PRELIMINARIES
LEGAL ETHICS it
is
a
branch
of
moral
science
which
treats
of
the
duties
which
attorney
owes
to
the
cou
rt,
to
his
client,
to
his
colleagues
in
the
profession
an
d
to
the
public
as
embodied
in
the
Constitution,
Rule
s
of
Court,
the
Code
of
Professional Responsibilities,
Ca
nons
of
Professional
Ethics,
jurisprudence,
moral
laws
a
nd
special
laws.
BAR
vs.
BENCH
BAR refers
collectively,
BENCH
the
whole
members
denotes
PRACTICING
Trial
ourt,
in
the
to
the
the
whole
LAWYER
Lawyer - A
administrative
actual
trial
defense
of
body
of
of
the
vs.
body
TRIAL
lawyer
who
agencies
or
work
either
clients.
of
TERMS
TO
judges
LAWYER
personally
boards
for
the
Practicing
Lawyer - one
engaged
in
trial
lawyers are
practicing
lawyers
lawyers
are
trial
lawyers.
OTHER
attorneys
and
counselors,
legal
profession.
handles
cases
in
c
which
means
engaging
prosecution
or
for
the
but
practice
of
not
all
law.
All
practicing
REMEMBER
Counsel de officio - a
counsel,
appointed
or
assigned
by
the
court,
from
among
members
of
the
Bar
in
good
sta
nding
who,
by
reason
of
their
experience
and
ability,
may
adequately
defend
the
accused.
Attorney of
Record
or
Counsel
de
Parte - one who
has
fil
ed
a
notice
of
appearance
and
who
hence
is
formally
mentioned
in
court
records
as
the
attorney
of
the
party.
Of
Counsel to
associate attorneys
distinguish
them
are
referred
to
from
attorneys
of
as
“of
counsel”
record,
Amicus Curiae - a friend
of
the
court, not
a
party
to
the
action;
is
an
experienced
and
impartial
attorney
invited
by
t
he
court
to
appear
and
help
in
the
disposition
of
th
e
issues
submitted
to
it,
it
implies
friendly
intervention
of
counsel
to
call
the
attention
of
the
court
to
some
ma
tters
of
law
or
facts
which
might
otherwise
escape
its
notice
and
in
regard
to
which
it
might
go
wrong.
PRACTICE
Q:
What
OF
is
LAW
“practice
of
law”?
A: Practice
of
Law
means
hich requires the
application
training
and
experience.
any
of
activity in
law,
legal
or out
of
court
w
procedure,
knowledge,
Generally,
to
any
kind
of
use
in
any
practice
law
is
to
give
notice
or
render
service,
which
device
or
service
requires
the
degree
of
legal
knowledge
or
skill. (Cayetano
vs. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).
The
practice
of
law is
not
limite
d
to
the
conduct
of
cases
in
court.
It
includes
legal
ri
ghts
are
secured,
although
such
matter
may
or
may
not
be
pending in
a
court.
(Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCR
A 378).
**** The title
“attorney”
is
reserved to those who, having obtain
ed the necessary
degree in
the
study
of
law
and
successfully
taken
the
Bar Examinations, having
been
admitted
to
the
Integrated
Bar
of
the
Philippines
and
remain
members
thereof
in
good
standing,
and
it
is
they
only
who
are
autho
rized
to
practice
law
in
this
jurisdiction.
As
to
the
case
of
Alauya,
the
Supreme
Court
has
declared
that
persons
who
passed
the
Shari’a
Bar
are
not
full-fledged
members
of
the
Philippine
Bar,
hence
may
only
practice
law
bef
ore
Shari’a
courts.
While one who has been admitted to the
Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine
Bar, may both be considered “counselors,” in the sense
that
the
y
give
counsel or advice
in
professional capacity, only the latter
is
an “attorney.” (Alawi vs. Alauya, 268 SCRA 628, February 24, 1
997).
ECO
vs.
B.M. 1217,
CHOA
January
18,
2005
FACTS: Complainants
are
students
of
the
FEU
Institute
of
La
w who learned that
respondent
has
been
holding
himself
out
as
a
lawyer
for
many
years
without
obtaining
a
license
f
rom
the
Supreme
Court
to
practice
law. Complainants
likewise
allege
that
respondent
has
been
advertising
the
name
of
his
supposed
law
firm, Choa
Montilla
Albeza
&
Associates
L
aw
Offices, with
himself
as
senior
partner.
Respondent
has
a
lso
been
representing
himself
as
a
full-fledged lawyer
by
sign
ing
official
documents
as
“Atty.
John
L.
Choa.”
In
his
co
mment,
respondent
admitted
that
his
use
of
“Atty.”
although
he
is
not
a
member
of
the
bar,
is
done
so
in
go
od
faith,
believing
that
the
title
is
synonymous
with
the
wo
rd “lawyer.”
ISSUE: Whether
good
faith
is
a
defense
for
ed
and
contumacious
use
by
the
respondent
“Atty.”
without
having
actually
been
admitted
hilippine
bar.
an
of
to
unauthoriz
the
title
the
P
HELD: NO. Respondent,
although
a
law
graduate
of
the
FE
U
Institute
of
Law, never
took
the
bar.
He
has
no
right
to
use
the
title “Atty.” which
others
have
earned
throug
h
rigorous
and
serious
efforts.
Likewise,
he
has
no
rig
ht
to
represent
himself
as
a
law
practitioner with
a
law
firm
under
his
name.
Respondent’s
defense
that
he
used
the
title
“Atty.” in good faith
does
not
exonerate
him
from
liability. Respondent
should
know
that
a
mere
law
gradu
ate
is
not
entitled to
use
the
title
“Atty.”
and
practice
law
unless
and
until
he
passes
the
bar
and
meets
th
e
requirements
of
the
Rules
of
Court.
Lastly,
his
voluntary
desistance
from
using
the
title
does
not
mitigate
his
li
ability either.
False
claiming
to
be
an
attorney
and
acting
as
such
without authority
constitutes
contempt
of
court.
Q:
Does
a
lawyer
have
the
right
to
represent
himself?
A: YES. A
party
has
the right
to
represent
himself.
Even
if
the
lawyer
is
suspended or disbarred,
he
can
appear
for
himself.
This
right, however, is
limited
to
criminal
cases
concerning
grave
or
less
grave
offenses.
UNATHORIZED
PRACTICE
OF
LAW
ALVIN S. FELICIANO vs. ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA - LOZADA
A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015, 752 SCRA 245
FACTS: On
December
13,
2005,
Atty.
Lozada
was
found
guil
ty
by
the
court
for
violating
Rules
15.03
and
15.04
of
CPR
and
she
was
suspended
from
the
practice
of
law
for
a
period
of
two
(2)
years.
However,
on
June
circumstance to
defend
embroiled
in
a
legal
City.
5,
2007,
Atty.
Lozada
was
forced
by
the
rights
of
her
husband
who
is
dispute
before
the
RTC
of
Valenzuela
The
complainant
who
is
the
defendant
in
pute
filed
a
complaint
against
Atty.
Lozada
in
counsel
for
her
husband while
still
suspended
tice
of
law
for
two
(2)
years.
that
legal
appearing
from
the
dis
as
prac
Atty.
Lozada
claimed
that
she
believed
in
good
faith
that
her
appearance
as
wife
of
Edilberto
Lozada
is
not
within
the
prohibition
to
practice
law,
considering
that
she
is
defe
nding
her
husband
and
not
a
client.
She
insisted
that
her
husband
is
a
victim
of
injustice,
and
his
reputation
and
honor
are
at
stake,
thus,
she
has
no
choice
but
to
giv
e
him
legal
assistance.
ISSUE: Whether
Atty . Lozada’s
appearing
as
counsel
for
husband
is
within
the
prohibition
of
practice
of
law.
HELD:
of
dure,
YES.
Practice
of
law
embraces
“any
activity
court, which
requires
the
application
of
law,
knowledge,
training and
experience.”
her
in
or out
legal
proce
It
is
clear
that
when
Atty.
Lozada
appeared
for
and
i
n
behalf
of
her
husband
and
actively
participated
in
the
proceedings
therein
within
the
two
(2)
year
suspension,
she,
therefore,
engaged
in
the
unauthorized practice
of
law.
Atty.
Lozada’s
defense
of
good
faith
She
knew
very
well
that
at
the
time
husband,
she
still
serving
her
two (2)
der.
fails
she
years
to
convince.
represented
her
suspension
or
She
would
have
deserved
a
harsher
penalty
but
the
fa
ct
that
it
is
part
of
the
Filipino
culture
that
amid
an
a
dversity,
families
will
always
look
out
and
extend
a
helping
hand
to
a
family member, more
so, in
this
case, to
a
sp
ouse.
Thus,
considering
that
Atty.
Lozada’s
actuation
was
prom
pted
by
her
affection
to
her
husband
and
that
in
essence,
she
was
not
representing
a
client
but
rather
a
spouse, T
he
SC
deems
it
proper
to
mitigate
the
severeness
of
her
penalty.
SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE O
F LAW INCLUDES SUSPENSION FROM
PUBLIC OFFICE
VICTOR C. LINGAN
A.C. No. 5377, June
vs.
30,
ATTY. JIMMY P. BALIGA
727 SCRA 341
2014,
FACTS: On June
15,
2006,
Atty.
Baliga
violating
Rule
1.01, Canon
1
of
the
s
secretary to
notarize documents
in
his
pended
him
for
one
year
and
revoked
on.
was
found
guilty
of
CPR
for
allowing
hi
stead.
The
SC
sus
his
notarial
commissi
The
Commission
on
Human
Rights
allowed
Atty.
Baliga
to
perform
his
function
as
Regional
Director
during
the
period
of
suspension.
Atty.
Baliga
argued
that
he
cannot
be
suspended
for
ac
ts
not
connected
with
his
function
as
Commission
on
Huma
n
Rights
Regional Director
as
his
suspension from
the
practic
e
of
law
did
not
include
his
suspension
from
the
practice
of
law.
ISSUE: Whether
Atty.
Baliga’s
suspension
law
includes his
suspension
from
public
HELD: YES.
Practice
of
law
is
“any
court,
which
requires
the
application
knowledge,
training
and
experience.
ledge
Work
is
late
The
the
is
government
that
requires
considered
practice
of
law.
Supreme
practice
Court
has
of
law.
the
from the
office.
activity,
of
law,
the
exclusive
use
practice
of
in
or out
of
legal
procedure,
of
legal
jurisdiction
to
know
regu
When
the
Supreme
Court
orders
a
lawyer
suspended
fro
practice
of
law,
the
lawyer
must
desist
from
performing
all
functions
requiring
the
application
of
legal
knowledge
with
in
the
period
of
suspension.
This
includes
desisting
from
h
olding
a
position
in
government
requiring
the
authority
to
pr
actice
of
law.
m
MISCONDUCT
L
OF
GOVERNMENT
OFFICIA
LIANG FUJI vs. ATTY. GEMMA ARMI M. DELA
A.C. No. 11043, March 8, 2017, 819 SCRA 602
CRUZ
FACTS: Complainant
Liang
Fuji,
a
Chinese
national,
was
ordered
to
be deported
for
overstaying
for
one (1)
year
and
six (
6 ) months
in
violation of
immigration
laws
upon
a
formal ch
arge
issued
by
Atty.
Dela
Cruz, Special
Prosecutor
of
the
Bu
reau
of
Immigration (BID).
Complainant
was
arrested
and
n
facility
for more
than nine
(9)
when
the
Board
of Commissioners
arge
against
him
on
the
ground
working
visa.
detained
at
the
BI
detentio
months,
but
was
released
dismissed
the
deportation
ch
that
he
has
still
valid
In
his
administrative
complaint, Fuji
alleged
that
his
rights
to
due process
were
violated
since
he
was
not
afforded
a
ny
hearing
or summary deportation proceedings
before
the
deport
ation
order
was
issued
against
him. He
further
alleged
that
Special
Prosecutor
Dela Cruz
failed
miserably
in
discharging
her
duties
because
a
simple initial
review
of
the
Bureau
of Im
migration
records
would
have
revealed
that
he
was
not
overs
taying because
his
Section
9 (g)
work
visa
was
valid
until
April 30, 2016.
ISSUE
a
a
Whether
Atty.
Dela
Cruz
member of
the
bar
in
government
official.
be
the
disciplined
for
misconduct
as
discharge
of
her
duties
as
RULING
e
YES,
respondent
may
bar
for misconduct
in
government
official.
be
the
disciplined
discharge
as
of
a
her
member
duties
of
as
th
a
Generally,
a
lawyer
who
holds
a
government
office
may
not
be
disciplined
in
the
discharge of
her
duties
as
govern
ment
official.
However,
if
said
misconduct
as
a
government
of
ficial
also
constitutes
a
violation
of her
oath
as
a
lawyer a
nd
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility (CPR), then
she may
be
subjected
to
disciplinary
sanction
by
the
Court.
In
this
case,
Atty . Dela
Cruz
failed to
observe
Rule
18.
03
of
the CPR,
which
mandates
that
“a
lawyer
shall
not
n
eglect
a
legal
matter entrusted
to
him,
and
his
negligence
in
connection
therewith
shall
render him
liable.”
As
a
Special
Prosecutor
in
the
BID,
she
is
the
representative,
not
of
an
y
private
party,
but
of
the
State.
Her
task
was to
investig
ate
and
verity
facts
to
determine
whether
a
ground
for dep
ortation
exists,
and
if
further
administrative
action -- in
the
form
of
a
formal
charge
-should
be
taken
against
an
ali
en.
Lawyers
in
the
government
service
should
be
more
consc
ientious
with their
professional
obligations
consistent
with
the
time-honored
of
public
office being a
public
trust.
The
ethical
standards
under
the
CPR
are
rendered
even
more
exacting
as
to
government
lawyers
because
they
have
the
added
d
uty
to
abide
by
the
policy
of
the
state
to
promote
a
high
standard
of
ethics,
competence
and
professionalism
i
n
public
service.
Here,
respondent’s
negligence
show
her
indifference
to
the
fundamental right
of
every
person,
including
aliens,
to
due
pr
ocess
and
to
the
consequence
of
her
action.
Q:
What
constitutes
Moral
Turpitude?
A: Moral
Turpitude
imports
an
act
of
baseness,
vileness
o
r
depravity in
the
duties
which
one
person
owes
to
anothe
r or
to
society
in
general
which
is
contrary
to
the
usu
al
accepted
and
customary
rule
of
right
and
duty
which
a
person
should
follow.
Q: What
are
the
acts
A:
The
following
involving moral
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Abduction
with Rape
Violation
of
BP
22
Bigamy
Murder
Falsification
of
public
Smuggling
Participation
in
fatal
acts
have
turpitude:
CONVICTION
FOR
AND A GROUND
MELVIN
G.
AC. Nos. 7973
involving
moral
been
declared
& 10457,
vs.
by
the
court
as
documents
“hazing”
of
a
HOMICIDE CONSTITUTES
FOR DISBARMENT
GARCIA
turpitude?
ATTY.
February
3,
RAUL
2015,
749
fraternity
neophyte
MORAL
TURPITUDE
H.
SESBREÑO
SCRA
1
FACTS: Amparado
and
his
companion,
Yapchangco,
were
walking
and
just passed
by Atty.
Sesbreño’s
house
when
the
latter,
without
any
provocation from the
former
went
out
of
his
hou
se,
aimed
his
rifle,
and
started
firing
at
them.
According
to
Yapchangco, they
were
about
five
meters,
mo
re
or
less, from
the
gate
of
Atty. Sesbreño,
when
they
hea
rd
screeching
sound
of
the
gate
and
when they
turned
arou
nd,
they
saw
Sesbreño’s
aiming
his
rifle
at
them.
They
ran
away
but
Amparado
was hit
which
led
to
his
death.
The
RTC
of
sentenced
him to
Cebu
found
suffer
the
Sesbreño
guilty
of
penalty
of
reclusion
murder
and
perpetua.
On
appeal,
the
SC
d
sentenced Sesbreño
to
r
9
years
and
1
day
16
years
and
4
months
downgraded
the
crime
to
homicide an
suffer
the
penalty
of
imprisonment
fo
of
prision
mayor
as
minimum
to
of
reclusion temporal
as
maximum.
Sesbreño
was
released
from
confinement
following
his
acceptance
of
the
conditions
10
July 2001.
on
of
27
his
July
2001
parole
on
ISSUE: Whether
Atty.
Sesbreño’s
conviction
for
homicide
es
moral
turpitude
which
warrants
his
disbarment.
constitut
HELD: YES.
Atty.
Sesbreño’s
conviction
for
homicide
involves
moral
turpitude.
Section
17,
Rule
138
of
the
Rules
of
Cou
rt
states
that
a
member
of
the
bar
may
be
disbarred
or
suspended
as
attorney
by
reason
of
his
conviction
of
a
crime
involving
moral
turpitude.
Moral
turpitude
is
an
act
of
baseness,
vileness,
or de
pravity in
the
private
duties
which
a
man
owes
to
his
fel
low
men
or
to
society
in
general,
contrary
to
justice,
hones
ty,
modesty
or good
moral
character.
The
conviction
of
Sesbreño
for
the
ave
found
that
the
circumstances
leading
e
victim
involved
moral turpitude.
e
crime
of
homicide
to
the
death
of
h
th
Neither
victim
Amparado
nor Yapchangco
was
shown
to b
a
foe
of
Atty.
Sesbreño
and neither
the
victim
Amparado
or Yapchangco
shown
to
have
wronged
Atty.
Sesbreño.
They
simply
happened
to
be
at
the
wrong
place
and
time
the
early
morning
June
3,
1993.
It
The
practice
of
law
is
is
granted only
to
those
not
a
right
but
a
possessing
good
moral
A
violation
of
the
high
moral
standards
of
ofession
justifies
the
imposition
of
the
appropriate
st
a
lawyer,
including the
penalty
of
disbarment.
NAZARIA
A.C.
No.
HERNANDEZ
1526,
January
vs.
31,
ATTY.
2005,
JOSE
450 SCRA 1
C.
privilege.
character.
the
legal
pr
penalty
again
GO
FACTS: Petitioner
sought
the
services
of
respondent
to
aid
he
r
in
settling
her
accounts
with
various
creditors to
prevent
her
property
from
being
foreclosed. Respondent
persuaded
her
to
give
him
her
land
titles
and
to
execute
deeds
of
sale
in
his
favor
without
any
valuable consideration
so
h
e
could
sell
the
lots
and
the
proceeds
pay
her
creditors.
Instead
of
selling
to
buyers
at
higher
price,
respondent
paid
petitioner’s
creditors
with
his
own
funds
and
registe
red
the
land
titles in
his
name,
depriving
petitioner
of
her
real
properties
worth
millions.
ISSUE:
l
and
Whether
grossly
respondent
engage
immoral
acts.
in
deceitful,
dishonest,
unlawfu
HELD:
YES.
Obviously,
had
he
sold
the
lots
to
other
buyer
s, complainant
could
have
earned
more.
Records
show
that
she
did
not
receive
any
amount
from
respondent.
Clearly,
respondent
did
not
adhere
as
complainant’s
counsel.
faithfully
and
honestly
in
his
duty
Respondent
did
not
adhere
faithfully
and
honestly
to
his
obligation
and
duty
as
counsel
when
he
took
advantage
of
the
trust
and
confidence
reposed
in
him
by
petitioner. Respo
ndent
is
duty
bound
to
render
a
detailed
report
to
petitione
r
on
how
much
he
sold
the
latter’s
lots
and
the
amounts
paid
to
her
creditors.
His
acts
of
acquiring
for
hims
elf
petitioner’s
lots
entrusted
to him are,
by any
standard,
acts
c
onstituting gross misconduct,
a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a
dereliction in duty, willful
in
character,
and
implies
a
wrongf
ul
intent
and
not
mere
error
in
judgment.
Membership
in
the
legal
profession
is
a
privilege.
And
whenever
it
is
made
to
appear
that
an
attorney
is
no
lon
ger
worthy
of
the
trust
and
confidence
of
his clients
and
the
public,
it
becomes
not
only
the
right
but
also
the
d
uty
of
this
Court,
which
made
him
one
of
its
officers
and
gave
him
the
privilege
of
ministering within
its
Bar,
to
withdraw
the
privilege.
Respondent,
by
his
conduct,
blemished
not
only
his
integrity
as
a
member
of
the
Bar,
but
also
the
legal
profession. He
is
hereby
DISBARRED.
Conviction
of
a
for
disbarment
crime
involving
moral
turpitude
is
a
ground
MICHAEL P. BARRIOS vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO P. MARTINEZ
A.C.
No.
4585,
November
12,
2004, 442
SCRA
324
FACTS:
Respondent
Atty.
Martinez
offered
his
legal
services
to
the
victims
of
the
Doña
Paz
tragedy
for
free.
The
plaintiff
in
the
said
civil
case
was
issued
a
check
for
P90,000
by
Sulpicio
Lines
representing
compensation
for
the
deaths
of
his
wife
and
two
daughters.
Atty.
Martinez
asked
plaintiff
to
endorse
said
check,
which
was
then
deposited
in
the
accou
nt
of
Dr.
Martinez,
Atty.
Martinez’s
wife.
When
plaintiff
asked
for
his
money,
he
was
only
able
to
recover
a
total
of
P30,000.
Atty.
Martinez
claimed
the
remaining
P60,000
a
s
his
attorney’s
fees.
The
trial
court
held
that
it
was
absurd
and
totally
ridiculous
that
for
a
simple
legal
ser
vice,
respondent
would
collect
2/3
of
the
money
claim. Resp
ondent
Martinez
was
convicted
by
final
judgment
of
violation
of
BP Blg.
22.
ISSUES: 1) Is
rpitude?
2) What
is
violation
the
of
BP
appropriate
22
a
crime
involving
moral
tu
penalty?
HELD: 1) YES. Moral turpitude “includes everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Conviction
of
a
crime
involving
moral
turpitude
might
not
relate
to
th
e
exercise
of
the
profession
of
a
lawyer;
however,
it
cert
ainly
relates
to
and
affects
the
good
moral
character
of
a
person
convicted
of
such
offense. The
act
of
a
person
i
n
issuing
a
check
knowing
at
the
time
of
the
issua
nce
that
he
or
she
does
not
have
sufficient
funds
in,
or
credit
with,
the
drawee
bank
for
the
check
in
full
up
on its presentment,
is
a
manifestation
of
moral
turpitude.
It
shows
a
lack
of
personal
honesty
and
good
moral
character
as
to
render
her
unworthy
of
public
confidence.
2) In Co. vs. Bernardino and Lao vs. Medel,
we
upheld
t
he
imposition
of
one
year’s
suspension
for
non-payment
of
debt
and
issuance of worthless checks,
or
a
suspension
of
six
months
upon
partial
payment
of
the obligation.
Howeve
r, in
these
cases,
for
various
reasons, none of the
issuances
resulted
in
a
conviction
by
the
erring
lawyers
for either
estafa or BP
22.
In
the
instant
case,
however,
herein
re
spondent
has
been
found
guilty
and
stands
convicted
by
final
judgment
of
a
crime involving
moral
turpitude.
He
is
hereby
DISBARRED.
CONTEMPT
OF
COURT
EPIFANIA Q. BANTOLO vs. ATTY. EGMEDIO B. CASTILLON, JR.
A.C. No. 6589, December 19, 2005, 478 SCRA 443
FACTS: Castillon
is
the
lawyer
and
one
of
the
defendants
i
n
a
case involving
a
parcel
of
land
in
Valderrama,
Antique.
The
case
was
decided
in
favor
of
the
complainant
and
her
co-plaintiffs,
with
the
decision
of
the
RTC
having
been
affirmed
by
the
CA
and
defendant’s
petition
for
certiorari
denied
by
the
Supreme Court.
Thereafter,
a
writ
of
execution
was
issued,
by
virtue
of
which,
defendants
were
ejected
fr
om
the
property. However,
respondent,
with
his
co-defendants, s
ubsequently
entered
the
disputed
property
and
harvested
palay
t
hereon.
Plaintiffs
were
prompted
to
move
out
that
defendants
be
declared
in
contempt
of
court
because
of
their
“open
defiance
and
willful
disobedience
to
the
lawful orders
of
the
court,
which
were
abetted
by
the
acts
of
Atty.
Eg
medio
Castillon,
Jr.
who
is
an
officer
of
the
court.
ISSUE:
acts.
Whether
or
not
Castillon
is
guilty
of
the
said
HELD: YES.
Castillon
is
guilty
of
indirect
contempt
for
disobey
ing
the
writ
of execution
and
for
attempting
to
mislead
the
Commission
into
believing
that
the
contempt
charge
is
still
pending
by
submitting
an
Order
of
the
trial
court
which
per
tains
to
a
second
contempt
charge.
Respondent’s
defiance
of
the
writ
of
execution
is
a
brazen
display
of
disrespect
of
the
very
system
which
he
has
sworn
to
support.
Lawyers
are
particularly
called
upon
to
obey
court
o
rders
and
processes,
and
this
deference
is
underscored
by
t
he
fact
that
willful
disregard
thereof
may
subject
the
lawyer
not
only
to
punishment
of
contempt
but
to
disciplinary
sa
nctions
as
well.
A
lawyer
is
first
and
foremost
an
officer
of
the
court.
Thus,
while
he
owes
his
entire
devotion
to
the
interest
and
causes
of
his
client, he
must
ensure
that
he
acts
within
the
bounds
of
reason
and
common
sen
se,
always
aware
that
he
is
an
instrument
of
truth
and
justice. More
importantly,
as
an
officer
of
the
court
and
its
indispensable
partner
in
the
sacred
task
of
administering
j
ustice,
graver
responsibility
is
imposed
upon
a
lawyer
than
any
other
to
uphold
the
integrity
of
the
courts
and
to
show
respect
to
their
processes.
**** Contempt
of
court
is
a
willful
disregard
or disobedience
t
o
the
court’s
authority
and
dignity,
and
includes
the
means
of
delaying
proper
administration
of
justice. Under
the
Ru
les
of
Court,
contempt
is
classified
into either direct
or in
direct
contempt.
Direct
contempt
is
committed
in
the
presence
of or so
near
a
court or judge
as
to
obstruct
or
interru
pt
the
proceedings
before
the
same.
Indirect
contempt
is
o
ne
not
committed
in
the
presence
of
a
court.
It
is
a
n
act
done
at
a
distance
which
tends
to
belittle,
degrad
e,
obstruct or embarrass
the
court
and
justice.
Atty. Quevedo’
s disobedience
and desistance
to
lawful
writ
and
judgment
as
he
prevented
its
execution
constitutes
indirect
contempt
of
co
urt.
(Macario
Y.
Siy
vs.
NLRC,
G.R.
No.
158971, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 154).
Q: When
may
refusal
of
a
counsel
to
act
as
counsel
de
oficio
be
justified
on
grounds
aside
from
reasons
of
he
alth,
extensive
travel
abroad,
or
similar
reasons
of
urgency?
A: Other
justified
oficio
are:
grounds
for
refusal
to
act
as
counsel
de
a) Too
many
de
oficio
cases
assigned
to
the
lawyer.
b) Conflict
of
interest.
c) Lawyer is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or
competently;
d) Lawyer is prohibited from practicing law by reason of his pub
lic office which prohibits
appearances
in
court; and
e) Lawyer
is
preoccupied
with
too
many
cases
which
will
sp
ell prejudice
to
the
new
clients.
Q: Should
a
lawyer
accept
a
losing
case?
A: It
depends.
If
it
is
a
criminal
case,
he
may
not
dec
line
to
represent
the
accused
solely
on
his
opinion
regarding
the
guilt
of
said
person (Rule 14.01, CPR). The
Supreme
C
ourt
has
held
that
a
counsel
de
officio
has
the
duty
t
o
defend
his
client
no
matter
how
guilty
he
perceives
him
to
be.
But
if
the
case
is
a
civil
case,
he should
declin
e
to
accept
the
same.
In
a
civil
action,
the
rules
and
et
hics
of
the
profession
enjoin
a
lawyer
from
taking
a
bad
case.
The
attorney’s
signature
in
every
pleading
constitutes
a
certification
that
there
is
good
cause
to
support
it
and
t
hat
it
is
not
interposed
for
delay.
It
is
the
attorney’s
duty
to
counsel
or maintain
such
actions
or
proceedings
only
as
appeared
to
him
to
be
just and
such
defenses
only
as
he
believes
to
be
honestly
debatable
under
the
la
w.
Q:
Atty.
A
is
offered
professional
engagement
to
appear
befor
e
Judge
B who
is
A’s
relative, compadre and former office c
olleague. Is A ethically compelled to refuse the engagement?
Why
?
A:
A
lawyer
shall
rely
upon
the
merits
of
the
cause
and
refrain
from
any
impropriety
which
tends
to
influence, or
gi
ves
the
appearance
of
influencing
the
court. There
is
no
ethi
cal
constraint
against
a
lawyer
appearing
before
a
judge who
is
a
relative,
compadre
or former
office
colleague
as
long
as
the
lawyer
avoids
giving
the
impression
that
he
can
inf
luence
the
judge. On
the
other
hand,
the
judge
is
required
by
the
Code
of
Judicial
Conduct
not
to
take
part
in
any
proceeding
where
his
impartiality
may
be
reasonably
questione
d.
Among
the
grounds
for
mandatory
disqualification
relative
by
GARY
A.M.
P.
No.
of
the
judge
is
if
any
of
consanguinity
or
affinity
within
ROSAURO
RTJ-03-1796,
vs.
February
JUDGE
ALFREDO
10, 2006,
482
the
the
SCRA
lawyers is
a
fourth
degree.
KALLOS
149
FACTS: Rosauro
orally
agreed
to
buy
the
unregistered
piece
of
land
in
Legaspi
City
of
respondent
Judge
Kallos
pr
ovided
that
the
respondent
would
take
care
of
its
re
gistration
in
complainant’s
name, at
no
additional
cost.
After
making
several
payments
to
the
respondent,
the
latter
obtain
ed
a
loan
from
the
former,
which was payable
in
2
m
onths.
The
respondent
failed
to
pay
for
the loan.
Moreover,
the
complainant
learned
that
a
receipt
and
the
Deed
of
Absolute
Sale
which
the
respondent
gave
him,
that
a
certain Esplana-Guerrero
owned
the
said
property
and
that
Guerrero
had
sought
the
reconstitution
of
her
alleg
ed
title
to
the
same
in
the
RTC
of
Legaspi
City,
bu
t
her
petition
was
dismissed.
Respondent
judge
also
failed
to
register
the
property
in complainant’s name.
As a result,
the
complainant
sought
to
rescind
the
contract
but
the
respondent
replied, using
his
sala’s
official stationary,
that
h
e
needs
more
time
as
Guerrero
was
still
raising
the
amount
to
refund
the
complainant.
ISSUE:
Code
Should
the
of
Judicial
judge
be
held
liable
for
Conduct
and
impropriety?
violating
the
HELD: YES. Respondent judge violated Rule 5.02 of the
Code of
Judicial Conduct
as
he
took
part
in
a
commercial
trans
action
falling
delineated
that
tend
to
interfere
with
the
pr
oper
performance
of
judicial
activities,
and
increased
his
involvement
with
persons
likely
to
come
before
his
sala
regarding
the
said
property,
thus,
increasing
the
chances
of
his
disqualification
from
future
litigation
concerning
the
same.
As held in Berin vs. Judge, the
respondent
judge
increa
sed
the
possibility
of
his
disqualification
to
act
as
an
impartial
judge
in
the
event
that
a
dispute
involving
the
said
contract
of
sale
arises. Also,
the
possibility
that
the
parties
to
the
sale
might
plead
before
his
court
is
not
remote
and
his
business
dealings
with
them
might
n
ot
only
create
suspicion
as
to
his
fairness
but
also
to
his
ability
to
render
it
in
a
manner
that
is
free
from
any
suspicion
as
to
his
fairness
and
i
mpartiality,
and
also
as
to
the
judge’s
integrity.
Responde
nt
judge
also
violated
Rule
5.08
of
the
Code
when
he
ser
ved
as
Guerrero’s
attorney-in-fact.
As
such,
the
judge
was
within
the
purview
of
other
fiduciary
as
used
in
the
rule.
He
should
not
serve
as
fiduciary
of
another, except
for
t
he estate,
trust,
or
person
of
a
member
of
the
immediat
e
family,
and
then
only
if
such
service
will
not
interfer
e
with
the
proper
performance
of
judicial
duties.
Finally, respondent
violated
Rule
2.03
by
using
the
of
ficial
stationery
for
his
correspondence
with
complainant
as
it
should
only
be
used
for
official
correspondence.
By
u
sing
his
sala’s
stationery
other
than
for
official
purpose
s, respondent
judge
evidently
used
the
prestige
of
his
off
ice
to
benefit
Guerrero
and
himself.
He
is
also
liable
for
impropriety
for
the
non-payment
of
the
loan.
Q: May
a
lawyer
withdraw
from
a
case?
A: YES. The
lawyer
may
withdraw
from
onsent
of
the
court, provided
that:
1. There
2.
e
it
Q:
3. Client
Conduct
Client
is
a
pursues
failure
an
insists
pursuance
of
Professional
to
illegal
compensation
by
of
the
c
fees;
conduct;
to
an
act
Responsibility;
What
meruit”?
with
legal
cause
to
public
client;
meant
case
pay
4. Appointment
of
lawyers
is
prejudicial
to
the
is
a
violative
position
based
except
on
of
th
when
“quantum
A:
The
term
“quantum
meruit”
as
used
in
attorney’s
f
ees
means
the
fee
which
as
much
as
the
lawyer
deserves
considering
the
reasonable
value
of
the
services
he
has
rendered. (Teerthdass vs. Pohoomul Brothers, 15 Phil. 60
7).
Q: Is
ent?
A: NO.
o
the
ge
to
ontempt
indefinite
suspension
of
a
lawyer
a
cruel
punishm
Indefinite
suspension
gives
the
lawyer
the
key
t
restoration
of
his
right
by
giving
him
a
chan
purge
himself
in
his
own
good
time
of
his
c
of
misconduct
by
acknowledging
his
misconduct,
exh
ibiting
appropriate
repentance,
s
and
capacity
to
live
required
of
every
lawyer.
1989).
RE: LETTER DATED
S. SORREDA
A.M.
No.
05-3-04-SC,
21
July
22,
and
demonstrating
his
willingnes
up
to
the
exacting
standards
(Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, February 1,
FEBRUARY
2005,
464
2005
OF
ATTY.
NOEL
SCRA
FACTS:
Atty.
Sorreda,
who
identified
himself
as
a
member
of
the
Philippine
Bar,
wrote
a
letter
to
the
Chief
Jus
tice,
expressing
his
frustrations
over
the
unfavorable
outco
me
of
the
manner
by
which
the
Court
resolved
the
cases
filed
by
him.
Atty.
Sorreda
wrote
several
letters
regarding
the
unfair
resolution
of
the
cases
filed
by
him.
They
were
addressed
to
the
Chief
Justice,
copy
furnished
all
the
Associate
Justices
of
the
SC,
the
Court
of
Appeals
and
the
Office
of
the
Solicitor
Gene
ral,
denouncing
the
Court.
The
letters
were
considered
as
degrading,
insulting
and
dishonoring
the
Supreme
Court
wit
h
the
use
of
vile,
offensive,
intemperate
and
contemptu
ous
derogatory
language
against
the
Court.
He
persistently
imputed
to
the
Court
and
its
Justices
offensive
and
uncalled
remarks
in
his
letters.
ISSUE:
empt
Whether
or
of
court.
not
Atty.
Sorreda
is
guilty
of
cont
HELD:
YES.
Atty.
Sorreda’s
conduct
violated
the
CPR,
s
pecifically
Canon
11,
which
states
that:
“A
lawyer
shall
observe
and
maintain
the
respect
due
to
the
courts
and
to
judicial
officers
and
should insist
on
similar
cond
uct
by
others.
While
a
lawyer
owes
absolute
fidelity
to
the
cause
of
his
client, full
devotion
to
his
client’s
genuine
interest
and
warm
zeal
in
the
maintenance
a
nd
defense
of
his
client’s
rights,
as
well
as
the
exertion
of
his
utmost
learning
and
ability,
he
must
do
so
only
within
the
bounds
of
the
law.
A
lawyer
i
s
entitled
to
voice
his
criticism
within
the
context
of
the
constitutional
guarantee
of
freedom
of
speech
w
hich
must
be
exercised
responsibly.
Unfounded
accusations
or
allegations
or
words
tending
to
embarrass
the
court
or
to
bring
it
into
disrepute
have
no
place
in
a
pleading.
Their
employment
serves
no
useful
purpose.
On
the
contrary,
they
constitute
dir
ect
contempt
of
court
or
contempt
in
facie
curiae
a
nd
a
violation
of
the
lawyer’s
oath
and
a
trans
gression
of
the
CPR.
Atty.
Sorreda,
as
a
citizen
and
as
an
officer
of
the
court,
is
entitled
to
criticize
the
rulings
of
the
Supreme
Court.
But,
certainly,
this does
not
give
him
unbridled
lice
nse
to
insult
and
malign
the
Court
and
bring
it
into
disrepute.
Thus, Atty. Sorreda
is
found
guilty
of
contempt
of
court
and
violation
of
the
CPR
amounting
to
gross
miscon
duct.
He
is
hereby
suspended
indefinitely.
ATTY. FIDELA
ASDALA
A.M.
No.
Y.
RTJ-99-1436,
VARGAS
vs.
September
30,
JUDGE
2004,
439
FATIMA
SCRA
GONZALES
579
Q:
In
an
affidavit-complaint,
the
complainant-lawyer
alleges
t
hat
the
posting
of
the
Manila
Standard
news
items
at
the
door
of
respondent
- judge’s
courtroom,
which
constitutes
libel,
brought
dishonor
and
great
embarrassment
to
complainant.
Is
the
respondent
judge
guilty
of
serious
misconduct?
A: NO.
There
is
no
evidence
to
support
the
charge
of
Oral
Defamation
and
there
is
no
evidence
that
respon
dent
judge
committed
a
misconduct
for
the
posting
of
th
e
newspaper
clipping
at
the
door
of
the
courtroom.
Th
ere
is
no
evidence
that
she
posted
said
clipping
or
that
she
ordered
its
posting.
She
was
not
the
writer
of
the
news
items
nor
is
there
a
showing
that
she
supplied
what
was
written
thereon.
JOVENCITO
444
SCRA
R.
382,
ZUÑO
vs.
JUDGE
A.M. No. 03-1800-RTJ,
ALEJANDRO
November
26,
2004
CABEBE
Q:
In
a
criminal
case,
a
judge
issued
motu
propio
an
order
granting
bail
to
the
accused
on
the
ground
that
the
accused
invoked
his
right
to
speedy
t
rial without
objection
on
the
part
of
the
prosecution.
Is
the
act
of
the
respondent
judge proper?
A:
NO.
Respondent
judge
granted
bail
to
the
accused
without
conducting
a
hearing, in violation
of
Sections
8
and
18,
Rule
114
of
the
Revised Rules
of
Criminal
Procedure.
Cle
arly,
therefore,
respondent
judge
cannot seek
refuge
on
the
alleged
absence
of
objection
on
the
part
of
the
pros
ecution
to
the
grant
of
bail
to
the
accused.
The
Code
of
Judicial
Conduct
enjoins
judges
to
be
conversant
with
the
law
and
the
Rules
and
maintain
professional
comp
etence;
and
by
the
very nature
of
his
office,
should
be
circumspect
in
the
performance
of
his
office. He
must
render
justice
without
resorting
to
shortcuts
clearly
uncalle
d
for.
Obviously,
respondent
failed
to
live
up
to
these
standards.
FELIX
A.C.
Q:
he
No.
E.
EDQUIBAL
5687,
February
May
the
his
defense
complainant
vs.
3,
respondent
that
he
in
the
ATTY.
2005,
ROBERTO
450
SCRA
FERRER,
406
lawyer
be
held
did
not
agree
appellate
court?
JR.
liable
considering
to
represent
t
A:
YES.
If
it
is
true
that
respondent
never
agreed
to
handle
the
appeal
upon
receipt of said notice,
respondent
s
hould
have
immediately manifested
to
the
Court
of
Appeals
that
he
is
not
handling
the
appeal
on
behalf
of
said
defendant-appellants.
Section
2,
Rule
44
of
the
Rule
s
of
Civil
Procedure
clearly
states
that “the
counsel
and
guardian
ad
litem
of
the
parties
in
the
court
of
origin
shall
be
respectively considered
as
their
counsel
and
guardians
ad
litem
in
the
Court
of
Appeals.”
By
f
ailing
to
do
so,
the
Court
of
Appeals
had
every
reas
on
to
assume
that
he
was
likewise
representing
defendant
s-appellants
in
the
appeal.
Accordingly,
his failure to timely
f
ile
the
required
appellants’
brief
resulted
in
the
dism
issal
of
the
appeal.
ATTY.
NEZA
A.M.
No.
ANTONIO
D.
RTJ-04-1864,
SELUDO
December
16,
vs.
JUDGE
2004,
447
ANTONIO
SCRA
J.
FI
73
Q:
During
the
hearing,
respondent
judge
uttered
the
following
vitriolic language
against
complainant:
a) Putang
ina
mo;
b)
If
respondent
knows
how
to
read
English;
c)
Let
it
be
put
on
record,
that
he
has
a
moronic
attitude;
d)
If
Your
Honor
please,
I
don’t
know
if
this
g
uy
is
really
stupid.
The
respondent
judge
explained
that
he
has
been
suffering
from
a
heart
ailment
and
di
abetes
causing
him
considerable
anxiety
and
pain
and
th
at
this
must
be
the
reason
why
he
could
not
control
his
outburst.
Does
the
respondent’s behavior
fall
short
of
the
standards
expected
of
a
magistrate
of
the
law?
A:
YES.
That
respondent
was
suffering
from
heart
ailment
and
diabetes
is
not
an
excuse.
He
could
have
asked
the
assistance
of
a
lawyer
to
represent
him
in
prosecuting
the
case.
Besides
possessing
the
requisite
l
earning
in
the
law,
a
magistrate
must
exhibit
that
hallma
rk
judicial
temperament
of
utmost
sobriety
and
self-restraint
which
are
indispensable
qualities
of
every
judge. A
judge
should
be
the
last
person
to
be
person
as
petty,
sharp-tongued
tyrant.
Sadly,
respondent
judge
failed
to
live
up
to
such
standards
of
judicial
conduct.
SALVADOR
ATA
A.C.
No.
G.
5041,
VILLANUEVA
November
23,
vs.
2004,
ATTY.
443
RAMON
SCRA
F.
ISHIW
401
Q:
In
the
course
of
the
proceedings
at
the
NLRC,
the
parties entered
into
a
compromise
agreement
whereby
f
or
a
consideration
of
P225,000,
complainant
agreed
to
releas
e
J. T.
Transport
from
all
its
obligations
to
him.
J. T.
Transport
delivered
four
checks
to
respondent
as
fu
ll
payment
of
complainant’s
claims.
However,
respondent gave
complainant
only
P45,000
as
“first
installment,” without
advisi
ng
him
that
the
settlement
award
had
been
paid
in
full.
Complainant
learned
about
it
and
demanded
the
balance
but
the
respondent
refused.
Is
the
act
of
the
responde
nt
improper?”
A: YES.
Obviously,
respondent’s
failure
to
return
the
balanc
e
to
complainant
upon
demand gave
rise
to
the
presumptio
n
that
he
misappropriated
it
in
violation
of
the
trust
repose
d
on
him.
His act is indicative
of
lack
of
integrity
and
propriety. He
was
clinging
to
something
not
his
and
which
he
had
no
right.
The
relationship
between
an
attorney
and
his
client
is
highly
fiduciary
in
nature.
Under
his
oath,
a
law
yer
pledges
himself
not
to
delay
any
man
for
money
and
he
is
bound
to
conduct himself
with
good
fidelity
t
o
his
clients.
A
lawyer
should
thus
refrain from
any
ac
tion
whereby
for
his
personal
benefit
or
gain,
he
abuses
or
takes
advantage
of
the
confidence
reposed
in
him
by
his
client.
Accordingly, any
money
collected
for
the
client
or
other
trust
property
coming
into
the
lawyer’s
possession
should
promptly
be
reported
by
him.
VALERIANA
A.C.
No.
DALISAY
5655,
April
vs.
22,
ATTY.
2005,
456
MELANIO
SCRA
508
MAURICIO,
JR.
Q:
Dalisay
alleged
that
she
engaged
the
services
of
re
spondent
Batas
Mauricio
as
her
counsel.
Respondent
asked
her
to
pay
an
acceptance
and
filing
fees
in
the
total
amount
of
P56,000.00.
Despite
her
payments,
respondent
ne
ver
rendered
any
legal
services
to
her.
As
a
result,
she
terminated
their
attorney-client
relationship
and
demanded
the
return
of
her
money
and
documents.
However,
h
e
refused
to
do
so.
Was
an
attorney-client
relationship
established?
A: YES.
When
respondent
accepted
P56,000.00
from
complainant,
it
was
understood
that
he
agreed
to
take
up
the
latter’
s
case
and
that
an
attorney-client
relationship
between
t
hem
as
established. From
then on,
it
was
expected
of
him
to
serve
complainant
with
confidence
and
attend
to
her
case
with
fidelity,
care
and
devotion.
A
member
of
the
legal
profession
owes
his
client
entire
devotion to
his
genuine
interest
and
warm
zeal
in
the
maintenance
and
defense
of
his
rights.
An
attor
ney
is
expected
to
exert
his
best
efforts
and
ability
to
protect
his
client’s
case,
for
his
unwavering
loyalty
to
his
client
likewise
serves
the
ends
of
just
ice.
Indeed,
the
entrusted
privilege
of
every
lawyer
to
prac
tice
law
caries
with
it
his
corresponding
duties
not
on
ly
to
his
client,
but
also
to
the
court,
to
the
b
ar
and
to
the
public.
CARLOS
A.C.
No.
B.
5835,
REYES
April
vs.
15,
ATTY.
2005,
456
JEREMIAS
SCRA
87
R.
VITAN
Q: Reyes
hired
the
services
of
respondent
Atty.
Vitan
for
the
purpose
of
filing
appropriate
complaint.
He
alleg
ed
that
respondent
after
receiving
the
amount
of
P17,00
0
did
not
take
any
action
on
his
case.
Did
Atty.
Vitan
violate
the
rules
of
the
Code
of
Professional
Re
sponsibility
had
done
when
he
received
nothing
in
behalf
payment
of
his
as
counsel
client?
but
A: YES.
A
member
of
the
legal
profession
owes
his
client
entire
devotion
to
his
genuine
interest,
warm
zeal
in
the
maintenance
and
defense
of
his
rights.
An
attorney
is
expected
to
exert
his
best
efforts
and
ability
to
preserve
his
client’s
cause,
for
the
unwavering
loyalty
displayed
to
his
client
likewise
serves
the
ends
of
justice.
Verily,
the
entrusted
privilege
to
practice
law
c
arries
with
it
the
corresponding
duties,
not
only
to
th
e
client,
but
also
to
the
court,
to
the
bar
and
to
the
public.
PAGCOR
A.C.
No.
vs.
5700,
ATTY.
January
DANTE
30,
2006,
A.
CARANDANG
480
SCRA
512
FACTS: Bingo
Royale
Inc. (Bingo Royale)
was
represented
by
r
espondent
Atty. Carandang
as
its
president.
when
Pagcor
had
granted
an
Bingo
Royale
authority
to
operate
Bingo
G
ames.
In
the
course
of
its
operations,
Bingo
Royale
incurred
arrears
the
amount
of
P6,064,833.14
with
Pagcor.
As
pa
yment
to
the
said
obligation,
Bingo
Royale
issued
to
Pagc
or
twenty
four
(24)
checks
in
the
sum
of
P7.2M
signed
by
the
respondent.
However,
as
the
checks
of
each
month,
they
were
bank
by
reason
of
“closed
d
letters,
respondent
failed
checks.
were
deposited
after
the
end
all
dishonored
by
the
drawee
account.”
Despite
Pagcor’s
deman
to
pay
the
amount
of
the
Respondent
averred
that
he
is
bouncing checks
because
they
were
e
and
his
act
of
doing
so
is
ffice
of
a
lawyer.
ISSUE:
Whether
respondent
is
by
issuing checks
in
violation
HELD: YES.
Misconduct
improper conduct”
and
lagrant
and
shameful.”
has
“gross”
not
liable
for
issuing
drawn
by
Bingo
Royal
not
related
to
the
o
guilty
of
of
BP
been
has
serious
22.
defined
as
been
held
As a
lawyer, respondent
is
deemed
especially
BP
22.
By
issuing
checks
provision
of
this
law, respondent
is
sconduct.
misconduct
“wrong
or
to
mean “f
to
know
the
law,
in
violation
of
the
guilty
of
serious
mi
A
lawyer
may
be
disciplined
not
only
for
malpractice
in
connection
with
his
profession
but
also
for
gross
misconduct
outside
of
his
professional
capacity.
Respondent
likewise
violated
the
Attorney’s
Oath
will,
among others, obey
the
laws
and
Canon
Code
of
Professional Responsibility.
1
that
of
he
the
PETITION
B.M.
No.
TO
1678,
RESUME
December
Q: May a Filipino
me his practice of
requirements?
17,
PRACTICE
2007,
OF
540
SCRA
LAW
424
lawyer
who became a
Canadian
law
in
the
Philippines?
What
citizen
are
resu
the
A: YES,
if a person intends to practice
the
legal profession in
the
Philippines
may
resume
his
practice
of
law
provided
he
reacquires
his
Filipino
citizenship
pursuant
to
RA
9225.
He
must
secure
following conditions:
1. updating
and
mbership dues;
2. payment
of
3. retaking
of
the
Constitution.
Rule 1.01
Violation
of
MARY JANE
R CENTENO
560
SCRA
1,
from
payment
the
in
professional
lawyer’s
Lawyer’s
SC
full
the
of
authority
his
IBP
on
annual
No.
me
tax;
oath
and
pledge
of
allegiance
to
Oath
VELASCO & ATTYS. CHARLIE DOROIN &
A.C.
the
5033,
July
28,
HECTO
2008
FACTS: Mary
Jane
was
appointed
by
the
RTC
as
administr
atrix
in
the
settlement
of
estate
of
her
late
father,
Dr.
Eduardo
Doroin.
Atty.
Charlie
Doroin
fooled
Mary
Jane
b
y
deceitful
means
into
making
her
sign
an
Extra-Judicial
Settlement
and
Deed
of
Partition
allotting
P1.2M as
her
share;
giving
Josephine,
her
father’s
paramour,
P7.2M;
allottin
g her
alleged
3
illegitimate
siblings
of
P1.2M
alleging
suc
h
sharing
is
in
accordance
with
law.
No
share
was
a
ssigned
to
her
mother
who
was
the
legal
wife
of
Dr.
Eduardo
Doroin.
When
Mary
Jane
visited
the
lot
owned
by
her
father
situated
at
Kingspoint
Subdivision
sometime
in
June
199
6,
there
was
no
house
constructed
thereon,
but
whe
n
she
visited
it
again
in
January
1999,
there
was
alrea
dy
a
four-door
townhouse
constructed.
She
was
informed
b
y
the
caretaker
at
the
site
that
the
owner
is
one
E
vangeline.
She
also
learned
later
that
the
said
property
was
one
of
the
properties
submitted
to
the
intestate
court
and
was
sold
by
Atty.
Doroin
to
Evangeline
by
forging
t
he
signature
of
her
father.
Atty.
Centeno,
being
a
Notary
Public,
knowing
well
that
Dr.
Eduardo
Doroin
was
alread
y
dead
as
of
21
January
1996,
made
it
appear
in
th
e
said
Deed
of
Absolute
Sale
that
Dr.
Doroin
appeared
before
him
on
17
January 1997.
ISSUE: Whether
the
acts
of
gery
&
falsification
constitute
justifies
imposition
of
penalty
Attys.
Doroin
&
Centeno
for
for
violation
of
lawyer’s
oath
and
of
suspension
and
disbarment.
HELD:
YES.
Rule
1.01,
bility
which
“A
lawyer
deceitful.”
nt
Attys.
Charlie
Canon
1
of
states
that:
shall
not
engage
Doroin
&
the
Code
in
Hector
Centeno
of
Professional
unlawful,
dishonest,
violated
Responsi
immoral
or
In
the
case
at
bar,
complainant
claims
that
responde
lawyers forged
the
deed
of
sale
and
forced
her
to
sign
the
deed
of
extra-judicial
settlement by
explaining
to
her
that
it
was
“in
accordance
with
law.”
The
complained
actuations
of
the
respondent
lawyers
co
nstitute
a
blatant
violation
of
the
lawyer’s
oath
to
up
hold
the
law
and
the
basic
tenets
of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility
that
no
lawyer
shall
engage
in
dishonest
conduct.
Lawyers
must
conduct
themselves
beyond
reproach
at
al
l
times, whether
they
are
dealing
with
their
clients
or
the
public
at
large and
a
violation
of
the
high
moral
standards
of
the
legal
profession justifies
the
imposition
of
the
appropriate
penalty,
including
suspension
and
disbarment.
FAILURE TO
S FUNDS
RETURN
CLEO B. DONGGA-AS vs. ATTYS. ROSE
CRUZ – ANGELES & WYLIE M. PALER
A.C, No. 11113, August 9, 2016, 799 SCRA
FACTS: Complainant
Cleo
engaged
the
Attys.
Trexie
Angeles
and
Paler
to
his
marriage
with
his
wife.
CLIENT’
BEATRIX
624
law
firm
of
respondents
handle
the
annulment
of
In
their
meeting, Attys.
Trexie
Angeles
and
Paler
told
co
mplainant
that
the
case
would
cost
P300,000,
with
the first
P100,000
payable
immediately. Accordingly,
complainant
paid
the
r
espondents
P100,000,
which
was
duly received
by
Atty. Trexie
Angeles.
Afterwards, Attys. Trexie
additional P250,000
for
them
However,
to
complainant’s
place.
Angeles
and
Paler
asked
for
to
continue
working
on
the
dismay no
appreciable
progress
an
case.
took
When
complainant
inquired
about
the
delay
in
the
filing
of
the
case, Atty.
Trexie
Angeles
attempted
to
ease
his
worri
es
by
saying
that
the
draft
petition
was
already
submitted
t
o the
judge
for
editing
and
that
the
petition
will
soon
be
finalized.
Utterly
frustrated
with
the
delay
in
the
filing
of
his
pe
tition
for
annulment,
complainant
went
to
respondents’
law
offic
e
to
terminate
their engagement
and
demanded
the
refund
of
the
aggregate
amount
of
P350,000 he
earlier
paid
them.
How
ever,
Attys.
Trexie
Angeles
and
Paler
refused
to
return
the
said
amount
and
to
complainant’s
surprise, received
two (2) billin
g statements from
the
respondents
in
the
amounts
of
P258,0
00
and
P324,000,
respectively.
ISSUE
or
on
Whether
Attys.
Trexie
Angeles
and
Paler
be
held
liable
f
failure
to
return
their
client’s
funds
on
demand
in
violati
of
Canons
16,
17
and
18
of
the
CPR.
le
YES,
Attys.
Trexie
Angeles and
Paler
should
for
failure to
return
their
client’s
funds
on
RULING
be
held
demand.
liab
They
violated
Rule
18.03
of
the
CPR
which
the
case
l
exhorts
that
“once
a
lawyer
takes
up
the
cause
of
his
client,
he
is
duty
bound
to
serve
the
latter
with
compet
ence,
and
to
attend
to
such
client’s
cause
with
diligence,
c
are,
and
devotion
whether
he
accepts
it
for
a
fee
or
fo
r
free.
aw
The
lawyer
owes
fidelity
to
such
a
cause
and
must
e
mindful
of
the
trust
and
confidence
reposed
upon
him.
herefore,
a
lawyer’s
neglect
of
a
legal
matter
entrusted
to
im
by
his
client
constitutes
inexcusable negligence
for
which
he
must
be
held
administratively
liable
as
in
this
case.
b
T
h
In
this
relation,
Attys.
Trexie
Angeles
and
Paler
also
vio
lated
Rule
16.01
and
16.03
of
the
CPR
to
return
to
compl
ainant
the
amount
of
P350,000
representing
their
legal
fees.
Thus,
a
lawyer’s
failure
to
return
upon
demand
the
fund
held
by
him
on
behalf
of
his
client,
as
in
this
case,
gives
rise
to
the
presumption
that
he
has
appropriated
the
same
for
his
own
use
in
violation
of
trust
reposed
in
him
by
his
client.
Such
act
is
a
gross violation
of
general
morality,
as
well,
as
of
professional
ethics.
s
Rule
1.01,
Canon
1
of
the
CPR
instructs
that
“as
offi
cers
of
the
court,
lawyers
are
bound
to
maintain
not
only
a
high
standard
of
legal
proficiency,
but
also
of
morality,
honesty,
integrity,
and
fair
dealing.
Clearly Attys.
Trexie
Angele
s
and
Paler
fell
short
of
such
standard
when
they
committe
d
the
afore-described
acts
of
misrepresentation
and
deception
against
complainant.
Their
acts
are
not
only
unacceptable,
disgr
aceful
and
dishonorable
to
the
legal
profession,
they
also
re
veal
basic
moral
flaws
that
make
Attys.
Trexie
Angeles
and
Paler
unfit
to
practice
law.
Attys.
Trexie
Angeles
and
Paler
are
found
guilty
of
viol
ating
Rule
1.01,
Canon 1,
Canon
7,
Canon
11,
Rule
18.03,
Canon
7,
Canon 11,
Rule
18.03,
Canon
18
and
Rules
16.0
1
and
16.03,
Canon
16
of
them
is
suspended
d
of
three
(3)
years.
of
the
CPR
from
practice
WITHHOLDING
and
accordingly
of
law
for
a
CLIENT’S
ADEGORE R. PLUMPTRE vs. ATTY. SOCRATES
A.C. No. 11350, August 9, 2016, 799 SCRA 639
R.
each
perio
FUNDS
RIVERA
FACTS: Complainant
Adegoke
engaged
the
services
of
respondent
Atty.
Rivera
in
order
to
help
him in
his
application
for
a
work
permit
from the
Bureau
of
Immigration.
Complainant
paid
the
respondent
P10,000
as
professional
fee
s.
They
met again and
complainant
gave
respondent
another
P1
0,000.
As
they
met
for
the
third
time,
respondent
asked
P8,000
in
order
to
pay
a
Las
Piñas
judge
to
reverse
the
motion
for
reconsideration
against
complainant.
on
rt
After
the
case.
which,
status
complainant
never
of
his
working
received
any
updates
permit
and
pending
cou
Further,
he
called
respondent
for
updates
but
the
latter
hurled invectives
at
him
and
threatened
him
and
his
wife.
After
tracking
respondent’s
whereabouts,
complainant
demanded
t
he
return
of
the
P28,000
endorsed
to
him,
to
which
the
latter
refused.
ISSUE
ding
Whether
respondent
Atty.
such client’s
funds
and
Rivera
be
held
for
bribing
the
liable
for
judge.
withhol
RULING
YES,
respondent
Atty.
Rivera
should
be
ithholding client’s
funds
and
for
bribing
the
The unjustified
withholding
nt
warrants the
imposition
of
wyer.
of
funds
disciplinary
held
liable
judge.
belonging
to
action
against
for
the
the
w
clie
la
By
absconding
with
the
money
entrusted
to
him by
his
client
and behaving
in
a
manner
not
befitting
a
member
of
the
bar,
respondent violated
the
following
Canons
of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility: Canon 1,
Canon 7,
Rule
16.
01
of
Canon 16,
Canon
17,
Rules
18.03
and 18.04
of
Cano
n
18.
As
his
bound
to
protect
rvice
expected
of
n
to
the
interest
nce
and
defense
ost
learning
and
client’s
advocate,
a
lawyer
is
duty his
client’s
interests
and
the
degree
of
se
him
in
this
capacity
is
his
“entire
devotio
of
the
client,
warm
zeal
in
the
maintena
of
his
rights
and
the
exertion
of
his utm
ability.
The
lawyer
also
a
fiduciary
duty,
wi
th
the
lawyer-client
confidence.
relationship
imbued
with
utmost
trust
and
Although
nothing in
the
records
showed
whether
the
court
case
was indeed
decided
in
complainant’s
favor,
Atty.
Rivera’s
act
of
soliciting
money to
bribe
a
judge
served
to
malign
the
judge
and
the
judiciary
by
giving
the
impression
that
court
cases
are
won
by
the
party
with
deepest pockets
an
d
not
on
the
merits.
This
gross
disrespect
of
the
judicial
system
shows
that
the
respondent is
wanting
in
moral
fiber
and
betrays
the
la
ck
of
integrity
in
his
character,
the
practice
of law
is
a
privilege
and
respondent
has
repeatedly shown
that
he
is
un
fit
to
exercise
it
and
is
suspended
from
the
practice
of
la
w
for
three
(3)
years.
A
LAWYER
HONESTY
MUST ACT WITH
AND INTEGRITY
CONDONING
LAWYER’S
IS
NOT ALLOWED
SPOUSES ROGELIO
CO D. YAP
A.C.
5914,
March
11,
&
2015,
FACTS: Atty.
Yap
sued
amount
of
P94,173.44.
was,
however,
stricken
at
he
was
suspended
time
of
its
filing.
Unable
to
find
Amatorio’s decided
to
AIDA
752
MALPRACTICE
AMATORIO
SCRA
vs.
ATTY.
FRANCIS
230
the
spouses
Amatorio
to
collect
the
The
answer
filed
by
Atty.
Paras
off
the
record
for
the
reason
th
from
the
practice of
law
at
the
a
lawyer
seek
an
to
replace
out – of - court
Atty.
Paras,
settlement.
the
On
May
23,
2001,
Aida
Amatorio
went
to
Atty.
Yap’s
law
office. She
appealed
for
his
reconsideration
and
asked
t
hat
they
be
allowed
to
pay
their
obligations
by
way
of
installment.
The
parties
agreed
on
the
terms
of
payment
and
on
the
same
day,
Aida
tendered
the
first
payment
o
f
P20,000
which
was
duly
received
and
acknowledged
by
Atty. Yap
in
the
written
letterhead
of
Yap
Law
Office.
nd
y.
s
When
Aida
the
pre-trial
Yap
assured
he
will
be
asked
Atty.
Yap
if
they
should
still
atte
conference
scheduled
on
May
28,
2001,
Att
her
that
they
need
not
attend
anymore
a
moving
for
the
dismissal
of
the
case.
Relying
attend
on
the
Atty.
Yap’s
scheduled
assurance,
hearing.
spouses
Amatario
did
not
Subsequently,
Spouses
Amatorio
were
surprised
to
receive
copies
of
the
decision
of
the
trial
court
filed
by
Atty.
Yap,
declaring
them
in
default
for
non-appearance
during
the
pre-trial
conference
and
ordering
them
to
pay
the
amount
of
their
indebtedness
with
damages.
The
decision,
however,
did
not
mention
the
out – of court
settlement
between
the
parties.
Nonetheless,
the
spouses
ments
to
Atty.
Yap’s
upon
will
disregard
the
decision
Again,
that
Yap
execution
The
p
with
sel.
the
filed
and,
spouses
were
surprised
to
learn,
however,
a
motion
for
the
issuance
of
a
writ
of
in
fact, the
trial
court
issued
that
writ.
spouses
the
IBP
filed
a
where
The
IBP
commissioner
be
suspended
from
the
months.
Upon
approved
of
law
review
that
for
continued
tendering
installment
pay
the
latter’s
assurance
that
he
of
the
trial
court.
disbarment
Atty.
Paras
case
against
Atty.
Ya
served
as
their
coun
recommends
that
practice
of
law
by
the
IBP
Board
of
Atty.
Yap
be
suspended
three
(3)
months.
On
August
9,
2007,
the
s
of
Atty.
Paras
for
reason
ford
the
services
of
a
private
Suspiciously,
on
the
same
Judicial Affidavit
forgiving
and
s
malpractice.
Atty.
for
Yap
six
should
(6)
Governors,
it
was
from
the
practice
spouses
terminated
the
service
that
they
can
no
longer
af
lawyer.
day,
the
spouses
exonerating
Atty.
ISSUE: Whether
the
statements
of
the
ally
contesting the
truthfulness
of
the
Yap
in
their
own
complaint
for
sults
to
Atty.
Yap’s
absolution.
executed
Yap
for
a
hi
spouses
Amatorio,
especi
allegations
against
Atty.
disbarment
necessarily
re
HELD:
NO.
The
Court
cannot
just
aside
the
finding
of
culpability against
Atty.
Yap
merely
because
the
spouses
Am
atorio
have
decided
to
forgive
him
or
settle
matters
amicabl
y
after
the
case
was
completely evaluated
and
reviewed
b
y
the
IBP.
The
spouses’
forgiveness
or even
withdrawal
from
the
ca
se
does
not
ipso
facto
obliterate
the
misconduct
committed
by
Atty.
Yap.
To
begin with,
it
is
already
too
late
in
the
day
for
the
spouses
to
withdraw
the
disbarment
ca
se
considering
that
they
had
already
presented
and
suppor
ted
their
claims
with
convincing
and
credible evidence,
and
the
IBP
has
promulgated
a
resolution
on
the
basis thereo
f.
It
bears
stressing
that
membership
in
the
bar
is
a
privilege burdened
with
conditions.
It
is
bestowed
upon
indiv
iduals
who
are
not
only
learned
in
law,
but
also
known
to
possess
good
moral
character.
Lawyers
should
act
and
integrity
in
a
promote
the
public
o
d
and
comport
themselves
with
honesty
manner
beyond
reproach,
in
order
t
faith
in
the
legal
profession.
Because
of
the
misconduct
of
Atty.
a
violation
of
his
oath
to
keep
of
the
profession
for
which
he
must
Yap,
it
is
sacred
the
be
disciplined.
deeme
integrity
It
is
clearly
established
that
Atty.
Yap
received
P20,0
00
as
initial
payment
for
their
out –
of - court
settlement.
He
told
the
Spouses not
to
attend
the
pre-trial
and
he
did
not
inform
the
court
of
the
settlement.
The
trial
court
granted
the
motion
for
execution
of
the
decision
filed
by
Atty.
Yap,
thus,
violating
the
standards
of
honesty
provided
for
in
the
Code
of
Pro
fessional
Responsibility.
JOSELANO
EALA
529
SCRA
GUEVARRA
1,
A.C.
No.
vs.
7136,
ATTY. JOSE
August
1,
“Noli”
EMMANUEL
2007
The
case
at
bar
involves
a
relationship
between
a
marr
ied
lawyer
and
a
married
woman
who
is
not
his
wife.
It
is
immaterial
whether the
affair
was
carried
out
discre
etly.
Thus,
it
is
considered
grossly immoral
conduct
which
is
a
ground
for
disbarment
under
Section
27,
Rule
138
of
the
Revised
Rules
of
Court.
REGIDOR
544
SCRA
R.
26,
TOLEDO
vs.
ATTY.
A.M. No. P-07-2403,
JERRY
February
6,
RADAM
2008
TOLEDO
With
respect,
however,
to
the
allegation
of
immorality,
this
Court has
held
that
to
justify
suspension
or
disbarm
ent,
the
act
complained of
must
not
only
be
immoral
b
ut
grossly
immoral
and
the
same must
be
established
by
clear
and
convincing
proof.
ROSA
529
YAP
PARAS
vs.
ATTY.
JUSTO PARAS
SCRA 81, G.R. No. 147824, August 2, 2007
FACTS: Rosa
filed
a
complaint
for
annulment
against
Justo on
the
ground
of
psychological
RTC
rendered
a
decision
upholding
the
arriage.
of
marriage
incapacity.
The
validity
of
m
In
the
meantime,
Rosa
filed
a
disbarment
case
agai
nst
Justo
premised
on
the
same
charges
alleged
in
her
complaint
for
declaration of
nullity
of
marriage.
The
Cou
rt
suspended
Justo
from
the
practice
of
law
after
f
inding
him
guilty
of
falsifying
Rosa’s
signature in
bank
do
cuments,
immorality
and
abandonment
of
his
family.
ISSUE:
are
Whether
the
conclusive
in
factual
findings
the
case
of
in
the
annulment
disbarment
case
of
marriage.
HELD: NO. Jurisprudence
abounds
that
administrative
cases
agai
nst
lawyers belong
to
a
class
of
their
own.
They
are
distinct
from
and
may
proceed
independently
of
civil
and
criminal
cases.
The
basic
premise
is
that
criminal
an
d
civil
cases are altogether different from administrative matters,
such
that
the
disposition
in
the
first
two
will
not
inevi
tably
govern
the
third
and
vice
versa.
Accordingly,
one’s
unfitness
as
a
lawyer
does
not
auto
matically
mean
one’s
unfitness
as
a
husband
or
vice
ve
rsa.
This
is
why
the
disposition
in
a
disbarment
case
cannot
be
conclusive
on
an
action
for
declaration
of
null
ity
of
marriage.
While
Rosa’s
charges
sufficiently
proved
Justo’s
unfitness
as
a
lawyer,
however,
they
may
not
establish
that
he
is
psychologically incapacitated
to
perform
his
duties
as
a
husband.
In
the
disbarment case,
“the
real
question
for
determination
is
whether
or
not
the
attorney
is
still
fit
person
to
be
allowed
the
privilege
as
such.”
REFUSING
THE
UNLAWFUL
CLAIM
BUDENCIO DUMANLAG vs. ATTY. JAIME M. BLANCO, JR.
A.C. No. 8825, August 3, 2016, 799 SCRA 207
FACTS: Under TCT No. 79146, El Mavic
to be
the
registered
owner
of
the
Company
land
it
(EMIDCI)
appears
occupies.
Complainant
Dumanlag
sent
a
letter
to
EMIDCI
claiming
to
be
an
agent
of the
Heirs
of
Don
Pedro
predicated
on
a
Spanish
title
T.P. 4136.
president,
Mariano
San
The
matter
was
referred
to
Atty.
Blanco,
counsel
of
EMI
DCI,
who
rejected
complainant’s
claim
on
the
ground
that
the
Supreme
Court
decision held
that
the
heirs of
Don
Mariano
San
Pedro
were
specifically
prohibited from
exercising
any
act
of
ownership
over
the
lands
covered
by
T.P. 4136.
the
Dumanlag
exercise
argues
of
his
that
Atty.
Blanco
had
rights
over
the
land.
unjustly
prevented
ISSUE
Whether
the
claim
was
done
Lawyer’s
Oath.
act
of
Atty.
Blanco
of
rejecting
Dumanlag’s
maliciously
and
in
violation
of
the
CPR
and
RULING
NO,
the
violate
the
ility (CPR).
act
done
was
not
malicious
and
it
Lawyer’s
Oath
and
Code
of
Professional
did
not
Responsib
A
lawyer
should
always
defend
the
cause
of
his
client
but
only
within
the
bounds
of
law.
A
lawyer
should
never
pursue
the
claims
of
a
client
if
he
is
fully
aware
that
such
claim
is
erroneous
or illegal.
Such
is
the
case
here.
Atty.
Blanco
validly
denied
Duma
nlag’s
claim as
the
rejection
is
validly
based
on
jurisprudence
validly
decided
by
the
Court.
Atty.
Blanco
performed
his
du
ty
to
his
client
without
exceeding
the
scope
of
his
authority.
There
was
no
misconduct
to
speak
of
on
the
part
of
Atty.
Blanco.
In
fact,
Atty. Blanco
should
even be
remained steadfast
in
maintaining
the
cause
as
he
was
subjected
to
harassment.
of
A
commended
as
of
his
client
lawyer
is
charged
with
a
duty
to
his
client
with
wholehearted
fidelity.”
MOTIONS
NOT
INTENDED
JOSEPH A. CHUA vs. ATTY. ARTURO
A.C. No. 10671, September 5, 2016, 811
M.
defend
TO
DE
SCRA
“the
he
even
cause
DELAY
CASTRO
534
FACTS: Complainant
Chua’s
company,
Nemar
Computer
Resources
Corporation (NCRC)
filed
a
collection
case
against
Dr.
Concep
cion
Aguila
Memorial College,
represented
by
its
counsel,
respon
dent
Atty.
De
Castro.
k
d
on
Respondent
initially
moved
to
dismiss
the
complaint
for
lac
of jurisdiction
over
the
subject
matter
(principal
amount)
an
the
court
granted the
dismissal,
however, it
was
reversed
complainant’s
motion.
Since
the
filing
of
the
collection
case,
it
took
more
th
an
5
years
to
present
one
witness
of
NCRC.
Complainant
a
lleged
that
such
delays
were
due
to
respondent’s
propensity
to
seek
postponements
of
agreed hearing
dates
for
unmeritori
ous
excuses.
Respondent
countered
that
his
pleas
for
continuance
and
resetting were
based
on
valid
grounds
and
were
not
obj
ected
to
by
the
counsel
for
NCRC.
He
asseverates
that
he
will
soon be
a
septuagenarian,
he
has
been
active
in
the
academe,
teaching
law
subjects and
preparing
bar
candidate
s.
His
record
as
a
lawyer
is
untarnished.
ISSUE
Whether
the
were deliberate,
motions
for
postponements
dishonest,
malicious
and
filed
with
by
respondent
ill
motives.
RULING
NO,
the
motion
for
postponements
if
indeed
y
the respondent
was
merely
professional
lapses
hedules,
and
they
were
not
deliberate,
dishonest,
d
with
no
ill
motives.
committed
in
his
malicious
b
sc
an
There
is
no
debate
that
lawyers
are
instruments
of
the
Court
in
the
administration
of
justice
throughout
the
coun
try.
Accordingly,
they
are expected
to
maintain
not
only
legal
proficiency
but
also
a
high
standard of
ethics,
honesty,
inte
grity
and
fair
dealing.
Only
in
this
way
will
the people’s
f
aith
and
confidence
in
the
judicial
system
be
ensured.
A
lawyer
indubitably
owes
fidelity
to
the
cause
of
his
clients,
and
is
thus
expected
to
serve
the
clients
with
co
mpetence
and
utmost diligence.
He
is
enabled
to
utilize
every
honorable
mean
to
defend
the
cause
of
his
client
and
s
ecure
what
is
due
to
the
latter.
In
this
case,
the
delay
in
the
disposition
of
the
civil
case
was
not solely
attributable
to
Atty.
De
Castro. The
tria
l
court
itself,
either
at
its
own initiative
or
at the
instance
of
Chua’s
counsel,
allowed
the
delays. Consequently,
if
not
all
of
such
delays
were
attributable
to
Atty.
De Castro’s
d
oing,
it
would
be
unfair
to
hold
him
solely
responsible
fo
r
the
delays
caused
in
the
case.
e
at
or
s.
Moreover,
it
appears
that
the
trial
court
granted
Atty.
D
Castro’s several
motions
for
resetting
of
the
trial and
th
at
no
time
did
the
trial
court
sanction
or cite
him
f
contempt
of
court
for
abuse
on
account
of
such
motion
CANON
TAN
530
7
TIONG
SCRA
748,
BIO
vs.
ATTY.
A.C. No. 6634,
RENATO
August
23,
L.
2007
GONZALES
For
all
legal
intents
and
purposes,
Atty.
Gonzales,
by
performing through
the
yea0rs
notarial
acts
in
Pasig
City
where
he
is
not
so
authorized
has
indulged
in
deliber
ate
falsehood.
NICOLAS
531
SCRA
TAN
645,
vs.
ATTY. AMADEO
A.C. No. 6483,
August
31,
E. BALON, JR.
2007
Respondent
Balon
is
liable
for
indirect
contempt because
notwithstanding
his
disbarment
on
October
28,
2003,
he
continued
to
represent
himself
as
a
lawyer,
not
only
before
the
IBP
but
also
before
the
Supreme
Court.
DIANA RAMOS vs. ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG
530 SCRA 759, A.C. No. 6788, August 23, 2007
es
o
Lawyers
in
government
service
cannot
handle
private
cas
for
they
are
expected
to
devote
themselves
full-time
t
the
work
of
their respective
offices.
As
a
PAO
lawyer,
respondent
should
not
have
accepted
attorney’s
fees
from
s
the
complainant
as
this
was
mission.
Respondent
violated
other
than
his
salary.
Rule
20.04
CONTROVERSY WITH
G COMPENSATION
VINSON
499
SCRA
PINEDA
608,
vs.
G.R.
No.
ATTY.
155224,
inconsistent
with
against
accepting
CLIENTS
the
legal
office’
fees
INVOLVIN
CLODUALDO DE JESUS et. al.
August
23,
2006
FACTS: Respondents
were
the
counsels
of
Vinson
Pineda
in
an
action
for
declaration
of
nullity
of
marriage
filed
agains
t
him
by
his
wife.
He
and
his
wife
agreed
to
a
settlement
regarding
visitation
rights
over
their
minor
chil
d
and
the
separation
of
their
properties
which
the
tr
ial
court
granted.
Throughout
the
proceedings,
respondent
counsels
were
well
-compensated. They, including
their
relatives
and
friends,
even
availed
of
free
products
and
treatments from
Dr.
Vinson’s
dermatology
clinic.
This
notwithstanding,
they
billed
Dr.
Vinso
n
additional
legal
fees
amounting
to
P16.5M
which
the
latter,
however,
refused
to
pay.
Instead,
Dr.
Vinson
issued
them
several checks
totaling
P1.12M
as “full payment for
settl
ement.”
Still
not
satisfied,
respondents
filed
in
the
same
trial
co
urt
a
motion for
payment
of
lawyers’
fees
for
P50M,
re
presenting
10%
of
the
value
of
the
properties
granted
to
petitioner
in
the
case
for
declaration
of
nullity
of
marriage.
ISSUE: Whether
legal
fees.
respondent
counsels
are
entitled
to
additional
HELD: NO. Respondents’
claim
for
additional
legal
fees
was
not
justified.
They
could
not
charge
petitioner
a
fee
based
on
percentage,
absent
an
express
agreement
to
that
effect.
The
payments
to
them
in
cash, checks,
free
products
and
services
from
petitioner’s
business --- all
of
which
w
ere
not
denied
by
respondents -more
than
sufficed
for
th
e
work
they
did.
The “full
payment
for
settlement”
should
have
discharged
petitioner’s
obligation
to
them.
The
practice
of
law
is
a
decent
profession
and
not
a
money-making trade. Compensation
should
be
but
a
mer
e
incident.
As
lawyers, respondents
should
be
reminded
that
they
are
members
of
an
honorable
profession,
the
primary
vision
of
which
is
justice.
It
is
respondents’
despicable
behavior
which
gives
lawyering
a
bad
name
in
the
mi
nd
of
some
people.
The
vernacular
has
a
word
for
it,
“nagsasamantala.”
NOTABLE
CASES
ON
LEGAL
ETHICS
Rule
3.04
of
the
Code
of
Judicial
Conduct
mandates
that
a
judge
should
be
courteous
and
civil,
for
it
is
unbecoming
of
a
judge
to
utter
intemperate
language
during
the
hearing
of
a
case.
A
judge
must
address
the
meri
ts
of
the
case
and
not
on
the
person
of
the
co
unsel. (Atty. Melvin Mane vs. Judge
Arnaldo Belen, A.M. No. RTJ-08
-2119, June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 555).
Judges
are
prohibited
from
engaging
in
the
private
pr
actice
of
law
while
holding
judicial
office.
Those
who
ha
ve
been
merely
suspended
and
not
dismissed
from
the
service
are
still
bound
under the
prohibition. (Atty. Florencio B
inalay vs. Judge Elias Lelina, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-09-2132, July 31, 2009,
594 SCRA 547).
Fighting
between
court
employees
during
office
hours
is
disgraceful behavior
reflecting
adversely
on
the
good
image
of
the
judiciary. It displays
a
cavalier
attitude
towards
t
he
seriousness
and
dignity
with
which
court
business
shou
ld
be
treated.
Shouting
at
one
another
in
the
workplac
e
and
during
office
hours
is
arrant
discourtesy
and
disr
espect
not
only
towards
co-workers,
but
to
the
court
as
well
the
behavior
of
the
parties
was
totally
unbecoming
members
of
the
judicial service. (Judge Rizalina Umali vs. Judg
e Paulita Villarante, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2124, August 27, 2009, 597 SCRA
240)
A
lawyer
who
contracted
a
second
marriage
while
the
fir
st
marriage
is still
subsisting
is
liable
for
violation
of
Rule
1.01
of the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility
(CPR).
Immoral
conduct
which
is
proscribed
under
Rule
1.01
of
the
C
PR
as
opposed
to
grossly
immoral
conduct, connotes
“condu
ct
that
shows indifference
to
the
moral
norms
of
society
an
d
the
opinion
of
good
and
respectable
members
of
the com
munity.” Gross
immoral
conduct
on
the
other
hand
must
be
so
corrupt
and
false
as
to
constitute
act
or
so
unprincipled
as
to
be
reprehensible
to
a
high
degree. (
Juan
Dulalia
vs.
Atty. Pablo C. Cruz, Jr., A.C. No. 6854,
April
25,
2007, 522
SCRA 244).
CANON 1 - DUTY
THE LAWS
TO
LIGAYA
vs.
A.C. No.
FACTS:
f
six
upon
f
period,
resuming
MANIAGO
7472,
March
30,
UPHOLD
ATTY.
2010,
617
THE
CONSTITUTION
LOURDES
SCRA
142
I.
DE
AND
DIOS
Atty. De Dios
was
meted
by
the
SC
the
penalty
o
months suspension. She
served
the
suspension immediately
the
receipt of
the
Court’s
resolution.
At
the
end
o
six
month
–
she
formally
informed
the
Court
that
she
was
her
practice
of
law
which
she
actually
did.
ISSUE:
omatic
Whether
the
lifting
after
the
expiration
of
of
the
the
suspension
period.
order
was
aut
HELD: NO.
The
lifting
of
a
lawyer’s
suspension
is
not
automatic
at
the
end
of
the
period
stated
in
the
Cour
t
decision. An
order from the Court
lifting
the
suspension
at
the
end
of
the
period
is
necessary in order
for
him
to
resume
the
practice
of
her
profession. Thus, a suspended
lawyer
must
first
present
proofs
of
his compliance by submi
tting
from
the
IBP
and
from
the
Executive
Judge
that
s
he
has
indeed
desisted
from
the
practice
of
law
during
t
he
period
of suspension.
IMMORAL
CONDUCT
MAELOTISEA
&
A.C.
ROMANA
No. 6593,
GARRIDO
P.
February
vs.
ATTYS.
VALENCIA
4,
2010,
611
SCRA
ANGEL
E.
GARRIDO
508
FACTS: Atty.
Garrido
contracted his
second
marriage
with
Maeloti
sea
notwithstanding
the
subsistence
of
his
first
marriage
with
Constancia. Their union
bore
six
(6)
children.
Upon
the
de
ath
of
his
first
wife, Constancia,
he
married
Atty.
Valencia
in
Hongkong.
ISSUE: Whether
ross
immorality
both
that
Attys.
would
Garrido
warrant
&
Valencia
committed
their
disbarment.
g
HELD: YES.
Immoral
conduct
involves
acts
that
are
willful,
f
lagrant or
shameless,
and
that
show
a
moral
indifference
to
the
opinion
of
the
upright
and
respectable
members
of
th
e
community.
They
failed
to
adhere
to
highest
standards
of
morality
when
Atty.
Garrido
engaged
in
an
extra-marital
af
fairs
with
Atty.
Valencia
while
his
two
marriages
were
in
p
lace
and
without
taking
into
consideration
the
moral
and
em
otional
implication
of
his
action
on
the
two
women
he
too
k
as
wives
and
on
his
six (6)
children
by
his
second
marriage.
EDUARDO
A.C.
No.
M.
2474,
COJUANGCO,
September
15,
JR.
2004,
vs.
438
ATTY.
SCRA
306
LEO
J.
PALMA
Atty.
Palma
secretly
contracted
a
second
marriage
with
the
daughter
of
his
client
in
Hongkong. The
Court
found
that
Atty.
Palma
exhibited
a
deplorable
lack
of
degree
of
morality
required
of
members
of
the
Bar. In particular,
he
made
a
mockery
of
marriage,
a
sacred
institution that
demands
respect
and
dignity.
The
Court
also
declared
his
act
of
contracting
a
second
marriage
contrary
to
honesty,
justice,
decency
and
immorality.
FLORENCE
A.C.
No.
Atty.
equently
MACARRUBO
6148,
February
Macarrubo
used
legal
27,
vs.
2004,
ATTY.
424
entered
into
remedies
to
EDMUNDO
SCRA
42
MACARRUBO
multiple
marriages
sever
them.
The
and
subs
Court
ru
led
Atty.
Macarrubo’s
pattern
of
misconduct
undermined
the
institution
of
marriage
and
family
institutions
that
this
socie
ty
looks
up
for
the
rearing
of
our
children
and for the
development of values essential to the survival and well-being of
our
communities
and
for
the
strengthening
of
our
nation
as
a
whole. In
this
light,
Atty.
Macarrubo
was
disbarred.
LILIAN
G.R.
No.
VILLASANTA
L-9513,
April
vs.
30,
ATTY.
1957,
101
HILARION
Phil.
313
M.
PERALTA
Atty.
Peralta
married
Lilian
while
his
marriage
with
his
first
wife
was
subsisting.
The
Court
ruled
that
the
ac
t
of
Atty.
Peralta
of
contracting
a
second
marriage
was
contrary
to
honesty,
justice,
decency
and
morality.
The
lac
k
of
good
moral
character
required
by
the
Rules
of
Co
urt
disqualified
Atty.
Peralta
from
admission
to
the
Bar.
ELPIDIO
A.C.
No.
P.
4428,
TIONG
December
vs.
12,
ATTY.
2010,
GEORGE
662
SCRA
M.
1
FLORENDO
FACTS: Atty. George
served
as
legal
counsel
and
administrato
r
of
Elpidio’s
business.
He
had
illicit
affair
with
his
cli
ent’s
wife
and
later
both
admitted
their
relationship.
Seekin
g
forgiveness,
Atty.
George
and
his
client’s
wife,
executed
an
affidavit
attesting
their
illicit
relationship
and
seeking their
respective spouses’ forgiveness.
ISSUE: Whether
onduct.
Atty.
George
is
liable
for
gross
immoral
c
HELD: YES.
Possession
of
good
moral
character
is
not
only
a
condition
for
admission
to
the
Bar
but
is
a
con
tinuing
requirement
to
maintain one’s
good
standing
in
the
l
egal
profession.
Atty.
George’s
act
of
having
an
affair
wit
h
his
client’s
wife
manifested
his
disrespect
for
the
laws
on
the
sanctity
of
marriage
and
his
own
marital
vow
of
fidelity.
TOMAS
A.C.
No.
P.
TAN,
9000,
JR.
October
vs.
5,
ATTY.
2011,
658
HAIDE
SCRA
V.
327
GUMBA
FACTS: Atty.
Haide
obtained
a
loan
of
P350,000
from
Toma
s
and
by
way
of
security,
she
offered
a
parcel
of
land
covered
by
a
TCT
registered
in
her
father’s
name.
She
executed
an
“open”
Deed
of
Absolute
Sale
over
the
sai
d
parcel
of
land
in
favor
of
Tan
attaching thereto
the
S
PA
in
the
event
she
failed
to
pay
the
full
amount
of
loan
on
due
date.
Respondent
lawyer
defaulted
on
her
l
oan
obligation
and
failed
to
pay
the
same
despite
complai
nant’s
repeated
demands.
Left
with
no
recourse,
Tomas
went
to
the
Register
of
Deeds
to
register
the
sale,
only
to
find
out
that
Atty.
Haide
deceived
him
since
the SPA di
d
not give
Atty. Haide
the
power
empowered
him
to
mortgage
the
ISSUE: Whether
Atty.
legal profession.
Haide
to sell the
property
property
solely
to
exhibited
conduct
unworthy
but only
banks.
of
the
HELD: YES.
Atty.
Haide
violated
Rule
1.01
of
Canon
1
of
the
Code
of
Professional Responsibility.
Respondent’s
action
cle
arly
show
that
she
deceived
complainant
into
lending
money
to her
through
the
use
of
documents
and
false
representa
tion
and
by
taking
advantage
of
her
education
and
complai
nant’s
ignorance
in
legal
matters.
RODOLFO
A.C.
No.
A.
9081,
ESPINOSA
October
12,
vs.
2011,
ATTY.
659
SCRA
JULIETA
1
A.
OMAÑA
FACTS: Atty.
Omaña
prepared
and
notarized
a
document
e
ntitled “Kasunduan
Ng
Paghihiwalay”
of
Espinosa
and
his
wife
Elena
and
that
they
could
legally
live
separately
and
di
ssolved
their
marriage.
ISSUE: Whether
void document
HELD: YES.
gration
of
of
the
partnership.
CANON
Atty.
Omaña’s
act
warrant
disciplining
A
notary
public
should
marriage
and
family
by
spouses
and
extrajudicially
9
UNAUTHORIZED
RULE
PRACTICE
OF
not
facilitate
the
disinte
encouraging
the
separation
dissolving
the
conjugal
LAW
9.01
RODRIGO
A.C.
of
preparing
and notarizing
measures
against
her.
TAPAY
No. 9604,
March
vs.
20,
ATTY.
2013,
CHARLIE
674
SCRA 1
L.
BANCOLO
FACTS:
A
complaint
for
usurpation
of
authority,
falsification
of
public document
and
graft
and
corrupt
practices
was
filed
against
Tapay
before
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman
by
a
certain
Divinagracia.
Atty.
Bancolo denied
that
he
represented
Divinagracia
since
he
had
to
meet
him
yet
in
person
and
his
signature
appearing
in
the
complaint
against
Tapay
was
signed
by
his
secretary
in
his
law
office.
ISSUE: Whether
of
the
Code
Atty.
Bancolo
violated
Canon
of
Professional
responsibility.
9
and
Rule
9.01
HELD: YES.
With
Atty.
Bancolo’s
admission
that
the
complaint
he
filed against
Tapay
before
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsm
an
was
signed
in
his
name
by
a
secretary
of
his
law
office
is
clearly
a
violation
of
Rule 9.01
of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility
which
provides
in
Canon
9
that
“A
Lawyer
Shall
Not,
Directly
or
Indirectly, Assist
in
the
U
nauthorized
Practice
of
Law” and
Rule
9.01
which
states
that
“a
lawyer shall
not
delegate
to
any
unqualified
person
t
he
performance
of
any
task
which
by
law
may
be
perform
ed
by
a
member
of
the
Bar
in
good
standing.”
The
lawyer’s
duty
to
prevent
or
at
the
very
least
to
assist in
the
unauthorized
practice
of
law
is
found
on
public
interest
and
policy. Public
policy
requires
that
the
practice
of
law
be
limited
to
those
individual
foun
d
only
qualified
in
education
and
character.
The
permissive
right
conferred
in
the
law
is
an
individual
and
limited
not
ed
privilege
subject
to
withdrawal
if
he
fails
to
maintain
proper
standards
of
moral
and
professional
conduct.
The
purpose
is
to
protect
the
public,
the
court,
the
client
and
the
bar
from
the
incompetence
or
dishonesty
of
those
unlicense
d
to
practice
of
law
and
not
subject
to
the
disciplinary
control
of
the
Court.
Undoubtedly,
Atty.
Bancolo
al
Responsibility
by
allowing
ature
to
a
pleading.
RULE
violated
the
a
non-lawyer
Code
of
to
affix
Profession
his
sign
9.02
MIGUEL
A.C. No.
VILLATUYA
6622,
July
10,
vs.
2012,
ATTY.
676
BEDE
SCRA
37
S.
TABALINGCOS
FACTS: Miguel
was
employed
by
Atty.
Bede
as
a
financial
consultant
to
assist
in
the
technical
and
financial
matter
i
n
the
numerous
petitions
for
corporate
rehabilitation
where
th
ey
had
a
verbal
agreement
that
Miguel
be
entitled
to
P50,
000
for
every
Stay
Order
and 10 (10%)
percent of
the
f
ees.
After
Atty.
Bede
was
able
to
rake
in
millions
of
pe
sos from
the
corporate
rehabilitation
cases
they
were
working
together,
Atty.
Bede
denied
said
agreement
and
proffered
doc
uments
showing
the
salary
of
Miguel
had
been
paid
as
h
is
employee.
ISSUE: Whether
the
sharing
of
legal
fees
e
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility.
is
violative
of
th
HELD:
YES.
The
agreement
is
violative
of
Rule
9.02
of
t
he
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility.
A
lawyer
is
prohibite
d
by
the
Code
to
divide or agree
to
divide
the
fees
fo
r
legal
services
rendered
with
a
person not
licensed
to
practice
law.
An
agreement
between
a
lawyer
and
a
layperson
to
share
the
fees
collected
from
clients
secured
by
the
ayperson
is
null
and
void
and
that
the
lawyer
may
be
disciplined
for
unethical
conduct.
CANON
RULE
21.01
21
l
DR.
A.C.
TERESITA
No.
9537,
LEE
June
vs.
10,
ATTY.
2013,
698
AMADOR
SCRA
20
L.
SIMANDO
FACTS: Atty.
Simando
was
the
retained
counsel
of
Dr.
Lee.
One
day, Atty.
Simando
went
to
see
Dr.
Lee
and
aske
d
her
to
extend
a
loan
of
P1.4M
to
a
certain
Mejora
do
who
was
then
awaiting
his
claim
for
informer’s
re
ward
from
the
Bureau
of
Customs.
Upon
persistence
of
Atty.
Simando
to
act
as
co-maker,
Dr.
Lee
finally
g
ave
in
her
lawyer’s
demand.
When
the
said
obligation
became
due,
despite
repeated demands, Mejorado
failed
and
referred
to
with
his
obligation.
Dr. Lee
instructed
Atty.
Simando
te
legal
actions
against
Mejorado
but
her
lawyer
and
failed
to
bring
legal
actions.
Dr.
Lee’s
comply
to
initia
ignored
A
demand
letter
was
sent
to
Atty.
Simando
in
his
capacity
as
the
co-maker
of
the
loans
of
Mejorado
but
he
denied
his
liability
as
co-maker
and
claimed
that
novation
had
occurred
because
Dr.
Lee
had
given
additional
loans
to
Mejorado
without
his
knowledge.
Dr.
Lee
accused
Atty.
Simando
of
violating
the
trust
and
confidence
which
she
gave
upon
him
as
a
lawyer
and
even
took
advantage
of
their
professional
relationship
in
order
to
get
a
loan
for
his
client. Worse,
when
the
sai
d
obligation
became
due,
Atty.
Simando
was
unwilling
to
h
elp
her
to
favor
Mejorado.
She
lamented
that
Atty. Simando
even
divulged
confidential
information
he
had
acquired
whil
e
he
was
still
her
lawyer
and
even
used
it
against
h
er.
ISSUES
(1)
interest.
Whether
Simando
is
guilty
(2)
Whether
the
CPR.
Simando
is
guilty
of
of
of
representing
violating
conflicting
Rule
21.01
HELD: (1)
YES.
His
representation
of
opposing
clients
in
bot
h
cases
though
unrelated
obviously
constitutes
conflict
of
int
erest
or at
least,
invites
suspicion
of
double
dealing.
More
over,
with
the
subject
loan agreement
entered
into
by
Dr.
Lee
and
Mejorado,
who
are
both
his
clients, readily
shows
an
apparent
conflict
of
interest,
more
so
when
he
si
gned
as
co-maker.
(2) YES.
In
his
last-ditch
effort
to
impeach
the
credibil
ity
of
Dr. Lee,
Atty.
Simando
violated
Rule
21.01
of
the
Code
of
Professional Responsibility
when
he
divulged
informatio
ns
which
he
acquired
in
confidence
during
the
existence
of
their
lawyer-client
relationship.
PRACTICE
OF
LAW
PETITION TO SIGN ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner,
B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013, 706 SCRA
FACTS: In
1979,
and
passed the
264
Medado
graduated
from
UP
College
bar
examinations
in
the same
year.
of
Law
In
1980,
he
took
the
Attorney’s
Oath
at
the
PICC,
but
failed
to
sign
the
Roll
of
Attorneys
on
his
scheduled
dat
e
as
he
misplaced
the
Notice
to
Sign
the
Roll
of
Attorne
ys
given
by
the
OBC
when
he
went
to
his
province
for
a
vacation.
Several
years
later,
when
he
was
already
involved
in
co
rporate
and
taxation
work,
he
came
across
the
aforementioned
Notice
and
realized
what
he
signed
at
the
entrance
of
PIC
C
was
just
an
attendance
record
and
not
the
Roll
of
Att
orneys. Thus, he
was
operating
under
the
mistaken
belief
that
since
he
already
took
the
oath,
the
signing
of
the
Roll
of
Attorneys
was
not
as
urgent,
nor
as
crucial
to
his
st
atus
as
a
lawyer.
In
2005,
when
he
attended
MCLE
seminars,
he
was
req
uired
to
provide
his
Roll
Number
in
order
for
his
MCLE
c
ompliances
to
be
credited,
but
was
unable
to
do
since
he
had
not
yet
signed
the
Roll of
Attorneys.
ISSUE:
aw.
Whether
Medado
commits
an
unauthorized
HELD: YES.
He
committed
unauthorized
practice
9
of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility
that
a
lawyer
shall
not
directly
or indirectly
unauthorized
practice
of
law.
Medado
1980,
a
ng
signed
has
been
engaged
in
the
period
spanning
more
than
in
the
Roll
of
Attorneys.
practice
of
l
of
law.
Canon
(CPR)
provides
assist
in
the
practice
of
law
30
years
without
since
havi
As
Medado
is
not
yet
a
full-fledged
lawyer,
he
cannot
be
suspended
from
the
practice
of
law,
it
is
best
to
impose upon
him
a
penalty akin
to
suspension
by
allowing
him
to
sign
in
the
Roll
of
Attorneys
one
(1)
year
after
the
receipt
of
SC
resolution.
SONIA
C.
DECENA
A. M. No. RTJ-10-2217,
vs.
April
JUDGE
8,
2013,
FACTS: During
a
hearing
for
r.
Amelita, where
her
daughter,
NILO
695
A.
SCRA
MALANYAON
284
an
administrative
case
Atty.
Ma.
Kristina,
a
against
D
new
prac
titioner,
acted
as
counsel,
her
husband,
Judge
Malanyaon
sat
beside
counsel,
prompting
her
to
rise
from
her
seat
and/
or
ask
permission
from
the
hearing
officer
to speak, and m
ake manifestations
while reading or glancing at the
paper
given
by
Judge
Malanyaon.
e
Counsel
for
complainant
questioned
the
propriety
Malanyaon’s sitting
with
and
assisting
his
daughter
hearing,
being
a
member
of
the
Judiciary.
ISSUE: Whether
Judge
Malanyaon
t
unbecoming of
a
judge.
is
guilty
of
of
in
exhibiting
Judg
that
conduc
HELD:
YES.
First,
by
occupying
a
seat
beside
his
daughter
that
was
reserved
for
lawyers
during
the
hearing,
Judge
Malanyaon
displayed
his
presumptuousness
and
perhaps
even
h
is
clear
intention
to
exert
his
influence
as
an
RTC
Judge
on
the
hearing
officer
in
order
for
the
latter
to
favor
his
wife’s
cause.
Second,
by
Judge
Malanyaon’s
admission
that
his
presence
in
the
hearing
was
to
advise
daughter
on
what
to
d
o
and
say
during
the
hearing
to
the
point
of
coaching
her,
and
claiming
that
it
was
his
filial
duty
towards
his
wife
and
daughter
that
brought
him
there.
But
the
situation
of
Judge
Malanyaon
was
different,
for
he
was
a
judicial
officer
who
came
under
the
structure
that
uniformity
applied
to
all
judges
of
all
level
of
the
judicial
hierarchy,
forbidding
him
from
engaging
in
the
private
practice
of
law
during
his
incumbency,
regardless
o
f
whether
the
beneficiary
was
his
wife
or
daughter
or
other
members
of
his
own
family.
UNLAWFUL, DISHONEST
L CONDUCT
SIMULATING
LILIA
A.C.
TRANSACTIONS
TABANG
No. 6490,
July
vs.
9,
- Rule
ATTY.
2013,
700
&
1.01
of
GLENN
SCRA
788
DECEITHFU
CPR
C.
GACOTT
FACTS: Lilia
purchased
seven
parcels
of
agricultural
a
total
area
of
30
hectares
and
obtained
the
g
TCT
under
the
names
of
fictitious
persons.
Later,
when
Lilia
was
offering
buyers,
Atty.
Gacott
borrowed
the
parcels.
the
parcels
to
seven (7)
TCTs
land
with
correspondin
prospective
covering
the
Atty.
Gacott
executed
several
documents
that
included
revo
cations
of
SPAs
and
various
affidavits
of
recovery
purportedly
signed
by
the
fictitious owners.
Also
he
caused
the
publica
tion
of
notices
where
he
represented himself
as
the
owner
of
the
parcels
and
announced
that
these
were
for
sale.
Subsequently,
Atty.
Gacott
succeeded
in
selling
the
parcels.
He
received
a
sum
of
money of more than
m
the
proceeds
of
the
sales.
seven
P3M fro
ISSUE: Whether
Atty.
Gacott
is
guilty
honesty
and
deceit
in
violation
of
of
Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
HELD:
YES.
and
deceit
Atty.
Gacott
in
violation
is
of
The
Rule
provides
that
unlawful, dishonest,
immoral
or
of
gross
Rule
1.01
guilty
of
Rule
1.01
misconduct,
dis
of
the
Code
misconduct,
dishonesty
of
the
CPR.
a
lawyer
shall
not
deceitful
conduct.
engage
in
While
it
may
be
true
that
Lilia
herself
engaged
in
illic
it
activities,
her
own
complicity
does
not
negate
or even
mitigate
the
repugnancy
of
Atty.
Gacott’s
offense.
He
is
a
lawyer
who
is
held
to
the
highest standards
of
morality,
h
onesty,
integrity, and
fair
dealing.
Perverting
what
is
expected
of
him, he
deliberately
and
c
unningly
took
advantage
of
his
knowledge
and
skill
of
the
law
to
prejudice
and
torment
other
individuals. Not
only did
he
countenance
illicit
action,
he
instigated
it.
Not
only
did
he
acquiesce to
injustice,
he
orchestrated
it.
BAR
ATTY.
ATTY.
G.R.
DISCIPLINE
PHILIP SIGFRID
PRIMA
JESUSA
No. 194578,
February
FACTS: Atty.
Fortun
principal
accused
in
13,
A.
B.
FORTUN
vs.
QUINSAYAS, et.
2013,
690
is
the
counsel
the
Maguindanao
SCRA
623
for
the
Massacre.
al.
Ampatuans,
the
Atty.
Quinsayas
filed
a
disbarment
complaint
against
Atty.
Fortun
for
misleading
the
prosecution and
trial
court
under
t
he
rules
and
muddled
the
issues
and
diverted
the
attention
away
from
the
main
subject
matter
of
the
case.
Atty.
Fortun
filed
an
indirect
contempt
against
Atty. Quinsa
yas
and
the
media
group
for
active
dissemination
of
the
details
of
the
disbarment
complaint
against
him
in
violation
of
Rule
139-B
of
the
Rules
of
Court on
confidential
nature
of
disbarment
proceedings.
The
media
group
denied
the
posting and
publication
of
t
he
articles
about
the
disbarment
complaint.
It
would
appear
t
hat
only Atty. Quinsayas was
responsible
for
the
distribution of
copies of
the
disbarment
complaint
to
the
members
of
the
media.
ISSUE: Whether
n
violation of
.
Atty. Quinsayas
is
Section
18,
Rule
guilty
of
indirect
contempt
i
139-B of
the
Rules
of
Court
HELD: YES.
Atty.
Quinsayas
is
39-B
of
the
Rules
of
Court
a
lawyer
in
the
disbarment
bound
by
Section
18,
Rule
both
as
a
complainant
and
case
against
Atty.
Fortun.
1
as
As
a
lawyer
and
an
officer
of
the
Court,
Atty.
Quinsa
yas
is
familiar
with
the
confidential
nature
of
disbarment
proc
eedings.
However,
instead
of
preserving
its
confidentiality,
she
d
isseminated
copies
of
the
disbarment
complaint
against
Atty.
F
ortun to
members
of
the
media
which act
constitutes
contempt
of
court.
RULE 6.06 CANON 6 OF CPR
Primary Duty of the Prosecutor
MARY ROSE A. BOTO vs.
A.C. No. 9684, September 18,
PROS. VINCENT L.
706 SCRA 1
2013,
VILLENA
FACTS:
Boto
had
filed
a
libel
case
against
Tizon
but
the
said
case
was
dismissed by
Prosecutor
Villena
without
condu
cting
preliminary
investigation.
However,
when
Tizon
filed
a
complaint
for
libel
against
Boto,
Prosecutor
Villena
immediately
acted
and
has
shown
inte
rest
from
its
filing
to
the
issuance
of
the
warrant
of
arre
st
on
the
same
day
the
case
was
filed
before
the
MeTC.
Boto
filed
the
lack
of
exclusive
der
posted
bail and
on
the scheduled
arraignment,
she
Motion to
Quash
the
information
on the
ground
of
jurisdiction
as
the
crime
of
libel
falls
within the
jurisdiction
of
the
RTC,
and
not
with
the
MeTC.
The
MeTC,
instead
of
dismissing
the
case,
requiring trial
prosecutor
Villena
to
file
his
ten
(10)
days
and
reset the
arraignment.
(10)
Prosecutor
Villena
failed
days
and
extended
to
to
five
file
(5)
Finally,
Prosecutor
Villena
opposed
and
contended
that
“the
court
had
cause
when
it
issued
the
warrant
ISSUE: Whether
of
the
law.
Prosecutor
Villena
is
issued
an
Or
comment
within
his
comment
months.
within
the
motion
to
already
determined
of
arrest.”
guilty
of
gross
ten
quash
probable
ignorance
HELD: YES.
When
the
motion
to
quash
was
filed
by
Boto
for
lack
of
jurisdiction,
Prosecutor
Villena
should
have
immedi
ately
acted
on
it
by
not
opposing
the
dismissal
of
the
case.
Patently,
the
responsive
pleading
of
Prosecutor
Villena
demo
nstrates
that
he
did
not
know
the
elementary
rules
on
juris
diction.
Fundamental
is
the
rule
that
jurisdiction
is
conferred
by
law
and
it
is
no
within
the
courts, let
alone
the
partie
s
themselves.
As
a
responsible
public
servant,
Rule
6.01 of
the
CPR
provides
that
“the
prosecutor’s
primary
duty
is
not
simply convict
but
to
see
that
justice
is
done.”
NON
JUDGE
COMPLIANCE
MARIBETH
A.C. No. 8954,
MANAHAN
November
FACTS: Atty.
Flores
in
a
civil
case
During
appearance
f.
the
and
13,
2013,
was
before
vs.
ATTY.
709
the
the
OF
SCRA
RODOLFO
297
counsel
sala
of
preliminary
conference,
was
given
time
MCLE
FLORES
for
the
defendant
Judge
Manahan.
Atty.
Flores
to
file
a
entered
his
Pre-Trial
Brie
Later,
Atty.
Flores
filed
his
Pre-Trial
Brief
but
without
proof
of
MCLE
compliance
hence
it
was
expunged
from
t
he
records
without
prejudice
to
the
filing
of
another
Pre-Tria
l
Brief
containing
the
required
MCLE
compliance,
however,
Atty.
Flores
asked
for
ten
(10)
days
to
submit
proof.
h
The
preliminary
conference
was
set
several
times
Flores
was
given several
occasions
to
submit
the
the
proper
MCLE compliance.
and
Atty.
brief
wit
On
the
final
instance,
instead
of
submitting
the
promi
proof
of
MCLE
compliance,
Atty.
Flores
filed
a
letter
stating
that
he
was
no
longer
representing
the
defendant.
Such
was
stated
in
what
was
deemed
as
intemperate
language.
sed
ISSUE:
Whether
urt
orders.
Atty.
Flores
is
guilty
of
disrespect
to
co
HELD:
YES. Court
orders
are
to be
respected
not
because
t
he
judges
who issue
them
should
be
respected,
but
because
of
the
respect
and
consideration
that
should
be
extended
to
the
judicial
branch of
the
Government.
Atty.
Flores
failed
to
obey
the
trial
court’s
order
to
su
bmit
proof
of
his
MCLE
compliance
notwithstanding
the
several
opportunities
given
him. Furthermore,
he
used
intemperate
langua
ge
in
his
pleadings
and
dealing
with
the
court.
As
an
officer
of
the
court,
he
must
his
language
and
should
have
abstained
s,
offensive
or menacing
language
or
behavior
court.
in
SAMUEL
A.C. No.
B.
ARNADO vs.
August 26,
9834,
FACT:
Atty.
First
and
expertise
of
Adaza
Second
law.
ATTY.
2015,
HOMOBONO A.
SCRA 172
768
filed
a
request
Compliance
period
for
on
be
circumspect
from
scandalou
before
the
ADAZA
exemption
for
the
grounds
the
of
While
awaiting
for
his
request
of
for
exemption,
he
used
to
indicate
in
his
pleadings
“MCLE
application
for
exemption
under
process” filed
in
2009,
2010,
2011
and
“
MCLE
Application
leadings
filed
in
On
d
his
sufficient,
expertise
for
Exemption
2012.
for
Reconsideration”
in
the
p
January
14,
2009,
the
MCLE
Governing
Board
denie
request
for
exemption
for
his
failure
to
submit
satisfactory and
convincing
proof
to
establish
his
in
a
certain
area
of
law.
ISSUE: Whether
Atty.
s
failure
to
comply
Adaza
is
with
the
administratively
liable
MCLE
requirements.
for
hi
HELD:
YES.
Atty.
Adaza’s
failure
to
comply
with
the
MCL
E
requirements and
disregards
of
the
directives
of
MCLE
o
ffice
warrant
his
declaration as
a
delinquent
member
of
th
e
IBP.
While
the
MCLE Implementing
Regulations
state
that
the
MCLE Committee
should
recommend
to
the
IBP
Board
of
Governors
the
listing
of
a
lawyer
as
a
delinquent
member,
there
is
nothing
to
prevent
the
SC
from
using
its
ad
ministrative
power
and
supervision
to
discipline
erring
lawyers
and
from
directing
the
IBP
Board
of
Governors to
decla
re
such
lawyer
as
a
delinquent
member
of
the IBP.
Having
declared
Atty.
Adaza
as
a
delinquent
member
of
the
IBP,
he
is
suspended
from
the
practice
of
law
for
SIX
MONTHS,
or
until
he
has
complied
with
the
MCLE
re
quirements
for
the
1st
to
the
Fifth periods
of
compliance.
FILING OF PLEADINGS WITH
CLE COMPLIANCE NUMBER
VIRGILIO J. MAPALAD vs. ATTY. ANSELMO S.
A.C. No. 10911, June 6, 2017, 826 SCRA 57
FALSE
M
ECHANEZ
FACTS: Complainant
Virgilio
filed
a
disbarment
case
against
res
pondent
Atty. Echanez
for
indicating
falsified
Mandatory Continuing
Legal
Education (MCLE) compliance
number
without
stating
the
d
ate
of
issue.
Atty.
Echanez
used said
falsified
MCLE
number
in
several
pleadings
against
complainant.
Upon
inquiry
with
the
MCLE office,
ued
stating that
the
respondent
has
not
requirements.
a
certification
was iss
complied
with
MCLE
Despite
the
resolutions
and
orders
requiring
him
to
file
a
comment, Atty. Echanez failed to do so. He
did not also attend
the mandatory conference/hearing
and
failed
to
submit
his
position
paper.
ISSUE
Whether
respondent’s
act
of
indicating
false
MCLE
e
number
in his
pleadings
and
repeatedly
failing
to
wful
orders
warrant
the penalty
of
disbarment.
complianc
obey
la
RULING
YES,
indicating
false
MCLE
compliance
ding
and repeatedly
failing
to
obey
lawful
penalty
of
disbarment.
number
in
his
plea
order
warrant
the
It
was
clearly
established
that
respondent
violated
Bar
Mat
ter
No. 850. No
less
than
the
MCLE
office
had
issued
a
certification
stating
that
respondent
had
not
complied
with the
first
and
second
compliance
period
of
the
MCLE.
Despite
such non-compliance,
respondent
repeatedly
indicated
a
false
MCLE
compliance
number
in
his
pleadings
before
the
trial
courts.
In
so doing,
he
indeed
misled
the
courts,
litiga
nts,
his
own
clients
included professional colleagues,
and
all
o
thers
who may
have
relied
on
such pleadings
containing
false
information.
Respondent’s act of filing pleadings
that
he
fully knew
to
contain
false information
is
a
mockery
of
the courts,
especially
the
Supreme
Court, considering
that
it
is
the
Supreme
Court
that
authored
the
rules
and regulations
that
the
respondent
violated.
In
using
a
false
MCLE
compliance
gs,
respondent also
put
his
own
client
cy
in
pleadings
can
be
fatal
to
the
dings
with
false
information
produces
no
the
Respondent
also
courts and
the
repeatedly
IBP-CBD
failed
despite
number
in
his
pleadin
at
risk.
Such
deficien
client’s
cause
as
plea
legal
effect.
to
obey
legal
due
notice.
orders
of
Court
orders
should
be
respected
not
only
because
the
authorities
who issued
them
should
be
respected,
but
because
of
the
respect
and
consideration
that
should
be
extended
to
the
judicial
branch
of
the government,
which
is
absolutely
e
ssential
if
our
government
is
to
be a
government
of
laws
and
not
of
men.
Clearly,
respondent’s
act
of
ignoring
the
court
order
despi
notice violates
the
lawyer’s
oath
and
runs
counter
to
the
precepts
of
the
CPR. By
his
repeated
dismissive
conduct,
th
e
respondent
exhibited
an
unpardonable lack
of
respect
for
the
authority
of
the
Court.
te
Taken
altogether,
considering
respondent’s
act
of
using
false
MCLE compliance
number
in
his
pleadings
and
his
ted
failure
to
obey
legal orders,
respondent
Atty.
Echanez
DISBARRED
from
practice
of
law.
a
repea
is
IMPROPRIETY
OF
A
POSTING IMPROPER
IENDSTER
ANTONIO M. LORENZANA vs.
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200,
April 2,
JUDGE
PHOTOS
IN
JUDGE MA. CECILIA I.
2014,
720 SCRA 319
FR
AUSTRIA
FACTS:
On
April
14,
2008,
a
complaint
was
filed
against
Judge
Austria
for
committing
an
act
of
impropriety
when
she
displayed
her
photographs
in
a
social networking
website
called
“Friendster”
and
posted her
personal
details
as
a
RTC
Judge,
allegedly
for
the
purpose
of
finding
a
compatibl
e
partner.
a
th
She
also
posed
with
her
upper
body
shawl allegedly
suggesting
that
nothing
except
probably a brassiere.
ISSUE:
Whether
the
posting
wearing
an “off-shouldered”
ct
of
impropriety.
HELD: YES. Judge Austria is
visible personification of
law
s
barely
covered
by
was
worn
undernea
of “Friendster”
photos
of
suggested
dress
constitutes
guilty of impropriety,
and
justice.
Judges
are
held
to
higher
standards
must
accordingly
comport
themselves.
of
as
herself
an
a
she
conduct
is
and
a
thu
The
very
nature
of
their
functions
requires
under
exacting
standards
of
morality,
decency
and
propriety;
both
in the
performance
of
their
duties and
their
daily
personal
lives,
they
should
be
beyond
reproach.
PROHIBITION OF
AS FIDUCIARY
JUDGES
TO
SERVE
CONRADO ABE LOPEZ vs. JUDGE ROGELIO S. LUCMAYON
A.M. No. MTJ-13-1837, September 24, 2014, 736 SCRA 291
FACTS: Conrado
alleged
opted
father, Restituto.
that
he
inherited
a
lot
from
his
ad
Sometime
in
October
2004,
Conrado
and
Judge
Lucmayon
met
in
a
waiting
shed
and
at
that
meeting,
Judge
Lucmay
on
allegedly
deceived
him into
signing
a
Special
Power
of
Attorney (SPA)
to
process
the
sale
of
Lot
1696
to the
pro
spective
buyer,
Aboitiz
Group
of
Company.
Unknown to
Conrado,
the
said
SPA
contained
at
the
bot
tom
portion, a
so-called
“Waiver
of
Rights”
that
Judge
Lucma
yon
had
deceptively
inserted
in order to strip
him of
his
o
wnership
of
Lot
1696.
After
signing
the
document
which
was
already
notarized
b
y a
certain Atty.
Mata
without
his
presence,
Judge
Lucmayon
allegedly
told
Conrado
that
he
no
longer
any right
over
the
property.
In
im
to
Rights
March
2005,
Judge
Lucmayon’s
father,
cease cultivating
the
land
because
of
in the
SPA
he
signed.
Pedro,
ordered
the
Waiver
of
h
Conrado
also
asserted
that
Judge
Lucmayon
had
caused
Pedro and
his
siblings to
execute
a
document
entitled “Supple
mental
Extrajudicial
Settlement” wherein
his
name
and
the
name
of
his
adopting
mother
were
excluded.
ISSUE:
erving
Whether
Judge
as
fiduciary.
Lucmayon
is
administratively
liable
for
s
HELD: YES.
First,
Judge
Lucmayon
violated
Rule
5.06 of
the
code.
As
a general
rule,
a
judge
is
prohibited
from
servi
ng
as
executor,
administrator, trustee,
guardian
or other
fiduciary.
The
intent
of
the
rule
is
to
limit
a
judge’s
involvement
in
the
affairs
and
interests
of
private
individuals
to
mini
mize
the
risk
of
conflict with
his
judicial
duties
and
to
al
low
him
to
devote
his
undivided attention
to
the
performanc
e
of
his
official
functions.
When
a
member
of
the
bench
serves
as
administrator of
the
properties
of
private
individuals,
he
runs
the
risk
of
losing
his
neutrality and
impartiality,
especially
when
the
interest
s
of
his
principal
conflicts
with
those
of
the
litigant
who
comes
before
his
court.
The
only
exception
to
this
rule
as
set
forth
in
Rule
5.06
is
when the
estate
or trust
belongs
to, or
the
ward
is
a
member
of
his
immediate
family, and
only
if
his
ser
vice
as
executor,
administrator,
trustee, guardian
or
fiduciary
will
not
interfere
with the
proper
performance of
his
judicial
duti
es.
The
Code
defines
“immediate
the
spouse and
relatives
within
guinity.
In
this
case,
Judge Lucmayon’s
latter’s
appointment
valid
exception
to
DISPLAY
OF
family”
as
the
second
being
degree
limited to
of
consan
since
Conrado
clearly
does
not
fall
under
“immediate
family”
as
herein
defined,
the
as
the
former’s
attorney-in-fact
is
not
a
the
rule.
BIAS
AND
PARTIALITY
GASPAR BANDOY vs. JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR.
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2399,
November 19, 2014, 740 SCRA 578
FACTS:
During
the
2007
local
elections,
Bandoy
was
an
on
watcher
of
former
mayor
Panaligan,
while
De
Jesus,
teacher,
was
one
of
the
chairpersons
of
the
Board
of
ion
Inspector.
De
Jesus
was
rumored
to
be
rival mayoralty
candidate,
Villarosa.
which
De
Jesus
was
was
captured
closely
associated
caught
in
the
act
of
on
video
by
a
member
electi
a
Elect
with
the
ballot
switching
of
media.
As
a
result
of
this
incident,
De
Jesus
was
criminally
c
harged with the
offense
of
ballot
switching.
Accordingly,
on
Au
gust
17,
2007,
a
warrant
of
arrest
was
issued
against
De
Jesus.
On
August
20,
2007,
while
there
was
of
arrest against
him,
De
Jesus
filed
a
e
the
prosecutor’s
office for
Serious
Illegal
andoy.
On
March
7,
before
Las
Piñas
2008,
Judge
Because
Bandoy
was
the
provincial
prosecutor
carcerated
for
more
than
De
Jesus
was
Raul
Villanueva.
charged with
recommended
two
years.
a
standing
warrant
criminal
case
befor
Detention
against
B
able
to
Serious
no
bail
Bandoy
charged
Judge
Jacinto
of
grave
y when
he granted
several
postponements
of
ment,
originally
scheduled
on
April
23,
2008
or
seven
times
until
De
Jesus
entered
a
lty
supposedly
inside
Judge
Jacinto’s
chamber
1.
post
bail
Illegal
Detention,
leaving
him
in
abuse
of
authorit
De
Jesus’
arraign
but
was
reset
f
plea
of
not
gui
on
July 6,
201
ISSUE: Whether
Judge
Jacinto
was
guilty
of
gross
of
the
law and
displayed
bias
and
partiality.
ignorance
HELD: YES.
Judge
Jacinto
was
directly
confronted
with
an
alle
gation
that
he
arraigned
De
Jesus
inside
his
chambers.
He
was
given
the
opportunity
to
answer,
but
he
chose
not
t
o
delve
into it.
Ultimately,
Judge
Jacinto
did
not
squarely
face
the
issues
being
imputed
against him,
which
was
quite
irregular
since
it
was
his
name
and
his
capacity
as
a
member
of
the
bench
that
was
being
challenged.
c,
His
silence
introduces
doubts
which
is not
acceptable.
in
the
minds
of
the
publi
Hence,
the
Court
cannot
fathom
why
the
arraignment
of
De
Jesus
was
postponed
from
2007
to
2011
without
appro
priate
action
coming
from
the
court.
Judge
Jacinto
should
h
ave
availed
of
known legal
remedies
to
compel
De
Jesus
to
personally
appear
for
his
arraignment
but he did
not. The
appearance
of
leniency
seemingly
exhibited
in favor of
De
Jes
us
gives an
impression
of
bias
and
partiality
that
should
be
addressed
and
corrected.
The
Code
of
Judicial
Ethics
emphasizes
that
Judges,
as
officers
of
the
court
have
the
duties
to
see
to
it
that
j
ustice
is
dispensed with
evenly
and
fairly.
Not
only
must
th
ey
be
honest
and
impartial,
but
they
must
also appear
to
be
honest
and
impartial
in
the
dispensation
of
justice.
Judg
es
should
make
sure
that
their
acts
are
circumspect
and
d
o not
arouse
suspicion
in
the
minds
of
the
public.
JUDGES TO WEAR JUDICIAL ROBES
AT ALL TIMES DURING COURT
SES
SION
JOCELYN
LES
MELAREN
A.M. No. MTJ-16-1876,
et.
al.
April 26,
vs.
2017,
JUDGE
824
JACINTO
SCRA
C.
GONZA
610
FACTS: The
complainants
were
the
defendants
in
civil
case
for
unlawful detainer. They
alleged
that
respondent
Judge
Gonzales
was
arrogant
during
the
hearings,
not
wearing
the
judicial
r
obe,
incessantly
puffing
a
lighted cigarettes and
unnecessarily
ba
nging
the
gavel.
Respondent
judge
admitted
not
wearing
the
judicial
robe
d
to
the extreme
heat,
non-functioning
air-conditioning
units
and
regular
brownouts
but
denied
that
he
unnecessarily
banged
the
gavel
and
smoked
during
trial.
ue
ISSUE
at
Whether
a
judge
is
all
times during
court
required
session.
to
wear
his
judicial
robe
RULING
all
YES,
a
judge
is
times during
court
required
session.
to
wear
his
judicial
robe
at
Respondent
Judge
Gonzales’
act
of
not
wearing
the
judici
robe during
court
sessions
violated
the
Administrative
Circular
No.
25
dated
June 9, 1989,
which
provides
that
“pursuant
to
Sections
5
and
6,
Article
8
of
the
Constitution
and
in
order
to
heighten
public
consciousness
on
the
solemnity
of
judicial
proceedings,
it
is
hereby
directed
that
beginning
Tuesd
ay,
August
1,
1989,
all
Presiding
Judges
of
all
Trial
Courts
shall wear
black
robes
during
sessions
of
their
respective
c
ourts.”
al
DUTY TO RESPECT THE
AND LEGAL PROCESSES
LAW
FERNANDO CHU vs. ATTY. JOSE
C. GUICO, JR.
A.C. No. 10573, January 13, 2015, 745 SCRA 257
FACTS: Chu
retained
the
services
of
Atty.
Guico
the
labor dispute
involving
his
company
CVC.
The
Labor
Arbiter
Hence,
the
case
was
a
to
judgment
adverse
the
NLRC.
Atty.
Guico
asked
Chu
to
raise
P300,000
the
NLRC Commissioner
handling
the
appeal.
gave
P280,000.
o
d
dly
Thereafter,
Atty.
a
draft of
the
the
appeal,
Arbiter.
Chu
then
confronted
Atty.
assistant
for
the
filing
of
(MR).
The
MR
having
before
the
Court
of
vices
of
Atty.
Guico.
the
Guico,
the
to:
In
taking
the
NLRC
Guico
violated
of
the
Code
Lawyer’s
Oath,
of
CANON
1
A
the
laws
of
the
or legal
processes.
Professional
CVC.
affirmed
allege
the
d
who
referred
him to
h
Motion
for
Reconsideration
case
the
ser
the
Lawyer’s
Oath
and
R
of
Professional
Responsibilit
money
from
Chu
to
guar
NLRC.
the
of
Lawyer’s
Oath
and
Rules
Professional
Responsibility (
Atty.
Guico
x x x maintain
allegiance
to
the
Republic
x
x
support
its
Constitution
and
obey
the
the
legal
orders
of
the
duly
constituted
x do
no
falsehood,
nor
consent
to
the
ourt; x x x
delay
no
man
for
money
or
The
Code
Oath, to
wit:
to
to
be
given
t
Chu
raised
an
been
denied,
Chu
brought
the
Appeals.
Finally,
Chu
terminated
ISSUE: Whether
Atty.
Guico
violated
ules
1.01
and
1.02
of
the
Code
y (CPR) for
demanding and
receiving
antee
favorable
decision
from
the
HELD: YES.
Atty.
1.01
and 1.02
CPR).
handle
Guico
showed
Chu
of
a
document
decision
favorable
to
CVC.
Upon
resolution
of
ecision
of
the
Labor
is
rendered
appealed
to
Responsibility
of
bound
the
himself
Philippines;
x
laws
as
well
as
authorities
therein; x x
doing
of
any
in
c
malice x x x.
echoes
lawyer
shall
uphold
the
land and
promote
respect
the
Lawyer’s
Constitution,
obey
for
law
and
f
st,
Rule 1.01
immoral
- A
lawyer
or
deceitful
shall
not
conduct.
Rule
1.02 - A
lawyer
shall
not
aimed
at
defiance
of
the
law
or
n
the
legal
system.
In
the
violated the
large
sums
on
in
the
case
at
bar,
Atty.
law
in
appearing
to
of
money
in
order
labor
case.
engage
in
unlawful,
dishone
counsel
or
abet activities
at
lessening
confidence
i
Guico
willingly
and
wittingly
counsel
Chu
to
raise
the
to
obtain
a
favorable
decisi
He thus violated the law aginst bribery and corruption. He co
mpounded
his
violation
by
actually
using
said
illegality
as
his means
of
obtaining
a
huge
sum
from
the
client
that
he
soon appropriated
for
his
own
personal
interest.
His
acts
constituted
gross dishonesty
and
deceit.
GAVINO & FLORDELIZA TOLENTINO vs. ATTY.
Y. FERDINAND ANCHETA
A.C. No. 6387, July 19, 2016, 797 SCRA 106
HENRY
FACTS: Flordeliza
was
a
defendant
in
a
civil
he
RTC
involving
recovery
of
possession of
a
which
was
rendered
against
Flordeliza
ordering
te
the
land.
.
.
The
pending,
case
was
Flordeliza’s
appealed
counsel
Spouses
Flordeliza
decision.
Atty.
Henry
necessary
action
to
to
the
CA.
was
replaced
SO
case
parcel
her
While
the
by
Atty.
&
ATT
before
t
of land,
to
vaca
appeal
Henry
is
So
learned
that
the
CA
affirmed
the
RTC
So
did
not
inform
them
nor take
the
elevate
the
case
to
the
Supreme
Court
Thus,
they
were
compelled
to
take
the
services
of
Atty.
Ancheta.
The
latter
promised
them
that
there
was
still
a
remedy
that
he
will
file
a
motion
to
reopen
appeal
case
and
asked P200,000
to
bribe
the
CA
justices.
Spouses
Flordeliza
learned
by
Atty.
Ancheta
and
the
executory.
that
no
such
motion
CA
decision
had
been
was
filed
final
and
Spouses
Flordeliza
sought
to
recover
the
money
from
Atty.
Ancheta
but
to no
avail.
On
the
other
hand,
Atty.
Henry
So
answered
explaining
that
he
had
departed
from
the
la
w
office
while
the
case
is
pending at
CA
and
moved
to
Western
Samar.
n
Atty.
Ancheta
failed to
follow
order
of
the
Commission o
Bar Discipline (CBD)
requiring
his
attendance
and
presence
in
the
hearing.
He
did
not
file
any
pleading.
ISSUES
ailure
1) Whether
Atty.
to
inform
the
Henry
So
is
guilty
of
spouses
of
the
status
2) Whether
Ancheta
Atty.
defrauded
the
negligence
for
of
the
case.
f
spouses.
RULINGS
1) NO,
Atty.
Henry
So
is
not
guilty
of
negligence.
The
serious
consequences
of
disbarment
or
suspension
sh
ould follow
only
where
there
is
a
clear
preponderance
of
evi
dence
of
Atty. Henry
So’s
misconduct
affecting
her
standing
and
moral
character
as
an
officer
of
the
Court
and
membe
r
of
the
bar.
Atty.
Henry
So’s
omission
is
not
of
would warrant
his
disbarment
or suspension.
2) YES.
Atty.
Ancheta
is
guilty
Any
member
of
the bar
who
standards
of
integrity
and
morality
trative liability.
of
such
defrauding
fails
to
exposes
gravity
the
that
spouses.
live
up
to
the
himself
to
adminis
Atty.
Ancheta’s
act
of
asking
for
money
from
the
spou
ses Flordeliza,
to
be
used
as
bribe
for
the
justices
of
th
e
CA,
is
clearly
an
act
which
shows
his
lack
of
integrit
y
in
violation
of
the
Lawyer’s
Oath
and
the
Code
of
Prof
essional
Responsibility (CPR). He
is
disbarred.
FLORDELIZA A. MADRIA vs. ATTY. CARLOS P.
A.C. No. 11256, March 7, 2017, 819 SCRA 261
RIVERA
FACTS: Complainant
Flordeliza
engaged
the
services
of
respondent
Atty.
Rivera
to
process
her
annulment
of
marriage.
After
s
he
signed the
petition for
annulment,
Flordeliza
was
assured
th
at
she
does
not
need to
appear
in
court.
When
her
daughter made follow-ups
on
the
case,
she
was
informed
that
the
petition
was
granted.
A
copy
of
the
de
cision dated
April 16, 2003
was
received
at
the
office
of
A
tty.
Rivera.
Believing
that
the
declared in
her
Voter
documents
Registration
After
securing
a
copy
of
iza applied
for
renewal
of
her
ner
filed
a
complaint
charging
the
annulment
of
her
marriage.
charges
for
violation
of
the
were authentic, Flordeliza
Record
that
she
was
then
single.
the
certificate
of
finality, Flordel
passport.
Later, her
former
part
her
fabricating
the
decision of
Accordingly,
she
faced
criminal
Philippine Passport
Act.
Complainant
claimed
that
she
relied
in
good
faith
on
the
representation
of
respondent
Atty. Rivera.
Respondent
averred
t
hat
his
client
prevailed
upon
him to
simulate
the
court
deci
sion
to
the
effect
that
her
marriage
had
been
annulled
and
to
fabricate
the
certificate
of
finality
and
she had
assured
him
that
idential.
such
simulated
documents
would
be
kept
strictly
conf
ISSUE
Whether
disbarment.
simulation
of
a
court
decision
and
finality
warrant
finality
warrant
RULING
YES,
disbarment.
simulation
of
a
court
decision
and
Falsifying
or simulating
the
court
papers
amounted
to
dece
it, malpractice or
misconduct
in
office,
any
of
which
was
alre
ady
a
ground
sufficient
for
disbarment under
Section 27,
Rule
138
of
the
Rules
of
Court.
Under
Rule
1.01,
a
lawyer
shall
not
engage
in
unlawful,
dishonest,
immoral
or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02
provides
that
a
lawyer
shall
not
counsel
or abet
activities
aimed
at
defi
ance
of
the
law
or
at
lessening
confidence in
the
legal
sy
stem.
Rule
15.07
mandates
that
a
lawyer
shall
impress
upon
his
client
compliance
with
the
laws
and
principles
of
fairne
ss.
In
this
case,
Atty.
Rivera
acknowledged
authorship
of
the
petition for
annulment
of
marriage
and
simulation
of
the
decis
ion
and
certificate
of
finality.
His
explanation
that
he
only
did
it
upon complainant’s
persistent
prodding
did
not
exculpate
him
from
responsibility
for
the
acts
are
outright
criminal
falsification
or
forgery.
His
deliberate
falsification
of
the
court
decision
and
certifi
cate
of
finality
of
the
decision
reflected
a
high
degree
of
moral
turpitude
on
his
part
and
made
mockery
of
the
ad
ministration
of
justice. He
is
therefore
unworthy
of
continuing
as a
member
of
the
Bar.
He
is
disbarred.
REBECCA
MARIE
UY
YUPANGCO – NAKPIL vs.
ATTY.
ROBERTO
L.
UY
A.C. No. 9115, September 17, 2014, 735 SCRA 239
FACTS: Rebecca
averred
that
Atty.
alf-cousin and
he
continuously
failed
with
the
court order
declaring
her
to
all
of
Pacita’s properties.
Atty.
the
PSB
property
Uy
was
her
illegitimate
h
and
refused
to
comply
as
the
successor-in-interest
Uy
mortgaged
a
commercial
property
in
favor
of
despite
an
existing
Trust
Agreement
wherein,
subject
was
subject
of
the
dispute.
ISSUE: Whether
of
Professional
Atty.
Uy
violated
Responsibility.
Rule
1.01
of
the
Code
HELD: YES.
Atty.
Uy
is
guilty
of
violating
Rule
1.01,
1
of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
Canon
Rule
1.01,
Canon
1
of
the
CPR
provides
that
a
lawye
shall not
engage
in
unlawful,
dishonest,
immoral
or
deceitful
conduct.
r
In
the
case
at
bar,
misconduct
by
mortgaging
the
apparent
dispute
over
have
lar.
Regardless
exhibited
of
the
prudent
Atty.
the
the
merits
of
or restraint
Uy
committed
some
form
of
subject
property,
notwithstanding
same.
his
own
becoming
claim,
of
a
He
should
not
have
exposed
himself
even
st
risk
of
committing
a
property
violation nor
hich would
endanger
the
Bar’s
reputation.
ORTIGAS PLAZA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
ATTY. EUGENIO S. TUMULAK
A.C. No. 11385, March 14, 2017, 820 SCRA 232
he
should
legal
exemp
to
the
slighte
any
action w
vs.
FACTS: Respondent
Atty.
Tumulak,
accompanied
by
uniformed
gua
rds, unlawfully
entered
and
took
control
of
the
entrance
and
exit
of
a
parcel
of
land,
which
was
related
to
the
proc
eeding
of
the
Estate of
the
late
Don
Hermogenes
Rodriguez
in
which
respondent
was designated
as
assignee.
Complainant
Ortigas
charges
Atty.
Tumulak
with
deceit, disho
nesty and
fraud
for
claiming
to
have
coordinated
the
proper
government agencies
prior
to
the
illegal
and
forcible
intrusion.
The
complainant
manifests
that
as
a
lawyer,
Atty.
ought to
know
that
the
claim
of
his
principal
in
roperty
was
barred
by
res
judicata
due
to
the
valid
e
of
a
torrens
title under
its
name.
Tumulak
the
p
issuanc
ISSUE
d
Whether
Atty.
Tumulak
violates
the
CPR
when
he
facilitate
the implementation
of
the
writ
of
execution
and
participated
in
the
forcible
intrusion
of
complainant’s
properties.
RULING
YES,
Atty.
Tumulak
violated
1.02 of
the
CPR
and
was
from
practice of
law.
Canon 1, Rule
suspended
for
1.01
two
and
(2)
Rule
years
Under
Canon 1,
a
lawyer
should
uphold
the
Constitution,
obey the
laws
of
the
land
and
promote
respect
for
law
a
nd
legal processes.
Rule 1.01
provides
that
a
lawyer
shall
n
ot
engage
in
unlawful,
dishonest,
immoral,
or deceitful
conduct.
Rule
1.02
mandates that
a
lawyer
shall
not
counsel
or ab
eit
activities
aimed
dence
in
the
legal
at
defiance
system.
of
the
law
or
lessening
confi
Atty.
Tumulak,
as
a
long-time
practitioner,
is
presumed
to
know that
the
Supreme
Court
has
promulgated
a
case
specif
ically
addressing
the
fake
titles
arising
from
a
spurious
Deed
of
Assignment
of
the
supposed
Estate
of
Don
Hermogenes
Rodriguez - the
2005
case
of “Evangelista et. al. vs. Santiago”
where
the
same modus
as
the
one
adapted
by
respondent
la
wyer
was
used
by
an “assignee”
in
claiming
properties
allege
dly
part
of
the
Estate
of
Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez.
Respondent
lawyer
is
presumed
to
know
the
legal
develop
ment that
only
by
virtue
of
his
becoming
an
assignee
of
t
he
estate,
but
also
because
of
his
being
a
lawyer
with
th
e
constant responsibility
of
keeping
abreast
of
legal
development.
All told, Atty.
Tumulak
was
guilty
of
misconduct
umventing
existing
laws
and
disregarding
settled
rulings
r
to
commit
injustice
against
the
complainant.
for
in
circ
orde