Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
Chapter 6: EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
“The executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines” – Article VII,
Constitution
EXECUTIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE
POWER
POWER
Exercised by the President
-to apply policies and
-to enforce and enforce orders as
administer the determined by proper
laws
governmental organs
-to carry the
-to see that every
laws into
government office is
practical
managed and maintained
operations and properly by the persons in
enforcing their charge in accordance with
due observance pertinent laws and
regulations
Additional
President:
Power/Prerogatives
of
the
1. Appointing Power
2. Power of Control
3. Military Power
4. Pardoning Authority
5. Diplomatic Power
6. Budgetary Power
7. Borrowing Power
8. Residual Power
9. Take Care & Informing Functions
10. Call Congress to session
11. Veto Powers
12. Deputization of Gov’t Personnel
13. Delegation of Emergency & Tariff
Powers
QUALIFICATIONS OF A PRESIDENT (and
Vice President):
1. Natural-born citizen
2. Registered voter
3. Able to read and write
4. At least 40 years of age on the day of
the election, and
5. Resident of at least 10 years
immediately preceding the election
CASE: Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs
Board
Facts: Pursuant to the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drug Act of 2002, COMELEC issued a resolution
making it mandatory for candidates for the
national and local elections to undergo drug
testing. This was countered by Senator Aquilino
Pimentel Jr., claiming that such resolution by the
COMELEC was unconstitutional given that
mandatory drug testing is not a qualification under
Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: WON the drug testing is mandatory as an
additional qualification for the national and local
elections.
Ruling: The mandatory drug testing for the
senatorial candidates, and of the national and local
candidates CANNOT be imposed as an additional
qualification, since doing so would mean going
against the qualifications provided by the
constitution.
ELECTION, TERM, & TERM LIMIT
The President and the Vice President shall be
elected via DIRECT VOTE OF THE PEOPLE for
a term of six (6) years – beginning at NOON
of the 30th day of June following the day of the
election, and ends at noon of the same date
six years after.
NOTE: A President shall not be eligible for
reelection while a Vice President can, but not
for more than two (2) consecutive terms.
NOTE: Election is on the 2nd Monday of May
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
CASE: Pormento v Estrada - Reelection Issue
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CONTESTS
Erap Estrada was elected as President of the PH in
1998, however, he was removed from office by
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. By 2010, Erap planned
to run again for Presidency, which was countered
by Atty. Pormento when he filed a disqualification
case against the former President. However, upon
election, Erap Estrada did not win as President.
The Constitution provides that “[t]he Supreme
Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President and
Vice President, and may promulgate its rules
for the purpose” – Sec. 4 (7), Article VII,
Constitution
Issue: WON he violated the constitution in filing for
candidacy in the 2010 elections.
Ruling: NO. The concept of “reelection” is
recognized to be that of “being elected for the
second term”. Given that former president, Erap
Estrada did not win during the 2010 elections, he
cannot be considered to have violated the “No
Reelection” condition for the presidency.
The Congress, even when adjourned sine die, only
the legislative functions end, not its non-legislative
functions. The Congress’ duty as the National
Board of Canvassers is the non-legislative function
of the Legislature. (Sec. 4, Art. VII, Constitution)
CASE: Pimentel, Jr. v. Joint Committee of Congress
to Canvass the Votes Cast for President and Vice
President in the May 10, 2004 Elections
Facts: Upon the adjournment of the regular
sessions of the 12th Congress on June 11, 2004,
the Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the
Votes of the President and Vice President was still
fulfilling its mandated tasks as canvassers. Senator
Pimentel, Jr., wanted to declare null and void the
Joint Committee since its legal existence would
have already ended upon the adjournment of
regular session.
Issue: WON the term of the Twelfth Congress
terminated and expired upon the adjournment sine
die of the regular session of both Houses on June
11, 2004.
Ruling: NO. Based on Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution, the Congress’ adjournment sine die
shall not impede in accomplishing the
constitutionally mandated tasks of canvassing and
proclaiming the newly elected President and Vice
President.
Presidential Electoral Tribunal
Independent from the Supreme Court but is
not separate from the judicial department,
that is tasked to handle electoral contests
involving the presidency and the vicepresidency.
Equivalent to the full authority conferred upon
the electoral tribunals of Senate and House of
Representatives (Senate Electoral Tribunal –
SET; House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal – HRET)
However, in Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, despite Atty. Macalintal’s accusation
that PET is unconstitutional; the court
recognizes that under Article 4, Section VIII,
of the Constitution, the law allows the
Judiciary to make the means to decide on the
presidential and vice-presidential elections.
RA 1793 did not create a separate court but
merely conferred upon the SC the functions of
PET – merely connotes the additional function
imposed upon the Supreme Court
Doctrine of Necessary Implication: conferment
of additional jurisdiction to the SC included the
means necessary to carry it into effect.
In Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, the Court
shall recognize the election protest of a losing
candidate as “abandoned” when she ran for,
won, assumed office as a senator. Such
abandonment protects the public interest
involved.
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
** PET, SET, and HRET are constitutional
bodies independent from the 3 departments
but not separate therefrom
CASE: Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC
In running for the presidency in the May 2016
elections, Grace Poe stated in her COC that
she was a natural-born citizen and that she
had met the residency requirement. Given that
in becoming the chairperson of MTRCB, she
had renounced her American citizenship.
However, COMELEC still denied the COC of
Grace Poe, for not meeting the citizenship and
residency requirement.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC has the
authority to decide on the case.
Ruling: NO. Under the 1987 Constitution, the
Supreme Court is the sole judge of all contests
of elections, returns, and disqualifications of
the President and Vice-President.
ASSUMPTION AND PERQUISITES OF
OFFICE
The President-elect and Vice President-elect
shall assume office at the beginning of their
terms, at noon of the 30th of June following
the day of the election; ends at noon of the
same date six years after.
-
Prior assumption of office, the elected
officials shall be provided with a special
oath or affirmation.
-
Conditions:
o President shall be entitled to an
official residence
o Salaries shall not be determined
by law and shall not be
decreased during their tenure
o Prohibited from receiving any
other emolument during tenure
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
VACANCY, DISABILITY, AND
SUCCESSION
Scenarios: (Sec.7, Article VII, Constitution)
a. If the President-elect may not be able
to assume office at the beginning of the
term – Vice-President-elect shall act as
the President in the meantime.
b. If the President have died or have
become permanently disabled, the
Vice-President elect shall become the
President.
c. If both the President-elect and Vice
President-elect are not able to assume
the President position, the Senate
President shall become President
**In case the Senate President is unable to
assume the Presidency position, the Speaker of the
House shall act as such, until a President or VicePresident would have been chosen and qualified.
In case of vacancy in the position of the President
due to death, permanent disability, removal from
office, or resignation – the Vice-President shall
succeed to serve the unexpired term of the former.
In case both offices are not able to assume the
position, the Senate President or Speaker of the
House shall act as President until the President and
the Vice-President have been elected and
qualified.
d. If there is vacancy in the position of the
Vice-President, the President shall
choose a nominee from the members of
Congress, subject to the majority vote
of all members, each house voting
separately.
e. If both offices are vacant at the same
time, Congress is mandated by the
Constitution to convene and enact a law
calling for a special election to be held
not earlier than 45 days and not later
than 60 days from the call.
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
**Appropriations for the special election shall be
charged against current appropriations, exempted
from the requirements of paragraph 4, section 25,
Art. VI of the Constitution
**No Special Elections shall be called if the
vacancy occurs within 18 months from the next
presidential election.
PRESIDENTIAL INCAPACITY AND
SERIOUS ILLNESS
“... in case of serious illness by the President,
the public shall be informed of the state of his
health.”
The President’s health has always been an
issue of great public interest because it
concerns the capability of the Chief Executive
to lead the nation.
Articles in the Constitution that serve as
contingencies in case the President may not be
able to enact his duties and responsibilities.
Section 11, Article VII, the Constitution –
Presidential Incapacity
“Whenever the President transmits to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, and until he
transmits to them a written declaration to the
contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the vice-president as Acting
President. “
“Whenever a majority of all the Members of
the Cabinet transmit to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that
the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the vicepresident shall immediately assume the
powers and duties of the office as Acting
President.”
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
Section 12, Article VII, the Constitution –
Serious Illness of the President
The Public shall be informed of the state of the
health of the President in case of serious
illness.
Even in times that the President has an illness,
national security and foreign relations cabinet
members & AFP Chief of Staff shall still have
access to the President.
CASE: De Leon v. Duterte
Facts: Petitioner alleged that the absence of the
President in several engagements and public view
was due to health reasons hence, petitioner then
filed a Freedom of Information request in the OP
seeking clarity on the status of the President’s
health. In response, the Malacanang Records
Office sent him an e-mail explaining that the office
is unable to provide information requests.
Petitioner anchors his rights to be informed on the
basis of Section 12, Art. VII and Section 7, Art. III
in relation to Section 28, Art. II of the 1987
Constitution.
Issue: WON the petition failed to set forth the
material allegations to establish a prima facie case
for mandamus.
Ruling: The court ruled that petitioner fell short of
proving to establish a prima facie case for
mandamus for failing to establish a legal right that
was violated by respondents. The claims presented
by the petitioner are merely based on what he
perceived from the online news articles discussing
the President’s illness.
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY
The President is immune from suit or from
being brought to court during the period of his
incumbency and tenure.
Assures that the President is free to exercise
his Presidential duties and responsibilities
without any hindrance or distraction.
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Doctrine of Executive Immunity
The President, being the highest official of the
land, may not be sued in any civil or criminal
case during his tenure of office or incumbency
-
absolute immunity from damages
liability predicated on his official acts
Rationale:
assure the exercise of the
President’s duties and functions free from any
hindrance of distraction
Basis: Medieval: “King can do no wrong”
-
the
seat
of
sovereignty
and
governmental power resides in the
throne, hence, allowing him to be sued
is contradiction to his sovereignty
Modern:
1) Separation of powers principle, assures
that the executive is separate from the
judiciary and legislative;
2) Public Convenience, assuring that he
can perform his Presidential functions
without any hindrance;
3) Public Policy, allowing the President to
make decisions that would greater gain
than losses.
Extent of Executive Immunity
-
-
-
He may be removed from office only
through impeachment
The extent of the executive immunity is
only available during the tenure of the
President. When he is no longer in
office, he is amenable to suits even for
acts committed during his stay in office
if the same were unlawful.
The privilege of immunity can only be
invoked by the President by virtue of
the office, not by any other person on
behalf of the President
looked upon with disfavor when it
impedes the search for truth or impares
the vindication of a right
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
*Presidential decisions may be questioned
before the courts where there is grave abuse
of discretion or that the President acted
without or in excess jurisdiction.
CASE: Soliven v. Makasiar
Facts: Luis Beltran was a columnist for the
newspaper Philippine Star. Maximo Soliven was
the paper’s editor-in-chief.Pres. Cory Aquino filed
a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran.
Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate
presidential immunity from suit impose a
correlative disability to file suit". He contends that
if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the
President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she
may subsequently have to be a witness for the
prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat
her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying
on the witness stand, she would be exposing
herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.
Beltran also contends that he could not be held
liable for libel because of the privileged character
of the publication. He also says that to allow the
libel case to proceed would produce a “chilling
effect” on press freedom.
Issue: WON the President of the Philippines, under
the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings
against the petitioners through the filing of a
complaint-affidavit.
Ruling: The rationale for the grant to the President
of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure
the exercise of Presidential duties and functions
free from any hindrance or distraction, considering
that being the Chief Executive of the Government
is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office
holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would
prevent the President from waiving the privilege.
Thus, if so minded the President may shed the
protection afforded by the privilege and submit to
the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to
exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot
be assumed and imposed by any other person.
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
CASE: Nixon v. Fitzgerald
Facts:
Respondent, a former government
employee, filed a suit against petitioner, a former
United States President, for retaliatory discharge.
After petitioner's motion to dismiss based upon a
claim of absolute immunity was denied, petitioner
filed a motion for a writ of certiorari. Petitioner
contended that he enjoyed absolute immunity
from civil liability for actions taken while serving as
President. The Court reversed the lower court's
decision.
Issue: WON the petitioner, as a former President
of the United States, entitled to absolute immunity
from damages liability predicated on his official
acts?
Ruling: Yes. The Court noted that a grant of
absolute immunity to the President would not
leave the President with unfettered power. The
Court stated that there were formal and informal
checks on presidential action that did not apply
with equal force to other executive officials. The
Court observed that the President was subjected
to constant scrutiny by the press. It noted that
vigilant oversight by Congress would also serve to
deter presidential abuses of office, as well as to
make the threat of impeachment. The court
determined that other incentives to avoid
misconduct existed, including a desire to earn
reelection, the need to maintain prestige as an
element of presidential influence, and a President's
traditional concern for his historical stature.
CASE: Clinton v. Jones
Facts: A private citizen sought to recover damages
against the President of the United States for
actions that allegedly took place before his term
began. The President sought a motion to dismiss
and argued that in all but the most exceptional
cases, the U.S. Constitution requires federal courts
to delay such litigation until the President's term
ends. The district court denied the motion to
dismiss but postponed the trial. On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court to deny the motion to dismiss and reversed
the district court's order postponing the trial until
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
the petitioner leaves office. The Supreme Court of
the United States granted certiorari.
Issue: WON it is proper for the district court to
postpone trial?
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that the doctrine of
separation of powers does not require federal
courts to stay all private actions against the
President of the United States until he leaves
office. When defining the scope of an immunity for
acts clearly taken within an official capacity, the
Supreme Court has applied a functional approach.
Thus, an official's absolute immunity should extend
only to acts in performance of particular functions
of his office. Immunities are grounded in the
nature of the function performed, not the identity
of the actor who performed it.
CASE: Trump v. Vance
Facts: The district attorney of New York County
issued a grand jury subpoena to an accounting
firm that possessed the financial records of
President Donald Trump and one of his businesses.
Trump asked a federal court to restrain
enforcement of that subpoena, but the district
court declined to exercise jurisdiction and
dismissed the case based on Supreme Court
precedent regarding federal intrusion into ongoing
state criminal prosecutions. The court held, in the
alternative, that there was no constitutional basis
to temporarily restrain or preliminarily enjoin the
subpoena at issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court with
respect to the alternative holding, finding that any
presidential immunity from state criminal process
does not extend to investigative steps like the
grand jury subpoena. However, it found that the
Supreme Court precedent on which the lower court
relied did not apply to the situation and vacated
the judgment as to that issue and remanded the
case to the lower court.
Issue: WON does the Constitution permit a county
prosecutor to subpoena a third-party custodian for
the financial and tax records of a sitting president,
over which the president has no claim of executive
privilege?
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Ruling: Article II and the Supremacy Clause neither
categorically preclude, nor require a heightened
standard for, the issuance of a state criminal
subpoena to a sitting President. All nine justices
agreed that a President does not have absolute
immunity from the issuance of a state criminal
subpoena, but a seven-justice majority voted to
affirm the decision of the Second Circuit.
In this case, the question was whether the
President has absolute immunity from state
criminal subpoenas. The Court held in Clinton v.
Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), that federal criminal
subpoenas do not rise to the level of
constitutionally forbidden impairment of the
Executive’s ability to perform its constitutionally
mandated functions, and here, it rejected the
President’s argument that state criminal
subpoenas pose a unique and greater threat. A
properly tailored state criminal subpoena will not
hamper the performance of a President’s
constitutional duties, there is nothing inherently
stigmatizing about a President performing a
normal citizen’s duty of furnishing information
relevant to a criminal investigation, and the risk
that subjecting sitting Presidents to state criminal
subpoenas will make them targets for harassment
is minimal given that federal law allows for a
President to challenge allegedly unconstitutional
influences. For these reasons, the Constitution
does not categorically preclude the issuance of a
state criminal subpoena to a sitting President.
De Lima v. Duterte
Facts: PRRD’s administration’s key agenda was the
national crackdown on illegal drugs. Several critics,
among those is Sen. De Lima, criticized the
strategies and devices adopted in pursuing the
crackdown. She urged the senate to conduct
investigations of the alleged victims. In response,
the President issued several public statements
against the senator including denunciations of her
immorality and corruption hence, this petition for
the issuance of a writ of habeas data against the
President.
The senator concluded that the petition is
warranted because there was a continuous
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
violation of her rights to privacy, life, liberty, and
security and that there is a continuous threat to
violate her said rights in view of the President’s
declaration that he had been listening to them
through the help of another country.
Issue: WON the incumbent Chief Executive may be
held liable to the court even for the limited purpose
under the Rules on the Writ of Habeas Data?
Ruling: No. The petition must be dismissed even
without the President invoking the privilege of
immunity from suit. Immunity from suit remains
preserved in our current system and that immunity
attaches to the President during his tenure. Our
governmental and constitutional system does not
distinguish where or not the suit pertains to an
official act of the President. The immunity makes
no distinction with regards to the subject matter of
the suit; whether or not the acts subject matter of
the suit is part of his duties and functions.
CASE: Almario v. Executive Secretary
Facts: The National Artists Awards Committee. and
the NCCA decided to team up and jointly
administer the National Artists Award. There were
three deliberations for determining the nominees
and on the final deliberation, a final list of four
names was agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde,
Ramon Santos, Lazaro Francisco and Federico
Aguilar-Alcuaz.
They
submitted
this
recommendation to the President. According to
respondents, the aforementioned letter was
referred by the Office of the President to the
Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of
the President allegedly received nominations from
various sectors, cultural groups and individuals
strongly endorsing private respondents. Acting on
this recommendation, a series of Proclamations
were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico
Aguilar-Alcuaz and private respondents, GuidoteAlvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno, respectively,
as National Artists. All of the petitioners claim that
former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely
abused her discretion in disregarding the results of
the rigorous screening and selection process for
the Order of National Artists and in substituting her
own choice for those of the Deliberation Panels.
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Issue: Whether or not the act of the President
amounted to grave abuse of discretion with
regards to the violation of the right to equal
protection
Ruling: Yes. It should be recalled that one of the
respondents was disqualified to be nominated for
being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that
time while respondents Masa and Caparas did not
make it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent
Moreno was not included in the second shortlist.
Yet, the four of them were treated differently and
considered favorably when they were exempted
from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA
and the CCP and conferred the Order of National
Artists. The special treatment accorded to
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and
Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny. No real and
substantial distinction between respondents and
petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify
deviating from the laws, guidelines and established
procedures, and placing respondents in an
exceptional position. In view of the foregoing,
there was a violation of petitioner Abads right to
equal protection, an interest that is substantial
enough to confer him standing in this case.
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
Commission, alleging that his separation
represented
unlawful
retaliation
for
his
congressional testimony. The Commission rejected
this claim, but concluded that respondent's
dismissal offended applicable regulations because
it was motivated by "reasons purely personal to"
respondent. Respondent thereafter filed suit for
damages in Federal District Court against various
Defense Department officials and White House
aides allegedly responsible for his dismissal. An
amended complaint later named petitioner as a
defendant. After earlier judicial rulings and
extensive pretrial discovery, only three defendants
were involved: petitioner and two White House
aides (petitioners in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, post, p.
457 U. S. 800). Denying the defendants' motion for
summary judgment, the court held that
respondent had stated triable causes of action
under two federal statutes and the First
Amendment, and that petitioner was not entitled
to claim absolute Presidential immunity. Petitioner
took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision
to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed
summarily.
Issue: Whether or not the Executive may invoke
privilege.
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
Power of the (President) Government to
withhold information from the public, the
courts, and the Congress.
CASE: Nixon v. Fitzgerald
Facts: During the waning months of the Presidency
of Lyndon B. Johnson in 1968, respondent, a
management analyst with the Department of the
Air Force, testified before a congressional
Subcommittee
about
cost
overruns
and
unexpected technical difficulties concerning the
development of a particular airplane. In January,
1970, during the Presidency of petitioner Richard
M. Nixon, respondent was dismissed from his job
during a departmental reorganization and
reduction in force, in which his job was eliminated.
Respondent complained to the Civil Service
Ruling: It is settled law that the separation of
powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of
jurisdiction over the President of the United States.
But our cases also have established that a court,
before exercising jurisdiction, must balance the
constitutional weight of the interest to be served
against the dangers of intrusion on the authority
and functions of the Executive Branch. In the case
of this merely private suit for damages based on a
President's official acts, we hold it is not.
In defining the scope of an official's absolute
privilege, this Court has recognized that the sphere
of protected action must be related closely to the
immunity's justifying purposes. Frequently our
decisions have held that an official's absolute
immunity should extend only to acts in
performance of particular functions of his office.
It is the right of the President and high-level
executive branch officers to withhold information
from Congress, the courts, and the public.
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
3 Kinds of Privileges:
Case: Clinton v. Jones
State Secret Privilege – information is of such
Facts: A private citizen sought to recover damages
nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial
military or diplomatic objectives.
Case: Akbayan Citizens Citizens Party v. Aquino
Facts: Petitioners, non-government organizations,
Congresspersons,
citizens
and
taxpayers
requested, via the petition for mandamus and
prohibition, to obtain from respondents the full
text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership
Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and
Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation
process and all pertinent attachments and annexes
thereto. The Congress, through the House
Committee called for an inquiry, the Executive
refused to give them the said copies until the
negotiation was completed. JPEPA was the
bilateral free trade agreement entered between
the Philippine government with Japan.
Issue: Whether or not the Executive may exercise
its Executive Privilege against furnishing
information regarding the JPEPA agreement.
Ruling: Considering the status and nature of such
documents then and now, these are evidently
covered by executive privilege consistent with
existing legal provisions and settled jurisprudence.
Furthermore,
the
negotiations
of
the
representatives of the Philippines as well as of
Japan must be allowed to explore alternatives in
the course of the negotiations in the same manner
as judicial deliberations and working drafts of
opinions are accorded strict confidentiality.
Generic Privilege - internal deliberations
involving the process
decisions and policies
of
governmental
Informer’s Privilege – privilege not to disclose
the identity of persons who furnish information
of violations of law to officers charged with
that certain law.
Based on the constitutional power of
separation of powers entailing that the
exemption is necessary in discharging the
executive responsibilities of the President.
against the President of the United States for
actions that allegedly took place before his term
began. The President sought a motion to dismiss
and argued that in all but the most exceptional
cases, the U.S. Constitution requires federal courts
to delay such litigation until the President's term
ends. The district court denied the motion to
dismiss but postponed the trial. On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court to deny the motion to dismiss and reversed
the district court's order postponing the trial until
the petitioner leaves office. The Supreme Court of
the United States granted certiorari.
Ruling: As our opinions have made clear,
immunities are grounded in “the nature of the
function performed, not the identity of the actor
who performed it.” Petitioner’s effort to construct
an immunity from suit for unofficial acts grounded
purely in the identity of his office is unsupported
by precedent.
Two kinds of Exec. Privilege (In re: Sealed
Case)
Presidential Communications Privilege
-
decision-making of the President
o communications, documents or
other materials that reflect
presidential decisionmaking and
deliberations
which
the
president deems should remain
confidential
o rooted in the constitutional
principle of separation of power,
and the President’s unique
constitutional role
Elements:
1. Protected communication must relate
to a “quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power”
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
2. Communication must be authored or
“solicited and received” by the close
advisor of the President or the
President himself (advisor must be in
“operational proximity” with the
President)
The presidential communications privilege
remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need,
such information would likely contain
“important evidence
Deliberative Process Privilege
-
decision-making of executive officials
o advisory
opinions,
recommendations
and
deliberations on formulation of
government decisions rooted in
the common law
DISABILITIES,
INHIBITIONS,
DISQUALIFICATIONS
AND
President, Vice-President, Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants
shall not hold any other office or employment
during their tenure (Sec. 13, Article VII)
Aforementioned individuals and civil servants
are also prohibited from directly or indirectly,
practice any other profession, participate in
any business, or be financially interested in
any contract, or any franchise, or special
privilege during their tenure – including GOCCs
(Sec.7, Article IX-B)
Case: Funa v. Agra
Facts: Petitioner alleges that Hon. Alberto C. Agra
was appointed by the president to be the Acting
Secretary of Justice and that Agra was also
subsequently appointed as Acting Solicitor General
in concurrent capacity. Respondent alleged that he
was
assigned to be the Acting Solicitor General
first, subsequently assigned to be the Acting
Secretary of Justice. Agra also alleged that he
relinquished his position as Acting Solicitor General
but kept performing his duties until his successor
was appointed.
Issue: Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions
of the parties, the fact that Agra has admitted to
holding the two offices concurrently in acting
capacities is settled, which is sufficient for
purposes of resolving the constitutional question
that petitioner raises herein. According to the
Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, the only two
exceptions: (1) those provided for under the
Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII,
authorizing the Vice President to become a
member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by
Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article
VII without additional compensation in ex officio
capacities as provided by law. The primary
functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are
not related or necessary to the primary functions
of the Department of Justice. Considering that the
nature and duties of the two offices are such as to
render it improper, from considerations of public
policy, for one person to retain both, an
incompatibility between the offices exists, further
warranting the declaration of Agra’s designation as
the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with
his designation as the Acting Solicitor General, to
be void for being in violation of the express
provisions of the Constitution.
President’s
spouse
and
relatives
by
consanguinity or affinity within the 4th civil
degree are also not eligible, during his tenure,
for appointment as members of the
Constitutional Commissions, Office of the
Ombudsman,
or
as
Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, Chairmen, or Heads of
Bureaus or Offices – including GOCCs and
subsidies.
XPN: ex-officio capacity – authority derived
from official character, without any other
appointment or authority than that conferred
by the office.
Those in the Judiciary.
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council: “In the end,
however, Commissioner Davide, Jr. withdrew the
proposal to include the Judiciary in Section 13,
Article VII “(t)o avoid any further complication,”8
such that the final version of the second paragraph
of Section 13, Article VII even completely omits
any reference to the Judiciary, to wit: “The spouse
and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth civil degree of the President shall not during
his tenure be appointed as Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government- owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries.”
In the Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma,
Chairman of PCGG, and later as CPLC is not
covered by the strict prohibition since the official is
neither a secretary nor an assistant secretary, even
if it is equivalent to them. Section 7, Article IX-B is
applicable on the prohibition against multiple
positions for civil servants.
CASE: Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary
Facts: EO 284 was issued by former president Cory
Aquino, allowing members of the Cabinet to have
other governmental positions in addition to their
primary roles within the government. However,
CLU
contends
that
such
issuance
is
unconstitutional as it goes against the limitations
of Sec 13, Art. VII.
Ruling: EO 824 is unconstitutional provided that
such order is a violation of the express prohibition
under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution.
Objective of Section 13, Article VII: to prevent the
concentration of powers in the Executive officials –
President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies and assistants.
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
Appointing Power of the President
-
executive in nature
personal act of the President which
cannot be exercised by anyone else.
While Congress and the Constitution in certain
cases may prescribe the qualifications for
particular offices, the determination of who
among those qualified will be appointed is the
President’s prerogative. (Pimentel v. Ermita,
G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005).
CASE: Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978,
October 13, 2005
Facts:
The Senate and the House of
Representatives ("Congress") commenced their
regular session on July 26, 2004. The Commission
on Appointments, composed of Senators and
Representatives, was constituted on August 25,
2004. Meanwhile, President Arroyo, through
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita (Secretary
Ermita), issued appointments to respondents as
acting secretaries of their respective departments.
Respondents took their oath of office and assumed
duties as acting secretaries.
On September 8, 2004, Senator Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., together with other senators, filed
the present petition for certiorari and prohibition to
declare unconstitutional the appointments issued
by President Arroyo to respondents as acting
secretaries of their respective departments.
Congress adjourned on September 22, 2004. On
September 23, 2004, President Arroyo issued ad
interim appointments to respondents as
secretaries of the departments to which they were
previously appointed in an acting capacity.
Issue:
APPOINTING POWER
Whether or not President Arroyo's
appointment of respondents as acting secretaries
without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments (CoA) while Congress is in session is
constitutional.
In General: The selection of an individual who
Ruling: The power to appoint is essentially
is to exercise the functions of a given office. It
may be made verbally but it is usually done in
writing through what is called commission.
executive in nature, and the legislature may not
interfere with the exercise of this executive power
except in those instances when the Constitution
expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
executive power to appoint are construed strictly
against the legislature. The scope of the
legislature's interference in the executive's power
to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the
qualifications to an appointive office. Congress
cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise
of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither
may Congress impose on the President the duty to
appoint any particular person to an office.
Even if the Commission on Appointments is
composed of members of Congress, the exercise
of its powers is executive and not legislative. The
Commission on Appointments does not legislate
when it exercises its power to give or withhold
consent to presidential appointments. The
Commission on Appointments is a creature of the
Constitution. Although its membership is confined
to members of Congress, said Commission is
independent of Congress. The powers of the
Commission do not come from Congress, but
emanate directly from the Constitution. Hence, it
is not an agent of Congress. In fact, the functions
of the Commissioner are purely executive in
nature.
CASE: Aguinaldo v. Aquino III, 811 SCRA 304
(2016)
Facts: The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) published
an announcement calling for applications for the
six newly created positions (16th to 21st position)
of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. After
screening and selection of applicants, the JBC
submitted to President Aquino six shortlists
contained in six separate letters. Thereafter,
President Aquino issued the appointment papers
for the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
Petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. were all nominees in
the shortlist for the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice. Petitioners contend that only nominees for
the 16th position of the may be appointed as the
16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, in
accordance with Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987
Constitution. However, President Aquino issued
appointment papers for positions that the
appointees were not nominated for (ex: Musngi
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
was nominated for the 21st Associate Justice but
appointed as the 16th Associate Justice).
In a 2016 Decision, the Court ruled that the JBC
acted beyond its constitutional mandate in
clustering the nominees into six separate short lists
and President Aquino did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in disregarding the said clustering.
The JBC filed the present Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for Reconsiderationin-Intervention. The JBC asserts that in submitting
six short lists for six vacancies, it was only acting
in accordance with the clear and unambiguous
mandate of Article VIII, Section 9 for the JBC to
submit a list for every vacancy. Considering its
independence as a constitutional body, the JBC has
the discretion and wisdom to perform its mandate
in any manner as long as it is consistent with the
Constitution. The JBC also points out that the acts
invoked against the JBC are based on practice or
custom, but the JBC enjoys independence, and as
such, it may change its practice from time to time
in accordance with its wisdom.
The JBC likewise moved for the inhibition of the
ponente (Justice Leonardo De Castro) of the
assailed 2016 Decision based on Canon 3, Section
5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
Philippine Judiciary. The JBC alleges that the
ponente, as consultant of the JBC from 2014 to
2016, had personal knowledge of the voting
procedures and format of the short lists, which are
the subject matters of this case. The ponente was
even present as consultant during the meeting on
October 26, 2015 when the JBC voted upon the
candidates for the six new positions of Associate
Justice of the Sandiganbayan.
Ruling: The clustering of nominees for the six
vacancies in the Sandiganbayan by the JBC is
unconstitutional as it impaired the President's
power to appoint members of the Judiciary and to
determine the seniority of the newly-appointed
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
The independence and discretion of the JBC is not
without limits. It cannot impair the President's
power to appoint members of the Judiciary and his
statutory power to determine the seniority of the
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
newly-appointed
Justices.
Sandiganbayan
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
Associate
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The clustering impinged upon the President's
appointing power in the following ways: The
President's option for every vacancy was limited to
the five to seven nominees in each cluster. Once
the President had appointed a nominee from one
cluster, then he was proscribed from considering
the other nominees in the same cluster for the
other vacancies. All the nominees applied for and
were found to be qualified for appointment to any
of the vacant Associate Justice positions in the
Sandiganbayan, but the JBC failed to explain why
one nominee should be considered for
appointment to the position assigned to one
specific cluster only. Correspondingly, the
nominees' chance for appointment was restricted
to the consideration of the one cluster in which
they were included, even though they applied and
were found to be qualified for all the vacancies.
Moreover, by designating the numerical order of
the vacancies, the JBC established the seniority or
order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices, a power which the law [Section
1, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1606],
rules [Rule II, Section 1(b) of the Revised Internal
Rules of the Sandiganbayan], and jurisprudence
[Re: Seniority Among the Four Most Recent
Appointments to the Position of Associate Justices
of the Court of Appeals], vest exclusively upon the
President.
The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until after
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments
or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 16
The President shall nominate and, with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law
to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
Under this provision, the President appoints
three groups of officers:
a. Those requiring confirmation by the
Commission on Appointment
b. Those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint
c. All other officers of the government
*Only if the law is silent on who has the
appointing power, or if the law to appoint is
declared unconstitutional
Appointments Subject to Confirmation by
Commission on Appointments
Coverage:
1) Heads of the Executive Department
(Cabinet Secretaries)
2) Ambassadors, other public ministers,
and consuls (those connected with the
diplomatic and consular services of the
country)
3) Officers of the Armed Forces (from the
rank of Colonel or Naval Captain)
4) Other officers of the government whose
appointments are vested in the
President in the Constitution (1987
Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 16)
a. Regular members of the Judicial
Bar Council (JBC) Aguinaldo v.
Aquino III [1987 Constitution,
Art. VIII Sec. 8(2)]
b. Chairmen and Members of Civil
Service
Commission
(CSC),
Commission
on
Elections
(COMELEC), and Commission on
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
Audit (COA) [1987 Constitution,
Art. IX-B,C,D, Sec. 1(2)]
c. Members
of
Regional
Consultative Commissions under
Sec 18, Art. X on autonomous
regions
Process:
1. NOMINATION by the President
2. CONFIRMATION
by
the
Commission on Appointments
3. Issuance of APPOINTMENT
*Acceptance by the Appointee
NOTE: Appointees may immediately assume
office while waiting for Congress to resume
session, for Commission on Appointment to
approve/disapprove, or otherwise adjourn
without acting on them.
B. Appointments
Confirmation of
Appointments
Not
the
Subject to
Commission
the
on
1) All other officers of the government
whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by the law
2) Those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint
3) Officers lower in rank
whose
appointments Congress may, by law,
vest in the President alone
CASE: Civil Liberties Union (CLU) vs Executive
Secretary 194 SCRA 317
Facts: (Former) President Corazon Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 284, allowing appointive
officials of the Executive Department (members of
the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries) to hold, in addition to his primary
position, not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and
receive the corresponding compensation therefor.
Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is
constitutional on the principal submission that it
adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other
than those provided in the Constitution
Ruling: By ostensibly restricting the number of
positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries
or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to
their primary position to not more than two
positions in the government and government
corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold
multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention to the express mandate of Section
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting
them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in
the 1987 Constitution itself.
The prohibition imposed on the President and his
official family is all-embracing and covers both
public and private office or employment. It is quite
notable that in all Constitutional provisions on
disqualifications to hold other office or
employment, the prohibition pertains to an office
or employment in the government and
government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the
wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that
“(T)he President, Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their
tenure.
These
sweeping,
all-embracing
prohibitions imposed on the President and his
official family, which prohibitions are not similarly
imposed on other public officials or employees
such as the Members of Congress, members of the
civil service in general and members of the armed
forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987
Constitution to treat the President and his official
family as a class by itself and to impose upon said
class stricter prohibitions.
While all other appointive officials in the civil
service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure
when such is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of their positions, members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so
only when expressly authorized by the Constitution
itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is
meant to lay down the general rule applicable to
all elective and appointive public officials and
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant
to be the exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice-President, Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
CASE: Funa v. Agra, 691 SCRA 196 (2013)
Facts:
President
Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo
appointed Alberto Agra as the Acting Secretary of
Justice following the resignation of Secretary
Agnes VST Devanadera. Subsequently, President
Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor
General in a concurrent capacity. Petitioner Dennis
Funa, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned
citizen and a lawyer, commenced this suit to
challenge the constitutionality of Agra's concurrent
appointments or designations, claiming it to be
prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution
Issue: Whether or not the designation of Agra as
the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with
his position of Acting Solicitor General, violate the
constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple
offices for the Members of the Cabinet and their
deputies and assistants.
Ruling: Being designated as the Acting Secretary
of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting
Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly
covered by Section 13, Article VII. Hence, Agra
could not validly hold any other office or
employment during his tenure as the Acting
Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not
otherwise so provided.
It was of no moment that Agra's designation was
in an acting or temporary capacity. To hold an
office means to possess or to occupy the office, or
to be in possession and administration of the
office, which implies nothing less than the actual
discharge of the functions and duties of the office.
Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself, supra,
the Constitution makes no reference to the nature
of the appointment or designation. The prohibition
against dual or multiple offices being held by one
official must be construed as to apply to all
appointments or designations, whether permanent
or temporary, for it is without question that the
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
avowed objective of Section 13, supra, is to
prevent the concentration of powers in the
Executive Department officials, specifically the
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. To
construe differently is to "open the veritable
floodgates of circumvention of an important
constitutional disqualification of officials in the
Executive Department and of limitations on the
President's power of appointment in the guise of
temporary designations of Cabinet Members,
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as
officers-in-charge of government agencies,
instrumentalities, or government-owned or
controlled corporations.
Assuming that Agra, as the Acting Solicitor
General, was not covered by the stricter
prohibition under Section 13 due to such position
being merely vested with a cabinet rank under
Section 3, Republic Act No. 9417, he nonetheless
remained covered by the general prohibition under
Section 7. Hence, his concurrent designations were
still subject to the conditions under the latter
constitutional provision
BACKGROUND OF
APPOINTMENTS
THE
PRESIDENTIAL
1935 – almost all presidential appointments
required the confirmation of the Commission
on Appointments
1973 – consistent with the authoritarian
process, placed the absolute power of
appointment in the President with hardly any
check on the part of the legislature
1987 – middle ground between the 1935 and
1973 constitution, requiring the confirmation
of the Commission on Appointments for the
first group of appointments, and leaving the
president to appoint other officers without the
need for consent.
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
“Hence, when Congress clothes the President
with the power to appoint an officer, it
(Congress) cannot at the same time limit the
choice of the President to only one candidate.
Once the power of appointment is conferred
on the President, such conferment necessarily
carries the discretion of whom to appoint.
Even on the pretext of prescribing the
qualifications of the officer, Congress may not
abuse such power as to divest the appointing
authority, directly or indirectly, of his
discretion to pick his own choice.
Consequently,
when
the
qualifications
prescribed by Congress can only be met by
one individual, such enactment effectively
eliminates the discretion of the appointing
power to choose and constitutes an irregular
restriction on the power of appointment.”
Flores v. Drilon (1993)
CASE: Flores v. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568 (1993)
FACTS: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d),
of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under
which Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City
was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(SBMA), is challenged in this petition for
prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order. Under said provision, the
President has the power to appoint an
administrator of the SBMA provided that in the first
year of its operation, the Olongapo City mayor
shall be appointed as chairman and chief of
executive.
Petitioners assail its constitutionality based on Sec.
7, Art. IX-B of the Constitution, which states "[n]o
elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public officer or
position during his tenure."
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it is not
a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers to
the appointee. Once the power of appointment is
conferred on the President, such conferment
necessarily carries the discretion of whom to
appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the
qualifications of the officer, Congress may not
abuse such power as to divest the appointing
authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion to
pick his own choice. Consequently, when the
qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be
met by one individual, such enactment effectively
eliminates the discretion of the appointing power
to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction
on the power of appointment.
Differentiation between
Designation:
Appointment is the selection, by the authority
vested with the power, of an individual who is
to exercise the functions of a given office.
Often results in security of tenure for the
person chosen unless he is replaceable at
pleasure because of the nature of the office.
Designation is the imposition of additional
duties on an incumbent official; implies that a
person shall hold office for a temporary
capacity and may be replaced at will by the
appointing authority.
AD INTERIM APPOINTMENTS
-
-
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a legislative
encroachment on the appointing authority of the
President.
RULING: The power of choice is the heart of the
power to appoint. Appointment involves an
Appointment and
-
Power of the President to make
appointment during the recess of
Congress.
Purpose: to prevent a hiatus in the
discharge of official duties
Nature: permanent appointment that
takes effect immediately and cannot be
withdrawn or revoked at the mere
pleasure of the President after the
appointees have qualified into office;
effective until such disapproval or next
adjournment
By-passed appointment: one that has
not been finally acted upon on the
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
merits by the Commission on
Appointments at the close of the
session of Congress.
CASE: Matibag v. Benipayo (2002)
FACTS: President Arroyo appointed, ad interim,
Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and
Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a
term of seven years and all expiring on February
2, 2008. The President submitted the ad interim
appointments to the Commission on Appointments
for confirmation; however, the latter did not act on
the said appointments. Subsequently, the
President renewed the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason two more times to the
same position and the same term of seven years,
with COA still not acting on the appointments.
On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc
appointed Matibag as “Acting Director” of the EID
in a “temporary” capacity. On April 16, 2001, in his
capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo
reassigned the latter to a different department and
designated a new Director for the EID.
This petition for Prohibition assails the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason as
Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC,
respectively, as violative of the constitutional
prohibition on temporary appointments. Matibag
also questions the legality of Benipayo’s
appointment of Velma J. Cinco as the new Director
IV of the Comelec’s EID and her (Matibag)
subsequent
reassignment
to
a
different
department.
HELD: An ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment because it takes effect immediately
and can no longer be withdrawn by the President
once the appointee has qualified into office. The
fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character. The Constitution itself
makes an ad interim appointment permanent in
character by making it effective until disapproved
by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of Congress. This is in contrast
with temporary or acting appointments which are
revocable at the will of the appointing authority
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
and constitutionally prohibited to ensure the
independence of the constitutional commissions.
As such, the ad interim appointments of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason are valid and do not constitute
temporary or acting appointments prohibited by
the Constitution.
Appointment in acting capacity
Purpose: stop-gap measure intended to
fill an office for a limited time until the
appointment of a permanent occupant to the
office
Nature: temporary appointment; in case
of vacancy in any office by an alter ego of the
President, the President must appoint an alter
ego as acting secretary before the permanent
appointee may assume office
Difference between Ad Interim Appointment
and Appointment in Acting Capacity:
BASIS
When made
AD INTERIM
APPOINTMENT
During the
recess of
Congress
Required
Permanent
Confirmation
Nature
Security of
Yes
Tenure
CASE: Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita
APPOINTMENT
IN AN ACTING
CAPACITY
Any time there
is vacancy
Not required
Temporary
No
FACTS: Pimentel, Jr. questions the constitutionality
of the appointment of Abad as Department
secretary in acting capacity by then president GMA
while Congress is in session.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abad’s appointment as
Department secretary in acting capacity by then
president GMA is constitutional.
RULING: YES. The appointment of Abad as
department secretary in acting capacity is
constitutional given that it is temporary in nature.
Whose purpose is merely to fill in the gap in the
office until the time that a permanent appointment
is made.
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
NOTE: Appointment by an acting president
would be the same where such appointment
shall remain effective unless revoked by the
elected President within nine (9) days from his
assumption or reassumption of office.
POWER TO
REMOVE
APPOINT,
POWER
TO
From the express power of appointment, the
President derives the implied power of
removal under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution.
A Presidential Appointee has the direct
disciplining authority of the President. Those
that the President can appoint in the Executive
Department, he may also have the power to
remove, unless they are protected under the
mantle of security of tenure (those that are
protected under the mantle of security of
tenure may only be removed for a cause and
in accordance with procedural due process).
MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENT BAN
Section 15, Article VII): “Two months
immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make
appointments,
except
temporary
appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.”
CASE: Aytona v. Castillo
FACTS: On December 29, 1961, Outgoing
President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner
Dominador Aytona as ad interim Governor of
the Central Bank. Aytona took the
corresponding oath. On the same day, at
noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal
assumed office; and on the next day, he
issued administrative order no. 2 recalling,
withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim
appointments made by former President
Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or
last minute appointments made by the former
President Garcia. On January 1, President
Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad
interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona
instituted a case (quo warranto) against
Castillo, contending that he was validly
appointed, thus the subsequent appointment
to Castillo by the new President, should be
considered void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 350 midnight
appointments of former President Garcia were
valid.
RULING: No. After the proclamation of the
election of President Macapagal, previous
President Garcia administration was no more
than a care-taker administration. He was duty
bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of
authority the incoming President, and he
should not do acts which he ought to know,
would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his
successor. It was not for him to use powers as
incumbent President to continue the political
warfare that had ended or to avail himself of
presidential prerogatives to serve partisan
purposes. The filling up vacancies in important
positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some
assurance of deliberate action and careful
consideration of the need for the appointment
and the appointee's qualifications may
undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of
350 appointments in one night and planned
induction of almost all of them a few hours
before the inauguration of the new President
may, with some reason, be regarded by the
latter as an abuse in Presidential prerogatives,
the steps taken being apparently a mere
partisan effort to fill all vacant positions
irrespective of fitness and other conditions,
and thereby deprive the new administration of
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
an opportunity to make the corresponding
appointments.
CASE: Velicaria-Garafil
President
v.
Office
of
the
FACTS: The present consolidated cases
involve four petitions: G.R. No. 203372 with
Atty. Cheloy E. Velicaria-Garafil, who was
appointed State Solicitor II at the Office of the
Solicitor General, as petitioner; G.R. No.
206290 with Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza, who
was appointed Prosecutor IV of Quezon City,
as petitioner; G.R. No. 209138 with Irma A.
Villanueva , who was appointed Administrator
for Visayas of the Board of Administrators of
the Cooperative Development Authority, and
Francisca B. Rosquita, who was appointed
Commissioner of the National Commission of
Indigenous Peoples, as petitioners; and G.R.
No. 212030 with Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong,
who was appointed member of the Board of
Directors of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority, as petitioner. Prior to the conduct of
the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued more than 800
appointments to various positions in several
government offices. The ban on midnight
appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution reads: Two months
immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make
appointments,
except
temporary
appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety. Thus,
for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March
2010 was the cutoff date for valid
appointments and the next day, 11 March
2010, was the start of the ban on midnight
appointments. Section 15, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution recognizes as an exception
to the ban on midnight appointments only
"temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety." None of the petitioners claim that their
appointments fall under this exception. On 30
June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III
(President Aquino) took his oath of office as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. On
30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2
recalling,
withdrawing,
and
revoking
appointments issued by President MacapagalArroyo which violated the constitutional ban
on midnight appointments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners'
appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution
RULING: The appointments of petitioners Atty.
Cheloy E. Velicaria-Garafil (G.R. No. 203372),
Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza (G.R. No. 206290),
Irma A. Villanueva, and Francisca B. Rosquita
(G.R. No. 209138), and Atty. Eddie U.
Tamondong (G.R. No. 212030) are declared
VOID. The following elements should always
concur in the making of a valid (which should
be understood as both complete and effective)
appointment: (1) authority to appoint and
evidence of the exercise of the authority; The
President's exercise of his power to appoint
officials is provided for in the Constitution and
laws. Discretion is an integral part in the
exercise of the power of appointment.
Considering that appointment calls for a
selection, the appointing power necessarily
exercises a discretion. (2) transmittal of the
appointment paper and evidence of the
transmittal; It is not enough that the President
signs the appointment paper. There should be
evidence that the President intended the
appointment paper to be issued. It could
happen that an appointment paper may be
dated and signed by the President months
before the appointment ban, but never left his
locked drawer for the entirety of his term.
Release of the appointment paper through the
MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies the
President's intent of its issuance. (3) a vacant
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
position at the time of appointment; and (4)
receipt of the appointment paper and
acceptance of the appointment by the
appointee who possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications. Acceptance
is indispensable to complete an appointment.
Assuming office and taking the oath amount
to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of
office is a qualifying requirement for a public
office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of
the office. Petitioners have failed to show
compliance with all four elements of a valid
appointment. They cannot prove with
certainty that their appointment papers were
transmitted before the appointment ban took
effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit
that they took their oaths of office during the
appointment ban.
Midnight appointment ban does not cover
the Judiciary (De Castro v. JBC)
The establishment of the JBC, who is
responsible in the nomination and screening of
candidates for judicial positions ensures that
no midnight appointment within the Judiciary
CASE: DE CASTRO v JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL, G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010
FACTS: The 2010 presidential election is
forthcoming. C.J. Puno is set to retire on 17
May 2010 or seven days after the presidential
election. January 2010, the JBC begun to take
applications for the position of C.J. Meanwhile,
strong objections to Pres. GMA’s appointing
C.J. Puno’s successor arose.
The instant petitions were thus filed
questioning her authority to appoint a new C.J.
in the light of the ban imposed on presidential
appointments two months immediately before
the next presidential elections up to the end of
the President’s term under Section 15, Article
VII of the Constitution. This view however
seemingly conflicts with Section 4(1), Article
VIII which provides that any vacancy in the SC
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
shall be filled within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy, and Section 9,
Article VIII which provides that the President
shall issue appointments to the Judiciary
within 90 days from submission by the JBC of
the list of nominees.
It is further argued that there is no imperative
need to appoint the next Chief Justice
considering that Section 12 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948 can still address the situation of having
the next President appoint the successor. It
provides that in case of a vacancy in the office
of the C.J. or of his inability to perform the
duties and powers of his office, they shall
devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first
in precedence, until such disability is removed,
or another C.J. is appointed and duly qualified.
It is also argued that there is no need for the
incumbent President to appoint during the
prohibition period the successor of C.J. Puno
because anyway there will still be about 45
days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII remaining (the period that remains
of the 90 days counted from C.J. Puno’s
retirement after the end of GMA’s term).
ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on making
presidential appointments under Section 15,
Article VII extend to appointments to fill
vacancies in the SC and in the rest of the
Judiciary.
RULING:
No. We reverse Valenzuela. Had the framers
intended to extend the prohibition contained
in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the SC, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. The
exchanges during deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission further show that
the filling of a vacancy in the SC within the 90day period was made a true mandate for the
President. This was borne out of the fact that
30 years hitherto, the Court seldom had a
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
complete complement. Further, the usage in
Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the word “shall”—
an imperative—should not be disregarded.
Given the background and rationale for the
prohibition in Section 15, Article VII,
undoubtedly, the Constitutional Commission
confined the prohibition to appointments
made in the Executive Department. The
framers did not need to extend the prohibition
to appointments in the Judiciary, because their
establishment of the JBC and their subjecting
the nomination and screening of candidates
for judicial positions to the unhurried and
deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured
that there would no longer be midnight
appointments
to
the
Judiciary
and
appointments to the Judiciary for the purpose
of buying votes in a coming presidential
election,
or
of
satisfying
partisan
considerations. The fact that Sections 14 and
16 of Art VI refer only to appointments within
the Executive Department renders conclusive
that Section 15 of the same also applies only
to the Executive Department. This is
consistent with the rule that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to
the context. If the framers intended Section 15
to cover all kinds of presidential appointments,
they would have easily and surely inserted a
similar prohibition. To hold that Section 15
extends to appointments to the Judiciary
undermines the intent of the Constitution of
ensuring the independence of the Judicial
Department for it will tie the Judiciary and the
SC to the fortunes or misfortunes of political
leaders vying for the Presidency in a
presidential election.
POWER OF CONTROL AND TAKE-CARE
CLAUSE
Power of Control – the president shall have
control of all executive departments, bureaus,
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
and offices; ensuring that the laws are being
faithfully executed
Laying down of rules in doing of an act
Includes the power of supervision given that
the president shall exercise general
supervision over local governments.
Provinces with respect to component cities
and
municipalities,
and
cities
and
municipalities with respect to component
barangays shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their
prescribed powers and functions.
The president shall exercise general
supervision over autonomous regions to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed
Control - power of an officer to alter or modify
or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his
duties, substituting the judgments of the
former to that of the latter.
Supervision - overseeing or having the
authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. Power to mere
oversight over an inferior body, not including
any restraint over the body.
The President’ constitutional power does not
require any implementing law.
The power of the president also covers the
GOCCs, bureaus, and offices (Hutchison Ports
Philippines Limited v. Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority), given that any award that may be
granted by the Board of SBMA, a chartered
institution, can be overturned by the
President.
Although the President may modify or nullify
certain acts of the subordinate, he cannot
remove the one who did the act
Qualified Political Agency (Alter Ego)
Doctrine
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Power to delegate many of the functions and
responsibilities of the President
President may have to rely on trusted
subordinates – the department heads and
cabinet secretaries – who would have to act
for and on his behalf, and whose acts must
accordingly be presumed to be those of the
President himself, unless he disapproves or
rejects them.
The president should be answerable for the
acts of the administration of the entire
Executive department before his own
conscience before the public
CASE: Manalang-Demigillo v. TIDCORP
Facts: On February 12, 1998, the Philippine
Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee was
renamed Trade and Investment Development
Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP)
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8494 entitled An
Act Further Amending Presidential Decree No.
1080, As Amended, by Reorganizing And
Renaming the Philippine Export and Foreign
Loan Guarantee Corporation, Expanding Its
Primary Purpose, and for Other Purposes.
Republic Act No. 8494 reorganized the
structure of TIDCORP. The issuance of
appointments in accordance with the
reorganization ensued. Petitioner Rosario
Manalang-Demigillo (Demigillo) was appointed
as Senior Vice President (PG 15) with
permanent status, and was assigned to the
Legal and Corporate Services Department
(LCSD) of TIDCORP. Petitioner was evaluated
and given a ‘poor’ rating for two consecutive
evaluations
due
to
her
unimproved
performance resulting to her name being
dropped from the rolls of TIDCORP.
Issue: Whether or not the reorganization is
valid resulting to Demigillo’s reassignment
valid.
Held: Yes. Under the circumstances, when the
members of the Board of Directors effected
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
the assailed 2002 reorganization, they were
acting as the responsible members of the
Board of Directors of TIDCORP constituted
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8494, not as the
alter egos of the President. We cannot stretch
the application of a doctrine that already
delegates an enormous amount of power.
Also, it is settled that the delegation of power
is not to be lightly inferred.
CASE: Abakada vs. Ermita (Tariff Powers)
FACTS:
RA 9337, an act amending certain sections of
the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997,
is questioned by petitioners for being
unconstitutional. Procedural issues raised by
petitioners are the legality of the bicameral
proceedings, exclusive origination of revenue
measures and the power of the Senate
concomitant thereto.
Also, Substantive issue was raised with regard
to the undue delegation of legislative power to
the President to increase the rate of valueadded tax to 12%.
Petitioners also argue that the increase to
12%, as well as the 70% limitation on the
creditable input tax, the 60- month
amortization on the purchase or importation of
capital goods exceeding P1,000,000.00, and
the 5% final withholding tax by government
agencies, is arbitrary, oppressive, and
confiscatory, and that it violates the
constitutional
principle
on
progressive
taxation, among others.
ISSUE:
WON Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the NIRC giving the President
the stand-by authority to raise the VAT rate
from 10% to 12% when a certain condition is
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
met, constitutes undue delegation of the
legislative power to tax.
Constitution. Accordingly, the Board ordered
their reinstatement.
HELD:
However, respondent Carpio, as Director of
NBI, returned the orders issued by the
Secretary of Justice to CSC “without action,”
claiming that they were null and void for
having been rendered without jurisdiction.
NO. The case before the Court is not a
delegation of legislative power. It is simply a
delegation of ascertainment of facts upon
which enforcement and administration of the
increase rate under the law is contingent. The
legislature has made the operation of the 12%
rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent
upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the
entire operation or non-operation of the 12%
rate upon factual matters outside of the
control of the executive.
No discretion would be exercised by the
President. Highlighting the absence of
discretion is the fact that the word shall is used
in the common proviso. The use of the word
shall connotes a mandatory order. Its use in
a statute denotes an imperative obligation and
is
inconsistent
with
the
idea
of
discretion.Where the law is clear and
unambiguous, it must be taken to mean
exactly what it says, and courts have no choice
but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed
CASE: De Leon v Carpio
FACTS: Estavillo and de Leon are two NBI
agents terminated by then Minister of Justice
Neptali A. Gonzales. Upon appeal to the
Review Committee, the said body declined to
act on their petitions for reconsideration on
the ground that it had lost its jurisdiction with
the ratification of the new Constitution. They
were advised instead to seek relief from the
Civil Service Commission.
The Merit Systems Protection Board of CSC
held that their dismissals were invalid and
unconstitutional, having been done in violation
of their security of tenure under the 1987
ISSUE: Whether or not the Director of the NBI
can disobey an explicit and direct order issued
to him by the Secretary of Justice
HELD: It is an elementary principle of our
republican government, enshrined in the
Constitution and honored not in the breach but
in the observance, that all executive
departments, bureaus and offices are under
the control of the President of the Philippines.
The President’s power of control is directly
exercised by him over the members of the
Cabinet who, in turn and by his authority,
control the bureaus and other offices under
their respective jurisdictions in the executive
department. The constitutional vesture of this
power in the President is self-executing and
does not require statutory implementation,
nor may its exercise be limited, much less
withdrawn, by the legislature.
Theoretically, the President has full control of
all the members of his Cabinet and may
appoint them as he sees fit or shuffle them at
pleasure, subject only to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, and replace
them in his discretion. Once in place, they are
at all times under the disposition of the
President as their immediate superior.
“Without minimizing the importance of the
heads of the various departments, their
personality is in reality but the projection of
that of the President. Hence, their acts,
performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business are, unless disapproved or
reprobated
by
the
Chief
Executive,
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”
(Villena v. Secretary of the Interior)
In the case at bar, there is no question that
when he directed the respondent to reinstate
the petitioners, Sec. Ordonez was acting in the
regular discharge of his functions as an alter
ego of the President. His acts should therefore
have been respected by the respondent
Director of the NBI, which is in the Department
of Justice under the direct control of its
Secretary. As a subordinate in this
department, the respondent was (and is)
bound to obey the Secretary’s directives,
which are presumptively the acts of the
President of the Philippines.
Powers of the President that cannot be
delegated:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
Power to appoint
Permissible fund transfers
Veto of bills
Declaration of martial law
Suspension of Habeas Corpus
Granting of Pardon
Among the alter egos of the President are the
Department Heads, Cabinet Secretaries
– the Executive Secretary is occupying the
primary position.
Executive Secretary - may override the
decisions of other Department heads, and
other secretaries
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v Pano 21 SCRA
895 (1967)
(POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE)
FACTS:
Magallanes was a permittee and actual
occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land
situated in Davao. He ceded his rights and
interests to a portion (392,7569 hectares) of
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
the above public land to plaintiff. However, the
same was officially released from the forest
zone as pasture land and declared agricultural
land.
Defendant Jose Paño and nineteen other
claimants applied for the purchase of ninety
hectares of the released area.
Plaintiff corporation in turn filed its own sales
application covering the entire released area.
The Director of Lands, following an
investigation of the conflict, rendered a
decision giving due course to the application
of plaintiff corporation, and dismissing the
claim of Jose Paño and his companions.
When the case was elevated to the President
of the Philippines, Executive Secretary, Juan
Pajo, by authority of the president, declared
that it would be for the public interest that
appellants, who are mostly landless farmers,
be allocated that portion on which the
petitioner have made improvements.
ISSUE:
W/N the Executive Secretary, acting by
authority of the President, reverse a decision
of the Director of Lands that had been
affirmed by the Executive Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.
RULING:
YES. The President’s duty to execute the law
and control of all executive departments are of
constitutional origin. Naturally, he controls and
directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority
to go over, confirm, modify, or reverse the
action taken by his department secretaries. It
may also be stated that the right to appeal to
the President reposes upon the President’s
power of control over the executive
departments. He may delegate to his
Executive
Secretary
acts
which
the
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Constitution does not command that he
perform in person. As the Executive Secretary
acts by faith and credit by our courts, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive.
Roque v. Director of Lands, 72 SCRA 1 (1976)
FACTS:
Ø Petitioner Roque alleged that he had been
in occupation of the disputed portion since
1937, for the whole of Lot No. 4507. Likewise,
Respondent Facun filed his homestead
application on the same land in 1935 and
submitted the final proof therefore in 1939.
Ø In settling the dispute, the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources decided in
favor of Roque but upon re investigation it is
found out that Roque submitted his sales
application for the disputed portion in 1948,
only during the course of the investigation of
his protest and it was verified during the re
investigation of this case that the appellee
(Roque) entered upon the disputed portion in
1951 only. So the President, through
respondent Assistant Executive Secretary,
awarded the land in favor of the respondent
Facun.
Ø The petitioner prayed that the order of the
respondent Honorable Director of Lands and
the decision of the respondent Honorable
Assistant Executive Secretary, be set aside on
the alleged ground that the said order of the
Director of Lands was issued with grave abuse
of discretion, consisting of unqualified reliance
and the biased report and recommendation.
And said that the decision of the Honorable
Executive Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction
and committed a grave abuse of discretion
disregarding the sales award of the land in
question in favor of the herein petitioner
having already paid is for the price of the
same, and praying further that the decision of
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
the Honorable Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources be sustained.
Ø Respondent Jose Facun, through Atty.
Cipriano A. Tan, filed an answer to the petition
denying specifically the allegation of abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness and excess of
jurisdiction of the Honorable Director of Lands
and Assistant Executive Secretary is perfectly
valid.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Assistant Executive
Secretary lacks the power to overrule the
decision of the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources?
RULING:
NO. to contend that the Office of the
President, through respondent Assistant
Executive Secretary, lacks the power to
overrule the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources is to betray lack of
awareness of the implications of what Justice
Laurel referred to in Villena v. Secretary of the
Interior as " As was further stressed by him:
"Without minimizing the importance of the
heads of the various departments, their
personality is in reality but the projection of
that of the President…. the acts of the
secretaries of such departments, performed
and Promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated
by
the
Chief
Executive,
presumptive the acts of the Chief Executive.”
The President has control of all the executive
departments, bureaus or offices and under
Pelaez v. Auditor General "The power of
control under this provision implies the right of
the President to interfere in the exercise of
such discretion as may be vested by law in the
officers of the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such
officers." Clearly then, there is nothing to
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
prevent the President from disapproving the
act of a department head.
Assistant Executive Secretary of the President
is correct for sustaining the award by the
Director of Lands of a homestead application
and thus overruling the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, because it
is in conformity with the policy of the law.
Petitioner, himself a previous beneficiary of
the statute, would seek to add to his holding
by a sales application. The prevailing party,
private respondent Jose Facun, on the other
hand, had applied for the disputed lot as a
homesteader as far back as 1935, and had
submitted his final proof in 1948.
Does not extend to acts of cabinet members
who are ex officio members of the Board of
Directors of a government corporation, even
to the Office of the Ombudsman
CASE: Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited
(HPPL) v Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
Facts
Petition to suspend or hold in abeyance the
conduct of SBMA of a rebidding.
Out of 7 bidders, 3 were declared as qualified:
1) ICTSI 2) RPSI and 3) HPPL
SBMA-PBAC first awarded to HPPL. However,
ICTSI filed an appeal with SBMA and also
before the Office of the President.
In a memorandum, the President ordered
SBMA Chairman Gordon to reevaluate the
financial bids together with the COA.
Again, the SBMA Board issued another reso
declaring that HPPL is selected as winner,
since it has a realistic business plan offering
the greatest financial return to SBMA and the
most advantageous to the government.
HPPL filed a complaint against SBMA before
the RTC and alleged that abinding and legally
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
enforceable contract had been established
between HPPL and SBMA under Article 1305 of
the civil code, considering that SBMA had
repeatedly declared and confirmed that HPPL
was the winning bidder.
Issue:
Can the President set aside the award made
by SBMA in favor of HPPL? If so, canthe Office
of the President direct SBMA to conduct
rebidding of the proposed project?
Held:
• YES. HPPL has not sufficiently shown that
it a has a clear and unmistakable right to be
declared the winning bidder. Though the
SBMA Board of Directors may have declared
them as winner, said award is not final and
unassailable.
• The SBMA Board of Directors are subject to
the control and supervision of the President.All
projects undertaken by SBMA require the
approval of the President under Letters of
Instruction No. 620
• Letters of Instruction No. 620 mandates that
the approval of the President is required in all
contracts of the national government offices,
agencies
and
instrumentalities
includingGOCCS involving P2M and above,
awarded
through
public
bidding
or
negotiation.
• The President may, within his authority,
overturn or reverse any award made by the
SBMABoard of Directors for justifiable reasons.
•
When the President issued the
memorandum setting aside the award
previously declared by SBMA in favor of HPPL,
the same was within authority of the President
and was a valid exercise of his prerogative.
• The petition is dismissed for lack of merit
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Faithful Execution Clause
Through Executive Orders, the President
ensures that laws are faithfully executed, by
handing out instructions to subordinate
executive officials and the public how the law
should be executed by the subordinate officials
and complied with by the public.
In determining facts and other circumstances,
the
President’s
power
to
conduct
investigations and create ad hoc committees is
inherent to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed.
In the case of Biraogo v. Philippine Truth
Commission, the issuance of E.O. No. 1 is
justified under Section 17, Article VII which
imposes to the President the duty to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed. The creation
of the ad hoc committee by the President is
deemed to be part of this duty.
ISSUE: IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284,
August 15, 2000
FACTS:
The President ordered the PNP and the
Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for
the purpose of crime prevention and
suppression. On January 17, 2000, the IBP
filed the instant petition to declare the
deployment
of
Philippines
Marines
unconstitutional thus null and void alleging
that no emergency situation would justify the
employment of soldiers for law enforcement
work and that the same is in derogation of
Article II Section 3 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President's factual
determination of the necessity of calling the
armed forces is subject to judicial review
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
HELD:
The President did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in calling out the Marines.
When the President calls the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a
discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the
framers and from the text of the Constitution
itself. The
Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule
the President's wisdom or substitute its own.
However, this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional
limits or whether it was exercised in a manner
constituting grave... abuse of discretion. In
view of the constitutional intent to give the
President full discretionary power to determine
the necessity of calling out the armed forces,
it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show
that the President's decision is totally bereft of
factual basis. The... present petition fails to
discharge such a heavy burden as there is no
evidence to support the assertion that there
exists no justification for calling out the armed
forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to
support the proposition that grave abuse was
committed because the power... to call was
exercised in such a manner as to violate the
constitutional provision on civilian supremacy
over the military. In the performance of this
Court's duty of "purposeful hesitation"[32]
before declaring an act of another branch as
unconstitutional,... only where such grave
abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the
Court interfere with the President's judgment.
To doubt is to sustain.
There is a clear textual commitment under the
Constitution to bestow on the President full
discretionary power to call out the armed
forces and to determine the necessity for the
exercise of such power.
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Power of Supervision over Local Governments
The power to investigate complaints against
local government officials and to discipline
them if warranted
Kulayan v. Gov. Abdusakat Tan, SCRA 675 482
Facts:
Three Red Cross members who were just
inspected a water sanitation project for the
Sulu provincial jail, were kidnapped by three
Abu Sayyaf members.Later on, the Governor
of Sulu
Tan. Formed a committee tasked to
investigate such incident and thus places the
province of SULU under a state of emergency
which he issued Proclamation no.1 and thus
invoked the Local Government Codeto justify
the said proclamation. In the said
proclamation, it stated that and called for the
National Police and other civilian forces to set
up checkpoints to ensure safety and alike.
Subsequently, petitioner Jamar Petitioner
argues that the said proclamation was out of
his capacity and that it was unjustified for
violating a couple of sections as provided in
the constitution.
Issue: Can a governor exercise emergency
powers just like the president?
Ruling:
No. The Governor is not bestowed with the
power as stated in article 1 and18 and thus his
acts are ultra vires. The president has the only
exclusive power toissues such power to call
upon the armed forces in times of acute crisis
and stateof emergency. The said powers are
summed up to be executive powers and
theyare only vested in the chief executive of
the Philippines as stated in section 1, article vii
of the Philippine constitution.
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
CASE: Laurel vs Garcia GR 92013 July 25,
1990.
Facts:
Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine
Government to sell the Roppongi Property,
which is located in Japan. It is one of the
properties given by the Japanese Government
as reparations for damage done by the latter
to the former during the war. Petitioner argues
that under Philippine Law, the subject property
is property of public dominion. As such, it is
outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it
cannot be alienated. Respondents aver that
Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall
apply to the case because the property is
located in Japan. They posit that the principle
of lex situs applies
ISSUE: Whether or not the Chief Executive,
her officers and agents, have the authority and
jurisdiction to sell the Roppongi property.
RULING: YES. The Petition is Granted. It is not
for the President to convey valuable real
property of the government on his or her own
sole will. Any such conveyance must be
authorized and approved by a law enacted by
the Congress. It requires executive and
legislative concurrence. It is indeed true that
the Roppongi property is valuable not so much
because of the inflated prices fetched by real
property in Tokyo but more so because of its
symbolic value to all Filipinos, veterans and
civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi
and related properties will eventually be sold
is a policy determination where both the
President and Congress must concur.
Considering the properties' importance and
value, the laws on conversion and disposition
of property of public dominion must be
faithfully followed.
Formality of Acts
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Unless the law prescribes of it, it is not
essential that orders and acts of the President
are to be written.
Baculi v. Office of the President 820
SCRA 1 (2017)
FACTS:
Petitioner, in his capacity as (Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer) PARO II, he entered
several contracts with various suppliers for the
lease of typewriters, computers, computer
printers, and other accessories. Separate
reports from the DAR Commission on Audit
and the DAR Regional Investigating
Committee of Cagayan, however, revealed
that the foregoing transactions were tainted
with irregularities.
He executed and approved contracts of
lease without the corresponding Certificate of
Availability of Funds as provided in Section 86
of Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise
known as the Auditing Code of the Philippines;
and that there was no public bidding held for
the purpose in violation of the Commission on
Audit Circular No. 85-55-A.
The DAR Secretary forwarded his
findings and recommendations to the Office of
the President its Order in OP Case dismissed
petitioner from the service.
For reference, the dismissal order of the
Office of the President is being referred to by
petitioner as his "SECOND Dismissal".
Petitioner sought recourse before the
court aquo for Mandamus to compel the DAR
Secretary to pay his basic salaries, other
emoluments and benefits with legal rate of
interest, covering the periods of August 2,
1994, when the DAR Secretary dismissed him
from service, to June 25,2003, a day before
the Office of the President rendered its
decision declaring him dismissed from the
service. CA granted backwages,
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
ISSUE:
G.R. No. 188681 is whether or not the order
of dismissal issued by the Acting Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs was valid;
while the issues in G.R. No.201130 are: (1)
whether or not the CA erred in reversing the
findings of the RTC, and in granting the
petition for mandamus;
RULING
Dismissal by Sec. Garilao was void. charges
against Baculi for gross dishonesty, abuse of
authority, grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service
based on the reports issued by the Regional
Investigating Committee of the DAR (DARRIC) and the Commission on Audit (COA)
about having violated Presidential Decree
No.1445 (Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines) as well as relevant DAR rules and
regulations. He was immediately placed under
preventive suspension for 90 days From
September 4 to December 3, 1992)
consequently Section 38(a) of Presidential
Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree),
Section 38. Procedure in Administrative Cases
Against
Non-Presidential
Appointees.(a)
Administrative
proceedings
may
be
commenced against a subordinate officer or
employee by the head of department or office
of equivalent rank, or head of local
government, or chiefs or agencies, regional
directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of
any other persons. x x x x Section 38(a) of
Presidential Decree No. 807 has drawn a
definite distinction between subordinate
officers or employees who were presidential
appointees, on the one
CASE: Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth
Commission of 201
FACT:
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth
Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by
President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere
branch formed under the Office of the
President tasked to investigate reports of graft
and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration and submit their
findings and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or
render awards in disputes between parties. Its
job is to investigate, collect and asses
evidence
gathered
and
make
recommendations. It has subpoena powers
but it has no power to cite people in contempt
or even arrest. It cannot determine for such
facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the
filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners contend the Constitutionality of the
E.O. on the grounds that.
It violates separation of powers as it arrogates
the power of Congress to create a public office
and appropriate funds for its operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section
31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated
authority of the President to structurally
reorganize the Office of the President to
achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency
does not include the power to create an
entirely new office was inexistent like the
Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution
when it made the Truth Commission and
vesting it the power duplicating and even
exceeding those of the Office of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause
ISSUE: W/N the said E.O is unconstitutional.
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
RULING:
Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is
violative of the equal protection clause. The
Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc
Investigating Committee cannot be doubted.
Having been constitutionally granted full
control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the
obligation to ensure that all executive officials
and employees faithfully comply with the law.
With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the
investigation is sustained. Such validity is not
affected by the fact that the investigating team
and the PCAGC had the same composition, or
that the former used the offices and facilities
of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
(MILITARY POWER)
CLAUSE
The President as the commander-in-chief of all
the armed forces may exercise the following
powers:
Calling-out Power (Sec.7, Article VIII)
Power to Suspend the Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus (P.D. 2045)
Power to Declare Martial Law
Power to Confirm Judgments of General Court
Martial
Power to Conduct Peace Negotiations
The President is authorized to direct the
operations and determine military strategies of
all armed forces placed by law at his
command, and to employ them in the manner
he may deem most effective.
In the history of the country, during the reign
of former President Marcos, who suspended
the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, followed
by the declaration of martial law, the 1987
Constitution provided a limitation to ensure
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
that the powers are kept within the Rules of
Law.
Declaration of martial law is limited only to 60
days, subject to the extension with the
consent of Congress
Upon declaration, the President is given 48hours to submit a report to Congress on the
reason for such, if the Congress deems it
unnecessary, it can revoke the suspension of
proclamation.
Congress is required to convene without need
to call within 24 hours following the President’s
proclamation or issuance
Supreme Court has the power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension in a proper suit
Provides that declaration of martial law does
not suspend the operation of the Constitution,
or of the civil courts, or of legislative
assemblies
During suspension of writ of habeas corpus,
any person arrested or detained must be
judicially charged within 3 days, otherwise he
shall be released
Martial Law
Rooted on the principle that the state has a
right to protect itself against those who would
destroy it and has therefore been likened to
the right of individuals to self-defense.
Inherent power in every state which is invoked
only in an extreme measure to control society
in periods of civil unrest or war.
Common Features:
Use of Military Force
Government military personnel have the
authority to make and enforce civil and
criminal laws
Certain civil liberties may be suspended
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
Exercising the power to suspend the privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus or the Imposition
of Martial Law: (conditions)
There must be an actual invasion or rebellion
Public Safety must require it
The present constitution recognizes the
authority of citizens to question the factual
basis for the exercise of these powers, vesting
the SC with the authority to decide on the case
within 30 days of its filing.
Calling-Out Power
Condition: “whenever it becomes necessary”,
the President may call out the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion,
or rebellion.
The President is given full discretion in the
exercise of the Power of Calling Out the Armed
Forces.
The President has the sole power to exercise
this power, and no other local chief executive
Can be exercised through “declaration of a
state of rebellion” or “declaration of a state of
emergency”
Ampatuan v. Puno, 651 SCRA 228 (2011)
FACTS:
On 24 November 2009, the day after the
Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo
issued Proclamation 1946, placing “the
Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat
and the City of Cotabato under a state of
emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP
“to undertake such measures as may be
allowed by the Constitution and by law to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence” in the named places. Three days
later, she also issued AO 273 “transferring”
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the
President to the DILG. She subsequently
issued AO 273-A, which amended the former
AO (the term “transfer” used in AO 273 was
amended to “delegate”, referring to the
supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
Calling Out Power
Suspension of the
Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas
Corpus
and
Proclamation
of
Martial Law
Most benign
More drastic
ISSUE:
Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly
exercised emergency powers when she called
out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and
suppress all incidents of lawless violence in
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato
City.
Whether or not the President had factual
bases for her actions
RULING:
The court ruled that the deployment is not an
exercise of emergency powers but rather an
exercise of calling out power since the
president did not proclaim a national
emergency but only a state of emergency in
the three places mentioned. Hence, she did
not need congressional authority as she was
given the full discretion to exercise the calling
out power.
while it is true that the court may inquire into
the factual bases for the president’s exercise
of calling out power, it would generally defer
to her judgement on the matter. If the
petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the
assertion that the President acted without
factual bases, the court cannot undertake an
independent
investigation
beyond
the
pleadings.
Difference between Calling Out Power and the
Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus and Proclamation of Martial
Law
The President is The President and
given full discretion the
congress
in
in its exercise
exercising this power
is sequential or joint
Can be exercised
through “declaration
of
a
state
of
rebellion”
or
“declaration of a
state of emergency”
Conditions
in
Exercising the power
to
suspend
the
privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus or
the Imposition of
Martial Law:
There must be an
actual invasion or
rebellion
Public Safety must
require it
POWER TO CONDUCT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
implicitly included in the president’s powers as
Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief.
Chief Executive - General responsibility is to
promote public peace.
Commander-in-Chief - more specific duty to
prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless
violence.
As Commander-in-Chief, the president may
also bar military officers from appearing before
the congressional inquiries without securing its
approval.
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Gudani v. Senga, 498 SCRA 671 (2006)
FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col.
Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election
fraud and the surfacing of the “Hello Garci”
tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials
of the executive department including the
military establishment from appearing in any
legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP
Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a
Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col.
Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate
Committee without Presidential approval.
However, the two appeared before the Senate
in spite of the fact that a directive has been
given to them. As a result, the two were
relieved of their assignments for allegedly
violating the Articles of War and the time
honoured principle of the “Chain of
Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be
subjected before the General Court Martial
proceedings for willfully violating an order of a
superior officer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority
to issue an order to the members of the AFP
preventing them from testifying before a
legislative inquiry.
RULING:
Yes. The SC held that the President has
constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of
her power as commander-in-chief, and that as
a consequence a military officer who defies
such injunction is liable under military justice.
At the same time, any chamber of congress
which seeks the appearance before it of a
military officer against the consent of the
president has adequate remedies under law to
compel such attendance (i.e President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the
attendance of the military officer).
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA
27 (1963)
FACTS:
On May 1952, Special Prosecutor Galang
charged Qua Chee Gan et al (Petitioners)
before the Deportation Board, with having
purchased $130K, without the necessary
license from the Central Bank, and of having
clandestinely remitted the same to HK; and
other petitioners, with having attempted to
bribe officers of the Philippine and US
Governments. A warrant for their arrest was
issued by the presiding member of the
Deportation Board. Upon their filing surety
bond for P10K and cash bond for P10K, Qua
CheeGan et al were provisionally set at liberty.
Petitioners filed a joint Motion to Dismiss
because the charges do not constitute legal
grounds for deportation of aliens from this
country, and that the said Board has no
jurisdiction to entertain such charges. MTC
denied it so petitioners filed a petition for
habeas corpus and/or prohibition, which
petition was given due course, but made
returnable to the CFI Manila.
The Board’s answer: The Deportation Board,
as an agent of the President, has jurisdiction
over the charges filed against petitioners and
the authority to order their arrest; and that,
while petitioner was acquitted of the offense
of attempted bribery of a public official, he was
found in the same decision of the trial court
that he did actually offer money to an officer
of the USAF in order that the latter may
abstain from assisting the Central Bank official
in the investigation of the purchase of $130K
from the Clark Air Force Base, wherein
petitioner was involved.
CFI upheld the validity of the delegation by the
president to the Board of his power to conduct
investigations for determining whether the
stay of an alien in this country would be
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EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
injurious to the security, welfare, and interest
of the State. CFI also sustained the power of
the Board to issue warrants of arrest and fix
bonds for the alien's temporary release
pending investigation of charges against him,
on the theory that the power to arrest and fix
the amount of the bond of the arrested alien
is essential to and complement the power to
deport aliens pursuant to Sec. 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the President has authority
to deport aliens.
2. Whether or not the Deportation Board also
has authority to file warrants of arrest
RULING
1. YES. Section 69 of Act NO. 2711 of the
Revised Administrative Code – Deportation of
subject to foreign power. — A subject of a
foreign power residing in the Philippines shall
not be deported, expelled, or excluded from
said Islands or repatriated to his own country
by the President of the Philippines EXCEPT
UPON PRIOR INVESTIGATION, conducted by
said Executive or his authorized agent, of the
ground upon which Such action is
contemplated. In such a case, the person
concerned shall be informed of the charge or
charges against him and he shall be allowed
not less than these days for the preparation of
his defense. He shall also have the right to be
heard by himself or counsel, to produce
witnesses on his own behalf, and to crossexamine the opposing witnesses.” In effect,
the President (Quezon, May 29, 1936) created
the
Deportation
Board
to
conduct
investigations.
2. Yes but only after investigation has resulted
in the actual order of deportation. Arrest would
have been necessary for deportation to take
effect. However, in the case at bar,
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
investigations were still ongoing and no order
for deportation was yet made. Decision: E.O.
No 398, series of 1951: declared illegal
Bayan (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v.
Zamora, 342 SCRA 449 (2000)
FACTS:
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the
United States of America forged a Military
Bases Agreement which formalized, among
others, the use of installations in the Philippine
territory by United States military personnel.
In view of the impending expiration of the RPUS Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the
Philippines and the United States negotiated
for a possible extension of the military bases
agreement. On September 16, 1991, the
Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security
which, in effect, would have extended the
presence of US military bases in the
Philippines. On July 18, 1997, the United
States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt
Campbell, met with the Philippine panel,
headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary
Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on
“the complementing strategic interests of the
United States and the Philippines in the AsiaPacific region.” Both sides discussed, among
other things, the possible elements of the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity).
Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos
approved the VFA, which was respectively
signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon
and United States Ambassador Thomas
Hubbard. On October 5, 1998, President
Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA.
On October 6, 1998, the President, acting
through respondent Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the
Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of
Ratification, the letter of the President and the
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
ISSUES:
Whether the VFA constitute an abdication of
Philippine sovereignty and deprived Philippine
courts of their jurisdiction to hear and try
offenses committed by US military personnel?
RULING:
No, the VFA is an agreement which defines the
treatment of United States troops and
personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides
guidelines to govern such visits of military
personnel, and further defines the rights of the
United States and the Philippine government
in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, importation
and exportation of equipment, materials and
supplies. Philippine authorities shall have
jurisdiction over United States personnel with
respect to offenses committed within the
Philippines and punishable under the law of
the Philippine.
PARDONING POWER
Power to extend executive clemency (reprieve,
commutation, pardon, and remission of fines
and forfeitures)
Restores the civil rights of the person
Two kinds of pardon:
Full / Absolute Pardon – relieving the party
from all the punitive consequences of the
criminal act (including disqualifications and
disabilities)
Conditional Pardon – relieving the party from
consequences of the criminal act given that
certain conditions must be strictly followed.
Limitations:
Cannot be extended to persons convicted by
impeachment
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
There must be a final judgment first
In granting amnesty, there must be the
concurrence of the majority of all members of
Congress
Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted
felon to public office necessarily relinquished
or forfeited by reason of the conviction
although such pardon undoubtedly restores
his eligibility for appointment to that office
(Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.)
MONSANTO v. FACTORAN February 9, 1989
(G.R. No. 78239)
FACTS:
• In a decision by the Sandiganbayan
convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto
was accused of the crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents and
sentenced them to imprisonment and to
indemnify the government in the sum of
P4,892.50 representing the balance of the
amount defrauded and to pay the costs
proportionately.
• She was given an absolute pardon by
President Marcos which she accepted.
• Petitioner requested that she be restored to
her former post as assistant city treasurer
since the same was still vacant, she also asked
for the backpay for the entire period of her
suspension.
• Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be
reinstated to her position without the necessity
of a new appointment
• The Office of the President said that the
acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former
public officer is the only ground for
reinstatement to his former position and
entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
and emoluments due to him during the period
of his suspension pendente lite.
• In fact, in such a situation, the former public
official must secure a reappointment before he
can reassume his former position. And a
pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon
him by the sentence.
• Petitioner argued that general rules on
pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of
the fact that she was extended executive
clemency while her conviction was still
pending appeal in this Court. There having
been no final judgment of conviction, her
employment therefore as assistant city
treasurer could not be said to have been
terminated or forfeited.
• The court viewed that is not material when
the pardon was bestowed, whether before or
after conviction, for the result would still be
the same
ISSUE:
1.Effects of a full and absolute pardon
2.WON a public officer, who has been granted
an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is
entitled to reinstatement to her former
position without need of a new appointment.
HELD:
1. A pardon reaches both the punishment
prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it
releases the punishment and blots out of
existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the
law the offender is as innocent as if he had
never committed the offense. If granted
before conviction, it prevents any of the
penalties and disabilities, consequent upon
conviction, from attaching; if granted after
conviction, it removes the penalties and
disabilities and restores him to all his civil
rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man,
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
and gives him a new credit and capacity. But
unless expressly grounded on the person’s
innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back
lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair
dealing.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not
retrospective. It makes no amends for the
past. It affords no relief for what has been
suffered by the offender. It does not impose
upon the government any obligation to make
reparation for what has been suffered.
2. No. To insist on automatic reinstatement
because of a mistaken notion that the pardon
virtually acquitted one from the offense of
estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon,
albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the
appointing power from refusing appointment
to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a
poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason
of the pardoned conviction.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility
from public office forms part of the
punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code for estafa thru falsification of public
documents.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted
in removing her disqualification from holding
public employment but it cannot go beyond
that. To regain her former post as assistant
city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo
the usual procedure required for a new
appointment.
35. GARCIA v. COA September 14, 1993 (G.R.
No. 75025)
FACTS:
Petitioner was a supervising lineman in the
Region IV Station of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Lucena City. A criminal
case of qualified theft was filed against him.
The president granted him executive
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EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
clemency. The petitioner filed a claim for back
payment of salaries. The petitioner was later
recalled to the service on 12 March 1984 but
the records do not show whether petitioner’s
reinstatement was to the same position of
Supervising Lineman.
ISSUE: Whether Garcia is entitled to the
payment of back wages after having been
reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive
clemency.
HELD:
Yes. The pardoned offender regains his
eligibility for appointment to public office
which was forfeited by reason of the
conviction of the offense. But since pardon
does not generally result in automatic
reinstatement because the offender has to
apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to
back wages.
If the pardon is based on the innocence of the
individual, it affirms this innocence and makes
him a new man and as innocent; as if he had
not been found guilty of the offense charged.
7 When a person is given pardon because he
did not truly commit the offense, the pardon
relieves the party from all punitive
consequences of his criminal act, thereby
restoring to him his clean name, good
reputation and unstained character prior to the
finding of guilt.
In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner
by the trial court was founded not on lack of
proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact
that petitioner did not commit the offense
imputed to him. Aside from finding him
innocent of the charge, the trial court
commended the petitioner for his concern and
dedication as a public servant. Verily,
petitioner’s innocence is the primary reason
behind the grant of executive clemency to him,
bolstered by the favorable recommendations
for his reinstatement. This signifies that
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
petitioner need no longer apply to be
reinstated to his former employment; he is
restored to his office ipso facto upon the
issuance of the clemency.
Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement to the
government service entitles him to back
wages. This is meant to afford relief to the
petitioner who is innocent from the start and
to make reparation for what he has suffered
as a result of his unjust dismissal from the
service. The right to back wages is afforded to
those who have been illegally dismissed and
were thus ordered reinstated or to those
otherwise acquitted of the charges against
them.
Therefore, the court ordered the full back
wages from April 1 1975 (date when he was
illegally dismissed) to March 12 1984
(reinstated) to the petitioner.
36. PEOPLE VS. SALLE, JR. 250 SCRA
581(1995)
Facts: On November 18, 1991, the RTC of
Quezon City found the accused-appellants
guilty of the compound crime of murder and
destructive arson. They both filed Notice of
Appeal which was accepted by the Supreme
Court on March 24, 1993. On January 6, 1994,
Salle withdrew his appeal. His counsel, a
member of FLAG (Free Legal Assistance
Group) verified that he withdrew such appeal
in light of the conditional pardon extended by
the President. The Court granted Salle’s
motion to withdraw appeal. On the other
hand, appellant Mengote has not filed a
motion to withdraw his appeal at the time of
this case.
Issue: Whether or not a pardon granted to an
accused during the pendency of his appeal
from a judgment of conviction by the trial
court is enforceable.
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Held: Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as
follows:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations,
and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures,
after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty
with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.
Where the pardoning power is subject to the
limitation of conviction, it may be exercised at
any time after conviction even if the judgment
is on appeal. It is, of course, entirely different
where the requirement is " final conviction," as
was mandated in the original provision of
Section 14, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution,
or "conviction by final judgment," as presently
prescribed in Section 19, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution. In such a case, no pardon
may be extended before a judgment of
conviction becomes final.
A judgment of conviction becomes final (a)
when no appeal is seasonably perfected, (b)
when the accused commences to serve the
sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is
expressly waived in writing, except where the
death penalty was imposed by the trial court,
and (d) when the accused applies for
probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal.
Where the judgment of conviction is still
pending appeal and has not yet therefore
attained finality, as in the instant case,
executive clemency may not yet be granted to
the appellant.
The "conviction by final judgment" limitation
under Section 19, Article VII of the present
Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon,
whether full or conditional, to an accused
during the pendency of his appeal from his
conviction by the trial court. Any application
therefore, if one is made, should not be acted
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
upon or the process toward its grant should
not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn.
Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities
of the Government concerned must require
proof from the accused that he has not
appealed from his conviction or that he has
withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in
the form of a certification issued by the trial
court or the appellate court, as the case may
be.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not
operate as an abandonment or waiver of the
appeal, and the release of an accused by
virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence,
or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal
shall render those responsible therefore
administratively liable. Accordingly, those in
custody of the accused must not solely rely on
the pardon as a basis for the release of the
accused from confinement.
WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant
Ricky Mengote y Cuntado is hereby given thirty
(30) days from notice thereof within which to
secure from the latter the withdrawal of his
appeal and to submit it to this Court. The
conditional pardon granted the said appellant
shall be deemed to take effect only upon the
grant of such withdrawal. In case of noncompliance with this Resolution, the Director
of the Bureau of Corrections must exert every
possible effort to take back into his custody
the said appellant, for which purpose he may
seek the assistance of the Philippine National
Police or the National Bureau of Investigation.
37. Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec Case Digest
Facts: In September 12, 2007, the
Sandiganbayan convicted former President
Estrada for the crime of plunder and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction during the period of sentence and
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EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
perpetual absolute disqualification. On
October 25, 2007, however, former President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive
clemency, by way of pardon, to Estrada,
explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil
and political rights.
In 2009, Estrada ran for President. None of the
disqualification cases against him prospered
but he only placed second in the results.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the
political arena and ran for the Mayor of the City
of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for
Disqualification against Estrada before the
Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to
run for public office because of his conviction
for plunder sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual
absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on
Section 40 of the Local Government Code
(LGC) in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC).
The Comelec dismissed the petition for
disqualification
holding
that
President
Estrada’s right to seek public office has been
effectively restored by the pardon vested upon
him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. She
also contends that the third preambular clause
of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada has publicly committed to no longer
seek any elective position or office," makes the
pardon conditional.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13,
2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the
second highest votes, intervened and sought
to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as
the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that
he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
Issues: 1. May former President Joseph
Estrada run for public office despite having
been convicted of the crime of plunder which
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
carried an accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office?
2. May the pardoning power of the President
be limited by legislative action?
3. Did the third preambular clause of the
pardon operate to make the pardon
conditional?
Held:
1. Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute
pardon that fully restored all his civil and
political rights, which naturally includes the
right to seek public elective office. The
wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous,
and unqualified.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada shows
that both the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua and its accessory penalties are
included in the pardon. The sentence which
states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil
and political rights,” expressly remitted the
accessory penalties that attached to the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence,
even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the
text of the pardon that the accessory penalties
of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted
together with the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Likewise, while Section 40 of the LGC
disqualifies "those sentenced by final
judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one
(1) year or more of imprisonment, within two
(2) years after serving sentence" to run for any
elective local position, Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code provides a legal escape
from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or
amnesty. In other words, the latter provision
allows any person who has been granted
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by
final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any
public office, whether local or national
position.
2. No. It is apparent from Section 19, Article
VII and Section 5, Article IX-C of the 1987
Consitution that the only instances in which
the President may not extend pardon remain
to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases
that have not yet resulted in a final conviction;
and (3) cases involving violations of election
laws, rules and regulations in which there was
no favorable recommendation coming from
the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that
any act of Congress by way of statute cannot
operate to delimit the pardoning power of the
President.
3. No. Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration,
the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e.,
"[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office," neither makes the
pardon conditional, nor militate against the
conclusion that former President Estrada’s
rights to suffrage and to seek public elective
office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does
not explicitly impose a condition or limitation,
considering the unqualified use of the term
"civil and political rights"as being restored.
Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not
an essential part of an act as it is an
introductory or preparatory clause that
explains the reasons for the enactment,
usually introduced by the word "whereas."
Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute
because, strictly speaking, they are not part of
the operative language of the statute. In this
case, the clause at issue is not an integral part
of the decree of the pardon, and therefore,
does not by itself alone operate to make the
pardon conditional or to make its effectivity
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
contingent upon the fulfillment of the
aforementioned commitment nor to limit the
scope of the pardon.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral
part of a law. It is merely an introduction to
show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the
origin of rights and obligations. Where the
meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither
expand nor restrict its operation much less
prevail over its text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the
pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s
promise never to seek a public office again,
the former ought to have explicitly stated the
same in the text of the pardon itself. Since
former President Arroyo did not make this an
integral part of the decree of pardon, the
Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd
preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a
condition to the pardon extended to former
President Estrada.
Distinction
Amnesty:
between
Pardon
and
PARDON
-
-
-
-
Private act of the President which must
be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned
Granted after conviction
Looks forward and relieves the offender
from the consequences of an offense;
abolishing the punishment
Does not restore right to hold office or
right to suffrage (unless expressly
stated)
Does not exempt accused from civil
liabilities
AMNESTY
-
Public act of the President, with the
concurrence of Congress, of which the
courts should take judicial notice
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
-
-
-
Granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of
political offenses, before or after the
institution of the criminal prosecution
and after conviction
Looks backward and abolishes the
offense, obliterates the offense he is
charged
Stands before the law as if there is no
offense committed
**Suspension of Death Penalty, is not an
executive power, but a Judicial Power!
33. Vera Vs. People, 7 SCRA 152 (1963)
Facts:
Vera and 96 others were charged with the
complex crime of kidnapping with murder
before CFI of Quezon. They invoked the
benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 of
the President; thus, the case was referred to
the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission which
tried the case. During the hearing, none of the
petitioners admitted having committed the
crime. Vera was the only one who took the
witness stand and denied having killed
Lozanes. The Commission said it could not
take cognizance of the case because the
benefits of amnesty could only be invoked by
defendants in a criminal case who, admitting
commission of the crime, plead that the said
crime was committed in pursuance of the
resistance movement and perpetrated against
persons who aided the enemy during the
Japanese occupation. The Commission
ordered that the case be remanded to the
court of origin for trial.
The CA affirmed the decision of the
Commission. Vera appealed to the SC,
contending that to be entitled to the benefits
of Amnesty Proclamation it is not necessary for
them to admit the commission of the crime
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
charged, citing the case of Barrioquinto vs.
Fernandez, etc.
Issue:
Whether or not persons invoking the benefit of
amnesty should first admit having committed
the crime of which they were accused?
Held:
Yes. It is rank inconsistency for appellant to
justify an act, or seek forgiveness for an act
which, according to him, he has not
committed.
Amnesty
presupposes
the
commission of a crime, and when an accused
maintains that he has not committed a crime,
he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where
an amnesty proclamation imposes certain
conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon
the accused to prove the existence of such
conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the
nature of a plea of confession and avoidance,
which means that the pleader admits the
allegations against him but disclaims liability
therefore on account of intervening facts
which, if proved, would being the crime
charged within the scope of the amnesty
proclamation.
Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez and the other
cases cited by petitioner were superseded and
deemed overruled by the subsequent cases of
People v. Llanita, et al. (L-2082, April 26, 1950,
86 Phil. 219) and People v. Guillermo, et al. (L2188, May 18, 1950, 86 Phil. 395).
BORROWING POWER
The President may contract or guarantee
foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, subject to prior concurrence of the
Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall
submit to the congress a complete report of its
decisions on applications for loans to be
contracted or guaranteed by the government
or GOCCs which could have the effect of
increasing the foreign debt.
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Includes the Buyback of Loans and Foreign
Borrowing Power (Buyback – purchase by the
sovereign issuer of its own debts at a
discount).
Borrowing power may be delegated by the
president to the Secretary of Finance as his
alter ego. However, the Secretary of Finance
must secure the president’s prior consent to or
subsequent ratification of his acts.
Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia, 472 SCRA 505
(2005)
FACTS:
During the Corazon Aquino regime, her
administration came up with a scheme to
reduce the country’s external debt. The
solution they came up with was to incur
foreign debts. Three restructuring programs
were sought to initiate the program for foreign
debts, they are basically buyback programs
and bond-conversion programs. The spouses
Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes
Constantino, as a taxpayers, and in behalf of
their minor children who are Filipino citizens,
together with FFDC (Freedom From Debt
Coalition) averred that the buyback and bondconversion schemes were onerous and they do
not constitute the loan “contract” or
“guarantee” contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. VII
of the Constitution. And assuming that the
President has such power, unlike other powers
which may be validly delegated by the
President, the power to incur foreign debts is
expressly reserved by the Constitution in the
person of the President, hence, the
respondents herein, Central Bank Governor
Jose Cuisia et al, cannot incur debts for the
Philippines nor such power can be delegated
to them. Constantino argued that the gravity
by which the exercise of the power will affect
the Filipino nation requires that the President
alone must exercise this power. They argue
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
that the requirement of prior concurrence of
an entity specifically named by the
Constitution, the Monetary Board, reinforces
the submission that not respondents but the
President “alone and personally” can validly
bind the country. Hence, they would like Cuisia
et al to stop acting pursuant to the said
scheme.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President of the Philippines
can validly delegate her debt power to the
respondents.
RULING:
Yes. There is no question that the president
has borrowing powers and that the President
may contract or guarantee foreign loans on
behalf of this country with prior concurrence
of the Monetary Board. It makes no distinction
whatsoever, and the fact that a debt or a loan
may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other
hand, the President can delegate this power to
her direct subordinates. The evident exigency
of having the Secretary of Finance implement
the decision of the President to execute the
debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the
fact that the process of establishing and
executing a strategy for managing the
government’s debt is deep within the realm of
the expertise of the Department of Finance,
primed as it is to raise the required amount of
funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives,
and meet any other sovereign debt
management goals. If the President were to
personally exercise every aspect of the foreign
borrowing power, he/she would have to pause
from running the country long enough to focus
on a welter of time-consuming detailed
activities,
the
propriety
of
incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and
choosing among the many methods that may
be taken toward this end, meeting countless
times with creditor representatives to
negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Monetary Board, explaining and defending the
negotiated deal to the public, and more often
than not, flying to the agreed place of
execution to sign the documents. This sort of
constitutional interpretation would negate the
very existence of cabinet positions and the
respective expertise which the holders thereof
are accorded and would unduly hamper the
President’s effectivity in running the
government. The act of Cuisia et al are not
unconstitutional.
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
Court cannot interfere with or question the
wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by
the Executive Department
Distinction between Treaty / International
Agreement and Executive Agreement
TREATY (International Agreement)
-
DIPLOMATIC POWER
General Rule: The President, as the sole organ
and authority in the external affairs of the
country, is vested with the power to enter into
international agreements, subject to the
concurrence of the Senate.
Power to ratify treaties and other international
agreements belong to the President
-
Steps in the treaty-making process:
1) Signing of an agreement – means of
authenticating a document; symbol of
good faith of the parties
2) Ratification – formal act of a state
confirming and accepting the provisions
of a treaty
Inclusions:
-
-
Authority
to
Recognize
foreign
governments
Discretion to recognize a particular
territory as part of a certain state or not
Prerogative to assign or withdraw
diplomatic representatives to foreign
states
To receive and recognize foreign
diplomatic representatives
Power to deport undesirable aliens
Prerogative to Implement a Judgment
of extradition
-
-
One concluded between states in
written form and governed by
international law, and may be in the
form of either:
o treaties that require legislative
concurrence after executive
ratification
o executive agreements that are
similar to treaties, but do not
require legislative concurrence
and are usually less formal and
deal with narrower range of
subject matters
Needs the concurrence of at least twothirds of all the Members of the Senate
to be valid and effective
Has greater “dignity” than an executive
agreement, because its constitutional
efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty
having behind it the authority of the
President, the Senate, and the people
Takes precedence over any prior
statutory enactment
Arrangements that are more likely to be
permanent in character
Considered superior to executive
agreements
CASE: Resident Marine Mammals of the
Protected Seascape Tanon Strait v. Reyes
FACTS: Petitioners, collectively referred to as
the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the
petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins,
porpoises, and other cetacean species, which
inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon
Strait. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their
legal guardians and as friends (to be
collectively known as "the Stewards") who
allegedly empathize with, and seek the
protection of, the aforementioned marine
species. Also impleaded as an unwilling copetitioner is former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration
and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to
protect the Tañon Strait, among others. On
June 13, 2002, the Government of the
Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered
into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration
Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. On
December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally
converted GSEC-102 into SC-46, which
allowed the exploration, development, and
exploitation of petroleum resources with the
said strait. The petitioners insist that SC-46 is
null and void for having violated Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Service Contract No.
46 is violative of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution and statutes
RULING: Petition is granted.
RATIO DECIDENDI: This Court has previously
settled the issue of whether service contracts
are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
In La Bugal, the Court held that the deletion
of the words "service contracts" in the 1987
Constitution did not amount to a ban on them
per se. In fact, portions of the deliberations of
the members of the Constitutional Commission
(ConCom) to show that in deliberating on
paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were
actually referring to service contracts as
understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit
with safety measures to eliminate or minimize
the abuses prevalent during the martial law
regime. In summarizing the matters discussed
in the ConCom, the Court established that
paragraph 4, with the safeguards in place, is
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of
Article XII. The following are the safeguards
this Court enumerated in La Bugal: Such
service contracts may be entered into only
with respect to minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to
several safeguards, among which are these
requirements: (1) The service contract shall be
crafted in accordance with a general law that
will set standard or uniform terms, conditions
and requirements, presumably to attain a
certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the
possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to
the country. (2) The President shall be the
signatory for the government because,
supposedly before an agreement is presented
to the President for signature, it will have been
vetted several times over at different levels to
ensure that it conforms to law and can
withstand public scrutiny. (3) Within thirty
days of the executed agreement, the President
shall report it to Congress to give that branch
of government an opportunity to look over the
agreement and interpose timely objections, if
any.69cralawlawlibrary. Adhering to the
aforementioned guidelines, the Court finds
that SC-46 is indeed null and void for
noncompliance with the requirements of the
1987 Constitution.
Pangilinan v Cayetano
Facts: On November 1, 2011, the Rome
Statute, a multilateral treaty that established
the International Criminal Court, where the
gravest crimes under international law are
prosecuted, entered into force in the
Philippines after the Senate's concurrence.
The country was the 16th state party to belong
to the Group of Asia-Pacific State Parties in the
International Criminal Court.
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
On March 15, 2018, the Philippines announced
its withdrawal from the International Criminal
Court. On March 16, 2018, it formally
submitted its Notice of Withdrawal through a
Note Verbale to the United Nations SecretaryGeneral’s Chef de Cabinet.
Issue: Whether or not the Philippines'
withdrawal from the Rome Statute through a
Note
Verbale delivered to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations is valid, binding, and
effectual?
Ruling: Yes. Article 127 of the Rome Statute
provides mechanisms on how a state party
may withdraw from it. The President's
withdrawal from the Rome Statute was in
accordance with the mechanism provided in
the treaty. The Rome Statute itself
contemplated and enabled a State Party's
withdrawal. A state party and its agents
cannot be faulted for merely acting within
what the Rome Statute expressly allows.
A treaty's effectivity depends on the Senate's
concurrence, in accordance with the
Constitution's system of checks and balances.
While Senate concurrence is expressly
required to make treaties valid and effective,
no similar express mechanism concerning
withdrawal from treaties or international
agreements is provided in the Constitution or
any statute. Similarly, no constitutional or
statutory provision grants the president the
unilateral power to terminate treaties. This
vacuum engenders the controversy around
which the present consolidated Petitions
revolve.
At no point and under no circumstances does
the president enjoy unbridled authority to
withdraw from treaties or international
agreements. Any such withdrawal must be
anchored on a determination that they run
afoul of the Constitution or a statute. Any such
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
determination must have clear and definite
basis; any wanton, arbitrary, whimsical, or
capricious withdrawal is correctible by judicial
review. Moreover, specific circumstances
attending Congress's injunction on the
executive to proceed in treaty negotiation, or
the Senate's specification of the need for its
concurrence to be obtained in a withdrawal,
binds the president and may prevent him or
her from proceeding with withdrawal.
Vinuya v. Romulo
Facts: This is an original Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an
application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against the
Office of the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the
DOJ, and the OSG. Petitioners are all members
of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, nonprofit
organization that provides aid to the rape
victims of Japanese military forces in the
Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have
approached the Executive Department
through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting
assistance in filing a claim against the
Japanese officials and military officers who
ordered the establishment of the “comfort
women” stations in the Philippines. But
officials of the Executive Department declined
to assist the petitioners, and took the position
that the individual claims of the comfort
women for compensation had already been
fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the
Peace Treaty between the Philippines and
Japan. Respondents maintain that all claims of
the Philippines and its nationals relative to the
war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace
Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations
Agreement of 1956.
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Issue: Whether or not the Executive
Department committed grave abuse of
discretion in not espousing petitioners’ claims
for official apology and other forms of
reparations against Japan.
Ruling: No, the petition lacks merit. From a
Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive
Department has the exclusive prerogative to
determine whether to espouse petitioners’
claims against Japan. Political questions refer
“to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided
that it is to the best interest of the country to
waive all claims of its nationals for reparations
against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951.
The wisdom of such a decision is not for the
courts to question. The President, not
Congress, has the better opportunity of
knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign
countries, and especially is this true in time of
war. He has his confidential sources of
information. He has his agents in the form of
diplomatic, consular and other officials. The
Executive Department has determined that
taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical
to our country’s foreign policy interests, and
could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby
creating serious implications for stability in this
region. To reverse the Executive Department’s
determination would mean an assessment of
the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate
political branch to which authority to make
that judgment has been constitutionally
committed. From a municipal law perspective,
certiorari will not lie.
As a general principle, where such an
extraordinary length of time has elapsed
between the treaty’s conclusion and our
consideration – the Executive must be given
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
ample discretion to assess the foreign policy
considerations of espousing a claim against
Japan, from the standpoint of both the
interests of the petitioners and those of the
Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies
are sufficient, and whether further steps are
appropriate or necessary.
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT
-
-
-
Embody adjustments of details carrying
out well-established national policies,
traditions
Arrangements that are more or less
temporary in nature
Must remain traceable to an express or
implied authorization under the
Constitution, statues, or treaties
Does not need the concurrence of
Senate
BUDGETARY POWER
Budget – financial plan of the government /
master plan of the government
The President has the responsibility to prepare
and submit to Congress the budget for the
latter to scrutinize, revise, and approve as it
may see fit,
The President is also vested with the duty of
forming the general appropriations bill which
will become the General Appropriations Act
upon approval by the President, minus the
provisions vetoed.
The President shall, within thirty days from the
opening of the regular session, submit to the
Congress a budget of expenditures and
sources of financing, including receipts from
existing and proposed revenue measures
which will serve as the basis of the general
appropriations bill.
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
INFORMING FUNCTION
Presented in a State of the Nation Address –
(SONA)
The President has the responsibility of
providing the people with an overview of the
condition of the country, as well as his vision
of what needs to be accomplished in the
foreseeable future.
The President has the opportunity to influence
the public through the enforcement of laws, or
in taking a stand on the issues presently faced
by the state
The President is steward of the people limited
only by the specific restrictions and
prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or
impleaded by Congress (“bully pulpit” – US
Pres. Roosevelt)
RESIDUAL POWERS (E.O. No. 292 –
Administrative Code of 1987)
Those “unstated powers” of the President
which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to
safeguard and protect general welfare
Exists only when there are plainly ambiguous
statements in the Constitution
It is a power borne by the President’s duty to
preserve and defend the Constitution
Recognized under the U.S. Constitution which
we have patterned the distribution of
governmental powers among 3 separate
branches
Sec. 20, Chap. 7, Title I, Book III,
Administrative Code of 1987: Unless Congress
provides otherwise, the President shall
exercise such other powers and functions
vested in the President which are provided
under the laws and which are not specifically
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
enumerated above or which are not delegated
by the President in accordance with the law
CASE: Marcos v. Manglapus
Facts: President Corazon Aquino barred the
Marcos Family from returning to the
Philippines after being exiled during the people
power revolution. It involves a petition of
mandamus and prohibition asking the court to
order the respondents Manglapus, etc., to
issue travel documents to former President
Marcos and his immediate family and to enjoin
the implementation of Aquino’s decision to
prohibit their return to the country. They
contended that Sections 1 and 6 of the Bill of
Rights guarantee their right to liberty and
travel. Petitioner claims that President
Aquino’s act was beyond the powers vested
upon by the Constitution, justifying it through
the powers enumerated in the present
constitution.
Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of
executive power, the President may prohibit
the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Ruling: NO, the petition is dismissed. The
functions and responsibilities of President
Corazon Aquino, as the embodiment of the
executive department, is not limited merely to
those stated in the Constitution (Residual
Powers). Aquino did not act arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion in determining that
the return of the Marcoses poses a serious
threat to national interest and welfare. She
determined that the destabilization caused by
the return would wipe away the gains
achieved during the past few years after the
Martial law.
CASE: Fortrich v Corona
Puno, J.
Separate Opinion (excerpt)
On the other hand, it is the President as
administrative head who is vested by the
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Administrative Code of 1987 to promulgate
rules relating to governmental operations,
including administrative procedure. These
rules take the form of administrative orders. 12
This power is necessary for the President to
discharge his constitutional duty of faithfully
executing our law. 13 Under exceptional
circumstances, this Court has suspended its
rules to prevent miscarriage of justice. In the
same breath, we should hold that the
President has the power to suspend the
effectivity of administrative rules of procedure
when they hamper, defeat or in any way
undermine the effective enforcement of the
laws of the land. Indeed, we already recognize
that Congress can suspend its own rules if
doing so will enable it to facilitate its task of
lawmaking. The three great branches of our
government are co-equal and within their own
sphere they have the same responsibility to
promote the good of our people. There is no
reason to withhold the power to suspend rules
from the President and grant it alone to the
two other branches of government.
CASE: Laurel v. Garcia
FACTS: The subject property in this case is
one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by
the Philippine government under the
Reparations Agreement entered into with
Japan, the Roppongi property. The said
property was acquired from the Japanese
government through Reparations Contract No.
300. It consists of the land and building for the
Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. As
intended, it became the site of the Philippine
Embassy until the latter was transferred to
Nampeidai when the Roppongi building
needed major repairs. President Aquino
created a committee to study the
disposition/utilization
of
Philippine
government properties in Tokyo and Kobe,
Japan. The President issued EO 296 entitling
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of
separations' capital goods and services in the
event of sale, lease or disposition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Chief Executive,
her officers and agents, have the authority and
jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property.
DECISION:
Granted. It is not for the
President to convey valuable real property of
the government on his or her own sole will.
Any such conveyance must be authorized and
approved by a law enacted by the Congress.
It requires executive and legislative
concurrence. It is indeed true that the
Roppongi property is valuable not so much
because of the inflated prices fetched by real
property in Tokyo but more so because of its
symbolic value to all Filipinos, veterans and
civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi
and related properties will eventually be sold
is a policy determination where both the
President and Congress must concur.
Considering the properties' importance and
value, the laws on conversion and disposition
of property of public dominion must be
faithfully followed.
Pimentel v. Office of the Executive Secretary,
462 SCRA 622 (2005)
FACTS:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by
petitioners to compel the Office of the
Executive Secretary and the Department of
Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its
concurrence in accordance with Section 21,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The Rome
Statute established the International Criminal
Court which shall have the power to exercise
its jurisdiction over persons for the most
serious crimes of international concern and
shall be complementary to the national
criminal jurisdictions. Its jurisdiction covers
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
the crime of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and the crime of
aggression as defined in the Statute. The
Statute was opened for signature by all states
in Rome on July 17, 1998 and had remained
open for signature until December 31, 2000 at
the United Nations Headquarters in New York.
The Philippines signed the Statute on
December 28, 2000 through Charge d Affairs
Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to
the United Nations. Its provisions, however,
require that it be subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval of the signatory states.
Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel
the respondents the Office of the Executive
Secretary and the Department of Foreign
Affairs to transmit the signed text of the treaty
to the Senate of the Philippines for ratification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Executive Secretary and
the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit
to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute
signed by a member of the Philippine mission
to the U.N. even without the signature of the
President.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held NO.
1. The President as the head of state is the
sole organ and authorized in the external
relations and he is also the country's sole
representative with foreign nations, He is the
mouthpiece with respect to the country's
foreign affairs.
2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole
authority to negotiate with other states and
enter into treaties but this power is limited by
the Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of
all the members of the Senate for the treaty to
be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).
3. The legislative branch is essential to provide
a check on the executive in the field of foreign
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit of
political maturity and growth.
Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 (1963)
FACTS:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the
importation of foreign rice to be purchased
from private sources. Gonzales filed a petition
opposing the said implementation because RA
No. 3542 which allegedly repeals or amends
RA No. 2207, prohibits the importation of rice
and corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration
or any other government agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation
permitted in RA 2207 is to be authorized by
the President of the Philippines, and by or on
behalf of the Government of the Philippines.
They add that after enjoining the Rice and
Corn
administration
and
any
other
government agency from importing rice and
corn, S. 10 of RA 3542 indicates that only
private parties may import rice under its
provisions. They contended that the
government has already constitute valid
executive agreements with Vietnam and
Burma, that in case of conflict between RA
2207 and 3542, the latter should prevail and
the conflict be resolved under the American
jurisprudence.
ISSUES:
1.
What is the nature of the government
contracts with Vietnam and Burma? Are they
valid?
2.
May an international agreement be
invalidated by our courts?
RULING:
1.) The parties to said contracts do not appear
to have regarded the same as executive
agreements. But even assuming that said
contracts may properly be considered as
executive agreements, the same are unlawful,
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
as well as null and void, from a constitutional
viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent
with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207
and 3452. Although the President may, under
the American constitutional system enter into
executive agreements without previous
legislative authority, he may not, by executive
agreement, enter into a transaction which is
prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.
Under the Constitution, the main function of
the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. The former may not interfere in the
performance of the legislative powers of the
latter, except in the exercise of his veto power.
He may not defeat legislative enactments that
have acquired the status of law, by indirectly
repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of
the very act prohibited by said laws.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 138, in all
purchases by the Government, including those
made by and/or for the armed forces,
preference shall be given to materials
produced in the Philippines. The importation
involved in the case at bar violates this general
policy of our government, aside from the
provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and
3452.
2.) Yes. The Constitution of the Philippines has
clearly settled it in the affirmative, by
providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof,
that the Supreme Court may not be deprived
"of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ
of error as the law or the rules of court may
provide, final judgments and decrees of
inferior courts in — (1) All cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation is
in question". In other words, our Constitution
authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only
when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but
also, when it runs counter to an act of
Congress
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH
POWER OF IMPOUNDMENT
President executes and implements the
legislative will expressed in statutes, including
appropriation acts.
Impoundment, is the refusal by the President,
for whatever reason, to spend funds made
available by Congress; the failure to spend or
obligate budget authority of any type
Source of authority - Sec. 38, Chap. 5, Book
VI, Administrative Code of 1987: Suspension
of Expenditure of Appropriations
-
authorized only the suspension or
stoppage of further expenditures, not
the
withdrawal
of
unobligated
allotments
in
the
General
Appropriations Act (GAA)
Sec. 28, Chap. 4, Book 6, Administrative Code
of 1987: Balances of appropriations that
remained unexpended at the end of the fiscal
year were to be reverted to the General Fund
Separate Opinion of Justice Carpio on Power
of Impoundment
-
The President has no power to stop the
expenditure if it is already a law
What the President can do is to veto
specific item in the GAA
There is no presidential power of
impoundment in the Constitution and
this Court cannot make one
CASE: Train v. City of New York (1975)
U.S. Supreme Court
Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975)
Syllabus
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments
of
1972
provide
a
comprehensive program for controlling and
abating water pollution. Title II of these
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Amendments makes available federal financial
assistance for municipal sewers and sewage
treatment works. Section 207 of Title II
authorizes the appropriation of "not to exceed"
specified amounts for each of three fiscal
years, and § 205(a) provides that the "[s]ums
authorized to be appropriated pursuant to [§
207] . . . shall be allotted by the Administrator"
of the Environmental Protection Agency. The
President directed the Administrator not to
allot among the States § 207's maximum
amounts, but instead to allot no more than $2
billion of the $5 billion authorized for fiscal
year 1973, and no more than $3 billion of the
$6 billion authorized for fiscal year 1974, and
the Administrator complied with this directive.
Thereupon, respondent city of New York
brought this class action seeking a declaratory
judgment that the Administrator was obligated
to allot to the States the full amounts
authorized by § 207 for fiscal years 1973 and
1974, and an order directing him to make
those allotments. The District Court granted
the respondents' motion for summary
judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding that "the Act requires the
Administrator to allot the full sums authorized
to be appropriated in § 207."
Issue: Whether or not the U.S. President has
the power to impound funds appropriated by
Congress through the Administrator.
Held: No. Congress has granted the president
the authority not to spend funds if it has
appropriated more funds than necessary to
reach its goals. However, the president does
not have a limitless impoundment power.
President Richard Nixon cannot order the
impoundment of substantial amounts of
environmental protection funds for a program
he vetoed, which had been overridden by
Congress. The president cannot frustrate the
will of Congress by killing a program through
impoundment.
GROUP 5
CASTILLO, HANNAH GIA | EUSEBIO, JULIUS ROLAND I.
GARCIA, ALEXANDRA MAUREEN | JALLORINA, ALDYNNE GENISE B.
MANANQUIL, SHAIRA JANE B. | PAGDONSOLAN, MARK MOSES H.
SAN DIEGO, REGINA SOPHIA | SANTOS, GWYNETH