The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) is a transitive policy that has, while not
without issue, effectively improved the IC (Intelligence Communities) communications abilities.
Restructuring the 17 IC under an umbrella authority, this being seen in the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), served to establish a more concise conduit that provided a greater forum for
information sharing and collaboration. Two arguable issues that arose from this act are 1)
Centralization upsets the status quote of the old IC status, thus potentially limiting communication
and collaboration due to inter-agency competition 2) the lack of authority the DNI has to exercise.
I would argue against several of the critics towards centralization in Thomas Hammond’s “Intelligence
Organizations and the Organization of Intelligence” (Hammond, 2010). There is some posited merit,
such as Richard K. Betts noting that decentralization allows for competition and redundancy.
(Hammond, 2010) In such a way, the redundancy can support validating that the product is correct and
competition between agencies can further authenticate it. However, it should be recognized that
intelligence needs to be adaptable with the evolving world. What was easier back in the 40s and 50s
with the culminating results from World War II and entering the Cold War may not be up to par with
how foreign actors operate in today’s environment.
As for those decentralization advocates that state having a “single, all-powerful” intelligence chief will
promote negative incentive, the observation can be made that the prior authority before the DNI was
the DCI, who had the weaker authority, but relatively the same oversight of operations. Ergo, there was
some level of centralization with the beginning of the IC after the National Security Act of 1947. Included
in that act was the provision that the DIC themselves would be solely responsible for the “shall be
responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.” (Best, 2014)
While not having the authority over any other agency except the CIA, the DCI was given an ambiguous
and broad role.
While those arguments for and against a centralized IC function both have merit, it is again important to
understand that intelligence gathering does change with time. The IRTPA might have its flaws and
weaknesses in function, but it allows for more cohesive information sharing and clean-cut
communication. Thus enabling the product to be delivered in efficient timeline and through fail-safes at
each level.
Hammond, T. H. (2010). Intelligence Organizations and the Organization of Intelligence. International
Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 23(4), 680-724. doi:10.1080/08850601003780987
Best, Richard A. “Leadership of the U.S. Intelligence Community: From DCI to DNI.” International
Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, vol. 27, no. 2, 2014, pp. 253–
333., https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2014.872533.
The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) was established by the Intell
igence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004, a move
that, as Richard Strongest points out, had been years and counting an
d had already been advocated for by many different institutions. The IR
TPA was created in response to public demand for a centralized organi
zation in charge of the Intelligence Community's 17 components. The
DNI's mission is to encourage and facilitate intelligence exchange acro
ss all intelligence channels while also deterring competition.The Office
of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), which was established i
n the aftermath of the intelligence failure that allowed the September 1
1 attacks to occur, has been heavily criticized throughout its brief exist
ence. The national intelligence director was created with the goal of bet
ter coordinating the intelligence community's efforts and resolving confl
icts between different spy agencies.
Prior to the founding of the DNI, the Director of Central Intelligence, als
o known as the CIA Director, was the highestranking intelligence official. However, the catastrophic security breach t
hat let terrorists to hijack planes and crash them into New York and Wa
shington, D.C. sparked such indignation that the Director of Central Int
elligence was demoted to the newly constituted Director of National Int
elligence. During its brief term, the new position has faced its own set o
f challenges.One issue raised by the DNI's establishment is that it is
run by an elected individual. I believe there will be a self-interested
inclination. As one of the President's principal intelligence advisers, I
believe governmental agendas influence the agency's judgments. The
DNI also has major finance and budgeting authority over the IC, and
these personality tendencies may lead to divergence from where funds
should be invested effectively - in the name of national security.
Supporters of ODNI admit the office has had troubles, and that reforms
are needed. But they insist to abolish the office would be an
overreaction. Some argue the problem lies with the CIA, which has
never been willing to give up its authority to the ODNI. Other
intelligence agencies behave similarly, creating too many turf wars that
leave the ODNI looking ineffectual. What needs to be done is the
president must pick a strong national intelligence director and stand
behind that person 100%, making it clear to the CIA and other offices
that they must comply with ODNI orders.
References
Best, Richard A. “Leadership of the U.S. Intelligence Community: From
DCI to DNI.” International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence, vol. 27, no. 2, 2014, pp. 253–
333., https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2014.872533.
Hammond, Thomas H. “Intelligence Organizations and the
Organization of Intelligence.” International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence, vol. 23, no. 4, 2010, pp. 680–
724., https://doi.org/10.1080/08850601003780987.