PRIMICIAS VS OCAMPO
G.R. NO. L-6120, JUNE 30, 1953
Facts:
Petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with two statutory offenses,
namely, (1) with a violation of Commonwealth Act No. 606, which was docketed as criminal case No.
18374, in that he knowingly chartered a vessel of Philippine registry to an alien without the approval of
the President of the Philippines and (2) with a violation of section 129 in relation to section 2713 of the
Revised Administrative Code, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 18375, in that he failed to submit
to the Collector of Customs the manifests and certain authenticated documents for the vessel "Antarctic"
and failed to obtain the necessary clearance from the Bureau of Customs prior to the departure of said
vessel for a foreign port.
On April 23, 1952, before the trial of said criminal cases, petitioner filed a motion praying that
assessors be appointed to assist the court in considering the questions of fact involved in said cases as
authorized by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as Revised Charter of the City of
Manila, which provides that "the aid of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal
Court, or the Court of First Instance, within the City, may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code
of Civil Procedure." This motion was opposed by the City Fiscal who appeared for the People of the
Philippines.
On April 28, 1952, the court issued an order denying the motion holding in effect that with the
promulgation of the Rules of Court by the Supreme Court, which became effective on July 1, 1940, all rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines previously existing were not
only superseded but expressly repealed, that the Supreme Court, having been vested with the rule-making
power, expressly omitted the portions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding assessors in said Rules of
Court, and that the reference to said statute by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 on the provisions
regarding assessors should be deemed as a mere surplusage.
Petitioner is now imputing abuse of discretion to the respondent Judge and further seeks to
prohibit respondent Judge from proceeding with the trial of two criminal cases without the assistance of
assessors in accordance with the provisions of section 49 of Republic Act No. 409.
Issue:
Whether or not the right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute
substantive right, and the duty of the court to provide assessors is mandatory.
Ruling:
Yes. A substantive law creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property, or
the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs, whereas rules of
procedure are provisions prescribing the method by which substantive rights may be enforced in courts
of justice.
The right to a trial by assessors is substantive in the sense that it must be created and defined by
express enactment as opposed to a mere remedy devised to enforce such right or obtain redress therefor.
The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section
2477 of the old Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law and as such are not embraced by the rulemaking power of the Supreme Court. This is so because in said section 154 this matter is referred to as a
right given by law to a party litigant. Section 1477 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is couched in such
a manner that a similar right is implied when invoked by a party litigant. It says that the aid may be invoked
in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. And this right has been declared absolute and
substantial by the Supreme Court in several cases where the aid of assessors had been invoked.
The promulgation of the Rules of Court did not have the effect of repealing the provisions on
assessors embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure. These provisions have not been incorporated by the
Supreme Court in the present Rules of Court because they are substantive in nature. This remedy may be
invoked not only in Manila but in all other places where it existed prior to the promulgation of the Rules
of Court. The provisions on assessors embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure are still in force and the
same may still be invoked in the light of the provisions of section 49 of Republic Act No. 409.
BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS MULTI PURPOSE COOPERATIVE VS. CABATO – CORTES
G.R. NO. 165922, FEBRUARY 26, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (petitioner) is a credit cooperative
organized under Republic Act No. 6938 (RA 6938), or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines.
Article 62(6) of RA 6938, exempts cooperatives from the payment of all court and sheriff's fees
payable to the Philippine Government for and in connection with all actions brought under this Code, or
where such action is brought by the Cooperative Development Authority before the court, to enforce the
payment of obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative.
In 2004, petitioner, as mortgagee, filed with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City (trial court) a petition to extrajudicially foreclose a mortgage under Act 3135, as amended. Under
Section 7(c) of Rule 141, as amended, petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure are subject to legal fees based
on the value of the mortgagee's claim. Invoking Article 62 (6) of RA 6938, petitioner sought exemption
from payment of the fees.
In an Order dated 30 August 2004, Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (respondent), Executive Judge
of the trial court, denied the request for exemption, citing Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, exempting from the Rule's coverage only the "Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities" and certain suits of local government units.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but respondent denied its motion in the Order dated 6 October
2004. This time, respondent reasoned that petitioner's reliance on Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is misplaced
because the fees collected under Rule 141 are not "fees payable to the Philippine Government" as they
do not accrue to the National Treasury but to a special fund under the Court's control.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner's application for extrajudicial foreclosure is exempt from legal
fees under Article 62(6) of RA 6938.
(2) Whether or not the power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure is with the
Judiciary alone.
Ruling:
(1)
No. We hold that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 does not apply to petitioner's foreclosure
proceeding.
The scope of the legal fees exemption Article 62(6) of RA 6938 grants to cooperatives is
limited to two types of actions, namely: (1) actions brought under RA 6938; and (2) actions
brought by the Cooperative Development Authority to enforce the payment of obligations
contracted in favor of cooperatives. By simple deduction, it is immediately apparent that Article
62(6) of RA 6938 is no authority for petitioner to claim exemption from the payment of legal fees
in this proceeding because first, the fees imposable on petitioner do not pertain to an action
brought under RA 6938 but to a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under Act 3135.
Second, petitioner is not the Cooperative Development Authority which can claim exemption only
in actions to enforce payments of obligations on behalf of cooperatives.
(2)
Yes, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous
charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress subsidiary and corrective power.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given
the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away
the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer
shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.
RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION OF THE GSIS FROM PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES
A.M. NO. 08-2-01-0, FEBRUARY 11, 2010, MARCH 20, 2003
Facts:
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on government-owned or
controlled corporations under Section 22,1 Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court. The said provision
states:
SEC. 22. Government exempt. – The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities
are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this Rule. Local government corporations
and government-owned or controlled corporations with or without independent charter are not
exempt from paying such fees.
The petitioner avers that the courts still assess and collect legal fees in actions and proceedings
instituted by the GSIS notwithstanding the exemption provided in Sec. 39 of RA 8291 which exempts GSIS
from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds. According to the GSIS, the purpose of its
exemption is to preserve and maintain the actuarial solvency of its funds and to keep the contribution
rates necessary to sustain the benefits provided by RA 8291 as low as possible. The GSIS argues that its
exemption from the payment of legal fees would not mean that RA 8291 is superior to the Rules of Court.
The GSIS urges the Court to show deference to Congress by recognizing the exemption of the GSIS
under Section 39 of RA 8291 from legal fees imposed under Rule 141. Effectively, the GSIS wants this Court
to recognize a power of Congress to repeal, amend or modify a rule of procedure promulgated by the
Court. The GSIS further contends that the right of government workers to social security is an aspect of
social justice. The Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, including the right to social security, but the GSIS is not compelling the Court to
promulgate such rules. The GSIS is merely asking the Court to recognize and allow the exercise of the right
of the GSIS “to seek relief from the courts of justice sans payment of legal fees.”
Issue:
Whether or not the legislature may exempt the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
from legal fees imposed by the Court on government-owned and controlled corporations and local
government units.
Ruling:
No. There is nothing in Section 39 of RA 8291 that exempts the GSIS from fees imposed by the
Court in connection with judicial proceedings. The exemption of the GSIS from “taxes, assessments, fees,
charges or duties of all kinds” is necessarily confined to those that do not involve pleading, practice and
procedure. Rule 141 has been promulgated by the Court pursuant to its exclusive rule-making power
under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. Thus, it may not be amended or repealed by Congress.
The Rules of Court was promulgated in the exercise of the Court’s rule-making power. It is essentially
procedural in nature as it does not create, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Corollarily, Rule
141 is basically procedural. It does not create or take away a right but simply operates as a means to
implement an existing right. Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated
by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or
modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain. That power is
no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the Executive.
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees
without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court’s independence —
fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and
collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic components, the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which
established the JDF and the SAJF expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to “guarantee the
independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy.” Any exemption from
the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled corporations and local
government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is
constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court’s guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence.
Hence, the petition of the GSIS was denied.
BUSTOS VS. LUCERO
G.R. NO. L-2068, OCTOBER 20, 1948
Facts:
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be
remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner
might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the
strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The motion was denied and that denial
is the subject matter of this proceeding.
According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to the Court of First
Instance in support of his motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary
investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of the charges and asked him if
he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel moved
that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and crossexamined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected,
invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel
announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence," and the justice of the peace
forwarded the case to the court of first instance.
Issue:
Whether or not section 11 of Rule 108 of the (old) Rules of Court 1 infringes section 13, Article
VIII, of the Constitution and that the rule in question deals with substantive matters and impairs
substantive rights.
Ruling:
No. Section 11 of Rule 108 is an adjective law and not a substantive law or substantive right.
Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be
synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal
system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates,
defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action;
that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law,
which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion.
As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and
prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides
or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished. Preliminary investigation is
eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution.
As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence — which is the "the mode
and manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to establish the
fact in dispute in judicial proceedings" — is identified with and forms part of the method by which, in
private law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a law transgressor is punished.
Criminal
procedure
refers
to
pleading,
evidence
and
practice.
The entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court.
The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is incapable of exact definition.
The difference is somewhat a question of degree. (Dexter vs. Edmands, 89 F., 467; Beazell vs.
Ohio, supra.) It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case beyond which legislative power over remedy
and procedure can pass without touching upon the substantive rights of parties affected, as it is impossible
to fix that boundary by general condition. This being so, it is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making
rules should step on substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to expect
such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense,
but operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the Court's power is not
merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure existing at the time of the Constitution's
approval. This power is "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,"
which is a power to adopt a general, complete and comprehensive system of procedure, adding new and
different rules without regard to their source and discarding old ones.
ESTIPONA VS. LOBRIGA
G.R. NO. 226679, AUGUST 15, 2017
Facts:
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs).
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of
Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time
offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section
23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the
rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and
(3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.
The trial court denied his Motion holding that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 expressly prohibits pleabargaining in drugs cases. Estipona filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court.
Arguing that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165 is unconstitutional for it encroaches upon the Supreme Court's
rule-making
power
and
therefore
violative
of
the
equal
protection
clause,
he
filed
a
Petition
before
the
SC
to
declare
Sec.
23
unconstitutional.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that (1) Congress was not impleaded,
(2) the constitutionality of the law cannot be attached collaterally, (3) the proper action should have been
a petition for relief before the RTC, and (4) the petition fails to satisfy the requisites for judicial review.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 23 of RA No. 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon the power of
the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.
Ruling:
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now in the exclusive domain
of the Supreme Court and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.
It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was
granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani
Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the
maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this
power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this
Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be
co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement. While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is,
by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs
exclusively
to
this
Court.
The power of Congress (to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines under Sec. 13, Art, VIII of the 1935
Constitution), however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. The rule making power of this
[1987] Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the
first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure. The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our
government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this
prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural
rules promulgated by the Court. Viewed from this perspective, we have rejected previous attempts on the
part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court.