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Danilo Tangcoy and Lito Corpuz met at a casino in Olongapo. Tangcoy was engaged in business of lending money to casino players.
Upon hearing that he also has jewelry for sale, Corpuz approached him and offered to sell the pieces of jewelry on commission basis.
The jewelries, amounting to 98,000 were turned over to Corpuz after agreement. The agreement involved the remittance of the proceeds
of the sale, or the returning of the jewelry if not sold within 60 days. The period expired, without remittance of sale, or return of the
jewelries. But Corpuz promised to pay the value of the items entrusted to him, but to no avail, thus an information for the crime of estafa
was filed against Corpuz. The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was sentenced to an imprisonment under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law of (4 years and 2 months of prision coreccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM to 14 years and 8
months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period as MAXIMUM). The CA upon review, denied his appeal and affirmed the decision
of the RTC, with modification. (Indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision coreccional as minimum to 8 years of prision
mayor as maximum plus 1 year for each additional 10,000 or a total of 7 years). The case was elevated to the Supreme Court and on
deliberation of the case; the question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property came up.
The legislature pegged the penalties on value of money and property in 1930. The members of the division reached no unanimity regarding
the question. A court en banc session was held and amici curiae were invited to give their opinion. It was raised that the incremental
penalty provided by law for the offense committed as tantamount to cruel and unreasonable punishment and violative of equal protection.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can adjust the penalties provided under the law to prevent injustice
HELD: There seems to be injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property
committed today based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money in 1932. However the court cannot modify the said
range of penalties, because that would be judicial legislation. The failure of legislature in amending the penalties provided for in the said
crimes cannot be remedied in the court’s decision, as that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government.
The primordial duty of the court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation.
The petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
18 SCRA 247, G.R. NO. L-19650
FACTS: In 1960, Caltex conceived a groundwork promotional scheme to drum up patronage for its oil products denominated “Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest”. Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also
for transmission of communications thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared
in advance for mailing. The then Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the Postal law and
declined to grant the requested clearance. The Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves consideration, or that,
if it does not, it is nevertheless a “gift enterprise” which is equally banned in the postal law.
ISSUES: Whether or not the proposed “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” violates the Postal Law.
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court established that where the word “lottery” is defined as a game of chance, one of the elements
of which is consideration, the term “gift enterprise” and “scheme” in the provision of the Postal Law making unmailable “any lottery,
gift, enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money or any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind” means
such enterprise as will require consideration as an element.
Under the prohibitive provision of the Postal Law, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only
if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. Because there is none in the contest herein in question, the appellee may not
be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof.
The Court also had occasion to define Construction as “the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention
of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by
reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.”
FACTS: Felicito Basbacio was acquitted and filed a claim under Rep. Act 7309 Sec 3a which provides compensation to “any person who
was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by judgment of acquittal. The claim was filed with the Board of
Claims of the DOJ, but was denied. On the ground that even if his presence in the scene of killing was not sufficient to find him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, considering there’s a bad blood between him and the deceased because of a land dispute and the fact that the
convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there is basis in finding him probably guilty. Through counsel he contends the language of Sec3a
is clear and does not need interpretation. He argues that there is only one requirement for conviction and that is proof beyond reasonable
doubt. If prosecution fails to present the proof, the presumption of innocence stands. There is no reason for requiring that he be declared
innocent of the crime before he can recover compensation for his imprisonment
ISSUE: Whether or not the phrase “unjustly accused convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of
acquittal” refer to all kinds of accusation and conviction
HELD: Petitioner’s contention has no merit. It would require that every time an accused is acquitted on appeal, he must be given
compensation on the theory that he was “unjustly convicted” by the trial court. His professed canon of construction that when the
language of the statute is clear, it should be given its natural meaning, leaves out the qualifying word “Unjustly”. Section 3a requires that
the claimant be “unjustly accused convicted and imprisoned”. The fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted does
not mean that the previous conviction was “unjust”. An accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his conviction by the
trial court may, for any of these reasons be set aside. Section3a does not refer solely to an unjust conviction, as a result of which the
accused is unjustly imprisoned, to an unjust accusation. The accused must have been “unjustly accused, in consequence of which he is
unjustly convicted then imprisoned”
FACTS: In a decision rendered by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, petitioner JMM Promotions and management,
Inc. appealed to NLRC which dismissed the petitioner’s appeal on the ground of failure to post the required appeal bond. Respondent
cited the 2nd paragraph of Article 223 of Labor Code and Rule VI Section 6 of the new Rules and Procedure of the NLRC. Petitioner
contends that NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules to decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the
appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment because it is required under POEA rules not only
to pay a license fee of 30,000 but also a cash bond of 100,000 and a surety bond of 50,000. The petitioner claims that it has placed in
escrow the sum of 200,000 with the PNB in compliance with the rules, to primarily answer for a valid and legal claim of recruited workers
as a result of recruitment violations or money claims. The solicitor general sustains the appeal bond requirement but suggests that the
rules cited by the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of the POEA. Appeals from the decisions of
POEA are governed by the provisions of Rule V Book VII of the POEA Rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the
NLRC after posting a total bond of 150, 000 and placed in escrow the amount of 200,000
HELD: Yes, the POEA Rules are clear. A reading of Section 6 Rule V Book VII of the POEA Rules shows that in addition to the cash
and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from
a decision of the POEA. The appeal bond is intended to insure the payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is
eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC. In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part thereof should be given effect,
on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. UT RES MAGIS
VALEAT QUAM PEREAT – construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute – every word. PETITION
206 SCRA 65, G.R. NO. 88979
FACTS: R.A. No. 6683 provides benefits to government employees for early retirement and voluntary separation from government
service as well as involuntary and separation pay due to reorganization. Petitioner Lydia Chua as an employee of the National Irrigation
Authority for fifteen years with a status of “co-terminus”. The petitioner believing that she is qualified of availing the benefits of the
program, filed an application with the respondent NIA which, however, denied the same and instead offered separation benefits
equivalent to one-half month pay for every year of service commencing from 1980.
Recourse by the petitioner to the CSC stating that she is qualified for the benefits of the program was again denied because her status
as “co-terminus” employee is excluded in the coverage of R.A. No. 6683, which only covers regulars, temporary, emergency, and casual
employees with the further requisite of at least two years of consecutive service.
ISSUES: Whether or not a coterminous employee, or one whose appointment is co-existent with the duration of a government project,
who has been employed as such for more than two years, is entitled to early retirement benefits under Section 2 of Republic Act No.
6683, which provides in part that the “benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency
employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of
RULING: Answering in the affirmative, the Court ruled that a coterminous employee is no different from a casual or temporary employee,
and by necessary implication, the inclusion of the latter in the class of government employees entitled to benefits of the law necessarily
implies that the former should also be entitled to such benefits.
115 PHIL 657, G.R. NO. L-14129
31 JULY 1962 REGALA, J.
FACTS: Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code which provides that “no justice,
judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province x x x shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in any election or
to take part therein, except to vote x x x”.
Manantan argues that he, a justice of the peace, is not comprehended among the officers enumerated in the law. He further contends
that a perusal of the history of the Revised Election Code will show that since Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code which
governed such an infraction included “justice of the peace” in its enumeration while omitted in the Revised Election Code shows the
intention of the Legislature to exclude “justice of the peace from its operation.
ISSUES: Whether a “justice of the peace” is included in the prohibition contained in Section 54 of the old Revised Election Code.
RULING: The Court ruled that Manantan’s argument is untenable in that it overlooks the fundamental fact that under the Revised
Administrative Code qualifies the word “judge” by the phrase “of First Instance” while the Revised Election Code does not. Justices of
the peace were expressly included in the Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified whereas the
Revised Election Code makes no such distinction. Also, an examination of the history of these laws show that whenever the word “judge”
was qualified by the phrase “of the first instance,” the word “justice of the peace” would follow. However, if the law simply said “judge,”
the words “justice of the peace” were omitted.
The defendant likewise invokes the statutory construction rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est or that a person, object or thing
omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally, was declared by the Supreme Court as inapplicable to the
case at bar. The rule can only be made to apply where the omission has been clearly establish, the fact of which is belied by the fact that
the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political
activities but rather merely called it by another name.
Its is for these reasons that the dismissal by the trial court is set aside and remanded for trial on the merits.
36 SCRA 228, G.R. NO. L-32717
FACTS: Petitioner, after setting forth his being a resident of Pampanga and his candidacy for the position of delegate to the Constitutional
Convention, alleged that respondent Commission of Elections informed him that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but
prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers, an order which petitioner says is
violative of his constitutional right to freedom of speech.
The Supreme Court adopted a resolution which required respondent to file an answer. Respondent does not deny the allegations of
the petitioner but justifies the prohibition on the Constitutional Convention Act which proscribes candidates “to purchase, produce,
request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic
goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.”
It is the respondent’s contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and
therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the above statute subject to confiscation. It is prayed that the petition be denied for lack
of merit.
ISSUES: Whether or not the jingles of petitioner are embraced within the phrase “and the like” and thus articles prohibited from being
RULING: In answering in the negative, the Court applied the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, where general words following any
enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to.
It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Constitution Convention Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind
referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution. Where an act makes
unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or material “and the like,” the
term “and the like” does not embrace taped jingles for campaign purposes, the said term being restricted only to things of the same kind
or class as those specifically enumerated.
1 SCRA 10, G.R. NO. L-15045
FACTS: On September 1, 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila filed with the Social Security Commission (SSC) a request
that “catholic Charities, and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations, which are directly or indirectly, wholly or
partially, operated by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,” be exempt from compulsory coverage of R.A. No. 1161 otherwise
known as the Social Security Act of 1954.
The SSC denied the petitioner’s request. After a request for reconsideration, the Commission again denied the exemption. In invoking
the rule of ejusdem generis, the petitioner claims that it is not included in the term “employer” as statutorily defined as “any person, natural
or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carried in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and sued
the services of another person who is under his order as regard the employment, except the Government and any of its political
subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the government.”
It is contended that the term “employer” should be limited to those who carry an “undertaking or activity which has the element of
profit or gain” because the phrase “activity of any kind” in the definition is preceded by the words “any trade, business, industry,
ISSUES: Whether or not the term “employer” should be limited to activities for profit or gain only, thus exempting the petitioner from
compliance with R.A. No. 1161.
RULING: In rejecting the petitioner’s contention, the Court held that the “rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It
is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated.” The definition is
“sufficiently comprehensive to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit,” and “this is made more
evident by the fact that it contains exceptions in which said institutions or entities are not included.”
100 PHIL 851, G.R. NO. L-9274
FACTS: Lopez and Sons imported hexagonal wire from Germany. The Manila Collector of Customs assessed the corresponding
customs duties in the importation on the basis of consular and supplier invoice. The collector, however, reassessed the dollar value of
the cost and freight of said wire netting and as a result, additional customs duties were levied upon petitioners They appealed to the Court
of Tax Appeals but such was dismissed on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of Customs
as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 1125.
Said law, creating the Court of Tax Appeals, provides in Section 7 thereof that the Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal “decisions of the commission or customs x x x.” However, Section 11 of said law states that
persons “adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the x x x collector of customs x x x may file an appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals
within thirty days after receipt of such decision or ruling.”
ISSUES: Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction over the case owing to the discrepancy in Sections 7 and 11 of R.A.
No. 1125.
RULING: There is a discrepancy between Sections 7 and 11. Taken literally, Section 7 would be empty, meaningless and unenforceable
because, while it grants the Court of Tax Appeals jurisdiction to review decisions of the commissioner of customs, under Section 11, no
person affected by the commissioner of customs may appeal to the tax court.
The Court changed the phrase “collector of customs” to “commissioner of customs” to correct an obvious mistake in the law. It is
more reasonable and logical to hold that in Section 11 of the Act, the legislature meant and intended to say, commissioner of customs,
instead of collector of customs in the first paragraph of said Section..
It further said that “the Courts are not indulging in judicial legislation. They are merely endeavoring to rectify and correct a clerical
error in the wording of a statute in order to give due course and carry out the evident intention of the legislature.
334 SCRA 738, G.R. NO. 142261
FACTS: A complaint was filed charging Gov. Manuel Lapid of “Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service”. The Ombudsman subsequently issued an order suspending Lapid for 6 months pursuant to R.A. 6770.
On November 22, 1999, the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the case finding the petitioner administratively liable for misconduct
and thus suspending him from office. The petitioner then filed for a petition for review with the Court of Appeals and prayed for a
temporary restraining order enjoining the Ombudsman from enforcing the questioned decision.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES: Whether or not decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in R.A. 6770 § 27
are final, unappealable, and immediately executory.
Whether or not the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local Government Code should be applied suppletorily
to the Ombudsman Act (R.A. 6770).
RULING: The rule inclusion unius est exclusio alterius applies in this case since suspension without pay for one month is not among those
listed as final and unappealable, hence immediately executory. Since express mention of the things included excludes those that are not
included, all those decisions which impose penalties found in Section 27 of R.A. 6770 are not final, unappealable, and immediately
executory, it will stay the immediate execution of the Ombudsman’s decision.
Anent the second issue, the lack of any provision providing for the suppletory application of the Administrative Code and the Local
Government Code to the Ombudsman Act, the two former laws cannot be applied suppletorily to the latter for that will enlarge the
scope of the law beyond that contemplated by the legislature when the latter law was enacted.
264 SCRA 49, G.R. NO. 123169
FACTS: Petitioner Danila E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangays
election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangays. Acting on the petition
for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition.
At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% required by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred
the recall election in view of petitioner’s opposition. The COMELEC set anew the recall election. To prevent such, the petition filed
before the RTC a petition for injunction and latter issued a TRO.
After conducting a summary hearing, the RTC lifted the TRO, dismissed the petition and required petitioner to explain why he should
not be cited for contempt for misrepresentation. In a resolution, the COMELEC rescheduled the recall election for a third time. Hence,
the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction.
Petitioner insists that the recall election scheduled for January 13, 1996 is now barred as the SK election on the first Monday of May
1996 is a regular election under Sec. 74(b) of R.A. No. 7160.
ISSUES: Whether or not the phrase “regular local election” includes the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808.
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court held that to construe the phrase “regular local election” as including SK elections, no recall
election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code. It would be more in keeping with the
intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the
local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
This construction is in accordance with the rule that in the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that
the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a
statute. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise
expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory.
248 SCRA 511, A.M. NO. RTJ-93-956
FACTS: A criminal complaint for murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code was filed against Rodrigo Umpad for shooting
Genaro Tagsip, causing the latter’s death. The crime of homicide was filed by the provincial fiscal after preliminary investigation. Upon
arraignment, the offended party and the public prosecutor entered into a plea bargain agreement with the approval of the judge and thus
the information was amended to attempted homicide to which the accused pleaded guilty thereto. The agreement was entered into and
approved by the judge pursuant to Section 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which allows the accused to
plead guilty to a lesser felony.
The deceased’s brother-in-law, herein complainant, wrote a letter-complaint to the Chief Justice for respondent judge Aujero’s gross
incompetence and gross ignorance of the law. In reply, Aujero based his reliance on the aforementioned rule and that the plea bargain
was pursuant to that rule and with the consent of the deceased’s wife.
ISSUES: Whether or not Judge Aujero is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law because of his interpretation of Sec. 2, Rule
116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
RULING: In holding the judge administratively liable for gross ignorance, the Court ruled that “the fact of death of the victim for which
the accused Rodrigo Umpad was criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense be reconciled with the plea of guilty
to the lesser offence of attempted homicide. The crime of homicide necessarily produces death; attempted homicide does not.”
It further went on to say that where literal application of a provision of law would lead to injustice for to a result so directly in
opposition with the dictates of logic and everyday common sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code admonishes judges to take
principles of right and justice at heart. In case of doubt the intent is to promote right and justice. Fiat justicia, ruat coelum.
7 SCRA 347, G.R. NO. L-17931
FACTS: This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of petitioner Casco Phils. Chemical
Co., Inc.
Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 2609, the Central Bank issued Circular No. 95 fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign
exchange transactions. As a result of which, petitioner paid the margin fees amounting to P33,765.42 and another P6,345.72.
Prior to the second payment of margin fees, petitioner sought the refund of its earlier payment relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of
the Monetary Board of said bank, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. The Auditor
of the bank refused to pass and approve said vouchers on the ground that urea and formaldehyde is not covered within the exemptions
provided for in Republic Act No. 2609.
ISSUES: Whether or not “urea formaldehyde” which appears in the provision should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde” and
therefore exempting the petitioner from payment of margin fees.
RULING: When petitioners contended that the bill approved in Congress was intended to exempt the individual items “urea” and
“formaldehyde” citing the statements made on the floor of the Senate, the Supreme Court ruled that these “statements do not necessarily
reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the indent of the House of Representatives.”
In construing the law, the Court ruled that the enrolled bill which uses the term “urea formaldehyde” rather than “urea and
formaldehyde” is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President.
86 SCRA 542, G.R. NO. L-42050-66
FACTS: The accused were charged with violation of P.D. No. 9 or “illegal possession of a deadly weapon,” specifically carrying outside
one’s residence any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon not used as a necessary tool or implement for livelihood. The defense bases its
contention that the accused should be carrying such weapons for the furtherance or in relation to subversion, rebellion, insurrection,
lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
ISSUES: Whether or not the law requires the elements that the possession of a deadly firearm be for the purposes or the furtherance of
those aims stated above in order that the accused be convicted.
RULING: The Court ruled that pursuant to the preamble of P.D. No. 9, the spirit and intent of the decree is to require the motivation
mentioned in the preamble as an indispensable element of the crime. Where, as in this case, there exists ambiguity in the scope of the
law, its preamble may be referred to in order to determine legislative intent.
236 SCRA 197, G.R. NO. 113092
FACTS: The officers of the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay had a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio
Tikay, Malalas, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno with Vicento Yeo solicited from Judge Angeles a contribution of P1,500. The
solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
Due to the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information was filed against petitioners with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yeo for the
violation of P.D. No. 1564. Petition filed a motion to quash claiming that P.D. No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or
public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose.
On December 29, 1992 the trial court convicted the petitioners and sentenced them to each pay a fine of P200. Accused Centeno
appealed to the RTC of Malolos. However, Judge Villalon-Pornillos affirmed the decision of the lower court but changed the penalty to
imprisonment of 6 months and a fine of P1000 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
A motion for reconsideration was denied by the same court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not solicitations for religious purposes are within the ambit of P.D. No. 1564.
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court said that used the statutory construction rule of expression unius est exclusion alterius, the express
mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others.
Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction be extended to
others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specific enumerations in a statute had the intention
been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out “charitable” and “religious” in an enumeration, whereas P.D. No. 1564
merely stated “charitable or public welfare purposes,” only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include
solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have stated so expressly.
• Issue: whether or not justice of peace is included
• Contention of Manantan, who is a justice of peace, is that the omission of “justice of peace” revealed the intention of the legislature to
exclude such from its operation
• Held: contention denied. In holding that the word “judge” includes “justice of peace”, the Court said that “a review of the history of
the Revised Election Code will help justify and clarify the above conclusion”
Cassus Omissus A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.
• Facts: P.D. No. 1869 authorized PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance.
• LGC of 1991, a later law, empowers all government units to enact ordinances to prevent and suppress gambling and other games of
• Statcon: These two should be harmonized rather than annulling one and upholding the other. Court said that the solution to this
problem is for the government units to suppress and prevent all kinds of gambling except those that are allowed under the previous law.
Noscitur a sociis A thing is known by its associates
BGEN. COMMENDADOR vs. Renato de Villa
• Issue: whether PD 39, which withdrew the right to peremptorily challenge members of a military tribunal, had been rendered inoperative
by PD 2045 proclaiming the termination of a state of martial law
• Held: YES! The termination of the martial law and the dissolution of military tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the existence
of PD 39 ceased automatically and the decree itself ceased "Cessante Ratione Legis, Cessat Ipsa Lex" - When the reason of the
law ceases, the law itself ceases
Lydia Chua vs. Civil Service Commission
• Issue: whether a coterminous employee, or one whose appointment is co-existent with the duration of a government project, who has
been employed as such for more than 2 years, is entitled to early retirement benefits under Sec 2 RA 6683
• Court held that YES, Chua is entitled! o A coterminous employee is no different from a casual or temporary employee, and by necessary
implication, the inclusion of the latter in the class of government employees entitled to the benefits of the law necessarily implies that
the former should also be entitled to such benefits o Wrong application of the maxim “expresio uniusest exclusion alterius” Remedy
implied from a right
• Ubi jus, ibi remedium - where there is a right, there is a remedy for violation thereof
• Right -> Obligation -> Remedy
• The fact that the statute is silent as to the remedy does not preclude him from vindicating his right, for such remedy is implied from
such right. Once a right is established, the way must be cleared for its enforcement, and technicalities in procedure, judicial as well as
administrative, must give way. Where there is “wrong,” (deprivation or violation of a right) there is a remedy. If there’s no right, principle
does not apply Doctrine of Necessary Implication
Angelito Mutuc vs. COMELEC
• Statute: Act makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods, materials
and the like”
• Held: and the like, does not embrace taped jingles for campaign purposes Ejusdem Generis. Of the same kind
Juanito Pilar vs. Comelec
• Statute: RA 7166 provides that “Every candidate shall, within 30 days after the day of the election file xxx true and itemized statement
of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.
• Held: Law did not distinguish between a candidate who pushed through and one who withdrew it.
• “Every candidate” refers to one who pursued and even to those who withdrew his candidacy Verba Legis. clear, plain, and free from
Colgate Palmolive Philippines vs. Hon. Pedro Gimenez
Statute: does not distinguish between “stabilizer and flavors” used in the preparation of food and those used in the manufacture of
toothpaste or dental cream violation of municipal ordinance is comprehended within the statute and precludes applicant from taking his
oath When the law does not distinguish, neither should we distinguish.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security Commission
• Issue: a religious institution invoking ejusdem generi whether ‘employer” be limited to undertaking an activity which has an element of
profit or gain?
• Statute: “any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carried in the Philippines any trade, business, industry…. and uses
the services of another person, who under his orders as regard the employment, except the Government, and any of its political
subdivisions branches or instrumentalities and GOCCs”.
• Held: No. the rule of ejusdem generis applies only when there is uncertainty. The definition is sufficiently comprehensive to include
charitable institutions and charities not for profit; it contained exceptions which said institutions and entities are not included. Expressio
unius est exclusion alterius. The express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.
Rufino Lopez & Sons vs. Court of Tax Appeals
• Court change the phrase “collector of customs” to “commissioner of customs” to correct an obvious mistake in law
• Sec 7 – “commissioner of customs” – grants the CTA jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs
• Sec 11 – “collector of customs” – refers to the decision of the Collector of Customs that may be appealed to the tax court
• “Commissioner” prevails – Commissioner of Customs has supervision and control over Collectors of Customs and the decisions of
the latter are reviewable by the Commissioner of Customs
Gov. Lapid v. CA
• Issue: whether or not the decision of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of suspension of one year without pay is immediately
• Administrative Code and LGC – not suppletory to Ombudsman Act
• These three laws are related or deal with public officers, but are totally different statutes
• An administrative agency tasked to implement a statute may not construe it by expanding its meaning where its provisions are clear and
unambiguous 1. Ejusdem Generis 2. In Pari Materia. on the same subject or matter
Panfilo Amatan vs. Judge Aujero
• Rodrigo Umpad was charged with homicide. Pursuant to some provision in criminal procedure, he entered into a plea bargaining
agreement, which the judge approved of, downgrading the offense charge of homicide to attempted homicide to which Umpad pleaded
guilty thereto.
• Fiat justicia, ruat coelum – let the right be done, though the heavens fall
• Stated differently, when a provision of the law is silent or ambiguous, judges ought to invoke a solution responsive to the vehement
urge of conscience Literal Interpretation will lead to absurdity
Mecano v. Commission on Audit
 Claim for reimbursement by a government official of medical and hospitalization expenses pursuant to Section 699 of the
Revised Administration Code of 1917, which authorizes the head of office to case a reimbursement of payment of medical and
 Implied repeal – earlier and later statutes should embrace the same subject and have the same object.
 In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing
law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together.
 It is necessary before such repeal is deemed to exist that is be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same
subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former.
 The fact that the terms of an earlier and later provisions of law differ is not sufficient to create repugnance as to constitute the
later an implied repeal of the former. The general law does not nullify the special law
Quimpo vs. Leocio Mendoza
 Where a statute which requires that the annual realty tax on lands or buildings be paid on or before the specified date, subject to
penalty of a percentage of the whole amount of tax in case of delayed payment, is amended by authorizing payment of the tax in
four equal installments to become due on or before specified dates.
 The penalty provision of the earlier statute is modified by implication that the penalty for late payment of an installment under the
later law will be collected and computed only on the installment that became due and unpaid, and not on the whole amount of
annual tax as provided in the old statute.
 Legislative intent to change the basis is clear when the later law allowed payment in four installments.
• The insurance company disclaimed liability since death resulting from murder was impliedly excluded in the insurance policy as the
cause of death is not accidental but rather a deliberate and intentional act, excluded by the very nature of a personal accident insurance.
• Held: the principle “expresssio unius est exclusio - the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of the other thing - not having been
expressly included in the enumeration of circumstances that would negate liability in said insurance policy cannot be considered by
implication to discharge the petitioner insurance company to include death resulting from murder or assault among the prohibited risks
lead inevitably to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for such death
• Insurance company still liable for the injury, disability and loss suffered by the insured.
• The language of the a statute which penalizes the mere carrying outside of residence of bladed weapons, i.e., a knife or bolo, not in
connection with one’s work or occupation, with a very heavy penalty ranging from 5-10 years of imprisonment, has been narrowed and
strictly construed as to include, as an additional element of the crime, the carrying of the weapon in furtherance of rebellion, insurrection
or subversion, such being the evil sought to be remedied or prevented by the statute as disclosed in its preamble
• Issue: whether the solicitation for religious purposes, i.e., renovation of church without securing permit for Department of Social
Services, is a violation of PD 1564, making it a criminal offense for a person to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public
welfare purposes
Held: No. Charitable and religious specifically enumerated only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to
include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage.
Limitations of the rule
1. It is not a rule of law, but merely a tool in statutory construction
2. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius, no more than auxiliary rule of interpretation to be ignored where other circumstances indicate
that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive.
3. Does not apply where enumeration is by way of example or to remove doubts only