Administrative Law Romulo Neri v. Senate Committees G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008 FACTS: Petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified the National Broadband Project. Petitioner disclosed that then COMELEC Chairman offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege." The respondent committees cited petitioner in contempt and ordered his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. ISSUE: Whether the power to secure a foreign loan does not relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential power," because the Constitution does not vest it in the President alone, but also in the Monetary Board which is required to give its prior concurrence and to report to Congress RULING: The Court held that "the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closeddoor Cabinet meetings." The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less executive. The power to enter into an executive agreement is in essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. The fact that the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power. The inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government by no means prescribes absolute autonomy in the discharge by each branch of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people. There is the corollary doctrine of checks and balances, which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches. Thus, by analogy, the fact that certain legislative acts require action from the President for their validity does not render such acts less legislative in nature. A good example is the power to pass a law. Article VI, Section 27 of the Constitution mandates that every bill passed by Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President who shall approve or veto the same. The fact that the approval or vetoing of the bill is lodged with the President does not render the power to pass law executive in nature. This is because the power to pass law is generally a quintessential and non-delegable power of the Legislature. In the same vein, the executive power to enter or not to enter into a contract to secure foreign loans does not become less executive in nature because of conditions laid down in the Constitution. The final decision in the exercise of the said executive power is still lodged in the Office of the President.
