
would ‘not accept it as a gift from the unionists’. The only way powersharing could come about was for the British to ‘intervene directly’.
Bloomfield argued that such intervention should be accompanied by constitutional change, veto powers in government and the legislature, and
reform of the electoral system, such as the implementation of a proportional electoral system, which would have ensured a greater voice for the
nationalist community. Bloomfield’s proposals were relayed to Prime
Minister Heath, who is reported to have read them ‘with great interest’
(TNA, CAB, 164/1175, ‘Robert Armstrong to Burke Trend’, 7
January 1972).
Whilst there is no evidence that Bloomfield’s proposals directly influenced Heath, their timing is important, and possibly significant, given that
some of what he advocated was adopted as government policy by Reginald
Maudling in the spring of 1972. Here, the Home Secretary advocated
adapting ‘administration, legislature and Government’ to allow for the
participation of the majority. Whilst respecting that the majority in
Northern Ireland favoured the maintenance of the union, he made a suggestion similar to that of Bloomfield: that periodic plebiscites be held,
primarily to reassure the Protestant community the union was secure.
Although the idea of periodic plebiscites did not materialise, a border poll
referendum was held in March 1973. Boycotted by nationalist politicians,
who knew the result was a foregone conclusion, it showed an overwhelming majority in favour of the status quo. Thus, whilst the future of the
union was ‘off the table’, support for constitutional change, power-sharing, and having constructive input from the Dublin government, as advocated by Bloomfield, was gaining increasing traction in London.
This change of attitude reflects that Heath’s thinking on Northern
Ireland underwent some development during the latter half of 1972.
From having told Lynch that he could not countenance constitutional
change in 1971, he did just that in endorsing Whitelaw’s 1973 White
Paper, The Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals. This White Paper,
which became law as the Northern Ireland Constitution Act (1973),
included a significant change to the constitutional position of Northern
Ireland, compared to the Ireland Act of 1949. For the first time, Northern
Ireland’s place in the union was made conditional on popular support.
The 1949 Act stipulated that Northern Ireland would not cease to be part
of HM dominions and the United Kingdom without the consent of its
Parliament. Since that parliament had, de facto, an in-built unionist
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majority, its position was very secure. The 1973 Act, however, made
Northern Ireland’s place in the United Kingdom subject to the ‘consent
of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll’: a simple majority. Whilst this may seem logical, given Stormont was no longer
operable, the longer-term implications of changing the law may not have
been thought through, given contemporary demographic and political
realities.
Furthermore, Heath’s government was prepared to introduce radical
reforms to the Stormont system, including what amounted to mandatory
power-sharing, again, very close to what Bloomfield had been proposing
in late 1971. As the White Paper put it, the government of Northern
Ireland could ‘no longer be solely based upon any single party, if that party
draws its support and its elected representation virtually entirely from only
one section of a divided community’ (Northern Ireland Constitutional
Proposals, 1973). This was a measure of how far the government, which
had presided over a series of counter-productive security interventions,
was prepared to go to address the political crisis in Northern Ireland.
A new Assembly was duly formed in the autumn of 1973, with discussions about the formation of a cross-community government continuing
until the new year. In the meantime, Heath instituted one of his most
significant policy initiatives on Irish affairs: the conclusion of the
Sunningdale Agreement between 6 and 9 December 1973.
At Sunningdale, the British and Irish governments, and the pro-power-­
sharing parties that went on to form a cross-community executive (the
faction of the UUP led by Brian Faulkner, the nationalist Social Democratic
and Labour Party (SDLP), and non-sectarian Alliance Party) agreed to the
formation of an all-Ireland collaborative body with ‘executive and harmonising functions’, to encourage co-operation in fields such as economic
development, agriculture, infrastructure, and the arts (Sunningdale
Agreement Communique 1973).
To soften the potential for the Sunningdale Agreement to raise unionist
anxieties, the British and Irish governments used the communiqué to issue
declarations concerning the constitutional status of Northern Ireland,
which may have actually exacerbated their fears. The UK government
made clear that it would support the wishes of the people of Northern
Ireland to remain in the union, but added that if in the future ‘they should
indicate a wish to become part of a united Ireland’, the British government would support that wish. At the same time, the Irish government
accepted the constitutional status of Northern Ireland could never change
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without the consent of a majority there. This, coupled with the proposed
‘Council of Ireland’, was highly controversial from a unionist perspective.
Indeed, many unionists felt that any Dublin involvement in Northern
Ireland affairs constituted a ‘slippery slope’ towards unity, even where this
was not, practically, the case. The extent to which the Dublin government
was actively using the Council to advance the cause of Irish unity is hotly
debated in the literature (See McDaid 2012; McGrattan 2009).
Regardless of Dublin’s intentions, what is significant here is the extent
to which Heath was prepared to involve the Irish government in the political future of Northern Ireland. As Jeremy Smith has demonstrated, this
willingness could be seen as far back as 1970, with Heath’s approach to
British-Irish co-operation and the cultivation of cordial relations with the
then Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, who was under pressure in parliament from a
republican rump within his own party (Smith 2007; O’Brien 2000; Hanley
2018). The establishment of a formal role for Dublin in Northern Ireland
affairs was to have long-­lasting implications for the development of the
conflict in the region. Most immediately, for Heath, was the effect on the
longevity of the power-sharing executive which his government was
instrumental in establishing. As an experiment in cross-community government, it was short-lived, and the spectre of Dublin involvement in
Northern Ireland’s affairs played a role in its downfall, at the hands of
unionists and loyalists in May 1974.
The Heath Government
and the Power-Sharing Executive
As mentioned, an executive was agreed in principle between the three pro-­
power-­sharing parties in the autumn of 1973. Comprising the wing of the
UUP led by Brian Faulkner, the SDLP, and Alliance parties, it took office
on 1 January 1974. Faulkner became Chief Executive, with the SDLP’s
Gerry Fitt as Deputy-Chief Executive. A little over five months later, the
power-sharing government collapsed in ignominious circumstances (See
Anderson 1994; Fisk 1975). It is not the purpose of the chapter to rehearse
its tenure in detail. Instead, we seek to contribute to the scholarly debates
still raging about whether the Heath government could have saved the
power-sharing administration whilst in office. To do so, it is necessary to
briefly recall some key facts about the executive’s downfall.
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The executive was plagued with external challenges during its short
lifetime. Republican and loyalist paramilitaries continued their campaign
of violence, (republican violence was particularly intense in border
regions), which meant that most citizens saw no immediate benefit to the
security situation that could be attributed to the new institutions, or
increased cross-­border security co-operation. Politically, many unionists
were vocally opposed to the power-sharing executive—with or without an
Irish dimension. Faulkner, therefore, was under significant pressure from
the unionist right, whose numbers included Paisley’s DUP but also the
Ulster Vanguard movement, who, following a decision by Heath, were
presented with an opportunity to press home their advantage just a month
after he assumed the role of Chief Executive.
The General Election that Heath called in February 1974 was meant to
settle the question, ‘Who Governs?’ In Northern Ireland, however, the
only substantive issue that was discussed during the campaign was the
continuation of the Sunningdale Agreement. Unionists opposed to the
agreement formed an electoral coalition, the United Ulster Unionist
Coalition (UUUC), with agreed candidates to maximise their vote. Their
emotive, if misleading slogan, ‘Dublin is just a Sunningdale away’ captured the imagination of the unionist electorate, and the UUUC won 11
of Northern Ireland’s 12 Westminster seats, an outcome that was to fatally
undermine its credibility (McDaid 2012). Heath lost the election, with
Harold Wilson’s Labour returning to power and Merlyn Rees took over as
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
The executive was eventually toppled by a political strike organised by
a body styling itself the ‘Ulster Workers’ Council’ (UWC) in May 1974.
The UWC was a ragtag of loyalist paramilitaries, trades unionists from the
Protestant community and politicians on the unionist right. In collaboration with the UUUC, the UWC called for the renegotiation of the
Sunningdale Agreement, but the Assembly instead endorsed an executive
amendment to the motion. On 14 May, therefore, the UWC strike began.
The UWC had a distinct advantage over the executive, and the British
government, in that their members controlled electricity generating stations, and power was rationed to exert pressure on the executive. Crucially,
gangs of loyalist paramilitaries acted as muscle for the UWC, with those
from unionist or loyalist communities ‘discouraged’ from breaking the
strike, which helped ensure it was widely observed.
On 28 May, with essential services such as water, power and sewage
under threat, Faulkner tendered his resignation (PRONI, Office of the
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Executive (OE) files, 2/32, executive minutes, 28 May 1974). The SDLP
refused to resign, but, under the terms of the Constitution Act, Rees was
obliged to dissolve the executive. The UWC strike is still the subject of
considerable political and scholarly dispute. Some scholars, such as
Brendan O’Leary, claim that the government could, and should, have
faced-down the UWC and ensured the executive’s survival. In failing to
do so, he argued, Wilson’s government was guilty of ‘abject spinelessness’
(O’Leary 2004: 196). This position has been supported by Tony Craig,
who has suggested the strike ‘could and would have been controlled had
British contingency plans not warned for years of the dangers of a
Protestant backlash’ (Craig 2010: 194). Although by this time out of government, Heath has been dragged into this counter-factual debate about
the outcome of the UWC strike.
Like O’Leary, Michael Kerr has critiqued the Labour administration for
failing to act against the UWC. Kerr, however, takes the argument a step
further, claiming that Wilson ‘simply chose not to act…if Heath had
remained Prime Minister he would certainly have acted’ (Kerr 2005: 68).
But could Heath have done more to save the executive in the face of the
UWC strike? A review of the available evidence suggests that this claim
may belong in the realms of wishful thinking.
In order for the British government to have defeated the UWC strike,
the government would have needed to take charge of essential services
from the strikers. As mentioned, the UWC controlled the electricity-generating stations. Without the power plant operators, or at least considerable support from middle management or imported expertise, the task of
generating and, more importantly, effectively distributing power, would
have fallen to the Army (For the discussion regarding security, see TNA,
CJ4, Northern Ireland Office /504, meeting between the Secretary of
State, the GOC, Chief of Staff, Chief Constable and Officials, 17 May
1974). As Stuart Aveyard’s (2016: 32-36) analysis of archival material has
demonstrated, this was a task that was beyond its capacity, notwithstanding the potential security implications of sending troops to engage in
strike-breaking activity where paramilitary groups were heavily involved.
The situation was deemed, by a contemporary official in Northern
Ireland, to be so dire that the prognosis was that essential services could
only be maintained between 2 and 14 days without serious risk to public
health and at some risk of life to the elderly and infirm in the event of a
collapse in the electricity supply (PRONI, OE2/24, ‘Situation report by
Maurice Hayes’ (Department of Health and Social Services), Executive
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minutes, 20 May 1974). What swapping Wilson for Heath might have
changed in these circumstances is not considered by those suggesting a
different approach was possible. Likewise, the assumption that Heath
would have acted does not imply that his intervention would have worked.
Indeed, such an assumption risks losing sight of the fact that popular
unionist opposition to Sunningdale and the executive meant that the
prognosis for its survival were grim to say the least.
Perhaps the most compelling evidence that Heath may not have been a
saviour in waiting for the executive comes from the former prime minister’s own memoir account of the UWC strike. It is worth recalling at
length, since it does not suggest that Heath paid particular attention to
the details of the strike at the time:
Then a strike of petrol tanker drivers took only a week to have its effect.
Although a comparatively small number of vehicles was involved, the economic activity of Northern Ireland ground rapidly to a halt. Attempts by the
TUC to lead a back to work movement were rapidly doomed. Brian Faulkner
and his senior colleagues went to see Harold Wilson … to ask for his help in
providing drivers from the armed forces, which he undertook to do.
However, none was forthcoming on the Monday and, as a result, the executive lost confidence in the Westminster government. This was a brutal and
unnecessary ending to the three-party coalition and another bitter personal
blow. At the time, Dr Paisley was in the United States campaigning for funds
and had nothing whatever to do with it. (Heath 1998: 434-435)
Heath’s account is riven with inaccuracies about the nature of the
strike, which he portrayed as involving little more than some fuel shortages as opposed to the potential threat to public health and life that it was
seen as at the time. Further, he completely misrepresented the role of
Paisley, who was in Canada (not the United States) to attend a funeral at
the start of the stoppage, but returned (when he saw it was likely to be
successful) to take a seat on the strike committee, although his considerable presence, and ego, was not always appreciated by the hard men of the
UWC (Bruce 2007; McDaid 2013). None of the above adds credence to
the notion that Heath was so committed to the executive that he would
have been prepared to make the massive investments of time and resources
to try and save it—especially when such an investment would have been
likely to be futile anyway.
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Northern Ireland: Economic Policy
In addition to managing the security situation and looking for political
solutions, the Heath government was concerned with the economic picture in Northern Ireland. Not that the two were unrelated, rather they
were seen as inherently interlinked. The centrality of tackling chronic economic underperformance in Northern Ireland, with a focus on state support for job creation and small businesses, such as rent rebate schemes or
the Local Enterprise Development Unit (set up on in 1971), reflected the
belief that reducing unemployment would in itself reduce violent disorder
(Cunningham 2001). Whitelaw in particular tried to sell the economic
benefits of the union, although policies such as public investment in the
shipyard industry, which had long been a site of exclusion for nationalists
in terms of employment opportunities, may not have had the impact he
hoped (Arthur 1996).
It would be unfair to judge the intense economic intervention in
Northern Ireland as evidence of Heath’s supposed U-turn from a commitment to unleash the forces of the market. The seriousness of the situation
and the sudden escalation of the violence after Heath took office necessitated a pragmatic and open approach, much like his humanitarian attitude
to the Ugandan Asian crisis. In addition, one needs to put these policies in
the context of what came after them. Successive Thatcher administrations
would maintain interventionist policies, such as state responsibility for fair
employment, economic stimulation through public sector jobs and investment in commercial enterprise and social housing. The rolling back of the
state emphatically did not occur in Northern Ireland (O’Leary 1989).
Conclusion
Heath would not return to the front bench of the Conservative Party after
he lost the position of leader but Whitelaw would find himself part of a
Conservative Cabinet which had to deal with a crisis precipitated by the
decision he came to regret most about Northern Ireland. The influx of
internees to Northern Ireland’s antiquated prison system created practical
as well as political headaches and Whitelaw decided on the expedient
course of creating a special category status for those convicted of terrorist
offences. The withdrawal of this by Labour provoked protests that would
escalate into the hunger strikes of 1980–1981.
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In his autobiography, Heath was very positive about the Good Friday
Agreement of 1998 that officially drew the conflict that had erupted in the
late 1960s to a close. He added that ‘I can only hope that it will fare better
than the Sunningdale Agreement, which it in so many ways resembles’
(Heath 1998: 445). The journey away from a security-first approach and
from solely internal political solutions that Heath and his Cabinet took
supports this claim. Heath and Whitelaw should also take credit for recognising and rectifying mistakes, accepting rebuke over the affront to the
rule of law represented by interrogation techniques and engaging with
actors and ideas that were so different from their own experience and position. Within the constraints of multiple other policy priorities, the difficulties of trying to manage the expectations and anger of unionist allies, and
the limited faith of nationalists after the violent reaction to the civil rights
campaign, there were sincere attempts to change things for the better.
However, the security blunders of the opening act of Heath’s policies
towards Northern Ireland extinguished any opportunity for swift and
peaceful resolution of the conflict, and while we cannot find any evidence
to support the idea that events such as Bloody Sunday were part of a deliberate policy, the travesty of the Widgery Report reminds us that the government was not a neutral arbiter of the situation and it would be for
another Conservative Prime Minister, David Cameron, to offer a fulsome
apology for what happened in Derry that day after Lord Saville published
the report of his commission in 2010. To argue that Heath would have
bolstered the executive in 1974 and faced down the UWC strike is to
engage in magical thinking.
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23(1), 61–78.
McGuffin, J. (1974). The Guinea Pigs. London: Penguin.
Murray, D. (2011). Bloody Sunday: Truth, Lies and the Saville Inquiry. London:
Biteback.
O’Brien, J. (2000). The Arms Trial. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan.
O’Leary, B. (1989). The Conservative Stewardship of Northern Ireland
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Smith, J. (2007). Walking a Real Tight-rope of Difficulties: Sir Edward Heath and
the Search for Stability in Northern Ireland, June 1970–March 1971. Twentieth
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conflict’ Northern Ireland. Museum International, 62(1-2), 31–36.
CHAPTER 10
Entry into the European Communities
Peter Dorey
Several post-war British prime ministers have retrospectively been identified, either by themselves directly or by others, with a particular policy or
achievement. Harold Wilson deemed the creation of the Open University
to be his greatest success (Castle 1990: 744, diary entry for 22 March
1976; Haines 1998: 2–3)—notwithstanding that Jennie Lee, as Minister
of Arts, was the real architect (Dorey 2015; Hollis 1997: chapters
10–11)—while in 2002, Margaret Thatcher declared that the creation of
New Labour was her most important legacy (Burns 2008). For Edward
Heath, the pride of his premiership was securing the UK’s membership of
the European Community: ‘It was my greatest success as Prime Minister…I
had spent my…parliamentary career working towards this’ (Heath 1998:
380). As Heath’s Political Secretary (and later a senior Cabinet Minister
under Margaret Thatcher and John Major) Douglas Hurd averred, ‘Ted’s
overwhelming ambition [was] to bring about British entry into the
European Community’ (Hurd 2003: 197).
One of his most respected biographers, John Campbell, concurred,
noting that securing UK membership of the European Communities (EC)
P. Dorey (*)
Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK
e-mail: Dorey@cardiff.ac.uk
© The Author(s) 2021
A. S. Roe-Crines, T. Heppell (eds.), Policies and Politics Under
Prime Minister Edward Heath, Palgrave Studies in Political
Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53673-2_10
211
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P. DOREY
had been ‘the central plank of Heath’s purpose…. Everything else was,
and always had been, secondary’ (Campbell 1993: 442), while another
biographer, writing in the midst of Heath’s premiership, prophesied that
‘whatever else he does, taking Britain into Europe is likely to be this Prime
Minister’s greatest achievement’ (Laing 1972: 247). Meanwhile, the then
Chief Whip, Francis Pym, deemed the European Communities Act to
have been ‘by far the most important piece of legislation…the centrepiece of the whole [1970–74] parliament really….The European Bill had
to have absolute priority’ (quoted in Kandiah 1995: 205), while a (then)
backbench opponent of EC membership described it as ‘his [Heath’s]
life’s ambition’ (Biffen 2013: 255). Another Conservative backbencher in
the early 1970s, Norman St. John-­Stevas (1984: 41), described EC membership as ‘Mr Heath’s lasting triumph, and the achievement which will
ensure his place in history’, while a political historian of the Conservative
Party agrees that taking the UK into the EC ‘was undoubtedly his government’s greatest success’ (Garnett 2015: 317; see also Kavanagh 1987: 228).
This chapter begins by examining Heath’s motives for placing such a
high priority on this policy objective, and then the means by which he
pursued it. This entails consideration of three discrete aspects: (1) the key
issues addressed in the prior negotiations, and how they were resolved; (2)
how Heath and the Conservative whips aimed to maximise parliamentary
support for EC membership in a Conservative Party which already harboured some strong Eurosceptics; (3) how Heath sought to ‘sell’ EC
membership to an initially sceptical electorate. Not only are these aspects
intrinsically important and interesting, they are also imbued with added
resonance, given Heath’s reputation as a taciturn leader who lacked communication and interpersonal skills, and emotional intelligence (for details
on these, see examples from the leading biographical works on Heath,
such as Campbell 1993 and Ziegler 2010).
Although sundry other authors have written about Heath and the EC,
this chapter benefits considerably from archival materials which have only
relatively recently become available to scholars, and which previous authors
did not have access to at the time they were writing, namely the
Conservative Party’s archives at the Bodleian Library, Oxford, and governmental/ministerial papers at the National Archives in Kew.
10 ENTRY INTO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
213
Heath and the Case for Pro-Europeanism
Heath had initially become enamoured with Europe as a consequence of
visiting Paris on a school exchange in 1931, and then, as an Oxford undergraduate, visiting Austria, Germany, Poland and Spain in the three years
preceding the start of the Second World War (Heath 1977: Chapters 1–3;
Heath 1998: 14, 40–44, 52–57, 68–71). According to his (1970–1973)
Press Secretary, Sir Donald Maitland, Heath’s experiences of visiting
Europe, under the shadow of Fascism, ‘had had a marked effect upon him.
From that moment on…[he] realised that there had to be a different
arrangement in Europe’ (quoted in Kandiah 1995: 206. See also Roth
1972: 34–35, 37, 40–41). As Heath himself reflected: ‘all these travels
have provided the background, if not the substance, of the policies and
ideals I have tried to pursue’ (Heath 1977: 222).
Moreover, according to his Parliamentary Private Secretary, Sir Timothy
Kitson, Heath’s experience of serving as a soldier in the War itself reinforced his conviction of the need for closer ties between European countries: ‘he came back after the war hell-bent on taking a different look at
Europe’ (quoted in Kandiah 1995: 206). This point was echoed by Lord
(Robert) Armstrong, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister,
who recalled that Heath ‘was determined that there should be some structure that would avoid another European war of the kind that he served
through from 1939–45’. This conviction only increased as the British
Empire steadily dissipated in the post-era, leaving the UK seeking a new
role in international affairs, and a means of restoring at least some of its
diminished global status. Lord Armstrong added that Heath ‘felt like a
European and he identified with European culture’ (quoted in Kandiah
1995: 206, 207; see also Young 1998: 216–218).
Writing an anonymous editorial in the Church Times in November
1948, Heath observed that: ‘on the continent…the man-in-the-street
realises the weakness of the nation in isolation’, but this realisation had not
yet been attained in the UK. However, Heath himself was already ‘beginning to sense that Britain needed to come to terms with its limitations….
My pre-war and wartime experience had by now convinced me that or
future must lie inside a European Community’ (Heath 1998: 122,
122–123). Given that victory in the Second World War had, on the contrary, convinced many people of Britain’s continued strength and supremacy, Heath’s less sanguine ruminations were remarkably prescient.
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P. DOREY
Heath’s conviction that it was in the UK’s interest to join the EC was
reinforced when Harold Macmillan appointed him Lord Privy Seal in
1960. This was a non-Departmental post, a ‘Minister without Portfolio’,
but such appointments invariably entail a specific ad hoc task, and in this
case, it was to lead the negotiations for the UK’s first (1961) application
to join the EC, even though the country had declined to join the six
founding members just four years earlier. Although the UK’s application
was vetoed, in 1963, by the French President, General De Gaulle, his discussions with sundry European politicians and diplomats reinforced
Heath’s personal commitment to Europe, and the necessity for the UK to
secure membership of the EC sooner or later.
In addition to his formative experiences and consequent personal commitment to closer, formal, ties with Europe, Heath was convinced that
membership of the EC was vital to the UK’s economic and political interests. The 1960s had heard growing concern being expressed about the
UK’s relative economic decline. In this context, ‘relative’ had two particular meanings—the performance of the economy in historical context when
compared to previous decades and, second, the international dimension,
whereby it became evident that other countries were outperforming the
UK economically. For example, towards the end of the 1960s, Britain’s
average rate of economic growth was just 2%, whereas the six-member
European Communities (hereafter referred to as the EC) were enjoying a
6.5% economic growth rate, a fact ruefully noted by the 1971 White Paper
delineating the Heath Government’s pursuit of membership: ‘we have
begun to drop seriously behind other countries, and particularly the members of the Community, in attaining a higher standard of living’ (HMSO
1971: 12, para. 40 and 15, paras. 51–54; see CPA, CRD 3/10/2/1/2,
FAC (71) 3, ‘Britain and the European Communities—Briefing Material
for the Parliamentary Debate on the Common Market’, July 1971). From
this perspective, the UK’s decision not to join the EC at the outset
appeared to have been a mistake, and a missed opportunity. As Reginald
Maudling, one of Heath’s senior Ministerial colleagues, candidly acknowledged in hindsight:
we underestimated the strength behind the new concept of the European
Economic Community in the early 1950s…we doubted in fact it would
really come to very much.…We were wrong, and we were wrong because we
had failed to recognize the historical decline in our own power…history had
overtaken us. (Maudling 1978: 232)
10 ENTRY INTO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
215
Heath certainly viewed it as economically imperative that the UK belatedly join the EC, for this would provide a major impetus to the country’s
sluggish economic performance by securing access to a free trade zone or
‘common market’ just across the English Channel, and thereby provide a
major fillip to British manufacturers in terms of exports. As was noted by
the White Paper which heralded imminent legislation to ensure the UK’s
accession to the EC:
If we do not join, we shall forego these opportunities which the members of
the Communities will increasingly enjoy. Their industries will have a home
market of some 190 million people.…Our industries would have a home
market of some 55 million people. (HMSO 1971: 14, para. 48)
This clearly offered enormous potential for improving the UK’s Balance
of Payments, which was often ‘in the red’ due to the scale of imports over
exports: the UK had lost its former reputation as ‘the workshop of the
world’. On the day that he signed the Accession Treaty, formally confirming that the UK would join the EC in January 1973, Heath reiterated the
economic benefits to be accrued, anticipating ‘a great improvement in the
standard of living for our people’, and envisaging that the EC would soon
rival the United States as a global economic power (Campbell 1993: 437).
Or as another of his biographers observed at the time: ‘Europe, he believes,
after it has given its original therapeutic shock of competition to this country, will be our salvation and give Britain back her place in the world’
(Laing 1972: 248).
So convinced was Heath of the economic advantages to be accrued
from the UK’s membership of the EC that he believed that they greatly
outweighed the formal diminution of parliamentary sovereignty, which
many opponents cited as a key reason for not joining. On one occasion, he
explained to the House of Commons that:
There is a pooling of sovereignty. Member countries of the Community
have deliberately undertaken this to achieve their objectives…because they
believe that the objectives are worth that degree of surrender of sovereignty.…When we surrender some sovereignty, we shall have a share in the
sovereignty of the Community as a whole, and of other members of it. It is
not just…an abandonment of sovereignty to other countries; it is a sharing
of other people’s sovereignty as well as a pooling of our own. (HD Deb,
Vol. 736, Cols. 653–54, 17 November 1966)
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P. DOREY
Heath’s Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, reiterated this perspective, explaining to an intra-Party policy forum that ‘sovereignty is
essentially the capacity of a nation to influence its own future. This could
often be achieved better in partnership than in isolation’ (CPA, ACP 2/3,
Advisory Committee on Policy, ACP (71) 113th meeting, minutes of
meeting held on 21 July 1971). However, although opponents of the
UK’s membership of the EC focused primarily on the issue of sovereignty
(see later), it is important to recognise that, at the time, member states
retained a ‘veto’ over issues deemed to be of particular importance to
them, something which Heath emphasised to the Cabinet when he
returned from a very successful meeting in Paris, in May 1971, with the
French President, Georges Pompidou (NA CAB 128/49, CM (71) 27th
Conclusions, Meeting of the Cabinet held on 24 May 1971), and which
was echoed by Douglas-Home (CPA, ACP 2/3, Advisory Committee on
Policy, ACP (71) 113th meeting, minutes of meeting held on 21 July
1971). The sovereignty/unanimity issue was reiterated in the 1971 White
Paper, which explained that:
The practical working of the Community…reflects the reality that sovereign
Governments are represented round the table. On a question where a
Government considers that vital national interests are involved, it is established that the decision should be unanimous….There is no question of any
erosion of essential national sovereignty; what is proposed is a sharing and
an enlargement of individual national sovereignties in the general interest.
(HMSO 1971: 8, para. 29; see also Heath 1970; 34)
In addition to the envisaged economic advantages to be accrued, Heath
also strongly favoured UK membership of the EC for political and diplomatic reasons. By the 1960s, it was not just the UK’s economy which was
in (relative) decline but the UK’s former Empire and status as a global
superpower, the latter reflected and reinforced by the UK’s termination of
its permanent military presence in the Far East (particularly in Malaysia
and Singapore), the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, a military retrenchment commonly termed ‘East of Suez’. The UK could no longer afford to
maintain permanent garrisons and naval bases across the globe, so, instead,
the country initially sought solace in the supposedly ‘special relationship’
with the US, albeit very much as a junior partner. According to one proEC Conservative parliamentarian, the ‘great post-war failure of British foreign policy was missing the European opportunity…in 1957 when we
10 ENTRY INTO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
217
turned down the chance to sign the Treaty of Rome’ (St. John-Stevas
1984: 40).
In this context, Heath was convinced that membership of the EC would
restore (if only indirectly) some of the UK’s recently reduced prestige and
influence in international affairs. Indeed, according to Lord Armstrong,
Heath was convinced that ‘with the dismantling of empire, Europe was
where our destiny lay, rather than in any relationship with the United
States’ (quoted in Kandiah 1995: 206; see also Heath 1970: 67).
Pre-entry Negotiations
In lieu of beginning formal negotiations, there was a tactical issue to be
resolved within the new Heath Government. It was envisaged that the
French remained the most likely obstacle to UK membership of the EC,
even though General De Gaulle (who had vetoed the previous two applications) had retired in 1969, and as such, the Foreign Office favoured
working primarily with the other five members in order to isolate France,
such that weight of numbers (of the other member states) would compel
the French to abandon any residual resistance to UK membership.
However, Heath flatly rejected such an approach, instead emphasising
the importance of winning the trust of the French political leadership,
partly as a matter of principle and partly to ensure that France did not
invoke its veto power against the UK for a third time: ‘there was no question of them accepting British membership just because the [other] Five
wanted us in’ (Hurd 1979: 58). It was thus decided that, instead of seeking to marginalise France, every diplomatic effort should be made to foster closer and more cordial ties with the French through bilateral meetings,
the most important and high profile of which was Heath’s meeting with
President Pompidou in Paris on 20–21 May 1971 (NA CAB 128/49, CM
(71) 26th Conclusions, Meeting of the Cabinet held on 18 May, 1971;
NA CAB 128/49; CM (71) 27th Conclusions, Meeting of the Cabinet
held on 24 May 1971). It was at this meeting—originally mooted by the
UK’s Ambassador to France, Christopher Soames—(NA PREM 15/368,
‘Note for the Record—meeting between Soames and Heath on 1 March
1971’, 2 March 1971)—that several points of disagreement between the
UK and France were resolved, such as the UK’s budgetary contributions—which then facilitated the relatively smooth completion of most
remaining negotiations over the UK’s application, sufficient to enable a
White Paper to be published in July 1971 (Heath 1998: 364–368).
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P. DOREY
Indeed, Hugo Young (1998: 233) described the Heath-Pompidou bilateral as ‘decisive in securing British entry’.
The UK’s negotiations with the six founding member states of the EC
formally commenced on 30 June 1970 and focused mainly on four main
issues, namely budgetary contributions, Commonwealth trade, the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the UK fishing industry, although
there were considerable interlinkages and overlaps between the first three
of these ostensibly separate spheres. Senior ministers, including Heath
himself, were acutely aware that ‘the success or failure of negotiations
would be determined’ by the resolution of these issues (NA PREM
15/368, ‘Note for the Record—Informal Meeting of Edward Heath,
Anthony Barber [Chancellor], Alec Douglas-Home [Foreign Secretary]
and Geoffrey Rippon, 31 January 1971’, 1 February 1971; NA PREM
15/62, ‘Record of Meeting between Geoffrey Rippon and the French
Prime Minister, 19 November 1970’, 20 November 1970; NA PREM
15/62, Rippon to Heath, ‘European Community Negotiations’, 30
October 1971).
Budgetary Contributions/Commonwealth trade
The EC’s budget was derived primarily from two main sources of revenue,
namely 1% of each member state’s Value Added Tax (VAT) receipts (or the
national equivalent thereof) and ‘external tariffs’ imposed on imports of
food and manufactured goods from beyond the EC. The former became
controversial in the early 1980s when the first (1979–1983) Thatcher
Government increased VAT from 8% to 15%, to offset the huge cuts in
income tax for the rich. In the early 1970s, though, the main issue was the
extent to which the UK would be permitted to ‘phase in’ its overall budgetary contribution, thereby facilitating a period of adjustment rather than
pay the full amount immediately.
Linked to this issue of timing, though, was the second aspect of the
UK’s contribution to the EC budget, namely the tariff to be imposed on
imports from the Commonwealth, especially dairy produce from New
Zealand and sugar from the Caribbean (CPA, ACP 2/3, Advisory
Committee on Policy, ACP (71) 110th meeting, minutes of meeting held
on 27 January 1971). As the prime economic purpose of the EC or
‘Common Market’ was to foster trade between member states, the UK’s
determination to maintain privileged access for food imports from the
Commonwealth—and the extent to which some of these countries relied
10 ENTRY INTO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
219
heavily on their exports to the UK—was potentially highly problematic
and against the spirit of the EC. Certainly, it could have been construed as
evidence that the UK was not yet fully committed to Europe, but wanted—
to maintain the food theme—to have its cake and eat it.
However, there was another reason why the UK’s Commonwealth
food imports were potentially a significant problem during the pre-entry
negotiations, namely that French farmers were themselves major producers of sugar beet and cheese (George 1998: 51). Given the extent to which
UK negotiators needed to persuade the French to say ‘oui’ to Heath’s
application to join the EC—the other five member states having already
indicated their desire to admit the UK—this could have been a particularly
vexatious source of disagreement and clash of domestic interests.
The outcome, though, was a compromise, whereby the UK’s food
imports from the Commonwealth would gradually decrease over a fiveyear period, this commencing from the date that the UK formally joined
the EC. For example, New Zealand’s butter exports to the UK would be
reduced by 4% each year, but this meant that after the five years, the country would still be permitted to export 80% of her existing quota to the
UK. The same period would see a parallel increase in the UK’s budgetary
contributions (as a share of the EC’s total budget), these rising from 8.6%
in 1973 to 18.9% in 1977 (HMSO 1971: 24, para. 93, Table 2; NA CAB
128/49, CM (71) 33rd Conclusions, Meeting of the Cabinet held on 24
June 1971; Heath 1998: 374; Kitzinger 1973: 142).
How much of a compromise this represented is indicated by the fact
that France had originally insisted on the UK paying its full share of contributions from the first year of membership, while the UK had suggested
a starting figure of 3%. However, Rippon had shrewdly envisaged that by
offering an unacceptably low opening figure for the UK’s budgetary contributions, subsequently offering more could be a quid pro quo for securing concessions over food imports from New Zealand (NA PREM
15/368, ‘Record of Meeting in the Foreign Office, chaired by the
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster [Rippon]’, 25 February 1971).
The Common Agricultural Policy
Inextricably linked to the negotiations over the UK’s budgetary contributions and tariffs on Commonwealth imports was the EU’s CAP, for at this
time, the overwhelming majority of EU funds were disbursed to the farming industry in member states. Yet the UK had a very small farming
220
P. DOREY
industry, both in comparison to other domestic industries and relative to
the scale of farming in other member states, especially France. This meant
that the UK was faced with the prospect of paying much more into the
EC’s budget than it received back. Moreover, it effectively meant that the
external tariffs, which would eventually (after a period of transition) be
imposed on Commonwealth food imports, would then contribute towards
EC subsidies for farmers in other member states. It was this kind of financial imbalance which led Margaret Thatcher, in the early 1980s, to demand
‘We want our money back’, whereupon she eventually secured a Budget
Rebate in 1984.
However, as with both the external tariff on Commonwealth imports
and the UK’s budgetary contribution, the Heath Government opted for a
gradualist and transitional approach, in order to avoid political or diplomatic obstacles to securing UK membership. Potential or actual problems
were, as far as practicably possible, to be deferred for several years, to be
tackled after the UK had become a full member. The reasoning was that
the UK would have greater bargaining power or leverage once it had actually become a member—a point explicitly made by Rippon on various
occasions when seeking to assuage the concerns of Conservative MPs on
specific issues (see, e.g. NA CAB 170/66, Rippon to Bennett, 14
December 1971)—due to the unanimity, between member states, which
was required for the most important policy issues.
The Heath Government’s tactic, therefore, was to continue negotiations after entry to the EC, with the objective of developing a European
Regional or Industrial Policy, which would disburse structural funds to
areas of economic decline or social deprivation, in order to facilitate economic growth and regeneration. Not only was it envisaged that this would
reduce the dominance of the CAP as the main focus of EC expenditure, it
would also greatly benefit the UK especially: ‘Agriculture was expected to
take progressively less of the Community’s budget, industry and regional
policy—from which Britain would have expected a greater return—progressively more’ (Campbell 1993: 362. See also HMSO 1971: 35, paras.
137–139).
It was also envisaged that the general fillip to the British economy,
which EC membership was intended to provide, would itself reinvigorate
British industry, thereby generating increased growth and employment.
This would effectively offset the disadvantage or injustice of the UK’s de
facto contribution towards the CAP and was therefore deemed a price
10 ENTRY INTO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
221
worth paying; the benefits to the UK economy and industry would greatly
exceed the lack of benefit gleaned from the CAP.
Fisheries policy
One of the most vexatious issues in the pre-entry negotiations concerned
fisheries policy and, in particular, the ‘exclusion zone’ around the UK’s
coast to protect the domestic fishing industry and those whose livelihoods
depended upon it. At the end of 1971, almost 18 months after the start of
negotiations between the Heath Government and the other EC leaders
over the terms and conditions of the UK’s putative membership, Rippon
informed the Cabinet that although most other issues had been satisfactorily resolved, ‘there remained serious fishery problems’. There had been
agreement with the EC that the UK would retain a six-mile exclusion
zone around its coast for 10 years after acquiring membership, whereupon
there would be a review. What was proving problematic was the UK’s
insistence that some sections ‘of our coastline which were of major importance to us’ should be protected by a further exclusion zone of up to 12
miles. The EC was willing to accede to this demand with respect to the
Orkneys, the Shetlands and parts of the north-eastern coast of Scotland,
but the Heath Government wanted this 12-mile zone to apply also to
much of the east coast of Scotland and England (as far as Spurnhead,
Humberside), and also the south-west coasts of both England and Wales
(NA CAB 170/66, Armstrong to Hepburn (MAFF), 26 November 1971).
It was acknowledged that failure to resolve this particular issue was
likely to alienate some Conservative MPs who had hitherto been supportive of EC membership, particularly those ‘with fisheries interests’ (NA
CAB 128/49, CM (71), 62nd Conclusions, Meeting of the Cabinet held
on 9 December 1971). Although many Conservative MPs had also been
concerned to ensure that the interests of Commonwealth countries were
protected with regard to food imports, the issue of fishing was more specific and tangible because the terms of accession to the EC had potentially
serious direct implications for the UK fishing industries and associated
communities. Moreover, some Conservative MPs represented coastal constituencies in which fishing was the main industry, and this, in turn, might
create divided loyalties—would these MPs support their local constituents
against their Party leadership in the House of Commons over fishing issues
vis-à-vis the EC or vice versa?
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P. DOREY
For example, the Secretary of State for Scotland wrote to Rippon reiterating the importance of a satisfactory deal which would simultaneously
protect the livelihoods of UK fishermen, be acceptable to the House [of
Commons] in general and assuage the anxieties of Conservative MPs in
particular (NA CAB 170/66, [Gordon] Campbell to Rippon, 27
September 1971; Campbell to Whitelaw, 12 October 1971). Likewise, the
Chief Whip explained to Rippon the negative impact of this issue on some
wavering Conservative MPs, especially those representing constituencies
in Cornwall (NA CAB 170/66, Pym to Rippon, 5 October 1971). On
one occasion, the Chief Whip attended a meeting of the Conservatives’
backbench fisheries committee, being addressed by Rippon, to ascertain
the anxieties of members, and he reported that some MPs were ‘very
angry’ or ‘livid’ at the potential impact on local fishing industries and
communities of failing to secure adequate and effective protection for UK
fishermen. The Chief Whip also noted that Rippon’s ‘exposition was poor
and went down like a stone’ (NA CAB 170/66, ‘AHW’ to Gregson, 8
December 1971). Indeed, one of the committee’s members, Sir Frederic
Bennett (Conservative MPs for Torquay), wrote to Rippon afterwards to
explain that he was ‘disturbed by the tenor of your remarks’ (NA CAB
170/66, Bennett to Rippon, 9 December 1971).
Yet in spite of these concerns, the Cabinet maintained that the ultimate
resolution of this issue should also be deferred until after the UK had
formally joined the EC, in order to prevent a delay to accession, while
reminding MPs that on issues of major importance or where national
interests were involved, member states would effectively retain a veto, due
to the need for unanimity in key votes (NA CAB 128/49, CM (71), 63rd
Conclusions, Meeting of the Cabinet held on 14 December 1971).
Moreover, Rippon also variously argued that the UK would be in a stronger negotiating position after acquiring EC membership, and hence it
made tactical sense to defer some detailed or contentious issues, in order
to focus on the prime objective of securing EC membership. Afterwards,
the UK could return to specific policies and technicalities, in order to
negotiate a better deal, whereas driving a very hard bargain at this stage
might alienate other member states and ultimately jeopardise their willingness to welcome the UK into the EC. This, of course, was part of the
government’s tactic of managing the parliamentary Conservative Party
and seeking to allay some of the concerns of backbench MPs on issues
such as fisheries policy.
10 ENTRY INTO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
223
Persuading and Managing the Parliamentary
Conservative Party
The General Election of 1970 had returned 330 Conservative MPs, which
(at a time when there were fewer constituencies/seats than today) yielded
them a parliamentary majority of 31 seats. On non-controversial issues,
this would be sufficient to deliver a relatively comfortable victory for the
government in divisions, but on more contentious policies, such a majority was likely to prove more problematic, because ‘rebellions’ by a relatively small number of Conservative MPs would be sufficient to inflict
defeat. This clearly had serious implications for the Heath Government
when seeking parliamentary approval for pursuing UK membership of the
EC, because as the Chief Whip Francis Pym recalled, ‘I do not think there
was a great deal of controversy about it in Cabinet. The controversy was
in the party’ (quoted in Kandiah 1995: 205).
In early 1971, the Whips’ Office calculated that whilst about 218
Conservative MPs supported the government’s position (favouring EC
membership), 75 were ‘in doubt’, and a crucial 33 were opposed. The
‘doubters’ encompassed various reservations, the two most notable of
which were whether the terms and conditions of UK membership would
be sufficiently favourable or advantageous to the UK, and whether EC
membership would secure enough support among the people of the
UK. Many of those in the former category were adopting ‘a position of
“wait and see”. They wish to see the actual terms before they make up
their minds’, while various other Conservative ‘doubters’ were ‘waiting to
be persuaded by the Government’. There were also some Conservative
MPs in this category who were influenced by a perception that public
opinion was opposed to membership and, as such, a few were advocating
a referendum on whether the UK should join the EC (CPA, CCO
20/32/28, ‘Report and Analysis of the State of the Party’, undated, but
circa January 1971; ACP 2/3, Advisory Committee on Policy, ACP (70)
108th meeting, minutes of meeting held on 6 May 1970).
However, even if the ‘doubters’ could all be persuaded to support the
government, this would still have been insufficient to secure victory in the
Division Lobbies if all of the 33 Conservative ‘antis’ voted against their
government—unless their opposition was countered by support from proEC Labour MPs. However, Heath did not want to be reliant on support
from the Opposition. Closer examination, by the Whips’ Office, of the 33
anti-EE MPs revealed
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a hard core of right-wingers, backed up by some Powellites, Ulster members, a handful of new Members, and one or two who for specialist reasons
oppose entry…15 of the antis come from the old brigade…who have always
been against the Market and always will be. (CPA, CCO 20/32/28, ‘Report
and Analysis of the State of the Party’, undated, but circa January 1971)
Most of these were opposed to UK membership of the EC as a matter
of principle, such as Enoch Powell, who eloquently articulated the concerns of many ‘antis’ with regard to the supposedly deleterious impact on
parliamentary sovereignty and national autonomy. Powell emphasised the
importance of the defence of the independence of a self-governing nation,
in the debate on the second reading of the European Communities Bill, as
he warned that:
[I]t is an inherent consequence of accession to the Treaty of Rome that this
House and Parliament will lose their legislative supremacy. It will no longer
be true that law in this country is made only by or with the authority of
Parliament—which in practice means the authority of this House. The legislative omni-competence of this House, its legislative sovereignty, has to be
given up…an unthinkable act. (HC Deb, Vol. 831, Cols, 699, 707, 17
February 1972)
However, although Powell was the most prominent and articulate
opponent of EC membership, he was not personally leading an organised
faction of Conservative Party ‘antis’ because he ‘operated essentially as a
lone voice’. Most of the Conservative opponents of UK membership of
the EC were not Powellites per se, even if they broadly shared his views on
the issue of parliamentary sovereignty (Campbell 1993: 401).
The issue of sovereignty was alluded to by Sir Robin Turton MP, who
warned that joining the EC would mean subordinating the UK to ‘an
illiberal and bureaucratic leviathan’ (HC Deb, Vol. 823, Col. 942, 21
October 1971), while the (then) chair of the Conservatives’ parliamentary
1922 Committee, Edward du Cann, insisted that membership of the EC
‘must eventually reduce the status of this Parliament…to…that of, say, the
Bavarian Landtag or an English county council’ (HC Deb, Vol. 823, Col.
1935, 27 October, 1971). For these ‘antis’, the importance of parliamentary sovereignty and independent nationhood vastly outweighed the purported economic advantages of UK membership which were consistently
cited by pro-EC Conservatives, not least Heath himself.
10 ENTRY INTO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
225
Further evidence of the primacy of ‘sovereignty’ for the ‘antis’ is provided by Christopher Lord’s analysis of the key themes or issues cited in
the relevant parliamentary debates, in July and October 1971. Having
analysed 294 speeches on the issue of the UK’s application to join the EC,
he found that two-thirds of speeches by Conservative ‘antis’ focused on
the loss of sovereignty which would ensue (Lord 1993: 102, Table 2). Not
surprisingly, therefore, these Conservative MPs proved to be among the
most problematic for the government whips because such MPs were
invariably the most ‘dedicated opponents’ of EC membership; ‘nothing
would have persuaded many of those on our side who were opposed in
principle to what they saw as a surrender of sovereignty’ (Whitelaw 1989:
73, 74). Given that they viewed sovereignty in zero-sum terms, it was
unlikely that their opposition could be nullified by concessions or
compromises.
Other themes articulated by the Conservative ‘antis’ were a commitment to global free trade, and maintenance of political links and trade
agreements with the Commonwealth (Lord 1993: 102, Table 2).
However, as alluded to earlier, a few Conservative ‘antis’ had specific
objections pertaining to the impact of EC membership on the UK’s fishing industry and concomitant close-knit communities. Such MPs spanned
the length of the UK, with Wilfred Baker, the MP for the constituency
(since abolished) of Banffshire, on the north-east coast of Scotland, sharing similar concerns on this issue as Sir Frederic Bennett, whose Torquay
constituency encompassed the Devon fishing town of Brixham (CPA,
CCO 20/32/28, ‘Report and Analysis of the State of the Party’, undated,
but circa January 1971). Indeed, Bennett warned that although he was
not the sort of MP who normally resorted to threats or rebellions against
the leadership, he felt so strongly about the need to protect his constituents on this issue that he would be unable to support the government in
relevant parliamentary votes if the terms of UK membership of the EC did
not guarantee strong and effective protection for the domestic fishing
industry (NA CAB 170/66, Bennett to Rippon, 9 December 1971).
However, whereas the issue of ‘sovereignty’ was (arguably) non-­
negotiable, or at least, a matter of a priori political principle, these other
objections or reservations were, to some extent, potentially capable of
being ameliorated by compromises and concessions secured during pre-­
entry negotiations. Moreover, Heath sought to allay fears over the specific
issue of the UK’s coastal waters and fishing rights by reiterating that on
matters of national importance or interests, member states would retain a
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P. DOREY
veto, viz. unanimity voting among member states. Indeed, this is precisely
what he did in his closing speech of the second reading debate of the
European Communities Bill, reiterating that the UK would continue to
enjoy a 6-mile ‘exclusion zone’ around the whole of its coast, supplemented by a zone of up to 12 miles in various locations. This would last
until 1982, when it would be subject to review, but with any changes
being based on a ‘unanimous decision’, which ensured that ‘we have the
ability to protect our essential interests…we have the right of veto’ (HC
Deb, Vol. 831, Col. 746, 17 February 1972). Following this emphatic
reiteration, many Conservative MPs representing coastal constituencies,
and who had hitherto expressed strong concern about the potential impact
of the EC’s Common Fisheries Policy on their local fishing industries,
such as Wilfred Baker and Sir Frederic Bennett, voted in favour of the Bill.
Meanwhile, 48% of speeches by pro-EC Conservatives emphasised the
envisaged economic advantages of UK membership, while 30% highlighted the importance of avoiding isolation in an increasingly interdependent world. Furthermore, 27% of pro-membership speeches by
Conservative MPs argued that joining the EC would either not entail a
loss of sovereignty or entail a pooling of sovereignty, which would enhance
the UK’s influence in international affairs (Lord 1993: 102, Table 2).
The Conservative whips monitored intra-Party opinion throughout the
summer and early autumn of 1971, in the hope and expectation that the
completion of the negotiations over the terms of EC membership, and
particularly the compromises reached on issues such as Commonwealth
trade, would assuage the doubts of some hitherto sceptical Conservative
MPs, sufficient that they would now feel able to support the government.
Indeed, the Chief Whip noted, in mid-August 1971, that ‘the position in
the Party has improved steadily since…the White Paper. That improvement continues, and will do so as long as public opinion is swinging our
way’ (NA PREM 15/574, Pym to Heath, 18 August 1971). A parallel
survey of backbench opinion, organised (with the approval of the Whips’
Office) by Norman St. John-Stevas, similarly reported that: ‘Since the
publication of the White Paper at the beginning of July…there has been a
heavy shift of opinion within the Party’, although the number of ‘antis’—
‘there really is very little one can do about them’—remained sufficient to
deprive the government of a parliamentary majority unless countered by
votes or abstentions by pro-­EC Labour MPs (NA PREM 15/574, St.
John-Stevas to Kitson [Heath’s PPS], 1 August 1971).
10 ENTRY INTO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
227
Clearly, these intra-Party divisions posed serious problems for the
Conservative leadership in terms of securing sufficient support in the relevant parliamentary Debates and Divisions, most notably endorsement of
a Motion in favour of UK membership and the subsequent European
Communities Bill. Indeed, both the timing of the Motion and whether a
three-line whip should be imposed to ensure its endorsement occasioned
divergent views at the highest levels within the Conservative government.
With regard to timing, Heath was strongly inclined (as was Douglas Hurd)
to hold the Debate in the early summer, before the parliamentary recess,
but as Chief Whip, Francis Pym counselled against being seen to ‘rush’ the
process or making some Conservative MPs feel that they were being
‘bounced’ into acceptance (Heath 1998: 377. See also Hurd 1979: 66).
Pym’s tactic was fully supported by the Minister who he had recently
replaced as Chief Whip, William Whitelaw (1989: 73).
Heath (himself a former Chief Whip) deferred to Pym’s judgement,
which meant that several months could be devoted to canvassing support
among wavering or doubtful Conservative MPs during the summer, whilst
also pursuing a publicity campaign extolling the benefits of EC membership to the wider public. Although the latter obviously played no direct
role in the parliamentary Debates, it was assumed that if enough of the
electorate was persuaded of the virtues of membership, this could (if only
indirectly) increase the electoral pressure on uncommitted or hesitant
Conservative MPs.
When the Motion was due to be debated in October 1971, Heath and
Pym again adopted different perspectives over parliamentary tactics. Heath
was inclined to impose a three-line whip to maximise Conservative support in the Division on the Motion, and thereby avoid a humiliating
defeat. By contrast, Francis Pym was convinced that a free vote should be
permitted, partly because a whipped vote was likely to provoke some ‘antiEC’ backbenchers into treating it as a cause célèbre. Moreover, when the
Whips’ Office surveyed Conservative MPs at the start of October 1971,
they found that 281 were now in favour (up from 218 at the start of the
year), due to the number of former ‘doubters’ who had subsequently
shifted in favour of EC membership following the successful negotiations,
and the concessions gained. It was also noted that ‘Over the summer,
Conservative constituencies had swung firmly behind our accession to the
Community’.
However, there remained 26 ‘hard-line antis’ and a further six who
were wavering between opposing the government or abstaining. There
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P. DOREY
were also 13 Conservative MPs who were still undecided, but who the
Whips’ Office judged amenable to being persuaded to support the government. Yet in spite of the shift towards the government (and EC membership) by many of the former ‘doubters’, the number of unrelenting
Conservative ‘antis’ meant that ‘the Division cannot be won without some
Labour votes and/or abstentions’ (NA PREM 15/574, Pym to Heath, 5
October 1971).
Pym also calculated that if the relevant vote was un-whipped, it would
make it easier for pro-European Labour MPs to support the Motion, and
thereby counteract any ‘rebellion’ by Conservative ‘antis’. This, in turn,
would send a message to the EC that there was considerable cross-party
support for UK membership of the EC rather than the issue being portrayed or perceived as a highly partisan one. In the event, ‘Pym’s wise
instinct in relation to the vote’ ensured victory for Heath’s Government
because while 39 Conservative MPs voted against the Motion, 69 proEuropean Labour MPs defied their own leadership’s three-line whip by
supporting it in the Division, thus ensuring that the Motion was endorsed
by 356 votes to 244 (Heath 1998: 379, 380. See also Campbell 1993:
404; Howe 1994: 67; Hurd 2003: 202; Norton 1975: 271–272; Norton
2011: 55).
Much less comfortable was the margin of victory in the February 1972
vote on the second reading of the European Communities Bill, when the
result was 309 to 301 in favour (HC Deb, Vol. 831, Cols, 753–8, 17
February 1972). In this crucial vote, 15 Conservative MPs voted against
and five abstained—mainly those who remained implacably opposed to
EC membership on the grounds of ‘sovereignty’— meaning that, again,
the government had won with the de facto assistance of Labour MPs who
defied a three-line whip imposed by their leadership to vote against the Bill
(Norton 2011: 57). Not only had the government imposed its own threeline whip requiring the Party’s MPs to support the Bill in the House of
Commons, Heath had actually deemed it an issue of confidence in his
administration, which meant that, constitutionally, defeat in the relevant
vote would precipitate the government’s resignation and the calling of a
General Election.
This was a high-stakes tactic indeed, because some Conservative backbenchers already disliked Heath due to his somewhat aloof or autocratic
style of leadership (of which this seemed an especially egregious example),
coupled with his ‘gauche…pompous and priggish’ persona and his alleged
failure to reward ‘enough’ loyal backbenchers with promotion (Fisher,
10 ENTRY INTO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
229
1977: 132; Norton 1978: 228–238). As was to be the case in 2018–2019,
for some implacable ‘anti-European Conservative MPs, trenchant hostility
to Europe transcended loyalty to their Party and its leadership—particularly when they viewed their leader with disdain anyway—although they
doubtless convinced themselves that rejecting EC (EU) membership was
in the national interest and that they were therefore patriotically putting
the country before their Party.
In total, the Bill’s passage through the House of Commons entailed
104 Divisions, of which 85 witnessed at least one Conservative MP voting
against their own government (for a detailed analysis, see Norton 1978:
64–82). The most frequent ‘rebel’ was Powell, who voted with the
Opposition in 80 Divisions, while John Biffen did, likewise, 78 times:
‘Europe dominated my life from the 1970 June election until the summer
of 1972 when the…Bill received its third reading’ (Biffen 2013: 258–259).
A further 14 Conservative MPs defied their Party leadership and whips in
at least 10 Divisions during the European Communities Bill’s passage
through the House of Commons (Norton 1978: 80; Norton, 211: 59.
See also Campbell 1993: 440). Indeed, Biffen claimed that the most
implacable ‘antis’ formed their own group, with Powell as chair and Biffen
as its ‘whip’ to co-ordinate votes against the Bill, particularly during committee stage, when amendments were tabled (Biffen 2013: 257).
Yet Heath, Francis Pym and those directly responsible for drafting the
Bill, most notably the government’s Solicitor-General, Geoffrey Howe,
had ‘achieved a considerable strategic coup at the outset, by contriving to
condense the legislation into a short Bill of only 12 Clauses…occupying
just 37 pages’. This had confounded the right- and left-wing parliamentary opponents of EC membership who ‘had looked forward with relish to
a Bill of perhaps 1,000 Clauses’, for this would have provided ample scope
for procedural challenges and substantive amendments intended to impede
its parliamentary progress (Campbell 1993: 438; see also Heath 1998:
383; Howe 1994: 68; Norton 2011: 56).
There was, though, another reason why Heath and his most senior colleagues wanted to minimise the scope for amendments to the European
Communities Bill by keeping it as short as possible, namely that any
changes imposed by backbench opponents risked ‘unpicking’ the often
technical or complex agreements reached in negotiations with the leaders
of other member states (NA CAB 128/49, CM (71) 26th Conclusions,
Meeting of the Cabinet held on 18 May, 1971; NA CAB 170/121, ‘Note
of a Meeting between Whitelaw, Rippon and Howe’, 15 November 1971).
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As the Bill was intended to give legislative effect to the agreement, as
achieved in the negotiations conducted since June 1970, on the terms and
conditions of UK membership, there was a clear risk that the longer the
Bill, and the more Clauses and administrative details it enshrined, the
more scope there would be for opponents to pursue amendments that
were incompatible with, and quite possibly negated, what had previously
been agreed with EC political leaders and diplomats. Thus, Heath
explained to the Cabinet: ‘the consequences of any amendments to the
European Communities Bill were so serious that it was essential that none
was made’ (NA CAB 128/50, CM (72) 26th Conclusions, Meeting of the
Cabinet held on 18 May, 1972).
Of course, any amendments could have been reversed subsequently,
but they might, nonetheless, have proved politically embarrassing, or even
highly problematic, and slowed down the progress of the Bill. Certainly,
any assumption that they could simply be reversed at a later stage was very
risky, so it was deemed essential to minimise the scope for such amendments in the first place.
In fact, although the European Communities Bill was subject to scrutiny by a committee of the whole House, as befitted a Bill of such major
constitutional importance, it emerged unamended. The government had
avoided any defeats, in spite of implacable opposition from a coterie of its
right-wing MPs, partly due to the skill of the Party’s Whips in persuading
and mobilising the rest of their backbenchers, and partly because ‘crossvoting’ by Conservative opponents of the Bill was countered by support
by some Liberal MPs and abstentions by several pro-European Labour
backbenchers in key Divisions (Campbell 1993: 441; Heath 1998: 284;
Norton 2011: 58–59).
‘Selling’ European Communities Membership
to the Public
Heath’s personal commitment to UK membership of the EC was never
shared by the public, though: on the contrary, throughout 1970 and
1971, there was a clear majority opposed to the UK joining the
EC. However, surveys conducted by the Gallup polling company during
this period did reveal a steady diminution of public opposition, such that
whereas in April 1970, only 20% of people were in favour of joining, while
62% were opposed, the respective figures for September 1971 were 37%
10 ENTRY INTO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
231
and 50%. The margin of opposition had fallen from 42% to 13% in 18
months. A further Gallup poll in February 1972 indicated that the margin
had fallen to just 2% (Lord 1993: 118, Table 3). In negotiations with the
French, though, Rippon maintained that this apparent negativity reflected
‘hesitancy’, rather than hostility, an understandable portrayal or ‘spin’, lest
the French viewed negative public opinion as evidence that the UK was
not sufficiently committed to EC membership. He even audaciously suggested that public opinion might be rendered more favourable if the
French political leadership itself publicly stated how much France now
wanted UK membership of the EC (NA PREM 15/62, ‘Record of
Meeting between Geoffrey Rippon and the French Prime Minister, 19
November 1970’, 20 November 1970).
Much of this shift in public opinion emanated from Conservative voters
whose stance was influenced by the perceived success of their government’s negotiations, and who therefore became more willing to support
EC membership on the basis of Party allegiance and trust (Lord 1993:
118; see also King 1977: 28). This diminution of opposition to the UK’s
membership of the EC effectively vindicated Heath’s calculation, in spring
1971, that within broadly sceptical public opinion, there existed ‘a substantial “grey area” in which pro-Market attitudes would gain the upper
hand if it became evident that success was feasible’ (Campbell 1993: 397).
This, though, might necessitate ‘a very major re-education of public
opinion’, during which ministers would ‘need to get across to the simplest
minds in the simplest language the positive case for British entry’ (CPA,
ACP 1/22, Douglas Hurd to James Douglas, 10 February 1971; Reginald
Maudling to James Douglas, 10 February 1971). Concern was expressed
that ‘the public were ill-informed about the positive factors…of entry’,
which reflected ‘the amount of public ignorance’ that the Party needed to
challenge (CPA, ACP 2/3, Advisory Committee on Policy, ACP (71)
110th meeting, minutes of meeting held on 27 January 1971). In order
to overcome this public ‘ignorance’, Rippon suggested to the Conservative
Chief Whip that Conservative MPs might want to undertake consultative
and educational meetings in their constituencies, during the spring of
1971, although there is no evidence that this suggestion was acted upon
to any notable degree (NA CAB 170/106, Rippon to Pym, undated, but
circa February 1971). On the other hand, John Selwyn Gummer sensed
that younger people were generally more favourable towards Europe and
that, as such, promoting the case for UK membership of the EC ‘would be
a good way of convincing young people that the Conservative Party was
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P. DOREY
not as dull as they often thought’ (CPA, ACP 2/3, Advisory Committee
on Policy, ACP (72) 119th meeting, minutes of meeting held on 19
July 1972).
In seeking to persuade a sceptical public of the apparent virtues of UK
membership of the EC, the Heath Government focused on three main
issues. First, and most obvious, was the economic advantage which would
supposedly be obtained, in terms of improved trade and (ultimately tarifffree) exports, and a general increase in economic growth and prosperity,
thereby reversing years of relative economic decline (HMSO 1971: 11–16,
paras. 40–57; HC Deb, Vol. 823, Cols. 1452–65, 21 July 1971; see also
CPA, CRD 3/10/2/1/2, FAC (71) 3, ‘Britain and the European
Communities—Briefing Material for the Parliamentary Debate on the
Common Market’, July 1971).
Second, there was an emphasis on the extent to which ministers had
secured favourable terms for food imported from the Commonwealth,
such that the tariffs ordinarily imposed on non-EC imports were greatly
reduced on foodstuffs from Australia, Canada and New Zealand: ‘we have
agreed on arrangements which will ensure that about 90 percent of our
imports from the outside the enlarged Community will continue to be
imported free of duty’ (HMSO 1971: 35, para. 141). The importance of
this was not solely economic—vital though this clearly was—but cultural,
in terms of the affinity that many British people felt towards the
Commonwealth countries and their people, sometimes referred to as ‘our
kith and kin’. Certainly, this sense of allegiance and loyalty to
Commonwealth citizens was greater than any comparable sentiments
towards Europe itself.
The third aspect highlighted by ministers in their efforts at overcoming
public scepticism about joining the EC concerned the UK’s budgetary
contributions. Cognisant that critics could argue that the UK would be
contributing rather more than it received, due to the amount which the
EC disbursed via the CAP (from the which the UK attained little benefit),
it was variously emphasised that in the next five to six years, the EC would
be undertaking various internal and structural reforms, which would be
advantageous to the UK. In particular, there were plans to develop industrial and regional policies, which would considerably offset the UK’s
‘losses’, namely the CAP (NA CAB 128/49, CM (71) 24th Conclusions,
Meeting of the Cabinet held 6 May 1971; NA CAB 129/154, CP (70)
115, Note by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
10 ENTRY INTO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
233
Affairs, ‘United Kingdom Contribution to the Budget of the European
Communities, 7 December 1970).
Once the Cabinet had formally committed the UK to EC membership,
and the relevant legislation had been enacted, adjustments had to be made
to the institutional architecture of the British government, with three initiatives or innovations briefly worth noting. The first was Heath’s approach
to dealing with European issues in Whitehall, for instead of establishing a
new Department for European Affairs, or adding EC matters to the remit
of the Foreign Office—as some officials preferred (NA PREM 15/351,
Trend to Simcock, 5 May 1971)—he resolved that every Department
should have a small team of officials who were responsible for examining
the impact and implications of EC membership on their policy remit. This
was intended to ensure that a culture of ‘Europeanisation’ developed
across Whitehall rather than being ‘siloed’ in one stand-alone Department
(Heath 1998: 393). Or as Heath explained to the Cabinet in August 1971:
We have now to adapt ourselves to the prospect of entry into the
Communities in terms of…our administrative practices.…From now on, we
cannot afford to compartmentalise Europe.…In all major problems of policy, whether political, economic or strategic in character, we have to learn to
‘think European’….We cannot expect to achieve this radical change of attitude by creating a new ‘Department of Europe’ or even by relying upon the
normal processes of inter-­departmental discussion. What is required is that
individual departments should themselves develop the habit of thinking and
acting, over the whole range of their business, in the manner appropriate to
a member of the Communities. (NA CAB 129/158, CP (71) 100,
Memorandum by the Prime Minister, ‘The European Economic
Communities’, 2 August 1971)
Thus did James Prior, as a Minister without Portfolio, inform the
Cabinet that ‘it is Government policy that all Departments should "think
European" and that our relations with the European Communities should
be treated as an extension of our domestic affairs rather than as a separate
external activity’ (NA CAB 129/166, CP (72) 131, Memorandum by the
Lord President of the Council, ‘Parliamentary Questions on the Activities
of the Institutions of the European Communities’, 27 November 1972).
However, it was acknowledged that some Departments would be more
affected by EC membership than others, with the Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food, and the Department of Trade and Industry, identified
as henceforth having the most frequent contacts with the European
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P. DOREY
Commission (NA PREM 15/351, Tickell [Rippon’s Private Secretary] to
Armstrong, 15 December 1971).
The second machinery of government aspect of accession to the EC
was ensuring the identification and co-ordination of European issues
across Whitehall, on an inter-Departmental basis. This was to be facilitated
by establishing a European Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, which would
not only oversee the European dimension of Departments and their policies, but liaise with 10 Downing Street itself in identifying (potential)
problems and monitoring progress, both within and between Departments,
pertaining to the EC.
The third EC-related machinery of government reform inaugurated by
Heath was to ensure that membership of United Kingdom Representation
to the European Union (UKREP)1 was based on the secondment of senior
civil servants from Departments across Whitehall rather than just from the
Foreign Office. This would not only imbue UKREP with a broader range
of policy expertise, it would also ensure that when these senior civil servants returned to Whitehall at the end of their secondment, they would
further instil an ethos of Europeanisation in their respective Departments,
having acquired first-hand, day-to-day, experience of how the EC, and
their counterparts, operated, while also having established valuable diplomatic contacts in Brussels. Heath deemed this to be ‘a very effective way
of propagating a European outlook within departmental culture’ (Heath
1998: 394). Or as Rippon’s private secretary expressed it, such a mode of
exchange would ‘give a rapidly increasing number of officials from home
Departments first-­hand experience of dealing with the Community, and so
make a very effective contribution to the spread of European-mindedness
throughout Whitehall’ (NA PREM 15/351, Tickell to Armstrong, 15
December 1971).
According to one of his Ministerial colleagues, Christopher Chataway,
another way in which Heath sought to foster the adoption of ‘a European
outlook’ within Departments was by encouraging ministers ‘to take lessons in French and German or other languages’, to the extent that if they
1
UKREP is the UK’s Permanent Representation in Brussels. These senior civil servants
provide a conduit between Whitehall, the European Commission and the senior policymakers of other member states. As such, they both convey the UK’s position or perspective to
other EC/EU policymakers, and they regularly brief officials in Whitehall about developments and Directives emanating from the EC/EU and how these will impact on the UK.
10 ENTRY INTO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
235
employed a private tutor, this was ‘paid for by the British government’
(quoted in Kandiah, 2005: 207).
Conclusion
Securing the UK’s membership of the EC was a prime objective of Heath,
but rather than interpreting this as a case of prioritising foreign policy or
international relations over domestic policy, it should be understood in the
context of his overall commitment to economic modernisation and the
need to render the UK economy more competitive. Heath was convinced
that EC membership would yield a major boost for domestic firms and
industries, in terms of facilitating an enormous expansion of customers,
across the English Channel, and thereby greatly increase UK exports. It
was envisaged, and indeed intended, that this would generate economic
competitiveness and growth far more effectively and extensively than any
mode of state-­sponsored or dirigiste industrial strategy. In other words,
EC membership was not viewed an alternative to reinvigorating a market
economy, but integral to it; the export and other trading opportunities
offered by EC membership would facilitate the renaissance of the British
economy after decades of (relative) decline.
Yet Heath and his closest pro-European colleagues had to overcome
strong opposition from about 30 Conservative MPs, some of whom bitterly resented the implications of EC membership for parliamentary and
national sovereignty, while a few other backbenchers were deeply concerned about either the likely consequences for trade with the British
Commonwealth—with whom some such Conservatives harboured a
much greater sense of affinity or allegiance than they did with Europe—or
the potential impact on the UK fishing industry. With regard to the former objection, Heath simultaneously argued that in an increasingly interdependent world, nation-states could often achieve more for their citizens
than could be attained by acting unilaterally, while also insisting that on
issues pertaining to national interests, decisions would need to be based
on unanimity; in the words, each member state would retain a veto power
on issues deemed to be of major national importance, such that considerable control would be retained over national/parliamentary sovereignty.
With regard to objections from anti-EC Conservatives pertaining to
Commonwealth trade and/or the UK fishing industry, it was emphasised
that the former would be granted special treatment and enjoy partial
exemptions from external tariffs for the first few years, whereupon imports
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P. DOREY
of dairy products and Caribbean sugar would be reduced gradually, thus
allowing the exporting countries a transitional period in which they could
diversify or foster new trade links. Similarly, a transition period was agreed
for the fishing industry, whereby most of the UK’s coastal waters would
continue to enjoy the extant ‘exclusion zone’, pending re-negotiations a
decade hence.
A period of transition was also secured for the UK’s budgetary contributions, which would increase over five years, during which time it was
intended that the EC would have devised a package of industrial and
regional policies, which would be highly beneficial to the UK. It was envisaged that the advantages of these would at least partly offset the lack of
benefits which the UK accrued from the Common Agricultural Policy.
In all these spheres, Heath and his main EC negotiator, Geoffrey
Rippon, proved to be highly adept and astute in their negotiations,
although critics would doubtless accuse them of creating several hostages
to fortune. Instead of isolating France, as the Foreign Office recommended, Heath actually devoted much of his time and energy to courting
France directly, due to his acute awareness that any objections to UK
membership of the EC were, once again, most likely to emanate from the
French political leadership. Moreover, Heath recognised that reaching
broad agreement on various policy issues, or phasing-in various changes
accruing from membership, were more likely to secure accession, than
getting too immersed in finalising detailed policies and resolving administrative complexities in advance. Hence, the willingness to defer various
policy issues until several years’ ahead, after the UK had joined the EC,
when the country would, Heath and Rippon reasoned, be in a stronger
bargaining position as an actual, established and paying, member rather
than merely an eager applicant.
Incidentally, Heath’s renowned pro-European stance was doubtless the
main reason why a 2019 YouGov poll of the Conservatives’ mass membership ranked him as the least respected of the Party’s post-war leaders, with
only 23% of the Party’s 160,000 members rating him favourably, compared to 58% viewing him unfavourably. By contrast, Margaret Thatcher
and Winston Churchill enjoyed ‘favourable’ ratings of 92% and 93%,
respectively (YouGov 2019). It is an indication of how much the
Conservative Party has changed in 50 years that what Heath, and many of
his closest colleagues and admirers, deemed his greatest achievement, is
now viewed by many contemporary Conservatives as a sufficient reason to
disparage his premiership.
10 ENTRY INTO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
237
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Archives
Conservative Party Archives, Bodleian Library, University of Oxford.
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4715. London: HMSO.
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Haines, J. (1998). How Harold’s Pet Project Became His Monument. The
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Memoirs
Biffen, J. (2013). Semi-Detached. London: Biteback.
Castle, B. (1990). The Castle Diaries: 1964–1976. London: Macmillan.
Heath, E. (1977). Travels: People and Places in My Life. London: Sidgwick and
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Heath, E. (1998). The Course of My Life: My Autobiography. London: Hodder and
Stoughton.
Howe, G. (1994). Conflict of Loyalty. London: Macmillan.
Hurd, D. (2003). Memoirs. London: Little, Brown.
Maudling, R. (1978). Memoirs. London: Sidgwick & Jackson.
Whitelaw, W. (1989). The Whitelaw Memoirs. London: Aurum Press.
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Burns, C. (2008). Margaret Thatcher's greatest achievement: New Labour.
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Campbell, J. (1993). Edward Heath: A Biography. London: Jonathan Cape.
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Establish the Open University, 1965–67. Contemporary British History, 29(2),
241–272.
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Fisher, N. (1977). The Tory Leaders: Their Struggle for Power. London: Weidenfeld
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Garnett, M. (2015). Edward Heath. In C. Clarke, T. James, T. Bale, & P. Diamond
(Eds.), British Conservative Leaders. London: Biteback.
George, S. (1998). An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community.
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Heath, E. (1970). Old World, New Horizons: Britain, The Common Market, and
the Atlantic Alliance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hollis, P. (1997). Jennie Lee: A Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hurd, D. (1979). An End to Promises: A Sketch of Government, 1970–74. London:
Collins.
Kandiah, M. (1995). Witness Seminar: The Heath Government. Contemporary
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Kavanagh, D. (1987). The Heath Government, 1970–1974. In P. Hennessy &
A. Seldon (Eds.), Ruling Performance: British Governments from Attlee to
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King, A. (1977). Britain Says Yes. Washington: American Institute for Policy
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Kitzinger, U. (1973). Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain Joined the Common
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Laing, M. (1972). Edward Heath: Prime Minister. London: Sidgwick and Jackson.
Lord, C. (1993). British Entry to the European Community Under the Heath
Government of 1970–4. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
Norton, P. (1975). Dissension in the House of Commons 1945–74. London:
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Norton, P. (1978). Conservative Dissidents: Dissent within the Parliamentary
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Ziegler, P. (2010). Edward Heath. London: Harper Press.
CHAPTER 11
Party Management
Philip Norton
In terms of the approach of Conservative leaders to party management,
we can distinguish between organisation and personnel. In respect of each,
the leader may adopt a position that is close or distant. By this, we mean
that in terms of party organisation, a leader may take a leading role in
determining policy and structures, either by deciding matters personally
or by putting close personal allies in charge (close) or may essentially leave
it to others (distant). In terms of personnel, a leader may devote time and
resources to communicating with party members, at both the parliamentary and grassroots levels (close) or operating at some distance, at times
possibly appearing aloof (distant). Few leaders have devoted themselves
both to the detail of party organisation and staying close to the party
membership. Distance in terms of both organisation and personnel has
tended to increase the longer a leader is in 10 Downing Street.
The capacity for a leader to determine the approach is marked in the
case of the Conservative Party, given the distinctive role accorded to the
leader for most of the party’s history. ‘The most striking feature of
Conservative party organisation’, wrote Robert McKenzie in 1964, ‘is the
P. Norton (*)
University of Hull, Hull, UK
e-mail: p.norton@hull.ac.uk
© The Author(s) 2021
A. S. Roe-Crines, T. Heppell (eds.), Policies and Politics Under
Prime Minister Edward Heath, Palgrave Studies in Political
Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53673-2_11
239
240
P. NORTON
enormous power which appears to be concentrated in the hands of the
Leader’ (McKenzie 1964: 21). At the time, the leader not only controlled
appointments to the party front bench and the professional organisation
(Central Office) but also determined party policy. The leader could draw
on party or other bodies to assist in developing policy, but ultimately the
decision rested at the top.
These distinctive features led to different models of the leader-party
relationship being developed. Looking at it in terms of sheer powers, the
leader could be likened to a leviathan or monarch (Norton and Aughey
1981: 241). Given the extent to which the leader, nonetheless, depends
on the party to achieve outcomes, a family model has also been offered,
with the leader akin to the head of the household (Norton and Aughey
1981: 241–243). Heath, on this model, could be characterised as equivalent to a stern Victorian father, not demonstrating much love for the family and deciding both household policy and expecting things to be done in
certain ways. Answering back, as we shall see, was neither expected nor
tolerated.
Organisation
In terms of the management of the party, leaders have differed in the
attention they have accorded it. Some have been distant. Margaret
Thatcher, for example, although keen to reform inefficient institutions,
largely left the management of the party to others (Norton 1987: 21–37;
Norton 2012: 102–105). Some leaders have taken a more direct approach.
Edward Heath fell in the latter category when he was leader in Opposition,
but he became more distant once ensconced in Downing Street. As we
shall see, there is a link in that his approach to party management was
instrumental.
In terms of party policy, Martin Burch has argued that in Opposition,
leaders have adopted either a critical approach, focusing on criticising and
undermining the position of the government, or an alternative government approach, concentrating on presenting the party as a credible party
of government, ready to take the reins of office (Burch 1980: 161–163).
The former approach runs the risk of not being seen as ready for office,
whereas the latter may present too many hostages to fortune. The two are
not mutually exclusive, but it is a matter of emphasis. Both Heath and
Thatcher adopted the alternative government approach. There were,
11 PARTY MANAGEMENT
241
though, significant differences. As Brendan Sewill observed, some politicians are intensely interested in policy and view politics as a distasteful
necessity (Sewill 2009: 56). Heath very much fell in that category, whereas
his successor did not.
Heath had the advantage over Thatcher in that when he succeeded to
the leadership, he was not seen as a divisive figure and was not driven by
the political imperative to achieve some balance between different sections
of the party. He was able to mould the party organisation, especially the
policy-­making process, in the way that he wished. Thatcher’s initial task
was to keep the different parts of the party together.
Heath’s approach to organisation was arguably a product of his philosophy. As John Biffen summarised it, ‘Heath was a powerful exponent of
managerial conservatism as well as having a One Nation social policy’
(Biffen 2013: 252). When he was elected as leader, many members of
parliament (MPs) mistook his approach of freeing industry through the
application of a free market as an end in itself rather than a means to an
end. When it failed to deliver, he changed tack. As we shall see, the fact of
doing so and the way he did it created tensions within the party. There was
no clear goal-­orientated approach and a failure to engage.
Once elected as leader, Heath drew on both the professional and voluntary wings of the Conservative party to help develop policy. In line with
his managerial ethos, there was an emphasis on process and reaching outcomes by rational deliberation. He used the Conservative Research
Department (CRD), created in 1929 to provide policy advice to the leader
and service party committees in Parliament (Ramsden 1980), to oversee a
wide range of policy groups, drawing on parliamentarians, business people
and academics. In the 1966–1970 Parliament, there were 29 such groups,
drawing on 191 politicians and 190 from outside (Cosgrave 1985: 78).
The exercise was extensive and seen as preparing the party, in a way that
had not happened before, for government. This was the alternative government approach in action.
However, as John Campbell recorded, ‘for all his high intentions and
some considerable achievements the policy exercise was not in reality quite
so impressive—neither so thorough nor so well directed—as was claimed’
(Campbell 1993: 217). There was a problem of numbers, with other bodies set up in addition to the formal policy groups. There was no overarching philosophy imposed from above. There was ‘a concentration on
practical proposals and a belief that themes would emerge from these practical proposals as work went on’ (Ramsden 1980: 241). The use of
242
P. NORTON
discrete policy groups led, as Chris Patten observed, to some eclecticism.
It was a case of planting the trees and neglecting the view of the wood.
Even the very full and lengthy discussion that took place over a whole weekend at the Selsdon Park Hotel in 1970 did not, as popular mythology would
have us believe, result in the formulation of some general concept which
could have been termed ‘Selsdon Man’. This conference remained a series
of discussions—often in very considerable detail—on a collection of specific
policies listed for inclusion in the draft manifesto. (Patten 1980: 17; see also
Sewill 2009: 68)
‘Selsdon Man’, rather like ‘Thatcherism’, was a concept given coherence not by supporters, but by opponents, in this case primarily by the
Labour leader, Harold Wilson (Patten 1980: 17).
In terms of party organisation, Heath ‘continued the process of overhauling the party organisation and shaping the party machine to his own
purposes. He boasted of taking a closer interest in matters of organisation
than any previous leader’ (Campbell 1993: 214). He managed, after two
years in the leadership, to dislodge Edward du Cann—a former minister
who had served under Heath when he was President of the Board of
Trade—as party chairman and replaced with the more loyal Tony Barber.
Heath and du Cann had a notably fraught relationship: ‘they jarred on
each other’ (Hutchinson 1970: 178) was one of the milder assessments of
their relationship. Heath said of du Cann ‘Instead of shaking up the party
machine after the 1964 defeat, his only significant changes were increases
in salaries at Conservative Central Office’ (Heath 1998: 29). In fact, du
Cann had initiated various reforms, whereas Barber devoted himself to
improving relations with the different elements of the party.
There was some reorganisation during the period of Opposition that
proved fruitful. There was some improvement in the salaries of constituency party agents and, by 1970, the party organisation was superior to
that of the Labour Party, though—as Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky
noted—the principal explanation for this lay in the decline of Labour Party
organisation (Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky 1971: 291). Within Central
Office, there was a rationalisation of resources. Management consultants
were brought in. An internal budgeting system was introduced and staffing, not least at area level, was slimmed down (Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky
1971: 96). On the significance of this period of opposition, Butler and
Pinto-Duschinsky concluded that:
11 PARTY MANAGEMENT
243
If the activity at Central Office from 1966 to 1970 is to be summed up in a
phrase, it must be the same as for Mr Heath’s handling of the party as a
whole: it was a negative success … Despite the marginal advances made
towards the goal of greater representativeness, the party remained basically
unaltered. (Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky 1971: 109)
There were attempts to widen the party’s support base as well as engage
more with party members through the Conservative Political Centre
(CPC) (Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky 1971: 98–99; Norton 2002), but
neither was to prove a notable success. There was a recruitment drive
(‘Action 67’) to encourage more young people to join the Young
Conservatives. ‘Within a few months of “Action 67” YC membership
declined to its previous level’ (Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky 1971: 101).
The CPC had been established in 1945 to stimulate party members to
think about and discuss ideas within the party (Conservative and Unionist
Central Office 1964: 15). Under Alec Douglas-Home’s leadership, Heath
had been appointed to initiate and co-ordinate ‘the biggest policy review
in the party since Rab Butler’s in the late 1940s’ (Heath 1998: 267). The
CPC under a new director, David Howell (a journalist recruited from The
Daily Telegraph), was used to generate new ideas—Howell contributed to
the 1966 party manifesto—and was active in disseminating pamphlets and
encouraging a two-way dialogue with party members (Norton 2002:
192–193). In many respects, this was a high point for CPC activity.
However, although it may have helped reinforce views being developed by
Howell, ‘it made little impact on party or public thinking’ (Butler and
Pinto-Duschinsky 1971: 102; see also Norton 2002: 193). It was a useful
means for those appointed by Heath to develop ideas rather than a means
of harvesting new ideas by party members. What discussions did take place
in CPC groups were on topics initiated by the centre.
Relations with the professional and voluntary wings of the party did not
improve once Heath was in No. 10. He appointed Defence Secretary
Lord Carrington as party chairman. As Jim Prior recalled:
Peter Carrington is a great diplomat but was never very happy at Central
Office. His liberal instincts made him dislike some of the hard-nosed characters in the constituencies. He had never experienced the cut and thrust of
party politics in the Commons or on the hustings. (Prior 1986: 96)
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P. NORTON
Carrington himself acquired ‘a strong distaste for what he considered
to be the ramshackle character of Tory organisation’ (Cosgrave 1985: 80).
He did, though, make some attempts to address it. There were tensions,
not least as a result of attempts to reform candidate selection, making it
more professional, as well as to draw together more the voluntary and
professional wings of the party and also the parliamentary party, as Bale
concludes:
At the same time as ‘the centre’ was worrying about surrendering autonomy
to the grass-roots, the grass-roots were concerned about what they saw as a
significant move towards centralisation. The cause of their concern was the
decision … to establish a National Agency Scheme. (Bale 2012: 156)
Constituency associations were keen to protect their independence and
did not want the constituency agent to become the employee of the centre. Anything that smacked of interference by Central Office—including
indicating a preference when a local party was interviewing for a new candidate—could be counterproductive. The need to render the party more
efficient in fighting elections was resisted on grounds of maintaining constituency autonomy.
Tensions existed, though, not only with the voluntary wing of the party
but also within Central Office. As Douglas Hurd recalled:
The leader of the party usually has trouble with Conservative Central Office.
Hothouse intrigues flourish unnaturally in that unattractive hulk at the corner of Smith Square. Ted sought to control the situation by appointing
Michael [Wolff] as, in effect, chief executive. Sara Morrison was at the same
time put in charge of the women’s section of the party … Neither Michael
nor Sara was allowed long enough at Central Office to complete the overhaul which they planned. (Hurd 2003: 231)
The party was largely external to Heath’s way of running government.
Indeed, much of his time in Opposition was geared to thinking how to
manage government effectively. As Peter Hennessy recorded:
there was nothing DIY or improvised about Heath’s ideas for the machinery
of government. He was, in such terms, the most managerially minded prime
minister since Attlee. As leader of the Opposition he had commissioned a
depth of detailed planning unmatched by any premier before or since.
(Hennessy 1989: 210; see also Hennessy 2000: 336–337)
11 PARTY MANAGEMENT
245
In essence, Heath saw the party machinery in instrumental terms. For
him, the party was essentially a means to an end. He was focused on how
to run an administration rather than lead a party. The latter was necessary
to achieve the former. From the moment he was elected party leader, he
gave thought to how to structure government. This, as he conceded in his
autobiography, ‘engrossed me’ (Heath 1998: 314). He drew on consultants and people in business to assist in developing his plans. Four months
after taking office, he presented a White Paper, The Reorganisation of
Central Government (HM Government 1970), the first across-the-board
look at the quality of Cabinet government, as Hennessy noted, since the
1918 Haldane report on the machinery of government (Hennessy 2000:
338). He sought to achieve a more streamlined system of Cabinet government and a hiving off of certain executive functions.
Once Heath entered No. 10, perhaps not surprisingly, party bodies
were essentially sidelined. Although more party members got involved in
CPC discussion groups (Norton 2002: 193), there is no evidence of the
work of the CPC having an impact on the prime minister. The same applies
to the professional wing of the party. ‘After June 1970 coherent CRD
[Conservative Research Department] input into Government ceased virtually overnight’ (Campbell 1993: 513). During the General Election
campaign, Heath was helped by an external team, led by Geoffrey Tucker.
Heath hosted a reception for them at Chequers. As Douglas Hurd recalled,
‘I spent much time thereafter warding off complaints from the team that
they never saw the Prime Minister’ and that ‘we were lost in a bureaucratic
haystack’ (Hurd 2003: 193).
It was not just the professional and voluntary wings of the party that
were neglected but also the very body that had made Heath leader. He
failed to maintain good relations with the 1922 Committee, the body
drawing together all Conservative private members (i.e. all Conservative
MPs bar the leader in Opposition and all backbenchers when in government) (Norton 2013). Although he had been elected leader by his fellow
parliamentarians, he had not necessarily had a smooth relationship with
them during his ministerial career. His successful attempt as president of
the Board of Trade to abolish resale price maintenance had been resisted
by many Conservative backbenchers, influenced by small shopkeepers in
their constituencies (see Findley 2001). Heath appeared before a meeting
of the 1922 to justify his policy: his argument ‘went down like a lead balloon’ (Du Cann 1995: 88). His victory in the 1965 leadership contest—
the first under the party’s new rules for electing the leader—was narrow
246
P. NORTON
and generally unexpected (as discussed in Chap. 2, see also Heppell 2008:
33–49). He was not the frontrunner, but he benefited from a lacklustre
campaign run by his opponent, Reginald Maudling (see Roth 1971: 185;
Baston 2004: 255).
As Prime Minister, Heath enjoyed the backing of the 1922 for the
policy of joining the European Communities (EC), despite some dissent.
It proved a forum, though, for criticism of his policy U-turns. At least with
the policy of joining the EC, there was a clear goal. With the policy shifts
on industry and the economy, the sense of direction was lost. At one point
during passage of the 1972 Industry Bill, the chairman of the 1922, Sir
Harry Legge-Bourke, fired a warning shot across the government’s bows,
suggesting ministers should ‘give full weight’ to the support given to an
amendment by leading figures in the parliamentary party (Norton
2013: 20).
As leader, Heath’s relations with the 1922 Committee were, at best,
correct, but in practice generally frosty. As one member of the executive
recalled, ‘He treated most of his Parliamentary colleagues with ill-concealed contempt, especially the Executive, whose meetings with him
appeared to us to be no more than a necessary nuisance as far as he was
concerned’ (Fisher 1977: 141). As Campbell recorded, he regularly
attended the backbench business committee on Wednesdays at 6.15, following meetings of the Shadow Cabinet, ‘but rather to tell the troops
what the officers had decided than to listen to what they themselves might
have to say’ (Campbell 1993: 216).
Elections of officers and the executive of the 1922 were used, in the
words of one member, to give ‘a signal to Heath’ (Norton 2013: 21). The
most notable example was the election in 1972 of Edward du Cann as
chairman. He had been approached, he said, by a number of MPs and
those who approached me were quite clear as to what they wanted—someone who would stand up to the Prime Minister, Ted Heath, and ensure he
was made aware of Party opinions. They felt he was ignoring the views of his
colleagues in the House. (Du Cann 1995: 194)
These views later spilt out into meetings of the 1922. Some members
by the end of 1973 were complaining of Heath’s ‘presidential style of
government’ (The Times, 19 October 1973). Attempts to create good
relations came to nothing. When Humphrey Atkins became Chief Whip in
1973, he arranged a dinner at No. 10 for the officers and executive of the
11 PARTY MANAGEMENT
247
1922, ‘in what was intended to be a grand rapprochement’ but ‘proved to
be calamitous’ (Ziegler 2010: 431). Heath apparently lost his temper, and
the experiment was never repeated.
Once in government, Heath favoured civil servants to party figures, as
‘Heath … made use of the Civil Service in a way rarely observed before or
since’ (Harris 2013: 470). He drew heavily on the head of the civil service,
Sir William Armstrong, and his principal private secretary, Robert
Armstrong. Heath’s reliance on William Armstrong grew, especially after
the introduction of a prices and incomes policy in 1972 (Holmes 1997:
130–131). Economic policy was shaped by Heath and a small group of
civil servants (Baker 1993: 36). The Cabinet and parliamentary party were
largely excluded from the process (Holmes 1997: 132–133).
Heath’s idea was ‘to reduce politics to the minimum and adopt the best
policy, arrived at by experts thinking logically’ (Harris 2013: 470). His
means of achieving this was using policy groups to help shape party policy
in Opposition and the newly formed Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS)
for coming up with innovative ideas within government. As its head,
Victor Rothschild emphasised it was ‘for’ government ‘but not a tool of
the party’ (Jago 2017: 58). The whole of government became more a
vehicle for effective administration than for thinking politically. As John
Ramsden noted, Conservative Research Department was limited ‘by the
strange reluctance of Ministers to act like politicians’ (Ramsden 1980:
294–295). This, though, reflected the basic stance of the party leader.
Heath, then, relied on officials rather than party figures. However,
according to William Waldegrave, when the government ran into difficulties, Heath felt he had not had the support he deserved from the party
hierarchy:
I believe that Heath’s embitterment started then [1973–4], as he came to
think that the British Establishment, and particularly the Conservative Party
Establishment—which he had conquered from far outside its traditional
borders—had failed him. There were no strong and confident structures to
rely on: just himself, and he could not do it all. (Waldegrave 2015: 119)
There was thus something of a growing disseveration between Heath
and his party. As Waldegrave observed, there was no ‘Heathism’, so nothing distinctive behind which he could rally the party. The party organisation served him as leader, but he was busy being prime minister.
248
P. NORTON
Personnel
Heath had been an effective Chief Whip from 1955 to 1959 (Campbell
1993: 90–107; see also Eden 1960: 349). However, he had operated in an
era when discipline was seen almost in military terms. Cohesion within the
parliamentary division lobbies for the Conservatives was the norm: the
rebellion rate in the 1951–1955 Parliament amongst Conservatives was
1.4% of all divisions, and the same rebellion rate was evident in the
1955–1959 Parliament (Norton 1978: 208). Horne identified how as
Chief Whip ‘Heath chivvied backbenchers with something of the manner
of a sergeant-major’ (Horne 1989: 10), but how Macmillan later described
him as a ‘first class staff officer’, adding ‘but no army commander’ (Horne
1989: 242). Edward du Cann offered an even more critical interpretation,
arguing that ‘it was commonly believed that his four years as Chief Whip
had given him a healthy contempt for his fellow Members of Parliament in
the Conservative Party’ (Du Cann 1995: 194).
When he became leader, he thus had a somewhat detached view of the
very body that he led. The troops were there to support the leader and, in
essence, to do so without question, and ‘nothing was explained or justified
in principle’, as the ‘party was just expected to accept it’ (Norton and
Aughey 1981: 155). A perception developed within the parliamentary
party that Heath regarded them as ‘cattle to be driven through the gates
of the lobby’ (Cosgrave 1972). This was said to reflect Heath’s desire to
avoid what he would see as the ‘embarrassment’ of his government engaging in ‘concessions’ or ‘compromises’ with his own backbenchers, and his
determination to secure his legislation ‘unchanged’ (Seldon and Sanklecha
2004: 55). It was a strategy that led to a significant increase in dissent—
the rebellion rate would increase to nearly 19% in the Heath premiership
(which included a 29% rebellion rate in the 1971–1972 parliamentary session) (Norton 1978: 208; see also Franklin et al. 1986). As Table 11.1
demonstrates, this was the highest rebellion rate of the eight post-war
Conservative governments between 1951 and 1997, with only the
October 1974–1979 Labour administration surpassing it of the six postwar Labour administrations between 1945 and 1979.
It appeared that Heath was more at home with process than he was
with people, as ‘he often failed to recognise that a party lives on custom
and personal kindnesses more than on rational calculation’ (Norton and
Aughey 1981: 145). As a consequence, Robin Harris noted the
Conservative Party ‘never learned to love Edward Heath, though it
11 PARTY MANAGEMENT
249
Table 11.1 Government rebellion rates in the House of Commons (1945–1997)
Government
Labour Governments:
1945–1951
1964–1970
1974–1979
Conservative Governments:
1951–1964
1970–1974
1979–1997
Parliament
Majority
Rebellion rate (%)
1945–1950:
1950–1951:
1964–1966:
1966–1970:
1974–1974:
1974–1979:
146
5
4
99
No majority
3
6
2
0.2
8
7
20
1951–1955:
1955–1959:
1959–1964:
17
59
100
31
44
144
101
21
1
1
12
19
12
16
12
13
1979–1983:
1983–1987:
1987–1992:
1992–1997:
Sources: Norton (1978: 208); Cowley and Norton (1999: 86)
Bold values signify the scale of rebellion in the Parliament under discussion
respected him and stood with him’ (Harris 2011: 457). The respect was
somewhat one-sided. Heath, as John Campbell observed,
had little sympathy with the passions and prejudices of the retired majors,
small businessmen and hatted ladies who organised fetes and stuffed envelopes in the constituencies and demanded tougher penalties for criminals
every year at conference. (Campbell 1993: 509)
As Campbell goes on to observe, Heath made little effort to disguise
his disdain (Campbell 1993: 509; see also Ziegler 2010: 232). In meetings with party supporters, he could be distant and sometimes silent, and
‘sometimes he simply could not bother to make any effort at all, particularly if he felt there was little to gain’ (Laing 1972: 173). He was notably
antipathetic towards women. As one female MP recalled, Heath ‘disliked
women intensely, and did not bother to hide his feelings’ and ‘even in the
constituencies, where 90 percent of the work is done by women, he could
barely be civil to them’ (Knight 1995: 129; see also Waddington
2012: 91–92).
In May 1973, he addressed the Scottish party conference. As Michael
Wolff wrote to his wife, Heath used his speech to launch a ferocious attack
250
P. NORTON
on inefficient British industry, the ugly face of capitalism (the Lonrho
company), ‘and finally on the Conservative Party for being smug, upper
and middle class and spending its time debating self-congratulatory resolutions’ (quoted in Hurd 2003: 210). The location is significant. Heath
had a particular dislike of the landed hierarchy of the Scottish Conservative
party (Hurd 2003: 210; Ziegler 2010: 232), which essentially represented
the social snobbery that he despised (see Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky
1971: 100–101).
Yet, the respect of the party membership was maintained somewhat
longer than that of the parliamentary Conservative Party. Party members
rallied to the government’s cause over membership of the European
Communities, but they began to waver over the government’s direction
from 1972 onwards, as Ball notes:
The rank and file remained supportive in public, while sending some remarkably crisp and frank reactions up through the confidential channels of communication within the party structure. (Ball 1996: 331)
Worries over the sense of direction of the government—or lack of it—
did not, though, threaten Heath’s leadership. Party members remained
supportive, even after support began to drift away in the parliamentary
party. It was the party’s MPs who were to be the biggest threat to his
leadership.
Heath was elected by the parliamentary Conservative Party but did little to sustain his relationship with them, which as Chap. 16 explains was
to have consequences. Heath was a prime example of a political leader
who took a distant approach. He neither listened to nor rewarded those
who sat behind him on the Conservative benches. When he failed to
deliver electoral success, his neglect of his parliamentary colleagues was to
prove fatal.
Heath in the wake of the General Election of 1970 was in a powerful
position, and he was largely credited with winning when the Conservatives
were expected to lose. He had the kudos of election victory and the considerable levers of power in No. 10 (see Donoughue 1987: 3; Thomas
1998: 74–75). He was able to craft a personally loyal Cabinet and put in
place loyalists as head of the party organisation. However, his ability to
command the loyalty of his backbenchers proved relatively short-lived.
The root cause of conflict was the policies he pursued. Policy shifts, especially the U-turns on industrial and economic policy, generated opposition
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from some backbenchers and a wider sense of unease. The situation was
encapsulated by Chris Patten, who served Heath as Director of Conservative
Research Department:
The Conservative Party shuffled, confused, with the Cabinet Secretary,
William Armstrong, at Ted Heath’s side, from a market-oriented policy,
designed by a regiment of policy groups in Opposition, to dirigisme and
corporatism in government. (Patten 2017: 135)
The policy changes encountered dissent from neo-liberal MPs, notably
those who shared the views of Enoch Powell (Norton 1978: 246–254),
but it was not confined to them. Although most Tory MPs supported
membership of the EC, it was resisted by a significant, and well-organised,
minority. The need for legislation meant that dissent was sustained during
the passage of the European Communities Bill (Norton 1978: 64–82),
though Heath was helped by the fact that, as a result of astute drafting by
Geoffrey Howe, it was a relatively short Bill. Despite its brevity, there were
over 80 divisions in which Tory MPs rebelled during its passage (Norton
1978: 64–82). When problems became more severe, Heath was vulnerable as a result of his failure to build a body of goodwill among
backbenchers.
Conservative prime ministers are often adept at maintaining good relations with their backbenchers through the judicious use of promotions
and honours (on the use of patronage, see Allen and Ward 2009; King and
Allen 2010; Jones 2010). Backbenchers are promoted to junior ministerial
office. Long-serving backbenchers are rewarded with knighthoods (or
damehoods). The prime minister will go to the 1922 Committee and seek
to charm the members. A good prime minister will spend at least some
time in the House, occasionally dining there and visiting the tea or smoking rooms. Heath’s problem was not so much that he failed at one of
these, but rather that he failed at all of them.
He did not help himself by reducing the number of ministerial posts
within government, thus blunting his powers of patronage as a tool of
party management. Whereas Wilson had 77 ministerial positions (23 in
Cabinet and 54 junior ministerial positions), Heath decided to streamline
government when entering office, reducing the number of ministers to 56
(18 Cabinet and 38 junior ministerial positions). Although the number of
ministerial positions would expand over the four-year time of the Heath
premiership (increasing to 70), the number remained lower than what he
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inherited from Wilson, and Theakston concludes that Heath had ‘made
the job of managing the parliamentary party more difficult’ (Theakston
1987: 43, 57).
It has also been suggested that Heath misused his powers of patronage
by his reluctance to engage in reshuffles and to promote and advance talent, especially in terms of promotions into Cabinet (Butler and Kavanagh
1974: 25; Norton 1978: 230–231). Those in office were seen as loyal to
Heath—‘one of the complaints against Mr Heath was that he had created
too like-minded a team of ministers’ (Butler and Kavanagh 1974: 25)—
and when occasional reshuffles occurred, there was a perception of ‘yes
men’ filling the vacancies. As Patrick Cosgrave observed, ‘You cannot
expect preferment, or even merited reward—so the belief increasingly
goes—if you disagree with, or oppose, the Prime Minister’ (Cosgrave
1972: 878). A consequence was not only to build resentment among
those overlooked for office but also to leave some notably able MPs on the
backbenches, where they could act as effective critics of government
(Norton 1978: 235). They included John Biffen, described by The
Economist as ‘an exceptionally dangerous parliamentary performer’ (The
Economist, 3 March 1973: 20).
Long-serving members who would not expect promotion, but who saw
themselves as likely ‘knights of the shire’, were also to be disappointed
(Ziegler 2010: 237). Only a small proportion of those who had served
20 years or more in the House were knighted. (No Member received a
baronetcy, and Heath followed Harold Wilson in appointing only life
peers and, even then, only two from backbench MPs; Norton 1978: 237.)
His failure to use his patronage went against the advice of his own Chief
Whip, Francis Pym (Norton 1978: 237; on the Heath-Pym relationship,
see Heppell and Hill 2015). As one backbench MP, Julian Critchley
observed, the parliamentary party was ‘once sweetened by the distribution
of awards. Mr Heath has set his face against such baubles; just as it was said
of Manning that “there is a lobster salad side to the Cardinal”, so there is
a Spanish Republican side to the Prime Minister’ (Critchley 1973: 402).
William Waldegrave summarised it even more pithily: ‘his handling of
honours was admirable but suicidal’ (Waldegrave 2015: 141).
Heath’s failure to listen to his backbenchers led to MPs taking their
dissent to the voting lobbies, and his failure to mix with them rendered
him vulnerable when challenged for the party leadership. His approach
was to decide policy, either along or in conjunction with a few trusted
ministers (Money 1975: 131), and then essentially announce it to Cabinet
11 PARTY MANAGEMENT
253
and to the parliamentary party. There was no real attempt to explain or
cajole. Heath expected loyalty and was not disposed to listen to those who
took a different view. Fruitful dissent, as The Economist noted, tended to
be confused with disloyalty (The Economist, 1 February 1975: 11).
Expressing disquiet directly to the prime minister, and being listened to,
was an avenue closed to backbench critics. This meant that the only
remaining avenue for expressing dissent was the chamber. As one MP,
Richard Body, expressed it: ‘Macmillan always listened, but Heath did not.
And if the Prime Minister did not listen to you, then the only alternative
was to vote against the Government’ (Norton 1978: 230). Heath variously ignored the advice of Francis Pym and insisted on pursuing measures
in the face of backbench opposition, with the consequence that the government experienced unprecedented levels of backbench dissent in the
division lobbies (Norton 1975, 1978).
Tory backbenchers voted against the party whip not only more often
than before but to an extent that on occasion resulted in a government
defeat. No fewer than 160 Tory MPs cast one or more votes against the
whip during the course of the Parliament (Norton 1978: 206) and on six
occasions did so in numbers sufficient to defeat the government: three of
the defeats were on three-line whips. The most important defeat was on
the immigration rules in 1972 (Norton 1976: 404–420). As The Times
recorded in the wake of the defeat, ‘There was considerable feeling at
Westminster ‘last night that the Prime Minister’ must no longer seek to
ride roughshod over his backbenchers’ (The Times, 24 November 1972).
However, arguably, the most important dissent did not result in defeat,
though it came close to doing so. Heath was the first post-war Conservative
Prime Minister to witness some of his own MPs vote against the government on a vote of confidence, when 15 Tory MPs voted against (and five
abstained from voting on) the second reading of the European
Communities Bill. Potential rebels had been called in ‘and told in no
uncertain terms where their duty lay’ (Kitzinger 1973: 387). Heath had
made clear in the Commons that, if the vote was lost, ‘my colleagues and
I are unanimous that in these circumstances this Parliament cannot sensibly continue’ (HC Debates, Vol. 831; Col. 752, 17 February 1972). The
government was saved from defeat by the votes of Liberal MPs and by the
abstentions of some Labour members (Kitzinger 1973: 388; Norton
1978: 74; Renton 2004: 291). There was no love lost between Heath and
backbench opponents of the Bill.
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P. NORTON
Heath’s failure to listen to his MPs had an immediate effect in terms of
votes in the Commons. His failure to engage with members had a longer-­
term impact. The loss of the two general elections in 1974 left Heath
especially vulnerable to backbench criticism. The Conservative Party does
not reward failure and Heath had little reservoir of goodwill on which to
rely once he had lost the status and power of a Prime Minister.
Heath not only failed to maintain cordial links with the party organisation in the House, he also failed to use opportunities to meet informally
with members. The use of informal space in Parliament is crucial to understanding parliamentary behaviour and not least the capacity of party leaders to maintain support (Norton 2019: 257–260). Heath rarely ventured
forth to the tea or smoking room in the Commons (Ziegler 2010: 234;
Campbell 1993: 216). As William Waldegrave recalled, it was difficult to
persuade him to utilise social skills with colleagues:
I would mention a backbencher who might be swayed by a little courteous
treatment. Heath would wave away the idea: ‘I have spoken to him. Last
year. He’s a great friend’. (Often, in reality, he was not.). (Waldegrave
2015: 141)
It was a characteristic observed by Jim Prior when he was Parliamentary
Private Secretary (PPS) to Heath as Leader of the Opposition:
Ted’s difficulty was that he would win one group round—perhaps on the
back benches, or amongst the Press—but then it was as though he said to
himself, ‘Well, thank goodness that’s over, I won’t have to worry about
them again for a while’. So, six months later he would be back to square
one, and would have to make a special effort with them all over again.
(Prior 1986: 55)
In many respects, it was a problem when Heath failed to meet with colleagues and equally a problem when he did meet them. As John Campbell
reported, ‘when Heath did try to show himself’ he actually ‘tended to
alienate more good will than he engendered: it became part of Pym’s task
to keep the Prime Minister away from the House as much as possible’
(Campbell 1993: 513). As Nigel Fisher noted:
his rather rare visits to the Members’ smoking room were unrewarding
because, as a friend of his put it to me, he could not talk about unimportant
11 PARTY MANAGEMENT
255
things to unimportant people. It bored and embarrassed him. (Fisher
1977: 166)
His Cabinet colleague, Peter Walker, was conscious of the problem:
At one point I advised Ted to spend more time in the smoking room since
MPs were seeing too little of him as Prime Minister. I went into the smoking
room a few days later to find that he had taken my advice and was talking to
a ­distinguished Tory. As I passed, I heard him say, ‘That was a dreadful
speech you made last Wednesday’. (Walker 1991: 120)
The behaviour was symptomatic of his period as prime minister (Norton
1978: 228–230; Clarke 2016: 88–89). As one backbench MP recalled:
he has always been a prickly and difficult colleague, giving the impression
that he neither knew nor cared to know even the names of his backbenchers,
let alone the backbenchers themselves. (Knight 1995: 129)
Criticisms were taken personally. When Peter Tapsell, who had been
Heath’s neighbour in the Albany, criticised his economic policy, Heath
never spoke to him again (Peter Tapsell to author). When Heath sought
to make pleasantries during the leadership contest in 1975, Members
tended to rebuff his advances. It was seen as too little, too late. As one MP,
later to be a Conservative Chief Whip, recalled:
It was this feeling of being slighted and ignored that caused so many Tory
MPs not to support Ted in the leadership campaign of early 1975 … There
is no doubt that pent-up irritation with Ted rather than Margaret’s virtues
and skills caused her to win and Ted to lose. (Renton 2004: 294)
Conclusion
Heath had no lasting legacy in terms of the organisation of the Conservative
Party, and his leadership ended as a result of neglecting his power base in
the party. He spent too much time being prime minister and not enough
being leader of the Conservative Party. Nigel Fisher quoted approvingly
Churchill’s observation:
The loyalties which centre upon number one are enormous. If he trips, he
must be sustained. If he makes mistakes they must be covered. If he sleeps,
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he must not be wantonly disturbed. If he is no good, he must be pole-axed.
(Fisher 1977: 3)
In February 1975, as Chap. 16 explains in detail, Heath was pole-axed
by his parliamentary party. This was a consequence of defeat at the General
Election of October 1974, which led many members to believe that he
was no longer the right person to lead the party. Furthermore, relations
between Heath and the 1922 Committee executive became notably
strained. The 1922 executive met at the home of the chairman, Edward
du Cann, who recorded: ‘They were clear and unanimous in what they
demanded: Heath should stand down as soon as possible’ (Du Cann 1995:
200). Although du Cann thought this was premature, he reported the
view to Heath. According to du Cann, he recommended that Heath consider appointing a body to devise rules for re-electing a leader, which
would give him time to rally support (Du Cann 1995: 201–202). Heath,
on the other hand, recalled only that du Cann told him that the executive
committee had decided that he should resign and that he had retorted that
the members represented no one but themselves (Heath 1998: 528).
Heath’s misreading of the opinion of his fellow parliamentarians, which
would lead to the removal, carried with it an irony, given his status as a
former Chief Whip. Indeed, when considering the rise and fall of Heath,
Michael Jago concluded that:
From being a widely popular Chief Whip—an achievement in itself—he
evolved into a leader who rapidly and comprehensively lost the support of
the very members who had promoted his candidacy for the leadership …
Ultimately, the support of his colleagues evaporated; the Tory Party rewrote
their account of the 1970s to exclude him; there were few after his fall in
1975, who admitted to supporting him a decade before. (Jago 2017: 71)
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CHAPTER 12
Heath, Powell and the Battle for the Soul
of the Conservative Party
Gillian Peele
A study of the relationship between Edward Heath and Enoch Powell
offers a fascinating prism through which to view the challenges which
faced Heath’s premiership and wider questions about the evolution of
Conservative Party politics in that period. At its most obvious, the relationship was one of suspicion and enmity between two complex individuals with different values, political agendas and personalities. Edward Du
Cann noted that he had never seen ‘two men dislike each other more, or
so obviously’ (Du Cann 1995: 127). Their natural antagonism was, he
said, ‘electric’. James Prior noted in his memoirs that the feud between
Heath and Powell rivalled those of mediaeval Sicily with a profound and
long-term impact on politics (Prior 1986: 53).
I am grateful especially to the Bodleian Library for help with the Heath papers and
with the Conservative Party Archive and to Churchill College, Cambridge, for
access to the Powell papers and the Wolff papers. I am also immensely grateful to
Mr Michael McManus for discussions about Heath and Powell, and to Lord Hunt
for discussing his role at the 1972 Conservative Conference and its aftermath.
G. Peele (*)
University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
e-mail: gillian.peele@lmh.ox.ac.uk
© The Author(s) 2021
A. S. Roe-Crines, T. Heppell (eds.), Policies and Politics Under
Prime Minister Edward Heath, Palgrave Studies in Political
Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53673-2_12
261
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G. PEELE
Heath and Powell were major figures in the post-1945 Conservative
Party. Their relationship from 1950, when both entered the House of
Commons, went through many stages, but its most dramatic period
occurred between April 1968, when Powell was sacked from the
Conservative shadow cabinet for his notorious ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech on
immigration (Powell 1968), and February 1975 when Heath lost the
party leadership to Margaret Thatcher (Peele 2018). After the dismissal,
Heath and Powell never again spoke to each other, but Powell waged a
series of strident campaigns on a broad front—on immigration, on the
economy, on British membership of the European Economic Community
(EEC) and on Ulster—against the policies espoused by Heath and the
Conservative Party. In these campaigns, Powell carved out an alternative
vision of the character of Conservatism, which, although not strongly supported in Parliament, resonated with the grassroots of the Conservative
Party and in certain sections of the media as well as with the general public. The populist appeal of what came to be called ‘Powellism’ was seen as
a threat to Heath’s pragmatic and technocratic style of government and
his moderate consensus politics. Indeed, it stalked Heath’s leadership of
the Conservative Party in government and opposition. Powell’s rhetorical
skills, his flair for self-publicity and his willingness to defy political orthodoxy allowed him to demonstrate a popular support beyond the ranks of
traditional Conservative voters in a way which was inevitably seductive to
a party out of power and challenged Heath’s authority in government.
For, although Powell had apparently put himself outside the pale of mainstream politics through his inflammatory crusade over immigration, he
retained the capacity to influence the political agenda and to shape opinion inside and outside the Conservative Party.
Powell’s growing opposition to the Heath government’s stance on the
economy and on Europe increasingly made his continued membership of
the Conservative Party anomalous. The issue of British membership of the
EEC proved decisive. In the run-up to the February 1974 General
Election, Powell announced that he would not seek re-election for his
Wolverhampton South West seat and advised voters to vote Labour to
secure a referendum on the United Kingdom’s membership of the
Common Market. But, his intense interest in the affairs of Northern
Ireland provided a re-entry route into Parliament, and in October 1974,
he was elected as an Ulster Unionist MP for South Down, a seat he held
until his defeat at the 1987 General Election. And just as Powell’s highlighting of immigration almost certainly helped Heath win in 1970, his
12 HEATH, POWELL AND THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL…
263
withdrawal of support almost certainly contributed to Heath’s failure to
secure a majority in February 1974.
The Heath-Powell enmity thus reflected and tapped into deep divisions
and uncertainties within the Conservative Party in the late 1960s and early
1970s, divisions and uncertainties about the character of its ideology, its
future policy direction, its popular appeal and its leadership. And it placed
in sharp relief the vulnerabilities of Heath’s leadership style and his
approach to party management. In this chapter, I explore some of the
wider dimensions of the antagonism between Heath and Powell, and
argue that in addition to having profound implications for Heath’s ability
to command the support of the Conservative Party and his personal
authority, it left important legacies for contemporary politics, not least by
highlighting fault lines over fundamental principles, policies and tactics.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, I explore briefly the
mood of the Conservative Party during Heath’s leadership both in opposition and as Heath took office in 1970. I explore why, although Heath
could congratulate himself for his own continuing faith that the
Conservatives would win in 1970, his political authority remained fragile
and, as was to become apparent over the next five years, his capacity to
retain the support of his Party was vulnerable to Powell’s challenges. Then
I suggest some contrasts and similarities between Heath and Powell in
their personalities, political skills and political philosophies. In the third
section, I look briefly at four of the issues taken up by Powell over the
years from 1968 to 1975, especially race and immigration but also the
economy, Europe and Northern Ireland, and at what their handling
revealed about Heath’s style of leadership and about Powell’s thinking.
Finally, in the fourth section, I discuss the extent to which the conflicts
over these issues shaped the course of later Conservative fortunes and left
legacies for the Party.
Not Quite a Personal Triumph?
Heath’s unexpected victory in the general election of 1970 did not produce the degree of personal supremacy that might have been expected.
Although Conservative MPs had elected him in 1965, he had not been
able to stamp his authority decisively on the Party. A significant factor in
this failure (though by no means the only one) was the open warfare,
which had erupted between Heath and Enoch Powell over Powell’s crusade to restrict immigration and to encourage repatriation. As Heath
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pointed out to the many correspondents who complained about the dismissal of Powell from the shadow cabinet in response to the ‘Rivers of
Blood’ speech, he had no option but sack Powell because of its racialist
tone and because he had strayed from his own shadow cabinet brief into
the territory of other shadow ministers (Statement from the Leader’s
Office April 1968. MS Heath E.3/3/73). But the sacking was something
of a double-edged sword: the speech had turned Powell into a celebrity
overnight, and his dismissal freed him to continue his campaigns without
any of the shackles of collective discipline. As a former minister with a
powerful sense of self-projection, Powell knew how to achieve political
impact. With immigration, he had identified an issue which resonated with
the public and sections of the Conservative rank and file. Although only a
minority of the Conservative Party in Parliament ever felt sympathetic to
Powell and many in the Party organisation regarded him as an unreliable
maverick, Powell took up a series of issues, not just immigration but also
Europe, Northern Ireland and the economy where he could challenge
Heath’s leadership. The motives for his engagement with these issues—
the balance between opportunism and conviction—varied as did their
impact on his popular support. But taken together, these campaigns
offered a reworking of Conservative principles, which, even if idiosyncratic, often seemed more inspiring than Heath’s policy formulations.
In the 1970 election campaign, the media dramatised the conflict
between Heath and Powell by assigning reporters to follow Powell around
as though he were of the same stature as the official party leader, giving
him a remarkable amount of newspaper coverage (Butler and Pinto-­
Duschinsky 1970: 233 quoted in Schoen 1977: 56). That this conflict
should have become such a feature of the election campaign was indicative
of the impact which Powell had achieved on the subject of immigration
and the changes which were occurring within the Conservative Party. The
usual tendency of the Conservative Party had been to suppress its internal
differences and display at least a semblance of unity, but not only was there
doubt about Heath’s performance as leader, but there was also an increase
in factional organisation with the Monday Club on the right and the Bow
Group and the Young Conservatives (YCs) on the left. While Heath won
the General Election of 1970 against the polling predictions, Powell’s
challenge did not disappear. Indeed, Powell claimed that his highlighting
of the immigration issue had been decisive in securing the return of a
Conservative government. Although the initial research on the 1970 election was sceptical about Powell’s effect on the result, subsequent analysis
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has argued strongly that immigration was a major factor in the 1970 election. While immigration’s potential to affect voting behaviour was not
realised in the 1964 and 1966 elections, in 1970 it had become a polar issue,
separating the major parties in the electorate’s perceptions and it was a
factor in the Conservative victory (Studlar 1978: 46–64). What made the
difference in heightening awareness of the issue between 1966 and 1970
was Powell’s campaign, and his reiteration of the need to restrict immigration on Studlar’s calculation gave the Conservatives a net increment in the
vote of 6.7% on the basis of the immigration issue alone (Studlar 1978;
Schoen and Johnson 1976). After 1970, Conservative leaders could not
afford to ignore a topic which so resonated with the Party and the public
and on which they had established an advantage over Labour (Schoen
1977: 45–68). Whatever his more liberal inclinations, Heath moved to
tighten party policy on immigration as, with more conviction, did his
immediate successor (Bale and Partos 2014: 603–619).
Powell’s own agenda broadened after 1970, as he staked out positions
in sharp opposition to the official Conservative party line on membership
of the EEC, on economic policy and on Northern Ireland. As the most
obvious and articulate prophet of an alternative version of Conservative
doctrine and strategy, he remained a major problem for the period of
Heath’s premiership, the more so as Heath’s government seemed to lose
direction and coherence.
Heath’s Leadership Style and the Challenge
of Powell
Successful leadership of any organisation requires qualities over and above
the authority, which comes from holding an office of command. In a political party, which itself is likely to contain very different perspectives at
different levels, there must be at least three elements—a coherent vision
and purpose, the ability to communicate that vision through a compelling narrative and the ability to understand the needs and ambitions of
followers and to mobilise them in support of the leader’s agenda. On each
of these dimensions, Heath’s leadership displayed weaknesses, which he
was fatally unable to correct. Before examining those dimensions, however, it may be helpful to sketch a little of Heath’s and Powell’s contrasting
personalities.
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The Roots of Enmity
The years from 1950 to 1968 provide some clues to the origins of the
antagonism which developed between Heath and Powell. That antagonism was not the result of markedly different family, educational or
employment experiences. Indeed, in some ways, Heath and Powell
appeared superficially to have much in common. Both came from modest
social origins in marked contrast to the backgrounds of the Conservatives’
traditional leadership elite as typified by its previous ‘grandee’ leaders, Sir
Winston Churchill, Sir Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan and Sir Alec
Douglas-Home. Heath was the elder son of a skilled carpenter who built
up his own building business. Heath’s mother had been in domestic service. Heath was brought up in Broadstairs and never entirely lost a slight
Kentish accent. These features (what Philip Ziegler called his ‘suspect
accent’ and ‘unabashed lower middle class origins’) were to prove a handicap when Heath started looking for a parliamentary seat and almost certainly contributed to his apparent lack of social skills and self-absorption
(Ziegler 2010: 55). Andrew Roth opens his earlier study of Heath by
noting the difficulty of someone of Heath’s background succeeding in the
leadership of the Conservative Party at that time. Roth quotes Lord
Hailsham (Quintin Hogg), who was allegedly fond of confiding that
Heath envied him for two things: the fact that Hailsham was a gentleman
and, second, that he had a first-class degree (Roth 1972: ix). It is likely
that Hailsham’s disdain would have been shared by other leading
Conservatives, and it is doubtful if Heath could have made himself completely impervious to it.
Powell was the only child of school teachers and grew up in Birmingham,
retaining its distinctive accent. Both Heath and Powell had obtained places
at Oxford and Cambridge, respectively. Heath had won a place at Balliol
College, Oxford, to read Modern Greats (PPE) and later in his first year
obtained an organ scholarship to support his studies. Powell had won a
scholarship to Trinity College, Cambridge, to read classics. The two had
used their university periods very differently. Heath’s undergraduate years
saw him becoming involved in the Oxford Union, the Oxford Conservative
Association and the Balliol Junior Common Room. The fact that he
became president of all three entities suggests that as an undergraduate at
least he enjoyed the respect of his peers. And the presidency of the Union
gave him an extra year at Oxford. Certainly Heath’s memoirs indicate
that, although initially nervous about the class differences between him
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and many of contemporaries, Heath was at the centre of the social and
political life of his Oxford College and the wider university (Heath 1998).
Powell by contrast appears to have eschewed Cambridge social life in a
determined effort to excel academically (Heffer 1998; Shepherd 1997).
At the age of 25, he became Professor of Greek at Sydney, and when the
Second World War broke out, he was on the verge of taking up a professorial appointment at Durham. The war took both men into military service, Powell ultimately in the Intelligence Corps and Heath into the Royal
Artillery Company. For both it was a formative experience, although
Heath was extremely dismissive of Powell’s affection for his regiment and
of the fact that Powell, unlike Heath, had not seen much military action.
After the war, Powell (although he had voted Labour in 1945) joined the
Conservative Research Department which, under R.A. Butler, became a
nursery for intellectually able new recruits and a source of policy renewal.
Heath joined the civil service until his selection as a parliamentary candidate for the marginal seat of Bexley forced him to resign. Both entered
Parliament in 1950 as part of the talented generation of new meritocratic
MPs. While both Heath and Powell were active in the formation and early
development of the One Nation group, Heath’s participation in its activities was limited, and Powell clearly regarded him as less intellectual than
many other members of the group. In fact, despite the apparent similarities in background, the two men had very different mindsets and political
philosophies. For Powell, ideas mattered, and although in many respects
he was also a romantic, political commitments were intellectually and theoretically driven. Powell was not, however, an entirely consistent or coherent thinker (Corthorn 2019). Although Iain Macleod famously remarked
that the problem with following Powell’s train of thinking was that you
needed to get off before the end when the train hit the buffers, Macleod
also noted that Powell’s remorseless logic should not be exaggerated.
Powell’s positions were internally thought out to his own satisfaction and
were not necessarily aligned to any external system of thought. And he was
capable both of changing his mind abruptly—as occurred with his U-turn
over Europe—and of conceptual ambiguity. In his discussions of national
identity in relation to the United Kingdom, he would sometimes focus on
England as the nation, sometimes on a broader construct of Britain. The
important feature of Powell’s approach to political life, however, was that
he presented himself as someone whose policy stances were intellectually
grounded and that he was obsessive in the degree to which he staked out
his own positions. Heath by contrast generally displayed little interest in
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the philosophical underpinnings of policy and politics. He was also suspicious of appeals to the emotion and deeply distrusted the element of
showmanship he saw in Harold Wilson. He was above all a details man,
concerned with what was achievable and practical. He was driven by the
lessons of experience—especially the lessons learnt from his own observation of domestic and international politics. Thus, the blight of unemployment and poverty which had characterised the interwar years remained a
powerful factor in shaping his approach to domestic politics, while the
horror of the Second World War shaped his international outlook and
underpinned his support for European unity. He identified naturally with
the post-war economic and welfare consensus and the assumption of a
positive role for the state. He could appreciate the need for reforms to
modernise Britain’s economy and to make government more efficient, but
such reforms would be driven by pragmatism and empirical analysis and
not economic doctrine.
The contrast between the two men’s political outlook emerged dramatically in relation to economic policy (where Powell became increasingly convinced by monetarism and arguments for a radical reduction of
the state’s role in the economy), immigration (where Powell urged ever-­
stricter controls to prevent, as he saw it, of the risk of racial conflict and the
dilution of the national culture) and the debate about the United
Kingdom’s relationship with Europe. For Powell, the nation and the
nation state were at the heart of his world view and, although he had supported the United Kingdom’s application to join the EEC in the 1960s on
economic grounds, by 1969 he had come to see the European project as
a dangerous threat to national identity and parliamentary sovereignty.
Heath, who had made his maiden speech on the need for Britain to
endorse the Schuman Plan and had conducted the negotiations for British
entry under Macmillan, was an ardent supporter of British membership of
the EEC. Unsurprisingly, he subsequently regarded the achievement of
the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Economic
Community as the greatest moment of his premiership. Objections on the
grounds that membership had caused a loss of parliamentary sovereignty
and weakened the United Kingdom’s independence were seen as an
abstract irrelevance to the creation of a new economic, political and diplomatic strength for Britain. For Heath, the nation state was dead and the
protection of sovereignty far less important than cooperation with other
countries to promote common objectives.
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It is significant that Powell’s exploration of key tenets of political principle after 1965 and his divergence from Heath on issues of policy, especially on economic policy and on Europe, came at a time of increasingly
intense debate about the character of Conservatism and how the
Conservative message could be more sharply differentiated from Labour’s.
The 1970s also saw a resurgence of interest in neo-liberal ideas, which was
to change the character of political argument in the United Kingdom and
the United States. Ultimately, of course, the beneficiary of the intellectual
reappraisal on the right of British politics was to be Margaret Thatcher not
Enoch Powell, but the exploration of the foundations of Conservative
politics was a process in which Powell was an early participant. It was also
one which inevitably undermined Heath’s command of the Party’s identity. While there is no doubt that Heath was deeply interested in the detail
of policy and did have a vision of the kind of society he wished to create,
his interest in the reappraisal of fundamental principles was limited.
Powell’s rejection of Heath’s version of Conservatism also coincided
with a series of major challenges to successive governments, both Labour
and Conservative, over the management of the economy and industrial
relations but also in other policy areas such as Northern Ireland. Steve
Richards notes that, despite having an unusual degree of relevant experience prior to assuming the premiership, Heath was an ‘unlucky prime
minister’, not least in the scale of the external challenges that beset his
administration (Richards 2019).
Heath and Powell were both self-contained individuals who were not
obviously gregarious. Early on as a whip, Heath was already seen as someone who did not need company and displayed a degree of disdain for
ordinary social interaction. With time, this degree of self-containment
transmuted into a manner that seemed brusque to the point of rudeness.
Edward Du Cann, who was Chairman of the Party when Heath became
leader in 1965, commented that, while Heath’s style of politics had ‘too
much of the fact in it (or the supposed fact) and too little of the philosophical and emotional’, it was his personality that separated him from Du
Cann and from so many others in the Party (Du Cann 1995: 127).
Du Cann asserted that he did not remember Heath ever taking the
trouble to be gracious to anyone during the three years he worked for
Heath at the Board of Trade and as Chairman of the Party: ‘If politics is
about the business of influencing opinion and getting people on one’s
side, Heath started (and continued) with a heavy self-imposed handicap’
(Du Cann 1995: 127). Precisely what the causes of Heath’s social
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ineptness were remains open to debate: those who knew him well noted
the extent to which he would often maintain long silences and avoid eye
contact with people. His circle of real friends was small, and later in life, it
was evident that Heath was intensely lonely. That said, although Heath
clearly antagonised some colleagues such as Du Cann, he inspired loyalty
and affection in many of those who worked with him. William Whitelaw,
for example, recorded in his memoirs that he had many happy memories
of working with Heath (Whitelaw 1989: 56). James Prior, while noting
Heath’s capacity for brusqueness to the point of rudeness, stated that for
those who came to work closely with Heath, there was nothing they would
not do for him (Prior 1986: 39).
Powell was also someone whose manner could be off-putting, but he
had the support of a wife and family. Powell’s political campaigns were
conducted without too much thought for their impact on his immediate
colleagues, and over time, he became increasingly isolated in the parliamentary party. He was never someone who sought to mobilise the support
of fellow MPs. In 1965, when he stood for the Conservative leadership in
a campaign organised by Nicholas Ridley, he attracted only 15 votes, a
mixture of personal friends, converts to his economic views such as Ridley
himself, John Biffen (who seconded him) and MPs who endorsed his
increasingly explicit concern with immigration control. But, as well as a
happy marriage, the Powells maintained an active social life, keeping contact with those back-bench MPs dissatisfied with Heath, as the diaries of
Pamela Powell reveal (Churchill/POLL1/8, Pamela Powell Diaries).
In the early months in the House of Commons, Heath’s qualities had
caught the eye of the whips’ office, and he was recruited as a junior whip,
responsible for pairing in the first instance. He rapidly rose to be joint and
then sole deputy chief whip. When, in 1955, Anthony Eden needed a new
chief whip, Heath was promoted. The long period in the whips’ office had
two consequences. First, it gave Heath an unrivalled knowledge of the
personalities and ambitions of his parliamentary colleagues, as well as the
opportunity to help or impede them. It is an interesting question as to
why, having learnt how to cajole and persuade his colleagues as a whip,
Heath could not carry this skill forward when he became leader (Du Cann
suggests that Heath had acquired a certain contempt for his colleagues
while in the whips’ office). Second, the long period as a whip in a sense
distanced Heath from the routine participation in parliamentary business
and social interaction, and it meant that he did not quickly develop an
intuitive understanding of speaking in the House because the whips are
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traditionally silent in debate. The skills which Heath did learn in his early
years in the House of Commons were knowledge of policy and procedure
and the importance of detail. He also impressed with his loyalty, a quality
which Heath especially prized and which perhaps limited his ability to
select close colleagues who would give him frank advice on political tactics
and his handling of the Party. Heath was rewarded by Macmillan in 1959,
becoming Minister of Labour and then Lord Privy Seal with responsibilities in the House of Commons for the Foreign Office and special responsibility for European negotiations. When Home succeeded Macmillan in
1963, Heath became Secretary of State for Industry, Trade and Regional
Development.
Powell by contrast had a more tempestuous apprenticeship in government. He entered government as Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry
of Housing and then became Financial Secretary at the Treasury. Together
with his fellow junior Treasury Minister, Nigel Birch, Powell submitted his
resignation when in 1958 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Peter
Thorneycroft, resigned in protest at increases in government spending.
Powell’s 1958 resignation was an early indication of his concern with
curbing public expenditure and his tendency to strike his own path. Powell
was reinstated in 1960 as Minister of Health, although he was not given
cabinet membership until 1962. Powell was not only a highly effective
Minister of Health, but he solidified a commitment to a strong welfare
state which often put him at odds later with more radical advocates of the
application of free-market principles to welfare and health provision.
Powell’s relationship with Macmillan was frosty because Powell distrusted
Macmillan. For his part, Macmillan disliked Powell (Macmillan found
Powell’s presence in cabinet discomforting and had Powell’s seat moved
so that he would not have to face Powell’s eyes. Heath later had Powell’s
position in the shadow cabinet rearranged to avoid having to face Powell’s
facial gestures in argument). When Macmillan engineered the succession
of Sir Alec Douglas-Home to the leadership in 1963, Powell, along with
Iain Macleod, refused to serve in Home’s government in protest.
In the 1965 leadership contest, under the new rules introduced to
democratise the way the Conservative Party chose its leader, the three
candidates—Heath, Maudling and Powell—represented the coming of
age of the 1950 intake. Heath was seen as the dynamic, modernising candidate and the one most able to counter the appeal of Harold Wilson,
while Maudling, who had started as the front runner, was weakened by his
apparently languid style. Powell’s candidacy was a marker for the future
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and was in a sense a sideshow. Heath defeated Maudling by 150 votes to
133, while Powell’s 15 votes put him well behind. But that he stood at all
underlines the fact that he had leadership ambition and wanted a key role
in shaping the destiny of his Party.
Heath’s victory from the beginning was in many ways a problematic
one. John Campbell comments that Heath’s triumph quickly became a
‘protracted nightmare’ (Campbell 2013: 189). Some resented the tactics
of Heath’s backers who were suspected as having worked to dislodge
Home. For many in the Party who had opted for Heath as the candidate
capable of countering Wilson, Heath’s performances in the House were a
disappointment, and his apparent lack of personal warmth meant that he
failed to generate enthusiasm either on the backbenches or among the
public. There were many in the Conservative Party who wondered whether
they had made a major mistake in choosing Heath as their leader. Certainly
timing was not on Heath’s side. In 1965, he inherited a political situation
in which another General Election was inevitable and a second Conservative
defeat seemed equally inevitable. If the Wilson victory of 1966 allowed
Heath time to reshape the Conservative Party’s image and policies, it also
ushered in a period of profound unhappiness on the Conservative benches.
It was in this period that Powell began his political odyssey, one which was
to take him out of the Conservative Party and ultimately to the ranks of
Ulster Unionism, as well as leaving lasting legacies for the Conservative Party.
Leadership and Vision
As noted earlier, Heath’s mindset was hostile to abstract arguments and
the pursuit of philosophical principles. The battle of ideas which increasingly became such a feature of the 1970s was not at all to his taste.
Although he allowed Sir Keith Joseph to set up the Centre for Policy
Studies after the Conservative defeat in February 1974, he was not greatly
interested in its work or that of other think tanks such as the Institute of
Economic Affairs (IEA).1 From the time of Heath’s election to the
­leadership, there was pressure to produce a more distinctive version of
Conservatism. T.E. Utley, an influential journalist and writer whose vision
1
The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), which had been founded in 1958, became an
important forum for exploring the application of free market ideas to policy, and it regularly
brought together sympathetic politicians, journalists and academics. Powell was a friend of
the IEA chairman Ralph Harris and often participated in IEA activities.
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of Conservatism was widely acknowledged to be very similar to that of
Powell’s, explored a series of dilemmas which faced the Conservative Party
after the Macmillan era, notably the role of government and whether planning or freedom should be given priority. Utley saw Powell’s role in the
late 1960s as being to criticise the ‘heresies’ absorbed by the Conservative
Party during the Macmillan administration. In 1967, Utley saw Powellism
as the ‘most valuable single ingredient in Conservatism today’ but it was
not so much a programme as a way of life (Moore and Heffer 1989: 21).
Utley’s comments and his support of Powell’s position through the 1960s
and 1970s are important because they reflect the yearning for a more
robust laissez-faire form of Conservatism and the spread of the influence
of neo-liberal ideas in political, academic and media circles, as well as the
growing doubts about Heath’s ability to promote a genuinely
Conservative vision.
Communication
In addition to having a coherent vision, a successful leader must be able to
communicate it to followers. He or she must have the ability to convey
arguments effectively in different arenas from the large and formal settings
of Parliament or a party conference to the more intimate venues of smaller
party meetings. The ability to be an effective communicator on television
is also crucial and had been so in Britain since the early 1960s. What makes
a speaker effective is not a clear-cut issue. The mastery of a case is clearly
part of it, but so too is fluency of expression and the creation of empathy
with the audience. Capturing the attention of the House of Commons is
to some extent a learnt skill, and Heath may have been handicapped by his
years of silence in the Whips’ Office. Whatever the cause, Heath’s performances in House were rarely stellar. Although his maiden speech had
attracted plaudits, his speaking style—at least in formal situations—was
often wooden and pedestrian and frequently disappointed his followers.
Some of the problem was in the construction of the speeches themselves,
despite the best efforts of speech writers. Various studies have drawn attention to the extent to which Heath’s approach to his speeches drove his
advisers to despair. Michael McManus quotes Brendan Sewill on the fact
that Heath did not have a natural flair with words and that ‘his difficulty
with speeches came because he was determined to get the facts right, to
present a clear, concise, factual argument’ (McManus 2016: 61). Others
wondered how someone with Heath’s ear for music could have so poor an
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ear for the spoken word. His speeches, though carefully written and frequently revised, as a result tended to lack humour and appeared stilted and
boring. Part of the problem was that Heath despised the verbal tricks of
Harold Wilson and hated attempts to turn politics into emotional appeals.
But it put him at a disadvantage with both Wilson and with Powell, whose
sensitivity to language was marked.
Mobilisation of Support
It was perhaps unsurprising in these circumstances that from early in his
leadership, Heath’s ability to mobilise support seemed so conspicuously to
fail. The period after the 1966 election saw Heath having to fend off a
series of rebellions within his own party, as well as trying to counter the
Wilson government. It has already been noted that the Conservative Party
after 1965 was changing and becoming more factionalised with more
organised activity and criticism on both the right of the Party and the left.
On the right, the Monday Club had begun to organise both in parliament
and in the country in 1961, and it developed a presence also in the universities. On the left, pressure groups such as the Bow Group were highly
active, and the Young Conservatives were also well organised. Parliamentary
dissent when the Party went into opposition in 1964 focused on a range
of inflammatory issues, including sanctions against Rhodesia and industrial relations, as well as Europe and foreign policy. Heath’s leadership
style had failed to convince many in the Party that it would deliver electoral success, and his performance in the House of Commons often
appeared lacklustre. Compromise positions often had to be adopted, and
even so, there were often humiliating episodes in which the party was
publicly divided.
The difficulty of party management was compounded by the unusual
nature of the issues themselves. Some such as the Rhodesian question
awakened imperialist sympathies, while others, such as membership of the
European Economic Community, touched on what some saw as the core
Tory values of nationhood and sovereignty. Any leader would have struggled to maintain a united party in the face of such divisions, but Heath’s
lack of social awareness and his neglect of small gestures of concern and
courtesy made the task of retaining support harder and increasingly generated resentment. Ziegler points to the handwritten note sent from
Anthony Eden to Heath, congratulating him on his maiden speech and
lamented that Heath, although noting in his memoirs the pleasure it gave,
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never realised how much such ‘encouragement from on high’ could have
smoothed his own relationships with backbenchers (Ziegler 2010: 70).
Patrick Cosgrave, writing in The Spectator at the time of the 1972
Conservative Party Conference, drew attention to the lack of ‘love’
between Conservative leaders and their followers, but he noted that Heath
loved his followers less than most. He went on to quote Heath’s alleged
declaration during a particularly ‘bad patch in opposition’ that he hated
‘the bloody Tory Party’, which he thought ‘never support their leader’
(Cosgrave 1972). Cosgrave, however, suggested that the problem was
also that the leader rarely supported the followers. As his leadership progressed, and especially after he became Prime Minister in 1970, the distance between Heath and his followers in both the Parliament and the
wider Party grew. Colleagues tried but largely failed to get him socialise
more effectively with MPs: Timothy Kitson, Heath’s parliamentary private
secretary tried to get Heath into the Commons tea room after Prime
Minister’s Questions, but Heath frequently pleaded the need to return to
Downing Street to work and lost these opportunities (McManus
2016: 104).
The form of the Heath government after 1970 also exacerbated his
isolation. It was a small cabinet, and there was a tendency to rely on men
(all but one were men) who were not only close to him and loyal but not
likely to challenge his position on policy and tactics. Little attention
seemed to be given to the judicious promotion of younger MPs, and the
team assembled in 1970 remained largely in place in 1974. As in the formation of his shadow cabinets, Heath was prepared to omit a number of
able individuals who might have expected to be included.
Powell had been included in Heath’s shadow cabinet as the shadow
defence spokesman despite the lack of warmth between them and because,
in Prior’s words, although an uncomfortable colleague, Powell was ‘too
dangerous to leave out’ (Prior 1986: 42–43). Moreover, Powell’s belief in
the need for British defence cutbacks East of Suez was unlikely to be popular in the Party. Increasingly, Powell had developed his own views on
economic policy, Europe and immigration, and he took it as his right to
express those views even if they strayed into other shadow cabinet portfolios. This freewheeling approach inevitably threatened the discipline of the
shadow cabinet and angered other spokesmen such as Iain Macleod and
Quintin Hogg and infuriated Heath, who had a strong view about maintaining order in his ranks. Powell’s volatility and his difficulty in subjecting
his priorities to those of a team suggest that a break with the shadow
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cabinet would have come sooner or later. Even if Heath had not himself
wished to sack Powell for his ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech, other members of
the shadow cabinet, notably Quintin Hogg, Iain Macleod and Robert
Carr, were adamant that he should be removed. Powell claimed that his
April 1968 ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech did no more than reflect existing
Conservative policy, but the claim was patently disingenuous. The speech
(which was deliberately not centrally cleared in advance) was strategically
calculated to maximise publicity for Powell himself. As Michael McManus
commented, the episode inspired one of the most passionate sections of
Heath’s memoirs in which he noted that the action he had taken in sacking Powell was ‘absolutely right’ and that ‘although it caused friction
between the party and extremists among the public, it saved our position
with the majority of our people’ (McManus 2016: 74).
Heath’s choice of colleagues in opposition and government reflected
the enormous premium he put on loyalty, and perhaps it also reflected his
conviction that a united team would be more efficient. But the creation of
a group of colleagues that looked so dependent on the leader’s approval
inevitably generated some resentment and gave the impression that he had
deliberately surrounded himself with ‘yes men’ rather than selecting talent
from all sections of the Party. Whether the criticism was fair or not, it was
not an ideal way to maintain a broad appeal within the Party, and it
deprived the leadership of both ability and linkages to wider parliamentary
sentiment.
In the House of Commons, the effect of Heath’s leadership style as well
as the emergence of a sequence of divisive issues triggered an increasing
amount of dissent. Although, as Philip Norton has detailed, dissent in the
first session of the 1970–1974 Parliament when the Heath government
was in office was relatively light, there was already opposition on four
issues: arms to South Africa, Rhodesian sanctions, Northern Ireland and,
more seriously, membership of the European Union—EU (Norton 1978).
The degree of dissent was however to escalate much further in subsequent
sessions, and on some of these issues, Powell was to become a major
spokesman of the dissenters.
There were problems too with the Conservative Party organisation.
Edward du Cann, the Party Chairman when Heath became leader, was
clearly a critic. Although the pair had developed a deep dislike for each
other earlier, Heath could not immediately sack him upon winning the
leadership. Although the Nation Union General Purposes Committee
recorded its gratitude to Heath in 1965 for keeping Du Cann on as
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Chairman, the relationship was always a strained one (CPA, NUA 5/1/5
1 September 1965). At various points thereafter, Heath came close to
removing Du Cann but drew back for fear of provoking opposition inside
the Party. In 1967, Du Cann, after a period of frustration with Heath’s
style of leadership, offered his resignation and was replaced by Anthony
Barber, a Heath loyalist who eventually went on to serve in Heath’s
Cabinet as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Du Cann moved on to chair the
powerful 1922 committee of backbenchers and would ultimately see the
ousting of Heath by Margaret Thatcher under new amended rules for the
leadership election. Du Cann in his memoirs claimed that Heath treated
the voluntary Party with little respect and ‘regarded the constituent parts
of the Party as instruments for the Leader’s support and little else’, whereas
Du Cann could not see them as ‘Heath’s servants, nor as inferior in status
to Members of Parliament’ (Du Cann 1995: 119). Clearly this view was
coloured by Du Cann’s own dislike of Heath, but it was evident that
activities which required extensive interaction with ordinary members
were often a trial for Heath and for the MP who had to host him at constituency events. Thus, Sir John Rodgers (who had much earlier beaten
Heath to selection for the Sevenoaks constituency and was a friend and
constituency neighbour of Heath) wrote thanking Heath for visiting in
1973. The tone of the letter, while grateful for Heath’s willingness to stay
for a buffet supper after his talk in the constituency, was apologetic for
calling on Heath’s time and suggests an understanding of how little Heath
enjoyed such gatherings (MS Heath 3/3/73).
Dividing Issues and the Battle for Support
Immigration
The issue of immigration was a continuous thread running through
Heath’s period as leader, and it was one which frequently forced him onto
the defensive. For Powell, the immigration issue, and his willingness to
break the cross-party consensus on it, was the one which for many observers came to define his politics. Certainly it was the one which brought out
the very strong antagonism and distrust between Heath and Powell and
also exposed sharp divisions within Conservative ranks. Powell may have
come to the issue of immigration relatively late by comparison with other
MPs such as Cyril Osborne, Norman Pannell and Duncan Sandys, but
after 1967 he became increasingly absorbed by it (Peele 2018). In early
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1965, 162 MPs had supported a private members’ bill brought forward by
Cyril Osborne, and throughout the period of Heath’s leadership of the
opposition, there were efforts within the Party to give the issue more
prominence. The 1968 ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech was but one in a series of
speeches in which Powell had started to highlight the necessity of strong
immigration control. The timing of Powell’s speech was influenced by the
upcoming debate on Labour’s strengthened Race Relations Bill, which
Powell thought the Conservatives should oppose on principle because it
was not only immoral but also ‘like throwing a match on gunpowder’ in
relation to racial harmony. The emotive tone of his Birmingham speech
made it completely unacceptable to Heath and the other members of his
shadow cabinet. Heath was congratulated for his decisive action in sacking
Powell in some quarters, and he claimed the complete support of his colleagues (Churchill/WLFF). Ominously, there was an enormous outpouring of support for Powell in the constituency parties and indeed among
the public more generally, including demonstrations by London dockers
and Smithfield porters who marched in his support. Heath was at the
receiving end of a ‘nasty, vicious reaction’, and his office was inundated
with letters deploring the dismissal, many of them so unpleasant that he
was distressed his secretaries had to read them (McManus 2016: 74).
Ziegler notes that of the 2756 letters Heath received on dismissing Powell,
only 12 approved of his action (Ziegler 2010: 207). The volume of support for Powell is also evident in the flood of letters, which Powell received
and which continued to come in months afterwards.
The 1968 ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech made the leader’s task more difficult, as he tried to keep the parliamentary party united in its position on
the Labour government’s 1968 Race Relations Bill. While a vocal right-­
wing contingent, including Ronald Bell, wanted the Party to oppose it,
others were happy with the principle, and a third group was uneasy about
its scope. Powell’s speech was delivered the weekend before the House of
Commons was due to debate the Bill’s second reading. The Conservative
Party had put down a reasoned amendment which, according to William
Whitelaw, Powell had helped to draft (Whitelaw 1989: 64), but it was
taunted by the government to be clear about its approach. After a debate
which McManus noted ‘fairly crackles off the page’, the legislation was
passed but not without serious rifts appearing in the Conservative Party.
One Conservative MP, Humphrey Berkeley, resigned from the Party
because of the decision to oppose the bill on second reading, and many
critics on the right wanted a firmer line. On the third reading (when the
12 HEATH, POWELL AND THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL…
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Conservative party decided not to whip against the principle of the Bill),
some 45 Conservatives insisted on dividing the House and voted against.
What made this rebellion especially noteworthy was the fact that, not only
was the shadow front bench split, but half of the officers of the 1922
Committee joined the rebellion, a move which prompted speculation that
there was a plot to destabilise the leadership (Wood and Clark 1968a).
In fact, at the subsequent 1922 Committee meeting, the Party’s loyalty to
Heath was affirmed (Wood and Clark 1968b). Notwithstanding Heath’s
formal rejection of Powell’s position, the sentiment in the country and in
the Conservative grassroots sent a powerful signal to the leadership about
the sensitivity of the issue. Heath moved to harden the Party’s stance on
immigration, setting out a much more restrictive position and promising
that the next Conservative government would strengthen legislation to
control Commonwealth immigration, a promise which was to result in the
Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1971.
Heath himself had tried while in opposition to respond to the threat
from Powell by visiting the areas where immigration was perceived as a
major problem. He was persuaded to make a tour of the West Midlands in
late January 1969 both because it would give an opportunity to appreciate
the problems associated with immigration in the area and because some
pointed questions had been asked at the Birmingham press conference in
April 1968 as to why he had not visited the area (WLFF 3/2/101). The
tour was clearly not an easy one to organise since Heath and his office
were very aware that there was considerable support for Powellism in the
West Midlands and indeed that Powell as a local MP would be present on
the platform at the public meeting in Walsall. The problem of immigration
continued to trouble the Conservatives and pose problems for party management after 1970, however. There were several reasons for this. First,
however, Heath and the government strengthened the policy of control,
and they often found themselves either outflanked by Powell who had
moved on to emphasise repatriation and resettlement or found their capacity to deal with immigration and indeed their sincerity on the issue questioned by Powell. A second problem was the extent to which events had
the capacity to knock government policy off course. The clearest example
of this was the crisis caused by Idi Amin’s persecution and expulsion of the
Ugandan Asians in the summer of 1972, where the Heath government
decided to admit those who were British passport holders. As the controversy over the admission of the Ugandan Asians underlined, the issue was
one that aroused intense feelings on the right, whereas the increasingly
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well-organised Monday Club saw a hard stance on immigration as a vote
winner. This stance was energetically resisted by more liberal groups (such
as the YCs and the Bow Group), who argued the need to appeal to the
more liberal attitudes of new generations of voters, including those from
ethnic minorities. Heath was well aware of the rumblings on the issue on
the backbenches. In the summer of 1972, John Biggs Davidson, for example, had unsuccessfully urged a recall of Parliament before any Ugandan
Asians were admitted and there were regular reports of critical opinions
being voiced in back-bench committees.
The Ugandan Asian question formed the occasion for a major confrontation between the different party factions, and between the leadership
and the Powellites at the Party Conference of 1972. The episode is worth
recounting in some detail because it underlines the extent to which it had
become imperative to deny Powell and his supporters any symbolic or
moral victories and the increasing difficulty of containing dissent on immigration. The 1972 Conference, as The Times put it, turned into a struggle
for the soul of the Conservative Party (The Times, 12 October 1972).
In general, Conservative Party conferences have been carefully stage
managed with rather bland motions put down for discussion and avoid topics which might cause the Party embarrassment. That the 1972 conference
would be difficult to manage became evident at the opening when one
representative, a Monday Club member and Powell supporter, Richard
Devenald-Lewis, moved that the agenda be referred back because it was
attempting to whitewash disagreements within the Party (The Times, 12
October 1972). Although the National Union would have chosen the
bulk of the subjects for debate well in advance, it was normal for Conference
itself to select by ballot two motions in addition. When the time came to
select these motions, one in the name of the Hackney South and Shoreditch
constituency association topped the ballot with the highest number of
votes secured for any motion since the war. On the face of it, the motion
could have appeared anodyne, stating, as Schoen puts it, ‘with wicked
simplicity’ that Conference believed the Conservatives ‘declared policy on
immigration to be the only approach likely to be successful’ (Schoen 1977:
92). The motion was, however, designed to highlight the Party’s failure to
implement its 1970 manifesto commitment through the decision to admit
the Ugandan Asians. The potential for disruption was further highlighted
when, on the day before the debate, the chairman of the association
(Harvey Proctor), who was to have moved the motion, ceded his right to
do so to its President who turned out to be Enoch Powell. When, in
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281
response, the Young Conservative Chairman, David Hunt, proposed an
amendment congratulating the government on its decision to admit the
Ugandan Asians, the scene was set for a major confrontation (David Hunt
had prior to the Conference made public a statement calling for an emergency resolution on the Ugandan Asian issue) (Young Conservative
Organisation News Service 1972). Hunt’s amendment to the Hackney
motion allowed the clash between the government and the Powellites to
be fought out without directly involving Heath himself, even though
there had been speculation earlier that Heath would himself confront
Powell (Wood 1972).
The debate was raucous. In addition to the drama and tension of the
speeches themselves, David Hunt was given a rousing reception with the
platform joining in the applause. There were also groups of Young
Conservatives cheering and booing from one of the galleries and holding
up placards giving the speakers scores for their contributions (Holroyd-­
Doveton 1976: 236–237). The motion went to a formal ballot—an event
so unusual that the tellers (Powell and Hunt) had difficulty using the key
to the box. The amendment was carried by 1721 votes to 736, a substantial victory for the government but not perhaps as crushing a defeat as
some had predicted. The platform had seen off the threat of a humiliating
reprimand to the government’s policy, and for the most part, press commentary applauded the outcome as a vote for moderation. The debate
itself did not entirely reflect the substantial minority who voted against the
amendment. Nor could it disguise the unhappiness of a section of the
membership. There was a sequel as the man who had moved the amendment, David Hunt, was soon deselected for Plymouth Drake at the constituency annual general meeting as a result of his role in opposing Powell.
Hunt and Plymouth Drake had agreed that his formal adoption meeting
be postponed until after the Party Conference, and at the meeting, there
were procedural irregularities involving the infiltration of the meeting by
members from Alan Clark’s adjacent constituency of Plymouth Sutton.
Hunt declined to stand again in that constituency when the selection procedures had to be rerun. He also received a significant amount of lurid and
threatening hate mails.
The ongoing battles about immigration inevitably continued to cause
problems in government. The attempt to pass new immigration rules in
1972 exposed the continued sensitivity of the subject especially when it
linked immigration issues to a new European system, which appeared to
give preferential arrangements for immigrants from the EEC over
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Commonwealth citizens. The rules were decisively rejected in what Philip
Norton noted was then the most important government defeat in post-­
war parliamentary history (Norton 1972). The rules had to be revised and
were passed without a problem in early 1973.
After the autumn of 1972, however, the immigration issue appeared to
lose much of its immediacy, overtaken as it was by other themes for both
Powell and the public. As the authors of the February 1974 General
Election study put it, ‘by the end of 1973 as little was being heard about
race relations and immigration as at any time for ten years’ (Butler and
Kavanagh 1974: 24).
Europe
The campaign to take the United Kingdom into the EEC from Macmillan’s
original application in 1961 took place against wider debates about the
decline of Britain and its future role in the world. For Powell, the loss of
Empire had been a devastating blow, but once it happened, he accepted
the consequences. Following through on the logic of retreat from Empire,
Powell advocated a radical retrenchment of overseas military commitments and obligations. He could see little purpose in the Commonwealth
and was suspicious about claims that Commonwealth citizens had any
claims on British citizenship, especially if that entailed the right to immigrate into the United Kingdom. Although not hostile to military engagement, he was sceptical about nuclear weapons. One important thread
running through Powell’s approach to international relations was an
enduring suspicion of the United States, which Powell saw as having been
hostile to the British Empire and engaged in a policy to unite Britain and
Europe. Heath did not have the same degree of hostility to the United
States, although in office the initially warm relationship with the US
administration became cooler. Heath did not possess the strong personal
or family ties, which bound many older Conservative MPs to the Empire/
Commonwealth, and his commitment to seeing the United Kingdom as a
full member of the Common Market developed steadily over his career.
Membership of the EEC had of course been controversial in British politics since it was first mooted and, while arguably it had become more toxic
in Labour ranks, Heath knew that it would also generate opposition inside
the Conservative Party. That opposition came generally from the right,
but there were divisions even on this wing of the Party as the Monday
Club, for example, was not united. Powell himself had shifted his opinion
12 HEATH, POWELL AND THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL…
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on the European issue, having supported the United Kingdom’s application to join in 1961 but moved against membership by 1969. His shift was
primarily because of the threat he thought European membership posed
to British parliamentary sovereignty and nationhood. Although Powell
was relatively muted on the issue in the period up to and during the 1970
General Election, thereafter he hammered it more frequently with a series
of anti-membership speeches and publications. Inevitably this stance put
him in direct opposition to Heath, whom he accused of misleading the
electorate (Schoen 1977). As with immigration, Powell saw the European
issue as one where the people were being betrayed by an elite, which had
reneged on its promise to take Britain into the EEC only with their full-­
hearted consent.
While it is certainly true that public opinion on the issue was very volatile and that there was substantial opposition to membership immediately
after the 1970 General Election, much of this opposition reflected concerns about the cost of living, not sovereignty. Public opinion moved
towards support for membership once Britain’s application to join the
EEC had proved successful.
Within Parliament, there had been some long-standing opponents of
entry on the Conservative side, including traditionalists such as Robin
Turton, Neil Marten, Anthony Fell, Gerald Nabarro, John Jennings and
Derek Walker Smith as well as neo-liberal sceptics such as Richard Body
and John Biffen. Both pro- and anti-European groups within the Party
had been active since the start of the 1970 Parliament, but opinion was
fluid on both sides of the House. The maximum level that the Conservative
opponents could claim was in the region of 62, a figure which dropped
over the course of the long parliamentary debate and which to some extent
was balanced by support from Labour pro-marketeers. The House of
Commons approved the principle of British entry to the EEC in 1971, but
securing this victory and implementing the subsequent legislation were to
expose Conservative divisions as well as Labour ones. The government
had to work hard to maintain its majority in the subsequent enabling legislation, the European Communities Bill, and there was a war of attrition
over its complex provisions. Powell (together with John Biffen, Roger
Moate and Neil Marten) led the opposition, but Powell alone stood out as
the one Conservative among the anti-marketeers who seemed willing to
bring down the government if necessary. In the 1971–1972 session he
voted against the EEC bill and related motions in 80 divisions (Norton
1978: 80).
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Within the Conservative grassroots, the opponents of membership had
only limited success. At the Conference of 1971, the vote in favour of UK
membership was carried by 2474 to 324 (Kitzinger 1973 quoted in
Schoen 1977: 85). Once UK membership of the European Economic
Community had been implemented, Powell’s alienation from Conservative
policy deepened. He finally made a dramatic break with it by announcing
that he would not fight the February 1974 election. Many in the
Conservative Party could have sympathised with this as honourable if perhaps quixotic, but his decision to go further and advise voters to vote
Labour to achieve a referendum caused outrage in the Party. The advice
was also somewhat paradoxical for Powell, since he had always been sceptical about referendums, seeing them as incompatible with the sovereignty
of Parliament, which he so cherished as a principle of British government
and an element of national identity. Nearly 50 years later of course, that
incompatibility was to become dangerously evident, as the Conservatives
tried to use a referendum to solve increasingly toxic internal party divisions about EU membership.
The Economy and the Role of the State
The handling of Britain’s troubled economy eventually brought down
Heath’s 1970–1974 government and paved the way for a new leader and
a new approach to economic policy under Heath’s successor. Powell had
become increasingly interested in free-market economics since the late
1950s and took an early interest in the work of the Institute of Economic
Affairs (IEA), which became the intellectual champion of neo-liberal ideas
on the economy and social policy in the 1970s. Powell also had come to
believe that controlling the money supply was the key to controlling inflation, and he ridiculed attempts to control price and incomes by government. He was a fierce advocate of greater freedom of choice in relation to
social services. He was not, however, a proponent of introducing market
principles into the provision of health and welfare across the board and
retained a strong commitment to a strong universal National Health
Service free at the point of delivery. On this, he differed sharply from the
most enthusiastic stalwarts of the free market. Powell also disagreed with
many of the free market theorists on the issue of the free movement of
labour, where Powell believed the protection of national identity trumped
economic arguments about the efficiency of the labour market.
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The centrality given to planning by the Wilson governments of
1964–1970 was anathema to Powell, and he initially saw much in Heath’s
approach in opposition to commend. But once in office, Heath’s essential
pragmatism became the dominant motif and Powell became a vocal critic.
This antagonism emerged early in the Heath government. Powell was
deeply sceptical about the nationalisation of parts of Rolls Royce in 1971,
arguing to the Conservative Political Centre (CPC) at Dover in February
1971 that the causes which had brought Rolls-Royce down were the same
as those that had ‘held Britain back and subdued her spirit’ over the past
quarter century (Powell 1971). Taken together, they had cast an elaborate
spell over the nation and, in Powell’s view, the shock of the bankruptcy,
however painful, would be a blessing if it broke that spell. No firm, however much it was a symbol of national prestige, could survive in defiance
of market forces: ‘patriotism and pride’ were desirable things, but in the
economic world they were a luxury that could not be bought without
profits. Powell’s message was a stern admonition about the inevitability
that firms which failed should be allowed to go bankrupt. He was even
more savage about the statutory prices and incomes policy, which Heath’s
U-turn of 1972 produced. Powell had been critical of all forms of prices
and incomes policies since the 1960s, seeing them as doomed to failure in
the bid to control inflation. His views were increasingly echoed by economists, and by the time of the Thatcher government of 1979, there was a
broad consensus in the Conservative Party in opposition to such policies.
But Powell’s objections to prices and incomes policies were not simply
based on the futility of trying to control inflation by prices and incomes
policies instead of the use of money supply. He also argued that the
attempt to control prices and incomes would require the extensive use of
state power and would push a country towards authoritarian, even fascist,
methods. The confrontation with the unions which engulfed the Heath
government confirmed Powell in his view that democratic systems cannot
enforce such policies and retain their democratic character.
Powell’s trenchant views on the economy were slowly to become dominant within the Conservative Party after October 1974, although there
remained important figures in its ranks who took a more pragmatic view
and who continued to argue that economic doctrine needed to be tempered by policy concerns about its social effects.
Although Powell became increasingly isolated in the Conservative
Party after 1971, he enjoyed social relationships with a number of backbenchers beyond the obvious core of his supporters. And, as recorded in
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Pamela Powell’s diaries, his association with the IEA was reinforced by
personal friendship with its director Ralph Harris and his wife Jose. As the
Conservative Party’s economic thinking and Powell’s aligned more closely
after 1979, Powell could claim that his arguments had triumphed,
although, as mentioned earlier, he never embraced the more radical neo-­
liberal views on social policy.
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland increasingly absorbed the attentions of Heath and
Powell in the 1970s. Heath as Prime Minister from 1970 to 1974 had the
responsibility of addressing the tensions and divisions which had erupted
in violence in Ulster in the late 1960s. Despite the fact that Powell had
displayed little interest in Ulster’s politics before the late 1960s, his intense
concern with the ideas of national identity and of the integrity of the
British state, as well as his scepticism about the merits of devolution, combined to raise the salience of Northern Ireland in his priorities. Powell’s
reverence for the sovereignty of the Westminster parliament and its historical role in the national life also made him hostile to devolution for
Scotland and Wales, but it was Northern Ireland which concerned him
most. He seems to have taken a conscious decision to immerse himself in
the issue at the end of 1970 and made a speaking tour of Northern Ireland
in 1971, where he further strengthened his links with Unionist politicians
in both the Province and Westminster (he was a close friend of James
Molyneaux, and the Ulster Unionists broadly shared his opposition to
British membership of the EEC). Ulster thus provided another theme on
which Powell could attack Heath and the government’s efforts to address
an increasingly intractable issue. Yet Northern Ireland was not a cause
which resonated much with the general public or the majority of the
Conservative Party. It did, however, provide a political lifeboat to him
after he resigned his Wolverhampton seat in February 1974 and later that
year accepted nomination for a constituency in Northern Ireland.
Powell’s involvement in the cause of Ulster Unionism was in many
ways problematic. There was a tension between the realities of Northern
Ireland politics, the priorities of its Unionist leaders and his own markedly
abstract vision of the relationship between Northern Ireland and the rest
of the United Kingdom (Corthorn 2012: 967–997). His opposition to
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government policy on Northern Ireland between 1970 and 1974 isolated
him further from his Conservative colleagues and, after October 1974,
when he became the MP for South Down, he was inevitably further distanced from mainland politics. The suspension of Stormont and the imposition of direct rule in 1972 after 50 years of devolved government caused
intense anger among the Ulster Unionist MPs, but although it initially
seemed to generate concern on the back benches, in fact the opposition to
the move from Conservative MPs was very much less than anticipated
(Norton 2002: 129–142). Only nine Conservative MPs voted against the
second reading of the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Bill,
which introduced direct rule, and a further six Conservative MPs rebelled
at various stages of the legislation’s passage through the House of
Commons. The legislation passed with a good deal of cross-party support,
but with its passage, the Conservative Party effectively lost the support of
its Ulster Unionist allies. The instinctive sympathy between Conservatives
and Ulster Unionists eroded as the intricacies of the conflicts between
unionists and nationalists became ever more distant from attitudes in the
rest of the United Kingdom. Heath himself never understood the dynamics of Ulster politics and lacked sympathy for the passions generated by the
conflicting identities there. The search for a new formula for returning
self-government to Northern Ireland constituted a central element of the
Heath government’s agenda, albeit one doomed to frustration by the sectarian politics of the Province. Powell’s approach to Northern Ireland
policy was increasingly idiosyncratic and in conflict both with British government policy and with the priorities of the Unionist community with
which he identified. For Powell’s policy prescription for the Northern
Ireland problem was to integrate it fully into the rest of the United
Kingdom. Most of his Ulster Unionist friends, however, wished a restoration of Stormont, preferably on their terms without the complications of
power-sharing and certainly without an explicit role for the Republic in
Northern Ireland’s affairs. Powell’s approach represented his belief that
integrating Northern Ireland fully into the United Kingdom would undermine its constitutional and political unity with the mainland and its enduring place as part of the traditional nation state.
Powell became involved in Northern Ireland at a time when its politics
had been destabilised by violence and when traditional alliances had begun
to fragment over issues of principle and tactics. Powell kept his distance
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from the more extreme elements of the Protestant community. He refused,
for example, to join the Orange Order, and he certainly was critical both
of William Craig and of the Vanguard movement. As British government
policy seemed to trample on Unionist sensitivities, Powell was forced to
confront difficult questions about whether the allegiance of Northern
Ireland to the wider United Kingdom could be conditional and on the
extent to which the future governance of Northern Ireland would have to
accommodate a role for the government of the Republic of Ireland.
Conclusions
The conflict between Enoch Powell and Edward Heath was one in which
personal animosity and policy disagreement reinforced each other. There
was however a difference in that Heath loathed and despised Powell,
whereas Powell’s attitude to Heath was less intense and reflected contempt rather than hatred. The degree of Heath’s antipathy to Powell was
underlined on Powell’s death in February 1998 when, unlike many other
politicians who paid tribute to his parliamentary career, Heath refused to
say anything. The policy tensions between Heath and Powell prefigured
and fed into later divisions in Conservative politics about the United
Kingdom’s constitutional structure, the role of the state, the relationship
with Europe and the character of British society. For Heath, the radical
technocrat, such questions were ones to be settled pragmatically, and the
task of government was to devise its policies on the basis of evidence and
judgement. Such an approach, while laudable in many respects, was unable
to capture the imagination of his party or inspire enthusiasm. When, not
surprisingly, Heath’s government was inevitably buffeted by events, his
ability to maintain support crumbled, destroyed by intellectual challenges
and his failures of leadership. In the process, Powell’s series of attacks and
his own crusades had an impact. On immigration, they certainly pushed
the issue to the centre of public consciousness, even if Powell’s predictions
of civil strife proved largely unfounded. For many critics, Powell’s legacy
was a toxic one for the Conservative Party, alienating ethnic minorities and
creating division and fear in the wider society. Certainly the Conservative
Party has had to work hard to erase the image of hostility to ethnic minorities and, while it has arguably made great strides in terms of increasing
Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) representation in Parliament, it still is
at a substantial disadvantage in terms of the voting preference of ethnic
12 HEATH, POWELL AND THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL…
289
minorities. (See, e.g. the Opinium poll taken just before the 2019 election
(Opinium 2019)). Although Heath was deeply hostile to racial prejudice
and even regarded Powell as ‘evil’, Powell’s campaign had the effect of
pushing Conservative governments after 1970 to tighten immigration
controls and to that extent helped create a new environment.
On the economy, Powell’s questioning of the Keynesian approach and
his urging of a reduced role for the state fed into the broad intellectual
movement towards neo-liberalism, even if his was but one voice among
many by the 1970s and even if it was Mrs Thatcher’s governments that
would implement the shift in policy orientation. On Europe his challenge
appears to have triumphed, as the Conservative Party has abandoned its
commitment to the European Union and opted for a return to national
sovereignty and control. It might be tempting to suggest that indeed the
Conservative Party of today has taken on board Powell’s populist strategy
and that, as new fault lines reshape Britain’s politics, not only will Powell’s
reputation be vindicated, but Heath’s premiership will seem increasingly
marginalised by history. Such a judgement would be a dangerous oversimplification. On economic policy and the balance between state regulation
and the market, today’s Conservative Party is likely to be motivated by
practical concerns and not economic doctrine. And while the tension
between a populist and, for want of a better word, elitist, strand of
Conservatism is still visible, there is a sense in which all political parties
have become more populist in the wake of the increased use of referendums and of social and technological changes, especially the advent of
social media. The experience of the Heath government has left its own
legacies in terms of the politics of support. The dangers inherent when
leaders become isolated from criticism and their own support bases were
underlined by Heath’s experience but also ironically by the ousting of Mrs
Thatcher.
Enoch Powell famously remarked that the careers of all politicians were
doomed to end in failure. Both Heath and Powell, although outstanding
figures in their political generation, saw both men’s political careers come
to a less than happy end, disappointing their own and many observers’
expectations. In both cases, personal character flaws were significant factors, which contributed to their political downfall. But the toxic rivalry
between these two political figures was a central and tragic element in a
saga, which played out over the tumultuous decade of the 1970s.
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Schoen, D. (1977). Powell and the Powellites. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Shepherd, R. (1997). Enoch Powell: A Biography. London: Pimlico.
Studlar, D. T. (1978). Policy Voting in Britain: The Colored Immigration Issue
and Voting in the 1964, 1966 and 1970 General Elections. American Political
Science Review, 72(1), 46–64.
Ziegler, P. (2010). Edward Heath: The Authorised Biography. London: Harper
Collins.
Newspapers
and
Periodicals
Cosgrave, P. (1972). Love and the Tory Party. The Spectator, October 14.
Schoen, D., & Johnson, R. W. (1976). The ‘Powell Effect’; Or How One Man
Can Win. New Society, July 22, pp. 168–172.
The Times. (1972). Diary. October 12.
Wood, D., & Clark, G. (1968a). Tory Revolt Threat on Race Bill. The Times, July 5.
Wood, D., & Clark, G. (1968b). Tories in Disarray on Race Bill. The Times, July 9.
Wood, D. (1972). Mr Heath Takes Up Mr Powell’s Challenge. The Times,
October 11.
CHAPTER 13
The Labour Party in Opposition
Timothy Heppell
The aim of this chapter is to consider the Labour Party in opposition. For
a party of opposition to secure their objective of gaining office by winning
the next General Election, there are two preconditions that we could
argue are required. First, there needs to be clear evidence that the governing party is not be worthy of being re-elected. Governing incompetence as
evidenced from policy failure, internal division and/or weak leadership
will be what makes a party of government vulnerable to eviction. This is
what Norton describes as the necessary precondition for a change of government (Norton 2009: 31–33). When facing a competent, unified and
effectively led government, such as the Tony Blair government when
entering the General Election of 2001, then the Conservati ves, as the
party of opposition, will find that they are unable to make a credible case
as to why a change of government is necessary (Butler and Kavanagh
2001). The Blair government had entered office at the General Election
of 1997 in part because the John Major government was widely viewed as
incompetent, divided and ineffectively led (Butler and Kavanagh 1997).
Second, just because the governing party is showcasing incompetence,
T. Heppell (*)
University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
e-mail: t.heppell@leeds.ac.uk
© The Author(s) 2021
A. S. Roe-Crines, T. Heppell (eds.), Policies and Politics Under
Prime Minister Edward Heath, Palgrave Studies in Political
Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53673-2_13
293
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division and/or weak leadership, that may not be sufficient for a change of
government. The party of opposition has to demonstrate that they are
worthy of office. The Blair-led opposition demonstrated that they were a
credible alternative government at the General Election of 1997. However,
a governing party showcasing weaknesses in office may be able to remain
in office, if doubts about the opposition override voter doubts about the
governing party—here the example of the General Election of 1992 demonstrates this, as the conditions were conducive for removing the Major
government, but the Neil Kinnock-led Labour opposition were still unable
to win the General Election (Butler and Kavanagh 1992).
As the chapters elsewhere in this book demonstrate, there were clearly
signs that the governing Conservatives met the necessary precondition for
a change of government, that is, sufficient doubts existed about their competence, the unity of the Conservatives and the Prime Ministerial leadership of Heath. This chapter broadens the analysis out and considers the
case of the Labour Party in opposition, to establish how they set about
seeking to regain office, that is, ensuring that they could exploit the governing difficulties of the Conservatives. It considers the following themes
in relation to the Labour Party when in opposition—first, the issue of the
party leadership and the wider public face of the party; second, their policy
platform and how that evolved during opposition; and third, how unified
the Labour Party appeared. However, before analysing these three themes,
the chapter opens up with a discussion on how and why the Labour Party
found themselves back in opposition, after the General Election of 1970.
That they were was not something that they had expected. During the
election campaign, Tony Benn recorded in his diaries that they were on
course for a majority of around 100 seats1 (Benn 1988: diary entry, 11
June 1970).
1
Barbara Castle doubted the size of the opinion polling lead that the Labour Party had
during the campaign. ‘I wish there weren’t another five days before the election’ as ‘although
Heath is making such a pathetic showing personally and is getting such a bad press, I have a
haunting feeling that there is a silent majority sitting behind its lace curtains, waiting to come
out and vote Tory’ (Castle 1984: 805).
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295
The Failure(s) of the Wilson Government
of 1964–1970
After 13 years in opposition, the Labour Party won the General Election
of October 1964 (Fielding 2007). Their return of 12,205,814 votes, a
44.1 percent vote share, provided them with a small parliamentary majority of 4 (Butler and King 1964). Wilson called a General Election in March
1966, and with 13,064,951 votes, and a 47.9 percent vote share, that
parliamentary majority was increased to 99, which ensured that they could
govern for a full five-year term, should they so wish (Butler and King
1966). With the Labour Party overturning the opinion polling lead that
the Conservatives had held between February 1967 and April 1970, and
then establishing a lead over the Conservatives of 7.5 percent (49 to 41.5
percent) by 17 May 1970, Wilson made the fatal decision (on 19 May) to
call a General Election for 18 June 1970, nearly one year earlier than was
necessary (King and Wybrow 2001: 9–10; However, the Labour Party
vote declined from the 47.9 percent secured at the General Election of
1966 to 43 percent, and their return of 12,178,295 votes represented a
decline of 886,656 votes, and resulted in them losing 75 seats (Butler and
Pinto-Duschinsky 1971; see also Abrams 1970). Critically, with the
Conservatives securing an overall parliamentary majority of 31, the Labour
Party entered opposition in the knowledge that the Conservatives would
be able to govern for a full term.
To determine what changes to initiate once in opposition, a party needs
to construct a clear understanding of the reasons why they were ejected
from power. The cumulative effect of policy failure, internal disunity and
leadership limitations would undermine the Labour Party, meaning that
by the time of the General Election of 1970, their governing credibility
was open to question, and their policy legacy was patchy—as Denis Healey
would later admit that they were ‘not regarded as a success, even by the
Labour movement’ (Healey 1990: 345). This would lead to an historical
interpretation of the Wilson era as a missed opportunity, as their achievements did not stand in comparison with the Attlee governments of
1945–1951 (Ponting 1990; Coopey et al. 1993; Dorey 2006; O’Hara and
Parr, 2006). Their reforming zeal was evident in social policy as they introduced equal pay for women, the statutory right to redundancy pay and
rent rebates for nearly one million householders; they increased pensions
and family allowances, and they legislated to outlaw racial discrimination
(Page 2016). They accelerated the demise of the eleven plus; they expanded
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participation within higher education by the creation of new polytechnics
and the innovation that was the Open University (Dorey 2015).
Parliamentary time was granted to facilitate the passage of a series of
socially liberal reforms—the legislation of male homosexuality (for those
over 21); the abolition of the death penalty; the liberalisation of abortion
law; and divorce law reform (Donnelly 2005: 116–131). Although a significant socially reforming agenda was evident, the record of the Wilson
governments with regard to economic policy, industrial relations and
European policy was less straightforward.
The Labour Party had entered office with a clearly defined set of objectives in terms of the economy (Tomlinson 2003; O’Hara 2006). Wilson
sought to create a choice between the Conservative Party as the party of
economic decline and the Labour Party as the party of economic modernisation based on technological change (Edgerton 1996). Their strategy
was to construct the national economic plan, which was published in
1965, and it aimed for a 25 percent increase in gross domestic product by
the end of the decade, with this requiring an annual economic growth rate
of 3.8 percent (Walker 1987: 203). Given that the economic growth over
the period from 1951 to 1964—a period that incorporated the so-called
age of affluence or politics of prosperity (Black and Pemberton 2004; see
also Black 2003 on affluence and the left)—was only 2.9 percent annually,
this was a very ambitious target (Pollard 1983: 345). The means by which
the national plan and their growth targets would be achieved was by the
creation of the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA), alongside a newly
formed Ministry for Technology, and they were both created as part of a
wider modernising strategy of how government should be organised and
how it should operate (Blick 2006). The rationale for the DEA was that it
would be responsible for long-term economic planning, whereas the
Treasury would concentrate on short-term economic management, but it
became viewed as a failure when the annual growth rates were lower than
those intended within the national economic plan—at just 2.2 percent
(Walker 1987: 203).
Closely aligned to the difficulties in hitting the growth targets of the
economic plan was the issue of devaluation. The Wilson administration
was in a bind. They entered office facing a significant trade deficit, and
even with sterling overvalued against the dollar, Wilson was determined to
avoid devaluation. They used deflationary measures in response to the
Balance of Payments deficit. In addition to increasing taxation, this
involved cutting public expenditure and initiating a statutory six-month
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wage freeze, the latter two of which served to alienate their activist, membership and voter base, and also undermined their ability to achieve the
economic growth targets of the national economic plan. Despite their
deflationary measures, the Wilson administration was eventually forced
into a humiliating devaluation, from $2.80 to $2.40, in November 1967
(Bale 1999).
Alongside the difficulties of implementing the national economic plan
and the humiliation of devaluation, the Wilson administration was struggling to manage both unemployment and inflation. In the first Wilson
parliamentary period (1964–1966), the rate of unemployment was 1.6
percent, but the rate increased to 2.5 percent over the course of the second parliamentary period (1966–1970), whilst the inflation rate was on an
upward trajectory as well, at 4.7 percent in 1968 and increasing to 5.4
percent in 1969 (Thorpe, 2015: 168–169). Compounding their governing difficulties was the escalation of trade union militancy, and Wilson
would be humiliated when he (along with his Employment Secretary,
Barbara Castle) attempted to intervene with legislative proposals to manage industrial relations more effectively (Tyler 2006). The white paper,
entitled In Place of Strife, would significantly alter the relationship between
the trade unions and the state (Ponting 1990: 350–351).
From its initial inception, it provoked considerable levels of disquiet
amongst trade unionists. Jack Jones, General Secretary of the Transport
and General Workers’ Union (TGWU) in succession to Cousins, took the
view that the proposed legislation was ‘repressive’ and he advocated ‘total
opposition to any legislation restricting the right to strike’ (Trade Union
Congress General Council Meeting minutes, 18 December 1968).
Wilson, however, was being led to believe that the opposition amongst
trade unionists would not be problematic. One of his advisors, Gerald
Kaufman, informed Wilson that he had been told by Victor Feather,
General Secretary to the Trade Union Congress, that they had ‘no belly
for a fight’ (TNA, PRO, PREM, 13/2724, Letter from Kaufman to
Wilson, 14 January 1969). Wilson also needed to be sensitive to opinion
within Cabinet. They were split and Callaghan, now Home Secretary and
seeking to resuscitate his reputation after being moved from the Treasury
after the devaluation of 1967, came out against the legislation. He told
his Cabinet colleagues that it was ‘absolutely wrong and unnecessary’
(TNA, CAB 128, Cabinet Minutes, C1 (69), 3 January 1969). It was also
clear that there were reservations amongst back-bench parliamentarians
(LPA, PLP Minutes, 29 January 1969). The Chief Whip, Bob Mellish,
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would warn the Cabinet about the scale of discontent (TNA, CAB 128
/44 Part 1, CC (69), 17 June 1969). Wilson was increasingly aware of
the need to back down, but he was deeply concerned about how this
would be interpreted—he informed Cabinet that he feared that the government ‘would lose all credibility’, and their ‘authority would crumble’
(TNA, CAB 128 /44 Part 1, CC (69), 17 June 1969). However, with it
being evident that over 100 Labour backbenchers would vote against the
proposals or would abstain, and with Wilson being faced down by senior
figures within Cabinet, he was forced to back down (Tyler 2006;
Dorey 2019).
These failings, in relation to the national economic plan, devaluation
and industrial relations, have to also be placed within the context of the
failed attempt to secure entry into the European Community. In opposition, when the Macmillan administration had sought entry, the Labour
Party was split but not necessarily along traditional lines (Broad, 2001).
Although it is easy to speak of a simplistic social democratic right versus
socialist left split, with the left defending further nationalisation, promoting unilateralism and being anti-marketeer, and the right questioning
nationalisation, arguing for multilateralism and being pro-marketeer, the
fractures that would emerge from 1962 were actually more complex than
that (Meredith 2012). Gaitskell could not afford another bout of infighting within the Labour movement, after his failed attempt to reform Clause
IV in 1959, and the schism between the unilateralists and multilateralists
in the 1960–1961 period (Jones 1996). Moreover, on these two disputes,
Gaitskell knew that the socialist left was in the minority, but on the
European dilemma, his faction was in the minority—Haseler estimated
that the majority of Labour parliamentarians in the 1959–1964 Parliament
were anti-marketeers (Haseler 1969: 228). Calculating that the Macmillan
application would be rejected anyway, Gaitskell sided with the anti-­
marketeers, traditionally assumed to be aligned to the left, and ‘ironically’
but temporarily, he unified the party (Howell, 1980: 235). Once in office,
Wilson, engaged in an incremental shift towards contemplating seeking
entry, in part due to the assumed economic advantages that this would
create and its contribution to modernisation (Parr 2006; Pine 2008).
However, its divisive capability was evident when the Wilson administration (May 1967) sought parliamentary approval for negotiating for
entry—although the division was won by 488 votes to 62, a total of 35
Labour parliamentarians voted against, and a further 51 abstained (Broad,
2001: 67). Although their subsequent attempt to secure entry was
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rejected, and could be interpreted as a failure, Wilson had bizarrely done
reasonably well in terms of party management—he could turn to the pro-­
marketeers (predominantly, but not exclusively, on the social democratic
right) and claim that he had sought entry, and the anti-marketeer and
socialist left were relieved that the application was rejected (Wrigley 1993;
see also Daddow 2003).
The cumulative effect of these difficulties in relation to the national
economic plan, devaluation, industrial relations and Europe was that the
Wilson administration was widely felt to have failed to have delivered upon
the ambitious objectives that they had when entering office. The impact
was evident in terms of public opinion. Two months into their time in
office (December 1964), their approval rating was +18 (48 percent
approve, 30 percent disapprove), and this remained relatively static by the
time Wilson decided to hold a General Election in March 1966: +12 (48
percent approve, 36 percent disapprove). By December 1968, their
approval rating reached a low of −53 (17 percent approve, 70 percent disapprove), and although their approval ratings would improve (by
December 1969, it was −22, 31 percent approve and 53 percent disapprove), and this levelled out by the time of the General Election of 1970
(42 percent approve, 42 percent disapprove), it cannot mask the scale of
disapproval that did exist throughout the latter parts of the Wilson era
(King and Wybrow 2001: 168–169). As such, it could be argued that as
they were still in the process of recovering ground in the early part of
1970, then fulfilling the full five-year Parliament, and holding a General
Election in early 1971, may have been preferable. When the parliamentary
Labour Party met in the aftermath, John Mackintosh captured that sentiment, arguing that more time was needed to secure an economic recovery
that could win over support that was lost by the trauma of devaluation,
and the humiliating climbdown on industrial relations (LPA, PLP minutes, 15 July 1970).
A period in opposition provided them with the time and space to reflect
upon their performance in government. Change was necessary, but what
form of change should they adopt? Did it require a change of party leader
and the leading figures on the frontbench? Did it require a change of
direction in terms of their public policy platform? If it did require a change
of policy direction, should that involve an ideological policy shift to the
middle ground of British politics and the location of the median voter, or
should they tilt more to the ideological left and offer a more radical public
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policy programme? Finally, given that they had appeared internally divided
when in office, could a new party leader and/or a modified public policy
platform provide the basis for greater internal cohesion?
Labour in Opposition (1970–1974): Issues
of Leadership
One obvious form of renewal is to change the leader of the party. Wilson
had seen his political credibility erode over his six-year tenure as Prime
Minister, for example, his satisfaction rating was as high as +28 at the time
of his calling of the General Election of 1966 (60 percent satisfied, 32
percent dissatisfied). The lowest it sunk was to −26 in November 1968 (31
percent satisfied, 57 percent dissatisfied), and although it improved by the
time of the General Election of 1970 (+6, 49 percent satisfied, 43 percent
dissatisfied), Wilson was a diminished figure by the time of becoming
leader of the opposition for a second time (King and Wybrow 2001:
187–188).
Leadership change within the Labour Party in 1970 could be achieved
by one of two means: one, the voluntary resignation of Wilson; two, a
challenge to Wilson, forcing a ballot of the parliamentary Labour Party.
Wilson gave a sharp response in the immediate aftermath of defeat when a
journalist asked whether there will be an inquest—he shot back that ‘there
is no post-mortem when there is no body’ (quoted in Hatfield, 1978: 37).
It seems clear that, although devastated by the loss of power, Wilson did
not seriously contemplate resignation (Pimlott, 1992: 571).
If the Labour Party wanted a change of party leader, then it would have
to be via a formal challenge. There was little to be gained from a challenge
by a candidate who lacked the ability to actually defeat Wilson, that is, a
signal-sending challenger who would expose divisions and undermine
Wilson, but would fail to replace him directly or cause him to resign and
create a vacancy. That meant it needed to be a credible figure, capable of
defeating Wilson outright and one who had (a) the credibility to unite the
Labour Party (not easy to demand after disloyally challenging the incumbent); (b) who had the attractiveness to increase the electoral appeal of the
Labour Party; and (c) who had the skills to be an effective Prime Minister
(Stark, 1996). Most attention was focused on Roy Jenkins, the former
Home Secretary (1965–1967) and Chancellor (1967–1970). During
1968 and 1969, with the Labour Party trailing the Conservatives in the
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301
opinion polls, there was considerable press speculation about whether
Jenkins would make a formal challenge to Wilson. However, Jenkins calculated that a challenge to a sitting prime minister was ‘too risky’ (Pimlott,
1992: 490–491). Their working relationship suffered as a consequence of
the press speculation, and Wilson used Cabinet to criticise the manoeuvrings of Jenkins. He emotionally informed colleagues that he knew where
the ‘leaking and backbiting comes from, it arises from the ambitions of
one member of this Cabinet to sit in my place’ (Jenkins 1991: 258). Even
after losing power, Jenkins remained concerned about the risks of a formal
challenge, and as consequence a toxic dynamic remained—Wilson was a
‘long suffering, much abused, ever exasperated, wearily tolerant monarch’,
opposed by Jenkins, his ‘brilliant, cruel and indifferent heir impatiently
waiting for his inheritance’ (Pimlott, 1992: 490). In his memoirs, Jenkins
would regret his unwillingness to challenge Wilson for the party leadership, arguing that to do so might have been ‘better for the future health
of the party’ (Jenkins 1991: 621; a view shared by Owen 1991: 190).
With the party leadership denied, Jenkins instead stood for the deputy
leadership. This was vacant, following the defeat of George Brown, at the
General Election of 1970. Jenkins won on the first ballot with 133 votes
(53.6 percent) over the left-wing backbencher Michael Foot on 67 votes
(27.0 percent) and Fred Peart (former Leader of the House of Commons
1968–1970) on 48 votes (19.4 percent) (Campbell 2014: 361–362).
Jenkins had to withstand a left-wing challenge to him in November
1971—he won 140 votes in the first ballot (48.3 percent) with Foot (96
votes or 38.0 percent) and Benn (46 votes or 16.3 percent) splitting the
left-wing vote. In the subsequent second ballot, Jenkins secured 52.6 percent (140 votes) over Foot (126 votes or 47.4 percent) (Campbell 2014:
362–392).
It is interesting to note that in both of these contests, Wilson ironically
backed Jenkins, but for calculating reasons. The selection of a leftish candidate for the deputy leadership of the Labour Party might be problematic
for Wilson, as Pimlott argues: ‘he wanted to bind the right to him
[Jenkins]; the last thing he wished for was to be shackled to a reconstituted left’ (Pimlott, 1992: 570). Both of these deputy leadership ballots
showcased the strength of Jenkins and suggested that he would have been
well placed to succeed Wilson, had he not resigned as deputy leader in
April 1972 due to his opposition to the leadership position of deciding to
hold a referendum on membership of the European Community (Campbell
2014: 391–392). In the vacant ballot, the unity candidate, the former
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Education Secretary (1968–1970), Edward Short, emerged as the new
deputy leader, defeating Foot and Anthony Crosland, who had held various Cabinet roles under Wilson (LPA, PLP Papers, 1971–2, minutes of
party meeting, 20 April 1972).
With the party leadership remaining unchanged, and with the deputy
leadership being held by two figures who had both been in the Wilson
Cabinet, the public face of the Labour Party in opposition seemed relatively similar to their time in office. This is significant, as one of the ways
to symbolise change and renewal is through an influx of new faces, who
can put forward alternative new ideas and present them enthusiastically.
The vast majority of the last Wilson Cabinet before the General Election
of 1970 remained on the frontbench in the shadow Cabinets when in
opposition, and by the time of the General Election(s) of 1974, the Labour
Party had a frontbench that looked experienced or ageing, depending
upon your viewpoint.
What was also problematic for the Labour Party was the conduct of
Wilson as Leader of the Opposition between 1970 and 1974, as compared
to his first period as Leader of the Opposition between 1963 and 1964.
Wilson was widely praised for his conduct in the 1963–1964 period, for
example, Shore argued that Wilson showed ‘sustained brilliance and effectiveness’ (Shore, 1993: 87–88). This was reflected in the opinion polling
evidence—by the time of the General Election of 1964, 59 percent of
voters thought Wilson was doing a good job as Leader of the Opposition,
whereas only 24 percent thought he was not (a + 35 rating) (King and
Wybrow 2001: 211).
However, during his second stint as Leader of the Opposition, Wilson
had ‘lost much of his former confidence and sureness of touch’ (Dorey
2012: 64). Dorey argues that three factors explain why Wilson was a
weaker politician in 1970–1974, as compared to 1963–1964. First, he
argues that Wilson lost ‘energy’ and ‘enthusiasm’, with the difficulties of
governing between 1964 and 1970 being ‘emotionally and politically
exhausting’ for him (Dorey 2012: 64). Second, the complexities of managing a fractious parliamentary Labour Party damaged Wilson’s reputation and relations with many Labour elites. For example, Healey felt that
Wilson had significant limitations as a political leader—i.e. his ‘short term
opportunism’ and ‘self-delusion’ had created a Labour government, which
had ‘no sense of direction’ (Healey 1990: 331, 336). Crosland felt that
the operational effectiveness of government was undermined by Wilson’s
deviousness, saying ‘one hasn’t the faintest idea whether the bastard means
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what he says even at the moment he speaks it’ (Crosland, 1982: 184). One
unnamed member of the Wilson frontbench reinforced that shifty reputation, when they humorously observed that ‘there are two things I dislike
about Harold: his face’ (Kellner and Hitchens, 1976: 180). Third and
finally, Wilson was a disengaged and distant figure in opposition, especially
in the initial period of the Heath administration (Ziegler, 1993: 372). He
spent the initial period of opposition focusing on writing his own account
of his time in office between 1964 and 1970 (Wilson, 1971). Indeed, after
six months in opposition, his parliamentary private secretary, Frank Judd,
urged him to initiate a public campaign to reintroduce himself to the electorate, by touring the country listening to the concerns of voters (MS
Wilson, c. 914, Judd to Wilson, 6 November 1970). Wilson continued to
believe, however, that Heath would experience a honeymoon period, and
that a hyperactive approach in the initial period of opposition would be
futile (Ziegler, 1993: 372).
These three factors contributed to Wilson having lower approval ratings in his second time as leader of the Opposition. The positive rating
that he had at the time of the General Election of 1964—at +24 percent
in terms of whether he was a good leader—was much lower at the time of
the General Election of 1974. Only 38 percent of voters thought he was a
good leader, whereas 49 percent thought he was not (a −11 rating) by
February 1974 (King and Wybrow 2001: 211–212).
Labour in Opposition (1970–1974): Issues of Policy
When they first entered opposition, Wilson made it clear that they would
be ‘no lurches of policy from what we did in Government’ (Hatfield,
1978: 38). The social democratic right felt that they were on the defensive
because of the senior roles afforded to them in the 1964–1970 administrations. Some of them appeared to be arguing that if strategic change was
needed, it was towards the centre-ground of British politics. From the
frontbench Jenkins argued that the Labour Party needed to shed itself of
its class-based and sectional image and broaden out its appeal (Jenkins
1972: 21–22). From the backbenchers, John Mackintosh, considered the
choice between a socialist and socially democratic future. He spoke out
against sectional and class-based politics, which he derided as ‘populist
socialism’, and he warned of the risks of the Labour Party becoming
‘merely the puppet party of those powerful union leaders whose first
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interest is not socialism or social justice, but simply the well-being of the
particular wage earners whom they represent’ (Mackintosh 1972: 484).
When considering the wider strategic choices facing Wilson and the
shadow Cabinet, we have three core dilemmas to consider: first, how viable was economic planning; second, what type of link to the trade union
movement should they adopt; and third, how could they construct an
approach to European policy that would unify the party? The overall
impact of four years of opposition was that Wilson was forced into a significant degree of policy development, and that a more leftish or radical
policy agenda would emerge in terms of the economics of redistribution,
the approach to industrial relations and positioning on membership of the
European Community.
Policy renewal culminated in the development of the Labour’s
Programme 1973 document, which was approved at the annual party conference that autumn (Labour Party 1973; Minkin, 1978: 336–337). That
agenda would feed into the Labour Party manifesto of 1974, which was
best known for the phrase about initiating ‘a fundamental and irreversible
shift in the balance of power and wealth in favour of working people’
(Labour Party 1974: 15). It committed them to renegotiating the terms
of entry into the European Community; to repealing the Industrial
Relations Act of 1971; and it also committed them to price controls, public ownership, economic planning and the extension of industrial democracy. They also advocated the creation of a National Enterprise Board that
could buy into private firms in the national interest. This investment by
the state would drive up productivity and stimulate economic growth. The
plans envisaged that the National Enterprise Board would take control of
around 25 companies, including large manufacturers, and the state would
enter into planning agreements with a further 100 private sector manufacturers in return for financial assistance (Tomlinson 1982: 99–122; see also
Tomlinson 2003). The imprint of the National Executive Committee
(NEC) upon policymaking was evident, as was that of the parliamentary
left elected onto the NEC, that is, Michael Foot and Tony Benn. Foot
described Labour’s Programme as the ‘finest socialist programme I have
seen in my lifetime’ (Guardian 1973), whilst Benn felt that it demonstrated that ‘the party was now firmly launched on a leftwing policy’,
which was ‘a remarkable development’ and the product of ‘three years of
hard work’ (Wickham-Jones 1996: 1). If the minority parliamentary left
(and extra-parliamentary left) were ecstatic at this radical shift to the left,
the social democratic right was aghast—Crosland would describe the
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programme as something that had been ‘written by people who didn’t live
in the real world’ (Wickham-Jones 1996: 1).
The breakdown in relations between the trade unions and the Wilson
leadership when in government, over In Place of Strife in 1969, was partly
overcome by their shared hostility towards the Industrial Relations Act of
1971. Ongoing dialogue between the Labour Party Liaison Committee
and the Trades Union Congress—TUC (Taylor 2000: 209) led to the
construction of the following document, Economic Policy and the Cost of
Living (TUC/Labour Party 1973). In addition to a return to voluntary
collective bargaining, the document also showcased their joint interests in
price controls, subsidies for public transportation and house building, and
the redistribution of incomes and wealth (TUC/Labour Party 1973:
313–315).
This would culminate in the construction of the so-called social contract between the next Labour government and the trade union movement. It amounted to a quid pro quo—the trade unions would take
responsibility for moderating ‘real’ wage claims, and in return, the Labour
government would enhance the ‘social’ wage, that is, increasing public
expenditure, redistributive taxation and greater public ownership (Harmon
1997: 56). There was no specific promise vis-à-vis incomes policy, which
could be said to reflect trade union scepticism in this regard, and amounted
to an assumption that an incoming Labour administration would not
introduce an incomes policy. Taylor felt that it was an imbalanced deal,
that is, the Labour Party had agreed to ‘little more than a shopping list of
TUC demands’ (Taylor 2000: 211). As has been well documented elsewhere, the weak condition of the British economy would undermine the
ability of the Labour administrations of 1974–1979 to deliver on the
social contract. The decision to approach the International Monetary
Fund to seek a loan required that the now Callaghan-led administration
had to impose cuts to public expenditure and introduce deflationary budgets. As a consequence, the Callaghan administration was reneging
on their commitment to enhance the social wage, that is, their side of the
bargain within the social contract. Their decision to introduce a formal
pay policy reflected their view that wage restraint was unavoidable, but to
the trade unions, it was unacceptable. The collision course that culminated
in the Winter of Discontent in early 1979 was the conveyer belt to
Thatcherism (Hickson 2005; Wass 2008; Rogers 2011).
Just as being in opposition required that the Labour Party respond to
the Heath government’s Industrial Relations Act of 1971, they also had to
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react to their decision to seek entry to the European Community. The
dilemma for Wilson was both personal and political. In seeking entry to
modernise Britain and aid economic performance, Heath was merely replicating a case that the Wilson administration had themselves made. For
Heath to succeed where Wilson had failed as Prime Minister would be
something the Conservatives could humiliate Wilson over. Politically, it
was problematic because, for Wilson, it remained a hugely divisive issue
within the Labour Party. Wilson constructed a classic Wilsonian compromise in an attempt to address the political problem (Dorey 2012: 57–58).
To placate those on the pro-market (and predominantly socially democratic right), Wilson did not dispute the principle of seeking entry, but to
keep the anti-marketeer (and predominantly socialist left) onside, Wilson
argued against the terms upon which the Heath administration was seeking to secure entry. It was clear that Wilson constructed this position to
preserve party unity, as he told the parliamentary Labour Party that they
must not ‘relapse’ into ‘backbiting’ that voters would not find ‘edifying’
(LPA, PLP Papers 1970–1971, minutes of party meeting, 20 July 1971).
As the subsequent section of the chapter considers in more detail, this
approach was unravelling by late October 1971. Although instructed to
vote against the Heath administration, in a division about joining the
European Community, a total of 69 Labour parliamentarians rejected the
instruction and voted for entry, including Jenkins, Shirley Williams, David
Owen and Bill Rodgers, whilst a further 15 abstained (Shaw 1988:
167–179). Running simultaneous to the Jenkins’ faction strengthening
their commitment to entry, Wilson was being pressurised by Benn on the
left to commit to the confirmatory referendum, if a future Labour administration had engaged in renegotiated terms of entry. For the anti-­
marketeers, this created the means by which a future Labour administration
could construct a route map out of the European Community, should the
Heath administration secure parliamentary approval for entry (Meredith
2008: 80–89). In March 1972, Wilson sought shadow Cabinet approval
to endorse a two-stage policy position for a future Labour administration.
In stage one, they would renegotiate the terms of entry into/with the
European Community, a position which was consistent with their opposition to the Heath administration on the terms of entry. Then in stage two,
they would present to the electorate a binary ‘yes/no’ choice on continued membership on those renegotiated terms (Pimlott, 1992: 583–586).
Once again, the sticking plaster solution that Wilson was advocating failed
to bridge the divide within the Labour Party—Jenkins resigned as deputy
13 THE LABOUR PARTY IN OPPOSITION
307
leader, in April1972, in opposition to the drift towards what he regarded
as an anti-marketer position (Meredith 2008; 88–91). When put alongside the new positioning on economic and industrial relations, the general
impression being created was that Wilson was tilting towards the agendas
being advanced by the left (Bell 2004).
Labour in Opposition (1970–1974): Issues of Unity
Throughout the post-war era, internal division had been a recurring problem for the Labour Party and their leaders. Richard Rose had famously
defined the Conservatives as a party of non-aligned tendencies, whereas the
Labour Party was a party of factions (Rose, 1964). The factional infighting
between the social democratic right and the socialist left covered debates
over (a) public ownership, (b) unilateralism versus multilateralism and (c)
the Common Market, but it also had a ‘power-political’ or personality-­
based dimension, as well as ideology (Crowcroft 2008; see also Haseler
1969; Sibley 1978; Jones 1997). What complicated matters further for
Wilson was that they were not entirely cohesive socialist and socially democratic blocks, that is, the assumption that an economic expansionist was
a unilateralist and anti-common market, and that an economic consolidator was an multilateralist and pro-common market, was not necessarily the
case. There was some cross-cutting or zigzagging in ideological terms
(Hayter 2005: 6; Meredith 2008: 8–12).
This point is best demonstrated by noting the academic research on the
ideological composition of the October 1974–1979 parliamentary Labour
Party. On the economic policy divide, Heppell et al. identified 156 expansionists to 133 consolidators (and 24 neutral or beyond classification);
118 unilateralists and 140 multilateralists (with 55 neutral or beyond classification) and 167 anti-common market and 136 pro-common market
(with 10 neutral or beyond classification). When mapping all three ideological divides together, they identified that 92 were on the absolute
socialist left (i.e. they adopted the traditionalist position on all three policy
divides), and 93 were on the absolute socially democratic right (i.e. they
adopted the revisionist position on all three policy divides), with 120
Labour parliamentarians engaging in ideological zigzagging (Heppell
et al. 2010: 75, 83, 88). No similar academic study exists on the 1970–1974
parliamentary Labour Party, but given that around 90 percent of Labour
parliamentarians in the October 1974–1979 Parliament had been in the
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1970–1974 Parliament, the above-mentioned argument seems credible
when applied to their period opposing the Heath administration.
As the Labour Party entered opposition, many of the key party leadership roles remained within the hands of the social democratic right. As
mentioned earlier, Jenkins was elected to the deputy leadership by fellow
parliamentarians, and he was also Shadow Chancellor, and the other leading shadow portfolios remained tilted against the instincts of the socialist
left, that is, James Callaghan (shadow Home Secretary) and Denis Healey
(shadow Foreign Secretary). The extra-parliamentary was frustrated by
this ideological imbalance. Fearing that this imbalance was institutionally
embedded, the left focused on addressing the following two issues. First,
they devoted their efforts on the National Executive Committee in terms
of extending its reach, notably in terms of policy development, and the
impact of elections to the NEC saw it tilt to the left in opposition (see
Minkin, 1978). Second, they formed the Campaign for Labour Party
Democracy in 1973, with the aim of democratising the Labour Party
(Kogan and Kogan, 1982: 23–35). Thus, the opposition years seemed to
be defined by the socialist left being on the ascendency and the defensiveness of the social democratic right.
Although disagreements would exist about the construction of their
new approach to economic policy and industrial relations, they were overshadowed by a fratricidal struggle between anti- and pro-marketeer forces.
Whereas the likes of Foot and Benn feared the capitalist and free-market
character of the common market, Jenkins and his allies came to regard
membership as a ‘sign of their intellectual sophistication [and] modernity’, making it ‘a matter of high principle’ (Cronin, 2004: 139–140).
Jenkins made two crucial decisions in opposition that would cost him the
leadership of the Labour Party. First, he led that group of 69 into the division lobbies with the pro-European Conservatives in late 1971, after the
failure of attempts (mobilised by Bill Rodgers) to allow Labour parliamentarians a free vote2 (LPA, PLP papers, 1970–1971, minutes of party meeting, 19 October 1971). Second, he then resigned from the shadow
Cabinet in 1972 in opposition to the decision of Wilson, and the rest of
the shadow Cabinet, to embrace a renegotiated and referendum strategy.
2
Jenkins recalled that he was ‘convinced that it was one of the decisive [parliamentary]
votes of the century’, and as such, I ‘had no intention of spending the rest of my life answering the question of what did I do in the great division by saying “I abstained”’ (Jenkins
1991: 329).
13 THE LABOUR PARTY IN OPPOSITION
309
The decision to embrace what Jenkins felt was a ‘left-wing bandwagon’
was the ‘last straw’, but his resignation left him facing accusations from
fellow parliamentarians that he was being divisive (LPA, PLP Papers 1972,
minutes of party meetings, 29 March, 1972, 12 April 1972, 19 April 1972).
Jenkins was a charismatic politician who possessed a band of acolytes
who shared his frustrations with the trajectory of the Labour Party in
opposition (Crewe and King 1995: 55–56). After his resignation, Jenkins
began, via speeches and essays, the process of articulating his wider political agenda beyond the European question, covering issues around industrial relations, trade union reform and public expenditure. The publication
of What Matters Now, outlined an alternative programme that the Labour
Party could pursue (Jenkins 1972). It was also seen as the basis upon
which Jenkins could present himself as a future leader of the Labour Party
(Bell 2004: 198–208). However, what Jenkins had succeeded in doing
was fragmenting the social democratic right into two subgroups and then
marginalising the subgroup that he himself was the de facto leader of. Let
us consider the process of fragmentation first. Other key players associated
with the socially democratic right were not as obsessed by the European
question as Jenkins. For example, Jenkins’ one-time ideological soulmate,
Crosland, felt that by rebelling and resigning, Jenkins and his acolytes had
‘divided the Labour right against itself’ (Marquand 1991: 170). In terms
of marginalisation, Jenkins had reduced his own power and influence, thus
undermining his ability to shape future policy (Bell 2004: 206). The combined impact, according to Crosland, was that Jenkins had ‘allowed the
left into the citadels of party power’ (Marquand 1991: 170). This would
also have longer-term implications, as those who became aligned to the
Jenkins faction in 1971–1972 would form the basis of those who would
subsequently join the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1981—according
to Owen, this is where the ‘true story of the formation’ of the SDP would
begin (Owen 1991: 172). A similar argument is put forward by Hattersley,
who argues that Jenkins’ resigning was ‘the moment when the old Labour
coalition began to collapse’, thus making the ‘eventual formation of a new
centre party inevitable’ (Hattersley 1995: 109).
The short-term consequence of their repeated infighting was that the
opposition era of 1970–1974 left voters with an impression that the
Labour Party remained disunited, despite the best efforts of Wilson. In his
first term as Leader of the Opposition, Wilson had made a significant
impact upon perceptions of internal division. Before Wilson replaced
Gaitskell, only 25 percent of voters thought that the Labour Party was
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T. HEPPELL
unified, and 47 percent thought they were divided (a −22 rating) (as of
May 1962). By December 1963, and a year of Wilson as the Leader of the
Labour Party, 51 percent of voters viewed the Labour Party as being unified, as opposed to 31 percent who regarded them as divided (a +20 rating) (King and Wybrow 2001: 44). The challenges of office saw a gradual
erosion of those positive internal unity ratings. They reached their lowest
point in March 1968, when only 15 percent of voters thought that the
Labour Party was unified, against 76 percent of voters who felt they looked
divided (a −61 rating). Although this stabilised in the latter part of the
Wilson era (with a −24 rating by September 1969), the Labour Party continued to suffer from an image of disunity, which was to continue during
the era of opposition between 1970 and 1974 (King and Wybrow 2001:
44). By November 1971, voter perceptions of unity for the Labour Party
sunk to a low of only 13 percent (as against 74 percent for divided), and
although their ratings improved to 37 percent unified against 46 percent
divided (by October 1973), it was clear that they entered the General
Election of 1974 undermined by perceptions of internal disunity (King
and Wybrow 2001: 44).
Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to explore the conduct of the Labour Party in
opposition to the Heath administration between 1970 and 1974. The
chapter rests on two assumptions about opposition politics. First, to succeed, a party of opposition would normally need the incumbent government to showcase a level of vulnerability/failing that make them worthy
of eviction, that is governing/economic incompetence, internal division
and/or weak leadership. Then, second, if the governing party shows these
tendencies, as the Heath administration did, then their vulnerability to
eviction is dependent upon the ability of the opposition to exploit these
limitations. To assess the Labour Party between 1970 and 1974, the chapter examined their opposition image/performance in relation to notions
of change, that is, change in terms of their public face/or the party leadership; change in terms of public policy platform; and change in terms of
their ability to project a more unified image.
By analysing these three themes, the chapter has demonstrated that the
Labour Party experienced difficulties in terms of projecting a positive
impression of change in the opposition years of 1970–1974. Renewal in
opposition did not involve a change in the public face of the Labour Party.
13 THE LABOUR PARTY IN OPPOSITION
311
Wilson did not wish to resign the party leadership and nor were his parliamentary colleagues willing to initiate a challenge to remove him. As such,
Wilson would lead the Labour Party into his fourth and then fifth General
Election campaigns in February and then October 1974, respectively.
Renewal in opposition did not involve repositioning the Labour Party
closer to the centre-ground of British politics—policy development tilted
towards the left in relation to the economics of redistribution and their
approach to industrial relations. Moreover, policy development vis-à-vis
membership of the European Community seemed to be driven more by
calculations associated with party management then principles. From this
would emerge the solution of a referendum on continued membership as
a means of addressing the enduring divide between pro- and anti-common
market forces. That the governing Conservatives had their own divisions,
with regard to the debates on membership, meant the two main parties
almost cancelled each other out in terms of the negatives that flowed from
their own rebelliousness.
That both the Conservatives and the Labour Party were undermining,
rather than enhancing, their appeal to voters is evident by comparing their
combined vote shares in the General Elections of June 1970 and February
1974. When Wilson and the Labour Party lost office in June 1970, the
combined Conservative and Labour Party return was 89.5 percent of the
vote, with the Conservatives securing 13,145,123 votes (at 46.4 percent)
and the Labour Party on 12,208,758 votes (and 43.1 percent) (Butler and
Pinto-Duschinsky 1971). When Wilson led the Labour Party back into
(minority) government in early 1974, the combined vote for the
Conservatives and Labour was 75.1 percent, with the Conservatives securing 11,872,180 votes (at 37.9 percent) and the Labour Party on
11,645,616 votes (at 37.2 percent) (Butler and Kavanagh 1974). Voter
dissatisfaction was contributing to the decline of the dominant two-party
system and has to be placed within the context of the rise of the Liberals—
from 2,117,035 votes or 7.5 percent in June 1970 to 6,059,519 or 19.3
percent in February 1974 (and an increase in seats from 6 to 14), and the
growth in support for the Scottish National Party (SNP)—from 306,802
to 633,180 votes between June 1970 and February 1974 (Butler and
Pinto-Duschinsky 1971; Butler and Kavanagh 1974). What is remarkable
about the return to government of the Labour Party was they secured a
lower vote base and vote share than the discredited Heath-led
Conservatives, and their vote share regaining power was 5.9 percent lower
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T. HEPPELL
(at 37.2 percent) than it was when they lost power 3.5 years earlier (at
43.1 percent) at the General Election of 1970.
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CHAPTER 14
Edward Heath: Leadership Competence
and Capability
Christopher Byrne, Nick Randall, and Kevin Theakston
Edward Heath’s performance as Prime Minister has rarely been celebrated.
Gallup’s polling during his premiership revealed persistent public dissatisfaction with his performance (King and Wybrow 2001; Denver and
Garnett 2012). After Heath’s dismissal by the electorate, most of his former Cabinet colleagues issued hostile or at best equivocal assessments of
his leadership. Among the former was his successor as Conservative leader:
‘wrong, not just once but repeatedly’ was her verdict (Thatcher 1995:
195). Others who might have been expected to be more generous, such as
his Chancellor, found it best to avoid any appraisal of Heath’s leadership
C. Byrne
Leeds Beckett University, Leeds, UK
e-mail: Christopher.Byrne@leedsbeckett.ac.uk
N. Randall
Newcastle University, Newcastle, UK
e-mail: nick.randall@ncl.ac.uk
K. Theakston (*)
University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
e-mail: K.Theakston@leeds.ac.uk
© The Author(s) 2021
A. S. Roe-Crines, T. Heppell (eds.), Policies and Politics Under
Prime Minister Edward Heath, Palgrave Studies in Political
Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53673-2_14
317
318
C. BYRNE ET AL.
(Barber 1996). The minority who undertook to defend his reputation
were either terse—‘I like Ted Heath. I think he was a good Prime Minister’
(Pym 1984: 21)—or reliant upon counterfactuals: ‘Ted Heath would have
been seen to be an outstanding Prime Minister’, wrote one faithful ally, ‘if
he remained in power’ (Walker 1991: 121).
The general assessment of those in the academy has also been negative.
Surveys of academics (Theakston and Gill 2006, 2011) have ranked Heath
amongst the worst of Britain’s post-war Prime Ministers. Those who have
studied Heath in depth rarely demur from this judgement, but they do
seek to account for Heath’s failures. Here three key themes emerge—that
Heath’s personality contributed to his difficulties, that he made a number
of tactical and strategic errors in office and that he was attempting to govern in challenging circumstances. However, such assessments have usually
been arrived at without reference to any framework for evaluating leadership performance.
Greenstein’s (2001) leadership style/skills model, has been applied to
Heath as part of a broader comparative analysis of UK Prime Ministers
(Theakston 2007) and more recently, both Heppell (2014) and Garnett
(2015) have applied Bulpitt’s statecraft model to the Heath premiership.
These recent systematic assessments of Heath are welcome, and this chapter seeks to contribute to this emerging, theoretically informed debate
both on Heath’s premiership and on the performance of UK prime ministers in general.
We approach Heath’s premiership via a critical reading of Stephen
Skowronek’s historical institutionalist account of leadership in ‘political
time’ (1993, 2011). For Skowronek, political time is defined by the rise
and fall of ‘regimes’. A regime is understood as a set of ideas, values, policy
paradigms and programmes, which are supported by a coalition of political interests and are associated with particular institutional supports. Each
regime is defined by a cycle in which, as political support and authority for
a regime accumulates or dissipates, the regime is established, maintained,
encounters crisis and is eventually replaced. For Skowronek, the challenges
of leadership differ according to where the regime is in this cycle of
resilience and vulnerability. In addition, the attitudes of each leader
towards the regime—whether they are affiliated or opposed—establishes a
broad pattern of opportunities and constraints. These two dimensions
allow Skowronek to distinguish between four distinct types of leaders
(Table 14.1):
14 EDWARD HEATH: LEADERSHIP COMPETENCE AND CAPABILITY
Table 14.1 Skowronek’s
typology of leaders,
regimes and patterns
of politics
Affiliated leader
Resilient regime
Articulation
Vulnerable regime Disjunction
319
Opposed leader
Pre-emption
Reconstruction
Affiliated leaders of a resilient regime pursue a politics of articulation.
They are regime managers who aim to ensure that the regime continues to
function well in changing times. Pre-emptive leaders aim to replace established commitments but in doing so galvanise political support for the
status quo that frustrates their objectives. Disjunctive leaders are those
who are affiliated to a failing regime and so encounter the challenges of
trying to govern an increasingly dysfunctional system. Finally, reconstructive leaders are those who, by building a new coalition around a new governing framework, are able to administer the coup de grâce to a
failing regime.
As has been shown elsewhere (Byrne et al. 2017), this model can, with
sensible adaptations, be applied to the UK premiership. It is also a model
that, we have argued, can address some of the shortcomings of other
approaches to the assessment of political leadership in the UK. Viewing
prime ministers in political time allows us, unlike Greenstein’s focus on the
personal qualities of leaders, to account for how the demands of political
circumstances affect leadership effectiveness. Statecraft approaches, on the
other hand, have recently been adapted to take better account of structural factors in the performance of statecraft tasks (Buller and James 2014).
However, the political time approach invokes within and between category comparisons of the four types of leadership. This permits us to more
systematically specify the structural constraints and the opportunities for
agency characteristic of each type of leadership. The result, we submit, is
an analysis, comparison and explanation of leadership performance that is
better attuned to the interaction between structure and agency (Byrne and
Theakston 2019).
The chapter proceeds by the following sequence of steps. First, we classify Heath according to Skowronek’s typology. We examine Heath’s attitude towards the regime and show that Heath was a regime affiliate. We
then examine the character of the regime. Here we argue that Heath took
office at a time in which the regime was facing increasing enervation. It is
on this basis that we classify Heath as a disjunctive Prime Minister. In the
third section of the chapter, we examine how Heath responded to the
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C. BYRNE ET AL.
dilemmas of disjunctive leadership through expectation management, the
valorisation of technique and policy experimentation. We conclude by
evaluating the state of the regime which Heath left behind, in terms of
both the immediate scenario facing Harold Wilson in February 1974 and
the longer-term path dependencies propelled by decisions taken by Heath
in government.
Heath: Opponent or Affiliate of the Regime?
Our first task is to establish Heath’s attitude towards the regime. Here we
need to exercise caution. The objectives of politicians are frequently and
easily misread. It often serves the interests of their opponents, inside and
outside their own party, to misrepresent their position. Equally, members
of the commentariat and academia are apt to arrive at conclusions by selective quotation from a limited range of public statements. Heath has frequently been misread, particularly in respect of the Selsdon Park meeting
of the Shadow Cabinet in January 1970. Harold Wilson used reports of
this conference to identify Heath with ‘Selsdon Man’: ‘a socio-political
cave-dweller whose appearance marked a major shift in the political zeitgeist’ (Christie 2004: 135). Heath’s Conservative critics after 1972
recalled Selsdon Park as evidence of Heath’s betrayal of a challenge to the
post-war consensus (see, e.g. Tebbit 1989). Yet, in our research we have
been able to identify only three occasions between 1970 and 1974, where
Heath actually referred to Selsdon Park in speeches or interviews (CPA,
CCO, PPB 21, ‘The Rt. Hon. Edward Heath, MBE, MP (Bexley) Leader
of the Opposition. Speaking at a meeting in Springhead Hall, Springhead
Road, Northfleet, Kent, on Friday, 13 March 1970’; CPA, CRD, PPB, 24,
‘The Prime Minister interviewed by Peter Hardiman Scott, Panorama 18
June 1970’; National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations
1973), and on each occasion Heath’s anodyne comments fail to warrant
the mythology.
This example serves to demonstrate the necessity of reviewing a wide
range of Heath’s public statements to establish his position in relation to
the regime. After all, Heath spent nearly five years and fought two general
elections in opposition before entering Downing Street. He was then
prime minister for nearly four years. Our analysis therefore proceeds on
the basis of a review of 627 speeches, interviews, statements, press conferences and party political broadcasts delivered by Heath between 28 July
1965 and 4 March 1974, which are found in the Conservative Party
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321
archive at the Bodleian Library. These, taken together with the party’s
principal policy statements and election manifestos during the same period,
comprise 1.18 million words of text.
Our starting point is to consider Heath’s stance as it emerged in opposition. This is summarised in Table 14.2.
Table 14.2 Heath’s attitude towards the regime, 1965–1970
Governing strategy Values
Policy goals
Return to
honesty, courage
and integrity in
political
leadership
Greater prosperity
and resting upon a
high wage, low-cost
economy; Increased
productivity; and
control of inflation
Competition
Policy means
Removal of restrictive practices;
trade union reform;
improvement of quality of
management; redeployment
and retraining; reduction of
tariffs where industries are
inefficient; and access to larger
market and sectoral
cooperation provided by EEC
Modernisation
Enterprise
Promotion of
Reduction of individual and
incentives
corporate taxation
Harnessing
Individualism Wider ownership
Measures to assist home
academic,
ownership including council
business and
house sales and capital grants
scientific expertise
for first-time buyers and
in government
promotion of occupational
pensions
Efficiency
Reduction of waste
Administrative reform of
in public sector
Whitehall; systems analysis;
value engineering; and critical
path control
‘One Nation’
Opportunity End to hardship and Improve social services by
poverty
directing resources to those
most in need
Equality
Racial harmony and Control of Commonwealth
prevention of
immigration; additional
discrimination
funding for areas where civic
against ethnic
infrastructure is under pressure
minorities
due to immigration
Nationalism Preservation of
Scottish devolution; support
Union and protection for reformists at Stormont; and
of British interests
maintenance of UK defence
overseas, particularly commitments East of Suez as
against instability
part of five-power force.
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C. BYRNE ET AL.
At this point in his career, Heath was fond of highlighting what he
described in his 1966 conference speech as the ‘great divide’ between the
parties. Accordingly, his public statements articulate a series of value commitments presented as intrinsic to his and his party’s stance. Commitments
to free enterprise and competition enjoy a high priority:
I was trained in private enterprise and I’ve had to earn my living in it. And
so, as a party our objective, when we are the government, is to enable private
enterprise to work and to work effectively. As a government we will encourage it, we want it to be both free and enterprising, and above all we want it
to be competitive. Because we know that competition brings the best out of
every one of us. (CPA, CRD, PPB, 014/1 ‘Speech by Edward Heath at
Llandudno’, 13 May 1967)
Heath also believed a recovery in national fortunes would depend principally on the efforts of individuals. Accordingly, he promoted opportunity, incentives and choice for individuals. As ‘the party of free choice’ the
‘whole purpose of the style of Government on which we shall embark is to
give the people of this country greater opportunities which they can use
for themselves’ (CPA, CCO, PPB 23/1, ‘The Rt. Hon. Edward Heath,
MBE, MP (Bexley) Leader of the Opposition. Speaking at a Conservative
Workers’ Briefing Conference at Church House, Westminster, on Friday,
22 May, 1970; and ‘The Rt. Hon. Edward Heath, MBE, MP (Bexley)
Leader of the Opposition. Transcript of Mr Heath’s opening remarks at
his news conference launching the Conservative Election Manifesto at
Conservative Central Office, on Tuesday, 26 May 1970’).
Heath not only also possessed an occasional tendency to outbursts of
‘Leninist’ rhetoric (King 1975: 7). Some of his policy goals were also open
to interpretation as radical departures from post-war practice. One example is his commitment to cut individual and corporate taxation and to
reduce the size and responsibilities of the British state. Another is his promotion of a ‘property-owning democracy’ by sale of council houses and
extension of occupational pensions. Taken together, these might lend
themselves to identifying Heath as an agent of regime reconstruction.
However, such commitments must be placed in their proper context.
Firstly, had Heath been intent on regime reconstruction, we would
have expected him to repudiate post-war governing practices. On the contrary, Heath repeatedly and proudly revisited his achievements as a member of the Eden, Macmillan and Home governments. Moreover, he
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advised fellow partisans to recall the record of the 1951–1964 governments as testimony of Conservative competence and credibility. He told
Conservative candidates:
We can point to our record in the past. We can show how in the years of
Conservative prosperity we reduced taxes and increased spending on the
social services at the same time. Not by magic, but by managing the economy so that people saved and greater wealth was created. (CPA, CCO, PPB
23/1, ‘The Rt. Hon. Edward Heath, MBE, MP (Bexley) Leader of the
Opposition. Text of a letter to all Conservative Candidates’)
Secondly, Heath’s value commitments must be seen in the context of
his governing strategy and the wider ensemble of his policy objectives and
policy means. Between 1964 and 1970, Heath did not identify fundamental and structural defects of the regime. Rather, he assigned primary
responsibility for the nation’s difficulties to the quality of leadership provided by Wilson and the Labour government. On Heath’s account,
Wilson’s perennial and chief concern was the partisan advantage of the
Labour Party. Wilson’s addiction to gimmickry, such as the National Plan,
delivered inertia and trivial government. The implications were clear. Had
the Conservatives been in government, the nation would have been spared
its travails. Furthermore, if the ‘lack of integrity and determination … that
has gravely weakened our national life’ could be replaced by a new style of
firm and frank leadership, there was every prospect of reinvigorating the
regime (CPA, CCO, PPB 221, ‘The Rt. Hon. Edward Heath, MBE, MP
(Bexley) Leader of the Opposition. Speaking at the Portobello Town Hall,
Edinburgh, at a Young Conservative Conference, 7 March, 1970’).
Thirdly, to read Heath as an advocate of regime transformation demands
we wilfully ignore the detail of his public statements. Despite Heath’s
commitments to free enterprise, he maintained that ‘The Tory Party has
never been laissez-faire, and isn’t laissez-faire at the moment’ (National
Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations 1965). While Heath
dismissed Wilson’s National Economic Plan, he saw continued value in
the planning apparatus established under Macmillan and did not foresee it
as an impediment to liberation of the forces of competition (see, e.g. CPA,
CRD, PPB, 012/3 ‘Interview with Mr. Edward Heath on the Programme
“Focus”’ 16 November 1965).
Rather, ‘Planning will take its proper place as an aid to the sound
management of the economy and not as a substitute for it’ (Conservative
Party 1968). Heath remained committed to the maintenance of full
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C. BYRNE ET AL.
employment (see, CPA, CCO, PPB 21, ‘The Rt. Hon. Edward Heath,
MBE, MP (Bexley) Leader of the Opposition. Transcript of a television
interview with Mr Robin Day on BBC1 on Tuesday 24 June, 1969’); and
accepted the government’s responsibility to maintain economic demand
(see, e.g. National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations
1965). While hostile to the state propping up declining industries, he
believed it had to ‘enable private enterprise to adapt itself more quickly to
changes in demand and methods of production’ (CPA, CRD, PPB 014/2,
‘Highfield Hall, Carshalton’) by policies to promote redeployment and
retraining. Government would also remain responsible for ensuring prosperity was shared by all parts of the nation:
We cannot tolerate the waste of human and economic resources which are
brought about by their uneven use in different parts of the country. We
refuse to condemn large parts of the United Kingdom to slow decline and
decay, to dereliction and to persistent unemployment in pursuit of old fangled 19th century doctrines of laissez faire, and so we shall act. (Conservative
Central Office 1969)
Nor did Heath envisage any significant redrawing of the boundaries of
the mixed economy. He rejected the proposals for extensive privatisation
presented by Nicholas Ridley’s policy group in 1968. Cuts in taxation and
reductions in state responsibilities would not need any political anaesthetic
since Heath had ‘a slimming pill to give Whitehall’ (CPA, CCO, PPB
012/1, ‘Extract from a speech by the Rt. Hon. Edward Heath, MBE,
Leader of the Conservative Party and Candidate for Bexley at Newcastle
on Tuesday, 22 March 1966’). That Labour had allowed the state to grow
corpulent with excess taxation and public spending demonstrated the
scope for straightforward economies. Reform of Whitehall and modern
management techniques would free further resources painlessly. If
increased prescription charges and the withdrawal of housing subsidies
were necessary, they were nonetheless tolerable for the beneficiaries of
post-war affluence. Indeed, Heath considered such policies an embodiment of the party’s ‘One Nation’ tradition. Better targeting of resources
to those most in need would liberate those who continued to experience
hardship and poverty.
Such commitments were in the service of a governing strategy that
sought to modernise rather than reconstruct the existing regime. Britain
had become, ‘A society dedicated to the prevention of progress and the
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325
preservation of the status quo’ (CPA, CCO, PPB 21, ‘The Rt. Hon.
Edward Heath, MBE, MP (Bexley) Leader of the Opposition. Speaking at
the Midland Hotel, Manchester, on Friday, 5 December 1969’). It is in
this context that two of Heath’s most ambitious and controversial commitments should be understood. Industrial relations law had gone unreformed for 60 years and was the legacy of an epoch of mass unemployment,
weak unions and victimisation in the workplace. Now it was imperative to
‘stop looking over our shoulders to Jarrow and the thirties’ (CPA, CCO,
PPB 012/1, ‘Text of a speech by the Rt. Hon. Edward Heath, MBE, MP
(Bexley), Leader of the Opposition, at a Mass Meeting at the Guildhall,
Southampton, on Saturday, 5 March, 1966’). Modernisation of the law
would strengthen the responsible union leaders whom Heath had encountered as Minister of Labour and who would then act as a vanguard for
efficiency. If management modernised its techniques too, then restrictive
practices could be challenged, productivity increased and the trajectory set
for a high-wage, low-cost economy.
EEC membership also featured as part of this broader strategy of modernisation. This would restore a sense of national purpose and provide
Europe with its rightful voice in world affairs. However, the primary benefit was that membership would foster the competition and dynamism
necessary to deliver accelerating economic growth. British firms would
gain access to larger export markets and new opportunities for cooperation across high-technology sectors. It is unfair to accuse Heath of misleading the nation over the implications that would follow for British
sovereignty (see CPA, CCO, PPB 016, ‘The Rt. Hon. Edward Heath,
MBE, MP (Bexley) Leader of the Opposition. Speaking at the Scottish
Conservative and Unionist Conference in Perth, on Saturday, 18 May,
1968; CPA, CCO, PPB 21, ‘The Rt. Hon. Edward Heath, MBE, MP
(Bexley) Leader of the Opposition. Speaking at the Caird Hall, Dundee,
on Tuesday, 9 September, 1969). However, the reconstructive potential
of membership was certainly downplayed in favour of stressing its revivifying material impacts.
On the threshold of the premiership, the limit of Heath’s radicalism
was, to use Peter Hall’s terminology (1993), a second-order change.
Heath was committed to broadly the same policy goals as his predecessors
in Number 10. Where Heath differed was in the policy instruments he
proposed for their realisation. Comparison with other voices in the
Conservative Party serves to reinforce this conclusion. Where Heath was
confident of reinvigorating the regime, Angus Maude, an early critic,
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believed the Conservatives were failing to recognise the extent of Britain’s
malaise (Maude 1966). Where Heath’s ambitions focused on reversing
Wilson’s reforms, others, like Lord Coleraine, inveighed against ‘the horrid hagiology of government by interferences and incantation’, represented by institutions like the National Economic Development Council
(Lord Coleraine 1970: 113). But the contrast with Enoch Powell is the
most revealing. Powell held a more pessimistic outlook than Heath. For
example, during the 1970 General Election, Powell foresaw civil strife of
‘appalling dimensions’ as a consequence of mass immigration (Powell
1970a) and identified a series of enemies within intent on subverting the
UK state and destroying its society (Powell 1970b). If Powell lacked a
fully developed platform, he had nevertheless associated himself with a
series of reconstructive commitments during the years of opposition.
These included proposals to cut income tax in half by cuts in public expenditure of the order of £2855 million (Powell 1968). Powell endorsed
denationalisation of the airlines, docks and telephone system, and he questioned the wisdom of government subsidies for socially deprived areas.
Powell also doubted whether military commitments outside Europe and
Britain’s overseas aid programme should be maintained.
Regime Vulnerability or Resilience (1970–1974)?
No prime minister since the war, it has been argued, ‘has confronted such
a combination of malign events’ as did Heath between 1970 and 1974
(Patten 2017: 135). As Campbell (1993: xix) put it:
International and domestic factors in the fevered 1970s conspired to derail
his Government. He was confronted by the collapse of the international
financial system and massive global inflation, culminating in the 1973 ‘oil
shock’; an irresponsible trade union movement at the height of its power,
backed by an unscrupulously opportunist Opposition; Northern Ireland on
the edge of civil war; plus a social climate disturbed by a whole range of fears
and dislocations, from terrorism and rising crime through student revolt and
violent demonstrations to coloured immigration, sexual permissiveness and
decimalisation of the currency.
Similarly, Sandbrook (2010: 13) has described the period 1970–1974
as ‘caught between past and present’, with its political consensus ‘fragmenting under the pressure of social change, its economy struggling to
cope with overseas competitors, [and] its culture torn between the
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comforts of nostalgia and the excitement of change’. In this confused and
unsettled environment, Heath aimed to stabilise and rehabilitate a set of
governing commitments rendered vulnerable by a structural crisis of the
international economy and claims of overload and ungovernability
(King 1976).
In Skowronek’s model, disjunctive leaders face the challenge of trying
to manage, maintain or rescue a failing regime in the context of mounting
problems, policy failures, deteriorating government performance and
diminishing support and authority. Do the regime’s ‘governing commitments’, as Skowronek (1993: 36) describes them, still ‘claim formidable
political, organizational, and ideological support? Do they offer credible
solutions or guides to the problems of the day? Or have they in the course
of events become open to attack as failed and irrelevant responses to the
nation’s problems?’ For Nichols and Myers (2010: 813–14), indicators of
an ‘enervated’ or weakened regime include the emergence of ‘new cleaving issues and problems’, growing tensions within and the decreased cohesion of the regime’s governing coalition, the rise of ‘opposition elements’
calling into question and beginning a national debate about the regime’s
established policies and its governing philosophy and competence, and the
‘advent of a crisis atmosphere’.
In trying to make sense of the vulnerability or resilience of the ‘regime’
in a broad sense, the relatively short Heath government cannot be seen in
isolation. Thus in terms of the periodisation of British policy regimes and
of regime crisis and change, Middlemas (1979: 430, 459) talks about a
‘crisis of the state’ and symptoms of breakdown and instability in the system over the period 1964–1975, in a later study referring to a ‘mid-1970s
crisis’ and ‘time of disjunctions … [and] disintegration’ (Middlemas 1991:
4–5). Beer (1982) traced the breakdown of ‘hubristic Keynesianism’, the
problem of ‘pluralistic stagnation’ and the ‘political contradictions of collectivism’ back into the mid-1960s, setting the scene for the failures and
‘self-defeating politics’ of the 1970s. Studlar (2007: 8–12) describes
1970–1979 as a ‘transitional period of turmoil and confusion’ in the shift
of post-war Britain’s political eras and orders from the collectivist consensus period of 1945–1970 to the neoliberal order after 1979 (though noting that several of the problems marking the ‘transitional era’ of the 1970s
were already evident in the later 1960s). Bogdanor (1994: 359) dates the
‘paradigm change in which one dispensation gradually came to be succeeded by something quite different’ to the years following 1974 and the
fall of Heath. In contrast Matthijs (2011: 31, 99) appears to date the
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tilting point between regime resilience and vulnerability more exactly to
1972 and the Heath U-turn, describing Conservative policy after 1972 as
‘crisis containment’ and dating the final disintegration of the post-war
consensus to the period of the 1974–1979 Labour government.
However, we would argue, with Campbell (1993: xix), that it is probably best to say that Heath was ‘caught at a moment of transition ... when
the earth moved under his feet’. Similarly, Arthur (1996: 257–258)
describes the UK as ‘going through a very difficult period of transition’ in
the Heath years, with the government ‘overwhelmed by one damned
problem after another—industrial relations, inflation, immigration and
Ireland’. Events between 1970 and 1974 can perhaps be likened in that
sense to a series of what seismologists label ‘foreshocks’ that may reflect a
general increase in underlying stress in a region or cause stress changes
resulting eventually in the ‘mainshock’ or major earthquake. Put another
way, it was not that 1970 itself marked ‘a major break in British history’
(Harrison 2010: xv). Regime decomposition and failure was, rather, a process traceable in many respects from the late 1960s through to the end of
the 1970s. This was a turbulent period of challenge, change, crisis and
adjustment across a number of fronts (economic, political, social, cultural,
ideological), affecting not just Britain but on a global scale (Black et al.
2013; Ferguson et al. 2010).
Regime vulnerabilities manifested themselves in a number of ways in
the Heath years. Public support for the Heath government was not particularly robust. Heath personally was not a popular leader—he was never
an electoral asset to his party, and his approval ratings as Prime Minister
(averaging 37 percent) were the lowest of any post-war Prime Minister
until John Major. After a brief political honeymoon in 1970, for most of
the period opinion polls showed a Labour lead over the Conservatives and
voter dissatisfaction with the government’s record (Kavanagh 1996:
377–378). By-elections and local council elections gave evidence of the
Liberal Party revival that proved so damaging to the Conservatives in
February 1974, an election that marked a crack in the established two-­
party domination of the political system—the Labour/Conservative share
of the vote falling from 89.4 percent in 1970 to 74.9 percent, with the
Liberals increasing from 7.5 percent to 19.3 percent (gaining nearly four
million more votes) and also a significant increase in the nationalists’ vote
in Scotland. All this was expressive of growing disillusion with the two
main governing parties during the 1970s. Exploiting popular anxieties
over immigration (including the expulsion of the Ugandan Asians) as an
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insurgent party of the extreme right, the National Front saw membership
growth and patchy electoral success in this period, particularly in some
local contests (Taylor 1982). At the same time, changes in the social and
electoral underpinnings of the wider party system were starting to become
apparent, with evidence of a weakening of party identities and of the class-­
party nexus, the emergence of a more de-aligned electorate, and a shift in
public attitudes on economic and welfare issues, and on attitudes towards
the trade unions, over the course of the 1970s (Norris 1997).
At a deeper level there seemed also to be a decline in the stabilising and
supportive elements of the traditional ‘civic culture’: as Kavanagh (1980:
370) put it, ‘the traditional bonds of social class, party, and common
nationality are waning, and with them the old restraints of hierarchy and
deference’. Schoen (1977: 232–239) also noted a growing ‘general political disillusionment’ in Britain, starting in the late 1960s, including evidence of dissatisfaction with the political system, the failure of government
to solve the problems facing the country, popular discontent with politicians and the major parties, falling confidence in party leaders, a growing
gap between mass and elite opinion, and increasing public fears of the
breakdown of traditional values and standards. The existing system and
political machinery seemed increasingly remote, irrelevant and/or incompetent. Beer (1982: 119) suggested that the failure or inability of the
political system to adapt to new expectations and attitudes undermined
the legitimacy and effectiveness of government and the wider collectivist
regime. Public concerns over law and order, rising crime and student protests fed into this general sense of social malaise and disarray, together with
the seemingly out-of-control violence in Northern Ireland (with 480
deaths in 1972 alone, the highest figure in any year of the Troubles) and
wider incidents of international terrorism.
In disjunctive conditions, populist and maverick figures often serve as a
focus for disaffection with the established regime and in the Heath years,
as noted earlier, it was Enoch Powell who articulated an alternative
Toryism and the need for a reconstructive solution to national malaise.
However, he remained a divisive figure and isolated at the parliamentary
level, more a ‘voice’ and a regular back-bench dissenter than a factional
leader, though all the same something of a magnet for the disaffected at
party grassroots level and in the wider electorate (Shepherd 1996: 406).
But analysing Powell’s public appeal in this period, Schoen (1977: 40–41)
found that the widespread support for his stance on immigration did not
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translate into support for his views on other key issues such as denationalisation or prices and incomes policy.
The wider climate of intellectual opinion in the early 1970s was still
supportive of the Keynesian consensus, backing high public spending and
state intervention, even as the limitations and the problems with that policy paradigm were becoming apparent in practice. There was, however, no
credible alternative available at that time, and a major shift in opinion had
not yet occurred, unlike in the Thatcherite decade of the 1980s. By the
late 1960s and early 1970s, press commentators like Peter Jay and Samuel
Brittan were popularising monetarist ideas, but the free-market economic
counter-revolution was still in its infancy in the years of the Heath government (Thompson 1996: 64–65). Whitehall and Treasury policy thinking
remained broadly Keynesian (Kandiah 1995: 197). Apart from the
Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) and some followers of Enoch Powell,
there was little interest in monetarist economics and explanations of inflation (Kavanagh 1996: 361). As Cairncross (1996: 125) put it, ‘monetarism’s time had not yet come’. Only a small minority of Conservatives were
seriously interested in ‘consensus-busting’ at this time (Garnett 1994:
279) with political figures like Jock Bruce Gardyne and Nicholas Ridley,
and economists like Alan Walters, talking about monetarism. Although
they were to later dominate policymaking, in 1970 the ideas of the IEA
‘remained on the political fringe’ (Harrison 2010: 290), though the creation of the Selsdon Group in 1973 to call for a change of direction and
to champion economic liberalism was a sign of growing dissatisfaction in
Conservative circles, not just with particular decisions of the Heath government but the whole politics of consensus, corporatism and Keynesian
economics (Cockett 1995: 212–213). There were other signs too that
opponents of and campaigners against the policies and values of the collectivist Keynesian welfare state consensus were becoming more organised
and influential. There was, for example, the appearance (from 1969
onwards) of the ‘Black Papers’ on education. Coinciding with the advent
of the Heath government, Rhodes Boyson joined with Ralph Harris and
Ross McWhirter to set up the ‘Constitutional Book Club’ in 1970, publishing pamphlets challenging ‘progressive thinking’ and making the case
for capitalism and free enterprise and against the welfare state, nationalisation and the ‘socialistic’ approaches adopted by both main parties over the
post-war period (Boyson 1970; Cockett 1995: 176–177). The failures
and the fall of the Heath government, together with the course of events
under the Labour government after 1974, seemed to vindicate these
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alternative ideas and to finally open the door to a politics of reconstruction
under Margaret Thatcher.
Trade union shop-floor militancy and strikes had been increasing since
the late 1960s, but the ‘pitched battles’ (Taylor 1996: 170) and ‘open
warfare’ (Porter 1996: 39) with the trade unions between 1970 and 1974
put a serious question mark against the post-war settlement between government, labour and capital (Middlemas 1990). A record number of
working days were lost due to strikes and industrial action: in 1972 alone,
over 23 million days were lost in stoppages and strikes, the highest figure
since the 1926 General Strike. The government’s Industrial Relations Act
aimed to stabilise industrial relations and reduce union conflict and strikes,
but it instead had the opposite effect, provoking a confrontation with the
TUC and even more union strife and stoppages. The unions rendered the
Act unworkable, and it was in the context of the confrontations and disorder over its implementation and enforceability that media commentators
started to ask whether Britain was becoming ‘ungovernable’ and to talk of
‘a major attack upon its constitutional principles and freedoms’ (Economist
1972; Sunday Times 1972). On a different front, the actions and defiance
of councillors in Clay Cross (on housing finance and other issues) constituted the most sustained challenge by a local council to the authority of
central government, parliament and the law for half a century
(Mitchell 1974).
In Opposition, the Conservatives had condemned Labour’s incomes
policy, promising to restore free collective bargaining, but in the face of
rising inflation and strikes and industrial action by the unions—and particularly after the bitter miners’ strike in early 1972, which led to a state of
emergency, power cuts and a three-day week—the government was driven
to introduce a statutory incomes policy. Through all the industrial conflict, however, Heath persistently and genuinely sought agreement with
the unions and with business, to try and make a ‘corporate’ or ‘tripartite’
system of economic management work. But the problem was the ‘social
partners’—the TUC and the union leadership on the one hand, the CBI
representing business on the other—were unable or unwilling fully to
cooperate, share responsibility and ‘deliver’. The second clash with the
miners in 1973–1974 then dealt a final fatal blow to the government’s
authority in the ‘who governs?’ election of February 1974.
The international economic scene could hardly have been more difficult or volatile, with the breakdown of the stable international currency
and financial system, based on fixed exchange rates, put together at
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Bretton Woods after the war; worldwide inflation and dramatically rising
world commodity prices; and then the massively disruptive shock of the
1973–1974 oil crisis, when OPEC action following the Arab-Israeli war
resulted in a quadrupling in the price of oil and cutbacks in production,
further accelerating inflation and deepening recession. In this context,
Britain was not uniquely challenged in the 1970s. Other countries also
experienced a severe deterioration in economic performance, with a
slowdown in growth rates and higher inflation and unemployment, signalling an end to the ‘golden years’ of the post-war boom (Coopey and
Woodward 1996: 3). Inevitably, in many states this led to a major rethink
of domestic policy regimes developed in the post-war period (Gamble
1988: 3). In Britain, the emergence of stagflation—simultaneously
increasing unemployment and inflation—was the moment when ‘the traditional macro-­economic methods stopped working’ and the established
Keynesian ‘conventional wisdom’ was fundamentally challenged
(Bogdanor 1994: 359).
The growing sense of regime crisis can also be seen in the tone and
tenor of internal government deliberations on economic problems and
policy. In the run up to the 1972 U-turn, there was the view that unemployment topping one million for the first time in 25 years was politically
and socially unacceptable, and an impatient sense of the need for a major
modernisation and reconstruction of British industry and what Heath
called ‘our whole economic structure’ to tackle long-term problems of
decline and meet the challenge of entry into Europe (Theakston and
Connelly 2018: 205–206). By early 1974—against the background of the
oil crisis and the pay policy struggle with the miners—the Whitehall language was of ‘economic life as we know it ... transformed’, ‘permanent
damage of the most serious kind to the economy’ and ‘an unmanageable
wage/price spiral’. Heath chaired a Number 10 meeting, where it was
agreed there were two possible scenarios: ‘one in which it was possible to
deal with the developing economic situation in a reasonably orderly manner, and another in which there was a major collapse of confidence which
called for immediate and drastic action’ (Theakston and Connelly 2018:
233–234). There have been claims there was in fact something like a ‘collective nervous breakdown in the official machine’. From the Central
Policy Review Staff (CPRS), Lord Rothschild minuted the prime minister
with apocalyptic warnings about the dangers of ‘chaos, riots and anarchy’
and the ‘downfall of democracy’ (Hughes 2012: 199, 216). Meanwhile
senior Treasury officials warned that ‘the country may face collapse’ and
14 EDWARD HEATH: LEADERSHIP COMPETENCE AND CAPABILITY
333
‘economic and social disaster’ (McIntosh 2006: 62, 68). The sense of ‘loss
of control’ at the centre helped open the way to later ‘fundamental changes
in economic management’ (Cairncross 1996: 137).
Heath and the Disjunctive Dilemma
Heath’s response to the disjunctive dilemma with which he was presented
was sui generis, which is to be expected, given the sui generis nature of
every instance of political disjunction. However, Heath relied on some
tried and tested means of resolving crises, and there are, therefore, parallels between the strategies and tactics he used, and those used by other
disjunctive leaders before and since. These included the discursive articulation of crisis conditions, so as to reduce expectations surrounding his government; attempting to achieve otherwise incompatible policy objectives
by valorising governing technique; and, adopting a highly pragmatic policy stance, which accounts for his government’s reputation as a frantically
U-turning administration, even if Heath did start out with a coherent
policy vision centred on winning EEC membership.
Crisis Narratives and Expectation Management in Heath’s
Political Discourse
The ontological status of crises, as Hay and Smith (2013) have argued, is
equivocal. Although it is possible to formulate objective measures of crises, perhaps referring to key economic indicators such as gross domestic
product (GDP) growth and rates of unemployment and inflation, or public opinion polling exploring ‘anti-political’ sentiment, the crucial fact is
that crises are always discursively mediated or even constructed. Similarly,
Jessop (2002) has noted in his analysis of the collapse of Keynesian welfarism and the emergence of the Schumpterian competition state that the
ultimate consequences of crisis tendencies appearing within a particular
political regime are determined by whether they are discursively articulated as a crisis within or of that regime.
For this reason, political leaders naturally attempt to promulgate an
understanding of the present that best serves their own interests and/or
accords with their pre-existing world view. Disjunctive leaders in particular
commonly display a tendency to discursively articulate a crisis within the
existing political regime, partly as a way of explaining political disjunction
but also as a way of handling the central disjunctive dilemma that
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C. BYRNE ET AL.
necessarily demands most of their attention. The ‘impossible leadership
situation’ of being affiliated to and therefore having to defend a failing
political regime can be made less onerous if this framing becomes the
dominant framing of the present, because it provides a ready-made excuse
for any policy failures that happen in government (which are inevitable in
disjunctive periods) and affords the government scope for ‘exceptional
measures’.
Although the crisis narrative in Heathite discourse was multifaceted, at
its core was an image of an economic malaise, which, in the early years, was
discursively articulated as part of the outgoing Labour government’s legacy, stemming as it did from tax rises and the devaluation of sterling. This
passage from Heath’s speech to the 1970 Conservative Party conference
sketches its broad outlines:
We have found in government, as I warned the country we would, that at
every turn we find limitations—limitations imposed on the nation in part by
past events and in part by the failures of our predecessors: limitations of the
economy, of heavy international indebtedness, of enormous and increasing
public expenditure, of a high and damaging level of taxation: limitations of
outmoded industrial relations and increasing losses through strikes: limitations of wildly excessive wage demands encouraged deliberately by the last
Administration for its own political purposes: limitations of a stagnant economy and roaring inflation (Heath 1970).
Later on, with Heath installed as Prime Minister and with the ready-­
made excuse of an outgoing Labour government no longer at hand, the
focus shifted onto underlying reasons for Britain’s long-term relative economic decline—mainly that other European countries and Japan had the
‘opportunity’ to redesign their industrial base from scratch after the
Second World War, and that Britain was outside the new engine of
European economic growth that was the European Coal
and Steel Community. This was framed as being particularly damaging
due to the growing interconnectedness of countries and intensified global
economic competition consequent upon the rise of major new economic
powers such as West Germany, Japan and China. Then in the final few
years of the Heath premiership, worsening international economic conditions beyond the government’s control came to the fore. This included a
recognition that the US was proving increasingly incapable of performing
the role of global hegemon (which Heath recognised the destabilising
potential of at least as early as mid-1971) and the disastrous inflationary
14 EDWARD HEATH: LEADERSHIP COMPETENCE AND CAPABILITY
335
consequences of the 1973 Oil Shock (Kavanagh 1996). Heath used this
image of a deteriorating world economy to dampen down expectations on
his government and to buy time, plainly stating in the February 1974
Conservative Party manifesto that the new developments ‘will make us
poorer as a nation’ but only until the panacea of North Sea Oil came on
stream (Conservative Party 1974).
However, the economy was just one facet of the crisis narrative running
through Heathite discourse. Closely linked was a crisis centred around
recalcitrant trade unions, with Heath making much of the fact that the
outgoing Labour government had presided over an annual record of
strikes in 1969 (which, as was mentioned earlier, was a dubious record the
Heath government itself would go on to break), while other more distant
facets of this crisis narrative included the threat to the territorial integrity
of the UK in the form of Scottish nationalism and the growing Troubles
in Northern Ireland, and an image of a breakdown of law and order, which
Heath saw largely as a consequence of the profligate, overextended and
‘antiquated’ Keynesian welfare state (Heath 1968). These separate strands
coalesced in Heathite discourse into an overarching crisis of governmental
‘overload’, referring to the fundamental inability of the government to
achieve even its most basic objectives of economic expansion and social
peace due to the over-encumbrancing of the state by Labour governments
and Conservative ones reacting to Labour’s political advances, which
badly undermined the Conservative Party’s hard-earned reputation for
governing competence (Kavanagh 1987).
Analysis of Heath’s speeches throughout this period using concordancing software serves to illustrate this point (see Table 14.3).
A comparison of two corpora—one containing all of Heath’s speeches
and election broadcasts as Prime Minister and the other containing all of
his speeches and election broadcasts as Leader of the Opposition—revealed
that keywords (and their synonyms) appearing much more frequently in
the former when compared to the latter included ‘inflation’, ‘Ireland’,
‘oil’, ‘miners’, ‘world’, ‘Europe’ and ‘community’, which reflects the various crises Heath encountered in government and his attempts to diffuse
them either by articulating them as beyond the control of national governments or by advocating membership of the EEC. Conversely, ‘Labour’
and ‘Mr Wilson’ were keywords that appeared much less frequently in the
former when compared to the latter, reflecting the fact that it became
more difficult to blame the previous Wilson government for the crisis the
further away from the 1970 General Election Heath got.
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Table 14.3 Twenty most frequent word-stems in Heath speeches, by period
Leader of the Opposition
Word
government
People
Now
Country
Labour
Britain
Must
Party
One
New
Time
Want
Years
Conservative
Well
Make
British
Last
Believe
Policy
Prime Minister
Weighted %
1.50
0.74
0.62
0.60
0.58
0.56
0.54
0.48
0.48
0.45
0.42
0.41
0.40
0.40
0.38
0.36
0.35
0.35
0.33
0.32
Word
Government
People
Now
Community
One
Country
New
Time
Must
World
Britain
Years
Europe
Last
Prices
Believe
British
Policy
Way
Many
Weighted %
1.04
0.78
0.69
0.55
0.55
0.54
0.53
0.46
0.45
0.45
0.42
0.41
0.38
0.38
0.36
0.36
0.34
0.34
0.34
0.34
Note: Data generated in Nvivo using a word stop-list.
‘Less Government, and of a Better Quality’: Heath’s Valorisation
of Technique
The framing of crises by political leaders invariably also entails the discursive articulation of a way out of the crisis. For reconstructive leaders such
as Attlee and Thatcher, this can involve the repudiation of the existing
political regime as a whole. For disjunctive leaders this is not an option, so
another way out of the crisis needs to be found. In Heath’s case this was
provided in the first instance by a new approach to the administration of
government, which painted him as a dynamic and modernising statesman
closer in kind to a British Roosevelt or de Gaulle than any of the ‘caretaker’ Conservative Prime Ministers of the post-war period (Bogdanor
1996: 387). In some of Heath’s earlier speeches as Leader of the
Opposition, this took the form of an emphasis on the unique ability of the
Conservatives to understand how to govern the ‘free enterprise system’
14 EDWARD HEATH: LEADERSHIP COMPETENCE AND CAPABILITY
337
and Labour’s inability to, due to not knowing ‘what makes it tick’
(Heath 1966).
Meanwhile, the need for a more conciliatory approach from all of the
industrial partners was a key theme for Heath from the outset, but it
became increasingly important after he took over the reins of power, as
Britain’s economic and political malaise worsened. Heath urged the industrial partners to put aside partisan or sectional interests and act responsibly,
and although there was a willingness evident early on during the Heath
government to take ‘tough decisions’, this faded quickly. In particular,
after the 1972 miners’ strike, Heath petitioned much more vociferously
for ‘a more sensible way to settle our differences’ (CPA, CRD, PPB
273/5, ‘Ministerial Broadcast. The Prime Minister. 27 February 1972’),
involving a great deal more consultation and cooperation between government, unions and employers, all of which was discursively framed in
terms of the exigencies of a traditional ‘One Nation’ Conservatism. In
broader perspective, this can be seen as part of a shift from ‘mechanical’ to
‘moral’ reform (Clarke 1978) under Heath: faced with the failure of his
top-down governing strategies to deliver the expected economic, political
and social changes, Heath increasingly defaulted to attempts at fostering
change through exhortations for all parties concerned to adopt the correct
values and attitudes in the hope that these might prove more effective.
The basic proposition Heath put to the electorate was that what was
needed in order to lift Britain out of its ongoing malaise was a more competent, less doctrinaire government willing to decentralise power where
needed. The following passage closing the 1970 Conservative manifesto is
emblematic of this way of thinking, and it also illustrates the ripple effects
of crisis narratives (in this instance, the crisis of governmental overload)
throughout Heathite discourse:
[The election] is a choice between another five years of the kind of incompetent, doctrinaire Government we have had for nearly six years and a new
and better style of Government. Faced with any problem, the instinctive
Socialist reaction is to control, to restrict, and to tax. We aim to reduce the
burden of taxation, and to extend individual choice, freedom and responsibility … government today is trying to do too much, managing too much,
bringing too much to the centre for decision. We plan to clear away from
Whitehall a great load of tasks which has accumulated under Socialism; to
hand back responsibilities wherever we can to the individual, to the family,
to private initiative, to the local authority, to the people.
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Heath’s presentation of himself as a ‘somersaulting moderniser’
(Hennessy 2000: 331) also led to a number of significant machinery of
government changes. Far from being public relations gimmicks, these
were rooted in a period of serious policy development while in opposition,
and not only was the 1970 Conservative Party manifesto the most detailed
one ever up until that point, there was also almost complete continuity of
Cabinet portfolios between opposition and government, making the
incoming Heath government perhaps the best prepared of any since the
end of the Second World War (Hennessy 2000: 336). Heath’s Whitehall
priorities upon entering government were threefold: to rationalise the
departmental structure of government, creating a system of larger, ‘federal’ departments; to minimise the number of ‘lowest common denominator’ compromises between departments, which he thought undermined
the government’s strategic vision; and to make the civil service more
dynamic and efficient (Theakston 1996: 77). Unlike some of the
Thatcherites making up the next Conservative government, Heath did
not view the civil service as an enemy, seeing it instead as a crucial component of his programme for a modernised governmental structure and an
instrument of his technocratic will. Nevertheless, his reforms to the civil
service proved in the event to be rather modest. However, he achieved the
first of these objectives by creating the Department of Trade and Industry
and the Department of Environment, and the second by creating the
aforementioned CPRS and Programme Analysis and Review (PAR).
The thinking behind Heath’s machinery of government reorganisation
was that it would eliminate unnecessary duplication across departments
(and so economise on the cost of government), make it easier to develop
effective strategies for implementing policies that had previously cut across
several different departments and help resolve policy conflicts within a
single unified line of management (Theakston 1996: 91). Heath’s
approach to Cabinet has been described as ‘the traditional collective
approach, but a sharpened version’ on the basis of his reforms to the
Cabinet committee system and others such as the CPRS (Hennessy 2000:
337). He was diligent when it came to consulting Cabinet colleagues on
issues of importance, even in fast-moving circumstances, but in the words
of William Waldegrave (cited in Hennessy 2000: 344), he intended the
Cabinet to be ‘a rational process for policy formation and analysis’, and he
hoped that it would ‘fulfil its textbook role as a hierarchy of rational decision’ so that some of the seemingly intractable problems facing government could be rationally solved.
14 EDWARD HEATH: LEADERSHIP COMPETENCE AND CAPABILITY
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The purpose of the CPRS was to deal with the long-standing lack of
strategic thinking within government and the Cabinet’s preoccupation
with ‘day-to-day’ matters. To this end, it provided policy advice from an
‘outsider’ perspective (Blackstone and Plowden 1988). Collective briefs
produced by the CPRS were designed to offer ministers a ‘synoptic digest’
of the most pressing issues facing the government, pointing out drawbacks
or weak spots in solutions arrived at using the traditional Whitehall
machinery. Other policy reports focused on long-term, cross-cutting
problems likely to affect the government’s ability to implement its policy
vision, presenting ministers with studiously non-partisan and sometimes
unwelcome takes on crucially important but ‘slow-burning’ issues such as
Concorde, the emergence of information and communications technologies, London’s future as a hub for international finance and energy policy
(Blackstone and Plowden 1988: 221). There is evidence that the CPRS
performed a useful strategic function for the government, advising against
certain ill-fated decisions and anticipating some of the major new governing challenges arising in the Heath years and after. For example, it advised
against the 1972 bailout of the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders on the grounds
that to do so in the absence of significant improvements in managerial
practice would badly undermine the government’s industrial strategy, and
it successfully anticipated a major rise in oil prices and the chaos that would
inevitably ensue for the economy and the public finances. It also advised
Heath against the course of action he pursued in relation to the 1974 miners’ strike, arguing that the events in the Middle East made it legitimate
for the government to grant a higher pay award than its incomes policy
technically allowed (Campbell 1993: 324). However, the actual influence
of the CPRS was tempered by a combination of a lack of resources,
Whitehall recalcitrance and Heath’s own unwillingness to heed the advice
of the body he created.
Programme Analysis and Review, meanwhile, can be seen as a complement to the CPRS in that its purpose was to help tackle the problem of
governmental overload and to bring public spending down by identifying
and eliminating unnecessary governmental functions (Theakston 1996:
92). But it failed to have a noticeable impact due to a combination of
Treasury and civil service suspicion and the effects of the short-lived
‘Barber Boom’ of 1972–1973, which in taking fiscal policy in a radically
expansionary new direction undermined PAR’s entire rationale (Campbell
1993: 316).
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Rearranging Deckchairs: Policy Experimentation Under Heath
Heath’s reputation as the ‘undisputed king of the U-turn’ (Bale 2011) is
undoubtedly partly due to the Thatcherites’ self-serving rhetoric on the
post-war consensus designed to bolster the narrative of a drastic post-1979
caesura in British politics, at which point the flaws of the Keynesian welfarist political regime Heath had signed-up to had been laid bare and a
new ‘free market’ regime was instituted (Hay 2010). However, the policy
record of the Heath government illustrates that such portrayals of governmental disarray were far from unfounded. What is significant about the
series of U-turns performed by the Heath government, for present purposes, is that they were a response to the disjunctive dilemma it faced.
It is fair to say that upon becoming Prime Minister, Heath did have a
coherent policy vision. The machinery of government changes sketched
earlier were a crucial part of this because—it was argued—they would
reduce the cost of government and, more importantly, help deal with the
problem of governmental overload but more important still was Britain’s
entry into the EEC. Heath saw EEC entry, combined with some protoThatcherite reforms to industrial relations, taxation and social policy, as a
way not only of resolving Britain’s increasingly dire economic problems
but also of finding Britain a new role in the world after empire. In economic terms, the main benefit of EEC membership would be to expose
British industry to intensified competition—providing it with the incentive to modernise—and to facilitate that modernisation by means of technological cooperation through EU institutions and the opening up of
European markets, which would enable greater economies of scale for
British firms (Young 1996: 259).
In terms of Britain’s place in the world, Heath was an advocate of EEC
entry not just because of a deep-seated Europhilia on his part, rooted in
his time spent on the continent prior to the outbreak of the Second World
War, or his desire to avoid a repeat of the latter, but primarily because of
the utility of EEC membership for the British national interest (Young
1996: 259). Heath thought of post-war and post-empire Britain as a ‘middle power’ (Heath 1973), but one that could continue to play an important role in a world of superpower rivalry through the EEC, partly because
an economically resurgent UK would strengthen old ties to the
Commonwealth and cement the Atlantic alliance but also because of
incipient moves towards a common European foreign and defence policy.
However, EEC membership failed to produce any of the intended benefits, at least in the short term. For the first several years of membership,
14 EDWARD HEATH: LEADERSHIP COMPETENCE AND CAPABILITY
341
higher food prices under the CAP, the hit to the public finances because of
the loss of earnings from external tariffs and the failure of British industry
to adapt quickly to intensified competition from Europe—not to mention
a major downturn in the world economy after 1973—meant that Europe
failed to alleviate any of Heath’s most pressing domestic problems (Young
1996: 281). It is in this context that Heath’s policy experimentation, and
all that entailed in terms of contradicting many of his earlier public pronouncements and much of what was in the 1970 Conservative Party manifesto, has to be considered.
Heath performed a series of major U-turns in response to events.
Firstly, the ‘lame ducks’ of Rolls-Royce and Upper Clyde Shipbuilders
were rescued despite Heath warning at the 1970 Conservative Party conference that:
If [private sector firms] go their own way and accede to irresponsible wage
demands which damage their own firms and create a loss of jobs for those
who work in them, then the Government are certainly not going to step in
and rescue them from the consequences of their own actions. (Heath 1970)
Secondly, Heath reversed his earlier objections to state-directed economic planning and regional development with the creation in March
1972 of the Industrial Development Executive and the 1972 Industry
Act. Thirdly, he abandoned his initial ‘hands-off’ approach to industrial
relations by adopting a policy of tripartism, following defeat at the hands
of the striking miners in 1972. Fourthly, his government adopted a statutory prices and incomes policy, following the failure of tripartism—this
was perhaps the starkest of all the U-turns, with the 1970 Conservative
manifesto stating that ‘Labour’s compulsory wage control was a failure
and we will not repeat it’. Then, fifthly, the Heath government U-turned
on its stated intention to reduce public expenditure with the ‘Barber
Boom’ (which fell victim to another U-turn in late 1973) (Ball 1996: 328).
The most important consequence of the series of U-turns—which
stood in such stark contrast to Heath’s approach to opposition, characterised by careful thought and meticulous planning—was that it put paid to
any semblance of a coherent policy vision undergirding the Heath government. However, what neither it nor Heath’s Europe policy did was turn
Heath into an opponent of the existing political regime. Heath’s overriding objectives were always full employment and social peace, and although
he had ambitious designs in Europe and was willing to U-turn when under
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pressure, he never went beyond being an advocate of a ‘better consensus’
(Hennessy 2000: 336). After the miners rejected the November 1973 pay
offer, Heath began to articulate the scale of the difficulties facing the
nation, with the Conservatives’ February 1974 manifesto describing the
situation as the gravest crisis since the war. Sacrifices would be needed, and
no party could be expected to deliver improved standards of living (CPA,
CRD, PPB 34/1, ‘Election Forum. The Rt. Hon. Edward Heath. Leader
of the Conservative Party. 14 February, 1974’), but despite such foreboding, Heath never endorsed ‘third order’ change, that is, while he did
countenance significant change in terms of policy instruments, he at no
point indicated that he thought the prevailing policy paradigm had become
obsolete (Hall 1993).
Evaluating Heath’s Prime Ministerial Performance
If we are to assess Heath’s performance as a disjunctive leader, it is important to not only evaluate the state of the political regime as Heath left it in
1974 but also look beyond the electoral horizon to which statecraft assessments are typically fixed and also consider the medium- and long-term
implications of Heath’s actions for the regime, identifying the path-­
dependent processes he set in motion and which his successors, both disjunctive and reconstructive, would be forced to contend with.
One key lesson of the Heath premiership is clearly that appeals to governing technique as a way out of crises can only get political leaders so far,
and in some instances, it can be actively counterproductive. Heath’s technocratic approach to government not only invited ridicule (e.g. in the
form of Private Eye’s regular ‘HeathCo’ series, depicting Heath as a
grumpy managing director of a small firm prone to management- speak)
(Sandbrook 2010), it also drew the ire of major intra-party rivals such as
Powell (Hennessy 2000: 349), and singularly failed to solve any of the
major governing challenges of the time. Although the CPRS, with its
remit to ‘think the unthinkable’, did identify some of the threats to the
regime, it proved rather better at scaring ministers than promoting policies capable of effecting meaningful change (Davis 2007: 127), and
straightforward appeals for key interests to act responsibly in a context of
major economic and political upheaval amounted to little more than wishful thinking.
Meanwhile, poor self-promotion and lack of political capital with the
party and the media cost Heath particularly dearly because of the character
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343
of his U-turns and his poor management of expectations. Where Heath’s
U-turns are concerned, it is easy to overlook that in several cases resistance
to changing course was anticipated at the time to have the potential to
destabilise the regime even further. For example, the bailout of
Upper Clyde Shipbuilders had followed warnings from the Chief Constable
of Glasgow that he could not guarantee public order in the event of closure of the yards, and capitulation to the miners in 1972 had come after
the West Midlands police had feared serious injuries or even deaths with
the mass picketing at Saltley Gate. Doubtless, these reversals would have
been difficult to sell to his party and the public in any circumstance, but
they were made considerably more so because Heath had so clearly and
trenchantly set out his positions before reversing course completely. A
more successful disjunctive leader would have been more guarded in the
commitments he made and the expectations he encouraged.
A successful disjunctive leader also frustrates reconstructive appeals
emerging within their own or other parties. Here, Heath’s record was
mixed. It should be noted first of all that, despite the difficulties encountered by his government, many shared his understanding of this as a crisis
within rather than of the regime. Neo-corporatism, incomes policies and
Keynesian demand management continued to have their adherents after
February 1974. Indeed, on their return to government, the leadership of
the Labour Party made its own attempt to stabilise and rehabilitate the
regime despite the misgivings of the left of the party. When necessary,
Heath could be adept at anticipating and bypassing opposition. For example, opposition to the 1972 Industry Act was forestalled by preparing it in
secret and then dismissing the DTI’s free-market junior ministers. As
noted earlier, reconstructive ideas did gain some ground in the Conservative
Party. But, despite the efforts of Powell, the IEA and some intra-party
groups (Grant 2010: 135), this diagnosis did not gain a breakthrough
before the Conservatives left office. Reconstructive ideas were not voiced
in Heath’s Cabinet. Although Heath was a dominant Prime Minister, the
silence of Thatcher and Joseph in this respect owed more to their own
agency than to Heath’s. Many back-bench neoliberals also chose not to
publicly mobilise against Heath’s U-turns. For example, many persuaded
themselves that the introduction of an incomes policy would be ‘a breathing space, during which the money supply could be dealt with, to be succeeded by a return to “the market”’ (Dorey 1995: 80).
Heath’s actions in office, however, ultimately undermined support for
the regime in the Conservative Party. The circumstances in which the
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Heath government fell validated those who had expressed misgivings
about incomes policies and neo-corporatism, and encouraged reassessment amongst those who had not. Skowronek (1993: 40) notes that disjunctive leaders tend to become ‘the foils for reconstructive leadership, the
indispensable premise upon which traditional regime opponents generate
the authority to repudiate the establishment wholesale’. This was to be
Heath’s fate. As Cowley and Bailey (2000) have shown, ideological hostility to Heath’s position played a significant role in the outcome of the
party’s 1975 leadership election—see also Chap. 16. Although Thatcher
was circumspect in her promotion of reconstructive politics while Leader
of the Opposition, the way was open to construct a narrative in which the
failures of office were traced back to Heath’s ‘betrayal’ of the Selsdon
manifesto and used to mobilise support for the anti-statist, free-market
reconstructive politics pursued by his successor (see, e.g. Kerr 2005).
Having come to power and encountered a regime manifesting increasing signs of enervation, it is hard to escape the conclusion that, in February
1974, Heath left a regime that had been further destabilised. As we saw
earlier, even Heath himself acknowledged the bleak prospects the nation
faced in early 1974. As Jeffreys (2002) notes, the atmosphere of crisis
anticipated by many was absent during both the three-day week and the
February 1974 election. Nevertheless, the nation’s mood had clearly
shifted since 1970. The belief that Britain was drifting towards ungovernability that had emerged in the late 1960s had gained further ground by
the end of Heath’s premiership. Under the headline ‘Is everybody going
mad?’ one national newspaper detected ‘the anxious feeling that this country is drifting—and drifting fast—towards national breakdown. And that
nobody is doing a blind bit about it. Except to make it worse’ (Daily
Mirror, 1973).
Popular attitudes and political behaviour confirm this sense of malaise.
For example, opinion polling conducted for the Royal Commission on the
Constitution revealed that 49 percent of those questioned felt that the
British political system needed major improvements (Royal Commission
on the Constitution 1973: 14). As noted earlier, faith in both the established political parties collapsed in February 1974, to the electoral benefit
of the Liberals and the nationalist parties. Furthermore, Heath’s mounting fears about the threat of subversion (Aldrich and Cormac 2016) came
to be shared more widely. ‘Patriotic’ vigilante groups like ‘Unison
Committee for Action’ and ‘Great Britain 75’ formed in the later stages of
the Heath government to maintain civil order (see BBC 2012; Bloom
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345
2010: 383). Some even entertained the possibility that the nation’s trajectory would eventually deliver it into the hands of the military (see Cosgrave
1973). However, significant as this burgeoning sense of crisis was, we
must also consider the status of specific regime vulnerabilities. Heath was
closely involved in developing responses in virtually all of these areas, and
it is here that a more complex picture of Heath’s performance emerges.
In the economic sphere, Heath left the nation in recession with inflation, borrowing, the money supply and public expenditure all at higher
levels than he inherited. Only unemployment remained (by later standards) low. Many of the government’s economic difficulties originated in
a structural crisis in the wider international economy. As Hall records,
Heath’s premiership coincided with the beginning of the end of the
Keynesian era in which such ‘policies proved increasingly inadequate to
the economic challenges facing the nation and more productive of political problems than solutions’ (Hall 1986: 93–94). However, even allowing
for these constraints, it is hard to escape the conclusion that Heath’s
actions frequently exacerbated these problems. For example, the relaxation of monetary policy during Heath’s ‘dash for growth’ saw lending
funnelled into property speculation. When this property bubble burst at
the end of 1973, it in turn triggered a crisis in the secondary banking sector, leading to Britain’s first bank crisis since 1866. Such developments
also drew attention to an increasing number of cases, including Vehicle
and General and Lonrho, where rapacious members of the political and
economic elite were seen to have mismanaged their businesses (see Clarke
1981). Having argued that business should be ‘free and enterprising’,
Heath was then forced to appeal to business to present its more acceptable
face. If anything, Heath was fortunate to escape some of the economic
consequences of his actions. His successors were often not so lucky. For
example, the threshold clause in Stage III of Heath’s incomes policy contributed to further substantial wage inflation in the first year of the Wilson
government. Similarly, the decision to float the pound initially delivered
an ‘Indian Summer’ (Hirowatari 2015: 77). However, a floating rate
regime diminished the capacity of the Treasury to defend sterling and
enhanced the power of market sentiment, as Denis Healey was to discover
during the 1976 IMF crisis.
EEC membership has been seen by some as Heath’s greatest achievement in a noticeably narrow field (Hurd 1979: 64; Ziegler 2010), although
the 2016 referendum result must now qualify even that assessment. Heath
cannot be blamed for the subsequent trajectory of integration that led to
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C. BYRNE ET AL.
Britain’s departure. However, he bears some responsibility for helping
entrench the British political elite’s preference for assuming, rather than
testing, the existence of a pro-integration ‘permissive consensus’ among
the public. It is certainly the case that the EEC was a source of dissatisfaction with Heath. In the February 1974 British Election Study, 53.9 percent of respondents were sorry that Britain had joined the EEC and only
11.5 percent endorsed staying in on the terms that Heath had negotiated.
Yet, as we noted earlier, Heath regarded EEC membership as essential
to modernisation of the British economy and the resilience of the regime.
Arguably, he secured the former prize, but not speedily enough to bolster
the latter. As the 1971 White Paper acknowledged, ‘entry would not, of
course, of itself bring about some automatic improvement in our performance’ (HMSO 1971: 12). Having only been a member for a year, and
with transitional arrangements that would not expire until the end of
1977, membership could scarcely be expected to have had any significant
impact, benign or malign, on the regime by February 1974. Nevertheless,
recent studies have suggested that EEC membership did have a positive
economic impact and laid the basis for improvements in Britain’s relative
economic performance. One study has calculated that, by 1978, membership had generated a 4.8 percent increase in GDP per capita (Campos
et al. 2014: 36). However, such benefits were not of an order that could
prevent the dysfunctions of the regime from economic collapse under
Heath’s successors. Rather, the principal beneficiary proved to be Heath’s
reconstructive successor since, ‘without EU membership, Mrs Thatcher’s
reforms would have been much less effective’ (Campos and Coricelli
2017: 69).
Heath’s responses to the territorial vulnerabilities of the regime also
defy a simplistic assessment. Heath inherited a deteriorating situation in
Northern Ireland that was exacerbated by the introduction of internment.
Soon, the government was literally staring into the abyss. As the minutes
of a meeting held at Downing Street days after Bloody Sunday record,
‘there seemed to be a real possibility of a major Civil War, affecting both
North and South’ (CAB/9/R/238/7). In the context of this crisis, a
number of regime-changing options were actively considered. In April
1971, Heath and his senior civil servants had considered withdrawal from
Northern Ireland, ‘in effect leaving Northern Ireland to work out its own
destiny either in independence or in fusion with the rest of Ireland’ (TNA,
14 EDWARD HEATH: LEADERSHIP COMPETENCE AND CAPABILITY
347
PREM 15/611). Alec Douglas-Home proposed that the government
should ‘start to push’ the Unionist community towards reunification
(Theakston 2010: 172). The Cabinet contemplated repartition of the border. However, the Heath government instead used the introduction of
direct rule to buy time. This breathing space was then used to negotiate a
deal to establish a power-sharing administration in Belfast and recognise
the relationship between Northern Ireland and the Republic. As Bulpitt
(2008) argues, this was an attempt to re-establish the old regime of the
‘dual polity’ by broadening the local elites in government at Stormont.
That the 1998 Good Friday Agreement was recognised as ‘Sunningdale
for slow learners’ shows that Heath’s general approach was a reasonable
one. Yet if Heath was in possession of a workable solution, he was a Prime
Minister, once again, at the wrong point in political time. Much attention
has focused on Heath’s pressure on Faulkner to accept a Council of
Ireland, withdrawing Whitelaw to Westminster, and the decision to call an
early election. But the fundamental obstacle to the prospects of Sunningdale
was one that Heath could do little to address. As Hennessey (2015) recognises, it was the Republicans’ refusal to accept the principle of consent
and their commitment to the armed struggle that stymied the prospects of
a stable settlement for the next two decades. The more immediate cost for
Heath of Sunningdale was a further fragmentation in the coalition supporting the regime. Anti-Sunningdale Unionists won all but one of the
Northern Irish seats in February 1974 and refused the Conservative whip.
Had Heath been able to rely on their support, the Conservatives would
have constituted the largest party in the new Parliament.
If Heath’s agency in Northern Ireland served to buy time for the established territorial regime, he was less successful elsewhere in the Celtic
periphery. Bulpitt notes how, Northern Ireland aside, peripheral nationalism presented little threat while Heath was in office. The SNP had
advanced at the 1970 election, winning its first parliamentary seat outside
a by-election. However, its performance fell below the expectations that
had been generated at the time of the Hamilton by-election. This perceived SNP under-performance, combined with the evident lack of enthusiasm within the Conservative Party (Mitchell 1990), had allowed Heath
to ignore proposals for Scottish devolution. However, Heath’s inability to
stabilise vulnerabilities elsewhere in the regime served to promote Scottish
nationalism. In particular, in a context where North Sea oil was to play a
348
C. BYRNE ET AL.
greater role in the UK’s economic fortunes, the SNP were delivered a
potent basis for electoral mobilisation. They exploited this in February
1974 by gaining six seats followed by further gains in October, leaving the
union less resilient than when Heath had taken office.
Yet within this overall picture it is easy to overlook that Heath managed
with credibility some sources of regime vulnerability. This, we would
argue, is the case with immigration. It was ‘a period in which anti-­
immigration sentiment reached near-hysterical levels, and the government
faced restrictionist pressure more intense than that faced by any British
Prime Minister, before or since’ (Hansen 2000: 179). Yet, unlike some of
his disjunctive counterparts, Heath never adopted the policies recommended to him by his populist critics. Similarly, where other disjunctive
leaders have brought the same populist critics into government, there was
to be no way back for Powell under Heath once he had been cast into the
wilderness. Although the 1971 Immigration Act tightened immigration
controls, Heath succeeded in maintaining the bipartisan operational code
that had underpinned policy in this area (Bulpitt 1986). He maintained
the consensus that such controls on immigration must be accompanied by
efforts to reduce racism and deprivation. Finally, Heath eschewed the
temptations of playing the race card for electoral advantage. In particular,
he ensured that Britain fulfilled its moral obligations to British passport
holders expelled from Uganda, and the boost which the far-right gained
in the aftermath of the crisis was small and temporary.
In the end, Heath’s attempts to resolve the disjunctive dilemma of
1970s’ Britain failed. Fundamentally, this was a result of the ‘impossible
leadership situation’—being an affiliate of an exceptionally vulnerable
political regime. However, political leaders enjoy considerable scope for
agency and action, even in periods of disjunction. The preceding analysis
has highlighted some of the ways in which Heath mishandled the disjunctive dilemma, but Heath did also enjoy some successes in managing the
regime he inherited. Some of his decisions had benefits his successors were
able to reap, and Heath was also able to identify solutions that would
prosper in better political times. Furthermore, although he left a regime
substantially weakened in many respects, it was Callaghan who was to
have the misfortune of governing when, as it were, the music stopped
and the political regime of Keynesian welfarism reached its highest degree
of entropy.
14 EDWARD HEATH: LEADERSHIP COMPETENCE AND CAPABILITY
349
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CHAPTER 15
Who Governs? The General Election Defeats
of 1974
Andrew S. Roe-Crines
The aim of this chapter is to consider the performance of the Conservative
Party in the General Elections of 1974. Having secured 13,145,123 votes
on a 46.4 percent vote share at the General Election of June 1970 (which
provided them with 330 parliamentary seats), the Conservative Party
would fall to 11,872,180 votes (a 37.9 percent vote share and 297 parliamentary seats) at the General Election of February 1974 (Butler and
Pinto-Duschinsky 1971; Butler and Kavanagh 1974). A further erosion in
the Conservative vote would occur at the General Election of October
1974, as they fell to 277 parliamentary seats on a 35.8 percent vote share
and 10,464,817 votes (Butler and Kavanagh 1975). In parliamentary
terms, their respective electoral reversals were marginal, that is, the Labour
Party entered government as a minority administration in March 1974
and then with a majority of three after the October General Election. This
reflected the fact that voters were displaying their scepticism towards the
two main parties. The combined Conservative-Labour vote at the General
A. S. Roe-Crines (*)
University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK
e-mail: a.s.crines@liverpool.ac.uk
© The Author(s) 2021
A. S. Roe-Crines, T. Heppell (eds.), Policies and Politics Under
Prime Minister Edward Heath, Palgrave Studies in Political
Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53673-2_15
355
356
A. S. ROE-CRINES
Election of February 1974 was 75.1 percent as compared to their combined return of 89.5 percent at the General Election of June 1970, and
Labour actually regained office on a lower vote share (37.9 percent) than
they had secured in losing the General Election of 1970 (43.1 percent)
(Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky 1971; Butler and Kavanagh 1974). The rise
of the Liberals from 2,117,035 votes or 7.5 percent in June 1970, to
6,059,519 or 19.3 percent in February 1974 (see Lemieux 1977; Alt et al.
1977), created a third-party vote twice the size of any that had returned
since the General Election of 1929 (Butler and Kavanagh 1974: 15). It
would act as a stimulus for the debates around the rise of multiparty politics in Britain (Berrington 1979).
The perception that the dynamics of party competition and parliamentary arithmetic was changing was felt within Conservatives’ circles from
March 1974 onwards. For example, based on the evidence from national
polling and their own internal polling, the Conservative Party Chair,
William Whitelaw, lamented that ‘the nation is in one of its coalition
moods’ (CPA, LCC 1/3/2/110-113 ‘The Liberals’, 28 June 1974).
That Whitelaw was discussing these issues within a shadow Cabinet meeting in June 1974 was a source of frustration and anger for Conservatives.
That is because the loss of office was not only unnecessary but also unexpected. It was unnecessary because having won the General Election of
June 1970, there was no need to face the electorate until June 1975
(Sandbrook 2010: 611–645). It was unexpected because despite the governing difficulties that the Conservatives had been experiencing over the
previous 3.5 years in office, any doubts about their governing competence
were not being translated into concrete support for the Labour opposition. As Ziegler observed ‘it was taken for granted by almost everyone that
the Conservatives would win’ (Ziegler 2010: 432). After all, within the
three-week campaigning period—between February 7 and February
28—a total of 26 opinion polls were conducted, and the Conservatives
held a lead in all but one of them, including one lead of 9 percentage
points. Of the final opinion polls, two gave them a 2 percentage-­point
lead; one gave them a 3 percentage-point lead; two gave them a 4 percentage-point lead; and one gave them a 1 percentage-point lead (Butler and
Kavanagh 1974: 95).
This chapter seeks to address the following dilemmas: first, how and
why did the Conservatives decide to call and then lose the General Election
of February 1974 and, second, how and why did they fail to regain office
at the General Election of October 1974. By analysing these two
15 WHO GOVERNS? THE GENERAL ELECTION DEFEATS OF 1974
357
dilemmas, we can highlight the mistakes that Heath made, which would
increase demands within the Conservative Party for a change in the party
leadership on the basis that he was an electoral liability (Fisher 1977:
147–173; Heppell 2008: 51–53).
The General Election of February 1974
Heath had not wanted to call an early General Election. In his memoirs he
would reflect that: ‘I always regarded the election as nothing better than a
grim necessity’ (Heath 1998: 512). The vast majority of Prime Ministers
prefer to choose the date when they return to the country for a renewed
mandate. This is because it gives them an advantage over their opposition
parties in being able to pick a moment that is most fortuitous to producing an increased majority. Moreover, Prime Ministers as a general rule
prefer not to call General Elections during the winter as the longer nights
and colder climates may risk (a) demotivating activists who go canvassing
and (b) a reducing turnout of supporters. The Prime Minister of the day
also risks all when they go to the country, especially prematurely.
Heath was made well aware of what those risks were. Earlier in the
Parliament, Conservative Central Office and Research Department had
given considerable thought to possible General Election dates prior to the
necessary deadline of June 1975. Within their deliberations was the recommendation that a ‘snap’ General Election would not be advisable, and
that one fought on a single issue could produce a ‘disturbing result’, as the
‘electorate or significant parts of it will not decide to vote about something else’ (CPA, SC/73/17, Memo by Michael Fraser, ‘Strategic
Situation in 1973’, 14 February 1973). The demands of being in office
had left them less well prepared than they had been for the General
Election in terms of protecting their own marginals and in terms of targeting seats that they could gain (see, e.g. CPA, CCO, 20/8/16, ‘Letter
from Michael Fraser to Edward Heath’, 26 May 1972). It is also worth
recalling that in the aftermath of winning power, Conservative strategists
had calculated that in order to regain power at the General Election in
June 1975, they ‘needed unemployment under half a million and inflation
under six percent’ (CPA, CCO 500/24/278, ‘Report on the 1970
General Election’, 17 July 1970). On both indicators, the Heath administration was clearly failing (as indicated in Chap. 5 by James Silverwood,
unemployment was around 946,000 and inflation was at 8.4 percent at
the end of 1973), so there were clearly good reasons to remain in office
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and wait (hope) for these indicators to improve by June 1975 (for the
economic policy record of the Conservatives under Heath, see Wade 2013).
Given these concerns about holding an earlier than necessary General
Election, then, the obvious question is what happened to make Heath feel
as if he had no other option than go to the electorate in February 1974?
Ultimately, the decision to hold an early General Election was a response
to the breakdown in negotiations with the National Union of Mineworkers
(NUM) in the winter of 1973–1974 (on the Heath government and the
Trade Unions, see Seldon 1988; Taylor 1996). Having been left humiliated by the Miners’ Strike of early 1972, which was resolved after the
Heath administration broke their own informal wage restraint policy
(Phillips 2006), the Cabinet was determined that they should not back
down again—as Ball argues, a ‘second surrender to the NUM was out of
the question’ (Ball 1996: 345). The NUM went on an overtime ban in
November 1973 as a response to the pay award offered by the National
Coal Board. With their action coinciding with the Yom Kippur War in the
Middle East and the OPEC initiating increases in oil crisis, the Heath
administration was not well positioned to withstand the impending energy
crisis. Diminishing coal supplies and electricity power cuts led to the imposition of the three-day week (Dorey 1995: 65–91).
Neither of the options for Heath looked that attractive politically. The
first avenue out of this national crisis, which was already undermining the
perception of the government as being competent, was for Heath to do
whatever was necessary to get the miners to end their action. Such a step
might be deemed to be unacceptable amongst some on the Conservative
backbenchers, and it would create an image of governing weakness. The
second avenue that Heath could pursue was to call a General Election and,
having secured a new (and potentially) larger parliamentary majority,
argue that the second Heath administration had been granted a mandate
to withstand the demands of the Miners, thus compelling them to back
down (Dorey 1995: 65–91).
However, although Heath and the Cabinet reached what Kavanagh
calls their ‘fatal decision’ in February 1974, rumours of a General Election,
as a way out of the industrial relations impasse, had been circulating within
the print media for weeks (see, e.g. Greig 1974; Hatfield 1974, Clark
1974a). Rumours focused on a possible General Election date of February
7, and for this to occur, Heath and his Cabinet would have to make their
decision to dissolve Parliament by January 17. If Heath and the Cabinet
had made their decision before January 17, then they would have launched
15 WHO GOVERNS? THE GENERAL ELECTION DEFEATS OF 1974
359
the General Election campaign against the miners’ overtime ban, but after
that date had passed, the NUM decided to call for a full strike (Kavanagh
1996: 362–363).
Heath had been leading a Cabinet that remained unsure of which avenue to pursue (Butler and Kavanagh 1974: 35). For example, Peter Walker
(President of the Board of Trade; 1972–1974) felt that the argument that
the miners constituted a special case was bogus and had favoured an earlier
General Election (Walker 1991: 125). In contrast, the Employment
Secretary, William Whitelaw, attempted to persuade his Cabinet colleagues
that when placed within the context of the oil price rise, the miners constituted a special case, and as such, he was opposed to a General Election
(Whitelaw 1991: 123–132). Lord Carrington, Conservative Party Chair
(1972–1974), would later reflect that Heath was correct in deciding to
call a General Election, given the circumstances that he faced, but that he
had delayed too long in reaching that decision (Carrington 1988:
264–266). What made Heath delay his decision for so long? Was it a sign
of weakness, that is, was Heath ‘dithering’ because having considered the
possibility of holding a General Election, he feared he might lose? (Ziegler
2010: 423). Or was it a sign of arrogance, that is, why rush into a General
Election to solve the problem when given his abilities at negotiation and
persuasion, Heath would be able to secure a compromise solution with
the NUM—a position which Taylor describes as ‘self-confidence bordering on delusion’? (Taylor 2005: 97).
In his memoirs Heath rationalised his decision on the following
grounds. He recalled that the NUM had ‘decided to hold a ballot on an
all-out strike’ and ‘asked union members whether they supported the line
of the executive’ (Heath 1998: 511). Heath regarded this as direct challenge to his political authority. Moreover, given ‘more than 80 per cent of
those voting [wanted] a complete stoppage’ from 4 February, he believed
he had ‘no further room for manoeuvre’ in finding a negotiated settlement with them (Heath 1998: 511). As a consequence, he concluded that
‘there was now only one possible course of action’, and that was to ask ‘the
British people to raise “the truth and familiar voice of Britain—the voice
of moderation and courage”’ (Heath 1998: 511).
Heath delivered a Prime Ministerial broadcast to the nation to justify
the need for holding a General Election: ‘do you want a strong Government
which has clear authority for the future to take decisions which will be
needed?’ (TNA: PRO, PREM 15/2128, ‘Text of Ministerial Broadcast’, 7
February 1974). By framing the question in this manner, Heath shifted
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the decision of how to govern onto the voters. Put simply, this strategy
sought the support of the British people in his government and their
broader economic strategy, and he continued by asking ‘do you want
Parliament and the elected Government to continue to fight strenuously
against inflation?’ (TNA: PRO, PREM 15/2128, ‘Text of Ministerial
Broadcast’, 7 February 1974). Here Heath was arguing that inflation was
the key issue that needed to be addressed rather than the traditional fight
against unemployment. Arguably this represented an emphasis upon fiscal
responsibility from which Heath was seeking a new mandate. He then
negatively posed the alternative, saying ‘or do you want them to abandon
the struggle against rising prices under pressure from one particularly
powerful group of workers?’ (TNA: PRO, PREM 15/2128, ‘Text of
Ministerial Broadcast’, 7 February 1974). By legitimising an early General
Election in this way, Heath was attempting to frame the problems facing
Britain as a clash of ideas whilst presenting himself as the solution:
• ‘this time of strife has got to stop. Only you can stop it. It’s time for
you to speak—with your vote’;
• ‘it’s time for you to say to the extremists, the militants, and the plain
and simply misguided: we’ve had enough’;
• ‘it’s time for your voice to be heard—the voice of the moderate and
reasonable people of Britain: the voice of the majority’;
• ‘there’s a lot to be done. For heaven’s sake, let’s get on with it’.
(TNA: PRO, PREM 15/2128, ‘Text of Ministerial Broadcast’, 7
February 1974)
The sense of this as a ‘crisis’ General Election (Sandbrook 2010: 611)
was also reflected in the title of the manifesto—Firm Action for a Fair
Britain (Conservative Party 1974a)—which appeared to promise a decisive response to the problems facing the country in the event the
Conservatives were returned with a renewed majority. The central message of the manifesto was that the Labour Party had been assimilated by ‘a
small group of power-­
hungry trade union leaders’ and that they had
become ‘committed to a left-­wing programme more dangerous and more
extreme than ever before in its history’, and Labour were a ‘major national
disaster’. These points sought to frame Labour as an even greater danger
to the country than they had been historically, that their policies were
‘very vague and woolly’ (Sandbrook 2010: 611). The political difficulties
15 WHO GOVERNS? THE GENERAL ELECTION DEFEATS OF 1974
361
associated with the leftish-shift with the Labour Party in opposition—see
Chap. 13—also motivated some Conservatives into thinking an early
General Election could be advantageous. Indeed, Douglas Hurd argued
in a paper to Heath that given the economy was unlikely to improve, it
would be prudent to take advantage of Labour’s problems with an early
General Election, especially as the Heath administration would likely face
growing difficulties were it to continue. As such, ‘there is therefore, in our
view, a strong argument for a change of approach’ in their strategic planning, that is, despite their earlier doubts, seeking a new mandate might be
the best way forward (Hurd 1979: 120).
Seeking a renewed mandate against the back drop of the so-called
three-­day week was not what they would have planned. The quadrupling
of oil prices following the Yom Kippur War between Israel and oil-producing states had, in turn, led to rising food prices, statutory prices and
incomes policy, power shortages and ultimately a wholesale re-evaluation
of the so-called Keynesian consensus that had informed economic policy
since the end of the Second World War (Sandbrook 2010). Heath would
reflect that the ‘oil crisis was a highly unwelcome disruption to our foreign
policy’, but it was also the primary cause of the problematic domestic
environment, as it led the NUM to ‘put in a pay claim which would have
meant increases of up to 50 per cent for some workers’ (Heath 1998:
503). It is also worth noting that a further significant issue Heath faced
during the campaign concerned the calls from the Confederation of British
Industry (CBI) for Heath to repeal the divisive Industrial Relations Act.
This was because the Act had reframed the relationship between government, employers and Unions to such an extent that it ‘sullied every relationship between employers and unions at national level’ (Clark 1974b:
28). This made seeking negotiated improvements in working conditions
problematic, thereby risking increases in strike action. Whilst Heath contended that this was simply the personal view of its Director-General,
Campbell Anderson, it nevertheless impacted upon the Conservative Party
campaign in a negative way, given it enabled Labour to argue the intervention validated their view that the Act was problematic (for a detailed discussion on the failure of the Industrial Relations Act, see Moran 1977).
The difficulties for Heath in securing re-election were not confined to
industrial unrest. Another problematic issue concerned membership of the
European Community. The electoral offer of a referendum on continued
membership that the Wilson Labour opposition was moving towards created an opportunity for Heath’s nemesis, Powell, to undermine his chances
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of re-election (Shepherd 1996: 433–436). An implacable opponent of
membership, aligned to his warnings over immigration and threats to
British national identity, led Powell to ask voters whether the UK should
‘remain a democratic nation or whether it will become one province in a
new Europe super-state’, from which Powell concluded that it was a
‘national duty’ for the voters to send a message to those who undermined
Parliament’s ability to ‘make the laws and impose the taxes of the country’
(Butler and Kavanagh 1974: 103). Instructing voters to endorse the
Labour opposition, as they had created a route map to exiting the
European Community, meant that the influence of Powell upon the Heath
era continued to the end (Sandbrook 2010: 611; see Chap. 12 for a
detailed discussion on the Heath-Powell relationship). On Powell’s decision to not stand as Conservative candidate, Heath bemoaned the fact that
‘he did not even have the decency to warn the officers of his association or
his agent in advance of his decision to abandon them’ (Heath 1998: 512).
The cumulative impact of the difficult economic and industrial relations
environment, compounded by the intervention of Powell on the European
issue, made it a problematic campaign for the Conservatives. The outcome of the voters to the ‘who governs’ presented to them by Heath was
inconclusive. Needing 318 parliamentary seats for a majority in the 635
strong Parliament (the redrawing of the boundaries facilitated an increase
from the 630 strong 1970 Parliament), the Conservatives were short on
297 (down from 330), and the Labour Party were up from 287 to 3011
(Butler and Kavanagh 1974). It was an outcome that left Heath, as the
incumbent Prime Minister with the ‘choice of either immediately conceding defeat, and thus tendering his resignation forthwith, or seeking a deal
with one or more of the smaller parties’, and ‘Heath pursued the latter
option’ (Dorey 2009: 28).
Given the Conservatives had secured the most votes—from 11, 872,180
to 11,645,616—this appeared a legitimate strategy. In his discussions with
the Liberal leader, Jeremy Thorpe, Heath rationalised why seeking an
arrangement between the two parties could be justified. First, it was feasible, given that Wilson had made it clear that whilst the Labour Party were
willing to form a minority administration (on 301 parliamentary seats,
they would be short by 17 of a majority), they were not willing to enter
into any coalition or understanding with any other parties. As an
1
King felt that ‘the Conservatives not only lost the February 1974 election but suffered
one of the most dramatic reversals in British electoral history’ (King 1985: 99).
15 WHO GOVERNS? THE GENERAL ELECTION DEFEATS OF 1974
363
alternative to that, a Con-Lib arrangement (297 Conservative parliamentary seats plus the 14 Liberal seats2) would take them to 311, and with the
7 Ulster Unionists likely to back the Conservatives, this could create an
administration that could govern (TNA PRO PREM 15/2069, ‘Note for
the Record’ [Heath meeting with Thorpe], 2 March 1974). Second, not
only was it feasible but Heath argued that it was not only his ‘overriding
duty’ to explore this option, as it was in the ‘national interest’, but it was
clear it would ‘represent the desires of the substantial number of voters to
not have a socialist government’ (TNA PRO PREM 15/2069, ‘Note for
the Record’ [Heath meeting with Thorpe], 2 March 1974). Third, it
would be ‘possible’ for them to ‘construct a programme’, given that in
‘two major respects’, that is, membership of the European Community
and inflation, ‘the policies of the two parties were both alike and both differed from those of the Labour Party’ (TNA PRO PREM 15/2069, ‘Note
for the Record’ [Heath meeting with Thorpe], 2 March 1974). However,
the ability of Heath to make an arrangement with Thorpe and the Liberals
floundered on the issue of electoral reform and Heath’s failure to secure a
means of remaining in power led to the Labour Party entering office as a
minority administration (TNA PRO PREM 16/231 ‘Events leading to
the resignation of Mr Heath’s Administration’ 16 March 1974).
It is worth noting that the Conservatives did not seem prepared for the
possibility of having to engage in negotiations with the Liberals in order
to remain in power. In mid-1973 their response to the improving electoral
position of the Liberals was remarkably complacent, with this being dismissed as little more than ‘the mid-term expression of disappointment’
(CPA, SC 14/74/29-31, 26 July 1973). From polling 8 percent in
October 1972, the Liberals had doubled their projected vote to 17 percent by July 1973, with that increasing to 28 percent by August 1973
(King and Wybrow 2001: 11). Despite their continuing progress,
Chancellor Anthony Barber remained confident that they would be stalled
and that ‘he didn’t believe they would hold the balance, or anything like
that’ (Hetherington Papers, Meeting with Anthony Barber’, 15 November
1973). Throughout the whole of 1973, the Conservatives appeared to
adhere to the view that the Liberals were a ‘paper tiger’ offering ‘quack
remedies’ (CPA, CCO, CRD, 500/25/8 ‘Liberal Policy Brief’, 1
April 1973).
2
The Liberal vote was up from 2,117,035 votes or 7.5 percent from June 1970 to
6,059,519 or 19.3 percent (Butler and Kavanagh 1974).
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Despite these assumptions, Heath was moving, within 48 hours of the
outcome of the General Election, towards attempting to form some form
of coalition arrangement with the Liberals, which he felt was preferable to
trying to operate as a minority administration (CAB 128/53, Cabinet
Conclusions, 1 March 1974, 5.45 pm). However, within both the Cabinet
and his own parliamentary ranks, there were real doubts about this course
of action. Those doubts were not necessarily influenced by left-right categorisations. The Heathite sympathising Whitelaw later reflected that in
the circumstances a ‘proposed coalition would have been regarded as
wrong on principle by the British people’ (Whitelaw 1991: 135), whilst
Lord Carrington, who was at the time open minded to the ideas, later
admitted that it would not have been ‘politically healthy or wise’
(Carrington 1988: 267). From the backbenchers, the view of Kenneth
Lewis was ‘just tell that man to stop messing about. We have lost an election, we cannot form a government, we have been defeated and we must
go with dignity’ (Ziegler 2010: 441). The issue of electoral reform was to
be critical in the tentative negotiations that took place with the Liberals.
Thatcher took the view that ‘horse trading’ like this was ‘making us look
ridiculous’, and the electorate would view Heath as a ‘bad loser’ if he continued to engage in such manoeuvres3 (Thatcher 1995: 239). Other cabinet sceptics included Maurice Macmillan and Keith Joseph, the latter of
whom claimed that Heath needed to step down on the grounds of ‘constitutional propriety’ in seeking to hold onto office (MS Hailsham, 1/1/8,
Diary, 1 March 1974). With the Chief Whip, Humphrey Atkins, informing Heath and the Cabinet that the number of Conservatives planning to
oppose an arrangement with the Liberals that would involve a Speakers
Conference on Electoral Reform, was around 50 plus4 (MS Hailsham,
1/1/8, Diary 2 and 3 March 1974), the Cabinet moved towards accepting that the longer-term electoral costs to the Conservatives of electoral
reform were more important than the short-term gain on holding onto
office (CAB 15/2069/16, Cabinet Conclusion, 4 March 1974). Fearful
of the negative connotations of ‘hanging on’ and how this might make the
Conservatives looked desperate and unprincipled, the decision to resign
3
Bogdanor argued that it ‘was at this point that her hostility to Heath as a traitor to
Conservatism crystallised’, as Heath was ‘prepared to sacrifice any chance of the Conservatives
ever again achieving an overall majority on their own for the mere temporary renewal of
power’ (Bogdanor 1996: 373).
4
Prior recalls that had Heath attempted to pursue this further, the Conservative Party
would have ‘split’ (Prior 1986: 95).
15 WHO GOVERNS? THE GENERAL ELECTION DEFEATS OF 1974
365
was reached (TNA: PRO PREM 16/231/6, ‘The Resignation of Mr.
Heath’, 16 March 1974). That feat seemed justified, given that Heath had
been christened the ‘squatter in No 10 Downing Street’ (The
Spectator 1974).
The General Election of October 1974
Having called an unnecessary General Election and then having failed to
win, the political authority of Heath was badly damaged. Cecil Parkinson
recalled how Heath seemed ‘almost physically diminished’ by the impact
of defeat and as a consequence ‘one just felt sorry for this desolate and
lonely figure’ (Parkinson 1992: 48). McManus argues that Heath was disappointed in himself for his own mistakes—he argues that Heath ‘blamed
himself for his failure to communicate effectively the necessary facts and
arguments to the people, for his procrastination about calling the election,
and for his failure to spare the nation’ (McManus 2016: 153).
Despite this, Heath did not consider resigning the leadership of the
Conservative Party, despite the fact that he had now led them into two
electoral reversals out of three in a 7.5-year period. He rationalised that
losing 8.5 percent of the Conservative vote and 1,272,943 votes was not
a resigning matter. He concluded that no other leading Conservative was
better positioned than him to lead them into a General Election, which,
given the inconclusive outcome of the February contest, was likely to
occur sooner rather than later (Ziegler 2010: 443–469). What was more
problematic was that even though it may have been in the interests of the
Conservative Party to have a new leader for that imminent General
Election if he would resign, they had no means by which to remove him.
The architects of the new democratic leadership election rules of 1965 had
deliberately avoided a challenger provision or confidence procedure on
the basis that they assumed that a failing party leader would voluntarily
step aside (Fisher 1977: 147–148). Ziegler provides an interesting interpretation of the interaction between the inevitability of a General Election
shortly and the lack of a procedural mechanism for the Conservatives to
utilise—he describes Heath being paradoxically both ‘weak’ and ‘impregnable’ (Ziegler 2010: 448).
As he entered his second spell as Leader of the Opposition, it was also
necessary for Heath to demonstrate that the Conservatives were a credible
government in waiting. As such, Heath would recall in his memoirs that
‘as soon as the February election was over, we had started work on the
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policies which would feature in our next manifesto’ (Heath 1998: 523).
Yet Heath seemed incapable of acknowledging or addressing the fact that
one of the biggest obstacles to the Conservatives regaining office was him,
that is, his image was tainted, and given the memory of his premiership
lingered as one of defeats, divisions and a failed crisis election, it was difficult for the Conservatives to repackage him as an emotionally intelligent
leader who understood the concerns of voters. Conservative strategists
had long understood that his inability to show empathy or emotions acted
as a barrier between himself and the voters. His style of communication
remained cool, detached and ridged when talking to voters through
broadcast media. This had been a problem for the duration of his tenure
as leader of the Conservative Party, and strategists had long worried about
his ‘stiff, odd, tense and humourless’ public persona’ (Campbell 1993:
189; see also Ziegler 2010: 184–188; 231–232; and for an illustration of
discussions on how to improve his public image during his first tenure as
Leader of the Opposition, see CPA CCO 20/8/10, ‘How to Show Mr
Heath as he really is’, 12 June 1967).
In the period between the February and October 1974 General
Elections, there was no evidence from the opinion polls of any improvement in the image of Heath. On the question of whether he ‘is or is not
proving to be a good leader’, those that thought that he was went down—
from 38 percent in April 1974 to 32 percent by October 1974—and those
that thought he was not went up—from 48 percent in April 1974 to 53
percent by October 1974. His second tenure as Leader of the Opposition
began with a −10 for leadership satisfaction, and by the time of the General
Election of October 1974, his efforts had converted a −10 percentage
score into a −21 percentage score (King and Wybrow 2001: 207). These
findings were replicated in terms of the projected vote: at the time of the
General Election of February 1974, the Conservatives were on 39 percent
to Labour on 37 percent; by June 1974 the Conservatives were down to
35 percent and Labour up to 44 percent; and by the time Wilson called
the General Election of October 1974, the Conservatives were still trailing
the Labour Party (by 6 percentage points), with the Conservatives on 36
percent and the Labour Party on 42 percent, (King and Wybrow 2001:
11–12). It is also worth noting that the Conservatives were in retreat on
the following question throughout 1974: ‘which party do you think can
best handle the problems of the current economic situation?’—at the time
of General Election of February 1974, the Conservatives held a small lead
over Labour (from 35 percent to –32 percent), but as they approached the
15 WHO GOVERNS? THE GENERAL ELECTION DEFEATS OF 1974
367
General Election of October 1974, the Labour response had remained
more or less stable (at 31 percent), whereas the Conservative had fallen 7
percentage points, and with them on 28 percent they now trailed Labour
by 3 percentage points (King and Wybrow 2001: 58).
Throughout the period between March 1974 and October 1974, there
was, therefore, little evidence to suggest that the Conservatives would be
capable of winning a parliamentary majority—that is, 318 seats—at the
General Election (they would need to make 21 gains to do so). Given this
evidence and the possibility of another hung Parliament, the Conservatives
were considering other options to ensure they could gain access to power.
The complacency that they had shown towards the Liberals in the last
Parliament would have to be addressed. The importance that they would
now attach to the Liberals is evident from the interventions of Ian Gilmour,
who was shadow Secretary of State for Defence in the Heath shadow
Cabinet. He emphasised to Heath shortly after losing office that ‘the need
for good relations with the minor parties is unlikely to be confined to this
Parliament’, before adding that ‘almost the only chance of our avoiding
defeat in the summer would be to make a limited electoral pact with the
Liberals’ (CPA, CCO, 20/2/7 ‘Ian Gilmour to Edward Heath’, 26
March 1974).
As Gilmour continued to use the print media as a means of mapping
out the future options for the Conservatives, including that need to appeal
to Liberals (Gilmour 1974a, 1974b, 1974c), the complexities and risks
associated with this were being identified. Backbencher Nigel Lawson was
concerned to make sure that the Conservatives were clear on arrangements with the Liberals that would be beneficial and those that would be
harmful. He informed Carrington, as Party Chair, that there were legitimate grounds for discussing some form of limited pact with the Liberals in
67 constituencies (CPA, CCO, 20/2/7 ‘Letter from Lawson to
Carrington’, 24 May 1974). Lawson argued that this could lead to gains
for the Conservatives totalling 31 seats and gains for the Liberals totalling
36 seats. He suggested that the short-term gain to the Liberals in terms of
their parliamentary representation (enabling them to have potentially 50
seats) might act as a means of stalling the issue of electoral reform.
Meanwhile the gains that the Conservatives would secure from the pact
would provide them with a majority, that is, if they hold all of their 297
current seats, it would take them past the majority figure of 318 seats,
whilst the 67 losses that the Labour Party would suffer would pull them
back down to 234 seats. The longer-­term value of this was clear to Lawson:
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‘having used an electoral pact to gain an overall majority, we might then
revoke the pact at the next election and annihilate the Liberals’ (CPA,
CCO, 20/2/7 ‘Letter from Lawson to Carrington’, 24 May 1974).
Neither Carrington nor Heath was convinced by the calculations that
Lawson had constructed. They were of course built on the assumption
that votes for parties would simply transfer across as a block, which was
not a legitimate assumption to make.5 Heath feared that the translation of
votes on block would not work in a uniform way and as such, ‘there was a
real danger of creating a Conservative minority government through giving away seats to the Liberals’ (CPA, SC 74/2-27, 1 April 1974).
Carrington also worried about how an electoral pact could be presented
to voters, arguing that this is ‘too sophisticated for the public to understand’ (CPA, SC 74/4, 1 July 1974). How it would be viewed by
Conservative activists was also a consideration, especially given the assumption that they would ‘still regard office as a prize they have no wish to
share with others’ (Ramsden 1996: 386).
However, given the evidence from the opinion polls throughout the
summer of 1974, the Conservatives continued to fret about their ability to
win an outright parliamentary majority (CPA, CCO, 180/34/2/9 ‘Third
Post Election Survey: Summary and Analysis, 13 August 1974). As a consequence, Heath moved towards a strategy that tried to convince voters
that national unity was more important than single-party rule (Behrens
1980: 27–28). If he was able to do this then he contended it might be
possible for Heath to return to Number 10 as a unifying figure, with the
Conservatives as the largest player. Furthermore, the hostility that existed
with the Labour ranks towards co-operation made Heath certain that it
would be impossible for Wilson (and any alternative figure within the
5
An example of this would be the seat of Lewisham West. The Conservatives had lost this
seat at the General Election of February 1974 with 18,716 votes compared to Labour’s
21,118 votes. The Liberals had come third on 7974 votes. The electoral pact suggested
would assume that if the Liberals did not stand then enough of the freed up Liberal vote
would transfer across to the Conservatives for them to regain the constituency (i.e. the combined Conservative and Liberal vote would take them to 26,690 votes). However, if the
Liberal vote fragmented with 60 percent of them breaking for the Conservatives (i.e. 4784)
and 40 percent of them for Labour (i.e. 3189), then the pact would fail, with Labour winning the constituency with 24,307 votes to the Conservatives on 23,500 votes. In the
General Election of October 1974, both the Liberals and Conservatives stood and both saw
their vote shrink—the Conservatives down to 15,573 from 18,716 votes and the Liberals
down to 5952 from 7974 votes, whilst the Labour vote was stable, down from 21,118 to
21,102 (Butler and Kavanagh 1974, 1975).
15 WHO GOVERNS? THE GENERAL ELECTION DEFEATS OF 1974
369
Labour Party) either to lead them into a coalition or to lead up a government of national unity (CPA, SC, 74/2-27, 1 July 1974).
Ultimately, this ploy became a part of the manifesto, when Wilson
decided (on September 18) to call a General Election, which was to be on
October 10 (Pimlott 1992: 643). The Conservative Party manifesto
stated that:
it is our objective to win a clear majority, but we will use that majority above
all to unite the nation, we will consult and confer with the leaders of other
parties, we will invite people from outside the ranks of our own party to join
us in overcoming Britain’s difficulties. (Conservative Party 1974b)
Heath defended this position in his memoirs, arguing that:
this was a difficult concept to put across, as cynics were bound to say that it
was forced out of us by the expectation of defeat. It would have held good,
however, whether we had formed a minority government or won a landslide
victory. (Heath 1998: 524)
How viable was the idea of some form of national unity government?
One problem was that there was voter scepticism about the sincerity of the
offer by the Conservatives. Some voters felt that it might be a ‘trick’, that
is, the Conservatives were using the rhetoric of ‘national unity’ to actually
secure partisan advantage (Butler and Kavanagh 1975: 261). Wilson
sought to stimulate those doubts dismissing Heath’s plan as a recipe for
‘Con policies, Con leadership by a Con party for a Con trick’ (Pimlott
1992: 646).
But the main problem was the idea of Heath as the Prime Minister of a
national unity administration. How plausible was it for him to present
himself as a candidate for consensus or unity in the General Election of
October when he had presented himself as a candidate or conviction and
confrontation in the ‘Who Governs’ General Election of February 1974—a
change in style and role may not fool voters (Wood 1974). Press speculation developed, which suggested that a government of national unity
might be a viable option, but that Heath might need to be sacrificed by
the Conservatives to aid this prospect. Shortly before polling day, the
Guardian reported that:
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Tory strategists say that Mr Edward Heath may be on the point of declaring
unambiguously that if elected with a majority he will seek to form a coalition
of parties to lead the country through the crisis. According to his aides Mr
Heath would be prepared to stand down were his leadership to be the obstacle to the formation of a coalition. (Guardian 1974)
This suggestion illustrated the depth to which Heath’s leadership was
being questioned (Garnett 2012: 94–95). Irrespective of how well it was
viewed within his own ranks, Heath continued to push this position—
indeed, his final message to Conservative activists before polling day was
unambiguous as he argued, ‘the real hope of the British people in this situation is that a National Coalition government, involving all the parties,
should be formed’ (Heath 1974).
Heath would be denied his opportunity as Wilson and the Labour Party
were able to win a small parliamentary majority of three. The outcome of
the General Election of October 1974 left the Conservatives in an even
worse position. Their vote share fell further from 37.9 percent to 35.8
percent and their return fell from 11,872,180 votes to 10,464,817 votes.
In parliamentary terms, this resulted in a further 20 seats being lost (Butler
and Kavanagh 1974, 1975).
Conclusion
In his study of the Conservative Party, Alan Clark described 1974 as the
‘year of blunder’ and the miscalculations that Heath had made contributed to an increasing sense of indiscipline and discontent within the parliamentary ranks (see Clark 1998: 435–452). What was worrying was that
this increase was coming on the back of the 1970-1974 period in which
back-bench rebellion rates had already increased significantly as compared
to the Conservative administrations of 1951–1964, notably the 1951–1959
Parliaments (see Norton 1978; see also Franklin et al. 1986). With the
conflict between the one nation left and the economic liberal right escalating throughout the Heath era, we can argue that his inability to manage
that divide effectively represented a failure of party management. Coming
as it did on the back of the governing failures of period from 1970 to
1974, this explains why his reputation was to be so sullied amongst
Conservatives as well as voters (Fry 2005: 211; on how Heath mismanaged his powers of appointment as a tool of party management, see
Heppell and Hill 2015).
15 WHO GOVERNS? THE GENERAL ELECTION DEFEATS OF 1974
371
It was the response of Heath to their second electoral defeat inside
eight months that irritated his eventual successor the most (Ziegler 2010:
470–473). As Heath mapped out how the Conservative campaign had
worked well as a containment exercise, Thatcher concluded that Heath
‘was too defensive of his own past record to see that a fundamental change
of policies was needed’, and that ‘everyone except Ted knew that the main
problem was the fact that he was still leader’ (Thatcher 1995: 261, 263).
However, despite holding the leadership of the Conservative Party for
nearly a decade, and having lost three elections out of four inside eight
years, Heath was simply unwilling to resign. And yet there had been a
desire to remove Heath from the leadership of the Conservative Party
amongst some backbenchers that predated their removal from office at the
General Election of February 1974. Back in December 1972, one backbencher, John Wells, wrote to Heath’s parliamentary private secretary
(PPS), Tim Kitson, and said that Heath is: ‘no doubt completely indifferent to what I think and he is unlikely to mend his ways. All I can do is to
play as active a part as I can in any moves to get rid of him’ (Heath Papers,
3 1/17, ‘Letter from John Wells to Tim Kitson’, 30 December 1972). A
similar warning came from another Conservative parliamentarian, David
Mudd, who wrote to Heath in September 1973 saying that there was a
group of 20-plus Conservative backbenchers who planned to make ‘moves
for a change of leadership’ (Heath Papers, 3 1/17, ‘Letter from David
Mudd to Edward Heath’, 25 September 1973). Given that there was no
provision for a challenge to Heath under the existing leadership election
rules that the Conservative Party were utilising, these letters acted as a
warning that pressure might be mounting for a rethink on those rules.
The desire for change was to increase once Heath had led the Conservatives
into the unnecessary General Election of February 1974. In opposition,
Heath was unmoved by the warnings about his leadership from Francis
Pym (his former Chief Whip in office and now a member of his shadow
Cabinet). Pym wrote to him speaking of the ‘crisis of confidence’ that
existed within the parliamentary Conservative Party, adding that: ‘I have
indicated my anxieties about the way the party is being run … I know
from what others have said that I am not alone in this view’ (Heath Papers,
3 1/9, ‘Letter to Edward Heath’, 11 June 1974). In the aftermath of the
General Election of 1974, with the Conservative Party procedurally incapable of removing, he was advised by many friends to resign. For example,
Kenneth Baker, his parliamentary private secretary, warned him:
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A. S. ROE-CRINES
you had better resign now as leader if you don’t want to be hurt, there are
many people in the party who are out to destroy you—the malicious, the
malcontents, the sacked, the ignored and overlooked, are all blaming you.
(Baker 1993: 43–44)
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CHAPTER 16
The Conservative Party Leadership Election
of 1975
Emily Stacey
The aim of this chapter is to identify how Edward Heath was removed
from the leadership of the Conservative Party. This chapter is split into the
following sections, covering the period between the party losing the
General Election of October 1974 and the Conservative Party leadership
election of February 1975. First, it considers how, in order to replace
Heath, moves initiated from within the 1922 Executive Committee of
Conservative backbenchers led to a change in their leadership procedures,
so as to permit a challenge. Second, it identifies how, having created the
rules to permit a challenge, there was a lack of viable candidates available
to challenge Heath because, for a variety of reasons, Edward du Cann,
William Whitelaw and Keith Joseph decided not to stand against him.
Third, it explains how and why Margaret Thatcher decided to challenge
Heath. Finally, this chapter profiles the campaigning period and the ballots, as a means of identifying why Heath was defeated and why Thatcher
was selected as his replacement.
E. Stacey (*)
Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, UK
© The Author(s) 2021
A. S. Roe-Crines, T. Heppell (eds.), Policies and Politics Under
Prime Minister Edward Heath, Palgrave Studies in Political
Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53673-2_16
377
378
E. STACEY
Changing the Rules to Permit a Challenge
As was emphasised in Chap. 15, the period between losing the General
Elections of February and October 1974 began the process of solidifying
opposition within the parliamentary Conservative Party towards Heath
remaining as their leader. As a young backbencher, Norman Lamont
recalled why so many Conservative parliamentarians thought a change
was needed:
Inflation was very badly out of control—well into double figures.
Unemployment was massively high. There were a huge number of strikes.
Britain was known as ‘the sick man of Europe’—it was legendary the poor
performance of the British economy. During Heath’s period we had had the
appalling Miners’ Strike and electricity to business was rationed to three
days a week. There were two elections in 1974 but Heath lost them both.
He lost decisively the second time, so all this chaos was blamed on Heath.
(Lamont Interview, 2005)
In the aftermath of the General Election of October 1974, the 1922
Executive Committee of Conservative backbenchers requested that Heath
resign (Watkins 1998: 187–188). That request was made by their Chair,
du Cann, with whom Heath had a relationship based around mutual distrust (Ziegler 2010: 354–355). In opposition, Heath had dismissed du
Cann as Party Chair in 1967, and then overlooked him when considering
ministerial positions once they entered office in 1970. It was rumoured
that Heath disliked du Cann because (a) he had not been supportive of
him over Resale Price Maintenance when he was President of the Board of
Trade (1963–1964), and because he had voted for Maudling in the
Conservative Party leadership election of 1965 (see, Wright 1970: 387;
Clark 1998: 457). Once du Cann realised that he would not secure ministerial advancement in the Heath era—(even though the Chief Whip,
Francis Pym did recommend Heath appoint du Cann in 1971, TNA, PRO
PREM, ‘Chief Whip Letter to Prime Minister’, 5/529, 22 October
1971)—he had rebuilt his influence by seeking the chair of the 1922
Executive Committee (Clarke 1972). The suspicion was that he was seeking to undermine Heath with the intention of then securing the leadership
of the Conservative Party for himself (Clark 1998: 457).
Having refused to agree to the demands of du Cann and the 1922
Executive Committee, Heath had to deal with their supplementary
requests, that is, if he would not resign, then the rules governing
16 THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 1975
379
leadership elections within the Conservative Party should be reconsidered
so that a challenger provision (or a confidence motion procedure), could
be introduced (Stark 1996: 27). Heath attempted to dispute the authority
of du Cann to deliver this message on behalf of the 1922 Executive
Committee. He implied that du Cann was speaking on behalf of the parliamentary Conservative Party, as constituted after the General Election of
February 1974, but that he did not speak for the newly elected parliamentary Conservative Party in October 1974. Without irony, Heath suggested
that the officers for the 1922 for the new parliamentary term should be
elected first—but the logic of this argument rested on the ability of Heath
and his supporters to use the new executive elections to secure a more proHeath executive (Fisher 1977: 149–151). When du Cann was re-elected
in early November 1974,1 and the remainder of the officers of the previous
Parliament were re-elected, this undermined Heath’s claim that they were
unrepresentative of the backbenchers (Ramsden 1996: 438). As a consequence, Heath was forced to accept that the rules governing leadership
selection within the Conservative Party would have to be reconsidered
(Blake 1998: 318).
A committee was set up, under the chairmanship of Alec DouglasHome, and by December 1974, they had completed their deliberations.
They recommended that an annual election for the leadership of the
Conservative Party should be created, and if no one stood against the
incumbent, then they would be re-elected unopposed. Challenges2 to the
incumbent would be permitted in the first three to six months of a new
Parliament (a move designed to facilitate the removal of a leader who had
been defeated in a General Election) or within the first 28 days of a new
parliamentary session (CPA, 6/2/11 ‘Procedure for the Selection of the
Leader of the Conservative Party’, 10 December 1974). Critically, the
committee concluded that the 50 percent plus 15 percent margin required
for victory rule (from the 1965 procedures, see Chap. 2) should apply to
all of Conservative parliamentarians (those eligible to vote, and not just to
those who actually voted). This was hugely helpful to those wanting to
1
When Heath offered du Cann a position in the newly constructed shadow Cabinet, du
Cann interpreted this as an attempt to ‘neutralise me’ (du Cann 1995: 204) and refused the
offer. Heath later accused du Cann of ‘undermining my attempt to unify the party’ (Heath
1998: 529).
2
To launch a challenge, the challenger would only need the support of a proposer and a
seconder (CPA, 6/2/11 ‘Procedure for the Selection of the Leader of the Conservative
Party’, 10 December 1974).
380
E. STACEY
eject Heath, as the actual number of parliamentarians whose support he
needed to retain would be higher if calculated from the whole of the parliamentary party rather than just those who had actually voted, that is,
abstentions would matter, and they would hurt him as the incumbent
(Shepherd 1991: 168; Bogdanor 1994: 87; Stark 1996: 28–29; Watkins
1998: 189; Heppell 2008: 55–56; Quinn 2012: 37).
The new procedures—known as ‘Alec’s revenge’, given the suggestion
that the Heathites attempted to push Douglas-Home out a decade earlier
(Ramsden 1996: 440)—clearly did nothing to help Heath if a challenge
was forthcoming, and in his memoirs, he was very critical of how they
were formulated (Heath 1998: 530). The critics of Heath had pushed for
reform with the intention of evicting him from the leadership of the
Conservative Party—all they needed was a candidate to challenge him.
The Lack of a Viable Challenger
In his study on the Conservative Party in the opposition years of 1974 and
1979, Behrens notes that there was a ‘dearth of likely leaders’ in the
Conservative Party (Behrens 1980: 37). The two candidates whom Heath
defeated in the leadership election of 1965 were both non-contenders this
time. Enoch Powell was not available to stand, as he was no longer a member of the parliamentary Conservative Party and his conduct in the interim
period would have made him an unacceptable choice anyway (see,
Shepherd 1996). Reginald Maudling may still have been eligible to stand,
but his resignation as Home Secretary in 1972—after press speculation
about his business activities—invalidated him as a viable option (Baston
2004). As a consequence, press attention was initially concentrated around
the following three possible contenders: du Cann, Whitelaw and Joseph.
All three managed to make themselves unavailable as potential challengers, while the 1922 Executive Committee was working on creating rules
that would permit a challenge to be made.
Although it was initially assumed that du Cann was using his position
at Chair of the 1922 Executive Committee of Backbenchers to oust Heath
and manoeuvre himself into the party leadership, he ultimately decided
not to stand. In his memoirs, he admitted that he was being encouraged
by backbenchers to stand (du Cann 1995: 205). What appeared to have
undermined him as a viable candidate, however, was the suggestion that
his business dealings could cause embarrassment to the Conservatives
should he secure the party leadership (Fisher 1977: 160–165).
16 THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 1975
381
It was thought that Whitelaw, who had served as Leader of the House
of Commons, Northern Ireland Secretary and Employment Secretary in
the Heath administration, could be a viable successor because of his reputation as a unifier and the perception that he had been a competent minister (Garnett and Aitken 2002). However, although Whitelaw had
ambitions to lead, he was too loyal (or calculating) to formally challenge
Heath himself. He rationalised that his chances would be best served by
someone else challenging Heath and causing his resignation, whereupon
Whitelaw would stand in the second ballot as a unity candidate (Clark
1998: 454–455).
Of the three rumoured challengers, it was thought that Keith Joseph,
Secretary of State for Social Services in the Heath administration, was the
most intriguing (Denham and Garnett 2001: 226–320). Despite remaining on the Conservative frontbench and staying as a member of the Heath
shadow Cabinet, Joseph used the period of opposition between March
and October 1974 to make the case for ideological renewal and policy
change. In doing so, the problematic working relationship that existed
between Heath and Joseph went from being an ‘open secret’ into ‘open
warfare’ (Ziegler 2010: 452), as Joseph used the formation of the Centre
for Policy Studies as ‘an intellectual springboard for a determined challenge’ to Heath’s leadership (Campbell 1993: 627).
As Joseph sought to promote his revived vision of Conservative ideology, he made a series of speeches throughout 1974 that were designed to
make the case for a monetarist approach in terms of economic reform—
see Joseph 1974a, 1974b. As he mapped out his vision—attacking the
power of the trade union movement and identifying the consequences of
excessive public spending—he not only argued that ‘inflation is threatening to destroy our society’ (Joseph 1974b), but also admitted (in June
1974) that: ‘I am perfectly clear in my eyes mind that Conservative governments have erred badly. I am not alone among my colleagues in thinking this, though we are a minority’ (Joseph 1974a).
Joseph was correct in his analysis that his views lacked real support
within the shadow Cabinet (see as evidence the minutes of the Steering
Committee meeting of July 1974: CPA, LSC, 74/14, 15 July 1974).
Thatcher was an exception in that she was a member of the shadow
Cabinet who supported the analysis that Joseph was advancing. She
recalled how these speeches ‘infuriated Ted and the Party establishment’
since Joseph ‘lumped together the mistakes of Conservative and Labour
Governments, talking about the 30 years of socialistic fashions’ (Thatcher
382
E. STACEY
1995: 253). As his parliamentary private secretary, Kenneth Baker recalled
that Heath was disappointed in how Joseph was behaving (Baker 1993:
42), whilst shadow Cabinet member, Michael Heseltine, remembers being
concerned about the damage to the unity of the Conservative Party that
was being caused by the ‘brutality’ of the conflict between them (Heseltine
2000: 157). From the conservative one-nation left, Maudling concluded
that the doctrine that Joseph was seeking to advance was ‘divorced from
reality’, adding that he personally felt that Joseph was a ‘nutty as a fruitcake’ (Maudling, 1978: 209). By late summer 1974, members of the
shadow Cabinet were being asked to persuade Joseph to desist from further criticisms of the record of former Conservative administrations (Prior
1986: 97; Howe 1994: 87). Somewhat foolishly, Thatcher was also asked
to get Joseph to ‘tone down’ one of his speeches, although Thatcher took
pride in recalling that ‘I made no suggestions for changes’ (Thatcher
1995: 255).
Although Joseph was able to generate considerable press attention for
his ideological and policy interventions, the fact was that he had many
weaknesses that made him unfit to lead the Conservatives in opposition,
let alone be Prime Minister (which he would later admit himself, Denham
and Garnett 2001: 277). Geoffrey Howe implied worries about Joseph’s
political judgement: he was felt to be a slow decision-maker, and there
were doubts about his ability to cope with pressure (Howe 1994: 89–90;
see also Evans 1997: 10; Vinen 2009: 66). In an off-the-record meeting
with Hugo Young in July 1974, Lord Hailsham commented that ‘the only
man with vision is Joseph, but he lacks the strength and character to lead,
let alone beat Ted’ (Trewin 2008: 38). Norman Tebbit, who sympathised
with the causes that Joseph was advancing and would later become widely
associated with the politics of Thatcherism, expressed similar doubts, and
noted that Joseph lacked the ‘indefinable quality takes makes for a national
political leader’ (Tebbit 1988: 177). Adam Ridley, who served as economic policy advisor to the Conservatives in opposition between 1974
and 1979, confirmed the validity validity of these assertions as he recalled
how Joseph ‘was charming, but flawed in policy and didn’t follow through
on his convictions’ (Ridley Interview, 2015).
Ultimately, however, it was Joseph himself who ended his chances of
emerging as the next leader of the Conservative Party. This was due to the
controversy that he generated by a speech that he delivered in Birmingham
in October 1974; shortly after the General Election defeat of earlier that
16 THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 1975
383
month (Denham and Garnett 2001: 265–75), where Joseph attacked the
‘permissive society, arguing that:
The balance of our population, our human stock is threatened. A recent
article in Poverty, published by the Child Poverty Action Group, showed
that a high and rising proportion of children are being born to mothers least
fitted to bring children into the world and bring them up. They are born to
mother who were first pregnant in adolescence in social classes four and five.
Many of these girls are unmarried, many are deserted or divorced or soon
will be. Some are of low intelligence, most of low educational attainment.
They are unlikely to be able to give children the stable emotional background, the consistent combination of love and firmness which are more
important than riches. They are producing problem children, the future
unmarried mothers, delinquents, denizens of our borstals, sub-normal educational establishments, prisons, hostels for drifters. Yet these mothers, the
under-twenties in many cases, single parents, from classes four and five, are
now producing a third of all births. A high proportion of these births are a
tragedy for the mother, the child and for us. (Joseph 1974c)
Having identified what was the primary cause of the cycle of social
deprivation, Joseph asked:
Yet what shall we do? If we do nothing, the nation moves towards degeneration, however much resources we pour into preventative work and the over-­
burdened educational system. It is all the more serious when we think of the
loss of people with talent and initiative through emigration as our semi-­
socialism deprives them of adequate opportunities, rewards and satisfactions. Yet proposals to extend birth-control facilities to these classes of
people, particularly the young unmarried girls, the potential young unmarried mothers, evokes entirely understandable moral opposition. Is it not
condoning immorality? I suppose it is. But which is the lesser evil, until we
are able to re-­moralize whole groups and classes of people, undoing the
harm done when already weak restraints on strong instincts are further
weakened by permissiveness in television, in films, on bookstalls?
(Joseph 1974c)
He concluded with what amounted to a call to action from social conservatives, arguing that:
This could be a watershed in our national existence. Are we to move towards
moral decline reflected and intensified by economic decline, by the corrosive
384
E. STACEY
effects of inflation? Or can we re-moralize our national life, of which the
economy is an integral part? It is up to us, to people like you and me.
(Joseph 1974c)
As Vinen observes, ‘this was an argument with something to offend
everyone’, as those on the left were ‘shocked by its eugenicism’, whilst
those on the right were ‘shocked by the vision of comprehensive schools
handing out contraceptives to retarded teenagers’ (Vinen 2009: 67). Even
ideological sympathisers, like Airey Neave, who later became Thatcher’s
campaign manager, thought that Joseph had been ‘very tactless’, given
that he had appeared to recommend that ‘family planning be particularly
applied to one-parent families’ (Moore 2013: 271). Ronald Miller, who
was a speech-­writer to Heath and later to Thatcher, recalled how the
Birmingham speech ‘seemed to indicate a lack of popular touch’ on behalf
of Joseph (Millar 1993: 223). As the media frenzy escalated, Joseph came
to accept that he had fatally damaged his chances of succeeding Heath,
admitting that: ‘I may have damaged—things which I rather deeply
believed’ (Halcrow 1989: 86–87). Joseph informed Thatcher: ‘I am sorry,
I just can’t run. Ever since I made that speech the press have been outside
the house. They have been merciless. Helen (his wife) can’t take it and I
have decided that I just can’t stand’. At this, Thatcher replied: ‘Look,
Keith, if you’re not going to stand, I will, because someone who represents our viewpoint has to stand’ (Thatcher 1995: 266).
The Accidental Candidate? Thatcher
Challenges Heath
Joseph delivered his Birmingham speech nine days after the Conservatives
had lost the General Election of October 1974, and before the
Conservatives had confirmed the change in their leadership election rules
that would actually permit a formal challenge to Heath could take place.
On the evening of the General Election of October 1974, however,
Thatcher had given unambiguous answers in television interviews regarding Heath and the leadership. She told the BBC that she did not want to
see an ‘immediate contest for the leadership’ (Thatcher 1974a). She reinforced that message in an interview for ITV, as she suggested that even if
a leadership election was in the offing, you could ‘cross my name off the
list’ of possible challengers (Thatcher 1974b).
16 THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 1975
385
What was motivating Thatcher in providing these responses is open to
interpretation. It could be that her comments were genuine, that is, she
did not plan to stand herself and was expected to support Joseph, and she
did not expect an immediate contest because it was impossible unless
Heath resigned, which seemed unlikely (Denham and Garnett 2001: 275).
Exploiting Anti-Heath Sentiment
The perception being created in late 1974 and early 1975 was this: the
procedures for electing the leader of the Conservative Party were being
reformed to aid the chances of a credible challenge to Heath, and yet the
best candidate that his critics could find was Thatcher3 (Wickham-Jones
1997: 75). After all, in the immediate aftermath of the General Election of
October 1974, the odds on who should replace Heath was led by Whitelaw
(who was 5 to 1 odds on) with Joseph 7 to 2—Thatcher was quoted as a
50 to 1 outsider, and yet she was now the best candidate available to the
enemies of Heath to back (Denham and Garnett 2001: 278). Upon hearing her decision to challenge Heath, her husband, Denis, told her ‘you
must be out of your mind’ as ‘you haven’t got a hope’4 (Thatcher 1995:
266). Despite Heath’s clear limitations, he was still expected to defeat
Thatcher, as he had retained the support of constituency chairs and no
newspaper was initially willing to back Thatcher as an alternative to Heath
(Campbell 1993: 671). As Tebbit admitted upon joining her campaign,
there was ‘big hill to climb to persuade colleagues’ to back her (Tebbit
Interview, 2015). Indeed, on her motivation to stand, Thatcher accepted
that it was ‘most unlikely that I would win’, but she felt that by entering the
contest, she could ‘draw in other stronger candidates’ (Thatcher 1995: 267).
Thatcher was a far stronger candidate than was initially understood,
and she was to benefit from the weaknesses and complacency associated
with the Heath campaign. Let us consider that latter issue first. Given his
electoral record and the failures associated with his administration, the
argument that Heath deserved to continue was a difficult one to make.
3
It is interesting to note the different recollections that Thatcher and Heath have of her,
informing him of her decision to stand against him for the leadership of the Conservative
Party. In his memoirs Heath claims that he thanked her for telling him in advance of her
intentions (Heath 1998: 530), whilst Thatcher recalls how ‘he looked at me coldly, turned
his back, shrugged his shoulders and said “if you must”’ (Thatcher 1995: 267).
4
Fowler would recall how the initial reaction amongst parliamentary colleagues to the
prospect of Thatcher winning was one of incredulity.
386
E. STACEY
This was especially true given the volume of enemies that Heath had accumulated in his decade-long tenure as leader of the Conservative Party.
A certain irony exists in that the Thatcher campaign would be mobilised by du Cann and Airey Neave. As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, du Cann had a problematic working relationship with Heath, and the
same applied with regard to Neave and Heath. Vinen argues that Neave
‘nurtured a bitter dislike of Heath’, after he had been previously told that
‘his poor health made it impossible for him to hope for further [ministerial] preferment’ (Vinen 2009: 71), and Tebbit identified how ‘the feeling
was mutual’ as ‘Heath greatly disliked’ Neave (Tebbit 2005: 110).
The advantage that Neave had in mobilising support against Heath was
the volume of Conservative parliamentarians whom Heath had alienated.
In office, Heath had misused his powers of patronage as a means of party
management. His ministerial ranks were unrepresentative of the ideological balance of forces within the parliamentary Conservative Party when
formed in 1970, that is, moderate/centrist loyalists were disproportionately likely to hold ministerial office, and those on the parliamentary right
were disproportionately located on the backbenches (Searing 1994: 350;
Heath was also reluctant to engage in reshuffles and promotions once in
office, Ball 1996: 342). Campbell then concludes that once appointed to
the frontbench, ‘you generally stayed in’ and, more significantly, ‘once
overlooked your chances of advancement were small’, but the consequence was a ‘dangerously high proportion of his MPs [being left] disappointed’ (Campbell 1993: 518–519; see also Norton 1978; Heppell and
Hill 2015). As a consequence, Campbell argues that it is ‘easy in retrospect to trace the parliamentary party’s rejection of Heath back well before
1974–5’ (Campbell 1993: 510), whilst Norton observes that the first ballot of the Conservative Party leadership election of 1975 was the ‘pulling
together’ of all of Heath’s ‘critics’ (Norton 1980: 339).
However, it was not simply the case that Heath had numerous enemies
who wanted him replaced. He also failed to effectively mobilise those who
may have been sympathetic to his type of Conservatism (Shepherd 1991:
168–169). His campaign was lacklustre and, as Vinen observes, ‘no one
really knew who ran [his] campaign: the main suspects—Kenneth Baker,
Tim Kitson and Peter Walker—[have] all denied that they had been campaign manager’ (Vinen 2009: 72). Additionally, it seemed that Heath had
fallen into an ‘innate sulkiness’, following his defeat in the two previous
general elections, along with the news of Thatcher’s challenge for the
leadership (Vinen 2009: 72). As a result, rather than actively attempting
16 THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 1975
387
to win over the Conservative vote, his ‘belated attempts at seduction were
so clumsy and blatantly insincere that they probably lost him votes5’
(Vinen 2009: 72). Moore also observes that by late 1974 and early 1975,
Heath was ‘a hopeless campaigner, resenting the very idea and, even more
than in the past, extremely bad at effecting interest in people’ (Moore
2013: 286–287). A number of Tory backbenchers, in particular, were
unimpressed by sudden lunch and dinner invites that came their way, provoking them to ask themselves, ‘why haven’t we been asked over the last
five years?’ (Moore 2013: 286–287). A ‘natural awkwardness’ in such situations, along with his resentment to his colleague in the form of Thatcher
due to her gender, did not add to his appeal (Moore 2013: 286–287).
A Pro-Thatcher Perspective?
Having identified the failings of the Heath campaign, it is important to
identify the advantages that Thatcher possessed when initiating her challenge. The first advantage of her candidature was that she had a very
strong campaign team around her. This was achieved through Neave.
Once it became clear that Thatcher would stand, Neave approached her to
ask who was leading her campaign. When she admitted ‘I don’t really have
a campaign’, Neave decided, ‘I think I had better do it for you’, and
Thatcher ‘agreed with enthusiasm’ (Thatcher 1995: 272). Neave had initially been coordinating plans for du Cann to challenge Heath once the
rules permitted. In reality, Neave was willing to support any candidate that
had a serious chance of replacing Heath. Neave simply transferred the
campaign infrastructure that he had been constructing for a du Cann candidature across to Thatcher (Fisher 1977: 163; Wickham-Jones 1997:
81). As Tebbit recalls, the Thatcher campaign ‘team set about rallying and
canvassing support’, which was ‘done with extraordinary thoroughness
and great secrecy’ (Tebbit 2005: 110).
Biographers of Thatcher emphasise the importance of Neave to the rise
of Thatcher. For example, Aitken argues that her ‘leadership prospects
were transformed’ with his organisational backing, meaning that she was
‘now a serious runner’ with ‘credible supporters, organizers and voters’
5
During his leadership tenure, Heath developed a reputation for being ‘rude’ to his own
parliamentarians and for being an ineffective communicator with those whose support he
needed to retain (Fisher 1977: 132-133; see also Norton 1978: 228-230; Behrens
1980: 31-32).
388
E. STACEY
(Aitken 2013: 169). Additionally, Moore argues that she took on board
Neave’s advice, for example ‘avoiding media interviews until the very late
stages’ and ‘seeing all MPs who want to see her’ (Moore 2013: 286). One
example of how Neave was drawing supporters to the Thatcher challenge
was Tebbit, who admitted that ‘it was Airey who first persuaded me that
we should elect Margaret as leader’ (Tebbit Interview, 2015).
The second advantage of her candidature was that her political stock
was rising at the very point of the campaigning period (by that we mean
both the formal campaigning period once the new rules were agreed upon
in December 1974, and through to the actual ballots of February 1975,
but also also the informal period after the General Election of October
1974). After the General Election defeat of October 1974, Thatcher was
moved from being shadow Environment Secretary to the position of
shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury. Although nominally number two
in that portfolio to the Shadow Chancellor, Robert Carr, Thatcher managed to turn this into an opportunity. Her performances in Parliament,
when opposing the Wilson administration’s Finance Bill, were widely
praised (Behrens 1980: 39). Here she was able to demonstrate her ‘ability
to master detail’ (Moore 2013: 286) and her ‘marshalling of facts and
figures within a clear framework of argument’ (Harris 2013: 108). This
was conducted right in front of her electorate in the forthcoming leadership ballot, and Neave knew how important this could be in garnering
support. Thatcher recalled how Neave would concentrated on the specifics
of campaigning tactics, telling her ‘to leave it to him and to concentrate on
my work on the Finance Bill’ (Thatcher 1995: 272). As she demonstrated
her intellectual and parliamentary prowess in duals with the combative
Labour Chancellor, Denis Healey (who would later describe her as ‘exceptionally able’ and a ‘formidable opponent’6, Healey 1990: 487), she was
making a ‘lot of converts’ according to Ridley (1991: 9). Even those
aligned to the Conservative left acknowledged as much. Prior recalls that
her ‘stature’ was ‘enhanced’ (Prior 1986: 99) by her parliamentary performances, and Francis Pym acknowledged that ‘amidst the shambles and
doubts of that time, here was one person who could articulate a point of
6
Crines et al. (Crines et al. 2016: 23) would argue that it was during these parliamentary
exchanges that Thatcher delivered ‘one of her best ever parliamentary rejoinders’, as she said
of Healey, who had been ridiculing her: ‘some Chancellors are macro-economic. Other
Chancellors are fiscal. This one is just plain cheap’ (HC Deb, Vol. 884, Col. 1553-4, 22
January 1975).
16 THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 1975
389
view with conviction’ (Pym 1984: 9). Of its significance, Heseltine argues
that: ‘She created an impact on those on the committee and the floor of
the House at the first stage, which gave her the opening to become the
favourite of the right wing of the party’ (Heseltine Interview, 2015).
This is a view that Lamont endorses as he recalls how:
I think at that point people were getting an inkling about the sort of things
Thatcher believed in. She spelt out very clearly her opposition to government borrowing or her dislike of it. I remember her slating Harold Lever ‘all
you know is how to borrow, borrow, borrow’. Those sort of lines stuck in
people’s minds. (Lamont Interview, 2015)
This was tied into the third advantage of her candidature: that is,
Thatcher could offer not just a new public face for the Conservative Party
but also a new direction for Conservatism. Neave argued that not only was
she a ‘formidable’ House of Commons performer and was ‘undoubtedly
the person the Labour Party fears most’, but that she ‘represents a break
with the past’ (McKie 1975). That change, which was key to her appeal,
key to her appeal was something she recognised in the aftermath of annexing the leadership of the Conservative Party. Speaking to the Daily Mail
in February 1975, she stated that ‘after ten years in which our vote had
slumped and we had become a losing party there HAD to be a change’
(Shrimsley 1975).
As Carrington argues, Thatcher had simply captured how there was a
‘mood’ within the Conservative Party for a ‘new direction’ (Carrington
1988: 275). What Thatcher was tapping into was the concern within the
Conservative Party about the prevailing political climate, as the politics of
consensus was increasingly becoming associated with the politics of decline
(Pemberton 2001). Perceptions of relative economic decline had gained
traction within British politics from the latter part of the Macmillan administration onwards (Tomlinson 1996), and the economic modernisation
strategies of the Wilson era had failed to reverse the decline. Those on the
right were, in effect, arguing that Heath needed to be removed because
the Conservatives had the right policy solutions in place to reverse the
decline in the 1970 General Election manifesto, but Heath lacked the
commitment to implement that long-term agenda (Holmes 1997).
Thatcher was thereby presenting herself as a candidate willing to make
that case in the knowledge of what it implied, that is, political methods
based on ‘conviction and confrontation’ rather than ‘compromise and
390
E. STACEY
consensus’ (Evans 1997: 47). Her approach would provide the basis for a
‘dramatic programme, calculated to stir the imagination’, which would
‘seize the political initiative’ (Turner 1995: 194). Conservative parliamentarians were attracted to Thatcher, as they could sense how her agenda
could appeal to those sections of the electorate who had become disenchanted with the methods and approaches used by previous governments
(of both persuasions in the 1960s and 1970s). With Kavanagh identifying
how the electorate was becoming more conservative after 1974, it was
possible for Thatcher to construct her new political constituency, that is,
middle-class, self-employed businessmen and the petit bourgeois
(Kavanagh 1987: 299–300). It is also worth emphasising how Thatcher
thought that the directionless Heathite Conservatives had contributed to
a crisis of morale. She used the campaigning period to demonstrate how
she believed she could rectify this failing:
There is a widespread feeling in the country that the Conservative Party has
not defended these ideals explicitly and toughly enough, so that Britain is set
on a course towards inevitable Socialist mediocrity. That course must not
only be halted, it must be reversed. The action by the Tory Party to carry
out that reversal must begin now, while we are in opposition and have time
to look at our policies afresh before the next election. That will be a priority
task. (Thatcher 1975)
When Conservative parliamentarians began voting to determine
whether Heath should remain as their party leader, it was actually a threeway contest. Although the print media attention was on the Heath versus
Thatcher contest, there was a third candidate—Hugh Fraser. He was not
a serious contender, as Vinen observes he ‘had no senior ministerial experience, no reputation for sound political judgment’ and illustrated the
‘weakness of old-style Tories’ (Vinen 2009: 69). Although Fraser was
expected to make a very poor showing in terms of votes cast, his presence
could have been significant. The Heathites were said to have welcomed
the presence of Fraser alongside Thatcher on the ballot, as it would split
the right-wing anti-Heath vote, thus suppressing the likely Thatcher vote
as opposed to the likely Heath vote (Gilmour and Garnett 1998: 296).
Although Heath was personally ‘pessimistic’ (Millar 1993: 224), his campaign was predicting that he would win a comfortable first ballot lead—
their calculations told them that they had 129 definite backers, and they
estimated that they might secure an additional 15 votes, so they predicted
16 THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 1975
391
a return of around 144 votes (from the 277 strong Parliamentary
Conservative Party (PCP)) (Campbell 1993: 671; Ramsden 1996: 450).
However, the Thatcher campaign team was estimating that support for
Heath had approximately 80 backers and Thatcher had 120 backers with
the remaining 70 plus Conservative parliamentarians up for grabs
(Thatcher 1995: 274; Ramsden 1996: 449). However, Neave deliberately
underestimated how well Thatcher was doing and created the impression
that Heath might well be on course for victory (Gilmour and Garnett
1998: 297). Neave did this so as (a) to make that those on the right voted
for Thatcher and not Fraser, and (b) to incentivise one-nation Conservatives
who wanted Whitelaw to succeed Thatcher to realise that they could only
get to a second ballot for Whitelaw to enter, if Heath was defeated, so they
needed to lend their vote to Thatcher in the first ballot (Wickham-Jones
1997: 81) (Table 16.1).
The strategy worked. Heath was forced out of the leadership of the
Conservative Party, and came second to Thatcher by 130 (47.1 percent) to
119 votes (43.1 percent). If the objective was to remove Heath and create
an open field for other candidates to enter the fray, then Thatcher had succeeded. The question now was whether she could actually exploit the
momentum that she had to win the leadership against the new candidates
who had emerged now that Heath had been removed. If the Thatcher vote
did comprise Whitelaw supporters who had lent their vote to Thatcher to
evict Heath, then if Whitelaw could garner all of the Heath voters plus those
Table 16.1 Candidate
support in the
Conservative Party
Leadership election
ballots of 1975
Candidate
First Ballot
Margaret
Thatcher
Edward Heath
Hugh Fraser
Abstentions
Second Ballot
Margaret
Thatcher
William Whitelaw
James Prior
Geoffrey Howe
John Peyton
Abstentions
Votes
Percentage
130
47.1
119
16
10
43.1
5.8
4.0
146
52.9
79
19
19
11
2
28.6
6.9
6.9
4.0
0.7
Source: Heppell 2008: 62–63.
392
E. STACEY
tactical voters, then the Thatcher-Whitelaw ballot could be very competitive. However, what undermined Whitelaw was the fact that a number of
new candidates joined the contest now that Heath was removed. Ironically
the Thatcher vote went up from 130 to 146—the increase in her vote equating Thatcher’s first round return of 130 plus that of Fraser on 16. That left
129 votes, that is, Heath’s 119 votes plus 10 abstentions, but Whitelaw
could only secure the backing of 79, with Howe and Prior securing 19 votes
each, John Peyton 10 votes and two abstentions (Heppell 2008: 63).
Conclusion: Peasants’ Revolt or Religious War?
That Thatcher was the new leader of the Conservative Party was viewed at
the time as an unexpected outcome. She certainly did not conform to the
type of leader that the Conservatives had been choosing via the undemocratic system of leadership selection known as ‘the magic circle’ up until
1965 (Fisher 1977; Shepherd 1991; Bogdanor 1994).
That Heath was removed, once the Conservatives had created the
means to do this, should not have been viewed as unexpected. He was
clearly vulnerable to eviction, once that option was made available, due to
the fact that his electoral record was poor and his governmental legacy was
unconvincing. His vulnerability was increased by the fact that the new
procedures would be based on all Conservative parliamentarians and not
just those voting, meaning that the threshold for winning was higher than
might have been the case. Heath also compounded his difficulties in holding onto office by running a complacent campaign, although it has to be
said that his campaign’s ability to persuade Conservatives to continue to
back Heath was undermined by the volume of enemies that had been
accumulated over his decade-long leadership tenure.
Thatcher was also a fortunate challenger. She was fortunate that the
talent pool to select a non-Heath challenger from was so shallow. She was
fortunate that Whitelaw was too loyal to challenge himself directly. She
was fortunate that Joseph discredited himself with a misjudged speech in
Birmingham, which derailed him before the campaign had even begun
(and before the new leadership election rules had been determined). She
was fortunate that the chances of a du Cann candidature were snuffed out
by concerns about his business dealings. She was also fortunate that she
was able to inherit the campaign infrastructure that Neave was constructing in coordinate the removal of Heath. That the maverick Fraser was the
only other alternative to her or Heath in the first ballot was fortunate, as
16 THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 1975
393
it enabled her to mobilise anti-Heath sentiment around her. She may have
been fortunate in these regards, but she made the most of her good fortune—for example, the excellence of her parliamentary interventions
when opposing Healey was widely acknowledged and helped to establish
that she had the intellectual abilities needed to lead. In late 1974 and early
1975, Thatcher propelled herself to victory due to her determination,
desire and her relentless commitment to hard work, as Harris concludes:
In the heat of the battle she turned out not to be frail at all … She showed
that her single greatest quality was courage … She suddenly acquired the
status of a heroine for the Tory men who had for so long skulked, grumbled
and plotted but failed to strike. More than any General Election she fought,
the leadership election that propelled Margaret Thatcher to the head of the
Tory Party was a raw and ruthless struggle rarely matched in British politics.
(Harris 2013: 94)
Over and beyond these considerations we need to acknowledge the fact
that political science academic literature suggests that the outcome can be
explained by one of two alternative perspectives, that is, it was the ‘peasants’ revolt’ or a ‘religious war’. The peasants’ revolt implies that ‘electing
Margaret had simply been the most effective way of getting rid of Ted’
(Critchley and Halcrow 1998: 60). Those that propelled her into the leadership of the Conservative Party were primarily located on the backbenches, but their motives were not ideological—as Crewe and Searing
imply they backed her, even after Heath had withdrawn, even though they
‘had no idea that she was about to hatch a new ideology and behind it
march the party off to the right’ (Crewe and Searing 1988: 371). Cowley
and Bailey (2000) challenge the non-ideological perspective and suggest
that the motives of those who voted for Thatcher were ideological, that is,
those of the backbenchers who voted for Thatcher against Heath, and
against Whitelaw and others, did so knowing that she was offering a
change of ideological direction. They imply that the right was disproportionately likely to back Thatcher and the left was disproportionately likely
to back Heath and then Whitelaw. As such, Tebbit offers the following
insight into the events of 1974–1975:
But a revolution, in all but the bloodiest sense, it certainly was. It represented a complete up-ending of prevailing assumptions. It marked a total
defeat for the existing party hierarchy. It was the work of a very few bold
men—and one bold woman—who risked all, and won. (Tebbit 2005: 93)
394
E. STACEY
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Wickham-Jones, M. (1997). Right Turn: A Revisionist Account of the 1975
Conservative Party Leadership Election. Twentieth Century British History,
8(1), 74–89.
Wright, E. (1970). The Future of Conservatism. Political Quarterly, 41(4),
387–398.
Vinen, R. (2009). Thatcher’s Britain: The Politics and Social Upheaval of the
Thatcher Era. London: Simon and Schuster.
Ziegler, P. (2010). Edward Heath. London: Harper Press.
CHAPTER 17
Margaret Thatcher and the Heath
Premiership: Recent History Re-written
Antony Mullen
Our understanding of continuity and change within post-war British politics has been defined in the work of political historians and political scientists by the theory of post-war consensus. The theory rests on the
assumption that the Conservative administrations of 1951–1964 made an
accommodation with the socially democratic-inspired policy platform that
they inherited from the Attlee administrations of 1945–1951. The leading
advocates of the theory of post-war consensus (Addison 1975, 1993;
Kavanagh 1992; Kavanagh and Morris 1994; Dutton 1997) that the transition from the Labour to Conservative governments in 1951 would lead
to the establishment of an elite-level consensus around the following policy pillars:
(1) A belief in a mixed economy thus promoting (Labour) or accepting
(Conservative) the public ownership of core industries.
(2) A commitment to ensuring full employment thus justifying the use
of Keynesian demand management techniques.
A. Mullen (*)
The Thatcher Network, Durham, UK
© The Author(s) 2021
A. S. Roe-Crines, T. Heppell (eds.), Policies and Politics Under
Prime Minister Edward Heath, Palgrave Studies in Political
Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53673-2_17
399
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(3) A belief in active and interventionist government based on the idea
of the state seeking to flatten out societal inequalities.
(4) A conciliatory approach to the trade union movement in terms of
governing approaches towards industrial relations.
(5) The promotion of the welfare state as a universal right.
(6) A foreign policy approach characterised by membership of the
Atlantic alliance and maintaining Britain as a nuclear power; and
the transition from Empire to Commonwealth (Kavanagh and
Morris 1994).
Consensus advocates argue that although the two main political parties
disagreed on priorities and specifics, their frontbenchers (i.e. those that
occupied ministerial office when their parties were in power), fought out
their differences within the context of a framework of common assumptions about the management of the economy and the role of the state.
One of the ways in which that supposed policy continuity was captured
was by the term ‘Butskellism’ (coined by the Economist in 1954), which
was based on the limited economy policy change between the approach of
the outgoing Labour Chancellor, Hugh Gaitskell, and the incoming
Conservative Chancellor, R. A. Butler (Rose 1961; Boxer 2010; for a
challenge to the notion of Butskellism, see Kelly 2002; Rollings 1994).
Although the theory of post-war consensus has been subjected to critiques (see Pimlott 1988; Jones and Kandiah 1996; Kerr 2001) and reappraisals (see Fraser 2000; Toye 2013; Blackburn 2018), it remains a key
determinant through which we understand and interpret post-war British
politics. If the consensus thesis helps us to understand policy trajectory in
post-war British politics after 1945, then consensus thesis advocates argue
that that policy continuity was ended by the onset of Thatcherism.
Specifically, they identify how the pillars of consensus were either directly
challenged or modified or refocused. Consider the following:
(1) The shift away from the mixed economy as evidenced by the politics
of privatisation.
(2) The abandonment of the commitment of the state to provide for
full employment alongside a shift from Keynesianism and towards
monetarism.
(3) The removal of a conciliatory approach towards the trade unions as
industrial relations became characterised by confrontation, as
Thatcher viewed the trade unions as an obstacle to the effective
functioning of a free-market economy.
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401
(4) A scepticism towards governmental intervention within the economy, given the Thatcherite assumption of the inevitability of
inequality and their desire to reduce public expenditure and a limited state.
(5) A challenge with regard to the welfare state and a shift away from
the principles of it as a universal right and towards seeing it as a
safety net.
(6) A foreign policy approach remained essentially in place, but the
Thatcher era was characterised by a particularly strong emphasis on
the Atlantic Alliance (Kavanagh and Morris 1994).
This long-standing narrative account of post-war British political history sees the onset of Thatcherism as a critical turning point, that is, 1979
sees the displacement of the period of social democratic consensus politics
with the conviction politics of Thatcherism.te. This notion of a bold and
radical movement replacing a tired approach lends itself to the creation of
a ‘conventional storyline’ of political development, as political historians
attempted to ‘portray the Thatcher governments as radical’ (Kerr 2001:
1–2). That portrayal of the Thatcher premiership of 1979–1990 as being
radical was based on the narrative that a break was being made with objectives of previous post-war governments. Significantly, for Thatcher and her
Thatcherite acolytes, this necessitated delegitimising the efforts (and competency) of previous post-war Conservative administrations and first in
line for their critique was the Heath premiership of 1970–1974. As Hilton
et al. have identified, however, the establishment of the neoliberal displacement narrative, which has been embraced into conventional historical accounts of the 1980s, is based on retelling a story of post-war Britain,
influenced by the narratives of the Thatcher premiership itself (Hilton
et al. 2017: 147).
The aim of this chapter is to identify the importance of narrative to our
understanding of political change. The term narrative embraces notions of
storytelling or of giving an account, which constructs the official, or
accepted, or correct version of history for a particular political period. The
chapter considers recent contributions to political history, concerning the
politics of Thatcherism, which have analysed the significance of narrative.
It considers their attempts to advance the ways that narrative theory can
be applied to the study of Thatcherism in the context of ongoing debates
about challenging established historical accounts. Moreover, in examining
the relationship between Thatcherism and narrative, the chapter explores
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the place of the Heath government, in which Thatcher had served, within
the narrative account of the end of consensus thesis, designed and promoted by those sympathetic to the Thatcherite project. Before doing so,
however, the chapter provides an overview of the existing academic perspectives on Thatcherism.
Consensus Politics and Alternative Perspectives
on Thatcherism
After the Conservative Party won power by winning the General Election
of 1979, it was able to implement a conviction-driven, consensus-ending
agenda, which is now widely recognised as Thatcherism. The impact of
Thatcherism—upon politics, the economy and wider society - was considerable, and excellent reappraisals have been offered by Vinen (2009);
Jackson and Saunders (2012); and Farrell and Hay (2014) (see also on the
legacy of Thatcherism, Mullen et al. 2020). With the extant academic literature, the consensus perspective is but one of a number of different
perspectives on Thatcherism.1
In addition to the consensus perspective are the following: first, there
are the economically driven perspectives. These suggest that Thatcherism
was a modernisation strategy constructed to address the stagnation that
characterised the British economy in the 1960s and 1970s. It was based
on the idea that reversing economic decline would necessitate tackling the
trade union problem: that is, the failure of consensus era corporatist solutions for addressing the fundamental incompatibility between the interests
of labour and capital. The solution to the problem was to advance the
causes of capital relative to labour to establish a more flexible and non-­
unionised workforce—a workforce segmented into a high-skill high-paid
segment alongside a low-skilled, low-paid segment (Jessop et al. 1988;
Taylor 1989).
Second, there are the ideologically driven perspectives. These imply
that Thatcher and Thatcherites were interested in securing ideological
hegemony within British politics so as to constrain any successor administration to govern on the political and economic terrain that they had
established. Their ideological project was based upon:
1
Reviews of the academic literature on Thatcherism are provided by Jessop et al. (1988:
22–51); Evans and Taylor (1996: 219–246); and Hay (2007).
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an ideological amalgamation of economic liberalism or neo-liberalism as
advanced by economic dries and neo-conservatism as promoted by social
conservatives. Neo-conservatism was motivated by three main concerns:
issues relating to authority and the maintenance of law and order; issues
relating to the importance of tradition, the sanctity of marriage and the
centrality of the family within the context of wider morality-based considerations; and issues relating to the preservation of national identity from internal and external threats. Critically, neo-conservatism rejected the parameters
of the 1960s sexual revolution and the liberalisation of abortion, divorce
and homosexuality. they suggested that a correlation existed between liberal
demands for sexual liberation (for example the contraceptive pill), progressive attacks on marriage, motherhood and the family, and increased divorce
rates, single parenthood, social disorder, juvenile delinquency and welfare
dependency. Neo-conservatism could be reactionary in tone. They were
known for their opposition to homosexual rights; freedom of contraception;
and abortion; but were supportive of the family; capital and corporal punishment; and censorship. Neo-conservatism was also characterised by a
desire to protect, preserve and promote British national identity, and it was
this that fuelled their rejection of devolution; their scepticism about the
growth of multiculturalism, and their strong rhetoric on immigration (thus
fuelling claims of populism within Thatcherite thinking and also links to
Powellism). Neo-conservative thinking contributed to hostility towards further integration within Europe and a strong desire to protect British national
sovereignty. (Crines et al. 2016: 3–4; see also Gamble 1988; Durham 1991;
Lynch 1999; Buller 2000)
Third, alongside the economic and ideologically driven perspectives of
what was driving Thatcherism comes the personality-driven perspective.
This acknowledges the centrality of the persona of Thatcher herself to the
construction and presentation of the agenda that had an -ism added to the
end of her name. Although this perspective tends to get overshadowed
within the academic literature, Thatcher did come to personify a set of
ideas and an approach to governing that would dominate British politics
in the period between 1979 and 1990—how effective would those economically and ideologically motivated ideas have been without her leadership to provide them with coherence and to mobilise support for them?
(Riddell 1989; see also Minogue and Biddiss 1987).
Fourth, complementing the economic, ideological and personality-­
driven perspectives on Thatcherism comes the electorally driven perspective associated with statecraft (Bulpitt 1986: 19–39). Jim Bulpitt
acknowledged that there was an ideological objective at the heart of
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Thatcherism. However, he also argued that this was not the primary driver
of the Thatcherites’ policy agenda (and within this, their attack on consensus politics). Their primary driver was electoral, that is, intended to showcase to the electorate that they were worthy of re-election which required
them to demonstrate economic competence, and this constituted the best
way of reversing economic decline (Bulpitt 1986). To enable them to
showcase their governing competence necessitated an approach based on
‘depoliticisation’ (Flinders and Buller 2006) and the ‘need to depoliticise
contentious issues by placing responsibility for decision-making ‘at one
remove’ from government (Crines et al. 2016: 7). On how this applied to
Thatcherism, Andrew Crines et al. note the following example:
Thatcherites felt that wage determination was a politicised and intensified
conflict between the trade unions and government, and by doing so,
increased perceptions of governing incompetence. Thatcherite policy solutions, such as eschewing formal incomes policy, reforming trade unions via
extensive legislation, and pursuing privatisation, were all designed to take
government out of Labour disputes. (Crines et al. 2016: 7)
The fifth perspective is the aforementioned consensus-ending perspective, explored within the introduction to this chapter. This acknowledges
that as Conservative Prime Minister between 1979 and 1990, Thatcher
would become well known for her attacks on consensus-style politics. She
viewed consensus as being driven by compromise and a lack of principle,
and she came to believe the post-war Conservative Party had ‘retreated
gracefully’ in the face of the supposedly ‘inevitable advance’ of socialism
(Thatcher 1993: 104). Her whole approach to politics was conviction
driven not consensus seeking, as evidenced from her tendency towards
divisive labelling, for example, within the Conservatives, members were
either with the Thatcherite ‘dries’ (‘one of us’) or against and aligned to
the One-Nation-inspired/interventionist ‘wets’. Meanwhile, the trade
unions were viewed as a destructive, undemocratic and illegitimate obstacle to the functioning of the free market and described as the ‘enemy
within’ (Young 1990; Dorey 1995).
That Conservative elites, such as Thatcher, believed that consensus was
a discredited term for a discredited era was becoming evident from the
beginning of her tenure as Leader of the Conservative Party in 1975.
When the newly formed Thatcher Shadow Cabinet of 1975 set about their
work in opposition, it was clear that ‘consensus’ was part of their thinking.
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Keith Joseph presented his Shadow Cabinet colleagues with a policy paper
in which he identified the negative effects to the British economy (and the
Conservatives electorally) of having acquiesced to the politics of consensus
(Thatcher MSS 2/6/1/156, Keith Joseph ‘Notes Towards the Definition
of Policy’, 4 April 1975). Angus Maude identified the necessity of challenging consensus, as he informed the Shadow Cabinet that ‘consensus
began to move towards socialism in 1960 to 1962’ (Hailsham MSS,
1/1/10, ‘Lord Hailsham notes on a meeting of the Shadow Cabinet, 11
April 1975). When commenting upon the ideas that Joseph was espousing
in terms of future policy, Howe noted that the Joseph diagnosis did represent a ‘departure from consensus’, but that it did not differ significantly
from what the Conservatives had advanced in their manifesto at the
General Election of 1970. Howe argued, however, that when they
attempted to initiate it in the first 18 months (prior to the infamous
U-turns), they ‘failed’ to ‘explain it’ and its ‘possibilities’. Somewhat
intriguingly, Thatcher concluded the 1970 Selsdon agenda when entering
office by saying: ‘all our policies were right, [but] all your presentation was
wrong’ (Hailsham MSS, 1/1/10, ‘Lord Hailsham notes on a meeting of
the Shadow Cabinet, 11 April 1975). What is critical, however, is this:
Although discussing consensus politics as being part of the problem, what
this chapter demonstrates is that it remained a term that Thatcher tended
to avoid utilising within her rhetoric whilst in opposition, and that she
would not go on to exploit it more openly until the run up to General
Election campaign of 1983.
However, with the General Election of 1979 on the horizon, the fact
that her agenda might be ideologically distinctive was noted. For example,
in what was one of the earliest attempts to define Thatcherism, Stuart Hall
put forward arguments that would be consistent with both the consensus-­
busting and ideologically driven perspectives. Writing in Marxism Today in
January 1979, Hall argued that Thatcher(ism) was aiming for the ‘destruction of consensus’ or, at least, the destruction of a consensus based upon
the principles of social democracy, and that this included ‘the “creeping
socialism” and apologetic “state collectivism”’ of the Heath wing’ of the
Conservative Party2 (Hall 1979: 16). Writing again in Marxism Today in
February 1980, Hall concluded that Thatcherism was ‘qualitatively new’
in British politics. She was advancing the ‘radical right’ agenda further
2
In February 1980, Hall appeared to contradict himself when he argued that elements of
Thatcherism’s radicalism were identifiable in the Heath programme of 1970 (Hall 1980: 26).
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than Heath government even contemplated, as her administration set
about ‘condensing a wide range of social and political issues and themes
under the social market philosophy’ (Hall 1980: 26).
What Hall proposed, in the second of these two essays, was that
Thatcherism brought together multiple strands of existing right-wing ideological positions and ideas from within the Conservative Party and presented them, for the first time, under a single banner. In doing so, Hall
was hinting at how certain tenets within Thatcherism were already part of
the political thought within the Conservative Party, but that they were
being brought into the mainstream (having been briefly there, e.g. in the
late opposition/early government period of the Heath leadership tenure).
Later in the decade, Andrew Gamble would reflect upon how Thatcherism
brought together different ideological strands—neoliberal and neo-­
conservative—in his seminal study on Thatcherism entitled The Free
Economy and the Strong State (Gamble 1988). In this, Gamble presented
what he regarded as a conundrum at the heart of understanding Thatcherism. He stated: ‘the key problem is to decide what gives it
coherence’ (Gamble 1988: 23).
It is this conundrum of identifying from what source or by what means
Thatcherism managed to present itself and exist as a coherent project
despite the potential for explicit ideological contradiction that this chapter
attempts to address. In doing so, it argues that Thatcherism was heavily
reliant upon a narrative framework in order to maintain coherence.
To demonstrate this, the chapter outlines the principles of the narrative
framework to which Thatcherism conforms. It then uses archival evidence
to highlight the key moments within the development of how Thatcher
would rely on this narrative relating to the idea of consensus. It does this
by examining the political career of Thatcher in the following stages: first,
as a backbench Member of Parliament and as a member of the Heath
Shadow Cabinet in the late 1960s; second, her period as a Cabinet Minister
in the Heath government 1970–1974; third; her tenure as Leader of the
Opposition between 1975 and 1979; and, finally, as Prime Minister
between 1979 and 1990. In doing so, the chapter also reflects upon the
place of the Heath premiership within this narrative and how it is, either
implicitly or explicitly, implicated as conforming to, or being part of, the
consensus against which Thatcherism (eventually) defined itself.
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Thatcherism and the Consensus Politics Narrative
Recent studies of Thatcherism by Robert Saunders (2012) and
Sally Abernethy (2018) have both highlighted the relationship that exists
between Thatcherism and narrative. While both scholarly contributions
are illuminating and valuable in many ways, neither give a full definition as
to what exactly narrative is intended to mean in relation to Thatcherism.3
Abernethy uses narrative to refer to ‘how Thatcherism was packaged and
presented to the electorate’ (2018: 2), while Saunders argues that Thatcher
‘offered a specific interpretation of the seventies that privileged particular
responses’, which became a ‘hegemonic narrative’ (2012: 25). Both these
statements are true, but more can be gained by considering narrative
structures in greater depth rather than using the term to refer simply to an
historical account or version of events.
Hayden White has rejected the notion that a narrative account of history can be a ‘neutral medium’, and he asserts that ‘narrative is an expression in discourse of a distinct mode of experiencing and thinking about
the world, its structures, and its processes’ (White 2010: 274). Drawing
upon the work of structuralist historian Fernand Braudel, who first systematically argued that narrative led to a dramatistic perspective on historical events, White argued that the ideological function of narrative
resulted in the ‘transformation of history into spectacle’ (White 2010:
275). White concluded that to narrate an account of the past is to present
a sequence of events as if a ‘theatrical production’ over which the narrator
has control (White 2010: 275). As such, to White, to narrate history is to
transform facts into a story in which historical events, agents and agencies
are all characterised in much the same way as fiction (White 2010: 290).
Historical events are, in this sense, utilised in a process of storytelling
intended to shape and influence how others understand both what preceded the current moment and the circumstances through which it came
into being. Narratives do not, however, amount to simply accounts of how
events unfolded.
The Thatcher narrative was a spectacle intended to frame the crisis of
the 1970s—in the mind of the onlooking electorate—not simply as economic, but as a crisis of national identity. The notion, proposed by
Thatcher, that the permissive society represented a regrettable break with
British values also implied a crisis of historical narrative. That is to say that
3
This is also true of earlier work of Hay (1996), see also Hay (2010).
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she and her supporters wanted to establish that what happened during the
1960s and 1970s was not just presented as a departure from British values
but a disruption to the equilibrium of British history. In this context it is
worth reflecting upon the work of Frederick Mayer on Martin Luther
King Jr in Narrative Politics (Mayer 2014). Here Mayer considered the
narrative techniques used in the infamous ‘I have a dream’ speech, in
which King quoted the opening of Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg
Address—about life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness—and framed the
America of the early 1960s as one which has ‘failed to live up to its true
character’, as described by Lincoln (Mayer 2014: 1). At that point in his
story, though, Mayer says that King took ‘a dramatic turn’ and his ‘narrative pivoted from a tragic past to a triumphant dream of the future’ (Mayer
2014: 1).
There are many differences between King and Thatcher. For example,
they had markedly different politics; they addressed different audiences
with different ambitions; and the King narrative is contained within a single speech, while the Thatcher narrative was drawn out over several years,
across a series of speeches, interviews and so on. Despite that, though,
Thatcher—in much the same way as King—presented the idea of the
nation not living up to its true character in recent years in order to assert
a vision of how that true character could be reinstated. In this sense, she,
like King, also looked to the future—presenting her own political vision as
a means of restoring the nation’s true character and correcting the course
of history. Both these narratives—of an America that has denied its black
citizens liberty and of a Britain that has become too permissive and caught
up in consensus—can be understood in relation to the same basic narrative
structure. In Tzvetan Todorov’s Introduction to Poetics (1981), he proposes that narratives are structured along the lines of equilibrium, disequilibrium and re-established equilibrium. He says of this model:
An ideal narrative begins with a stable situation that some force will perturb.
From which results a state of disequilibrium; by the action of a force directed
in a converse direction, the equilibrium is re-established; the second equilibrium is quite similar to the first, but the two are not identical. Consequently,
there are two types of episodes in narrative: those that describe a state (of
equilibrium or of disequilibrium) and those that describe the transition from
one state to the other. (Todorov 1981: 51)
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What he describes here is an initial state of order being interrupted by
an event or change of circumstances significant enough to destabilise it.
There is a subsequent point at which the period of disorder is ended and
resolved, after which a state of order is returned. Crucially, though, what
emerges in the final phase of this process is not the same as the initial state
of order. The disruption to the initial equilibrium, and the means by which
it was dealt with, is reflected in the nature of re-established order. For
Dominic Strinati, narrative is, therefore, ‘the story of how this disruption
arises, how it is dealt with and how order is restored’ (Strinati 2000: 29).
It is this theoretical model which best highlights how and why Thatcherism
should be understood as reliant upon a historical narrative framework to
achieve a sense of coherence.
Thatcher, as narrator, situated herself at the tipping point between disequilibrium and re-established equilibrium, emphasising the former and
promising the latter. Her Victorian values and the lessons of thriftiness
harked back to a time when, in her view, Britain was true to itself (i.e. in
Todorov’s model, the initial period of equilibrium). The period which followed, which Thatcher deemed the permissive society, was presented as a
moment of crisis in which these British values were lost. Thatcher presented the Conservatives under her leadership as the opportunity to
reverse the decline and to restore those lost values. Positioning herself as
the narrator of this apparent moment of crisis in which British values had
been lost also allowed Thatcher to appear dominant within the narrative as
well as informed about the cause and effect plot. That is to say, she framed
herself as best placed to resolve the crisis because she was different to those
who had caused it. What is significant here though is that, while this is a
narrative, it is not a resolved one. Thatcher would not have benefited from
telling the full story. She benefited from promoting the idea that the
period of disequilibrium was ongoing, but that she could bring it to an
end. To say this though is to speak in broad, general terms. To demonstrate exactly how Thatcherism relied upon a narrative framework, and to
consider why this is relevant to the Heath government, the second half of
this chapter documents the emergence of the anti-consensus politics element of Thatcher’s account of recent history. By carefully tracing the
development of her anti-consensus rhetoric in the period from 1968 to
the end of her premiership, using the archival evidence available, we can
see that her criticism of the so-called consensus is not fully articulated until
the run-up to the general election of 1983. That the United Kingdom had
suffered because of ‘consensus’ politics was not a view that Thatcher
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expressed at the time of the so-called consensus, but one which she retrospectively applied in her narrativisation of the period—and it was necessary
to present Heath and his government as part of this failed consensus.
Having been elected to Parliament at the General Election of 1959,
Thatcher spent only two years on the parliamentary backbenches
(1959–1961) before she was promoted to a junior ministerial post within
the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance (Harris 2013: 55–57). In
her three years in this post before the defeat that the Conservative Party
suffered at the General Election of 1964, she impressed both her
Conservative colleagues and her Labour opponents with her administrative competence and parliamentary ability (Harris 2013: 58). In opposition she became the Conservative spokesperson on Housing between
1964 and 1966, before working with the Shadow Treasury team between
1966 and 1967. Her effectiveness made it inevitable that she would be
elevated to the Heath Shadow Cabinet. Although her entry into the
shadow Cabinet was with one of the less prestigious portfolios—fuel and
power—her promotion demonstrated how she had become a ‘well-­
respected’ figure within the parliamentary party (Moore 2013: 189).
A further indication of her growing status with the Heath frontbench
team was the fact that she was selected by Heath to deliver a lecture to the
Conservative Politics Centre in 1968, on the theme of ‘what’s wrong with
politics?’ The speech was significant within the context of the views that
she expressed in relation to the role of the state, taxation and prices, and
incomes policy (Thatcher 1968). However, whilst Thatcher had used this
opportunity in opposition to identify her commitment to ideas that would
be consistent with the politics of what was to become defined as
Thatcherism, that speech did not explicitly focus in on critiquing the
notion of consensus politics. Intriguingly, and on the contrary, she said
that ‘we have not suffered the fate’ of consensus (Thatcher 1968).
Furthermore, during her time as Secretary of State for Education and
Science between 1970 and 1974, Thatcher did not publicly—or privately
(as far as the available archival material reveals)—devote much of her time
to criticising the idea of a consensus. For all that she would later become
critical of a post-war consensus existing during this time, there is no evidence of her raising concerns about it or even discussing the concept at
the time of its apparent existence. Indeed, during her period in the
Department for Education and Science, she continued implementing
Labour policies. She continued, for example, the roll out of comprehensive schools; she extended the cuts to free school milk which Labour first
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411
initiated; and she overturned the Conservative policy to close the Open
University and favoured Labour’s policy of continuing to fund it (on
Thatcher as Education Secretary, see Moore 2013: 211–228). To compound this, Thatcher remained silent on the issue of consensus politics
when she challenged Heath for the leadership of the Conservative Party
(on her challenge, see Cowley and Bailey 2000; Heppell 2008: 51–70).
During that leadership election, Thatcher, although seeking to argue that
she would be a more effective Leader of the Conservative Party, did not
attempt to associate Heath personally with a failed consensus.4
As Leader of the Opposition, Thatcher could be seen as attempting to
distinguish herself from an era of consensus, by using very soft, only mildly
critical language talking, for example, about consensus going as far as it
could and now looking to have a bigger slice of the cake (Thatcher 1979).
This, however, only occurred outside of the House of Commons. She
never referred to the post-war consensus in parliamentary debates. By
contrast, Prime Minister James Callaghan did, with positive connotations,
but Thatcher never challenged him on this. On 24 February 1979, she
gave a speech to a conference of Conservative European Candidates,
which was off the record and not attended by journalists. Her speech was
given from a series of brief notes rather than written out in full. The archive
contains these notes, and one of the points she made on the night was
summarised, in those notes, as ‘need for conviction—not consensus’
(Thatcher 1979). During the Conservatives’ period in opposition under
Thatcher, then, she may have privately been critical of consensus, but she
did not challenge it publicly. There are two possible reasons for this. The
first, as Heppell (2014) states in The Tories, is that the scepticism surrounding her leadership meant that she took a conciliatory
approach among Conservative MPs when she became their leader. The
second, as Emily Stacey’s (2017) research suggests, is that Thatcher was
more focused, as Leader of the Opposition, on developing her image as a
leader—that is to say, she had to prove she could offer an alternative before
she could say with any authority that an alternative was needed.
4
On the contrary she tells World in Action that she wants Heath to want to be part of her
cabinet (Thatcher 1978). This interview is, however, better remembered for her declaration
that the United Kingdom was ‘rather swamped by people with a different culture’—though,
as the editorial comment which accompanies the archival manuscript states, it was reported
that Thatcher had said the United Kingdom was ‘rather swamped by people of a different
culture’ (Thatcher 1978, emphasis added).
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However, while Thatcher was not critical of a post-war consensus during her time in the Heath government, the Centre for Policy Studies
(CPS) (which Thatcher helped establish in 1974) certainly was. There is
archival evidence to demonstrate that some of what CPS figures like Alfred
Sherman said in private—such as that the consensus was based on a misunderstanding of the economist John Maynard Keynes—was later repeated
in public by Thatcher and her allies.5 Thatcher, then, was silent on the
issue in public, but in private, her associates within the CPS were creating
an anti-consensus rhetoric that Thatcher would later adopt.
Over the course of her first government, Thatcher initially continued
the mild approach about criticising the notion of consensus. The first
explicitly critical intervention on the subject, during this period, came not
from Thatcher but from Nigel Lawson. In ‘The New Conservatism’, a
1980 lecture to the Bow Group which was published as a pamphlet by the
CPS later in the same year, Lawson dismissed the post-war consensus as a
period of failed Keynesian economics (Lawson 1980). The following year,
in a radio interview with the BBC, Thatcher was told that Heath had
urged her government—via the media—to return to consensus policies.
Rather than challenge Heath’s assertion with the certainty and force
of Lawson’s lecture, Thatcher gave a vague response in which she did not
give a direct answer to Heath’s proposal but claimed not to know exactly
what people meant by consensus (Thatcher 1981a). However, within a
month—in time for her Robert Menzies Lecture at Monash University—
Thatcher concluded that consensus was ‘the process of abandoning all
beliefs, principles, values and policies in search of something in which no-­
one believes’ (Thatcher 1981b). This stark change in tone may have been
a consequence of the fact that Thatcher was speaking to a small, foreign
audience rather than a domestic one. However, the next day the BBC,
which had been following her international trip, picked up the comment
and asked if it was aimed at her predecessor. Thatcher denied this and said
she was referring to another Commonwealth leader, whom she would not
name, and not Heath (Thatcher 1981a).
5
See, for example, the 1976 document produced by Sherman, to mark the CPS’ second
birthday, which states: ‘a good deal of our work has related to questioning the post-war
consensus, based on a misunderstanding of Keynes, which must carry much of the blame for
our inflationary regression and stagnation’ ((Sherman MSS, Royal Holloway Library, Box 7,
‘Note on the role of CPS (Out Second Birthday Party. Two Candles to Shed Light”) [trailblazers not a private army]’, 20 May 1976).
17 MARGARET THATCHER AND THE HEATH PREMIERSHIP…
413
If most of her first term was one in which Thatcher did not explicitly
criticise the idea of a consensus, then the General Election campaign of
1983 represented a tipping point. That election campaign marked a notable shift to a much more publicly and explicitly critical position on consensus politics. In a series of print and broadcast interviews over a period of
five months leading up to the General Election, Thatcher intensified her
anti-consensus rhetoric. This directly corresponds to what Ben Jackson
and Robert Saunders (2012) refer to as the beginning of ‘High
Thatcherism’, and Heppell makes a similar point in The Tories about
Thatcher’s second term in office being the point at which she abandoned
a conciliatory approach and became more markedly ‘Thatcherite’ (Heppell
2014: 80).
Among the comments she made in these interviews was the suggestion
that consensus is ‘not right for the British character’, deploying a discourse
about British renewal, and claiming that she would liberate the ‘true’
nature of the nation (Thatcher 1983a). When asked in another interview
what she intended to replace ‘consensus’ politics with, she responded
‘with freedom and responsibility’ (Thatcher 1983b). This phrase encapsulates succinctly the contradictory nature of Thatcherism, with the liberal
idea of freedom twinned with the more authoritarian idea of responsibility
which—in her mind—also meant a responsibility to the nation.
Here we can see, in practice, how Thatcher is indebted to Quintin
Hogg in the way that James Freeman (2017) describes. Freeman identified in Thatcher’s rhetoric an intentional conflation of socialism and left-­
wing economic ideas with a perceived moral crisis, both of which she
attributed to the so-called permissive society. It is, he says, through this
conflation of economic and moral decline (for which neoliberal ideas were
proposed as a solution, to the former at least) that neoliberalism became
linked with the New Right. However, Freeman also writes that, in January
1970, Hogg gave a speech at the Selsdon Park Hotel in which ‘the definition of freedom’ was manipulated to ‘stress its reliance on authority and
morality’. This rhetorical conflation of freedom with authority, Freeman
concludes, was used by Thatcher but invented by Hogg (Freeman 2017).
After the General Election of 1983, Thatcher became more comfortable with critiquing consensus politics in her public interventions, and
there are several key moments worth highlighting because of their significance to the development of her overall narrative. The first substantial
intervention was a BBC Radio 3 interview, which took place in 1985. In
the interview, Michael Charlton proposed that Thatcher’s government
414
A. MULLEN
had abandoned consensus which, he said, ‘was for full employment’
(quoted in Thatcher 1985). In response, Thatcher—who had said in 1968
that she did not believe a consensus existed in Britain—implied that governments that value free societies would not embrace consensus or aim for
full employment, and only Communist Russia would have such a mentality. She said that consensus politics was directly responsible for the Winter
of Discontent and that the trade unions had been running the country
rather than the government. She went further than she ever previously
had, though, by going on to describe the nature of consensus politics as
un-British, claiming that consensus politicians are weak and incapable of
taking tough decisions, and that—during the consensus era—British voters were crying out for a strong leader to rescue them and restore their
freedom (Thatcher 1985). Implicated in this period of failed consensus
that Thatcher outlined, though not explicitly, was the Heath government.
By 1986, we can detect movement in the position on the kind of model
trajectory, like Todorov’s, according to which Thatcher was narrating,
that is, from the tipping point between disequilibrium and re-established
equilibrium, firmly into the territory of the latter. In March of that year,
she told the Conservative Central Council that Britain had been transformed—and that this was not because of consensus, but because of decisive leadership (Thatcher 1986). In April 1987, she highlighted that her
policy agenda—once ‘derided, criticised and frowned upon’—had taken
hold. This agenda, she says, emerged because she and Keith Joseph set out
to ‘do justice to the British character’, and she identified, again, her values
of liberty and enterprise as intrinsic to the nation’s heritage (Thatcher
1987a). A few months later, following the General Election of 1987, she
reflected upon Thatcherism’s defeat of the Alliance’s call for a return to
consensus politics and argued that ‘we are a successful party leading a successful nation’ (Thatcher 1987b).
That Thatcher’s narrative shifted from one which looked forward to a
period of re-established equilibrium to occupying this position is reinforced by the Conservative’s 1987 General Election manifesto, which
spoke of the ‘British revival’ and argued that ‘a Conservative dream is at
last becoming a reality’6 (Conservative Party 1987). This rhetoric about a
return to greatness and the restoration of a successful nation was only
6
Their manifesto emphasised how, back in 1979, Britain was described as ‘ungovernable’
and was in the grip of an ‘incurable British disease’, meaning that it was ‘heading for irreversible decline’. It also boasted of how Thatcher had demonstrated that ‘the people were not
17 MARGARET THATCHER AND THE HEATH PREMIERSHIP…
415
effective because, for years beforehand, the Conservatives had emphasised
that ‘true’ Britishness had been lost or abandoned. While Heath was not
mentioned directly in this criticism, the distinction made between Thatcher
and her predecessors, combined with the fact that she was aware of Heath’s
desire for her to return to consensus politics, indicates Thatcher’s willingness to retrospectively frame the Heath government as somehow complicit in the failed leadership she described in the later part of her
premiership.
Conclusion
Throughout the period over which Thatcher’s anti-consensus rhetoric
developed from subtle criticism to its most explicit, her position on the
notion of a post-war consensus and what this was or meant was inconsistent. What this chapter argues is substantially at variance with the ideas of
those scholars like Smith (2013) who have it that Thatcher was always
anti-consensus.
What I have argued here is that to frame her in this way—even when
this framing is critical, as in Smith’s case—is to reinforce Thatcher’s narrative about herself, rather than to expose the reality of her development
into an anti-consensus, conviction politician (which was for electioneering
purposes and, above all else, successful). She was not a vocal critic of any
such consensus during her time as a backbench parliamentarian and, more
significantly in the context of this chapter, nor was she when serving in the
Heath government. Her time as Leader of the Opposition was also not
one which saw a sudden pivot to an anti-consensus position but, during
this time, it is clear (judging by the archival evidence) that the CPS think
tank was beginning to develop the anti-consensus rhetoric which Thatcher
eventually adopted in the run up to the 1983 General Election and
beyond. This intensified anti-consensus attack suggested that the idea of
consensus politics was somehow un-British, and Thatcher’s politics, by
contrast, was truly British. The development and eventual deployment of
this anti-consensus rhetoric, retrospectively applied to the Heath government and, indeed, to Heath himself, gives a clear indication that this was
a consciously developed narrative used, initially, for electioneering purposes but which has since fed into a broader sense of Thatcher being a
ungovernable, the disease was not incurable, the decline has been reversed’ (The Conservative
Party 1987).
416
A. MULLEN
conviction, not consensus politician. Unsurprisingly, Heath was resentful
at what he regarded as an ‘absurd caricature’ of the administration that he
led between 1970 and 1974 (Heath 1998: 576).
The chapter had two principle aims: first, to give greater consideration
to the relationship between Thatcherism and narrative than has been
offered in other studies concerned with this relationship and, second, to
examine how the specific (subjective and politicised) narrative about the
post-war consensus articulated by Thatcher framed Heath and the Heath
premiership.
To see Thatcherism as reliant upon a narrative framework enables us to
see more precisely how Thatcher used her principles and mobilised a historical account of British history, which she said had, in recent years, lost
its way. The Thatcherite narrative, in this sense, was a call to arms to
restore Britain to its former glory and rescue it from an ostensible moment
of crisis, linking—as Freeman notes—a decline in the economy with a
sense of moral decline. While it is reasonable to suggest that many political
figures deploy narratives in some way, Thatcher’s was unique/significant
in the following two ways.
First, it was unique in that it provided a highly politicised historical
account of the nation’s recent history as a means of framing her own values, as well as the extent to which this politicised history has been absorbed
into and shaped mainstream history (as Hilton et al., have demonstrated).
Second, it is significant in terms of our thinking about Thatcherism,
because to view it from a perspective of narrative theory provides a possible solution to the problem that Gamble (1988) identified: what makes a
contradictory set of ideas coherent? As I have demonstrated here, and as
others like Stephen Farrall (2017) have suggested, the ideological contradictions of Thatcherism are made coherent or, at least, sufficiently masked
to appear coherent through how they were framed in Thatcher’s
storytelling.
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CHAPTER 18
The Heath Premiership: A Transitional Era?
Timothy Heppell and Andrew S. Roe-Crines
The introduction to this book identified how the Heath premiership has
been subjected to two competing perspectives. It has been defined as
either a governing failure—see, for example, Bruce-Gardyne (1974),
Holmes (1982, 1997)), or it has been defined by a contingencies or
circumstances-­
based perspective—see, for example, Ball and Seldon
(1996). We wanted to reassess the Heath premiership and how it should
be considered. We did so for the following reasons. First, we have reached
the 50th anniversary of the General Election of June 1970 that ushered in
the Heath premiership, and that landmark was a reason for reassessment.
Second, and most importantly, the exiting of the UK from the European
Union in January 2020 has reversed the most important achievement
associated with the Heath premiership.
T. Heppell (*)
University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
e-mail: t.heppell@leeds.ac.uk
A. S. Roe-Crines
University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK
e-mail: a.s.crines@liverpool.ac.uk
© The Author(s) 2021
A. S. Roe-Crines, T. Heppell (eds.), Policies and Politics Under
Prime Minister Edward Heath, Palgrave Studies in Political
Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53673-2_18
421
422
T. HEPPELL AND A. S. ROE-CRINES
The Heath Premiership: A Failure of Statecraft
To help the process of reassessing the Heath premiership, the introduction
identified the value of using the statecraft model, as advanced by Bulpitt
(1986; see also Stevens 2002; Buller 1999, 2000; Hickson 2005a; Taylor
2005; Buller and James 2012). We did so because we believed the dimensions identified within the statecraft model—(1) a winning electoral strategy, (2) evidence of governing competence, (3) political argument
hegemony, (4) effective party management and then (5) another winning
electoral strategy—would help to provide a clear structure for the chapters
within our reassessment. The dimensions of the statecraft model embrace
not only governing performance in office but also party performance in
both government and opposition. Thus, the statecraft model enabled us
to assess Heath as a political leader in terms of his role as leader of the
Conservative Party (between 1965 and 1975), as well as the performance
of his government whilst he was Prime Minister between 1970 and 1974.
In terms of the Heath era in Conservative politics, our findings can be
summarised as follows.
First, with regard to the first dimension of statecraft, although the
Conservative Party was rejected by the electorate at the General Election
of March 1966—shortly after Heath had won the leadership of the
Conservative Party (Butler and King 1966)—we can say that they were
successful at this dimension. After all, they were returned to office at the
General Election of June 1970 on a public policy platform that differed
from their approach when in office between 1951 and 1964 (Butler and
Pinto-Duschinsky 1971; Garnett 2005, 2012, 2015; Bale 2012).
Second, when we consider governing competence, we cannot construct an argument in which we can legitimately claim that they demonstrated this (Garnett 2015). We cannot dispute that the objective of
gaining entry into the European Communities was secured or that this
was a substantive achievement (Kitzinger 1973; Lord 1993). However,
that achievement has become tainted by historical developments there­
after. This can be viewed from a national perspective. The UK would
forge a problematic relationship within Europe—the accusation would
be that the UK was ‘semi-detached’, ‘awkward’, ‘reluctant’, ‘on the
side-lines’ or a ‘stranger in Europe’—(see, e.g. George 1992, 1994;
Baker and Seawright 1998; Gowland and Turner 1999; Daddow 2004;
Gifford 2008; Wall 2008; Gowland et al. 2010; Baker and Schnapper
2015; Gifford and Tournier-­Sol 2015). This can also be viewed from
18 THE HEATH PREMIERSHIP: A TRANSITIONAL ERA?
423
a Conservative perspective. Not only did Heath fail to educate the electorate
on the case for Europe, but he failed to educate his own party. They
evolved from a party of pro-Europeanism under him in the 1960s and the
1970s to a party of Euroscepticism by the 1990s and 2000s, with that
process of change being strongly influenced by the thinking of Thatcher
as his successor1 (Smith 2018; Fontana and Parsons 2015; see also Turner
2000 and Crowson 2007).
Beyond that the picture with regard to the Heath premiership and governing competence is predominantly negative. In saying this, we acknowledge the work of Kavanagh on the Heath premiership and what constitutes
success or failure in governing terms (Kavanagh 1996). Kavanagh suggests
the following criteria provide us with the ability to determine governing
success or failure (i.e. competence or incompetence): (1) fulfilling manifesto promises, (2) achieving intended outcomes and (3) introducing policies which survive the lifetime of the government (Kavanagh 1996:
362–363). Against these criteria the Heath premiership cannot be deemed
a success and nor can it be defined as being competent. They did deliver
on many of their aims in terms of passing legislation—for example entering the European Communities; the Industrial Relations Act; reforming
taxation and housing finance. However, these are entirely undone by the
failure of the Heath premiership to secure their intended outcomes, for
example, just because you legislate to pass the Industrial Relations Act
does not mean it will succeed (Moran 1977; Warner 2019). Not only
was their approach to industrial relations perceived to have failed (with a
record number of working days lost to strike action), but their actual
record in terms of wider economic performance was questionable in relation to inflation, the Balance of Payments deficit and unemployment
(Kavanagh 1996: 362; see also Seldon 1988; Phillips 2006, 2007; Wade
2013). Furthermore, the Heath premiership, with the exception of
1
The labels used to define Conservative parliamentarians over Europe would change over
time, as the question(s) with regard to Europe evolved. Those with reservations were labelled
as anti-Marketeers in the 1960s and 1970s. The term Euroscepticism only really gained traction in the 1990s. What united anti-Marketeers and Eurosceptics was their concern about
the validity of the supposed benefits flowing from economic integration and political multilateralism. They viewed this as the surrendering of sovereignty over to a supranational body
which they could not control. Those on the pro-European wing of the Conservative Party
were pro-Marketeers in the 1970s, and they held a con-federalist position, that is, the pooling of sovereignty inside an integrated Europe would create economic gains (Crowson 2007:
105-126; Heppell et al. 2017: 764-768).
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T. HEPPELL AND A. S. ROE-CRINES
Europe,2 would see many of their legislative achievements undone by the
successor Labour administration of 1974–1979, be that in industrial relations, housing finance or local government, for example (Kavanagh 1996:
362; on the 1974 to 1979 Labour administrations, see Holmes 1985;
Harmon 1997; Hickson and Seldon 2004; Hickson 2005b and
Shepherd 2013).
Third, when we consider the statecraft criteria of political argument
hegemony, we cannot really construct a defence for the Heath premiership. By political argument hegemony, Bulpitt meant demonstrating to
the electorate that you were winning the battle of ideas, that is, your
approach to policy solving was superior than the approach of your political
opponents. This dimension of statecraft is closely aligned to the second
dimension in that a governing party that is able to demonstrate competence in office is likely to secure political argument hegemony and push
the ideas of their political opponents to the margins. One way of determining this is to track the opinion polling data from the era. In September
1970—just three months after entering power—voters were asked ‘which
party do you think can best handle the problems of the present economic
situation’. The Conservatives led Labour by 44 percent to 29 percent,
with the remaining 27 percent either claiming it was the Liberals or
they did not know. The lead that they held over Labour would decline
significantly under the demands of office—for example, by September
1973, the Conservatives had fallen to 24 percent (down 20 percent from
three years earlier), and Labour had also fallen (down 8 percent to 29
percent) as the ‘don’t knows’ and ‘others’ increased from 27 to 47 percent. At the onset of the General Election of October 1974, the
Conservatives continued to lag behind the Labour Party on this critical
question. Whilst Labour were on 31 percent, the Conservatives were on
28 percent and the remainder amounted to 41 percent who could not
endorse either of the two main parties (King and Wybrow 2001: 58).
When narrowing down the focus to specific issues, a similar pattern
would emerge of voters having increasing doubts about the solutions
being offered by the Conservatives. On the issue of inflation/prices and
the cost of living, the Conservatives had entered office with a lead over the
Labour Party—led by 40 percent to 29 in September 1970 with 31
2
European membership was briefly threatened by the commitment of the incoming
Wilson administration to hold a referendum on continued membership. This was overcome
by 67–33 percent in 1975 (see Butler and Kitzinger 1976; see also Saunders 2018).
18 THE HEATH PREMIERSHIP: A TRANSITIONAL ERA?
425
percent either others or ‘don’t know’. However, the Conservatives were
behind the Labour Party on this issue at both the General Election of
February 1974 (behind on 31 percent to Labour on 36 percent) and the
General Election of October 1974 (Conservatives 26 percent, Labour 37
percent) (King and Wybrow 2001: 60). On unemployment, pollsters did
not ask for a party of preference when the Conservatives entered office,
but as the rate of unemployment increased, so they began to do so. At the
time of the General Election of February 1974, voters thought that the
Labour Party was the strongest on this issue (led by 38 percent to 33 percent) and their lead on this issue was stronger still by the General Election
of October 1974 (led by 43 percent to 24 percent) (King and Wybrow
2001: 66). On healthcare, the Conservatives would trail at 36 percent to
that of Labour Party at 42 percent (with 22 percent others or ‘don’t
know’) shortly after the onset of the Heath premiership (in September
1970), and that deficit would increase over the course of the next four
years. At the time of the General Election of October 1974, the Labour
lead had increased to 20 percentage points—Labour were up to 44 percent (an increase of just 2 percent) but the Conservatives had declined by
12 percentage points to 24 percent (from 36 percent) (King and Wybrow
2001: 74). On the challenges associated with industrial relations, voter
faith in the Conservatives would diminish significantly over the course of
the Heath era. Shortly after entering office (in September 1970), voters
thought the Conservatives were better equipped than the Labour Party to
manage strikes and industrial disputes (Conservatives on 37 percent; the
Labour Party on 32 percent and others/‘don’t know’ on 31 percent). By
the time of the General Election of October 1974, the Conservatives were
on 20 percent; the Labour Party on 53 percent (and 27 percent were
either other or ‘don’t know’) (King and Wybrow 2001: 87).
When we pull the opinion polling evidence together, it is clear that
voter scepticism with regard to the Conservatives was gradually increasing,
which suggests that they were failing in the statecraft dimension of political argument hegemony.
When we consider the fourth dimension of statecraft—that of party
management—this is another problematic issue in the Heath era. One
plus point in the Heath era was that he did lead a relatively cohesive
Cabinet and ministerial team, and one which avoided the divisiveness associated with big name Cabinet resignations. However, this positive was
possibly a by-product of Heath’s approach to patronage (Ball 1996).
Whereas traditionally prime ministers would seek balances that would aid
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party management—ideological balance to limit the scale of back-bench
dissent—Heath would construct a Cabinet and ministerial team on the
basis of expertise, competence and loyalty (Norton 1978; Ball 1996; see
also Alderman 1976 and Allen and Ward 2009). Significant figures within
the Conservative parliamentary ranks who were aligned to the right wing
were deliberately excluded from office—Edward du Cann, Angus Maude
and of course (but understandably) Enoch Powell—all of whom would land
up causing Heath considerable difficulties from the backbenchers (Heppell
and Hill 2015).
If the so-called Heathmen (plus Thatcher) (Roth 1971) were located
within the ministerial ranks, then the enemies of Heath were positioned
on the backbenchers. Without the lubrication of reshuffles and the possibility of ministerial advancement (Heath did not engage in as many
reshuffles as some Prime Ministers), the traditional incentives to remain
loyal (in legislative terms) were not as strong under Heath as they had
been under previous Conservative Prime Ministers (Ball 1996; Heppell
and Hill 2015). This would result in an increasingly rebellious parliamentary party, for example, whereas the four-year Parliament of 1955–1959
had a Conservative rebellion rate of 1.4 percent, the Parliament of
1970–1974 had a Conservative rebellion rate of approaching 19 percent
(Finer et al. 1961; Norton 1978: 208; see also Franklin et al. 1986; Piper
1991; Seldon and Sanklecha 2004). These divisions within the Conservative
Party were at their most severe over the legislative passage of the European
Communities Act (Norton 2011) and would dominate the political coverage (television and print media) of the Heath premiership in the 1971–1972
period. This fact, added to the status of Powell as a constant and high-­
profile critic of Heath, would ensure that those divisions remained in the
public eye (Critchley 1973). Showcasing their differences to the electorate
would have consequences. Just before Heath replaced Home as leader of
the Conservative Party (in May 1965), 51 percent of voters viewed the
Conservatives as unified as opposed to 29 percent who viewed them as
divided, with 20 percent of voters offering ‘don’t know’ as their response
to the pollsters. By the endgame of the Heath era in February 1975, those
figures had been reversed—32 percent saw them as united, 52 percent saw
them as divided and 16 percent answered ‘don’t know’ (King and Wybrow
2001: 37).
Statecraft is a cyclical model—the leadership construct a winning electoral strategy in order to acquire power, they then demonstrate governing
competence when in office to gain dominance of elite debate (political
18 THE HEATH PREMIERSHIP: A TRANSITIONAL ERA?
427
argument hegemony) and they underpin that with effective internal party
management. The ultimate proof of the success of their statecraft strategy
is that not only do they get from opposition and back into government
(dimension one), but their success in office (dimensions two, three and
four) ensures that they secure re-election (dimension five). Although the
Heathite statecraft strategy was successful at dimension one—getting from
opposition and into government—it was a failure in terms of governing
competence, political argument hegemony and party management
(dimensions two, three and four). As a consequence—and despite the difficulties that were being experienced by the Labour Party in opposition—
the Conservatives would fail to secure re-election in the General Election
of February 1974—dimension five (Butler and Kavanagh 1974).
Using the statecraft model provides us with the basis for suggesting
that the failure interpretation of the Heath premiership does carry validity.
However, it is also clear from the chapters within this book, that the argument that the Heath era was (no italics) characterised by difficult circumstances, also carries some validity. As such, with both perspectives carrying
with them some justification, what we wanted to do was to show how the
Heath premiership could be seen—alongside the critical and contingencies perspective—from a transitional perspective.
The Heath Era: Evidence That It Was Era
of Transition
The remainder of the conclusion seeks to position the Heath era—both
the Conservative Party under his leadership between 1965 and 1975 and
the government of 1970–1974—within the context of it being a transitional period. This perspective enables us to acknowledge the perceptions
of failure associated with the Heath premiership and the difficult circumstances that they faced. We will split our arguments into the following:
first, party political reasons covering how the Heath leadership tenure was
a transitional era and, second, governing perspectives on how the Heath
premiership can be viewed from a transitional perspective.
In making the argument that the Heath leadership tenure coincided
with significant transitions in terms of party politics, this relates to both the
changing intra- and inter-party dynamics. Let us consider the intra-party
arguments first. The Conservative Party of the mid-to-late 1970s, after
Thatcher succeeded Heath, differed significantly from the Conservative
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Party that Heath inherited in the mid-1960s. The Conservatives had the
following three cultural or doctrinal norms:
(1) They had historically placed a considerable premium on unity, both
behaviourally in Parliament and also attitudinally in terms of their
conduct in the media. This was because they feared that divided
parties could not be successful at winning General Elections or in
demonstrating governing effectiveness.
(2) They had traditionally emphasised the importance of showcasing
loyalty to their leaders. This helped them in demonstrating strong
and effective leadership in order to strengthen the electoral prospects of the Conservative Party.
(3) They had emphasised how their electoral success had been predicated on their ‘appetite for power’ and being non-ideological. This
reflected their claim that the interaction between the ethos of the
Conservative Party and the ideological doctrines of Conservatism
was clear, that is, they prioritised being in office, and being ideologically pragmatic and adaptable was key to their historical success
(Ramsden 1999; see also Rose, 1964; Norton and Aughey 1981;
Barnes 1993; Heppell and Hill 2005).
Although some scepticism could be expressed about the validity of
these claims—oft made by Conservatives for self-interested reasons—if we
do accept their validity pre-1965, then these norms were being challenged
between 1965 and 1975. On the first norm of internal party unity, our
conclusion has already emphasised how the rebellion rate escalated significantly in the Heath era, relative to the rebellion rates experienced by the
Conservatives in the pre-Heath era. However, what substantiates our
claim that the Heath era was a transitional era within the Conservative
Party is that an increased rebellion rate was to become their new normal.
If the rebellion rates of the 1951–1964 period oscillated between 1 percent and approaching 12 percent, the rates were higher in the period
between 1979 and 1997—12 percent between 1979 and 1983; 16 percent between 1983 and 1987; 12 percent between 1987 and 1992 and 13
percent between 1992 and 1997—and increased further in the Cameron
era (at 28 percent) (Cowley and Norton 1999: 86; see Cowley et al. 2016:
108–109).
The Heath era also coincided with significant changes in relation to
how they selected their leaders. The organisational changes that created
18 THE HEATH PREMIERSHIP: A TRANSITIONAL ERA?
429
internal democracy—for vacancies in 1965 and for challenges in 1974–75—
represented a significant watershed within the history of the Conservative
Party. Or to put it another way, had the magic circle remained in place, it
is unlikely Thatcher would have become their leader. The means by which
Heath was forcibly evicted from the party leadership in early 1975, demonstrated that challenging the incumbent, a new option for Conservative
parliamentarians, could result in a change of leader. This carried implications for the old maxim that loyalty was their secret weapon. Could they
really claim this after Thatcher acquired the leadership via an act of disloyalty? (see, e.g. Fisher 1977; Shepherd 1991; Bogdanor 1994; Stark 1996;
Heppell 2008; Quinn 2012). Thereafter attempts to unseat the incumbent would become a norm—Thatcher was challenged in 1989 and 1990,
John Major had to secure re-election in 1995, Iain Duncan Smith was
removed by a confidence motion in October 2003 and Theresa May survived a confidence motion in December 2018. These developments question the validity of the loyalty to the leader claim (Quinn 2012: 97–130;
see also Jeffery et al. forthcoming).
The Heath era also coincided with the Conservative Party beginning
the protracted process of transitioning from being a one-nation party
(dominated and led by the apostles of consensus) and towards being an
economically liberal-free market party (to be driven by a conviction style
of politics associated with Thatcher and the Thatcherites) (Gamble 1988;
Fry 2005). The era of opposition under Heath was characterised by the
modernisation of their policy platform. The policy review process that
would culminate in the construction of the Selsdon agenda would, with its
perceived emphasis on tax cuts, trade union reform, law and order, immigration control and pensions reform, take a significant hold over ‘the
psyche of Conservatives over the next two decades’ (Heppell 2014: 47).
Although those on the Heathite wing of the Conservative Party would
imply that Selsdon was overstated, those on the economically liberal wing
believed that the shift had been agreed upon and would be implemented.
Oppositi