North South University
School of Humanities and Social Science
Department of English & Modern languages
Name: Syeda Fahmida Malik
ID: 1931709615
Assignment Name: India-China rivalry: Challenges and
opportunities for Bangladesh
Report Submission Date: 7 -9-2021
Section: 08
Submitted to: Dr. M. Jashim Uddin
India-China rivalry: Challenges and opportunities for
Bangladesh
Introduction: The main cause of this problem is related to the border area. Both countries are
battling for infrastructure along the Line of Actual Control, which runs parallel to the bord er. The
construction route going to an Indian high-altitude air station, which can be considered to be one of
the main causes of a conflict with Chinese troops that resulted in the deaths of at least 20 Indian
soldiers. China is a country that desires colonialism to return and for the entire world to be ruled by
the Chinese government. The McMahon Line designates the border among China-controlled East
Himalayan territory and Indian territory. This area is a high-altitude mountainous area. Sir Henry
McMahon, then Foreign Secretary in the Government of British India, drew this line, which is known
as the McMahon Line after him. This line stretches about 890 kilometers. The McMahon Line is
recognized by India and is considered the 'Actual Line of Control (LAC)' between India and China,
however, China does not acknowledge it. The disputed area is 2,000 kilometers long, according to
China, and 4,000 kilometers long, according to India. (SINGH, JUL 2, 2020)
India-China rivalry: Small countries’ perspectives in South Asia: According to my research instead of
benefiting from the many small countries Sri Lanka, Nepal e.t.c are negatively affected by India-China
rivalry. Although it may not seem like at first glance, it has a lot of effects in the long run and we can
see many countries already affected by this behavior. We will explain it with an example down
below. This secondary state approach is based on the United States-China rivalry in East and
Southeast Asia. While there is no security danger in South Asia, secondary states that are facing
strategic competition with both India and China have sought hedging methods. To reconcile these
two facts, we develop a theoretical framework. As a result, the benefits of cooperating with a large
power in a competitive context have to be balanced against the risks of losing autonomy as a result.
When both benefits and expenses increase at the same time, states are more likely to take
precautions. These theories are tested in the Maldives and Sri Lanka situations. When faced with a
security danger or not, there is a trade-off between autonomy and security. The governments of the
Maldives and Sri Lanka have adopted a hedging policy toward China and India to protect their
autonomy in the face of pressure from India or local backlash against Chinese investment. In Sri
Lanka's situation, there is also the issue of failing infrastructure projects, which leads to China
acquiring critical assets such as ports, posing a danger to the country's autonomy. For example, if we
talk about Sri lank we can see that the Hambantota Port Development Project made a name for
everyone by failing, as expected. The port drew only 34 ships in 2012, despite thousands of ships
passing by along one of the world's busiest shipping channels. The port was eventually turned over
to China. Because Sri Lanka's new government was having trouble repaying the debt he had incurred.
The government handed away the port and 15,000 acres of territory surrounding it under duress
after months of discussions with the Chinese. The case is one of the most evocative examples of
China's bold use of loans and aid to acquire global influence. Now if we talk about Nepal we can see
some complications, like road-building in districts of Nepal bordering China. One primary goal of
developing this road as quickly as possible is to reduce Nepalese residents' dependency upon Indian
highways. The Nepalese government has enlisted the help of its army to speed up the construction of an
87-kilometer piece of road near Ghantibagar in Darchula district as part of the Mahakali corridor or
Darchula-Tinkar Road Project. The area is next to the Pithoragarh district and is close to the India-Nepal
border. The government agreed last month to transfer the construction project to the Nepal Army.
As a result of the road, it will be easier to reach the China border, which is beyond Tinkar. To reduce
Nepalese residents' dependence on Indian highways, this route must be built as quickly as possible. It
will also allow locals to reach their communities without crossing Indian borders, and it will make it
easier for the Nepalese Army to conduct patrols. As a result of deteriorating relations between India and
Nepal, road development has accelerated. A perceptible strain has grown between the two countries
since the Nepali parliament decided to include areas of Uttarakhand in the country's newly-designed
map. This kind of activity leads to land acquisition. Those are some perspectives in south Asian small
countries. Though some countries benefiting from them quite good it also has a great impact on
other countries.
(Lim, 14 May 2019) (Abi-Habib, June 25, 2018) (DASSON, JUNE 27, 2020)
Are there opportunities for Bangladesh because of the rivalry between India and China?
In our previous section, we see that many countries in South Asia facing some issues for India-China
rivalry. According to popular opinion, great power competition puts smaller neighbors at risk. In the
case of China and India's battle for regional influence in Bangladesh, however, this conventional
wisdom appears to be flawed. Instead of suffering, the small country in South Asia is gaining in the
long run. With 160 million inhabitants, Bangladesh is also one of the world's fastest-growing
economies, as well as the seventh most populated country. The number of the population, which
reflects the size of the market, serves to obscure the modest size of the country's territory. By 202 4,
Bangladesh will be able to graduate from the position of a developing country. To be sure,
Bangladesh will continue to prioritize growth, both in terms of large-scale infrastructure, military
capabilities, as well as people resources and services. Many countries trying to invest here it’s like
the center points of attraction. Another reason is the Bay of Bengal strategically crucial for Major
powers. When it comes to Bangladeshi geopolitics, India has always been the focus of attention, but
the United States has always had a strong hand. There used to be a lot of regional powers such as
China. Bangladesh's cultural and societal ties to India go back a long way. But India's imperialist
approach and forceful techniques infuriated ordinary Bangladeshis, especially when contrasted with
China's policy of non-interference in domestic affairs mixed with generous investment. Bangladesh
now considers China as one of its biggest important trading partners. For the first time in 40 years,
China overtook India as Bangladesh's top trading partner in 2015. Bangladesh imports 34 percent of
its total via China. Bangladesh has recently received an infusion of Chinese investment as a member
of China's Belt and Road Initiative. When President Xi Jinping visited Bangladesh in 2016, he signed
27 agreements for investments and loans of a total of $24 billion, demonstrating Beijing's support for
Bangladesh. These investments, together with a previous $13.6 billion investment in strategic
partnerships, increased Chinese investment in Bangladesh to a total of $38 billion, the biggest value
ever vowed by a single country to Bangladesh. New Delhi felt it was falling behind due to the massive
quantity of Chinese investment in India's most trusted and friendly neighbor. As a result, I ndia
announced $5 billion in loans for Bangladesh in 2017, the greatest amount of money the country has
ever invested in the country. Bangladesh, as a rapidly rising economy, is in desperate need of
investment, and both China and India regard Bangladesh as a chance to expand their influence.
Bangladesh is taking advantage of the situation, relying on both China and India to meet its needs.
Bangladesh now imports the majority of its weaponry from China, and Dhaka is China's second largest arms export destination after Pakistan. Bangladesh is the recipient of 20% of all Chinese arms
exports. Bangladesh also received military aid from both countries. Five maritime patrol vessels, two
submarines, 16 fighter jets, 44 tanks, as well as anti-ship and surface-to-air missiles, have been
delivered to Dhaka by Beijing. The Bangladesh Navy received two Chinese submarines at a low cost in
2017. As a result of India's dissatisfaction with the deal, New Delhi expressed interest in providing
submarine training to the Bangladesh Navy. Also, Bangladesh having the opportunity to build power
plant. Last year, China Huadian Hong Kong Company Limited agreed to build one power plant in
Bangladesh, and earlier this year, Power China joined with a British partner to develop ano ther. So
we can say that Bangladesh getting more opportunities in terms of this issue.
(Anwar, July 12, 2019) (Deal signed with Chinese firm for 1,320MW plant, THURSDAY, September 9,
2021)
What are the challenges for Bangladesh because of the conflict between India and China?
The main challenge for Bangladesh is to maintain a good relationship with China. Bangladesh risks
losing far too much by siding with China in this big political battle. It would conveniently offend the
US, India, Australia, and Japan in their newly reconstituted "Quad" – a side effect that would damage
Bangladesh economically and politically, given that Bangladesh's billion-dollar apparel export
industry is dependent on the US and Europe, and that Japan and Australia have supported
Bangladesh to create/ building infrastructure and social development. Bangladesh, on the other
hand, would not want to provoke China. Another challenge is for Bangladesh to concern about is the
Teesta river issue: For their livelihood and other economic activities, almost 21 million people rely on
the Teesta's 100-kilometer section in Bangladesh. Due to dam development and irrigation canals
upstream, as well as the effects of climate change, water levels in the Teesta have dropped
substantially in recent years during the dry season in Bangladesh - another incentive to strengthen
ties with India. From China’s Side a very serious issue raise, Land acquisition: The Bangladesh Power
Development Board inked an agreement in February 2016 to begin purchasing power from a
partnership of two companies: S. Alam Group of Industries in Bangladesh and Shandong Electric Power
Construction Corporation in China. With the support of the ruling Awami League, the S. Alam Group of
Industries (the plant's local owner) began acquiring property from local inhabitants in 2013. Residents
complained that they were underpaid and were banned from contacting the company's officials. This is
a very serious issue’s for Bangladesh to maintain its autonomy. On top of that if Bangladesh wants to
build a deep seaport with the partnership it can break the stability of our autonomy. The primary
concern for the country, though, is the Rohingya refugee problem. The flood of a million refugees could
represent a severe danger to the country's future stability and security. Bangladesh's best bet is to
continue to play the balancing act between these two major nations.
(LINTNER, OCTOBER 14, 2020) (Mukhopadhyay, 05.02.2021) (Wikipedia)
Can Bangladesh make a balanced relationship with these two great powers? Provide specific
examples. Balancing the relation between the two is the most challenging part for Bangladesh.
Bangladesh's economic relations with its two most important trading partners, India and China. Since
Bangladesh's independence, India has been an important neighbor, while China is a growing
diplomatic and economic associate. The growing alliance between Bangladesh and China has the
potential to cause significant tensions with India, harming trade and regional peace and jeopardizing
the growth of Bangladesh's textile sector. To ensure geopolitical stability, mitigation techniques
stressing amicable ties through economic cooperation are advocated. The most crucial relationship
for Bangladesh seems to be with India. Because of its proximity, this relationship is culturally,
historically, and economically interwoven. Border issues along Bangladesh's eastern frontier,
disagreements over river water sharing, continuous illegal migration of Bangladeshis into India, and
the presence of anti-Indian militia bases in Bangladesh are among the most important difficulties.
India is the second-largest import trading partner, accounting for 14% of total imports (US$5.51
billion). If this flow of goods is disrupted due to political tensions, it will have a detrimental influence
on the entire nation's livelihood.
Bangladesh's administration has already been strengthening its relationship with China during the
last decade. The Chinese government has spent heavily in the development of Bangladesh's military
and infrastructure, with a total investment of US$24 billion in the latter. For example, the 2005
Bangladesh-China Defense Cooperation Agreement emphasized China's commitment to assisting
Bangladesh in harnessing its nuclear energy. Dhaka-Beijing ties are presently strong, however, there
are no grounds to think that relations with India will suffer the consequences. Bangladesh and India
have a strong military and intelligence links, and cooperation between the two has helped to reduce
militancy in both nations. Beijing also obtained trade access to Bangladesh's two largest ports,
Chittagong and Mongla. (Li, 2017-2018)
Recommendations:



Maintaining a Balanced approach while both the countries' investment projects.
Not allowing India and China’s rivalry Create a hazy situation by Clarifying their clear Stance
and goal along with their foreign policies.
Not allowing any form of action between China and India dictate and affects the national
policies and decision-making processes in any way unless it is necessary to maintain national
and international peace and security.
Bibliography
Abi-Habib, M. (June 25, 2018). How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port. The Newyork Times.
Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html
Anwar, A. (July 12, 2019). How Bangladesh Is Benefiting From the China-India Rivalry. THE DIPLOMAT.
Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/how-bangladesh-is-benefiting-from-thechina-india-rivalry/
DASSON, B. (JUNE 27, 2020). Nepal Fast-Tracks Border Road Building to Cut Dependence on India,
Improve China Access. News18. Retrieved from https://www.news18.com/news/world/nepal-
fast-tracks-border-road-building-to-cut-dependence-on-india-improve-china-access2689543.html
(THURSDAY, September 9, 2021). Deal signed with Chinese firm for 1,320MW plant. The Daily Star.
Retrieved from https://www.thedailystar.net/business/deal-signed-chinese-firm-1320mw-plant1572652
Li, A. (2017-2018). Balancing India and China: The Impact of Foreign Relations on Bangladesh. Western
Social Science. Retrieved from
https://www.democracylab.uwo.ca/Archives/2017_2018_research/textiles_in_bangladesh/bala
ncing_india_and_china_the_impact_of_foreign_relations_on_bangladesh.html
Lim, D. J. (14 May 2019). Hedging in South Asia: balancing economic and security interests amid SinoIndian competition. Oxford Academic . Retrieved from https://academic.oup.com/irap/articleabstract/19/3/493/5489338?redirectedFrom=fulltext
LINTNER, B. (OCTOBER 14, 2020). Bangladesh wins and loses in China-India rivalry. ASIA TIMES.
Retrieved from https://asiatimes.com/2020/10/bangladesh-wins-and-loses-in-china-indiarivalry/
Mukhopadhyay, A. (05.02.2021). Why the Bangladesh-India friendship is under pressure. Retrieved from
https://www.dw.com/en/india-bangladesh-ties/a-56473457
SINGH, H. (JUL 2, 2020). What is the McMahon Line between India and China? JARGAN JOSH. Retrieved
from https://m.jagranjosh.com/general-knowledge/what-is-mcmahon-line-15936669421?fbclid=IwAR0jC4YyW772emjadF1yBlg3ZcsZFCaFT3GNcrxKPBbARmsd9lojSe2NByY
Wikipedia. (n.d.). Banshkhali power plant movement. Retrieved from
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banshkhali_power_plant_movement