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Rea Bautista
Patrick Manalo
Loraine Saguinsin
Naomi Quimpo
Succession Reviewer
Inside: Illustrative Problems by Mr. Patrick, Sample
Exam Questions, Answer Key and more!!!1
accdg to extent of rights and obligations
transmitted:
universal – entire patrimony or an aliquot part
particular – devise, legacy
accdg to importance:
compulsory
testamentary
intestate
Parties:
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Decedent
o Testator
o Decedent (intestate)
•
Successor
o Heir
o Devisee or Legatee
Balane:
•
Only transmissible rights and obligations pass by
succession
o Criterion: if the rights or obligation is
strictly personal (intuitu personae), it is
intransmissible; otherwise, it is
transmissible.
•
Pecuniary obligations must be paid first before
distributing the residue of the estate to the heirs.
Union Bank vs. Santibañez (2005)
F: Decedent contracted loans during his lifetime. After
decedent died, creditor filed an action for collection
against the heirs.
H: The bank should have filed its claim in the probate
court pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. The
filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the
probate court is mandatory.
Estate of K.H. Hemady vs. Luzon Surety (1956)
F: Lower court ruled that claims filed by Luzon Surety
against decedent’s estate based on contracts of suretyship
entered into by the decedent were not chargeable because
death extinguished liability as surety/guarantor.
“Solvitur Ambulando”
I.
General Provisions
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of
which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of
the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted
through his death to another or others either by his will or
by operation of law. (n) 2
Class Notes:
Kinds of Succession
•
according to moment of transmission:
1) mortis causa
2) inter vivos (none in PH law, only donations)
1
Disclaimer: All photos lifted from Google images. No copyright
infringement intended.
2
 provisions recited
H: Obligations of a guarantor are transmissible. Contracts
take effect only between parties, their assigns and heirs,
unless they are intransmissible by their nature, by
stipulation or by operation of law.
Alvarez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (1990)
F: A judgment ordering decedent to return the lots was
entered during his lifetime but was not executed because
he sold the lots to a 3rd person. A suit for recovery of the
lots was filed against the heirs of seller.
H: Liability that arose from the sale of decedent in bad
faith was not extinguished by his death and was passed on
to his heirs. However, the heirs are only liable to the
extent of the value of their inheritance.
Art. 775. In this Title, "decedent" is the general term
applied to the person whose property is transmitted
through succession, whether or not he left a will. If he left
a will, he is also called the testator. (n)
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights
and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by
his death. (659) 
Art. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent. (657a) 
Notes:
•
•
1.
3.
Heir can sell his aliquot share but not specific
property/physical
portion
of
property.
Otherwise, it is only pro tanto valid (to the extent
of seller’s share) [Lee vs RTC (2007)]
The heirs have the right to be substituted for
deceased as party in an action that survives
Bonilla vs. Barcena (1976)
Infelicitous wording. The rights to the succession
are vested; inheritance transmitted
CONSEQUENCES:
The law at the time of the decedent’s death
will determine who the heirs should be.
Uson vs. Del Rosario (1953)
F: Nebreda died in 1945 and was survived by his wife and
4 illegitimate children. Wife brought action against
illegitimate children for the recovery of the possession of
land left by husband on the theory that she is the sole heir.
Defense: while under the Old CC spurious children do not
have successional rights, under the New CC they are
granted the same status as natural children thus entitled
to succeed from their father’s estate.
H: The right granted under the New CC cannot be given
retroactive effect. New rights have retroactive effect only
when they do not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights of the same origin. The right of ownership of Wife
over the land became vested in 1945 upon decedent’s
death because of Article 657 of the Old Civil Code (now
777) which was in effect at the time he died.
2.
Note:
•
Ownership passes to the heir at the very
moment of death who therefore, from that
moment, acquires the right to dispose of his
share.
De Borja vs. Vda. De Borja (1972)
F: Decedent died with a will. Before probate of his will and
to end suits between them, D’s son by his first marriage
and 2nd wife entered into a compromise agreement that
2nd wife will receive P800,000 as full and complete
payment of her hereditary share.
H: Agreement is valid. There is no legal bar for the heir to
dispose of her share immediately upon death of the
decedent even if actual extent is not yet determined. The
agreement is a sale of the shares and not a settlement of
the estate.
Alfonso vs. Sps. Andres (2010)
F: Jose inherited subject property from his father. This
was assigned to him in a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement.
Jose sold it Sps Andres.
H: The transfer is valid because title of property of person
who died intestate passes at once to his heirs, subject to
the claims of administration and payments of debts and
expenses.
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
F: Decedent, during her lifetime, filed an action to quiet
title. During the pendency of the case, D died and counsel
asked that her heirs be substituted.
H: The heirs may be substituted to the deceased party
because upon the latter’s death, her claim/rights to the
land were not extinguished but were transmitted to her
heirs.
Note:
•
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What was transmitted was the right to prosecute
the action
If there is dispute as to who are the legal heirs,
must first establish the right to succeed in a
separate action [Heirs of Yaptinchay vs Del
Rosario, 304 SCRA 18]
Republic vs. Marcos (2012)
F: Cases for reversion, reconveyance and restitution of ill‐
gotten wealth were filed against persons including heirs of
Marcos were sought to be dismissed against the latter‐
mentioned defendants.
H: Despite the finding that their involvement in the
alleged illegal activities was not established, they should
be maintained as defendants because the case is an action
that survives thus it is imperative that the estate be
represented. As to Imelda and Bongbong, they are the
executors of FM’s estate, and as to Imee and Irene, they
possibly possess/ed ill‐gotten properties.
Art. 778. Succession may be:
(1) Testamentary;
(2) Legal or intestate; or
(3) Mixed. (n)
Art. 779. Testamentary succession is that which results
from the designation of an heir, made in a will executed in
the form prescribed by law. (n)
Art. 780. Mixed succession is that effected partly by will
and partly by operation of law. (n)
Balane:
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Some inaccuracies:
o Did not mention compulsory
o Mixed is not really a type of succession
o No definition of Legal/intestate
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Per Agbayani, our Expert in Succession, the 3
Kinds of Succession according to importance are:
1. Compulsory
2. Testamentary
3. Intestate
Page 2 of 73
Art. 781. The inheritance of a person includes not only
the property and the transmissible rights and obligations
existing at the time of his death, but also those which have
accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. (n)
Balane:
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Best deleted! Inheritance does not include
accruals!
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Free and intelligent
Solemn and formal
Revocable and ambulatory
Mortis causa
Individual
Executed with animus testandi
Executed with testamentary capacity
Unilateral
Dispositive of property
Statutory
Balus vs. Balus (2010)
Vitug vs. Court of Appeals (1990)
F: Mortgage on decedent’s land was foreclosed by the
Bank and there being to redemption, title was
consolidated to the Bank. D died and 2 of his 3 children
bought land from the Bank. 3rd child demanded share in
the property as his inheritance.
F: Husband and Decedent Wife executed a Survivorship
Agreement with the Bank that after the death of either of
them, the money in their joint savings account would
belong to the survivor.
H: Property, the ownership over which has been lost
during the lifetime of a decedent, no longer forms part of
the estate which his compulsory heirs may lay a claim
over.
Art. 782. An heir is a person called to the succession
either by the provision of a will or by operation of law.
Devisees and legatees are persons to whom gifts of real
and personal property are respectively given by virtue of
a will. (n)
Balane:
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Heir = one who succeeds to the whole or an
aliquot part of the inheritance
•
Devisee = Succeeds to definite, specific,
individual REAL properties
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Legatee = Succeeds to definite, specific,
individual PERSONAL properties
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Distinction is important in preterition!
II.
Testamentary Succession
a. Wills
1.1. Wills in General
Art. 783. A will is an act whereby a person is permitted,
with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a
certain degree the disposition of this estate, to take effect
after his death. (667a) 
Balane:
Operative words:
1. Act – too broad, it is suggested that it be
delimited with a more specific term such as
“instrument”
2. Permitted – purely statutory
3. Formalities prescribed by law – depends on
whether attested or holographic
4. Control to a certain degree – power to dispose
gratuitously is limited by rules on legitime
5. After his death – takes place mortis causa
a. Sir says this should be “at the moment
of/upon death”
11 Characteristics of Wills: <PRIME FEUDSS>
1. Purely personal
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
H: The agreement is not a mortis causa conveyance which
needs to be in a will but a mere obligation with a term, the
term being death.
Take note of the definition of a will in this case: “a
personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a
capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and
declares or complies with duties to take effect after his
death” (The deposit was not property of the decedent but
was conjugal property.)
Seangio vs. Reyes (2006)
F: Holographic will contains only a clause disinheriting an
heir without express disposition of property.
H: While it does not make an affirmative disposition of the
testator’s property, the disinheritance of the son is an act
of disposition of the property of the testator in favor of
those who would succeed in the absence of the person
disinherited.
Art. 784. The making of a will is a strictly personal act; it
cannot be left in whole or in part of the discretion of a
third person, or accomplished through the instrumentality
of an agent or attorney. (670a) 
Notes:
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•
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Purely personal character of wills
What is non‐delegable is the exercise of the
disposing power, mechanical acts not included.
In this article, “third person” should read as
“another person” because who is the “second
person”? Jericho Rosales?!
Art. 785. The duration or efficacy of the designation of
heirs, devisees or legatees, or the determination of the
portions which they are to take, when referred to by
name, cannot be left to the discretion of a third person.
(670a) 
Notes:
•
The ff are non‐delegable: <DDD>
1. designation of heirs, devisees, legatees
2. duration or efficacy of such designation
(including conditions, terms, substitutions)
Page 3 of 73
3.
determination of portions they are to
receive
to use them in another sense can be gathered, and that
other can be ascertained.
Art. 786. The testator may entrust to a third person the
distribution of specific property or sums of money that he
may leave in general to specified classes or causes, and
also the designation of the persons, institutions or
establishments to which such property or sums are to be
given or applied. (671a) 
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical
sense, unless the context clearly indicates a contrary
intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that he was
unacquainted with such technical sense. (675a)
Notes:
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Two things the T must determine:
1. Property or amount of money to be given
2. Class or cause to be benefitted
Two things he may delegate:
1. Designation of persons, institutions or
establishments within the class or cause
2. Manner of distribution
Art. 787. The testator may not make a testamentary
disposition in such manner that another person has to
determine whether or not it is to be operative. (n)
Notes:
•
This does not prejudice right of heirs, devisee,
legatee to accept or renounce.
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
In case of doubt as to different interpretations
Art. 788. If a testamentary disposition admits of different
interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by
which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred.
(n)
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The thing may rather be effective than be
without effect
Ambiguity; Latent or Patent
Art. 789. When there is an imperfect description, or when
no person or property exactly answers the description,
mistakes and omissions must be corrected, if the error
appears from the context of the will or from extrinsic
evidence, excluding the oral declarations of the testator as
to his intention; and when an uncertainty arises upon the
face of the will, as to the application of any of its
provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained
from the words of the will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made, excluding such
oral declarations. (n)
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•
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Latent = not obvious on the face of the will
Patent = Obvious on the face of the will
How to deal with ambiguities whether latent or
patent: Clear up/resolve in order to give effect to
the disposition by any evidence admissible and
relevant excluding in either case, oral
declarations of the testator (Dead Man’s Statute)
Words; Technical Words
Art. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their
ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear intention
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Preference to testacy
Art. 791. The words of a will are to receive an
interpretation which will give to every expression some
effect, rather than one which will render any of the
expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting
a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy.
(n)
Invalidity of one of several dispositions
Art. 792. The invalidity of one of several dispositions
contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the
other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the
testator would not have made such other dispositions if
the first invalid disposition had not been made. (n)
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severability
Property acquired after will was made
Art. 793. Property acquired after the making of a will
shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had possessed it
at the time of making the will, should it expressly appear
by the will that such was his intention. (n)
Devise/Legacy
Art. 794. Every devise or legacy shall cover all the interest
which the testator could device or bequeath in the
property disposed of, unless it clearly appears from the
will that he intended to convey a less interest. (n)
Art. 795. The validity of a will as to its form depends upon
the observance of the law in force at the time it is made.
Notes:
•
Aspects of Validity:
o Extrinsic – Formal
o Intrinsic – Substantive
1.2. Testamentary
Intent
Capacity
and
Art. 796. All persons who are not expressly prohibited by
law may make a will. (662) 
Art. 797. Persons of either sex under eighteen years of
age cannot make a will. (n) 
Art. 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the
testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution. (n)

Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the
testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties,
or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or
Page 4 of 73
Abangan vs. Abangan (1919)
unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of
making the will to know the nature of the estate to be
disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the
character of the testamentary act. (n) 
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound
mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound
mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the
person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the
testator, one month, or less, before making his will was
publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains
the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it
during a lucid interval. (n)
Art. 801. Supervening incapacity does not invalidate an
effective will, nor is the will of an incapable validated by
the supervening of capacity. (n)
Ortega vs. Valmonte (2005)
F: 81 year old testator’s will was opposed on the ground
that he was not of sound mind.
H: Mere old age does not mean that a person is not of
sound mind. To be of sound mind, at the time of making
the will, the testator need only know (1) the nature of the
estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of his
bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act.
Baltazar vs. Laxa (2012)
F: 78‐year‐old spinster’s will was being assailed because
she was allegedly not of sound mind when it was made
(because she was “forgetful”)
H: Soundness of mind is presumed. Forgetfulness is not
equivalent to unsoundness of mind.
Art. 802. A married woman may make a will without the
consent of her husband, and without the authority of the
court. (n)
Art. 803. A married woman may dispose by will of all her
separate property as well as her share of the conjugal
partnership or absolute community property. (n)
1.3. Forms of Wills
Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in a
language or dialect known to the testator. (n) 
F: Records do not show that the will, executed in Cebu and
written in the dialect of that locality where the testatrix is
neighbor, was in a language known to the testatrix.
H: Compliance with the language requirement
presumed if (but Sir says “proved by”): (1) the will is
the language/dialect generally spoken in the place
execution and (2) the testator is a native or resident
said locality.
is
in
of
of
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must
be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or
by the testator's name written by some other person in
his presence, and by his express direction, and attested
and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his
name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also
sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the
last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part
of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon
which the will is written, and the fact that the testator
signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some
other person to write his name, under his express
direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses,
and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all
the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of
one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the
witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. (n) 
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The
notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the
will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.
(n) 
(1) subscribed by the T or his agent in his presence
and by his express direction at the end thereof, in the
presence of the witnesses
•
signature
Payad vs. Tolentino (1936)
F: Testatrix thumb marked end and each and every page
of the will then her lawyer wrote her name to indicate the
places where her thumb marks were.
Suroza vs. Honrado (1981)
H: Will is valid. A statute requiring a will to be “signed” is
satisfied if the signature is made by the testator’s mark.
F: Will of illiterate testatrix was written in English, a
language she did not understand.
Matias vs. Salud (1958)
H: Will is void because of the mandatory provision of Art
804 that every will must be executed in a language or
dialect known to the testator.
F: The testatrix placed her thumb mark in lieu of her usual
signature on the will. Beside the thumb mark was the
name of the testatrix as purportedly written by one of the
witnesses. The attestation clause, however, does not
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Page 5 of 73
indicate that the person who wrote the name of the
testatrix thereon was directed by the latter to do so.
H: A thumb mark is considered a signature. It is therefore
unnecessary to indicate in the attestation clause that
another person has been directed by the testator to write
his (testator’s) name thereon, because in effect, the
testator signed the will himself.
Garcia vs. Lacuesta (1951)
of each signature must be such that they may see
each other sign if they choose to do so.
By merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they
could have seen each other sign
(2) attested and subscribed by at least 3 witnesses in
the presence of the T and of one another
•
Attesting: act of witnessing
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Subscribing: act of signing
Q: Must W sign at the end of the will?
A: Literally and ideally, the Ws should sign
at the end of the will, though failure in this
regard may be overlooked (Taboada vs
Rosal [1982])
F: Lawyer wrote the name of the testator followed by “a
ruego del testador” then the lawyer’s name on the
testator’s will. Beside his name, the testator wrote an X.
Attestation clause did not state that the lawyer was
expressly directed to write testator’s name.
H: Void for attestation clause’s failure to state that lawyer
wrote T’s name under his express direction. The cross
cannot be taken as a signature because it is not the usual
way by which the deceased signed his name, nor is it one
of the usual ways by which he signed. A cross does not
have the trustworthiness of a thumb mark.
(3) the T or his agent must sign every page, except the
last, on the left margin in the presence of the
witnesses
•
Mandatory – signing on every page in the
witnesses’ presence
•
Directory – place of the signature
Icasiano vs. Icasiano (1964)
•
Signing by an agent of T
o Must sign in T’s presence
o By his express direction
Barut vs Cabacungan (1912)
F: The agent (who was also a witness) signed the name of
the testator in the latter's presence and by his express
direction. Probate was opposed on the ground that the
handwriting of the person who signed the name of the
testator was of another witness.
H: Valid. It is not essential that the person signing for the
testator also sign his name. The law only requires:
1. name was written at T’s express direction;
2. in T’s presence; and
3. in the presence of all witnesses.
F: Original of the will did not contain signature of one of
the witnesses but duplicate copy does.
H: Inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature
to one page, due to simultaneous lifting of pages, is not per
se sufficient denial of probate. Impossibility of
substitution of page is assured by the signature of the
testatrix and the two other witnesses, and the imprint of
the seal of the notary public.
(4) the witnesses must sign every page, except the
last, on the left margin in the presence of the T and of
one another
Lee vs. Tambago (2008)
F: Will was attested by only 2 witnesses.
•
‐
‐
‐
•
Signing at the end
If there are non‐dispositive portions, there are 2
ends:
o Physical end: where the writing stops
o Logical end: where the testamentary
disposition ends
T may sign at either end as the non‐dispositive
portions are not essential parts of the will.
If T signs before the end, the ENTIRE will is
invalid!
Signing in the presence of witnesses
Nera vs. Rimando (1911)
Doctrine: Test of presence – not whether they actually
saw each other sign but whether they might have seen
each other sign had they chosen to do so, considering their
mental and physical condition and position with relation
to each other at the moment of inscription of each
signature.
•
Such that the position of the parties with relation
to each other at the moment of the subscription
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
H: Void!
(5) all numbers must be numbered correlatively in
letters on the upper part of each page
•
Mandatory – pagination by means of a
conventional system
•
Directory – pagination in letters on the upper
part of each page
(6) attestation clause
•
Stating the number of pages of the will;
•
The fact that the T/his agent signed the will and
every page thereof in the presence of the Ws
•
The fact that the W witnessed and signed the will
and every page thereof in the presence of the T
and of one another
‐
The attestation clause is the affair of the
witnesses, therefore, it need not be signed by the
T
Cagro vs. Cagro (1953)
Page 6 of 73
F: The signatures of the instrumental witnesses were not
at the bottom of the attestation clause but on the left‐hand
margin of the page containing the AC.
H: Fatally defective. Signatures at the left‐hand side were
in compliance with the mandate that the will be signed on
the left‐hand margin of all its pages
Azuela vs. CA (2006)
F: Witnesses did not sign at the bottom of the attestation
clause but they signed the left‐hand margin of the page
where the AC is found.
H: Will void. Signatures on the left‐hand margin comply
with the requirement that witnesses sign each page of the
will. The signatures to the attestation clause establish that
the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in
the attestation clause itself. The attestation clause is
separate and apart from the disposition of the will. An
unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will.
(7) acknowledgement before a notary public
Javellana vs. Ledesma (1955)
F: The notary public signed the certificate of
acknowledgement in his office and not in the presence of T
and witnesses.
H: VALID. The Civil Code, while requiring that a will must
be signed by the T and the witnesses in the presence of
each other, does not require that the acknowledgement by
the notary happen in the presence of the parties.
Obiter: It is not required that the T and the Ws
acknowledge on the same day it was executed.
Logical inference: Neither does Art 806 require that T and
Ws acknowledge in each other’s presence.
Cruz vs. Villasor (1973)
F: There were only three witnesses to the will and it was
acknowledged before a notary public who was one of the
witnesses.
H: VOID for failing to meet the 3‐witness requirement. The
notary public cannot acknowledge before himself his
having signed the will.
Balane asks: If one of the witnesses is a duly
commissioned notary public and he notarizes the
will, the will is void. TRUE OR FALSE?
A: FALSE (If there are more than 3 witnesses, the
will meets the 3‐witness requirement hence still
valid)
Guerrero vs. Bihis (2007)
F: Notary public who acknowledged the will was acting
outside the place of his commission.
H: VOID. No notary shall possess authority to do any
notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. Since
Atty. in this case was not commissioned in the place where
he notarized the document, he lacked the authority to take
the acknowledgment of the testatrix and the witnesses.
Ortega vs. Valmonte (2005)
F: Valmonte’s will is being contested because the date of
execution and the date of acknowledgment are different.
H: Will is valid. Conflict between the dates does not
invalidate the will because the law does even require that
a notarial will be executed and acknowledged on the same
occassion.
Q: Must an attested will be dated?
A: No. Consequently, variance between the
indicated dates does not in itself invalidate a
will (Ortega vs. Valmonte [2005])
Art. 807. If the testator be deaf, or a deaf‐mute, he must
personally read the will, if able to do so; otherwise, he
shall designate two persons to read it and communicate to
him, in some practicable manner, the contents thereof. (n)

Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to
him twice; once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and
again, by the notary public before whom the will is
acknowledged. (n) 
•
Arts 807 and 808 are mandatory
Garcia vs. Vasquez (1970)
F: The will and the AC were crammed together on a single
page and had typographical errors. It was alleged by
proponents that T read the will silently before she signed
it BUT there was evidence that T’s vision was for counting
fingers at 5 ft and for distant objects only.
H: VOID. T could not have read the will silently as she was
not unlike a blind testator and execution of the will
requires observance of Art. 808.
Alvarado vs. Gaviola, Jr (1993)
F: Testator had glaucoma. When the will was executed,
each witness and the notary were given their own copies
of the will. It was read aloud by the lawyer to the testator.
The court held there was substantial compliance.
H: T was blind for purposes of Art 808 but there was
substantial compliance in this case. The purpose of the law
was satisfied (to make known to the T the contents of the
will and confirm his desires)
Art. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or
undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and
imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language
used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved
that the will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with all the requirements of
Article 805. (n)
Note:
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Page 7 of 73
This is criticized as “liberalization running riot”.
JBL’s suggested rewording:
“In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue
and improper pressure and influence, defects and
imperfections in the form of the attestation or in the
language used therein shall not render the will invalid if
such defects and imperfections can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself and it is proved that the will
was in fact executed and attested in substantial
compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.”
•
Caneda vs. Court of Appeals (1993)
XPN: Substantial compliance is considered valid if there is
no appearance of fraud, BF, undue influence and pressure
and the authenticity of the will is established.
Labrador vs. Court of Appeals (1990)
F: Date was stated in the first paragraph of the second
page of the will.
H: VALID. The law does not specify a particular location
where the date should be placed in a will.
(3) Signed by the T
F: The attestation clause failed to specifically state the fact
that the attesting witnesses and the testator signed the
will and all its pages in their presence and that they, the
witnesses, likewise signed the will and every page thereof
in the presence of the testator and of each other.
H: AC not valid. Art 809 does not apply. It cannot be
conclusively inferred from the signatures that they were
made in the presence of each other. Furthermore, the
defects were not in the “form...or language.”
Rule: Omissions which can be supplied by an examination
of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic
evidence, will not be fatal...However, those omissions
which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde
would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause
and ultimately, of the will itself.
Azuela vs. Court of Appeals (2006)
F: Attestation clause failed to state the number of pages.
H: VOID. Art 809 was not applied because there was no
indication in any part of the will that it was composed of
such a number of pages.
Lopez vs. Lopez (2012)
F: The will stated that it contained 7 pages but the
acknowledgement stated that there were 8. AC did not
state the number of pages.
H: Art 809 does not apply. The discrepancy cannot be
explained by mere examination of the will itself but
through the presentation of evidence aliunde.
Art. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which
must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of
the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and
may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be
witnessed. (678, 688a) 
(1) Entirely written by the hand of the T
(2) Dated by the T
Roxas vs. De Jesus (1985)
F: The holographic will was dated FEB./61
H: VALID. GR: Date in a holographic will should include
the day, month and year of its execution as this is relevant
to provide for contingencies of ascertaining soundness of
mind, or when there are two competing wills.
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
SUMMARY: FORMAL REQUIREMENTS OF WILLS
Testamentary Capacity
1. There is a general grant of testamentary capacity
to natural persons
2. Exceptions:
a. Under 18
b. Unsound mind
•
A legal question, not medical
•
Soundness of mind was defined
Negatively
‐
Not necessary that testator be in full possession
of reasoning faculties
‐
Not necessary that testator’s mind be wholly
unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by
disease, injury or other cause
Positively
Ability to know:
‐
Nature of estate to be disposed of
‐
Proper objects of one’s bounty
‐
Character of testamentary act
3. There is a presumption of soundness of mind,
but a presumption of insanity exists when:
(1) one month or less before making his will, T
was publicly known to be insane
(2) executed after being placed under
guardianship or ordered committed because of
insanity and before said order was lifted
Common Requirements (Attested and Holographic)
1. in writing
2. language and dialect known to the testator
•
There is no presumption that language is
known to the T
•
BUT the will need not state that it is a
language known to the T. It may be proven
by extrinsic evidence
Special Requirements; Attested Wills
1. That the testator sign
‐ in the presence of the witnesses
•
Remember the test of presence!
‐ at the end
­ on each and every page, except the last, on the left­
hand margin
‐ if signing through an agent
•
In the T’s presence
•
Under his express direction
•
Write in his own hand the T’s name in the
proper places
•
There is no need to sign the agent’s name
(Barut)
Page 8 of 73
•
It is disputed whether the agent may be one
of the 3 witnesses
2. Attested and subscribed by 3 or more credible
witnesses
‐ on each and every page, except the last, on the left­
hand margin
­ in the T’s presence and in the presence of each other
3. All pages must be numbered correlatively in letters
on the upper part of each page
4. Attestation clause
‐ stating the number of pages upon which the will is
written
­ the fact that the T signed the will and each and every
page thereof (or caused an agent to write his name, in
his presence and under his express direction)in the
presence of the witnesses
­ that the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and
the pages thereof in the presence of T and of each other
5. Acknowledged before a notary public
Special Requirements; Attested Wills; Handicapped
Testators
1. Deaf/deaf‐mute
•
If able to read – must read personally
•
If unable to read – designate 2 persons to:
(1) Read it
(2) Communicate to him the contents
‐ in some practicable manner (sign
language, lip reading, pictures, etc)
2. Blind, Illiterate, Unable to read
•
The will shall be read to him twice
(1) One of the subscribing witnesses
(2) Notary public before whom the will is
acknowledged
The burden of proof is upon the proponent of the will
that the special requirement of the article was
complied with.
There is also no requirement that compliance be
stated in the attestation clause.
Special Requirements; Holographic wills
1. Entirely written
Balane asks: What if the will was partly written?
A: If with knowledge/consent of T, VOID AS A
WHOLE;
If without, the part written by another is void
(the validity of a will cannot be placed in the
hands of another; it may be sabotaged)
2. Dated
•
Test is if designated date can be
independently checked and ascertained
•
Examples: Christmas Day 2012, 71st
anniversary of Pearl Harbor, At the
beginning of Ramadan 2013
3. Signed
ART. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall
be necessary that at least one witness who knows the
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly
declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at
least three of such witnesses shall be required.
In the absence of any competent witness referred to in
the preceding paragraph, and if the court deem it
necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. 
Notes:
‐
‐
this article prescribes the statutory requisites for
the probate of a holographic will; testimonial
evidence (rule of evidence)
jurisprudential requirement (in addition to the
statutory requirements):
o the will itself must be presented (Gan
v. Yap [1958], infra)

the will itself is the only
material proof (Scaevola)
Art. 811 applies only to post mortem (not ante
mortem) probates
How to prove genuineness of a handwriting (Sec. 22,
Rule 132, Rules of Court)
‐
a witness who actually saw the person writing
the instrument
‐
a witness familiar with such handwriting and
who can give his opinion thereon, such opinion
being an exception to the opinion rule
‐
a comparison by the court of the questioned
handwriting and admitted genuine specimen
thereof; and
‐
expert evidence
The three­witness provision in case of contested
holographic wills is directory, not mandatory
Azaola v. Singson (1960)
Facts: In probate of testatrix’s holographic will, only one
witness was presented by proponent. Opposition: that the
will was procured by undue and improper influence; that
testatrix did not intend the instrument to be her last will.
Held: That since the authenticity of the holographic will
was not contested, production of more than one witness
not required. That even if the will was contested, ART.
811 does not require presentation of three witnesses to
identify handwriting of testator since no witness may have
been present at execution.
Balane Notes:
‐
to “contest” means to attack the authenticity of
the will (i.e. that the will is forged)
‐
the Latin maxim testis unus, testis nullus (one
witness is not witness) is too archaic a rule
(quoting J.B.L. Reyes)
o quality of testimony over number of
witnesses
Codoy v. Calugay (1999)
Facts: Holographic will of the testatrix presented for
probate. Proponents presented six witnesses. Opposition:
Page 9 of 73
that the will was forged and that the same is illegible.
Probate allowed, lower court citing Azaola v. Singson.
Held: That the provisions of Article 811 are mandatory
because of the word “shall.” That not all of the witnesses
presented by the proponents were familiar with the
testatrix’s handwriting. That a visual examination of the
will reveals that the strokes are different compared with
other documents written by the testatrix. That case must
be remanded to allow contestants to adduce evidence in
support of their opposition.
Balane Asks: Did Codoy reverse Azaola?
Balane Thinks: No, for the following reasons:
‐
Codoy ruling not based on there being less than
three witnesses (there were in fact six)
‐
Codoy ruling did not state that since there were
less than three witnesses, even if their
testimonies were convincing, probate must be
denied (testimonies were indecisive)
‐
Codoy ruling said that visual examination of the
will reveals that strokes are different compared
with standard documents
‐
basis of Codoy ruling: evidence for authenticity,
inadequate, not failure on the part of proponents
to present three witnesses
Balane Notes:
‐
Codoy is consistent with Azaola (quality of
testimony over quantity of witnesses)
‐
Codoy, rather than reversing Azaola, may have
affirmed it
‐
the statement of the Court in Codoy to the effect
that the use of the word “shall” in Article 811
denotes that it is mandatory, is too shallow
In the probate of a holographic will, the document
itself must be produced; a lost holographic will cannot
be probated
Gan v. Yap (1958)
Facts: Petition for probate of testatrix’s will. Opposition:
that testatrix left no will. Proponent did not present will
and instead tried to establish contents and due execution
thru testimonies.
Held: That holographic will must be presented to court for
probate, the document itself being material proof of
authenticity. That if holographic will not presented,
opportunity to oppose and assess the handwriting of the
testator, foreclosed. That lost or destroyed holographic
will may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy
or by other similar means.
Exception to the Gan ruling:
Rodelas v. Aranza (1982)
made with the standard writings of the testator. That this
exception to the general rule was stated in a footnote in
Gan v, Yap (1958).
ART. 812. In holographic wills, the dispositions of the
testator written below his signature must be dated and
signed by him in order to make them valid as
testamentary dispositions.
ART. 813. When a number of dispositions appearing in
a holographic will are signed without being dated, and
the last disposition has a signature and date, such date
validates the dispositions preceding it, whatever be the
time of prior dispositions.
Formal requirement for additional dispositions in a
holographic will
‐
signature, and
‐
date
When there are several additional dispositions
‐
signature and date, or
‐
each additional disposition signed and undated,
but the last disposition signed and dated
If (in case of several additional dispositions) the
additional ones before the last are dated but not
signed—
‐
only the last will be valid, provided the last is
signed and dated
If there are several additional dispositions and the
additional ones before the last are neither signed nor
dated, but the last is both signed and dated—
‐
intermediate dispositions:
o VALID if all dispositions made on one
occasion (signature and date under last
additional disposition validate all)
o INVALID or VOID if dispositions made
on different occasions
ART. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure
or alteration in a holographic will, the testator must
authenticate the same by his full signature.
“Full signature,” meaning
‐
not necessarily full name of testator
‐
it means his usual and customary (habitual)
signature
Effect of noncompliance with article
‐
change (insertion, cancellation, etc.) is simply
considered as not made
‐
will is not invalidated as a whole, but at most,
only as regards the particular words erased,
corrected, or inserted (Kalaw v. Relova [1984])
o unless the portion involved is an
essential part of the will, such as the
date
Facts: A photostatic copy of testator’s holographic will
was presented for probate. Opposition: that the original
must be presented.
Illustration—
Held: That a photostatic copy or photocopy of the
holographic will, allowed because comparison can be
Facts: Proponent Gregorio filed a petition for probate of
testatrix’s will. Opposition by Rosa: that she was named as
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Kalaw v. Relova (1984)
Page 10 of 73
sole heir and sole executrix. There were two alterations:
first, Rosa’s name crossed out as sole heir and Gregorio’s
name written above it (no initial); second, Rosa’s name
crossed out as sole executrix and Gregorio’s name written
above it (with initial).
Held: That ordinarily, erasures without proper signature
do not invalidate the will as a whole, but at most only as
respects the particular words erased. That that general
rule does not apply in this case because the holographic
will had only one substantial provision which was altered
without proper authentication. That the entire will is void
because nothing remains in the will that could remain
valid. That not even the original unaltered text can be
given effect because of the seeming change of mind of
testatrix.
Balane Comments:
‐
it is beyond cavil that the insertion of Gregorio’s
name cannot be given effect because of lack of
proper authentication
‐
but why was the cancellation given effect when it
was not properly done?
‐
to say that giving effect to the will as first written
would disregard the seeming change of mind of
the testatrix is no argument at all
o it is not enough that the testator
manifest his intent—he must manifest
it in a manner required by law
ART. 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign country, he is
authorized to make a will in any of the forms
established by the law of the country in which he may
be. Such will may be probated in the Philippines.
ART. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces
effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides,
or according to the formalities observed in his country,
or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.
ART. 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or
subject of another country, which is executed in
accordance with the law of the country of which he is a
citizen or subject, and which might be proved and
allowed by the law of his own country, shall have the
same effect as if executed according to the laws of the
Philippines.
ART. 815 to 817 govern rules of formal validity in the
following instances (not covered: a Filipino executing
a will in the Philippines)
‐
a Filipino abroad (ART. 815)
‐
an alien abroad (ART. 816)
‐
an alien in the Philippines (ART. 817)
The rule (combining these three articles, ART. 15 and
17):
‐
every testator, whether Filipino or alien,
wherever he may be, has five choices as to what
law to follow for the form of his will, viz.:
o law of citizenship
o law of place of execution
o law of domicile
o law of residence
o law of the Philippines
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Illustration
‐
An engineer (German citizen), with permanent
residence in Paris (where he and his wife reside),
was contracted by the Brazilian government to
construct a dam in Brasilia. He resided in Brazil
for five years. One summer on a holiday, he goes
to Tokyo for a tour. He also has investments in
the Philippines. The German engineer, while in
Tokyo, made a will.
o the following laws may govern the form
of the engineer’s will:

law of Germany – German
citizen

law of France – domiciled in
France

law of Brazil – resident of
Brazil

law of Japan – place of
execution

law of the Philippines
ART. 818. Two or more persons cannot make a will
jointly, or in the same instrument, either for their
reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. 
Joint will, meaning
‐
one document which constitutes the wills of two
or more individuals
The following is a joint will—
‐
“We, the testators, of legal age and of sound and
disposing mind...”
The following is NOT a joint will—
‐
if there are separate documents, each serving as
one independent will (even if written on the
same sheet)
o e.g. will of testator A on front part of
sheet; will of testator B on the back of
the same sheet
o e.g. will of testator A on upper part of
sheet; will of testator B on lower part of
the same sheet
Joint wills are VOID, but reciprocal wills are VALID
‐
reciprocal wills: two wills instituting each of the
respective testators as heirs
o e.g. will of testator A designated B as
heir; will of testator B designated A as
heir
Reasons for the prohibition against joint wills
‐
limitation on modes of revocation
‐
diminution of testamentary secrecy
‐
increased danger of undue influence
‐
increased danger of one testator killing the other
ART. 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article,
executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be
valid in the Philippines, even though authorized by the
laws of the country where they may have been
executed.
Outline on joint wills
‐
executed by Filipinos in the Philippines
Page 11 of 73
‐
‐
‐
‐
o VOID
executed by Filipinos abroad
o VOID, even if authorized by law of place
of execution
executed by aliens abroad
o see ART. 816
executed by aliens in the Philippines
o one view: VOID (public policy)
o another view: ART. 817 applies
executed by a Filipino and an alien
o VOID as to Filipino
o ART. 816 or 817 applies as to alien
Subsection 4 – Witnesses to Wills
ART. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of
eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb,
and able to read and write, may be a witness to the
execution of a will mentioned in article 805 of this Code.

ART. 821. The following are disqualified from being
witnesses to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines;
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a
document, perjury, or false testimony. 
Six qualifications of witnesses
‐
of sound mind
o attestation is an act of the senses
‐
at least 18 years of age
‐
not blind, deaf, or dumb
o again, witnessing is an act of the senses
o dumb means mute, not someone who is
simply stupid
‐
able to read and write
o or literate, because such literate
witness would have a better
understanding of the solemnity of the
execution of a will and his act of being a
witness thereto
‐
domiciled in the Philippines
o citizenship of witness, immaterial (even
if he is not a Filipino or a foreigner)
o the only requirement is that the
witness is domiciled in the Philippines

there is a high probability that
witness would be in the
country if will is probated and
said witness is called to testify
in court
‐
must not have been convicted of falsification of a
document, perjury, or false testimony
o conviction must be by final judgment
o these crimes relate to the witness’s
trustworthiness or credibility

if a witness had been
convicted of murder or rape,
he is qualified because he can
still be honest
Competence and credibility, distinguished
Gonzales v. CA (1979)
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Facts: Testatrix’s will submitted for probate. Opposition:
that the will was not attested to by three credible
witnesses. Witnesses were driver of the testatrix, driver’s
wife, and piano teacher of testatrix’s grandchild.
Contestant argued that witnesses must initially testify as
to their good standing in the community, their reputation
for trustworthiness and reliability, their honesty and
uprightness, in order that their testimony may be believed
and accepted.
Held: That the credibility of a witness is presumed unless
the contrary is proved. That the rule is that the
instrumental witnesses in order to be competent must be
shown to have the qualifications under ART. 820 and
none of the disqualifications under ART. 821. That the
contestant’s arguments must fail.
ART. 822. If the witnesses attesting the execution of a
will are competent at the time of attesting, their
becoming subsequently incompetent shall not prevent
the allowance of the will.
Note:
‐
time of execution of the will is the only relevant
temporal criterion
ART. 823. If a person attests to the execution of a will,
to whom or to whose spouse, or parent, or child, a
devise or legacy is given by such will, such devise or
legacy shall, so far only as concerns such person, or
spouse, or parent, or child of such person, or any one
claiming under such person or spouse, or parent, or
child, be void, unless there are three other competent
witnesses to such will. However, such person so
attesting shall be admitted as a witness as if such devise
or legacy had not been made or given.
Notes:
‐
‐
‐
article is misplaced, since it is not concerned
with capacity to be a witness, but with capacity
to succeed
in essence, a witness cannot succeed to a will he
is witnessing
o because such witness will be very
partial; he will have some interest to
protect (i.e. even if the will had some
defect, witness will of course not testify
as to said defect)
it must be noted that the law does not disqualify
the witness
Disqualification of a witness to succeed to a devise or
legacy when there are only three witnesses
‐
competence of witnesses, not affected
‐
will is valid but witness (or relatives specified in
this article) cannot inherit
Article also applies to heirs (not only legatees and
devisees)
‐
intent of the law is to cover all testamentary
institutions
Disqualification to succeed applies only to
testamentary disposition made in favor of the witness
or the specified relatives
Page 12 of 73
‐
if the party is also entitled to a legitime or an
intestate share, that portion is not affected by the
party’s witnessing the will
o testamentary disposition in favor of a
witness, VOID
o but if the same witness is a compulsory
heir, his legitime is unaffected
EXCEPTION
‐
if there are three other witnesses (or four
witnesses)—
o the testamentary disposition in favor of
one of them is valid
ART. 824. A mere charge on the estate of the testator
for the payment of debts due at the time of the testator’s
death does not prevent his creditors from being
competent witnesses to his will.
Notes:
‐
the creditor does not need the testator’s will in
order that he may be paid
o his claim will be proved in the
settlement of the decedent’s estate
o the creditor is not an heir
Subsection 5 – Codicils and Incorporation by
Reference
ART. 825. A codicil is a supplement or addition to a will,
made after the execution of a will and annexed to be
taken as a part thereof, by which any disposition made
in the original will is explained, added to, or altered.
ART. 826. In order that a codicil may be effective, it
shall be executed as in the case of a will.
Codicil
‐
explains, adds to, or alters a disposition in a prior
will
Subsequent will
‐
makes independent and distinct dispositions
Codicil need not conform to the form of the will to
which it refers
‐
an attested will may have a holographic codicil
‐
a holographic will may have an attested codicil
ART. 827. If a will, executed as required by this Code,
incorporates into itself by reference any document or
paper, such document or paper shall not be considered
a part of the will unless the following requisites are
present:
(1) The document or paper referred to in the will must
be in existence at the time of the execution of the will;
(2) The will must clearly describe and identify the same,
stating among other things the number of pages thereof;
books of account or inventories.
Documents
‐
inventories, books of accounts, documents of
title, papers of similar nature
‐
must not make testamentary dispositions (lest
formal requirements for wills be circumvented)
Holographic wills cannot incorporate documents by
reference
‐
par. 4 of the article requires the signatures of the
testator and the witnesses on every page of the
incorporated document (except voluminous
annexes)
Subsection 6 – Revocation of Wills and
Testamentary Dispositions
ART. 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at any
time before his death. Any waiver or restriction of this
right is void. 
A will is essentially revocable or ambulatory
‐
this characteristic cannot be waived even by the
testator
‐
a will is revocable ad nutum, i.e. at the testator’s
pleasure, during his lifetime
‐
no such thing as an irrevocable will
‐
cf. ART. 777 (successional rights vest only upon
death)
ART. 829. A revocation done outside the Philippines, by
a person who does not have his domicile in this country,
is valid when it is done according to the law of the place
where the will was made, or according to the law of the
place in which the testator had his domicile at the time;
and if the revocation takes place in this country, when it
is in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
Rules for revocation
‐
if made in the Philippines
o follow Philippine law
‐
if made outside the Philippines
o if testator domiciled in the Philippines

follow law of place of
execution, or

follow law of place where
testator was domiciled at the
time of revocation
o if testator domiciled in the Philippines
(not governed by ART. 829)

follow Philippine law

follow law of place of
revocation

follow law of place of
execution
ART. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the
following cases:
(a) By implication of law; or
(3) It must be identified by clear and satisfactory proof
as the document or paper referred to therein; and
(4) It must be signed by the testator and the witnesses
on each and every page, except in case of voluminous
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
(b) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as
provided in case of wills; or
(c) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the
Page 13 of 73
will with intention of revoking it, by the testator
himself, or by some other person in his presence, and by
his express direction. If burned, torn, cancelled, or
obliterated by some other person, without the express
direction of the testator, the will may still be
established, and the estate distributed in accordance
therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the
fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or
obliteration are established according to the Rules of
Court. 
First mode of revocation: By operation of law—
‐
revocation may be total or partial
‐
examples
o preterition (ART. 854)
o legal separation (ART. 63, par. 4,
Family Code)
o unworthiness to succeed (ART. 1032)
o transformation, alienation, or loss of
the object devised or bequeathed (ART.
957)
o judicial demand of a credit given as a
legacy (ART. 936)
Second mode of revocation: By a subsequent will or
codicil—
‐
revocation may be total or partial
‐
requisites
o subsequent instrument must comply
with the formal requirements of a will
o testator must possess testamentary
capacity
o subsequent instrument must either
contain an express revocatory clause
(express) or be incompatible with the
prior will (implied)
‐
revocatory will must be probated
same as in testamentary
capacity
the testator must have completed
everything he intended to do

o
*must concur, otherwise, no revocation
Testate Estate of Adriana Maloto v. CA (1988)
Facts: Heirs of late Maloto instituted intestate proceeding
for settlement of decedent’s estate. Later, a document
purporting to be the will of decedent was discovered.
Some heirs filed a petition for probate of alleged will.
Opposition: that the testatrix’s will had been revoked, her
maid having burned the same.
Held: That there was no valid revocation by physical
destruction because animus revocandi and corpus did not
concur. That while animus revocandi may be conceded
because that is a state of mind, corpus was not
established. That it was not shown that the paper burned
by the maid was the will of the testatrix; that the burning
was not proven to have been done under the testatrix’s
express direction; that the burning was not done in the
presence of the testatrix.
The loss or unavailability of a will may, under certain
circumstances, give rise to the presumption that it had
been revoked by physical destruction
Gago v. Mamuyac (1927)
Facts: Proponent sought to have will of decedent
probated, presenting a carbon copy of same. Opposition:
that original (will) had been revoked by testator, as
testified to by witnesses. Original copy of will could not be
found.
Third mode of revocation: By physical destruction—
‐
four ways of destroying:
o burning
o tearing
o cancelling
o obliterating
Held: That there is a presumption that the will had been
revoked (cancelled or destroyed) if it cannot be found and
is shown to be in the possession of the testator when last
seen. That the presumption is that the will was revoked by
the testator himself. That the will of the testator in this
case is presumed to have been properly revoked.
Physical destruction may be done—
‐
by testator personally, or
‐
by another person acting in the testator’s
presence and by the testator’s express direction
ART. 831. Subsequent wills which do not revoke the
previous ones in an express manner, annul only such
dispositions in the prior wills as are inconsistent with
or contrary to those contained in the later wills.
Effect of unauthorized destruction
‐
will may be proved as lost or destroyed
o but only if will is attested
o if holographic, will cannot be probated
if lost or destroyed without authority
(Gan v, Yap), unless a copy survives
(Rodelas v. Aranza)
Note:
‐
Elements of a valid revocation by physical
destruction*
‐
corpus
o the physical destruction itself
o there must be evidence of physical
destruction
‐
animus
o capacity and intent to revoke
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
the execution of a subsequent will does not ipso
facto revoke a prior one
ART. 832. A revocation made in a subsequent will shall
take effect, even if the new will should become
inoperative by reason of the incapacity of the heirs,
devisees or legatees designated therein, or by their
renunciation.
Efficacy of the revocatory clause does not depend on
the testamentary dispositions of the revoking will
‐
unless the testator so provides
Page 14 of 73
GENERAL RULE: Revocation is an absolute provision
independent of the acceptance or capacity of the new
heirs
EXCEPTION (“dependent relative revocation”): If
testator provides in the subsequent will that the
revocation of the prior one is—
‐
dependent on the capacity of the heirs, devisees,
or legatees instituted in the subsequent will, or
‐
dependent on the acceptance of the heirs,
devisees, or legatees instituted in the subsequent
will
Dependent relative revocation, explanation (Molo v.
Molo [1951])
‐
if act of revocation of a previous (original) will is
made by executing a subsequent (new) will, the
revocation is conditional and dependent upon
the efficacy of the subsequent will
‐
if, for any reason, the new will intended to be
made as a substitute is inoperative, the
revocation fails and the original will remains in
full force
‐
failure of the new will upon whose validity the
revocation depends is equivalent to the non‐
fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence
prevents the revocation of the original will
Dependent relative revocation applies ONLY if it
appears that the testator intended his act of
revocation to be conditioned on—
‐
the making of a new will, or
‐
the validity of a new will, or
‐
the efficacy of a new will
Rule of dependent relative revocation applies if the
revocation is by physical destruction
Molo v. Molo (1951)
Diaz v. De Leon (1922)
Facts: Testator executed a second will revoking the first.
First will presented to court for probate.
Held: That the second will did not constitute sufficient
revocation. That existence of animus revocandi, sufficient
for revocation. That first will, having been shown to have
been destroyed with animus revocandi, is considered
revoked. That first will was returned to testator who
ordered his servant to tear the same, which was done in
the presence of testator, clearly manifesting his intent to
revoke said first will. That first will cannot be probated for
having been destroyed with animus revocandi.
Rule if revocation is implied (incompatibility of
provisions)
‐
rule in ART. 832 applies
‐
intent of testator to set aside prior will is clear
ART. 833. A revocation of a will based on a false cause
or illegal cause is null and void.
Wills, revocable ad nutum
‐
testator does not have to have a reason or cause
for revoking his will
‐
the law protects the testator’s true intent (i.e. to
revoke), so this article sets aside a revocation
that does not reflect such true intent
Requisites for the application of ART. 833 regarding
revocation for a false cause
‐
cause must be concrete, factual, and not purely
subjective
‐
cause must be false
‐
testator must not know of the falsity of the cause
‐
it must appear from the will that the testator is
revoking because of the false cause
Facts: Testator left two wills: original and new which
contained a revocatory clause. New will was probated.
Later, probation was set aside as oppositors proved that
new will not made in accordance with law. Proponents
sought to have original will probated. Opposition: that
original will had been revoked by new will,
notwithstanding disallowance of new will. Evidence was
presented by contestants that original will had been
destroyed by testator.
Extension of ART. 833 to illegal causes (reason: public
policy), in effect, restricts the testator’s freedom to
revoke
‐
illegal cause must be stated in the will as the
cause of revocation
Held: That original will stands because subsequent (new)
will containing a revocatory clause has been disallowed.
That a subsequent will containing a revocatory clause
which was denied probate cannot produce the effect of
annulling the original or previous will because the
revocatory clause is void. That destruction of original will
cannot have the effect of defeating said will (prior will)
because of the fact that it is founded on mistaken belief
that subsequent will has been validly executed and would
be given effect.
Notes:
‐
Balane Thinks:
‐
“Can it not be argued that the act of the testator
in destroying the will in fact confirmed his intent
to revoke it? (referring to the case of Molo v.
Molo)”
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
ART. 834. The recognition of an illegitimate child does
not lose its legal effect, even though the will wherein it
was made should be revoked.
‐
recognition of an illegitimate child in a will is
irrevocable (i.e. even if the will is revoked, the
recognition remains effective)
under the Family Code (cf. ART. 175, Family
Code), admission of illegitimate filiation in a will
would constitute proof of illegitimate filiation
Subsection 7 – Republication and Revival of Wills
ART. 835. The testator cannot republish, without
reproducing in a subsequent will, the dispositions
contained in a previous one which is void as to its form.
ART. 836. The execution of a codicil referring to a
previous will has the effect of republishing the will as
Page 15 of 73
modified by the codicil.
with the Rules of Court.
Notes:
‐
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition
the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his
will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules
of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator’s
death shall govern.
republication or revival to give back efficacy to a
will which has become inefficacious
Will, void as to form if it does not comply with the
requirements of ART. 804 to 808; 810 to 814; 818 and
819
How to republish a will that is void as to its form—
‐
to execute a subsequent will and reproduce (i.e.
copy out) the dispositions of the original will
o mere reference, not enough
How to republish a will that is not void as to its form
but (a) void for a reason other than a formal defect
[e.g. a will that institutes one of the three attesting
witnesses], or (b) previously revoked—
‐
to execute a subsequent will or codicil referring
to the previous will
o no need to reproduce the provisions of
the prior will in the subsequent
instrument
ART. 837. If after making a will, the testator makes a
second will expressly revoking the first, the revocation
of the second will does not revive the first will, which
can be revived only by another will or codicil.
Explanation—
‐
the revocation of a second will (revoking a first
will) by a third will does not revive the first will
o the revocatory clause of a revoked will
(second will) remains effective
(because third will revoking second
will does not revive first will)
Balane Notes:
‐
this article is based on the theory of instant
revocation, which is inconsistent with the
principle that wills take effect mortis causa
‐
a revocatory will, as in every will, in order to
have effect must be probated; but a second will
revoking the first, which second will has already
been revoked, must be submitted to court for
probate?
ART. 837 does not apply in case of implied revocation
(i.e. the article only applies if revocation of the first
will by the second will is express)—
‐
the revocation of a second will (revoking a first
will) by a third will would revive the first will,
UNLESS the third will is itself inconsistent with
the first
EXCEPTION
‐
if the second will is holographic and is revoked
by physical destruction
o because it cannot be probated, unless a
copy survives
Subsection 8 – Allowance and Disallowance of Wills
ART. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional
Rules of Court as may be necessary for the allowance of
wills on petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will,
either during the lifetime of the testator or after his
death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution. 
Probate, defined
‐
a judicial process to determine the due execution
(formal or extrinsic validity) of a will
Probate of a will, mandatory
Guevara v. Guevara (1943)
Facts: Testator executed a will which was never
presented to court for probate. Respondent sought to
recover a parcel of land sold to petitioner, claiming that
said land was part of her legitime. To support her claim,
respondent presented the will before the court to prove
that she was acknowledged by testator as his natural
child, and only for that purpose (i.e. not for probate).
Respondent claimed to be an intestate and compulsory
heir of decedent.
Held: That the procedure adopted by respondent cannot
be sanctioned because presentation of will to court for
probate is mandatory, and its allowance essential and
indispensable for its efficacy.
Two stages of settlement of estate
‐
probate of will
o formal validity is determined
‐
settlement proper
o substantive validity (i.e. efficacy of
provisions) of will is passed upon
Once a decree of probate becomes final, it is res
judicata
De la Cerna v. Potot (1964)
Facts: Joint will executed by testator and testatrix. When
testator died, will admitted to probate. Probate decree
became final. Later, same will submitted to court for
probate when testatrix died. Probate court denied probate
(the second time) because joint wills are void.
Held: That the admission of a joint will to probate is an
error of law which should have been corrected by appeal,
but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate
court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision. That
since the probate court (during the first probate) has
spoken with finality when it admitted the joint will to
probate, the final decree of probate has conclusive effect
as to testator’s will.
Page 16 of 73
Scope of final decree of probate:
GENERAL RULE: Conclusive as to due execution (i.e.
extrinsic or formal validity only)
Gallanosa v. Arcangel (1978)
Facts: Legal heirs of testator filed an action for annulment
of testator’s duly probated will. Ground: fraud in the
execution and simulation. Testamentary heirs opposed.
Lower court annulled probated will.
Held: That procedural laws do not sanction an action for
the “annulment” of a will. That decree of probate of will is
conclusive as to its due execution or formal validity. That
admission of will to probate means that the testator was
of sound and disposing mind; that his consent was not
vitiated; that the will was signed by him in the
presence of the required number of witnesses; and
that the will is genuine. That these facts cannot again be
questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a
criminal action for forgery of will. That trial judge gravely
abused his discretion in annulling duly probated will.
What formal validity encompasses (Dorotheo v. CA
[1999])
‐
whether the will submitted is indeed the
decedent’s last will and testament
‐
compliance with the prescribed formalities for
the execution of wills
‐
testamentary capacity
‐
due execution of the will
Due execution means:
‐
the testator’s sound and disposing mind
‐
freedom from vitiating factors (duress, menace,
undue influence)
‐
will genuine, not forgery
‐
proper testamentary age
‐
the testator is not expressly prohibited bylaw
from making a will
Another way of defining the scope of a final decree of
probate is to refer to ART. 839, infra—
‐
objection to a will on any of the grounds
enumerated in that article is foreclosed by a final
decree of probate
EXCEPTION: A decree of probate does not concern
itself with the question of intrinsic validity, and the
probate court should not pass upon that issue, except
if on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void
Nepomuceno v. CA (1985)
Facts: Testator devised entire free portion to kabit.
Testator noted in his will that he could not marry kabit
because he was legally married to someone else. Kabit
presented will to court for probate. Legal wife opposed.
Probate denied: the will was invalid on its face because of
prohibited disposition. Appellate court reversed: will valid
except that devise in favor of kabit is null and void, per
ART. 739 in relation with ART. 1028 of the Civil Code.
Held: That while the general rule is that in probate
proceedings the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the
will, the general rule is not inflexible and absolute, for
probate court not powerless to pass upon certain
provisions of will. That probate of a will might become an
idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically
void. That a donation cannot be given between persons
living in adultery or concubinage, in which case donation
is void. That this rule also applies to testamentary
dispositions. That therefore the testamentary disposition
in favor of kabit is void.
Baltazar v. Laxa (2012)
Facts: Will of the testatrix presented to court for probate.
Opposition: those enumerated in ART. 839, infra).
Held: That courts are only tasked to pass upon the
extrinsic validity of will in probate proceedings. That due
execution of will or its extrinsic validity pertains to
whether testator, being of sound mind, freely executed
will in accordance with formalities prescribed by law
(ART. 805 to 806). That there is faithful compliance with
formalities laid down by law apparent from face of will.
That contestants failed to substantiate their allegations,
hence probate of will must be allowed.
ART. 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the
following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been
complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally
incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or
the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure
and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some
other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by
fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend
that the instrument he signed should be his will at the
time of affixing his signature thereto. 
Grounds for disallowance of a will listed in ART. 839,
exclusive
‐
a final probate decree forecloses any subsequent
challenge on any of the matters enumerated in
this article
‐
if any of these grounds for disallowance is
proved, the will shall be set aside as void
o a will is either valid or void (no such
thing as a voidable will)

VALID – if none of defects in
ART. 839 are present

VOID – if any one of the
defects is present
Re ART. 839(1)—
‐
See ART. 804 to 814, 818 to 819, and 820 to
821
Page 17 of 73
Re ART. 839(2)—
‐
cf. ART. 796 to 803
Re ART. 839(3)—
‐
force (violence), as defined in contract law (ART.
1335)
‐
duress (intimidation), as defined in contract law
(ART. 1335)
Re ART. 839(4)—
‐
undue or improper pressure or influence (undue
influence), as defined in contract law (ART.
1337)
Re ART. 839(5)—
‐
fraud, as defined in contract law (ART. 1338)
Re ART. 839(6)—
‐
mistake, as defined in contract law (ART. 1331)
Section 2 – Institution of Heir
ART. 840. Institution of heir is an act by virtue of which
a testator designates in his will the person or persons
who are to succeed him in his property and
transmissible rights and obligations. 
Notes:
‐
‐
rules on institution of heir apply also to
institution of devisees and legatees
wills are for institution of heirs
ART. 841. A will shall be valid even though it should not
contain an institution of an heir, or such institution
should not comprise the entire estate, and even though
the person so instituted should not accept the
inheritance or should be incapacitated to succeed.
In such cases the testamentary dispositions made in
accordance with law shall be complied with and the
remainder of the estate shall pass to the legal heirs.
Notes:
‐
‐
cf. Seangio v. Reyes (2006)
o involving a will without testamentary
dispositions (disinheritance)
if heir, legatee, or devisee does not accept or is
incapacitated
o intestacy as to that part results
ART. 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may
dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor
of any person having capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate
provided he does not contravene the provisions of this
Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs.
Even if will does not contain any testamentary
disposition—
‐
it will be formally valid provided it complies with
all the formal requisites
How much can be disposed of by will—
‐
if testator has no compulsory heirs:
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
‐
o the entire hereditary estate
if testator has compulsory heirs:
o the disposable portion (i.e. the net
hereditary estate minus the legitimes)
If testator disposes by will of less than he is allowed
whether or not he leaves compulsory heirs—
‐
mixed succession results
o testamentary succession as to that part
disposed of by will, and
o intestate succession as to that part not
disposed of by will
o (legitimes pass by strict operation of
law)
ART. 843. The testator shall designate the heir by his
name and surname, and when there are two persons
having the same names, he shall indicate some
circumstance by which the instituted heir may be
known.
Even though the testator may have omitted the name of
the heir, should he designate him in such manner that
there can be no doubt as to who has been instituted, the
institution shall be valid.
ART. 844. An error in the name, surname, or
circumstances of the heir shall not vitiate the institution
when it is possible, in any other manner, to know with
certainty the person instituted.
If, among persons having the same names and
surnames, there is a similarity of circumstances in such
a way that, even with the use of other proof, the person
instituted cannot be identified, none of them shall be an
heir.
Requirement for designation of heir
‐
that the heir, legatee, or devisee must be
identified in the will with sufficient clarity to
leave no doubt as to the testator’s intention
Designation of name and surname is directory
‐
what is mandatory is that the identity of the
heirs, legatees, or devisees must be sufficiently
established (usually, by giving the name and
surname, but there are other ways)
Other ways of establishing identity of heir, devisee, or
legacy
‐
“I designate as heir to one‐eighth of my estate
my eldest first cousin”
‐
“I devise my lechon parlor to my Civil Procedure
professor”
If there is any ambiguity in the designation, the
ambiguity must be resolved in accordance with ART.
789
‐
i.e. by evidence aliunde, excluding oral
declarations of the testator
If ambiguity cannot be resolved—
‐
testator’s intent becomes unascertainable
o intestacy therefore as to that portion
results
Page 18 of 73
ART. 845. Every disposition in favor of an unknown
person shall be void, unless by some event or
circumstance his identity becomes certain. However, a
disposition in favor of a definite class or group of
persons shall be valid.
Unknown person
‐
refers to a successor whose identity cannot be
determined because the designation in the will is
so unclear or so ambiguous as to be incapable of
resolution
‐
this does not refer to one with whom the testator
is not personally acquainted
‐
testator may institute somebody who is a perfect
stranger to him, provided the identity is clear
Illustrations of a successor whose identity cannot be
determined
‐
“I designate as heir to one‐fourth of my estate a
fiction writer”
‐
“I give one‐third of my estate to someone who
cares”
Illustration of a designation of an unknown person
whose identity, “by some event or circumstance”
becomes certain
‐
“I designate as heir to one‐fourth of my estate,
whoever tops the bar the year after my death”
Illustration of a disposition in favor of a definite class
or group of persons
‐
“I institute as heir to the entire free portion of
my estate, the poor”
ART. 846. Heirs instituted without designation of
shares shall inherit in equal parts.
General presumption in cases of collective
designation—
‐
EQUALITY
‐
if testator intends an unequal apportionment, he
should so specify
ART. 846 applies only to testamentary heirs as such
(or devisees or legatees), and NOT to an heir who is
both a compulsory and a testamentary heir (because
the heir will get his legitime and his testamentary
share)
To illustrate—
‐
a testator institutes his son, his friend, and his
cousin as testamentary heirs
o son will get his legitime plus his
testamentary share
o friend and cousin each get an equal
share
o son’s testamentary share is equal to
each of friend’s and cousin’s
testamentary share

son gets more (legitime plus
testamentary share)
Not explicitly covered by ART. 846 is a situation where
the shares of some of the heirs are designated and
those of others are not
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
ART. 847. When the testator institutes some heirs
individually and others collectively as when he says, “I
designate as my heirs A and B, and the children of C,”
those collectively designated shall be considered as
individually instituted, unless it clearly appears that the
intention of the testator was otherwise.
Equality and individuality of designation
‐
in addition, this article establishes the
presumption that the heirs collectively referred
to are designated per capita along with those
separately designated
‐
if testator intends a block designation, he must
so specify
Illustration
‐
“I designate as heirs Mrs. Shoal Halimawis, her
daughter Ms. Cera Halimawis, and Block A2015
of the PUP College of Law” (Block A2015
composed of 20 people; testator died single and
without legitimate issue)
o Mrs. Shoal, Ms. Cera, and the 20 people
of Block A2015 would be considered as
individually instituted

each would receive 1/22 of
the estate
ART. 848. If the testator should institute his brothers
and sisters, and he has some of full blood and others of
half blood, the inheritance shall be distributed equally
unless a different intention appears.
Again, EQUALITY of shares
‐
if testator intends otherwise, he must so specify
This article applies to testamentary succession only
‐
in testamentary succession
o equality of shares of full‐ and half‐blood
brothers and sisters, unless the testator
provides otherwise
‐
in intestate succession
o proportion of 2:1 between full‐ and
half‐blood brothers and sisters (ART.
1006) and only if the disqualification in
ART. 992 does not apply
ART. 848 seems to apply even to illegitimate brothers
and sisters, in cases where the testator is of legitimate
status, and vice­versa
‐
the article makes no distinction
‐
ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere
debemus
ART. 849. When the testator calls to the succession a
person and his children, they are all deemed to have
been instituted simultaneously and not successively.
Note:
‐
equality and individuality rule again
ART. 850. The statement of a false cause for the
institution of an heir shall be considered as not written,
unless it appears from the will that the testator would
not have made such institution if he had known the
falsity of such cause.
Page 19 of 73
Note:
‐
truth or falsity of cause is immaterial because the
basis of institution, like donation, is liberality
General Rule: Falsity of stated cause for testamentary
disposition does not affect validity or efficacy of
institution
‐
reason: testamentary dispositions are ultimately
based on liberality
Exception: Falsity of stated cause for institution will
set aside or annul the institution if certain factors are
present
‐
the factors / requisites (Austria v. Reyes [1970])
o the cause for the institution must be
stated in the will
o the cause must be shown to be false
o it must appear from the face of the will
that the testator would not have made
such institution if he had known the
falsity of the cause
Austria v. Reyes (1970)
Facts: Testatrix instituted as heirs her legally adopted
children. Ante mortem probate of will allowed. Opposition
to partition of estate: entire estate should descend to
contestants by intestacy because of intrinsic nullity of
institution of heirs (theory of false adoption); that
testatrix was led into believing that instituted heirs
entitled to legitimes as compulsory heirs, as evidenced by
her use of the phrase “sapilitang mana.”
Held: That requisites for annulment (see factors
enumerated in the Exception above) of institution of heirs
based on false cause not present. That there was not even
a cause for institution stated in will. That testatrix’s use of
phrase “sapilitang mana” probably means that she
approved of system of legitimes.
Correlate ART. 850 (annulling factor: falsity) with
ART. 1028 in relation to ART. 739 (annulling factor:
illegality)
ART. 851. If the testator has instituted only one heir,
and the institution is limited to an aliquot part of the
inheritance, legal succession takes place with respect to
the remainder of the estate.
The same rule applies, if the testator has instituted
several heirs each being limited to an aliquot part, and
all the parts do not cover the whole inheritance.
Wording of ART. 851, erroneous
‐
legal succession does not take place with respect
to the remainder of the estate, but to the
remainder of the disposable portion
o there may be compulsory heirs whose
legitimes will cover part of the estate
o the legitimes do not pass by legal or
intestate succession
ART. 851 states exactly the same rule laid down in
ART. 841
ART. 852. If it was the intention of the testator that the
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
instituted heirs should become sole heirs to the whole
estate, or the whole free portion, as the case may be,
and each of them has been instituted to an aliquot part
of the inheritance and their aliquot parts together do
not cover the whole inheritance, or the whole free
portion, each part shall be increased proportionally.
ART. 853. If each of the instituted heirs has been given
an aliquot part of the inheritance, and the parts together
exceed the whole inheritance, or the whole free portion,
as the case may be, each part shall be reduced
proportionally.
Elements common to both ART. 852 and 853
‐
there are more than one instituted heir
‐
the testator intended them to get the whole
estate or the whole disposable portion
‐
the testator has designated a definite portion for
each heir
In ART. 852—
‐
total of all portions is less than the whole estate
(or free portion)
o therefore, a proportionate increase is
necessary
o difference cannot pass by intestacy
because the intention of the testator is
clear—to give the instituted heirs the
entire amount
In ART. 853—
‐
the total exceeds the whole estate (or free
portion)
o therefore, a proportionate reduction
must be made
Illustrations of ART. 852:
‐
X dies without any compulsory heirs but leaves a
will: “I institute A, B, and C to my entire estate in
the following proportions: A – 1/2, B – 1/3. C –
1/8.” The estate is valued at P600,000 at the time
of X’s death.
o the total of the specified portions is
only 23/24
o total of proportions: 575,000

A = 300,000 (1/2 or 12/24 of
600,000)

B = 200,000 (1/3 or 8/24)

C = 75,000 (1/8 or 3/24)
o to find A’s increased share (x):
SOLUTION 1:
x
= 300,000_
600,000
575,000
575x
575
x
= 180,000,000_
575
=
313,043.48
SOLUTION 2:
A is entitled to 12/24
B is entitled to 8/24
C is entitled to 3/24
Total: 23/24
Page 20 of 73
Ratio of 12:8:3 = 23
SOLUTION 2:
A is entitled to 6/24
B is entitled to 3/24
C is entitled to 2/24
Total: 11/24
So:
12
23
=
x_____
600,000
Ratio of 6:3:2 = 11
23x =
23
7,200,000__
23
x
313,043.48
=
o
o
o
‐
So:
find B’s increased share using any of
the solutions presented above (you
may also use your own devised solution
and share it with the class); your
answer must be 208,695.65
6
11
=
x_____
300,000
11x
11
=
1,800,000__
11
x
=
163,636.36
o
find B’s increased share; your answer
must be 81,818.19
o
find C’s increased share; your answer
must be 54,545.45
o
now add A’s, B’s, and C’s increased
shares; the total must be 300,000 (Y is
entitled to 300,000, his legitime)
find C’s increased share; your answer
must be 78,260.87
now add A’s, B’s, and C’s increased
shares; total must be 600,000
X dies with Y (a legitimate child) as his only
compulsory heir. X leaves a will: “I give A, B, and
C the entire free portion of my estate, such that A
gets 1/4, B gets 1/8, and C gets 1/2 of said free
portion.” X’s net estate is worth P600,000.
o the total of the specified portions is
only 11/24
o total of proportions: 275,000

A = 150,000 (1/4 or 6/24 of
600,000)

B = 75,000 (1/8 or 3/24)

C = 50,000 (1/12 or 2/24)
o NOTE: the free portion is only 1/2 of
the estate, i.e. half of 600,000 or only
300,000

as the total legacies given to A,
B, and C is only 275,000
(25,000 short of 300,000)
their shares need to be
proportionately increased
SOLUTION 1:
x
300,000
=
150,000__
275,000
275x
275
=
45,000,000_
275
x
=
Illustrations of ART. 853:
‐
X dies without any compulsory heirs but leaves a
will: “I institute A, B, and C to my entire estate. A
is to get 1/2, B is to get 1/3, and C is to get 1/4
thereof.” X’s net estate is valued at P600,000 at
the time of his death.
o the total of the specified portions is
13/12
o total proportions: 650,000

A = 300,000 (1/2 or 6/12 of
600,000)

B = 200,000 (1/3 or 4/12)

C = 150,000 (1/4 or 3/12)
o to find A’s reduced share (x):
SOLUTION 1:
x
=
600,000
650x
650
x
=
=
300,000__
650,000
180,000,000_
650
276,923.08
163,636.36
SOLUTION 2:
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Page 21 of 73
A is entitled to 6/12
B is entitled to 4/12
C is entitled to 3/12
Total: 13/12
325x
325
x
=
45,000,000_
325
=
138,461.54
Ratio of 6:4:3 = 13
SOLUTION 2:
A is entitled to 6/24
B is entitled to 4/24
C is entitled to 3/24
Total: 13/24
So:
6
13
=
_ x_____
600,000
13x
13
=
13
x
=
3,600,000__
Ratio of 6:4:3 = 13
So:
o
276,923.08
find B’s reduced share; your answer
must be 184,615.38
6
13
=
x_____
300,000
13x
13
=
1,800,000__
13
x
o
o
‐
=
138,461.54
o
find B’s reduced share; your answer
must be 92,307.69
o
find C’s reduced share; your answer
must be 69,230.77
o
now add A’s, B’s, and C’s reduced
shares; the total must now be 300,000
(Y is entitled to 300,000, his legitime)
find C’s reduced share; your answer
must be 138,461.54
now add A’s, B’s, and C’s reduced
shares; the total must now be 600,000
X dies with Y (a legitimate child) as his only
compulsory heir. X leaves a will: “I give A, B, and
C the entire disposable portion of my estate, such
that A is to get 1/4 of the estate, B is to get 1/6 of
my estate, and C is to get 1/8 of my estate.” X’s
net estate is worth P600,000.
o the total of the specified portions is
13/24 (more than 1/2 or 12/24
available as disposable)
o total of proportions: 325,000

A = 150,000 (1/4 or 6/24 of
600,000)

B = 100,000 (1/6 or 4/24)

C = 75,000 (1/8 or 3/24)
o NOTE: the free portion is only 1/2 of
the estate, i.e. half of 600,000 or only
300,000

as the total legacies given to A,
B, and C is 325,000 (25,000 in
excess of the 300,000
disposable portion) their
shares need to be
proportionately decreased
SOLUTION 1:
x
=
300,000
150,000__
325,000
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or
all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution
of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the
testator, the institution shall be effectual, without
prejudice to the right of representation. 
Preterition (omission) in sum:
‐
omission from what?
o from inheritance, NOT from the will
(“total omission in the inheritance”)
‐
who can be preterited?
o compulsory heirs in the direct line
‐
what is the effect of preterition?
Page 22 of 73
o
annuls the institution of heir but
respects legacies and devises insofar as
these do not impair the legitimes
The following cases do NOT constitute preterition:*
‐
if the heir in question is instituted in the will but
the portion given to him by the will is less than
his legitime (Reyes v. Barretto­Datu [1967])
‐
if the heir is given a legacy or devise (Aznar v.
Duncan [1966])
‐
if the heir had received a donation inter vivos
from the testator
o donation inter vivos is considered as an
advance on the legitime (cf. ART. 906,
909, 910, and 1062)
‐
if the heir is not mentioned in the will nor was a
recipient of a donation inter vivos from the
testator, but not all of the estate is disposed of by
will
o the omitted heir would receive
something by intestacy from the vacant
portion (not disposed of by will)
*in all these cases, the remedy of the compulsory heir, if
the value of what he received is less than his legitime, is to
demand completion of the same (ART. 906 and 907)
Held: That there was no preterition because Helen Garcia,
a compulsory heir, was not entirely omitted from the
inheritance as in fact she received a legacy. That Helen
Garcia’s remedy is to have her legitime satisfied.
Heirs of Ureta v. Heirs of Ureta (2011)
Facts: Heirs of Policronio argued that they had been
preterited because they were deprived of a share in the
estate of their late father.
Held: That preterition is a concept of testamentary
succession and that where decedent leaves no will, as in
this case, there can be no preterition.
There is preteriton if a compulsory heir received
nothing from the testator by way of:
‐
testamentary succession
‐
legacy or devise
‐
donation inter vivos
‐
intestacy
What constitutes preterition is not omission
(in the sense of not being mention) in the will but
being completely left out of the inheritance
Seangio v. Reyes (2006)
Reyes v. Barretto­Datu (1967)
Facts: Testator instituted as heirs his two daughters,
Salud and Milagros. Later, it turned out that Salud was not
the testator’s daughter by his wife. Milagros claimed that
Salud not entitled to any share in her father’s estate.
Held: That while the share assigned to Salud impinged on
the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason
cease to be a testamentary heir. That there was no
preterition or total omission of a forced heir (Milagros)
despite the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father’s
will a share smaller than her legitime. That such allotment
did not invalidate the institution of heir (Salud).
Balane Comments:
‐
in Reyes: (a) there was a compulsory heir
[Milagros]; (b) such heir was instituted in the
will; (c) the testamentary disposition given to
such heir was less than her legitime
o there was NO PRETERITION
o reason: there was NO TOTAL
OMISSION inasmuch as the heir
received something from the
inheritance
o remedy of compulsory heir who
received less than his legitime:

completion or satisfaction of
legitime (ART. 906 and 907)
Facts: Testator executed a holographic will wherein he
disinherited one of his compulsory heirs (Alfredo,
testator’s son). Virginia’s name mentioned in the
holographic will.
Held: That there was no preterition because it was
testator’s intention to bequeath his estate to all his
compulsory heirs except Alfredo. That testator did not
institute an heir to the exclusion of other compulsory
heirs. That mere mention of Virginia’s name did not
institute her as universal heir but a mere witness to
Alfredo’s maltreatment of testator.
Who are included within the terms of ART. 854
‐
a compulsory heir in the direct line, “whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or
born after the death of the testator”
o but quasi‐posthumous children also
included

those born after the execution
of the will but before the
testator’s death
Compulsory heirs in the direct line—
‐
children or descendants*
o including adopted children (Acain v.
IAC [1987])
‐
parents or ascendants (in default of children or
descendants)*
Aznar v. Duncan (1966)
Facts: Testator instituted as heir his acknowledged
natural daughter, Lucy Duncan. Helen Garcia, another
natural daughter of testator who however was not
acknowledged, complained that she had been preterited.
Helen Garcia was given only a legacy of 3,600 pesos.
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
*legitimate or illegitimate; the law does not distinguish
(Manresa)
Surviving spouse is NOT a compulsory heir in the
direct line
‐
while a compulsory heir, he is NOT in the direct
line (Balanay v. Martinez, Acain v. IAC)
‐
meaning of direct line (ART. 964, par. 2)
Page 23 of 73
o
“a direct line is that constituted by the
series of degrees among ascendants
and descendants”
Predecease of preterited compulsory heir (par. 2,
ART. 854)
‐
the determination of whether or not there are
preterited heirs can be made only upon the
testator’s death
‐
if the preterited heir predeceases (or is
unworthy to succeed) the testator, preterition
becomes moot
o BUT if there is a descendant of that heir
who is himself preterited, then the
effects of preterition will arise
o to illustrate—

if a testator (X) makes a will
which results in the
preterition of one of his two
sons (A); A predeceases his
father X but A leaves a son (A‐
1); ART. 854 applies (i.e. A‐1
is preterited because he
succeeds X by representation
of his father A, the son of X)
Adopted children—
Acain v. IAC (1987)
Facts: Widow and legally adopted child of testator
opposed probate of testator’s will: they had been
preterited. Will had no legacies or devises.
Held: That widow not preterited because she is not a
compulsory heir in the direct line; but legally adopted
child, preterited. That adoption gives to adopted person
same rights and duties as if he were legitimate child of
adopter and makes adopted person a legal heir of adopter.
That will is totally abrogated.
Effect of preterition
‐
annulment of the institution of heir, but
‐
validity of legacies and devises to the extent that
these do not impair legitimes (to the extent of
the free portion; legacies and devises merely to
be reduced if legitimes are impaired)
o preterition is the only instance where
distinction between heirs and legatees
/ devisees is relevant

if will contains only
institutions of heirs and there
is preterition—total intestacy
results
Meaning of annulment of institution of heir:
Nuguid v. Nuguid (1966)
abrogate, to make void, to reduce to nothing, to annihilate,
to obliterate, to blot out, to make void or of no effect, to
nullify, to abolish. That institution of testatrix’s sister as
sole her is annulled.
Preterition contra ineffective disinheritance
‐
preterition is the total omission from the
inheritance, without the heir being expressly
disinherited
o implied basis: inadvertent omission by
the testator

so if testator explicitly
disinherits the heir, ART. 854
will not apply
‐
if the disinheritance is ineffective for absence of
one or other of the requisites for a valid
disinheritance—
o the heir is simply entitled to demand
his rightful share
ART. 855. The share of a child or descendant omitted in
a will must first be taken from the part of the estate not
disposed of by will, if any; if that is not sufficient, so
much as may be necessary must be taken proportionally
from the shares of the other compulsory heirs.
Proper application of ART. 855—
‐
where a compulsory heir is not preterited but
left something (because not all the estate is
disposed of by will) less than his legitime
How to fill up a compulsory heir’s impaired legitime:
‐
from the vacant portion
‐
from the shares of the testamentary heirs,
legatees, and devises, proportionally
ART. 855 is superfluous because is speaks of
completion of legitime (dealt with in detail in ART.
907, et seq.)
ART. 855 is inaccurate
‐
coverage should be all compulsory heirs, not just
children or descendants
‐
proportionate reduction must be borne by
testamentary heirs, including devisees and
legatees, and NOT by the compulsory heirs
ART. 856. A voluntary heir who dies before the testator
transmits nothing to his heirs.
A compulsory heir who dies before the testator, a
person incapacitated to succeed, and one who
renounces the inheritance, shall transmit no right to his
own heirs except in cases expressly provided for in this
Code.
Right to succeed cannot be transmitted—it is a purely
personal right
Facts: Testatrix died without descendants. Testatrix
instituted in her will her sister as sole heir. Testatrix’s
parents opposed probate: that they had been preterited.
Representation
‐
representative is raised to the level of the person
represented
Held: That testatrix’s parents (forced heirs in the direct
ascending line) had been preterited, as will completely
omits both of them. That the word “annul” means to
Complete statement of the rule:
‐
an heir (whether compulsory, voluntary or
testamentary, or legal) transmits nothing to his
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Page 24 of 73
heirs in case of predecease, incapacity,
renunciation, or disinheritance
o however, in case of predecease or
incapacity of compulsory or legal heirs,
as well as disinheritance of compulsory
heirs—

the rules on representation
shall apply
‐
incapacity of the first heir
How testator may provide for simple substitution with
all three causes—
‐
by specifying all the three causes
‐
by merely providing for a simple substitution
ART. 857. Substitution is the appointment of another
heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default
of the heir originally instituted.
Restricted simple substitution
‐
testator may limit the operation of simple
substitution by specifying only one or two of the
three causes
o vacancy results if the cause specified
does not happen (i.e. if another cause
not specified in the will occurs)
Simple substitution is really a form of conditional
institution
ART. 860. Two or more persons may be substituted for
one; and one person for two or more heirs.
Basis of substitutions
‐
testamentary freedom
‐
in simple substitutions, the testator simply
makes a second choice, in case the first choice
does not inherit
‐
in fideicommissary substitutions, the testator
imposes a restriction or burden on the first heir
coupled with a selection of a subsequent
recipient of the property
Brief or compendious substitution
‐
a possible variation of either a vulgar or a
fideicomisaria
‐
brief
o two or more substitutes for one
original heir
‐
compendious
o one substitute for two or more original
heirs
ART. 858. Substitution of heirs may be:
Substitution will take place only if all the original
heirs are disqualified—
‐
if one is substituted for two or more original
heirs, and one but not all is not qualified to
inherit
o NO SUBSTITUTION—share left vacant
will accrue to surviving co‐heir/s

if A and B were instituted as
heirs to 1/3 of the estate, with
C as substitute, substitution
will take place only if both A
and B are disqualified to
inherit; if only A is
disqualified, B would inherit
A’s share, exclusively
o EXCEPTION—

if testator provides otherwise
(that substitution will take
place in case any one of the
original heirs dies, renounces,
or is incapacitated
Section 3 – Substitution of Heirs
(1) Simple or common;
(2) Brief of compendious;
(3) Reciprocal; or
(4) Fideicommissary.
Four kinds of substitution:
‐
simple or common (vulgar) [ART. 859]
‐
brief or compendious (brevilocua o compendiosa)
[ART. 860]
‐
reciprocal (recíproca) [ART. 861]
‐
fideicommissary (fideicomisaria) [ART. 863]
In reality, there are only two kinds of substitutions:
vulgar and fideicomisaria (mutually exclusive, i.e.
substitution must be one or the other, cannot be both
at the same time)
‐
the other two are modalidades of the vulgar or
the fideicomisaria
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more
persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case
such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not
wish, or should be incapacitated to accept the
inheritance.
A simple substitution without a statement of the cases
to which it refers, shall comprise the three mentioned in
the preceding paragraph unless the testator has
otherwise provided. 
Causes of simple substitution
‐
predecease of the first heir
‐
renunciation of the first heir
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
ART. 861. If heirs instituted in unequal shares should
be reciprocally substituted, the substitute shall acquire
the share of the heir who dies, renounces, or is
incapacitated, unless it clearly appears that the
intention of the testator was otherwise. If there are
more than one substitute, they shall have the same
share in the substitution as in the institution.
Reciprocal substitution
‐
just a variation of simple or fideicommissary
substitution
Illustration of second sentence, ART. 861—
‐
A, B, and C are instituted, respectively, to 1/2,
1/3, and 1/6 of the estate
Page 25 of 73
o
o
o
if A predeceases the testator, B and C
will acquire A’s 1/2 portion in the
proportion of 2:1 (their testamentary
shares being 1/3 and 1/6)
should B predecease, A and C will get
B’s 1/3 portion in proportion of 3:1
(1/2 and 1/6)
if C predeceases, A and B will share C’s
1/6 portion in the proportion of 3:2
‐
ART. 862. The substitute shall be subject to the same
charges and conditions imposed upon the instituted
heir, unless the testator has expressly provided the
contrary, or the charges or conditions are personally
applicable only to the heir instituted.
Rationale
‐
substitute merely takes the place of the original
heir
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of
which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted
with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a
second heir the whole or part of the inheritance, shall
be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution
does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally
instituted, and provided, further, that the fiduciary or
first heir and the second heir are living at the time of the
death of the testator. 
Elements of the fideicomisaria
‐
a first heir (fiduciary / fiduciario) who takes the
property upon the testator’s death
o the fiduciary enters upon the
inheritance upon the opening of the
succession (i.e. when the testator dies)
‐
a second heir (fideicommissary heir /
fideicomisario) who takes the property
subsequently from the fiduciary
o fideicommissary heir does not receive
property until the fiduciary’s right
expires
o both heirs enter into the inheritance
successively (i.e. one after the other,
each in his own turn)
o note that while the fideicommissary
heir does not receive property upon the
testator’s death, his right thereto vests
at that time and merely becomes
subject to a period, and that right
passes to his own heirs should he die
before the fiduciary’s right expires
‐
the second heir must be one degree from the
fiduciary or first heir
o only one transmission is allowed in the
fideicomisaria (from fiduciary to the
fideicommissary heir)
o “one degree” means that the
fideicommissary heir must be in the
first degree of relationship with the
fiduciary or first heir (i.e. second heir
must either be a child or a parent of the
first heir) per Palacios v. Ramirez
(1982), infra

the rule applies and is true a
fortiori in case of an adopted
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
‐
child vis‐à‐vis his adopter (cf.
Acain v. IAC)
the dual obligation imposed upon the fiduciary
to preserve the property and to transmit it after
the lapse of the period to the fideicommissary
heir
o this is the essence of the fideicomisaria
(Crisologo v. Singson [1962])
o fiduciary or first heir is basically a
usufructuary, with the right to use and
enjoy the property but without the
right to dispose of the same (jus
disponendi)
o effect if there is no obligation to
preserve and transmit—there is no
fideicommissary substitution, but
something else (PCIB v. Escolin
[1974])
both heirs must be living and qualified to
succeed at the time of the testator’s death
o living
o qualified (cf. ART. 1024 to 1034)

these two requisites are met
only upon the testator’s death,
and applies to both the first
and second heirs

thus, the second heir need not
survive the first heir

if the second heir dies before
the first heir, the second heir’s
own heirs merely take his
place
Palacios v. Ramirez (1982)
Facts: Testator’s will instituted his companion over 2/3 of
estate (usufruct), and at the same time instituted as
substitutes of companion two others not related at all to
companion.
Held: That the fideicommissary substitution is void
because law mandates that “such substitution does not go
beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted.”
That “degree” means generation, and second heir must be
related to and be one generation from first heir. That
fideicommissary heir can only be either a child or a parent
of first heir.
Balane Criticizes the Palacios Ruling:
‐
per Justice José Vitug, the Palacios
interpretation of “degree” as degree of
relationship “would disenfranchise a juridical
person from being either a fiduciary or
fideicommissary heir”
PCIB v. Escolin (1974)
Facts: Testatrix instituted to the whole estate her
husband, with right to dispose, and at the same time her
siblings or the respective heirs of her siblings, as heirs to
residue and remainder of estate, after death of husband.
Held: That there is no fideicommissary substitution
because there is no obligation on the part of testatrix’s
husband as first heir, to preserve properties for substitute
heirs. That siblings of testatrix instituted simultaneously
Page 26 of 73
with testatrix’s husband, subject to certain conditions.
That brothers and sisters of testatrix were to inherit what
husband would not dispose of during his lifetime. That
this is a valid simultaneous institution of heir.
Balane Comments:
‐
the institution in PCIB is a simultaneous
institution (not a fideicomisaria because there is
no obligation imposed upon the husband to
preserve the estate or any part thereof for
anyone else)
o on the one hand, of the husband subject
to a resolutory condition (i.e. right
terminates at the time of death)
o on the other, of the husband’s brothers‐
and sisters‐in‐law subject to a
suspensive condition (i.e. condition
may or may not happen—remainder of
estate)
Tenure of the fiduciary or first heir
‐
primary rule
o period indicated by the testator
‐
secondary rule
o the fiduciary’s lifetime (if the testator
did not indicate a period)
ART. 864. A fideicommissary substitution can never
burden the legitime.
Note:
‐
the legitime passes by strict operation of law,
therefore the testator has no power over it
ART. 865. Every fideicommissary substitution must be
expressly made in order that it may be valid.
The fiduciary shall be obliged to deliver the inheritance
to the second heir, without other deductions than those
which arise from legitimate expenses, credits and
improvements, save in the case where the testator has
provided otherwise.
Re par. 1:
‐
manner of imposing a fideicomisaria: express
o two ways

by the use of the term
fideicommissary, or

by imposing upon the first
heir the absolute obligation to
preserve and to transmit to
the second heir
Re par. 2:
‐
allowable deductions
o general rule: the fiduciary should
deliver the property intact and
undiminished to the fideicommissary
heir upon the arrival of the period
o exception: the only deductions allowed,
in the absence of a contrary provision
in the will—

legitimate expenses (i.e.
necessary and useful, not
ornamental expenses)

credits
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI

improvements
Damage to, or deterioration of, property
‐
if caused by a fortuitous event or ordinary wear
and tear
o fiduciary not liable
‐
if caused by fiduciary’s fault or negligence
o fiduciary liable
ART. 866. The second heir shall acquire a right to the
succession from the time of the testator’s death, even
though he should die before the fiduciary. The right of
the second heir shall pass to his heirs.
Notes:
‐
‐
second heir’s right vests upon the testator’s
death (cf. ART. 777 and ART. 878 since as far as
the second heir is concerned, the institution of
him is one subject to a suspensive term)
the second heir need not survive the first heir in
order for substitution to be effective
o the second heir’s own heirs simply take
his place
ART. 867. The following shall not take effect:
(1) Fideicommissary substitutions which are not made
in an express manner, either by giving them this name,
or imposing upon the fiduciary the absolute obligation
to deliver the property to a second heir;
(2) Provisions which contain a perpetual prohibition to
alienate, and even a temporary one, beyond the limit
fixed in Article 863;
(3) Those which impose upon the heir the charge of
paying to various persons successively, beyond the limit
prescribed in Article 863, a certain income or pension;
(4) Those which leave to a person the whole or part of
the hereditary property in order that he may apply or
invest the same according to secret instructions
communicated to him by the testator.
Re par. 1:
‐
see notes under ART. 865
‐
note that lack of this element does not, by that
fact alone, nullify the institution
o it only means that the institution is not
a fideicomisaria; it could however be
something else, as in PCIB
Re par. 2:
‐
if there is a fideicomisaria, the limit is the first
heir’s lifetime
‐
if there is no fideicomisaria, the limit is 20 years
(ART. 870)
Re par. 3:
‐
there can only be two beneficiaries of the
pension, one after the other, and the second
must be one degree from the first (as in ART.
863)
‐
there is no prohibition however on simultaneous
beneficiaries
Page 27 of 73
Re par. 4:
‐
the ostensible heir is in reality only a dummy,
because in reality, the person intended to be
benefited is the one to whom the secret
instructions refer
o purpose of surreptitious disposition is
to circumvent some prohibition or
disqualification—T.C.B.C.I.T.J. (this
cannot be countenanced in this
jurisdiction)
o effect: entire disposition or provision is
VOID
ART. 868. The nullity of the fideicommissary
substitution does not prejudice the validity of the
institution of the heirs first designated; the
fideicommissary clause shall simply be considered as
not written.
Effect if fideicommissary substitution is void or
ineffective—
‐
institution of first heir simply becomes pure and
unqualified
Effect if the institution of the first heir is void or
ineffective—
‐
not provided in ART. 868
‐
“when the fiduciary predeceases or is unable to
succeed, the fideicommissary heir takes the
inheritance upon the death of the decedent” (Mr.
Justice Vitug)
o the nullity or inefficacy of the
institution of the fiduciary should not
nullify the institution of the
fideicommissary heir
o the right of the fideicommissary heir
should then be absolute and effective
upon the testator’s death, as if no
fiduciary or first heir had been
instituted

since ultimately, the intention
of the testator is to ultimately
pass the property to the
second heir (Manresa)
ART. 869. A provision whereby the testator leaves to a
person the whole or part of the inheritance, and to
another the usufruct, shall be valid. If he gives the
usufruct to various persons, not simultaneously, but
successively, the provisions of Article 863 shall apply.
Note:
‐
if testator institutes successive usufructuaries,
there can only be two, one after the other, and as
to the two of them, all the requisites of ART. 863
must be present
ART. 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all
or part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty
years are void.
Effect if testator imposes a longer period than 20
years
‐
prohibition to partition is valid only for 20 years
If there is a fideicommissary substitution—
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
‐
‐
time limitation will not apply
ART. 863 will apply, which allows, as a period,
the lifetime of the first heir
Rationale (as in ART. 867, par. 2, supra)
‐
commerce
Section 4 – Conditional Testamentary Dispositions
and Testamentary Dispositions With a Term
Three kinds of testamentary dispositions
‐
conditional dispositions
o condition (see ART. 1179, par. 1)
‐
dispositions with a term
o term (see ART. 1193, par. 1 and 3)
‐
dispositions with a mode (modal dispositions)
o mode (see ART. 882)
General Provisions:
ART. 871. The institution of an heir may be made
conditionally, or for a certain purpose or cause.
ART. 872. The testator cannot impose any charge,
condition or substitution whatsoever upon the legitime
prescribed in this Code. Should he do so, the same shall
be considered as not imposed.
Conditions:
ART. 873. Impossible conditions and those contrary to
law or good customs shall be considered as not imposed
and shall in no manner prejudice the heir, even if the
testator should otherwise provide.
Impossible conditions
‐
may be factually or legally impossible
Effect if impossible or illegal condition is imposed by
testator
‐
condition is simply considered as not written
o testamentary disposition is not
annulled
o disposition becomes pure (no
condition)
‐
rule in donations is same (ART. 727) while rule
in obligations is different (ART. 1183)
o reason for the difference: basis of
testamentary dispositions and
donations, both gratuity (liberality); on
the other hand, obligations are onerous
(condition imposed is causa, and if
eliminated for being impossible or
illegal, there would be a failure of
consideration)
ART. 874. An absolute condition not to contract a first
or subsequent marriage shall be considered as not
written unless such condition has been imposed on the
widow or widower by the deceased spouse, or by the
latter’s ascendants or descendants.
Nevertheless, the right of usufruct, or an allowance or
some personal prestation may be devised or
bequeathed to any person for the time during which he
or she should remain unmarried or in widowhood.
Page 28 of 73
Conditions prohibiting marriage
‐
if a first marriage is prohibited
o condition always considered not
imposed
‐
if a subsequent marriage is prohibited
o if imposed by the deceased spouse or
by his / her ascendants or
descendants—VALID
o if imposed by anyone else—considered
not written
Re par. 2:
‐
this paragraph may provide the testator of a
means of terminating the testamentary
benefaction should the heir contract marriage
(even a first one)
‐
wording of disposition must not be so as to
constitute a prohibition forbidden in par. 1
o e.g. “I institute as heir to 1/5 of my free
portion Mr. Quevedough provided he
does not marry a lawyer or a non‐
lawyer”

NOT ALLOWED (absolute
prohibition)
o e.g. “I institute as heir to my entire free
portion Ms. Buttad for as long as she
remains single or a widow”

ALLOWED
ART. 874 does not prohibit the imposition of a
condition to marry (either with reference to a
particular person or not)
‐
cf. condition to marry
Neither does ART. 874 declare void a relative
prohibition
‐
e.g. “I institute to 2/5 of my free portion Mr.
Seraphim Salvavidador provided he does not
marry a hotel receptionist”
ART. 875. Any disposition made upon the condition
that the heir shall make some provision in his will in
favor of the testator or of any other person shall be void.
This article is the scriptura captatoria (“Legacy­
hunting dispositions, whether to heirs or legatees, are
void”)
‐
it is not allowed
‐
quid pro quo, forbidden
Reasons for the prohibition
‐
captatoria converts testamentary grants into
contractual transactions
‐
it deprives the heir of testamentary freedom
‐
it gives the testator the power to dispose mortis
causa not only of his property, but also of his
heir’s
What is declared void—
‐
testamentary disposition itself, not merely the
condition
ART. 876. Any purely potestative condition imposed
upon an heir must be fulfilled by him as soon as he
learns of the testator’s death.
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
This rule shall not apply when the condition, already
complied with, cannot be fulfilled again.
ART. 877. If the condition is casual or mixed, it shall be
sufficient if it happen or be fulfilled at any time before
or after the death of the testator, unless he has provided
otherwise.
Should it have existed or should it have been fulfilled at
the time the will was executed and the testator was
unaware thereof, it shall be deemed as complied with.
If he had knowledge thereof, the condition shall be
considered fulfilled only when it is of such a nature that
it can no longer exist or be complied with again.
ART. 883. x x x
If the person interested in the condition should prevent
its fulfillment, without the fault of the heir, the condition
shall be deemed to have been complied with.
ART. 879. If the potestative condition imposed upon
the heir is negative, or consists in not doing or not
giving something, he shall comply by giving a security
that he will not do or give that which has been
prohibited by the testator, and that in case of
contravention he will return whatever he may have
received, together with its fruits and interests.
These articles govern potestative, casual, and mixed
conditions
‐
potestative: one that depends solely on the will of
the heir / legatee / devisee
o e.g. “I institute as heir to 4/5 of my free
portion Ms. Chit Ha‐e provided that she
establish a permanent residence in
Burunggan”
‐
casual: one that depends on the will of a third
person or on chance
o e.g. “I institute as heir to 4/5 of my free
portion Ms. Chit Ha‐e provided that Mt.
Pinatubo erupts” (chance)
o e.g. “I institute as heir to 4/5 of my free
portion Ms. Chit Ha‐e provided that
Knorr Miswari surrenders to the
President” (will of a third person)
‐
mixed: one that depends partly on the will of the
heir / legatee / devisee and partly either on the
will of a third person or chance
o e.g. “I institute as heir to 4/5 of my free
portion Ms. Chit Ha‐e provided she
marries during my lifetime Mr. Rubber
Bellyhar” (dependent partly on the will
of Ms. Chit Hae, the heiress, and the will
of Mr. Bellyhar, a third person)
Rule on potestative conditions (ART. 876)
‐
positive
o general rule: must be fulfilled as soon
as the heir learns of the testator’s death
o exception:

if the condition was already
complied with at the time the
Page 29 of 73
‐
heir learns of the testator’s
death, and

the condition is of such a
nature that it cannot be
fulfilled again
o constructive compliance (ART. 883,
par. 2): condition deemed fulfilled
negative (ART. 879)
o heir must give security (caución
muciana) to guarantee the return of the
value of the property, fruits, and
interests, in case of contravention

if condition is violated,
intestate or legal heirs must
go after security (caución
muciana)
Rule on casual or mixed conditions (ART. 877)
‐
general rule: may be fulfilled at any time (before
or after the testator’s death), unless the testator
provides otherwise
o qualification: if already fulfilled at the
time of the execution of the will—

if testator unaware of fact of
fulfillment—deemed fulfilled

if testator aware thereof—(a)
if cannot be fulfilled again:
deemed fulfilled; (b) if can be
fulfilled again: must be
fulfilled again
‐
constructive compliance (ART. 883, par. 2)
o if casual—not applicable
o if mixed—

if dependent partly on
chance—not applicable

if dependent partly on the will
of a third party—(a) if third
party is an interested party:
applicable; (b) if third party is
not an interested party: not
applicable
ART. 880. If the heir be instituted under a suspensive
condition or term, the estate shall be placed under
administration until the condition is fulfilled, or until it
becomes certain that it cannot be fulfilled, or until the
arrival of the term.
The same shall be done if the heir does not give the
security required in the preceding article.
ART. 881. The appointment of the administrator of the
estate mentioned in the preceding article, as well as the
manner of the administration and the rights and
obligations of the administrator shall be governed by
the Rules of Court.
Between time of testator’s death and time of
fulfillment of suspensive condition or of certainty of
its non­occurrence—
‐
property to be placed under administration
o if condition happens: property to be
turned over to instituted heir
o if it becomes certain that condition will
not happen: property to be turned over
to a secondary heir (if there is one) or
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
to the intestate heirs, as the case may
be
ART. 880 must not be applied to institutions with a
term despite wording
‐
otherwise, there will be an irreconcilable conflict
with ART. 885, par. 2, which mandates that
before the arrival of the term, the property
should be given to the legal heirs
Re par. 2, ART. 880—
‐
property shall be in the executor’s or
administrator’s custody until the heir furnishes
the caución muciana
Procedural rules governing appointment of
administrator—
‐
Rules 77 to 90, Rules of Court
ART. 884. Conditions imposed by the testator upon the
heirs shall be governed by the rules established for
conditional obligations in all matters not provided for
by this Section.
Note:
‐
suppletorily governing conditional institutions
are ART. 1179 to 1192, on conditional
obligations
Terms:
ART. 878. A disposition with a suspensive term does
not prevent the instituted heir from acquiring his rights
and transmitting them to his heirs even before the
arrival of the term.
Term: certain to arrive
‐
may either be suspensive or resolutory
Condition: uncertain to happen
When heir’s right vests (in dispositions with a term)
‐
upon the testator’s death
o should heir die before the arrival of the
suspensive term, he merely transmits
his right to his own heirs who can
demand when the term arrives (cf.
ART. 866)
Rule in conditional institutions (if instituted heir dies
before the happening of the condition)
‐
cf. ART. 1034, par. 3 (“if the institution, devise,
or legacy should be conditional, the time of the
compliance with the condition shall also be
considered”)
o import: in conditional institutions, the
heir should be living and qualified to
succeed both at the time of the
testator’s death and at the time of the
happening of the condition

i.e., the heir or devisee or
legatee who dies before the
happening of the condition,
even if he survives the
testator, transmits no right to
his heirs (Spanish Civil Code)
Page 30 of 73
ART. 885. The designation of the day or time when the
effects of the institution of an heir shall commence or
cease shall be valid.
In both cases, the legal heir shall be considered as called
to the succession until the arrival of the period or
(from) its expiration. But in the first case he shall not
enter into possession of the property until after having
given sufficient security, with the intervention of the
instituted heir.
If term suspensive (ex die, “out in the day”; “[from] its
[period’s] expiration”)—
‐
before the arrival of the term, the property
should be delivered to the legal or intestate heirs
‐
a caución muciana has to be posted by them
If term is resolutory (in diem, “into the day”; “until the
arrival of the period”)—
‐
before the arrival of the term, the property
should be delivered to the instituted heir
‐
no caución muciana required
Modes:
Ms. Coscolluela 100 piculs of sugar, and that should Mr.
Rabadilla die, his heirs shall similarly have same
obligation, and in the event that property devised is sold,
etc., seller, etc. shall have same obligation.
Held: That the institution of Mr. Rabadilla is a modal
institution (because it imposes a charge or obligation
upon the instituted heir without affecting the efficacy of
such institution), and ART. 882 applies. That in modal
institutions, the testator states (a) the object of the
institution, (b) the purpose or application of the property
left by the testator, or (c) the charge imposed by the
testator upon the heir. That a condition suspends but does
not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not
suspend. That to some extent, mode is similar to a
resolutory condition.
Caución muciana to be posted by the instituted heir
ART. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an
institution referred to in the preceding article cannot
take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it
shall be complied with in a manner most analogous to
and in conformity with his wishes.
xxx
ART. 882. The statement of the object of the institution
or the application of the property left by the testator, or
the charge imposed by him, shall not be considered as a
condition unless it appears that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed
at once provided that the instituted heir or his heirs
give security for compliance with the wishes of the
testator and for the return of anything he or they may
receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or
they should disregard this obligation.
ART. 882, par. 1—
‐
defines a mode obliquely
‐
in brief, a mode is an obligation imposed upon
the heir, without suspending (as a condition
does) the effectivity of the institution
o a mode obligates but does not suspend
o a condition suspends but does not
obligate
Note:
‐
intention of the testator should always be the
guiding norm in determining the sufficiency of
the analogous performance
o e.g. “I institute as heir to 1/5 of my free
portion Mr. St. Peter and he shall, every
month, give to my daughter Ms. Cera
Halimawis one sack of Milagrosa rice
the expense for which is to be taken
from said 1/5 share”

if Milagrosa rice is no longer
available in the market, then a
variety of similar quality
should be given by Mr. St.
Peter, the instituted heir, to
Ms. Cera Halimawis, in the
same quantity
Section 5 – Legitime
Mode must be clearly imposed as an obligation
‐
mere preferences or wishes expressed by
testator, not modes
o e.g. “I institute as heir to 2/5 of my free
portion Ms. Steffanie Summera and I
would be very delighted and my soul
would surely rest in peace if she gives
my daughter Ms. Cera Halimawis
money allowance of P50,000 per month
to be taken from said 2/5 of my free
portion”—NOT MODE
Preliminary Notes:
‐
legitime
o the portion of the decedent’s estate
reserved by law in favor of certain heirs
‐
free or disposable portion
o the portion left available for
testamentary disposition after the
legitimes have been covered
‐
compulsory heirs
o the heirs for whom the law reserves a
portion of the decedent’s estate
A mode functions similarly to a resolutory condition
Nature of legitimes
‐
legitimes are set aside by mandate of law
‐
testator is required to set aside or reserve them
o the testator is prohibited from
disposing by gratuitous title (inter
vivos or mortis causa) of these
legitimes
Rabadilla v. CA (2000)
Facts: Testatrix instituted as heir in her will Mr. Rabadilla,
predecessor of petitioners. Will stated that Mr. Rabadilla
shall have obligation until he dies, every year, to give to
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Page 31 of 73
but dispositions by onerous title are
NOT prohibited because, in theory,
nothing is lost from the estate in an
onerous disposition, (there is merely an
exchange of values)
because the testator is compelled to set aside the
legitimes, the heirs in whose favor the legitimes
are set aside are called compulsory heirs
o note: testator is the one compelled, not
his heirs who are free to accept or
reject the inheritance
o
‐
ART. 886. Legitime is that part of the testator’s
property which he cannot dispose of because the law
has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore,
called compulsory heirs.
ART. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect
to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children
and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural
children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not
excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they
exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must
be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the
three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the
manner and to the extent established by this Code.
ART. 887 enumerates the compulsory heirs;
enumeration is exclusive
Classification of compulsory heirs
‐
primary – legitimate children and / or
descendants
o called as such because they are
preferred over, and exclude, the
secondary
‐
secondary – legitimate parents and / or
ascendants; illegitimate parents
o called as such because they receive
legitimes only in default of the primary

legitimate parents /
ascendants – only in default of
legitimate children /
descendants

illegitimate parents – only in
default of any kind of children
/ descendants
‐
concurring – surviving spouse; illegitimate
children and / or descendants
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
o
called as such because they succeed as
compulsory heirs together with
primary or secondary heirs (except
only that illegitimate children /
descendants exclude illegitimate
parents, i.e. only illegitimate children /
descendants will get their legitimes, the
illegitimate parents to get nothing in
the form of legitimes)
The COMPULSORY HEIRS
‐
legitimate children (law does not specify how
they should share, but universal agreement is
that they will share equally regardless of age,
sex, or marriage of origin; include legitimate
descendants other than children, in the proper
cases)
o ART. 164, Family Code

children conceived or born
during the marriage of
parents

children conceived of artificial
insemination
o ART. 54, Family Code

children conceived or born
before judgment of annulment
or absolute nullity of marriage
under ART. 36 has become
final / executory

children conceived or born of
subsequent marriage under
ART. 53 (i.e. after annulment
/ declaration of nullity of
marriage, and separated
spouses subsequently
remarry)
o ART. 179, Family Code

legitimated children (i.e.
subsequent valid marriage
between parents of
illegitimate children)
o Sec. 17 and 18, RA 8552 (Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998)

adopted children (is an
adopted child entitled to
inherit by compulsory and
intestate succession from his
biological parents and
relatives?—no answer)
‐
legitimate descendants
o general rule: the nearer exclude the
more remote

children, if all qualified, will
exclude grandchildren, and so
on
o qualification: right of representation
(succession per stirpes), when proper
‐
legitimate parents (include legitimate ascendants
other than parents, in the proper cases—see
Baritua v. CA [1990], infra)
o including adopter (per Sec. 18, RA
8552)
‐
legitimate ascendants
o only in default of parents
Page 32 of 73
the rule (absolute in the ascending
line): the nearer exclude the more
remote
surviving spouse
o of the decedent, not the spouse of a
child who has predeceased the
decedent (Rosales v. Rosales [1987],
infra)
o marriage must be valid or voidable
(with no final decree of annulment at
the time of the decedent’s death)
o mere estrangement not a ground for
disqualification of surviving spouse as
heir
o effect of decree of legal separation

offending spouse:
DISQUALIFIED to inherit

innocent spouse: QUALIFIED
to inherit
o death of either spouse during pendency
of petition for legal separation—
dismissal of case

surviving spouse, QUALIFIED
to inherit (whether innocent
or not) (Lapuz v. Eufemio
[1972], infra)
illegitimate children
o in general: children conceived and born
outside a valid marriage (ART. 165,
Family Code)
o in particular: children born of—(taken
from Sempio­Diy)

couples who are not legally
married, or of common‐law
marriages

incestuous marriages

bigamous marriages

adulterous relations between
the parents

marriages void for reasons of
public policy under ART. 38,
Family Code

couples below 18 years old,
whether married (void) or not

other void marriages under
ART. 35, Family Code
o note: rule if decedent died before the
effectivity of the Family Code (August
3, 1988) is ART. 895 of the Civil Code
o cf. right of representation (an
illegitimate child can be represented by
both legitimate and illegitimate
descendants, while a legitimate child
can only be represented by legitimate
descendants, per ART. 902 and ART.
992)
illegitimate descendants
o same rule as in legitimate descendants

nearer exclude the more
remote

right of representation
illegitimate parents
o only parents in the illegitimate
ascending line)

unlike in the legitimate
ascending line (includes
o
‐
‐
‐
‐
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
o
ascendants of whatever
degree)
excluded by legitimate children and
illegitimate children

unlike legitimate parents
(excluded only by legitimate
children / descendants)
Variations in legitimary portions
‐
general rule: 1/2 of estate is given to one heir or
one group of heirs
‐
exceptions:
o surviving spouse and illegitimate
children (ART. 894)
o surviving spouse in a marriage in
articulo mortis, with the conditions
specified (ART. 900, par. 2)
o surviving spouse and illegitimate
parents (ART. 903)
The different combinations
‐
legitimate children alone (ART. 888)
o 1/2 of estate divided equally
‐
legitimate children and surviving spouse (ART.
892, par. 2)
o legitimate children – 1/2 of estate
o surviving spouse – a share equal to that
of one child
‐
one legitimate child and surviving spouse (ART.
892, par. 1)
o legitimate child – 1/2 of estate
o surviving spouse – 1/4 of estate
‐
legitimate children and illegitimate children
(ART. 176, Family Code)
o legitimate children – 1/2 of estate
o illegitimate children – each will get 1/2
of share of one legitimate child
‐
legitimate children, illegitimate children, and
surviving spouse
o legitimate children – 1/2 of estate
o illegitimate children – each will get 1/2
of share of one legitimate child
o surviving spouse – a share equal to that
of one legitimate child

his or her share is preferred
over those of the illegitimate
children which shall be
reduced if necessary (ART.
895)
‐
one legitimate child, illegitimate children, and
surviving spouse
o legitimate children – 1/2 of estate
o illegitimate children – each will get 1/2
of share of one legitimate child

in effect, just divide the 1/4
remainder of estate to the
illegitimate children, equally
o surviving spouse – 1/4 of estate

his or her share is preferred
over those of the illegitimate
children which shall be
reduced if necessary (ART.
895)
‐
legitimate parents alone (ART. 889)
o 1/2 of estate
Page 33 of 73
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
legitimate parents and illegitimate children
(ART. 896)
o legitimate parents – 1/2 of estate
o illegitimate children – 1/4 of estate
legitimate parents and surviving spouse (ART.
893)
o legitimate parents – 1/2 of estate
o surviving spouse – 1/4 of estate
legitimate parents, illegitimate children, and
surviving spouse (ART. 899)
o legitimate parents – 1/2 of estate
o illegitimate children – 1/4 of estate
o surviving spouse – 1/8 of estate
surviving spouse alone
o 1/2 of estate (ART. 900, par. 1), or
o 1/3 of estate (if marriage, being in
articulo mortis, falls under ART. 900,
par. 2)
surviving spouse and illegitimate children (ART.
894)
o surviving spouse – 1/3 of estate
o illegitimate children – 1/3 of estate
surviving spouse and illegitimate parents (ART.
903)
o surviving spouse – 1/4 of estate
o illegitimate parents – 1/4 of estate
illegitimate children alone (ART. 901)
o 1/2 of estate
Illegitimate parents alone (ART. 903)
o 1/2 of estate
Rosales v. Rosales (1987)
Facts: Decedent died intestate, leaving as heirs her
husband, her child, and her grandchild by another child
who predeceased her. Widow of the child who
predeceased decedent claimed that she, as surviving
spouse of predeceased child, was a compulsory heir of
mother‐in‐law (decedent).
Held: That spouse of predeceased child of decedent not a
compulsory heir of decedent mother‐in‐law. That ART.
887 refers to estate of deceased spouse in which case
surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, and does not apply
to estate of parent‐in‐law.
Lapuz v. Eufemio (1972)
Held: That decedent’s parents not entitled to payment
because payment was already received by decedent’s
surviving spouse and child, the deceased’s compulsory
heirs. That parents of deceased succeed only when latter
dies without legitimate descendant. That surviving spouse
concurs with all classes of heirs.
Tumbokon v. Legaspi (2010)
Facts: Grandmother (decedent) died intestate. She left as
compulsory and intestate heirs her daughter and her
grandson (son of predeceased daughter). Widower or son‐
in‐law (husband of predeceased daughter) claimed to be
decedent’s compulsory heir.
Held: That son‐in‐law (widower of decedent’s
predeceased daughter) not a compulsory heir of decedent.
Articles governing the particular combinations:
ART. 888. The legitime of legitimate children and
descendants consists of one‐half of the hereditary estate
of the father and of the mother.
The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half,
subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the
surviving spouse as hereinafter provided.
Equal sharing among legitimate children (including
adopted children) regardless of age, sex, or marriage
of origin, of 1/2 of the estate of their deceased parent
Descendants other than children
‐
general rule: the nearer exclude the more remote
o grandchildren cannot inherit since
children will bar them, unless all the
children renounce
o the rule goes on down the line (no limit
to the number of degrees in the
descending line that may be called to
succeed)
‐
qualification: right of representation
ART. 889. The legitime of legitimate parents or
ascendants consists of one‐half of the hereditary estates
of their children and descendants.
Facts: Wife filed a petition for legal separation against
husband: sexual infidelity. Wife died pendente lite. Trial
court dismissed action.
The children or descendants may freely dispose of the
other half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children
and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided.
Held: That death of either spouse during pendency of
action for legal separation (before final decree) abates
action. That this abatement also applies if action involves
property rights. That effect is ultimately, surviving spouse,
whether guilty or not (note: no final decree of legal
separation because of death of one of the spouses), is not
disqualified to inherit from decedent (spouse who died).
ART. 890. The legitime reserved for the legitimate
parents shall be divided between them equally; if one of
the parents should have died, the whole shall pass to
the survivor.
Baritua v. CA (1990)
Facts: Decedent died in an accident, and parties
responsible for death settled with surviving spouse.
Decedent’s parents later filed a complaint for damages
against parties liable for death of their son.
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
If the testator leaves neither father nor mother, but is
survived by ascendants of equal degree of the paternal
and maternal lines, the legitime shall be divided equally
between both lines. If the ascendants should be of
different degrees, it shall pertain entirely to the ones
nearest in degree of either line.
Legitimate parents / ascendants as secondary
compulsory heirs
Page 34 of 73
‐
they succeed only in default of the legitimate
descending line
Three basic rules governing succession in the
ascending line—
‐
the nearer exclude the more remote
o rule is ABSOLUTE (i.e. no qualification;
no right of representation)
‐
division by line
o applies if there are more than one
ascendant in the nearest degree
o legitime to be divided in equal parts
between the paternal and maternal
lines
‐
equal division within the line
o after portion corresponding to the line
has been assigned, there will be equal
apportionment between or among the
recipients between the line, should
there be more than one
ART. 892. If only one legitimate child or descendant of
the deceased survives, the widow or widower shall be
entitled to one‐fourth of the hereditary estate. In case of
a legal separation, the surviving spouse may inherit if it
was the deceased who had given cause for the same.
If there are two or more legitimate children or
descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a
portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate
children or descendants.
In both cases, the legitime of the surviving spouse shall
be taken from the portion that can be freely disposed of
by the testator.
TEST: One legitimate child, surviving spouse—what is
the sharing?
If there has been legal separation—
‐
if there is a final decree of legal separation and
the deceased is the offending spouse
o surviving spouse gets his legitime
(ART. 63, par. 4, Family Code)
‐
if there is a final decree of legal separation and
the deceased is the innocent spouse
o surviving (offending) spouse is
disqualified from inheriting (idem.)
‐
if after the final decree of legal separation there
was a reconciliation between the spouses
o reciprocal right to succeed is restored
(reconciliation sets aside the final
decree) (ART. 66, par. 2, Family Code)
Death pendente lite—see Lapuz v. Eufemio, supra
Problem: Termination of marriage by reappearance of
prior spouse / decree of annulment or absolute nullity
of marriage
‐
reappearance of prior spouse
o suppose a person (husband), believing
in good faith that his wife had already
died, remarries, and then subsequently
his wife reappears, are both his first
wife and second wife entitled to
legitime from the husband if he dies?
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
‐
‐
marriages judicially annulled or declared void ab
initio
o same rule as in reappearance applies;
problem arises if either or both
partners in the defective marriage
remarry later
Balane comments: why should consorts of a
terminated marriage, or an annulled one, or one
declared void ab initio, continue to be heirs of
each other when the very basis of the right of
succession (i.e. marriage) no longer exists?
TEST: Legitimate children, surviving spouse—what is
the sharing?
Determination of surviving spouse’s share:
‐
as long as at least one of several children inherits
in his own right
o equivalent to share of one child
‐
suppose all the children predecease (or are
disinherited or unworthy to succeed): all the
grandchildren inherit per stirpes, and therefore
in different amounts
o spouse still gets a share equivalent to
that of what one child would have
gotten if qualified
‐
suppose all the children renounce: all the
grandchildren inherit per capita, and therefore
equally
o spouse still gets a share equivalent to
that of what one child would have
gotten had he succeeded
In what instance then will the surviving spouse get a
share equivalent to the share of a descendant?
ART. 893. If the testator leaves no legitimate
descendants, but leaves legitimate ascendants, the
surviving spouse shall have a right to one‐fourth of the
hereditary estate.
This fourth shall be taken from the free portion of the
estate.
TEST: Legitimate ascendants, surviving spouse—what
is the sharing?
ART. 894. If the testator leaves illegitimate children, the
surviving spouse shall be entitled to one‐third of the
hereditary estate of the deceased and the illegitimate
children to another third. The remaining third shall be
at the free disposal of the testator.
TEST: Illegitimate children, surviving spouse—what is
the sharing?
[ART. 895. The legitime of each of the acknowledged
natural children and each of the natural children by
legal fiction shall consist of one‐half of the legitime of
each of the legitimate children or descendants.
The legitime of an illegitimate child who is neither an
acknowledged natural, nor a natural child by legal
fiction, shall be equal in every case to four‐fifths of the
legitime of an acknowledged natural child.]
Page 35 of 73
The legitime of the illegitimate children shall be taken
from the portion of the estate at the free disposal of the
testator, provided that in no case shall the total legitime
of such illegitimate children exceed that free portion,
and that the legitime of the surviving spouse must first
be fully satisfied.
TEST: One legitimate child, illegitimate children,
surviving spouse—what is the sharing?
TEST: Legitimate children, illegitimate children,
surviving spouse—what is the sharing?
Reduction of shares (if total legitimes exceed the
entire estate); rules
‐
legitimes of legitimate children never reduced
(they are primary and preferred compulsory
heirs)
‐
legitime of surviving spouse never reduced
‐
legitimes of illegitimate children will be reduced
pro rata and without preference among them
ART. 896. Illegitimate children who may survive with
legitimate parents or ascendants of the deceased shall
be entitled to one‐fourth of the hereditary estate to be
taken from the portion at the free disposal of the
testator.
TEST: Illegitimate children, legitimate parents—what
is the sharing?
ART. 897. When the widow or widower survives with
legitimate children or descendants, and acknowledged
natural children, or natural children by legal fiction,
such surviving spouse shall be entitled to a portion
equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children
which must be taken from that part of the estate which
the testator can freely dispose of.
ART. 898. If the widow or widower survives with
legitimate children or descendants, and with
illegitimate children other than acknowledged natural,
or natural children by legal fiction, the share of the
surviving spouse shall be the same as that provided in
the preceding article.
ART. 899. When the widow or widower survives with
legitimate parents or ascendants and with illegitimate
children, such surviving spouse shall be entitled to one‐
eighth of the hereditary estate of the deceased which
must be taken from the free portion, and the illegitimate
children shall be entitled to one‐fourth of the estate
which shall be taken also from the disposable portion.
The testator may freely dispose of the remaining one‐
eighth of the estate.
TEST: Legitimate parents, illegitimate children,
surviving spouse—what is the sharing?
ART. 900. If the only survivor is the widow or widower,
she or he shall be entitled to one‐half of the hereditary
estate of the deceased spouse, and the testator may
freely dispose of the other half.
testator was solemnized in articulo mortis, and the
testator died within three months from the time of the
marriage, the legitime of the surviving spouse as the
sole heir shall be one‐third of the hereditary estate,
except when they have been living as husband and wife
for more than five years. In the latter case, the legitime
of the surviving spouse shall be that specified in the
preceding paragraph.
Surviving spouse as sole compulsory heir
‐
general rule: 1/2 of estate
‐
exception: 1/3 of estate, if the following
circumstances concur
o the marriage was in articulo mortis
o the testator died within three months
from the time of the marriage
o the parties did not cohabit for more
than five years, and
o the spouse who died was the party in
articulo mortis at the time of the
marriage
ART. 901. When the testator dies leaving illegitimate
children and no other compulsory heirs, such
illegitimate children shall have a right to one‐half of the
hereditary estate of the deceased.
The other half shall be at the free disposal of the
testator.
TEST: Illegitimate children alone—how much do they
get?
ART. 902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in
the preceding articles are transmitted upon their death
to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
Right of representation to the legitimate and
illegitimate descendants of an illegitimate child
‐
compare with ART. 992 (in case of legitimate
children, right of representation is given only to
their legitimate descendants)
‐
effect: right of representation of illegitimate
children is broader than right of representation
of legitimate children
ART. 903. The legitime of the parents who have an
illegitimate child, when such child leaves neither
legitimate descendants, nor a surviving spouse, nor
illegitimate children, is one‐half of the hereditary estate
of such illegitimate child. If only legitimate or
illegitimate children are left, the parents are not entitled
to any legitime whatsoever. If only the widow or
widower survives with parents of the illegitimate child,
the legitime of the parents is one‐fourth of the
hereditary estate of the child, and that of the surviving
spouse also one‐fourth of the estate.
TEST: Illegitimate parents alone—how much do they
get?
TEST: Illegitimate parents, surviving spouse—what is
the sharing?
If the marriage between the surviving spouse and the
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Page 36 of 73
This is the only instance when illegitimate children
exclude secondary compulsory heirs (illegitimate
parents)
7)
1 legitimate child =
surviving spouse =
Intent of the law in giving spouse arbitrary shares—
‐
so that something may be left for free disposition
8)
1 legitimate parent =
2 illegitimate children =
LEGITIMES QUIZZER SET 1: Write how much each
compulsory heir would get. Do not show your
solution. Time limit—5 minutes.
9)
3 legitimate children =
2 adopted children =
surviving spouse =
1)
1 legitimate child =
1 adopted child =
2)
2 adopted children =
legitimate parents =
3)
1 adopted child =
4 illegitimate children =
4)
surviving spouse =
6 legitimate children =
5)
5 legitimate children =
1 illegitimate child =
6)
7)
5 illegitimate children =
legitimate parents =
4 illegitimate children =
legitimate parents =
surviving spouse =
8)
legitimate parents =
surviving spouse =
9)
1 legitimate child =
legitimate parents =
1 illegitimate child =
surviving spouse =
10) surviving spouse =
1 illegitimate parent =
LEGITIMES QUIZZER SET 2: Write how much each
compulsory heir would get. Do not show your
solution. Time limit—5 minutes.
1)
3 legitimate children =
surviving spouse =
2)
2 legitimate children =
4 illegitimate children =
surviving spouse =
3)
3 legitimate children =
2 adopted children =
4)
illegitimate parents =
2 illegitimate children =
5)
2 legitimate children =
1 illegitimate child =
6)
3 adopted children =
1 legitimate parent =
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
10) 2 legitimate children =
surviving spouse =
The Reserva Troncal
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or
a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property
as he may acquired by operation of law for the benefit
of relatives who are within the third degree and who
belong to the line from which the said property came. 
Illustration and diagram
O or M.S.
R’ista
g.t.
o. of l.
P
R’ios
Explanation of illustration and diagram—
‐
P (prepositus) inherits a piece of land from his
father, O or M.S. (origin or mediate source).
Subsequently, P dies, intestate, single, and
without legitimate issue, and the land is in turn
inherited by his mother R’ista (reservista)
‐
R’ista is now required to reserve the property in
favor of P’s paternal relatives within the third
degree (R’ios or reservatarios)
Other terms for reserva troncal
‐
lineal, familiar, extraordinaria, semi‐troncal,
pseudo‐troncal
Purpose
‐
“the reserva troncal is a special rule designed
primarily to assure the return of the reservable
property to the third degree relatives belonging
to the line from which the property originally
came, and to avoid its being dissipated...by the
relatives of the inheriting ascendant (Padura v.
Baldovino [1958])
‐
“to avoid the danger that property existing for
many years in a family’s patrimony might pass
gratuitously to outsiders through the accident of
marriage and untimely death (Gonzales v. CFI
[1981])
‐
“to prevent outsiders from acquiring, through an
accident of life, property which, but for such
Page 37 of 73
accident, would have remained in the family”
(idem.)
‐
‐
Requisites (as given in Chua v. CFI [1977])
‐
that the property was acquired by a descendant
from an ascendant or from a brother or sister by
gratuitous title
o term descendant should read person (if
grantor is brother or sister, acquirer is
not a descendant)
o acquisition is by gratuitous title (título
lucrative) when the recipient does not
give anything in return

encompasses transmissions
by donation or by succession
of whatever kind
‐
that said descendant died without an issue
o should read: “that said person died
without legitimate issue” (because only
legitimate descendants will prevent the
property from being inherited by the
legitimate ascending line by operation
of law)

if descendant dies with
illegitimate issue, there will
be reserva troncal
‐
that the property is inherited by another
ascendant by operation of law
o by operation of law is limited to
succession to the legitime or by
intestacy, NOT testamentary succession

no donation
‐
that there are relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which said property
came
o reservatarios, to be discussed infra
Process
‐
first transfer
o by gratuitous title, from a person to his
descendant, brother, or sister
‐
second transfer
o by operation of law, from the transferee
in the first transfer to another
ascendant

it is this second transfer that
creates the reserva
‐
third transfer
o from the transferee in the second
transfer to the relatives (reservatarios)
Solivio v. CA (1990)
Facts: Mother died intestate, leaving all properties to sole
heir, her child. Child (decedent) died intestate, single, and
without legitimate issue. Decedent was survived by
maternal aunt and paternal aunt. Maternal aunt:
properties left by decedent belong to her because she is a
third degree relative of decedent’s mother, from whose
line property came.
Held: That there is no reserva troncal because descendant
(decedent) inherited from ascendant (mother), the
reverse of situation covered by ART. 891.
‐
‐
origin or mediate source
o the transferor in the first transfer
prepositus
o the first transferee, who is a
descendant or brother / sister of the
origin
reservista or reservor
o the ascendant obliged to reserve
reservatarios or reservees
o the relatives benefited
Two basic rules—
‐
no inquiry is to be made beyond the origin
o it does not matter who the owner of the
property was before it was acquired by
the origin
‐
all the relationships among the parties must be
legitimate
The Origin / Mediate Source
‐
either an ascendant or a brother or sister of the
prepositus
o ascendant: may be of any degree of
ascent
o brother or sister: conflicting views

one view – must be of the
half‐blood (because
otherwise, property would
not change lines in passing to
a common ascendant of the
prepositus and the brother;
no reserve if fraternal
relationship is of the full‐
blood because it would be
impossible to identify the line
of origin—whether paternal
or maternal) (J.B.L. Reyes)

another view – does not
matter whether of the full‐ or
half‐blood (Sánchez Román)
The Prepositus
‐
either a descendant or a brother or sister of the
origin who receives property from the origin by
gratuitous title
o he is the first transferee
‐
while property is still with him, there is as yet no
reserva
o reserve arises only upon the second
transfer
o while prepositus owns the property, he
has all rights of ownership over it and
may exercise such rights in order to
prevent a reserve from arising, by:

substituting or alienating the
property

bequeathing or devising it
either to the potential
reservista or to third persons
(subject to the constraints of
the legitime), or

partitioning in such a way as
to assign the property to
parties other than the
potential reservista (subject
Parties
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Page 38 of 73
‐
to the constraints of the
legitime)
the prepositus therefore is the arbiter of the
reserva troncal (Sánchez Román)
The Reservista
‐
he is an ascendant of the prepositus, of whatever
degree
o must be an ascendant other than the
origin (if the origin is also an
ascendant)

if two parties are the same
person, no reserva troncal
‐
should the origin and the reservista belong to
different lines (i.e. grandchild receives property
by donation from paternal grandfather;
grandchild dies; property received by donation
passes by succession to the legitime and
intestacy to the father, the paternal grandfather’s
son)?
o one view – no because another
ascendant is one belonging to a line
other than that of the reservista
(purpose of reserve is only curative)
(J.B.L. Reyes)
o another view – yes because (a) the law
does not distinguish, and (b) purpose of
reserva is not only curative, but also
preventive, i.e. to prevent the property
from leaving the line (Sánchez Román)
The Reservatarios
‐
the reserva is in favor of a class, collectively
referred to as the reservatarios (reservees)
‐
requirements to be a reservatario:
o he must be within the third degree of
consanguinity from the prepositus
(Cabardo v. Villanueva [1922])
o he must belong to the line from which
the property came (determined by the
origin)

if origin is an ascendant—
either of the paternal or
maternal line

if origin is a brother or sister
of the full blood—it would be
impossible to distinguish the
lines
o must the reservatario also be related to
the origin?

one view: no, because the
article speaks only of two
lines (paternal and maternal)
of the descendant, without
regard to subdivisions
(Manresa)

another view: yes, otherwise
results would arise
completely contrary to the
purpose of the reserva, which
is to prevent property from
passing to persons not of the
line of origin (Sánchez
Román)
‐
reserva in favor of reservatarios as a class
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
it is not required that the reservatario
must already be living when the
prepositus dies, because the reserve is
established in favor of a group or class,
not in favor of specific individuals
(Manresa)

as long as the reservatario is
alive at the time of the
reservista’s death, he qualifies
as such, even if he was
conceived and born after the
prepositus’s death
preference among the reservatarios
o rules on intestate succession govern
how reservable property is to be
distributed to reservatarios (Padura v.
Baldovino [1958])

i.e. the nearer exclude the
more remote, share of 2:1 in
favor of full‐blood in relation
to half‐blood relatives of the
prepositus
representation among the reservatarios (see
Florentino v. Florentino [1919])
o there is only one instance of
representation among the
reservatarios:

if the prepositus was survived
by brothers or sisters and
children of a predeceased or
incapacitated brother or
sister
o
‐
‐
Padura v. Baldovino (1958)
Facts: Origin (father) died, leaving properties by will to
surviving wife (mother or reservista) and three children
(one from first marriage, two from second marriage). One
of two children (prepositus, single, without legitimate
issue) in the second marriage predeceased the mother
(reservista). Reservatarios were full‐blood sister of
prepositus and his half‐brother (child of origin from first
marriage).
Held: That reservatarios of the full‐blood are entitled to a
share twice as large as that of others (half‐blood
relatives). That reservable property should pass not to all
reservatarios as a class but only to those nearest in degree
to the prepositus, excluding those reservatarios of more
remote degree. That reserva troncal merely determines
group of relatives (reservatarios) to whom property
should be returned; but within that group individual right
to property should be decided by rules of intestate
succession. That basic principles of intestacy to be applied
are (a) proximity in degree, (b) right of representation,
and (c) rule of double share for relatives or collaterals of
whole blood.
Florentino v. Florentino (1919)
Facts: Origin left by will all his properties to 11 children.
One child (prepositus) died intestate, single, and without
legitimate issue, and was succeeded by his mother
(reservista). Reservista instituted her daughter as sole
heir, giving to daughter the properties she inherited from
prepositus, her son. Surviving siblings and nephews and
Page 39 of 73
nieces, as representatives of predeceased siblings of
prepositus complained.
Held: That properties given by reservista to her daughter
are reservable. That reservatarios within the third degree,
as in case of nephews and nieces of prepositus from whom
reservable property came, have right of representation (to
represent their ascendants, or fathers and mothers, who
are brothers and sisters of prepositus).
Juridical nature
‐
nature of reservista’s right (Edroso v. Sablan
[1913], infra)
o reservista’s right over the reserved
property is one of ownership
o ownership is subject to a resolutory
condition (i.e. the existence of
reservatarios at the time of the
reservista’s death)
o right of ownership is alienable, but
subject to the same resolutory
condition
o reservista’s right of ownership is
registrable (if property can be
registered)
‐
nature of reservatarios’ right (Sienes v. Esparcia
[1961], infra)
o reservatarios’ right over the reserved
property is one of expectancy
o expectancy is subject to a suspensive
condition (i.e. existence of reservista at
the time of the reservatarios’ death;
expectancy ripens into ownership if the
reservatarios survive the reservista)
o right of expectancy is alienable, but
subject to the same suspensive
condition
o reservatarios’ right of expectancy is
registrable (if property can be
registered)
Edroso v. Sablan (1913)
Facts: Father (origin) died with a will. Property of father
passed to only son (prepositus) who died intestate, single,
and without legitimate issue. Property of son inherited
from his father passed by operation of law to mother
(reservista). Mother sought to have property inherited
from son registered. Uncles of son or prepositus (brothers
of father or origin), reservatarios, opposed.
Held: See nature of reservista’s right, supra.
Sienes v. Esparcia (1961)
Facts: Father (origin) died with a will. Property of father
passed to five children. One child (prepositus) died
intestate, single, and without legitimate issue. Property of
child inherited from his father passed by operation of law
to mother (reservista). Mother sold property. Surviving
half‐sisters of prepositus also sold same property.
Gonzales v. CFI (1981)
Facts: Father (origin) died intestate. Property of father
passed to children. One child (prepositus) died intestate,
single, and without legitimate issue. Property inherited by
child passed by operation of law to mother (reservista).
Mother gave by holographic will property she inherited
from prepositus to her grandchildren (children of her
surviving sons).
Held: That reservista cannot convey reservable properties
by will (mortis causa) to reservatarios within the third
degree, to the exclusion of reservatarios in the second
degree (her surviving daughters and sons). That the
principle is that the nearer excluded the more remote.
That reservista cannot by will select reservatarios to
whom reservable property should be given and deprive
the other reservatarios of their share therein.
Balane Comments:
‐
the rule therefore is that upon the reservista’s
death, the reserved property passes by strict
operation of law (according to the rules of
intestate succession) to the proper reservatarios
‐
thus the selection of which reservatarios will get
the property is made by law and not by the
reservista
Property reserved
‐
kind of property reservable
o any kind (real or personal, corporeal or
incorporeal, fungible or non‐fungible,
etc)

in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez
(1957), a sugar quota
allotment (incorporeal) was
held to be reservable
‐
effect of substitution
o the rule is that the very same property
must go thru the process of
transmissions
o what must come from the origin to the
prepositus (by gratuitous title) and to
the reservista (by operation of law)
must be the same property

if prepositus substitutes the
property by selling, bartering,
or exchanging it. the
substitute cannot be reserved

e.g. there would be no reserva
if the prepositus sold the
property he received from the
origin under a pacto de retro
and then redeemed it
(because property would not
be the same as prepositus
bought it back from the
vendee a retro)
Reserved property, not part of reservista’s estate
upon his death:
Held: See nature of reservatarios’ right, supra.
Cano v. Director (1959)
Reservista has no power to appoint, by will, which
reservatarios were to get the reserved property:
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Page 40 of 73
Facts: Reservista died. Surviving reservatario sought to
have land (reserved property) registered in her name. Son
of reservista opposed.
Held: That reservatario is not reservista’s successor
mortis causa nor is reservable property part of
reservista’s estate. That upon death of reservista,
reservatario nearest to prepositus becomes automatically
and by operation of law owner of reservable property.
That reservable property cannot be transmitted by a
reservista to his own successors mortis causa so long as a
reservatario within the third degree from prepositus and
belonging to line where property came exists when
reservista dies.
Balane States:
‐
since the reserved property is not computed as
part of the reservista’s estate, it is not taken into
account in determining the legitimes of the
reservista’s compulsory heirs
A problem will arise if two circumstances concur: (a)
the prepositus makes a will instituting the ascendant­
reservista to the whole or a part of the free portion;
and (b) there is left in the prepositus’s estate, upon his
death, in addition to the reserved property, property
not reservable [or, if (a) prepositus dies with two or
more properties, one reservable, one his own; and (b)
prepositus makes a will giving all or part of the free
porstion to reservista]
‐
two theories advanced:
o reserva máxima – as much of the
potentially reservable property as
possible must be deemed included in
the part that passes by operation of law
(maximizing the scope of the reserva)
o reserva mínima – every single
property in the prepositus’s estate
must be deemed to pass, partly by will
and partly by operation of law, in the
same proportion that the part given by
will bears to the part not so given
‐
to illustrate: suppose prepositus receives 2M
from origin, and earns 4M as his own; prepositus
makes a will instituting his mother (reservista)
to his free portion (1/2 of estate); prepositus
dies single and without legitimate issue;
reservista inherits entire estate of prepositus
(half by legitime, half by testamentary
succession); how much of the 2M will be
reserved?
o reserva máxima – all of the 2M
(reservable property) will pass to
reservista as her legitime (rule: fit as
much of reservable property in that
part which passes by operation of law)

3M as reservista’s legitime
(included in this 3M is the 2M
reservable property)
o reserva mínima – only 1M of the 2M
reservable property will pass to
reservista as part of her legitime (rule:
every item to pass to reservista in
proportion or ratio as to how much of
the free portion the prepositus gave to
the reservista)
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI

3M as reservista’s legitime
(composed of 1M from the 2M
reservable property, and 2M
from the 4M own property of
the prepositus; 1M of the 2M
reservable property passes to
reservista by will, and 2M of
the 4M own property of the
prepositus passes to
reservista by will)
Rights of reservatarios and obligations of the
reservista
‐
to inventory the reserved properties
‐
to annotate the reservable character (if
registered immovables) in the Registry of
Property within 90 days from acceptance by the
reservista
o there is only one title to the immovable
property, the registered owner being
the reservista, and the reservable
character of the property has to be
annotated at the back of the title as a
lien or encumbrance in favor of the
reservatarios
‐
to appraise the movables
‐
to secure by means of mortgage: (a) the
indemnity for any deterioration of or damage to
the property occasioned by the reservista’s fault
or negligence, and (b) the payment of the value
of such reserved movables as may have been
alienated by the reservista onerously or
gratuitously
Extinguishment; how reserva troncal extinguished
‐
by death of reservista
o reservatarios to get property; no more
reserva

reserva troncal begins when
the prepositus dies

reserva troncal ends when the
reservista dies (reservatarios
must be alive)
‐
by death of all the reservatarios
o note: if one subscribes to the view that
the reservista can belong to the line of
origin, death of all reservatarios will
not ipso facto extinguish the reserva
because the reservista could have a
child subsequently, who would be a
reservatario
‐
by renunciation by all the reservatarios,
provided that no other reservatario is born
subsequently
‐
by total fortuitous loss of the reserved property
‐
by confusion or merger of rights
o as when the reservatarios acquire the
reservista’s right by a contract inter
vivos

e.g. sale of reserva to
reservatarios
‐
prescription or adverse possession
ART. 904. The testator cannot deprive his compulsory
heirs of their legitime, except in cases expressly
provided by law.
Page 41 of 73
‐
Neither can he impose upon the same any burden,
encumbrance, condition, or substitution of any kind
whatsoever.
The legitime is not within the testator’s control
‐
legitime passes to compulsory heirs by strict
operation of law
Testator devoid of power to deprive compulsory heirs
of legitime
‐
it is the law, not the testator, which determines
the transmission of the legitimes
‐
EXCEPT: in disinheritance
o the only instance in which the law
allows the testator to deprive the
compulsory heirs of their legitimes
Testator devoid of power to impose burdens on
legitime
‐
qualifications: in at least two instances, the law
grants the testator some power over the legitime
o payment of legitime in cash (ART.
1080, par. 2) as when a parent who
wishes to keep an agricultural
enterprise intact, and such agricultural
enterprise was assigned to a child who
does not know how to operate the
same
o prohibition on partition (ART. 1083,
par. 1)
‐
restrictions on the legitime imposed by law
o the family home cannot be partitioned
(ART. 159, Family Code)
o the reserva troncal
ART. 905. Every renunciation or compromise as
regards a future legitime between the person owing it
and his compulsory heirs is void, and the latter may
claim the same upon the death of the former; but they
must bring to collation whatever they may have
received by virtue of the renunciation or compromise.
Reason for the rule—
‐
before predecessor’s death, heir’s right is simply
inchoate
Duty to collate
‐
any property which the compulsory heir may
have gratuitously received from his predecessor
by virtue of the renunciation or compromise will
be considered as an advance on his legitime and
must be duly credited
o e.g. if son asked for 30M from his father
in order to start a business, and the
father agrees, the 30M would be
considered as an advance on the son’s
legitime

during the settlement of his
father’s estate, if it turns out
that the son is entitled to 50M
as legitime, he would be given
20M more (the 30M already
credited to his legitime)
Scope and prohibition
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
article only applies to transactions of
compromise or renunciation between the
predecessor and the prospective compulsory
heir
o BUT a transaction of similar character
between a prospective compulsory heir
and another prospective compulsory
heir, or between a prospective
compulsory heir and a stranger, also
not allowed (ART. 1347, par. 2)

e.g. A asked 50M from his
wealthy brother, B in order to
start a business, in exchange
for which A renounces the
legitime he will get from their
father X in favor of B; X dies;
during the settlement of X’s
estate it turns out that A is
entitled to 80M as legitime; B
claims that A can no longer
get the 30M balance as A
already renounced his share
in favor of B; B is wrong, for A
can still get his 30M share
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator
has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to
him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.
ART. 906 applies only to transmissions by gratuitous
title
‐
e.g. donation, etc.
This is the well­known right of completion of legitime
‐
cf. ART. 855, 909 and 910
Principle: anything that a compulsory heir receives by
gratuitous title from the predecessor is considered as
an advance on the legitime and is deducted therefrom
‐
exceptions:
o if the predecessor gave the compulsory
heir a donation inter vivos and
provided that it was not to be charged
against the legitime (ART. 1062)
o testamentary dispositions made by the
predecessor to the compulsory heir,
unless the testator provides that it
should be considered part of the
legitime (ART. 1063)
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or
diminish the legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be
reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be
inofficious or excessive.
Notes:
‐
‐
‐
same principle as in ART. 904
if testamentary dispositions exceed the
disposable portion, compulsory heirs may
demand their reduction to the extent that the
legitimes have been impaired
cf. ART. 911
ART. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the
property left at the death of the testator shall be
considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall
Page 42 of 73
not include those imposed in the will.
To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added
the value of all donations by the testator that are subject
to collation, at the time he made them.     
The net hereditary estate
‐
ART. 908 makes possible the computation of the
absolute amounts of the legitimes by laying
down the manner of computing the net value of
the estate (the net hereditary estate), on which
the proportions are based
How to compute the hereditary estate:
‐
inventory of all existing assets
o appraisal or valuation of existing assets
at the time of the decedent’s death
o assets include only those that survive
the decedent (i.e. not extinguished by
his death)
o value determined by inventory will
constitute the gross assets
‐
deduct unpaid debts and charges
o all unpaid obligations of the decedent
must be deducted from gross assets
o only obligations with monetary value,
not extinguished by death, are
considered (i.e. not intuitu personae
obligations)
o difference between gross assets and
unpaid obligations will be the available
assets
‐
add the value of donations inter vivos
o add to the value of available assets all
the inter vivos donations made by the
decedent
o donations inter vivos must be valued as
of the time they were made (increase
or decrease in value, for the donee’s
account)
o sum of available assets and all
donations inter vivos is the net
hereditary estate
To illustrate—
‐
inventoried assets: 17M (gross assets)
‐
deduct debts: 6M (11M as available assets)
‐
add donations inter vivos: 4M (15M as net
hereditary estate)
o if testator left 3 legitimate children and
a surviving spouse, they will get the
following:

2.5M each to 3 legitimate
children (rule: 1/2 of estate)

2.5M to surviving spouse
(rule: share equivalent to that
of one child)

total legitimes: 10M

free portion: 1M (note:
available assets, only 11M;
value of net hereditary estate
[15M] only relevant for
purposes of computing the
legitimes)
Vizconde v. CA (1998)
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Facts: Decedent sold parcel of land to daughter. Daughter
had husband and two children. Daughter and children
died in massacre, in which daughter died ahead. Children
became heirs of mother. When children died, their father
(husband) became sole heir. Husband (widower)
extrajudicially settled estate of wife with parents‐in‐law
(decedent and his wife). Decedent died and a collation was
asked where widower included.
Held: That inclusion of widower (son‐in‐law in relation to
decedent) in settlement of intestate estate of his father‐in‐
law (father of his late wife) is erroneous because son‐in‐
law not a compulsory heir of his father‐in‐law. That
assuming collation were proper, still property sold by
decedent to his dead daughter (wife of decedent’s son‐in‐
law or the widower) not collationable for the reason that
transfer was not by gratuitous title but by onerous title
(sale). That obligation to collate is lodged with decedent’s
compulsory heir, his dead daughter, and not to said
deceased daughter’s husband.
ART. 909. Donations given to children shall be charged
to their legitime.
Donations made to strangers shall be charged to that
part of the estate of which the testator could have
disposed by his last will.
Insofar as they may be inofficious or may exceed the
disposable portion, they shall be reduced according to
the rules established by this Code.
ART. 910. Donations which an illegitimate child may
have received during the lifetime of his father or
mother, shall be charged to his legitime.
Should they exceed the portion that can be freely
disposed of, they shall be reduced in the manner
prescribed by this Code.
Donations inter vivos to compulsory heirs, considered
as an advance on their legitimes
‐
coverage of rule
o applies to all compulsory heirs

including ascendants

excluding a surviving spouse
(except in cases of donations
propter nuptias and moderate
gifts)
‐
exception
o rule of imputation of legitime will not
apply if donor provided otherwise
(vide ART. 1062)

in which case donation to be
imputed to the free portion
Donations inter vivos to strangers
‐
a stranger is anyone who does not succeed as a
compulsory heir
o e.g. father, if decedent has children
‐
donations inter vivos to strangers are imputed to
the disposable portion
ART. 911. After the legitime has been determined in
accordance with the three preceding articles, the
Page 43 of 73
reduction shall be made as follows:
(1) Donations shall be respected as long as the legitime
can be covered, reducing or annulling, if necessary, the
devises or legacies made in the will;
(2) The reduction of the devises or legacies shall be pro
rata, without any distinction whatever;
If the testator has directed that a certain devise or
legacy be paid in preference to others, it shall not suffer
any reduction until the latter have been applied in full
to the payment of the legitime.
(3) If the devise or legacy consists of a usufruct or life
annuity, whose value may be considered greater than
that of the disposable portion, the compulsory heirs
may choose between complying with the testamentary
provision and delivering to the devisee or legatee the
part of the inheritance of which the testator could freely
dispose.
Legitimes are inviolable
‐
if impaired, gratuitous dispositions of the
testator (inter vivos or mortis causa) have to be
set aside or reduced as may be required to cover
the legitimes
Method of reduction*
‐
first, reduce pro rata the non‐preferred legacies
and devises (ART. 911[2]), and the
testamentary dispositions (to heirs) (ART. 907)
o no preference among these legacies,
devises, and testamentary dispositions
‐
second, reduce pro rata the preferred legacies
and devises (ART. 911, last par.)
‐
third, reduce the donations inter vivos according
to the inverse order of their dates (i.e. the oldest
is the most preferred)
*reductions shall be to the extent required to complete the
legitimes, even if in the process, the disposition is reduced
to nothing
Devises / legacies of usufruct / life annuities /
pensions (ART. 911[3])
‐
if upon being capitalized according to actuarial
standards, the value of the grant exceeds the free
portion (i.e. it impairs the legitime), it has to be
reduced, because the legitime cannot be
impaired
‐
the testator can impose no usufruct or any other
encumbrance on the part that passes as legitime
‐
subject to the two rules abovementioned, the
compulsory heirs may elect between ceding to
the devisee / legatee the free portion (or the
proportional part thereof corresponding to the
said legacy / devise, in case there are other
dispositions), and complying with the terms of
the usufruct or life annuity or pension
Art. 912. If the devise subject to reduction should consist
of real property, which cannot be conveniently divided, it
shall go to the devisee if the reduction does not absorb
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
one‐half of its value; and in a contrary case, to the
compulsory heirs; but the former and the latter shall
reimburse each other in cash for what respectively
belongs to them.
The devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the
entire property, provided its value does not exceed that of
the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him
as legitime. (821)
Balane:
Provision covers the ff. cases:
1. The devisee has to be reduced
2. The thing given as a devise is indivisible
•
In either case, there should be pecuniary
reimbursment to the party who did not get his
physical portion of the thing
Rules:
1.
2.
If the extent of reduction is less than ½ of the
value of the thing – it should be given to the
devisee.
If the extenet of reduction is ½ or more of the
value of the thing – it should be given to the
compulsory heir.
Art. 913. If the heirs or devisees do not choose to avail
themselves of the right granted by the preceding article,
any heir or devisee who did not have such right may
exercise it; should the latter not make use of it, the
property shall be sold at public auction at the instance of
any one of the interested parties. (822)
Balane:
•
This article applies if neither party (the
compulsory heir and the devisee) elects to
exercise his right under Art. 912.
Rules:
1.
2.
Any other heir or devisee, who elects to do so,
may acquire the thing and pay the parties (the
compulsory heir and the devisee in question)
their respective share in money.
If no heir or devisee elects to acquire it, it shall
be sold at public auction and the net proceeds
accordingly divided between the parties
concerned.
Art. 914 The testator may devise and bequeath the free
portion as he may deem fit. (n)
6. Disinheritance
Art. 915. A compulsory heir may, in consequence of
disinheritance, be deprived of his legitime, for causes
expressly stated by law. (848a).
Balane:
Requisites of a valid disinheritance: (SLaW­PUTT)
1. It must be made in a will.
•
It must be admitted into probate.
2. It must be for a cause specified by law.
3. The will must specify the cause.
4. It must be unconditional.
Page 44 of 73
5.
6.
7.
It must be total.
The cause must be true.
If the truth of the cause is denied, it must be
proved by the proponent.
Effect of disinheritance:
The disinherited heir forfeits:
1. his legitime
2. his intestate portion, if any, and
3. any testamentary disposition made in a prior
will of the disinheriting testator
Class Notes:
•
This should be correlated with Art. 904.
Art. 916. Disinheritance can be effected only through a will
wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. (849)
Art. 917. The burden of proving the truth of the cause for
disinheritance shall rest upon the other heirs of the
testator, if the disinherited heir should deny it. (850)
Art. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the
cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is
not proved, or which is not one of those set forth in this
Code, shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may
prejudice the person disinherited; but the devises and
legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid
to such extent as will not impair the legitime. (851a)
Balane:
•
If the disinheritance lacks one or other of the
requisites in this article, the heir in question gets
his legitime.
•
As to whether he will get also any part of the
intestate portion or not, it depends in whether
the testator gave away the free portion through
testamentary dispositions:
o If through testamentary provision,
these dispositions are valid and the
compulsory heir improperly
disinherited gets only his legitime.
o He will get his corresponding share of
the free portion is if is not through
testamentary provision.
Art. 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the
disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as
well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of
an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her
spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of
a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six
years or more, if the accusation has been found
groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of
adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to
make a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the
parent or ascendant who disinherits such child or
descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the
child or descendant;
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or
disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty
of civil interdiction. (756, 853, 674a) 
Balane:
Grounds for disinheritance: (DAMA­FASI)
1. Attempt against the life
•
All stages of commission are included –
attempted, frustrtaed or consumated.
•
Intent to kill must be present.
•
Final conviction is necessary.
2. Accusation
•
This includes the filing of the complaint
before the prosecutor, or presenting
incriminating evidence against the testator,
or even supressing exculpatory evidence.
•
There should be imprisonment of more than
six years.
•
The accusation must be found to be
groundless.
3. Adultery and concubinage
•
Final conviction is required.
4. Fraud, violence, intimidation and undue
influence in the making of the will
5. Refusal to support without justifiable cause
•
The demand must be unjustifiably refused.
•
Refusal may be justified:
o E.g. If the obligor does not have
enough resources for all whom he
is obliged to support. The
ascendants are only third in the
hierarchy of preference among
claimants of support.
6. Maltreatment
•
It is required that the act of verbal or
physical assault be of serious nature.
•
No conviction is required. It is not even
required that any criminal case be filed.
•
This may be proved by preponderance of
evidence.
7. Leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life
•
There must be habituality to the conduct.
•
The conduct need not be sexual in nature.
8. Crime with civil interdiction
o Final conviction is required.
Class Notes:
•
Accusation
o The exoneration or acquittal must be
because the charge is groundless.

If the acquittal is only beyond
reasonable doubt, then there
is some ground.
•
Fraud, violence, intimidation and undue
influence in the making of the will
o No conviction is required here
•
Maltreatment
o Usually this is hard to prove because
there is no witness and the testator is
dead.
•
Leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life
o It cannot be only once.
o It need not be sexual in nature. For
example, partaking in the pork barrel
scam with Janet Napoles.
Page 45 of 73
Compelling the child to
be or

Subjecting the child or
allowing him to be
subjected to acts of
lasciviousness
Attempt against the life of a parent by another
•
Includes all stages of consummation. No
conviction is required.

Art. 920. The following shall be sufficient causes for the
disinheritance of parents or ascendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) When the parents have abandoned their children or
induced their daughters to live a corrupt or immoral life,
or attempted against their virtue;
(2) When the parent or ascendant has been convicted of
an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her
spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(3) When the parent or ascendant has accused the testator
of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for
six years or more, if the accusation has been found to be
false;
(4) When the parent or ascendant has been convicted of
adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(5) When the parent or ascendant by fraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to
make a will or to change one already made;
(6) The loss of parental authority for causes specified in
this Code;
(7) The refusal to support the children or descendants
without justifiable cause;
(8) An attempt by one of the parents against the life of the
other, unless there has been a reconciliation between
them. (756, 854, 674a)
Balane:
•
Number 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 are the same ground
under Article 919.
Other grounds for disinheritance of parents or
ascendants: (CIA)
1. Abandonment by parent of his children
•
This is not restricted to those instances of
abandonment penalized by law.
2. Inducement to live a corrupt or immoral life.
•
Applies only to daughters
•
It includes grandparents to granddaughters
as the provision contemplates ascendants
vis‐à‐vis descendants.
•
Mere attempt against their virtue is enough
as long as it can be proven.
•
No conviction is required in all three cases
provided in the provision.
3. Loss of parental authority
•
Not all causes for loss of parental authority
are grounds for disinheritance; for instance,
attainment of majority.
•
Only those causes which involve culpability
on the part of the parents will provide
grounds for disinheritance:
o Judicial deprivation of parental
authority on the ground of sexual
abuse
o Loss of parental authority as a
result of judicial declaration of
abandonment of the child
o Judicial deprivation of parental
authority on the grounds of

Excessively harsh or
cruel treatment of the
child

Giving the child
corrupting orders,
counsel or example
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
4.
Class Notes:
•
Accusation
Art. 921. The following shall be sufficient causes for
disinheriting a spouse:
(1) When the spouse has been convicted of an attempt
against the life of the testator, his or her descendants, or
ascendants;
(2) When the spouse has accused the testator of a crime
for which the law prescribes imprisonment of six years or
more, and the accusation has been found to be false;
(3) When the spouse by fraud, violence, intimidation, or
undue influence cause the testator to make a will or to
change one already made;
(4) When the spouse has given cause for legal separation;
(5) When the spouse has given grounds for the loss of
parental authority;
(6) Unjustifiable refusal to support the children or the
other spouse. (756, 855, 674a)
Balane:
•
The only new ground is number four. A decree of
legal separation is not required. There are ten
causes of legal separation given in Article 55 of
the Family Code.
•
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be
filed on any of the following grounds:
o (1) Repeated physical violence or
grossly abusive conduct directed
against the petitioner, a common child,
or a child of the petitioner;
o (2) Physical violence or moral pressure
to compel the petitioner to change
religious or political affiliation;
o (3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or
induce the petitioner, a common child,
or a child of the petitioner, to engage in
prostitution, or connivance in such
corruption or inducement;
o (4) Final judgment sentencing the
respondent to imprisonment of more
than six years, even if pardoned;
o (5) Drug addiction or habitual
alcoholism of the respondent;
o (6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the
respondent;
o (7) Contracting by the respondent of a
subsequent bigamous marriage,
whether in the Philippines or abroad;
o (8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
o (9) Attempt by the respondent against
the life of the petitioner; or
o (10) Abandonment of petitioner by
respondent without justifiable cause
for more than one year.
Page 46 of 73
For purposes of this Article, the term
"child" shall include a child by nature or
by adoption. (9a)
Unlike in Art. 920 where actual loss of parental
authority is required, here giving grounds
therefor is sufficient.
o
•
Art. 922. A subsequent reconciliation between the
offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the
right to disinherit, and renders ineffectual any
disinheritance that may have been made. (856)
Balane:
Reconciliation is either:
1. An express pardon – which must be expressly
and concretely extended to the offender who
accepts it. A general pardon extended by the
testator on his deatbed to all who have offended
him will not suffice.
2. An unequivocal conduct – wherein the intent to
forgive must be clear. This is ultimately a
question of facts which must be resolved by the
courts.
Effects of reconciliation:
1. If it occurs before disinheritance is made – right
to disinherit is distinguished.
2. If it occurs after the disinheritance is made,
disinheritance is set aside.
Effects of setting aside disinheritance:
1. Disinherited heir is restored to his legitime.
2. If the disinheriting will did not dispose of the
disposable protion, the disinherited heir is
entitled to his proportionate share, if any, of the
disposable portion.
3. If the disposable will or any of the subsequent
will disposed of the disposable portion (or any
part thereof) in favor of testamentary heirs,
legatees, or devisees, such dispositions remain
valid.
Art. 923. The children and descendants of the person
disinherited shall take his or her place and shall preserve
the rights of compulsory heirs with respect to the legitime;
but the disinherited parent shall not have the usufruct or
administration of the property which constitutes the
legitime. (857)
Balane:
•
The right of representation is granted only to
descendants of disinherited descendants.
However if the heir disinherited is a
parent/ascendant or spouse, the children or
descendants of the disinherited heir do not have
any right of representation.
•
The representative takes the place of the
disinherited heir not only with respect to the
legitime, but also to any intestate portion the
disinherited heir would have inherited.
Representation therefore, occurs in compulsory
and intestate succession but not in testamentary
succession.
8.
Legacies and Devises
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Art. 924. All things and rights which are within the
commerce of man be bequeathed or devised. (865a)
Balane:
•
What can be devised or bequethed: anything
within the commerce of man. It is not required
that the thing devised or bequethed belong to
the testator.
•
Limitations on legacy or devise – it should not
impair the legitime.
Art. 925. A testator may charge with legacies and devises
not only his compulsory heirs but also the legatees and
devisees.
The latter shall be liable for the charge only to the extent
of the value of the legacy or the devise received by them.
The compulsory heirs shall not be liable for the charge
beyond the amount of the free portion given them. (858a)
Balane:
•
The wording of this provision is erroneous. A
compulsory heir as such cannot be burdened
with a legacy or devise because that would
impair his legitime. Only a testamentary heir can
be so burdened.
Art. 926. When the testator charges one of the heirs with
a legacy or devise, he alone shall be bound.
Should he not charge anyone in particular, all shall be
liable in the same proportion in which they may inherit.
(859)
Balane:
•
General rule is that the estate is charged with the
legacy.
•
Exception is that the testator may impose the
burden on a testamentary heir or a legatee or
devisee. If he does so, then the heir, legatee, or
devisee charged will, if he accepts the disposition
in his favor, be bound to deliver the legacy or
devise to the person specified.
Art. 927. If two or more heirs take possession of the
estate, they shall be solidarily liable for the loss or
destruction of a thing devised or bequeathed, even though
only one of them should have been negligent. (n)
Balane:
•
The liability imposed gere is based on malice,
fault or negligence. The liability will also attach
to the executor or administrator in the proper
cases.
Art. 928. The heir who is bound to deliver the legacy or
devise shall be liable in case of eviction, if the thing is
indeterminate and is indicated only by its kind. (860)
Balane:
•
General rule, the estate is liable in case of
eviction.
•
Exception is in the case of a subsidiary legacy or
devise, the heir, legatee or devisee charged shall
be liable.
Art. 929. If the testator, heir, or legatee owns only a part
Page 47 of 73
of, or an interest in the thing bequeathed, the legacy or
devise shall be understood limited to such part or interest,
unless the testator expressly declares that he gives the
thing in its entirety. (864a)
Art. 930. The legacy or devise of a thing belonging to
another person is void, if the testator erroneously
believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the thing
bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he
made the will, afterwards becomes his, by whatever title,
the disposition shall take effect. (862a)
Art. 931. If the testator orders that a thing belonging to
another be acquired in order that it be given to a legatee
or devisee, the heir upon whom the obligation is imposed
or the estate must acquire it and give the same to the
legatee or devisee; but if the owner of the thing refuses to
alienate the same, or demands an excessive price therefor,
the heir or the estate shall only be obliged to give the just
value of the thing. (861a)
Art. 932. The legacy or devise of a thing which at the time
of the execution of the will already belonged to the legatee
or devisee shall be ineffective, even though another
person may have some interest therein.
If the testator expressly orders that the thing be freed
from such interest or encumbrance, the legacy or devise
shall be valid to that extent. (866a)
Art. 933. If the thing bequeathed belonged to the legatee
or devisee at the time of the execution of the will, the
legacy or devise shall be without effect, even though it
may have subsequently alienated by him.
If the legatee or devisee acquires it gratuitously after such
time, he can claim nothing by virtue of the legacy or
devise; but if it has been acquired by onerous title he can
demand reimbursement from the heir or the estate.
(878a)
Art. 934. If the testator should bequeath or devise
something pledged or mortgaged to secure a recoverable
debt before the execution of the will, the estate is obliged
to pay the debt, unless the contrary intention appears.
The same rule applies when the thing is pledged or
mortgaged after the execution of the will.
Any other charge, perpetual or temporary, with which the
thing bequeathed is burdened, passes with it to the legatee
or devisee. (867a)
Art. 935. The legacy of a credit against a third person or of
the remission or release of a debt of the legatee shall be
effective only as regards that part of the credit or debt
existing at the time of the death of the testator.
In the first case, the estate shall comply with the legacy by
assigning to the legatee all rights of action it may have
against the debtor. In the second case, by giving the
legatee an acquittance, should he request one.
In both cases, the legacy shall comprise all interests on the
credit or debt which may be due the testator at the time of
his death. (870a)
Art. 936. The legacy referred to in the preceding article
shall lapse if the testator, after having made it, should
bring an action against the debtor for the payment of his
debt, even if such payment should not have been effected
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
at the time of his death.
The legacy to the debtor of the thing pledged by him is
understood to discharge only the right of pledge. (871)
Art. 937. A generic legacy of release or remission of debts
comprises those existing at the time of the execution of
the will, but not subsequent ones. (872)
Balane:
•
Legacy/Devise of a thing owned in part by the
testator:
o General Rule: conveys only the interest
or part owned by the testator.
o Exception: if the testator provides
otherwise.

He may convey more than he
owns. The estate should try to
acquire the part of interest
owned by other parties. If the
other parties are unwilling to
alienate, the estate should
give the legatee/devisee the
monetary equivalent.

He may convey less than he
owns.
•
Legacy/Devise of a thing belonging to another:
o If the testator ordered the acquisition
of the thing – the order should be
complied with. If the owner is unwilling
to part with the thing, the
legatee/devisee should be given the
monetary equivalent.
o If the testator erroneously believed that
the thing belonged to him –
legacy/devise void.

Exception: if subsequent to
the making of the disposition,
the thing is acquired by the
testator onerously or
gratuitously, the disposition is
validated.
o If the testator knew that the thing did
not belong to him but did not order its
acquisition, the Code is silent on this.
•
Legacy/Devise of thing belonging to the
legatee/devisee or subsequently acquired by
him:
o If the thing already belonged to the
legate/devisee at the time of the
execution of the will – legacy/devise
void. It is not validated by an alienation
by the legatee/devisee subsequent to
the making of the will, unless the
acquirer is the testator himself.
o If the thing was owned by another
person at the time of the making of the
will and acquired thereafter by the
legatee/devisee:

If the testator erroneously
believed that it belonged to
him – legacy/devise void.

If the testator was not in
error.
•
If the thing was
acquired onerously
by legatee/devisee –
Page 48 of 73
•
•
•
the legatee/devisee
is entitled to
reimbursement
•
If the thing was
acquired
gratuitously by
legatee/devisee,
nothing more is due.
o If the thing was owned by the testator
at the time of making the will and
acquired thereafter from him by the
legatee/devisee – Art 932 and 933 are
silent on this but Art. 957 par. 2 can be
applied and the legacy/devise should
be deemed revoked.
Legacy/Devise to remove an encumbrance over
a thing belonging to the legatee/devisee:
o Valid if the encumbrance can be
removed for a consideration.
Legacy/Devise of a thing pledged:
o The encumbrance must be removed by
paying the debt, unless the testator
intended otherwise.
o A charge other than a pledge or
mortgage (as a usufruct or easement)
passes to the legatee or devisee
together with the thing
Legacy of credit or remission:
o Applies only to amount still unpaid at
the time of the testator’s death
o Revoked if testator subsequently sues
the debtor for collection
o If generic, applies only to those existing
at the time of execution of the will,
unless otherwise provided
heir is so obliged.
If the heir, legatee or devisee, who may have been given
the choice, dies before making it, this right shall pass to
the respective heirs.
Once made, the choice is irrevocable.
In the alternative legacies or devises, except as herein
provided, the provisions of this Code regulating
obligations of the same kind shall be observed, save such
modifications as may appear from the intention expressed
by the testator. (874a)
Balane:
To whom the right of choice (one made is irrevoacble)
is to be given:
•
General rule
o The estate through the executor or
administrator – in a direct
legacy/devise
o The heir, legatee, or devisee charged –
in a subsidiary legacy/devise
•
Exception:
o The legatee/devisee (or indeed any
other person), if the testator so
provides
If the person who is to choose dies before the choice is
made:
•
If the choice belonged to executor or
administrator – the right is transmitted to his
successor in office.
•
If the choice belongs to an heir, legatee or
devisee – the right is transmitted to his own
heirs.
Art. 938. A legacy or devise made to a creditor shall not
be applied to his credit, unless the testator so expressly
declares.
In the latter case, the creditor shall have the right to
collect the excess, if any, of the credit or of the legacy or
devise. (837a)
Art. 941. A legacy of generic personal property shall be
valid even if there be no things of the same kind in the
estate.
A devise of indeterminate real property shall be valid only
if there be immovable property of its kind in the estate.
The right of choice shall belong to the executor or
administrator who shall comply with the legacy by the
delivery of a thing which is neither of inferior nor of
superior quality. (875a
Art. 939. If the testator orders the payment of what he
believes he owes but does not in fact owe, the disposition
shall be considered as not written. If as regards a specified
debt more than the amount thereof is ordered paid, the
excess is not due, unless a contrary intention appears.
The foregoing provisions are without prejudice to the
fulfilment of natural obligations. (n)
Art. 942. Whenever the testator expressly leaves the right
of choice to the heir, or to the legatee or devisee, the
former may give or the latter may choose whichever he
may prefer. (876a)
Balane:
•
Legacy/Devise to a creditor
o General rule: It will be treated like any
other legacy/devise and therefore will
not be imputed to the debt.
o Exception: It will be imputed to the
debt if the testator so provides, and if
the debt exceeds the legacy/devise, the
excess may be demanded as an
obligation of the estate.
Art. 940. In alternative legacies or devises, the choice is
presumed to be left to the heir upon whom the obligation
to give the legacy or devise may be imposed, or the
executor or administrator of the estate if no particular
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Art. 943. If the heir, legatee or devisee cannot make the
choice, in case it has been granted him, his right shall pass
to his heirs; but a choice once made shall be irrevocable.
(877a)
Balane:
Rules on validity:
•
Generic legacy – valid even If no such movable
exist in the testator’s estate upon his death. The
estate will simply have to acquire what is given
by legacy.
•
Generic devise – valid only if there exists such an
immovable in the testator’s estate at the time of
his death
Rules on right of choice:
Page 49 of 73
•
•
General rule: the executor or administrator,
acting for the estate has the right of choice.
Exception: if the testator gives the right of choice
to the legatee/devisee, or to the heirs on whom
the obligation to give the benefit is imposed (in a
subsidiary legacy or devise)
Transmissibility of choices:
•
If the choice belongs to the
executor/administrator and he dies before
making the choice – right is transmitted to his
successor in the position.
•
If the choice belongs to the legatee/devisee and
he dies before making the choice – the right
passed to his heirs.
Regarding choices:
•
The choice must be limited to something which
is neither superior nor inferior in quality. This
rule applies whether the choice belongs to the
executor/administrator or the legatee/devisee.
Art. 944. A legacy for education lasts until the legatee is of
age, or beyond the age of majority in order that the legatee
may finish some professional, vocational or general
course, provided he pursues his course diligently.
A legacy for support lasts during the lifetime of the
legatee, if the testator has not otherwise provided.
If the testator has not fixed the amount of such legacies, it
shall be fixed in accordance with the social standing and
the circumstances of the legatee and the value of the
estate.
If the testator or during his lifetime used to give the
legatee a certain sum of money or other things by way of
support, the same amount shall be deemed bequeathed,
unless it be markedly disproportionate to the value of the
estate. (879a)
Balane:
•
On legacy for education:
o The duration is the age of majority or
the completion of a professional,
vocational, or general course,
whichever comes later [in the latter
instance only if the legatee pursues his
studies diligently.]
o On the amount, it is primarily fixed by
the testator. Secodarily is that which is
proper as determined by two variables:
(i) the social standing and
circumstances of the legatee, and (ii)
the value of the disposable portion of
the estate.
•
On legacy for support:
o The duration must be the legatee’s
lifetime unless the testator provides
otherwise.
o The amount is primarily fixed by the
testator. Secondarily is that which the
testator during his lifetime used to give
the legatee by way of support, unless
markedly disproportionate to the value
of the disposable portion. Tertiarily is
that which reasonable, on the basis of
two variables: (i) the social standing
and circumstances of the legatee, and
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
•
(ii) the value of the disposable portion
of the estate.
Legacy of a periodical pension can be demanded
upon testator’s death, and the succeeding ones at
the beginning of the period without duty to
reimburse should the legatee die before the
lapse of the period.
Art. 945. If a periodical pension, or a certain annual,
monthly, or weekly amount is bequeathed, the legatee
may petition the court for the first installment upon the
death of the testator, and for the following ones which
shall be due at the beginning of each period; such payment
shall not be returned, even though the legatee should die
before the expiration of the period which has commenced.
(880a)
Art. 946. If the thing bequeathed should be subject to a
usufruct, the legatee or devisee shall respect such right
until it is legally extinguished. (868a)
Art. 947. The legatee or devisee acquires a right to the
pure and simple legacies or devises from the death of the
testator, and transmits it to his heirs. (881a)
Art. 948. If the legacy or device is of a specific and
determinate thing pertaining to the testator, the legatee or
devisee acquires the ownership thereof upon the death of
the testator, as well as any growing fruits, or unborn
offspring of animals, or uncollected income; but not the
income which was due and unpaid before the latter's
death.
From the moment of the testator's death, the thing
bequeathed shall be at the risk of the legatee or devisee,
who shall, therefore, bear its loss or deterioration, and
shall be benefited by its increase or improvement, without
prejudice to the responsibility of the executor or
administrator. (882a)
Art. 949. If the bequest should not be of a specific and
determinate thing, but is generic or of quantity, its fruits
and interests from the time of the death of the testator
shall pertain to the legatee or devisee if the testator has
expressly so ordered. (884a)
Balane:
Rules on demandability, ownership and fruits of
legacies/devises:
•
Demandability:
o pure – upon testator’s death
o with a (suspensive) term – upon
arrival of the term
o conditional – upon the happening of the
condition
•
When ownership vests:
o pure and determinate – upon testator’s
death
o pure and generic –

if from testator’s estate ‐
upon testator’s death

if acquired from a third
person – upon acquisition
o with a (suspensive) term – upon arrival
of the term, but the right to it vests
upon the testator’s death
Page 50 of 73
o
•
Fruits:
o
o
o
o
conditional (suspensive) – upon the
testator’s death, if the condition is
fulfilled
pure and determinate – upon testator’s
death
pure and generic ‐ upon determination,
unless the testator provides otherwise
with a term – upon arrival of the term
with a condition – upon the happening
of such condition, unless the testator
provides otherwise
Art. 950. If the estate should not be sufficient to cover all
the legacies or devises, their payment shall be made in the
following order:
(1) Remuneratory legacies or devises;
(2) Legacies or devises declared by the testator to be
preferential;
(3) Legacies for support;
(4) Legacies for education;
(5) Legacies or devises of a specific, determinate thing
which forms a part of the estate;
(6) All others pro rata. (887a)
Art. 951. The thing bequeathed shall be delivered with all
its accessories and accessories and in the condition in
which it may be upon the death of the testator. (883a)
Art. 952. The heir, charged with a legacy or devise, or the
executor or administrator of the estate, must deliver the
very thing bequeathed if he is able to do so and cannot
discharge this obligation by paying its value.
Legacies of money must be paid in cash, even though the
heir or the estate may not have any.
The expenses necessary for the delivery of the thing
bequeathed shall be for the account of the heir or the
estate, but without prejudice to the legitime. (886a)
Art. 953. The legatee or devisee cannot take possession of
the thing bequeathed upon his own authority, but shall
request its delivery and possession of the heir charged
with the legacy or devise, or of the executor or
administrator of the estate should he be authorized by the
court to deliver it. (885a)
Art. 954. The legatee or devisee cannot accept a part of
the legacy or devise and repudiate the other, if the latter
be onerous.
Should he die before having accepted the legacy or devise,
leaving several heirs, some of the latter may accept and
the others may repudiate the share respectively belonging
to them in the legacy or devise. (889a)
Art. 955. The legatee or devisee of two legacies or devises,
one of which is onerous, cannot renounce the onerous one
and accept the other. If both are onerous or gratuitous, he
shall be free to accept or renounce both, or to renounce
either. But if the testator intended that the two legacies or
devises should be inseparable from each other, the legatee
or devisee must either accept or renounce both.
Any compulsory heir who is at the same time a legatee or
devisee may waive the inheritance and accept the legacy
or devise, or renounce the latter and accept the former, or
waive or accept both. (890a)
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Balane:
Rules on acceptance and repudiation of
legacies/devises:
1. Aceptance maybe total or partial (as implied
from Art. 954, par.1)
•
Exception: If the legacy/devise is partly
onerous and partly gratuitous, the recipient
cannot accept the gratuitous part and the
renounce the onerous part. Any other
combination however is permitted.
•
If the legatee or devisee dies before
accepting or renouncing, his heirs shall
exercise such right as to their pro‐indiviso
share, and in the same manner as outlined
above.
2. When there is two legacies/devises to the same
recipient:
•
If both gratuitous – the recipient may accept
or renounce either or both
•
If both onerous – same rule as above
•
If one is gratuitous and the other is onerous
– the recipient cannot accept the gratuitous
part and the renounce the onerous part. Any
other combination however is permitted.
3. When legacy or devise is also given to one who is
a compulsory heir
•
The recipient may accept either or both
4. Effect if will provide otherwise – all the rules
above outlined apply in the absence of a
stipulation in the will providing otherwise.
Art. 956. If the legatee or devisee cannot or is unwilling to
accept the legacy or devise, or if the legacy or devise for
any reason should become ineffective, it shall be merged
into the mass of the estate, except in cases of substitution
and of the right of accretion. (888a)
Balane:
Rules in case of repudiation by or incapacity of
legatee/devisee:
1. Primarily – substitution
2. Secondarily – accretion
3. Tertiarily – intestacy
Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect:
(1) If the testator transforms the thing bequeathed in such
a manner that it does not retain either the form or the
denomination it had;
(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the
thing bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood
that in the latter case the legacy or devise shall be without
effect only with respect to the part thus alienated. If after
the alienation the thing should again belong to the
testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract,
the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless
the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the
exercise of the right of repurchase;
(3) If the thing bequeathed is totally lost during the
lifetime of the testator, or after his death without the
heir's fault. Nevertheless, the person obliged to pay the
legacy or devise shall be liable for eviction if the thing
bequeathed should not have been determinate as to its
kind, in accordance with the provisions of Article 928.
(869a)
Page 51 of 73
Balane:
Instances when legacy/devise is revoked by operation of
law:
1. transformation – the testator converts a
plantation into a fishpond
2. alienation – the alienation by the testator may be
onerous or gratuitous.
•
The alienation revokes the legacy/devise
even if for any reason the thing reverts to
the testator.
•
Exceptions:
o If the reversion is caused by the
annulment of the alienation and
the cause for annulment was
vitiation of consent on the
grantor’s part, either by reason of
incapacity or of duress.
o If the reversion is by virtue of
redemption in a sale with pacto de
retro.
3. total loss – this will be a cause for revocation
only if it takes place before the testator’s death.
Fortuitous loss after the testator’s death will not
constitute revocation.
Art. 958. A mistake as to the name of the thing
bequeathed or devised, is of no consequence, if it is
possible to identify the thing which the testator intended
to bequeath or devise. (n)
Art. 959. A disposition made in general terms in favor of
the testator's relatives shall be understood to be in favor
of those nearest in degree. (751)
III.
Legal or Intestate Succession
1. General Provisions
Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or
one which has subsequently lost its validity;
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose
of all the property belonging to the testator. In such case,
legal succession shall take place only with respect to the
property of which the testator has not disposed;
(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution
of heir does not happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir
dies before the testator, or repudiates the inheritance,
there being no substitution, and no right of accretion takes
place;
(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding,
except in cases provided in this Code. (912a)
Balane:
Intestacy:
•
That which takes place by operation of law in
default of compulsory and testamentary
succession. It is the least preferred among the
three modes of succession, but is the most
common.
•
It applies the principle of exclusion and
concurrence (the same principle as in
compulsory succession).
Kinds:
1.
Total – no testamentary disposition; only if there
is no will disposing of the property.
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
2.
Partial – A will that disposes of part of the free
portion; insofar as it does not impair
Instances when legal or intestate succession operates:
(WISE­PIR)
1. If a person dies without a will, or with a void will,
or one which has subsequently lost its validity;
•
Sir: The will does not lose its
validity.
2. When the will does not institute an heir to, or
dispose of all the property belonging to the
testator. In such case, legal succession shall take
place only with respect to the property of which
the testator has not disposed;
3. If the suspensive condition attached to the
institution of heir does not happen or is not
fulfilled, or if the heir does not happen or is not
fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator or
repudiates the inheritance, there being no
substitution, and no right of accretion takes
place.
4. When the heir instituted is incapable of
succeeding, except in cases provided in this
Code.
5. happening of resolutory condition
6. expiration of resolutory term
7. preterition
Art. 961. In default of testamentary heirs, the law vests
the inheritance, in accordance with the rules hereinafter
set forth, in the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of the
deceased, in the surviving spouse, and in the State. (913a)
Art. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in
degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of
representation when it properly takes place.
Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares,
subject to the provisions of article 1006 with respect to
relatives of the full and half blood, and of Article 987,
paragraph 2, concerning division between the paternal
and maternal lines. (912a)
Balane:
Basis of Instate Succession:
•
The presumed will of the decedent, which would
distribute the estate in accordance with the love
and affection he has for his family and close
relatives, and in default of these persons, the
presumed desire of the decedent to promote
charitable and humanitarian.
Basic Rules of Intestacy:
•
The rule of preference of lines
o The three lines of relationship are:

the descending

the ascending

the collateral
o The law lays down an order of
preference among these lines, such that
the descending excludes the ascending
and the collateral, and the ascending
excludes the collateral.
•
The rule of proximity of degree
o The nearer exclude the more remote
without prejudice to representation.
Page 52 of 73
•
The rule of equality among relatives of the same
degree
o If the nearer exlucde the more remote,
logically those of equal degree should
inherit in equal shares
o Exceptions to rule of equality in the
same degree:

the rule of preference of lines,
supra

the distinction between the
legitimate and illegitmate
filiation

the rule of division by line in
the ascending line

the distinction between full‐
blood and half‐blood
relationships among brothers
and sisters, as well as
nephews and nieces

representation
Class Notes:
Additional rule of intestacy (not found in the book):
•
The rule of relationship (there are four kinds):
(FaBSS)
a. Family – Jus familial, ascendants and
descendants in the direct line
b. Blood – Jus sanguinis, collaterals up to
the fifth degree
c. Spouse – Jus conjugis
d. State – Jus imperii, the right of
sovereignty
1.1. Relationship
Art. 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the
number of generations. Each generation forms a degree.
(915)
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be
either direct or collateral.
A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees
among ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees
among persons who are not ascendants and descendants,
but who come from a common ancestor. (916a)
Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending.
The former unites the head of the family with those who
descend from him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom he
descends. (917)
Art. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there
are generations or persons, excluding the progenitor.
In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor.
Thus, the child is one degree removed from the parent,
two from the grandfather, and three from the great‐
grandparent.
In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common
ancestor and then descent is made to the person with
whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is
two degrees removed from his brother, three from his
uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first
cousin, and so forth. (918a)
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Balane:
Line:
•
Direct
o Descending
o Ascending
•
Collateral
o Direct and Collateral – Importance of
distinction: the direct is preferred over
the collateral.
o Descending direct and ascending direct
– Importance of distinction: The desce
Computation of degrees:
•
Direct line – there is no legal limit to the number
of degrees for entitlement to intestate
succession. The practical limit, of course, is
human mortality.
o Mode of counting degrees in the direct
line:

one generation = one degree

parent‐child = one degree

grandparent‐grandchild = two
degrees

great‐grandparents‐great‐
grandchild = third degrees;
and so forth
•
Collateral line – Computation of degrees is
particularly important in the collateral line
because intestate succession extends only to the
5th of collateral relationship.
o Modes of counting degrees in the
collateral line:

From one reference point,
ascend to nearest common
ancestor [If there are more
than one nearest common
ancestor, choose any one]

Then descend to the other
reference point

Number of generations
constituting the ascent and
the descent is the degree of
collateral relationship
o Collateral by Degrees

First degree – none

Second degree –
brothers/sisters

Third degree
•
Uncles/Aunts
•
Nephews/Nieces

Fourth degree
•
First cousins
•
Brothers/Sisters of a
grandparent
(granduncles/grand
aunts)
•
Grandchildren of a
brother/sister
(grand‐
nephews/grand‐
nieces)

Fifth degree
•
Children of a first
cousin
•
First cousins of a
parent
Page 53 of 73
•
•
Brothers/sisters of a
great‐grandparent
Great grandchildren
of a brother/sister
Art. 967. Full blood relationship is that existing between
persons who have the same father and the same mother.
Half blood relationship is that existing between persons
who have the same father, but not the same mother, or the
same mother, but not the same father. (920a)
Balane:
Importance of rules on relationships:
•
The nearer excludes the more remote
•
Direct line is preferred over the collateral
•
Descending line is preferred over the ascending
Two basic concepts in relationship:
•
Concept of degree – This method of computing
the proximity of relationship. Every degree is
one generation.
•
Concept of lines – These are relative positions in
the family between 2 persons.
o In intestacy:

There is no limit in the direct
line either ascending or
descending.

There is a limit of five degrees
in the collateral line (2
persons having a common
ancestor)
Art. 968. If there are several relatives of the same degree,
and one or some of them are unwilling or incapacitated to
succeed, his portion shall accrue to the others of the same
degree, save the right of representation when it should
take place. (922)
Balane:
•
There is accretion in intestacy among heirs of the
same degree, in case of predecease, incapacity or
renunciation of any of them.
•
In case of predecease or incapacity,
representation, if proper, will prevent accretion
from occurring.
•
Relatives must be in the same kind of
relationship. For accretion to take place the heirs
involved must be in the same kind of
relationship to the decedent. Thus, there can be
no accretion among a grandchild, a grandparent
and a brother of the decedent because they are
not inheriting together in the first place.
Art. 969. If the inheritance should be repudiated by the
nearest relative, should there be one only, or by all the
nearest relatives called by law to succeed, should there be
several, those of the following degree shall inherit in their
own right and cannot represent the person or persons
repudiating the inheritance. (923)
Balane:
Effect of Renunciation by All in the Same Degree:
•
The descending line first – if all the descendants
of a certain degree renounce, succession passes
to the descendants of the next degree, and so on,
ad indefinitum.
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
•
•
The ascending line next – Should no one be left in
the descending line, the heirs in the ascending
acquire the right of succession, again in order of
degrees of proximity;
The collateral line last – Only if all the
descendants and ascendants renounce will the
collateral relatives acquire the right to succeed.
Predecease or Incapacity by All in the Same Degree:
•
This eventuality is not provided for by this
article. The rules above are equally applicable to
such a situation except in cases where
representation is proper, i.e., in the descending
line.
•
Representation does not apply in cases of
universal renunciation outlined above.
1.2. Right of Representation
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of
law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the
place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited. (942a)
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by
the law and not by the person represented. The
representative does not succeed the person represented
but the one whom the person represented would have
succeeded. (n)
Art. 972. The right of representation takes place in the
direct descending line, but never in the ascending.
In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the
children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full
or half blood. (925)
Art. 973. In order that representation may take place, it is
necessary that the representative himself be capable of
succeeding the decedent. (n)
Art. 974. Whenever there is succession by representation,
the division of the estate shall be made per stirpes, in such
manner that the representative or representatives shall
not inherit more than what the person they represent
would inherit, if he were living or could inherit. (926a)
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or
sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the
latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles
or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in
equal portions. (927)
Art. 976. A person may represent him whose inheritance
he has renounced. (928a)
Art. 977. Heirs who repudiate their share may not be
represented. (929a)
Balane:
Instances when representation operates: (DIP)
•
Predecease
•
Incapacity or Unworthiness
•
Disinheritance
Page 54 of 73
In what kind of succession representation operates:
•
The legitime – there is no express provision on
representation in legitime, except in Article 923,
in case of disinheritance.
•
Intestacy – there is no representation in
testamentary succession.
In what lines does representation obtain:
•
With respect to the legitime – in the direct
descending line only
•
With respect to intestacy
o In the direct descending line
o In one instance in the collateral; i.e.
nephews and nieces representing
brothers and sisters of the deceased.
Representation by illegitimate children:
•
If the child to be represented is legitimate – only
legitimate children/descendants can represent
him
•
If the child to be represented is illegitimate ‐
both legitimate and illegitimate
children/descendants can represent him
Representation of and by an adopted child:
•
An adopted can neither represent or be
represented.
Teotico vs. Del Val (1965)
F: Oppositor claims to be an adopted daughter of
Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix. SC
ruled that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as
testamentary or as legal heir in the probate proceeding of
the deceased sister of her adopted mother.
H: Relationship of adoption is limited solely to the adopter
and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of
the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as
expressly provided for by law. As a consequence, the
adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of
the adopter.
Represenation by a renouncer:
•
Although a renouncer cannot be represented, he
can represent the person whose inheritance he
has renounced.
How representation operates:
•
Per stirpes – the representative or
representatives receive only what the person
represented would have received. If there are
more than one representative in the same
degree, then divide the portion equally, without
prejudice to the distinction between legitimate
and illegitimate children, when applicable.
Rules on Qualification:
•
The representative must be qualified to succeed
the decedent.
•
The representative need not be qualified to
succeed the person represented.
•
The person represented need not be qualified to
succeed the decedent – in fact, the reason why
representation is taking place is that the person
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
represented is not qualified, because of
predecease, or in capacity or disinheritance.
Representation by grandchildren and Representation
by nephews/nieces: Difference Rule
•
If all the children are disqualified – the
grandchildren still inherit by representation.
•
If all the brothers/sisters are disqualified – the
nephews/nieces inherit per capita.
•
Note: If only some, not all children or
brothers/sisters are disqualifed the rule is the
same.
2.
Order of Intestate Succession
Intestate Heirs
I. Legitimate Children/Descendants
II. Illegitimate Children/Descendants
III. Legitimate Parents/Ascendants
IV. Illegitimate Parents
V. Surviving Spouse
VI. Brothers, Sisters, Nephews, Nieces
VII. Other Collaterals – to the 5th degree
VIII. State
Class Notes:
•
It is correct to say that a compulsory heir is an
intestate heir. But it is not correct to say that an
intestate heir is not a compulsory heir.
Intestacy
Balane:
Rules of Exclusion and Concurrence:
(Note: Children include, in proper cases, other
descendants; and parents, other ascendants.)
1. legitimate children
a. exclude parents, collaterals & State
b. concur with surviving spouse &
illegitimate children
c. are excluded by no one
2. illegitimate children
a. exclude illegitimate parents, collaterals
& State
b. concur with surviving spouse,
legitimate children, and legitimate
parents
c. are excluded by no one
3. legitimate parents
a. exclude collaterals & state
b. concur with illegitimate children &
surviving spouse
c. are excluded by legitimate children
4. illegitimate parents [only, not ascendants]
a. exclude collaterals & State
b. concur with surviving spouse
c. are excluded by legitimate children and
illegitimate children
5. surviving spouse
a. excludes collaterals other than
brothers, sisters, nephews & nieces, &
State
b. concur with legitimate children,
illegitimate children, legitimate
Page 55 of 73
6.
7.
8.
parents, illegitimate parents, brothers
sisters, nephews & nieces
c. is excluded by no one
brothers & sisters, nephews & nieces
a. exclude all other collaterals & the State
b. concur with surviving spouse
c. are excluded by legitimate children,
illegitimate children, legitimate
parents, and illegitimate parents
Other collaterals
a. exclude collaterals in remoter degrees
& the State
b. concur with collaterals in the same
degree
c. are excluded by legitimate children,
illegitimate children, legitimate
parents, illegitimate parents, surviving
spouse, brothers & sisters, and
nephews & nieces
State
a. excludes no one
b. concurs with no one
c. is excluded by everyone
Class Notes:
•
Number 5 surviving spouse does not exclude the
group in number 6.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
Balane:
Combinations in Intestate Succession (found passim in
Art. 978):
1. legitimate children alone
•
the whole estate divided equally
2. legitimate children & illegitimate children
•
the whole estate, each illegitimate child
getting ½ the share of one legitimate
child
3. legitimate children & surviving spouse
•
the whole estate, divided equally (the
surviving spouse counted as one
legitimate child)
4. legitimate children, surviving spouse &
illegitimate children
•
the whole estate, the surviving spouse
being counted as one legitimate child
•
each illegitimate child getting ½ the
share of one legitimate
5. legitimate parents alone
•
the whole estate divided equally
6. legitimate ascendants (other than parents) alone
•
the whole estate, observing, in proper
cases, the rule of division by line
7. legitimate parents & illegitimate children*
•
legitimate parents – ½ of the estate
•
illegitimate children – ½ of the estate
8. legitimate parents & suriving spouse*
•
legitimate parents – ½ of the estate
•
surviving spouse – ½ of the estate
9. legitimate parents, surviving spouse, illegitimate
children*
•
legitimate parents – ½ of the estate
•
surviving spouse – ¼ of the estate
•
illegitimate children – ¼ of the estate
10. illegitimate children alone
•
the whole estate divided equally
11. illegitimate children & surviving spouse*
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
•
illegitimate children – ½ of the estate
•
surviving spouse – ½ of the estate
surviving spouse alone
•
the whole estate
surviving spouse & illegitimate parents (no
article governing, combination applied by
analogy with Art. 997)*
•
surviving spouse – ½ of the estate
•
illegitimate parents – ½ of the estate
surviving spouse & legitimate brothers & sisters,
nephews & nieces*
•
surviving spouse – ½ of the estate
•
legitimate brothers, sisters, nephews,
nieces – ½ of the estate (the nephews &
nieces inheriting by representation, in
the proper cases)
surviving spouse & illegitimate brothers &
sisters, nephews & nieces*
•
surviving spouse – ½ of the estate
•
illegitimate brothers, sisters, nephews,
nieces – ½ of the estate (the nephews &
nieces inheriting by representation, in
the proper cases)
•
the illegitimate brothers & sisters are
those mentioned in Art. 994.
illegitimate parents alone
•
the whole estate
illegitimate parents & children of any kind
•
illegitimate parents – excluded
•
children inherit in accordance with
Nos. 1, 2 & 10.
legitimate brothers & sisters alone
•
the whole estate, with a brother/sister
of the half‐blood inheriting ½ of the
estate the share of a brother/sister of
the full blood
legitimate brothers & sisters, nephews & nieces
•
the whole estate, observing the 2:1
proportion of the full‐and half‐blood
fraternity (No. 18 supra) and the
nephews and nieces inheriting by
representation in the proper cases
nephew & nieces with uncles & aunts
•
by inference uncles and aunts –
excluded (accdg. to Bacayo v.
Borromeo) nephews and nieces
inheriting in accordance with No. 23
infra
illegitimate brothers and sisters alone – no
article governing
•
the whole estate, observing the 2:1
proportion of full‐ and half‐ blood
fraternity – by analogy with No. 18
supra
illegitimate brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces ‐ no article governing
•
the whole estate, as in No. 19 supra, by
analogy
nephews & nieces alone
•
the whole estate, per capita, but
observing the 2:1 proportion for the
full‐ and the half‐ blood
other collaterals
•
the whole estate, per capita, the nearer
in degree excluding the more remote
State
Page 56 of 73
•
•
•
the whole estate
Assignment & disposition of decedent’s
assets
o If the decedent was a resident
of the Philippines at any time:

Personal property –
to municipality of
last residence

Real property –
where situated
o If the decedent never a
resident of the Philippines:

Personal and real
property – where
respectively situated
How property is to be used
o For the benefit of public
educational and charitable
institutions in the respective
municipalities/cities
o Alternatively, at the instance
of an interested party, or
motu propio, court may order
creation of a permanent trust
for the benefit of the
institutions concerned
Class Notes:
•
Follow the rules except for number 2 and
number 4. Both have different steps from the
step. Be careful because you might end up
impairing the legitime.
•
Just follow the rules on intestacy, the legitimes
will never be impaired. They are automatically
covered by the rules.
•
But Art. 983 (which covers number 2 also) might
impair the legitime.
Illustration on how Art. 983 can impair the legitime:
X’s estate is worth P1,800,000
|
A
4M
|
B
4M
:
C
2M
X (decedent)
:
:
D
E
2M
2M
:
F
2M
2M
:
G
Here the legitime of A and B is impaired because their
legitime is P900,000 and their share together is P800,000.
There is a deficit of P100,000 in their legitime.
Since Art. 983 impairs the legitime as shown in the
illustration, two steps must be followed to avoid such:
1. Give the legitime first – legitimate before
illegitimate.
2. If there is an excess divided it to a ratio of 2:1.
3. If lacking, reduce the share of illegitimate
children pro‐rata.
|
B
4.5
Reduction of share of each illegitimate child:
225,000 (deficit) / 5 (illegitimate children) = P45,000.
The share of each illegitimate child should be reduced by
P45,000. Thus from P225,000, each illegitimate child will
now get P180,000 each.
Class Notes:
•
Number 1 illustrated total intestacy.
•
Number 15 will only happen in one case.
o In a case where X has three children, A
(legitimate), B (illegitimate) and C
(illegitimate), when B dies, A cannot
inherit from him (and B cannot inherit
from him) but C can.
o This is not prohibited by Article 992.
o In Manuel v. Ferrer: “When the law
speaks of ‘brothers and sisters,
nephews and nieces’ as legal heirs of an
illegitimate child, it refers to
illegitimate brothers and sisters as well
as to the children, whether legitimate of
illegitimate of such brothers and
sisters.”
•
In number 20, if there are nephews and nieces,
they exclude uncles and aunts.
Sample Problems:
1. Patrick, illegitimate child of the late Don Ruben
by his late mistress Evelyn dies in a vehicular
accident while riding his Harley because he hates
wearing a helmet. He did not leave a will and his
estate is worth P25,000,000. His spouse Amirah
and his full sister Cielo were devastated by his
abrupt death. Meanwhile Robert, Don Ruben’s
child by his wife Araceli, is also maddened with
grief as he was not able to make peace with his
estranged brother. How should Mr. Patrick’s
estate be distributed?
2. Serafin, a notorious womanizer and self‐
proclaimed Cassanova, was killed in flagrante
delicto with his current mistress Danica. He was
shot by John Mark, Danica’s ex‐boyfriend when
he caught them together. This scandalized his
wife Lorie to no end. To compound the wife’s
grief, Danica’s children with Serafin: Auring,
Koring, Kristina, Paula, Ogie and Joselit are
fighting with Lorie’s twin children Jess and
Roslene over their late father’s estate which is
worth only P500,000. How should the estate be
apportioned?
2.1. Descending Direct Line
Art. 978. Succession pertains, in the first place, to the
descending direct line. (930)
Illustration:
|
A
4.5
The total is P2,025,000. The estate is only P1,800,000.
There is a deficit of P225,000. The solution is to reduce the
shares of illegitimate children pro‐rata.
:
C
2.25
X (decedent)
:
:
:
D
E
F
2.25
2.25
2.25 2.25
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
:
G
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants
succeed the parents and other ascendants, without
distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come
from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting
Page 57 of 73
parents in the same manner as a legitimate child. (931a)
the entire estate of the child. (936)
Balane:
•
The right of an adopted child in relation to his
adopter is now governed by Secs. 17 and 18 of
R.A. 8552, which lays down the same rule as the
second paragraph of this article.
Art. 987. In default of the father and mother, the
ascendants nearest in degree shall inherit.
Should there be more than one of equal degree belonging
to the same line they shall divide the inheritance per
capita; should they be of different lines but of equal
degree, one‐half shall go to the paternal and the other half
to the maternal ascendants. In each line the division shall
be made per capita. (937)
Sayson vs. Court of Appeals (1992)
F: Private respondents who are adopted children of
Teodoro and Isabel, filed a claim in the estate of the
parents of their adopters.
H: SC held that the private respondents exclusive heirs of
their parents and deemed to as total strangers to their
grandparents. The adopted child shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, but
these rights do not include the right of representation.
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit
from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in
equal shares. (932)
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and
descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the
former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by
right of representation. (934a)
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall
inherit by right of representation, and if any one of them
should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion
pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in
equal portions. (933)
Art. 983. If illegitimate children survive with legitimate
children, the shares of the former shall be in the
proportions prescribed by Article 895. (n)
Balane:
•
Segregate the legitimes of the children – both
legitimate and illegitimate.
•
If any residue is left, apportion it in proportion of
2:1
•
If the estate may not be sufficient to satisfy the
legitimes, the legitimes of the illegitimates will
have to be reduced pro rata.
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving
no children or descendants, his parents and relatives by
consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.
(n)
Balane:
•
Repealed by Secs. 17 and 18 of R.A. 8552.
2.2. Ascending Direct Line
Art. 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants
of the deceased, his parents and ascendants shall inherit
from him, to the exclusion of collateral relatives. (935a)
Art. 986. The father and mother, if living, shall inherit in
equal shares.
Should one only of them survive, he or she shall succeed to
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
2.3. Illegitimate Children
Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or
ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased. (939a)
Art. 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there
should survive descendants of another illegitimate child
who is dead, the former shall succeed in their own right
and the latter by right of representation. (940a)
Art. 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two
preceding articles to illegitimate children shall be
transmitted upon their death to their descendants, who
shall inherit by right of representation from their
deceased grandparent. (941a)
Art. 991. If legitimate ascendants are left, the illegitimate
children shall divide the inheritance with them, taking
one‐half of the estate, whatever be the number of the
ascendants or of the illegitimate children. (942‐841a)
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
(943a)
Corpuz vs Administrator (1978)
F: Deceased Teodoro has no forced heirs. His closest
relatives were half‐siblings. Tomas, the son, of Juanita,
who is in turn the daughter of Teodoro’s half‐brother Jose,
filed an action to recover her mother’s supposed share in
the intestate estate of the decedent.
H: Juanita is not a legal heir of Teodoro since there is no
reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate
relatives. The rule is based on the theory that the
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the
legitimate family, while the latter is, in turn, hated by the
illegitimate child.
Leonardo vs Court of Appeals (1983)
F: Petitioner Cresenciano, claiming to be the son of the late
Sotero, sought to be declared one of the lawful heirs of
decedent who is the grandfather of Sotero.
H: At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who
has no right to inherit in ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father, like the deceased.
Diaz vs. IAC (1987)
Page 58 of 73
F: The case involves a dispute between the petitioners, the
illegitimate children of decedent’s son Pablo Santero, and
the decedent’s niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin, as to who could
legally inherit from the decedent. Petitioners allege that
they could inherit by right of representation of their
father, who is a legitimate child of the decedent.
H: SC held the legal heir to be the niece. The New Civil
Code still does not confer to illegitimate children the right
to represent their parents in the inheritance of their
legitimate grandparents, even if the New Civil Code have
made illegitimate children as compulsory primary heirs
under Art. 887.
Diaz vs. IAC (1990)
F: A second MR from the earlier 1987 case. Issue here is
does the term “relatives” in Art. 992 include the legitimate
parents of the father or mother of the illegitimate
children? May these illegitimate children of Pablo (father)
inherit from Simona (grandmother), by right of
representation of their father Pablo who was a legitimate
son?
H: Art. 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato
between an illegitimate child and the legitimate children
and “relatives” of the father or mother of said legitimate
child.
Art. 993. If an illegitimate child should die without issue,
either legitimate or illegitimate, his father or mother shall
succeed to his entire estate; and if the child's filiation is
duly proved as to both parents, who are both living, they
shall inherit from him share and share alike. (944)
Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate
child shall be succeeded by his or her surviving spouse
who shall be entitled to the entire estate.
If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and
sisters, nephews and nieces, she or he shall inheritt one‐
half of the estate, and the latter the other half. (945a)
Balane:
•
According to jurisprudence, when the law speaks
of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces as
legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to
illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as the
children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of
such brothers and sisters.
2.4. Surviving Spouse
Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and
ascendants, and illegitimate children and their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the
surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without
prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews
and nieces, should there be any, under article 1001.
(946a)
Art. 996. If a widow or widower and legitimate children
or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the
succession the same share as that of each of the children.
(834a)
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Balane:
•
This rule holds even if there is only one
legitimate child, in which case the child and the
surviving spouse will divide the estate equally.
Santillon vs. Miranda (1965)
F: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be
divided when the only survivors are the spouse and one
legitimate child? The son is claiming that Art. 892 should
be applied while the wife states that the division is ½
between them.
H: SC ruled for the wife. Art. 996 which applies in
intestacy should be read: “If the widow or widower and a
legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the same
share as that of the child.”
Art. 997. When the widow or widower survives with
legitimate parents or ascendants, the surviving spouse
shall be entitled to one‐half of the estate, and the
legitimate parents or ascendants to the other half. (836a)
Art. 998. If a widow or widower survives with illegitimate
children, such widow or widower shall be entitled to one‐
half of the inheritance, and the illegitimate children or
their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, to
the other half. (n)
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with
legitimate children or their descendants and illegitimate
children or their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to
the same share as that of a legitimate child. (n)
Art. 1000. If legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse,
and illegitimate children are left, the ascendants shall be
entitled to one‐half of the inheritance, and the other half
shall be divided between the surviving spouse and the
illegitimate children so that such widow or widower shall
have one‐fourth of the estate, and the illegitimate children
the other fourth. (841a)
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one‐half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other half. (953, 837a)
Art. 1002. In case of a legal separation, if the surviving
spouse gave cause for the separation, he or she shall not
have any of the rights granted in the preceding articles. (n)
2.5. Collateral Relatives
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased
in accordance with the following articles. (946a)
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and
sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.
(947)
Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together
with nephews and nieces, who are the children of the
Page 59 of 73
descendant's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the
former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes.
(948)
Art. 1006. Should brother and sisters of the full blood
survive together with brothers and sisters of the half
blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that
of the latter. (949)
Art. 1007. In case brothers and sisters of the half blood,
some on the father's and some on the mother's side, are
the only survivors, all shall inherit in equal shares without
distinction as to the origin of the property. (950)
Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half
blood shall succeed per capita or per stirpes, in
accordance with the rules laid down for the brothers and
sisters of the full blood. (915)
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters
nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral
relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them by reason of relationship by the
whole blood. (954a)
Art. 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not
extend beyond the fifth degree of relationship in the
collateral line. (955a)
2.6. The State
Art. 1011. In default of persons entitled to succeed in
accordance with the provisions of the preceding Sections,
the State shall inherit the whole estate. (956a)
Art. 1012. In order that the State may take possession of
the property mentioned in the preceding article, the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court must be
observed. (958a)
Art. 1013. After the payment of debts and charges, the
personal property shall be assigned to the municipality or
city where the deceased last resided in the Philippines,
and the real estate to the municipalities or cities,
respectively, in which the same is situated.
If the deceased never resided in the Philippines, the whole
estate shall be assigned to the respective municipalities or
cities where the same is located.
Such estate shall be for the benefit of public schools, and
public charitable institutions and centers, in such
municipalities or cities. The court shall distribute the
estate as the respective needs of each beneficiary may
warrant.
The court, at the instance of an interested party, or on its
own motion, may order the establishment of a permanent
trust, so that only the income from the property shall be
used. (956a)
IV.
1.
Provisions Common to Testate and
Intestate Succession
Right of Accretion
two or more persons are called to the same inheritance,
devise or legacy, the part assigned to the one who
renounces or cannot receive his share, or who died before
the testator, is added or incorporated to that of his co‐
heirs, co‐devisees, or co‐legatees. (n)
Art. 1016. In order that the right of accretion may take
place in a testamentary succession, it shall be necessary:
(1) That two or more persons be called to the same
inheritance, or to the same portion thereof, pro indiviso;
and
(2) That one of the persons thus called die before the
testator, or renounce the inheritance, or be incapacitated
to receive it. (928a)
Accretion
a. Definition (Art. 1015)
Occasions for the operation of accretion:
•
Renunciation
•
Predecease
•
Incapacity
b.
Elements (Art. 1016)
Pro indiviso – “as undivided” or “in common”; does not
import equality
Ex:
I give my portion to A, B and C
I give 1/8 of my estate to A, B and C
Can there be accretion if the shares are not equal?
Ex: A to get ½, B to get 1/3, and C to get 1/6
•
Tolentino: NO. Must be equal.
•
Sir: Yes, it is possible. See Art. 1019, which
contemplates unequal shares.
Art. 1017. The words "one‐half for each" or "in equal
shares" or any others which, though designating an
aliquot part, do not identify it by such description as shall
make each heir the exclusive owner of determinate
property, shall not exclude the right of accretion.
In case of money or fungible goods, if the share of each
heir is not earmarked, there shall be a right of accretion.
(983a)
Art. 1018. In legal succession the share of the person
who repudiates the inheritance shall always accrue to his
co‐heirs. (981)
In intestacy, accretion occurs: (RIP)
a. In repudiation or renunciation
b. In predecease, only if representation does not
take place
c. In incapacity or unworthiness, only if
representation does not take place
The co‐heirs in whose favor accretion occurs must be co‐
heirs in the same category as the excluded heir.
Art. 1015. Accretion is a right by virtue of which, when
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Page 60 of 73
Art. 1019. The heirs to whom the portion goes by the
right of accretion take it in the same proportion that they
inherit. (n)
Art. 1020. The heirs to whom the inheritance accrues
shall succeed to all the rights and obligations which the
heir who renounced or could not receive it would have
had. (984)
Exceptions:
a. In testamentary succession, if the testator
provides otherwise
b. If the obligation is purely personal, and hence,
intransmissible
Art. 1021. Among the compulsory heirs the right of
accretion shall take place only when the free portion is left
to two or more of them, or to any one of them and to a
stranger.
Should the part repudiated be the legitime, the other co‐
heirs shall succeed to it in their own right, and not by the
right of accretion. (985)
In what kinds of succession does accretion take place?
1) Testamentary succession
2) Intestate succession
Not compulsory (refer to par. 2, Art. 1021)
Art. 1022. In testamentary succession, when the right of
accretion does not take place, the vacant portion of the
instituted heirs, if no substitute has been designated, shall
pass to the legal heirs of the testator, who shall receive it
with the same charges and obligations. (986)
In testamentary succession, accretion is subordinate to
substitution, if the testator has so provided.
•
Substitution – express intent
•
Accretion – implied intent
No substitution, No accretion: Vacant part will lapse into
intestacy and be disposed of accordingly
2.
Capacity to Succeed by Will or by Intestacy
Art. 1024. Persons not incapacitated by law may succeed
by will or ab intestato.
The provisions relating to incapacity by will are equally
applicable to intestate succession. (744, 914)
Gen. Rule: In favor of capacity to succeed, as long as
successor has juridical personality
To prove incapacity: Legal ground; Must be shown
Par. 2 is wrong.
Art. 1025. In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir,
devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
succession opens, except in case of representation, when it
is proper.
A child already conceived at the time of the death of the
decedent is capable of succeeding provided it be born
later under the conditions prescribed in article 41. (n)
Par. 1 is wrong; there is no exception.
Natural Persons: Requirement for capacity to succeed:
Must be living when succession opens
See Arts. 40 and 41 of the Civil Code
•
•
Living: already conceived when decedent dies,
provided it be born later
When succession opens: Decedent’s death
If institution is subject to a suspensive condition: Must
be living both when decedent dies and when the condition
happens.
If institution is subject to a suspensive term: Must be
living when decedent dies
Exception: None
Parish Priest of Roman Catholic Church of Victoria,
Tarlac vs. Rigor (1979)
F: Testator intended to devise his riceland to his “nearest
male relative who would become a priest after his death”.
There was an ambiguity as to whether he contemplated
only his nearest male relative at the time of his death or
any of his nearest male relatives at any time after the
same.
H: The bequest refers to the testator’s nearest male
relative living at the time of his death and not to any
indefinite time thereafter.
Art. 1026. A testamentary disposition may be made to
the State, provinces, municipal corporations, private
corporations, organizations, or associations for religious,
scientific, cultural, educational, or charitable purposes.
All other corporations or entities may succeed under a
will, unless there is a provision to the contrary in their
charter or the laws of their creation, and always subject to
the same. (746a)
Juridical Persons: Requirement for capacity to succeed:
Must exist as a juridical person when the decedent dies.
(1) The State and its political subdivisions
•
State: must have acquired the 4 elements –
territory, people, government, sovereignty
•
Local government unit: must have been created
by law
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public
interest or purpose, created by law
•
their personality begins as soon as they have
been constituted according to law;
Page 61 of 73
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for
private interest or purpose
•
Corporation: must have been created in
accordance with the Corporation Code
•
Partnership: partners must have agreed (except
when real property is contributed, where you’ll
need a public instrument
Except for the State, Juridical persons cannot succeed by
legitime or intestacy.
Art. 1027. The following are incapable of succeeding:
(1) The priest who heard the confession of the testator
during his last illness, or the minister of the gospel who
extended spiritual aid to him during the same period;
(2) The relatives of such priest or minister of the gospel
within the fourth degree, the church, order, chapter,
community, organization, or institution to which such
priest or minister may belong;
(3) A guardian with respect to testamentary dispositions
given by a ward in his favor before the final accounts of
the guardianship have been approved, even if the testator
should die after the approval thereof; nevertheless, any
provision made by the ward in favor of the guardian when
the latter is his ascendant, descendant, brother, sister, or
spouse, shall be valid;
A makes a will in favor of his pastor. Later, he becomes
seriously ill, and calls the pastor for spiritual
ministration. A dies. Is the pastor disqualified? No.
Proper sequence: A is dying  Summons pastor 
Spiritual ministration  During or After spiritual
ministration, he makes a will, with a disposition in favor of
the pastor  A dies
Does the prohibition apply to ministers of religions
other than the Christian denomination?
Yes, if such religion has a counterpart (someone who gives
spiritual ministration)
Par. 2
Purpose:
To
prevent
indirect
violations or circumventions of Par. 1
Suppose B summons a priest, who is also his son, and he
makes a disposition in his will, in his son’s favor. B’s son
is disqualified from receiving the terstamentary
disposition, but not to his legitime.
Par. 3
•
•
Requisite: Will must have been executed by
the ward during the effectivity of the
guardianship
To whom applicable: Guardians of persons
and property
(4) Any attesting witness to the execution of a will, the
spouse, parents, or children, or any one claiming under
such witness, spouse, parents, or children;
Exception: Guardian who is also an
ascendant, descendant, brother, sister or
spouse of ward‐testator
(5) Any physician, surgeon, nurse, health officer or
druggist who took care of the testator during his last
illness;
Note: the provision does not exclude the relatives of the
guardian, unlike the rule for priests
(6) Individuals, associations and corporations not
permitted by law to inherit. (745, 752, 753, 754a)
There is an exception. See Art. 823, where
the witness may be qualified if there are 3
other witnesses
Par. 1­5:
•
Apply only to natural persons
•
Applicable in testamentary succession, not to
legitime or intestacy
•
Rationale: The law seeks to prevent possible
abuse of moral or spiritual ascendancy
•
Duress or influence is conclusively presumed;
need not be proved
Par. 1
•
•
Par. 4
•
Par. 5
•
Scope of prohibition: Person must have
taken care of the testator during the latter’s
final illness
“Taking care” means medical attendance
with some regularity or continuity
Par. 6:
Total disqualification; Should be a separate
article
To whom applicable: priests, pastors,
ministers etc. belonging to religions, sects or
cults, whose office or function it is to extend
the peculiar spiritual ministrations of their
creed
Art. 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in article 739,
concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to
testamentary provisions. (n)
Requisites:
a. Will must have been executed during
the testator’s last illness
b. Spiritual ministration must have
extended during the last illness
c. Will must have been executed during or
after the spiritual ministration
Art. 1029. Should the testator dispose of the whole or
part of his property for prayers and pious works for the
benefit of his soul, in general terms and without specifying
its application, the executor, with the court's approval
shall deliver one‐half thereof or its proceeds to the church
or denomination to which the testator may belong, to be
used for such prayers and pious works, and the other half
to the State, for the purposes mentioned in Article 1013.
(747a)
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Page 62 of 73
Requisites:
a. Disposition for prayers and pious works for the
benefit of the testator’s soul
b. No specification of application of disposition
Apportionment of disposition or its proceeds:
•
½ to the church or denomination to which the
testator belonged
•
½ to the State (see Art. 1013)
Art. 1030. Testamentary provisions in favor of the poor in
general, without designation of particular persons or of
any community, shall be deemed limited to the poor living
in the domicile of the testator at the time of his death,
unless it should clearly appear that his intention was
otherwise.
The designation of the persons who are to be considered
as poor and the distribution of the property shall be made
by the person appointed by the testator for the purpose;
in default of such person, by the executor, and should
there be no executor, by the justice of the peace, the
mayor, and the municipal treasurer, who shall decide by a
majority of votes all questions that may arise. In all these
cases, the approval of the Court of First Instance shall be
necessary.
The preceding paragraph shall apply when the testator
has disposed of his property in favor of the poor of a
definite locality. (749a)
Beneficiaries: The poor
Par. 1 refers to the poor of the testator’s domicile, unless
excluded by the testator in his will.
Who determines the individual beneficiaries within the
class designated by the testator? AEA
a. Person authorized by the testator, or in his
default
b. Executor, or in his default
c. Administator
against the life of the testator, his or her spouse,
descendants, or ascendants;
(3) Any person who has accused the testator of a crime for
which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or
more, if the accusation has been found groundless;
(4) Any heir of full age who, having knowledge of the
violent death of the testator, should fail to report it to an
officer of the law within a month, unless the authorities
have already taken action; this prohibition shall not apply
to cases wherein, according to law, there is no obligation
to make an accusation;
(5) Any person convicted of adultery or concubinage with
the spouse of the testator;
(6) Any person who by fraud, violence, intimidation, or
undue influence should cause the testator to make a will
or to change one already made;
(7) Any person who by the same means prevents another
from making a will, or from revoking one already made, or
who supplants, conceals, or alters the latter's will;
(8) Any person who falsifies or forges a supposed will of
the decedent. (756, 673, 674a)
Application: all kinds of succession
Grounds for unworthiness:
Pars. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6: see discussion under Art. 919 (as
grounds for disinheritance)
Par. 4:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Heir has knowledge of violent death of the
decedent
Heir is of legal age
Heir fails to report it to all officer of the law
within a month after learning of it
Authorities have not yet taken action
Legal obligation for the heir to make an
accusation
Effect of Unworthiness: Total disqualification by any
form of succession
Art. 1031. A testamentary provision in favor of a
disqualified person, even though made under the guise of
an onerous contract, or made through an intermediary,
shall be void. (755)
Effect of simulation or circumvention: Disposition is
void, hence ineffective as to the intended beneficiary and
the intermediary.
Intestate heirs, to whom the property would go, have the
right to claim the nullity.
Art. 1032. The following are incapable of succeeding by
reason of unworthiness:
(1) Parents who have abandoned their children or
induced their daughters to lead a corrupt or immoral life,
or attempted against their virtue;
Art. 1033. The cause of unworthiness shall be without
effect if the testator had knowledge thereof at the time he
made the will, or if, having known of them subsequently,
he should condone them in writing. (757a)
2 ways to restore capacity:
a. Written condonation
b. Execution by the offended party of a will with
knowledge of the cause of unworthiness (the will
must also institute the unworthy heir or restore
him to capacity)
How to reconcile common grounds for Unworthiness
and Disinheritance (Arts. 1033 and 922):
a. If offended party does not make a will
subsequent to the occurrence of the common
cause: Art. 1033 applies
(2) Any person who has been convicted of an attempt
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Page 63 of 73
b.
If offended party makes a will subsequent to the
occurrence of the common cause:
This article grants a right of reimbursement of necessary
expenses to the excluded heir.
If he knew of the cause
1) If he disinherits – apply Art. 922
2) If he institutes or pardons the offender –
restored to capacity
3) If will is silent – unworthiness stays
Art. 1038. Any person incapable of succession, who,
disregarding the prohibition stated in the preceding
articles, entered into the possession of the hereditary
property, shall be obliged to return it together it its
accessions.
If he did not know of the cause – unworthiness
stays
He shall be liable for all the fruits and rents he may have
received, or could have received through the exercise of
due diligence. (760a)
Disqualified heir here is a possessor in bad faith.
a. Obligation to return, with accessions
b. Liability for fruits which were received and could
have been received
Art. 1034. In order to judge the capacity of the heir,
devisee or legatee, his qualification at the time of the
death of the decedent shall be the criterion.
In cases falling under Nos. 2, 3, or 5 of Article 1032, it shall
be necessary to wait until final judgment is rendered, and
in the case falling under No. 4, the expiration of the month
allowed for the report.
If the institution, devise or legacy should be conditional,
the time of the compliance with the condition shall also be
considered. (758a)
When capacity is to be determined:
Gen. Rule: Time of decedent’s death
If institution is subject to a suspensive condition:
a. Time of decedent’s death, and
b. Time of happening of condition
If final judgment is a requisite of unworthiness: Time
of final judgment
Art. 1035. If the person excluded from the inheritance by
reason of incapacity should be a child or descendant of the
decedent and should have children or descendants, the
latter shall acquire his right to the legitime.
The person so excluded shall not enjoy the usufruct and
administration of the property thus inherited by his
children. (761a)
Extent of Representation: Legitime and intestacy
Representation in the collateral line: If the unworthy
heir is a brother or sister, his children (nephews and
nieces of the decedent) will represent
Art. 1036. Alienations of hereditary property, and acts of
administration performed by the excluded heir, before the
judicial order of exclusion, are valid as to the third persons
who acted in good faith; but the co‐heirs shall have a right
to recover damages from the disqualified heir. (n)
This applies the Doctrine of Innocent Purchaser for Value
without prejudice to the right to damages of the
prejudiced heirs against the incapacitated heir.
Art. 1037. The unworthy heir who is excluded from the
succession has a right to demand indemnity or any
expenses incurred in the preservation of the hereditary
property, and to enforce such credits as he may have
against the estate. (n)
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of
the nation of the decedent. (n)
Art. 1040. The action for a declaration of incapacity and
for the recovery of the inheritance, devise or legacy shall
be brought within five years from the time the disqualified
person took possession thereof. It may be brought by any
one who may have an interest in the succession. (762a)
The right of heir to recover the inheritance must be
exercised within 5 years.
5‐year prescriptive period applies to:
a. the declaration of incapacity of the heir
b. the recovery of the inheritance or portion
thereof wrongfully possessed by the disqualified
heir.
3.
Acceptance and Repudiation of the
Inheritance
Art. 1041. The acceptance or repudiation of the
inheritance is an act which is purely voluntary and free.
(988)
Art. 1042. The effects of the acceptance or repudiation
shall always retroact to the moment of the death of the
decedent. (989)
Retroactivity:
a. Of acceptance – successor will be deemed to
have owned and possessed the property from
the moment of decedent’s death
b.
Of renunciation – substitute, co‐heir or intestate
heir who gets the property in default of the
renouncer, is deemed to have owned and
possessed it from the moment of decedent’s
death
c.
Conditional institutions
1) Condition happens – Property passes with
retroactive effect
2) Condition does not happen – Property goes
to the appropriate successor, with the same
retroactive effect
Art. 1043. No person may accept or repudiate an
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inheritance unless he is certain of the death of the person
from whom he is to inherit, and of his right to the
inheritance. (991)
Article requires:
a. Certainty of death
b. Established right to inherit
Art. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his
property may accept or repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons
may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or
guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their
wards only by judicial authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall
belong to the persons designated by the testator to
determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or
in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030. (992a)
Acts of mere preservation or provisional administration
do not imply an acceptance of the inheritance if, through
such acts, the title or capacity of an heir has not been
assumed. (999a)
Kinds of acceptance:
a. Express
1) Public document
2) Private writing
b. Tacit
c. Implied
Art. 1050. An inheritance is deemed accepted:
(1) If the heirs sells, donates, or assigns his right to a
stranger, or to his co‐heirs, or to any of them;
(2) If the heir renounces the same, even though
gratuitously, for the benefit of one or more of his co‐heirs;
Art. 1045. The lawful representatives of corporations,
associations, institutions and entities qualified to acquire
property may accept any inheritance left to the latter, but
in order to repudiate it, the approval of the court shall be
necessary. (993a)
(3) If he renounces it for a price in favor of all his co‐heirs
indiscriminately; but if this renunciation should be
gratuitous, and the co‐heirs in whose favor it is made are
those upon whom the portion renounced should devolve
by virtue of accretion, the inheritance shall not be deemed
as accepted. (1000)
Art. 1046. Public official establishments can neither
accept nor repudiate an inheritance without the approval
of the government. (994)
Tacit acceptance is inferred from acts of ownership
performed by the heir over the property.
Art. 1047. A married woman of age may repudiate an
inheritance without the consent of her husband. (995a)
Art. 1048. Deaf‐mutes who can read and write may accept
or repudiate the inheritance personally or through an
agent. Should they not be able to read and write, the
inheritance shall be accepted by their guardians. These
guardians may repudiate the same with judicial approval.
(996a)
Accept
Repudiate
Parents or guardians
Yes
Yes*
Authorized person
Yes
No
Lawful
Yes
Yes*
representatives
Public official
Yes, but only with approval of
establishments
government
Married person (w/o
Yes
Yes
spouse’s consent)
Deaf‐mutes who can
Yes, personally or through an
read and write
agent
Deaf‐mutes who
Yes, through
Yes, through
cannot read and
their guardians
their
write
guardians*
*Requires judicial authorization
Art. 1049. Acceptance may be express or tacit.
An express acceptance must be made in a public or private
document.
A tacit acceptance is one resulting from acts by which the
intention to accept is necessarily implied, or which one
would have no right to do except in the capacity of an heir.
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Art. 1051. The repudiation of an inheritance shall be
made in a public or authentic instrument, or by petition
presented to the court having jurisdiction over the
testamentary or intestate proceedings. (1008)
Form of renunciation:
a. Public or authentic (genuine) instrument
b. Petition filed in the settlement proceedings
Art. 1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the
prejudice of his own creditors, the latter may petition the
court to authorize them to accept it in the name of the
heir.
The acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to an
extent sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. The
excess, should there be any, shall in no case pertain to the
renouncer, but shall be adjudicated to the persons to
whom, in accordance with the rules established in this
Code, it may belong. (1001)
This is an instance of accion pauliana, which is the right
given to creditors to impugn or set aside contracts,
transactions or dispositions of their debtors which will
prejudice or defraud them.
Extent of right of creditor to accept the inheritance in
the name of the debtor: Only to the amount or value
necessary to satisfy the credit
Art. 1053. If the heir should die without having accepted
or repudiated the inheritance his right shall be
transmitted to his heirs. (1006)
Art. 1054. Should there be several heirs called to the
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inheritance, some of them may accept and the others may
repudiate it. (1007a)
Their right to accept or repudiate corresponds to the
aliquot share to which they are entitled.
Art. 1055. If a person, who is called to the same
inheritance as an heir by will and ab intestato, repudiates
the inheritance in his capacity as a testamentary heir, he is
understood to have repudiated it in both capacities.
Should he repudiate it as an intestate heir, without
knowledge of his being a testamentary heir, he may still
accept it in the latter capacity. (1009)
Rationale: The testamentary disposition is the express
will of the testator, whereas intestacy is only his implied
will. One who renounces the express will is deemed to
have renounced the implied also, but not the other way
around.
Rule does not apply to legitime.
Art. 1056. The acceptance or repudiation of an
inheritance, once made, is irrevocable, and cannot be
impugned, except when it was made through any of the
causes that vitiate consent, or when an unknown will
appears. (997)
Gen. Rule: Acceptance or repudiation of inheritance is
irrevocable
Exceptions:
a. Factors vitiating consent are present –FIVUM
(fraud, intimidation, undue influence, mistake,
fraud)
b. Appearance of an unknown will (which is valid
and admitted to probate)
Art. 1057. Within thirty days after the court has issued an
order for the distribution of the estate in accordance with
the Rules of Court, the heirs, devisees and legatees shall
signify to the court having jurisdiction whether they
accept or repudiate the inheritance.
If they do not do so within that time, they are deemed to
have accepted the inheritance. (n)
Implied acceptance – failure to signify acceptance or
renunciation within the 30‐day period
4.
Executors and Administrators
Art. 1058. All matters relating to the appointment,
powers and duties of executors and administrators and
concerning the administration of estates of deceased
persons shall be governed by the Rules of Court. (n)
Art. 1059. If the assets of the estate of a decedent which
can be applied to the payment of debts are not sufficient
for that purpose, the provisions of Articles 2239 to 2251
on Preference of Credits shall be observed, provided that
the expenses referred to in Article 2244, No. 8, shall be
those involved in the administration of the decedent's
estate. (n)
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Art. 1060. A corporation or association authorized to
conduct the business of a trust company in the Philippines
may be appointed as an executor, administrator, guardian
of an estate, or trustee, in like manner as an individual; but
it shall not be appointed guardian of the person of a ward.
(n)
See Rules 78‐90 of the Rules of Court
5.
Collation
3 meanings of collation:
1. As computation – add all available assets, deduct
debts, and add the donations to get the net
hereditary estate
Arts. 1061, 1067, 1071, 1072
2.
As imputation – determine if the donation is
chargeable/imputable to the legitime or free
portion
Arts. 1062 –1066, 1068, 1069, 1071–1073
3.
As return – If donation to a stranger exceeds the
free portion, he would have to give back to the
estate as much as is needed to complete the
legitimes
Arts. 1075, 1076
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with
other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the
estate any property or right which he may have received
from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way
of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it
may be computed in the determination of the legitime of
each heir, and in the account of the partition. (1035a)
Donations inter vivos – made to compulsory heirs AND
strangers
Value of donation: At the time donation was made
Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among
compulsory heirs if the donor should have so expressly
provided, or if the donee should repudiate the inheritance,
unless the donation should be reduced as inofficious.
(1036)
Gen. Rule: Donations inter vivos to compulsory heirs
should be imputed to the heir’s legitime (considered an
advance to the legitime)
Exceptions:
a. Donor provides otherwise
b. Donee renounces the inheritance
Instances when donations inter vivos are to be
imputed to the free portion:
a. When made to strangers
b. When made to compulsory heirs and the donor
so provides
c. When made to compulsory heirs who renounce
the inheritance
d. When in excess of the compulsory heir’s legitime,
as to the excess
Art. 1063. Property left by will is not deemed subject to
collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, but
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the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired. (1037)
Gen. Rule: Testamentary dispostions to compulsory heirs
should not be imputed to the legitime, but to the free
portion
Exception: If the testator provides otherwise
Art. 1064. When the grandchildren, who survive with
their uncles, aunts, or cousins, inherit from their
grandparents in representation of their father or mother,
they shall bring to collation all that their parents, if alive,
would have been obliged to bring, even though such
grandchildren have not inherited the property.
They shall also bring to collation all that they may have
received from the decedent during his lifetime, unless the
testator has provided otherwise, in which case his wishes
must be respected, if the legitime of the co‐heirs is not
prejudiced. (1038)
Grandchildren have to impute to their legitime:
a. Whatever the parent whom they are
representing would have been obliged to collate;
and
b. Whatever they themselves have received from
the grandparent by gratuitous title (subject to
the rules and exceptions under Art. 1062)
Art. 1065. Parents are not obliged to bring to collation in
the inheritance of their ascendants any property which
may have been donated by the latter to their children.
(1039)
Donation to the grandchild should be imputed to the free
portion, since it is a donation to a stranger.
Art. 1066. Neither shall donations to the spouse of the
child be brought to collation; but if they have been given
by the parent to the spouses jointly, the child shall be
obliged to bring to collation one‐half of the thing donated.
(1040)
Donation given to the child’s spouse will not be imputed to
the child’s legitime, as it is a donation made to a stranger.
Treatment of donations made to the spouses jointly:
•
½ belongs to the donor’s child (Art. 1062)
•
½ belongs to the child’s spouse (donation to
stranger)
Art. 1067. Expenses for support, education, medical
attendance, even in extraordinary illness, apprenticeship,
ordinary equipment, or customary gifts are not subject to
collation. (1041)
Support – defined in Art. 194, Family Code; does not
include expenses for the recipient’s professional,
vocational or other career
Art. 1068. Expenses incurred by the parents in giving
their children a professional, vocational or other career
shall not be brought to collation unless the parents so
provide, or unless they impair the legitime; but when their
collation is required, the sum which the child would have
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
spent if he had lived in the house and company of his
parents shall be deducted therefrom. (1042a)
Gen. Rule: Expenses for the child’s professional,
vocational, or other career, are not inofficious; should not
be charged against the recipient’s legitime, but against the
free portion
Exception: If the parents provide otherwise
Art. 1069. Any sums paid by a parent in satisfaction of the
debts of his children, election expenses, fines, and similar
expenses shall be brought to collation. (1043a)
Donations by the parent to the child should be treated like
other donations to compulsory heirs under Art. 1062.
Art. 1070. Wedding gifts by parents and ascendants
consisting of jewelry, clothing, and outfit, shall not be
reduced as inofficious except insofar as they may exceed
one‐tenth of the sum which is disposable by will. (1044)
Wedding gifts in excess of 1/10 of the free portion are
inofficious.
Art. 1071. The same things donated are not to be brought
to collation and partition, but only their value at the time
of the donation, even though their just value may not then
have been assessed.
Their subsequent increase or deterioration and even their
total loss or destruction, be it accidental or culpable, shall
be for the benefit or account and risk of the donee.
(1045a)
Value to be computed and imputed: the value of thing
donated at the time donation was made
Reason: Any appreciation or depreciation of the thing
after that time should be for the donee’s account, since
donation transfers ownership to him
Art. 1072. In the collation of a donation made by both
parents, one‐half shall be brought to the inheritance of the
father, and the other half, to that of the mother. That given
by one alone shall be brought to collation in his or her
inheritance. (1046a)
Joint donation: Pertaining to equal shares to the estates
of the father and mother
Donation by one parent: Treated separately
Art. 1073. The donee's share of the estate shall be
reduced by an amount equal to that already received by
him; and his co‐heirs shall receive an equivalent, as much
as possible, in property of the same nature, class and
quality. (1047)
Art. 1074. Should the provisions of the preceding article
be impracticable, if the property donated was immovable,
the co‐heirs shall be entitled to receive its equivalent in
cash or securities, at the rate of quotation; and should
there be neither cash or marketable securities in the
estate, so much of the other property as may be necessary
shall be sold at public auction.
Page 67 of 73
adequate security is given. (1050)
If the property donated was movable, the co‐heirs shall
only have a right to select an equivalent of other personal
property of the inheritance at its just price. (1048)
Applies if Art. 1073 is not possible.
a. Immovables – co‐heirs entitled to cash or
securities
b. Movables – co‐heirs entitled to similarly‐valued
movable
Art. 1075. The fruits and interest of the property subject
to collation shall not pertain to the estate except from the
day on which the succession is opened.
For the purpose of ascertaining their amount, the fruits
and interest of the property of the estate of the same kind
and quality as that subject to collation shall be made the
standard of assessment. (1049)
Rationale: The obligation to return inofficious donations
to the estate arises at the time succession vests
(decedent’s death). From that time, the compulsory heir is
entitled to the fruits.
Extent of compulsory heir’s right to fruits:
a. Entirety of fruits – if donation was totally
inofficious
b. Prorated between heir and donee – if partially
inofficious
Art. 1076. The co‐heirs are bound to reimburse to the
donee the necessary expenses which he has incurred for
the preservation of the property donated to him, though
they may not have augmented its value.
The donee who collates in kind an immovable which has
been given to him must be reimbursed by his co‐heirs for
the improvements which have increased the value of the
property, and which exist at the time the partition if
effected.
As to works made on the estate for the mere pleasure of
the donee, no reimbursement is due him for them; he has,
however, the right to remove them, if he can do so without
injuring the estate. (n)
Totally
inofficious
Reimburse in full
Reimburse in full,
if improvement
still exists
6.
Partition and Distribution of Estate
6.1. Partition
Partition is a judicial proceeding that comprises the
entire settlement of the decedent’s estate, covered by
Rules 73 to 90 of the Rules of Court.
1
Decedent dies
2
Co­ownership of heirs
over net hereditary estate
or partible estate
3
Subsequent partition by:
‐ extrajudicial agreement
(Rule 74, Sec. 1, Rules of Court),
OR
‐ through judicial order
in appropriate settlement
proceedings
(Rule 90, Rules of Court)
Art. 1078. Where there are two or more heirs, the whole
estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in
common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of
the deceased. (n)
Art. 1079. Partition, in general, is the separation, division
and assignment of a thing held in common among those to
whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its
value. (n)
Kinds of partition:
a. Actual – physical division of the thing among the
co‐heirs
b. Constructive – any act, other than physical
division, which terminates the co‐ownership (ex:
sale to a 3rd person)
Casilang vs. Dizon (2013)
Partially
inofficious
Necessary
Partial
reimbursement in
Useful
proportion to the
value to be
returned
Ornamental No reimbursement No reimbursement
Only removal, if no Only removal* if no
injury to the estate injury to the estate
* If the property is physically divided, and the ornament
happens to be located in the donee’s portion, donee will
have all rights of ownership.
F: The decedent’s grandchildren petitioned to have Jose
evicted and executed a deed of extrajudicial partition over
the lot.
Art. 1077. Should any question arise among the co‐heirs
upon the obligation to bring to collation or as to the things
which are subject to collation, the distribution of the
estate shall not be interrupted for this reason, provided
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, desires
to keep any agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing
enterprise intact, may avail himself of the right granted
him in this article, by ordering that the legitime of the
other children to whom the property is not assigned, be
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
H: Jose is the lawful owner of the lot. He and his siblings
were able to present sufficient evidence that they entered
into a verbal partition, while Rosario was unable to show
any proof that her father inherited the lot from Liborio.
Art. 1080. Should a person make partition of his estate by
an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of
the compulsory heirs.
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paid in cash. (1056a)
Partition by the Causante (decedent):
Characteristics:
a. Takes effect only upon death
b. Revocable as long as the causante is alive (hence,
can be changed, modified or rescinded)
How made:
a. By will, or
b. By act inter vivos
•
In writing
•
In a public instrument
Legasto vs. Verzosa (1930)
F: During the testatrix's lifetime, she made a partition of
the parcels of land to her heirs by virtue of deeds of
assignment. However probate of the will was denied.
H: Will is not valid as it was not admitted for probate.
Partition of the testator's estate inter vivos, as
contemplated in the Civil Code, can only be validly made in
the presence of a valid will, which is why the (old)
provision speaks of a "testator."
Limitation on partition by causante: Legitimes of
compulsory heirs cannot be impaired
Art. 1081. A person may, by an act inter vivos or mortis
causa, intrust the mere power to make the partition after
his death to any person who is not one of the co‐heirs.
The provisions of this and of the preceding article shall be
observed even should there be among the co‐heirs a
minor or a person subject to guardianship; but the
mandatary, in such case, shall make an inventory of the
property of the estate, after notifying the co‐heirs, the
creditors, and the legatees or devisees. (1057a)
Mandatary cannot be a co‐heir, to ensure fairness and
impartiality.
Art. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to
indivision among co‐heirs and legatees or devisees is
deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be
a sale, and exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction. (n)
Tuason vs. Tuason (1951)
F: The share of one of the Tuason siblings in a huge parcel
of land was sold to Araneta. They executed a MoA where
they agreed that no co‐owner shall sell his interest in the
land w/o first giving preference to the other co‐owners.
Angela argued that the contract is null and void for
violating CC400.
H: CC400 is not applicable. The contract’s provision
preserving the co‐ownership until all lots have been sold,
is a mere incident to the main object of dissolving the co‐
ownership.
Art. 1083. Every co‐heir has a right to demand the
division of the estate unless the testator should have
expressly forbidden its partition, in which case the period
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
of indivision shall not exceed twenty years as provided in
article 494. This power of the testator to prohibit division
applies to the legitime.
Even though forbidden by the testator, the co‐ownership
terminates when any of the causes for which partnership
is dissolved takes place, or when the court finds for
compelling reasons that division should be ordered, upon
petition of one of the co‐heirs. (1051a)
Gen. Rule: Any co‐heir may demand partition at any time
Exceptions:
a. When forbidden by the testator for a period not
exceeding 20 years
Exceptions to the exception:
•
When any of the causes for dissolution
of a partnership occurs
•
When the court finds compelling
reasons for partition
b. When the co‐heirs agree on indivision for a
period not exceeding 10 years (renewable)
c. When the law prohibits partition
Art. 1084. Voluntary heirs upon whom some condition
has been imposed cannot demand a partition until the
condition has been fulfilled; but the other co‐heirs may
demand it by giving sufficient security for the rights which
the former may have in case the condition should be
complied with, and until it is known that the condition has
not been fulfilled or can never be complied with, the
partition shall be understood to be provisional. (1054a)
Rationale: Right as heir vests only when the suspensive
condition happens.
Other heirs can demand parition after furnishing adequate
security.
Art. 1085. In the partition of the estate, equality shall be
observed as far as possible, dividing the property into lots,
or assigning to each of the co‐heirs things of the same
nature, quality and kind. (1061)
Equality among co­heirs:
a. Quantitative – Shares of
determined by law and by will
b.
co‐heirs
are
Qualitative – The law mandates equality in
nature, kind and quality
Exceptions:
•
Causante has made the partition himself
•
Co‐heirs agree otherwise
•
Qualitative equality is impossible or
impracticable
Art. 1086. Should a thing be indivisible, or would be much
impaired by its being divided, it may be adjudicated to one
of the heirs, provided he shall pay the others the excess in
cash.
Nevertheless, if any of the heirs should demand that the
thing be sold at public auction and that strangers be
allowed to bid, this must be done. (1062)
To whom thing may be sold:
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a.
b.
To a 3rd person, or
To any of the co‐heirs (if none of them object)
Art. 1087. In the partition the co‐heirs shall reimburse
one another for the income and fruits which each one of
them may have received from any property of the estate,
for any useful and necessary expenses made upon such
property, and for any damage thereto through malice or
neglect. (1063)
Upon partition, the co‐heirs shall render a mutual
accounting of benefits received and necessary and useful
expenses incurred by each of them.
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary
rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the
co‐heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser
by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they
do so within the period of one month from the time they
were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. (1067a)
Right of redemption given to a co­heir
•
Co‐heir sold his undivided share or portion in
the estate
•
Share was sold to a stranger
•
Written notice by co‐heirs to the vendor
Garcia vs. Calaliman (1989)
F: There was an extrajudicial partition and deed of sale.
Two groups of heirs sold their shares to Calaliman and
Trabadillo. The heirs of the vendors filed a case against
Calaliman and Trabadillo for legal redemption. Heirs were
not notified of the sale so they claim the 30 day period
stipulated in Art 1088 has yet to begin.
Obvious effect: Termination of co‐ownership
Art. 1092. After the partition has been made, the co‐heirs
shall be reciprocally bound to warrant the title to, and the
quality of, each property adjudicated. (1069a)
Obligation of mutual warranty: Liable for defects of title
and quality (Art. 501)
Warranties are the same as in sales:
a. Eviction (title)
b. Hidden defects (quality)
Art. 1093. The reciprocal obligation of warranty referred
to in the preceding article shall be proportionate to the
respective hereditary shares of the co‐heirs, but if any one
of them should be insolvent, the other co‐heirs shall be
liable for his part in the same proportion, deducting the
part corresponding to the one who should be indemnified.
Those who pay for the insolvent heir shall have a right of
action against him for reimbursement, should his financial
condition improve. (1071)
Proportional liability of co­heirs on warranty: Burdens
should be proportional to benefits
Art. 1094. An action to enforce the warranty among heirs
must be brought within ten years from the date the right
of action accrues. (n)
Action to enforce warranty: 10 years
To be counted from the time the portion was lost or the
hidden defect was discovered.
H: Written notice is required before the period of one
month for the other co‐heirs to redeem begins to run. The
redemptioner is entitled to written notice to remove all
uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to
quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive.
Art. 1095. If a credit should be assigned as collectible, the
co‐heirs shall not be liable for the subsequent insolvency
of the debtor of the estate, but only for his insolvency at
the time the partition is made.
If only 1 co­heir redeems: he will pay the purchase price
The warranty of the solvency of the debtor can only be
enforced during the five years following the partition.
If more than 1 will redeem: they will pay proportionally
to their share in the property
Art. 1089. The titles of acquisition or ownership of each
property shall be delivered to the co‐heir to whom said
property has been adjudicated. (1065a)
Art. 1090. When the title comprises two or more pieces of
land which have been assigned to two or more co‐heirs, or
when it covers one piece of land which has been divided
between two or more co‐heirs, the title shall be delivered
to the one having the largest interest, and authentic copies
of the title shall be furnished to the other co‐heirs at the
expense of the estate. If the interest of each co‐heir should
be the same, the oldest shall have the title. (1066a)
6.2. Effects of Partition
Art. 1091. A partition legally made confers upon each heir
the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to
him. (1068)
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Co‐heirs do not warrant bad debts, if so known to, and
accepted by, the distributee. But if such debts are not
assigned to a co‐heir, and should be collected, in whole or
in part, the amount collected shall be distributed
proportionately among the heirs. (1072a)
Credit assigned to a co­heir in partition:
Warranty covers only insolvency of the decedent’s debtor
at the time of partition, not subsequent insolvency, for
which the co‐heir takes the risk.
Prescriptive period: 5 years
Art. 1096. The obligation of warranty among co‐heirs
shall cease in the following cases:
(1) When the testator himself has made the partition,
unless it appears, or it may be reasonably presumed, that
his intention was otherwise, but the legitime shall always
remain unimpaired;
(2) When it has been so expressly stipulated in the
Page 70 of 73
agreement of partition, unless there has been bad faith;
(3) When the eviction is due to a cause subsequent to the
partition, or has been caused by the fault of the distributee
of the property. (1070a)
Instances when there is no mutual warranty:
1. Partition by the testator himself (save where the
legitime has been impaired)
2. Agreement among the co‐heirs to suppress the
warranty
3. Supervening events causing the loss or the
diminution in value
4. Fault of the co‐heir
5. Waiver
6.3. Rescission and Nullity of
Partition
Art. 1097. A partition may be rescinded or annulled for
the same causes as contracts. (1073a)
Causes for annulment: Art. 1390
Causes for rescission: Art. 1381‐1382
Art. 1098. A partition, judicial or extra‐judicial, may also
be rescinded on account of lesion, when any one of the co‐
heirs received things whose value is less, by at least one‐
fourth, than the share to which he is entitled, considering
the value of the things at the time they were adjudicated.
(1074a)
Lesion is economic injury, where thep arty receives less
than he is entitled to receive.
Amount of lesion: Minimum is ¼
Art. 1099. The partition made by the testator cannot be
impugned on the ground of lesion, except when the
legitime of the compulsory heirs is thereby prejudiced, or
when it appears or may reasonably be presumed, that the
intention of the testator was otherwise. (1075)
Gen. Rule: Heirs cannot demand partition on the ground
of lesion, if partition was done by the testator.
have not been prejudiced nor those have not received
more than their just share. (1077a)
Co­heir who is sued for rescission has two options:
a. Re‐partition, or
b. Indemnify the co‐heir the amount of lesion
suffered
Art. 1102. An heir who has alienated the whole or a
considerable part of the real property adjudicated to him
cannot maintain an action for rescission on the ground of
lesion, but he shall have a right to be indemnified in cash.
(1078a)
Art. 1103. The omission of one or more objects or
securities of the inheritance shall not cause the rescission
of the partition on the ground of lesion, but the partition
shall be completed by the distribution of the objects or
securities which have been omitted. (1079a)
Incompleteness of partition is not a ground for rescission.
Remedy: Supplemental partition
Art. 1104. A partition made with preterition of any of the
compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, unless it be
proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the
other persons interested; but the latter shall be
proportionately obliged to pay to the person omitted the
share which belongs to him. (1080)
Heir is mistakenly excluded
•
In good faith ‐ the omitted heir gets his rightful
share
•
In bad faith – partition shall be annulled
Art. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to
be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect
to such person. (1081a)
Heir is mistakenly included. In this case the property
will be taken away from him and redistributed among the
proper recipients.
Exceptions to Art. 1098:
a. Impairment of the legitime
b. Mistake by the testator or vitiation of his intent
Art. 1100. The action for rescission on account of lesion
shall prescribe after four years from the time the partition
was made. (1076)
Congratulations! You are now ready to
nail the exam!
A few things to remember:
•
Prescriptive period (lesion): 4 years
Art. 1101. The heir who is sued shall have the option of
indemnifying the plaintiff for the loss, or consenting to a
new partition.
Indemnity may be made by payment in cash or by the
delivery of a thing of the same kind and quality as that
awarded to the plaintiff.
•
•
Spot concepts that might apply (if there’s a will,
there’s a way...for preterition to operate, or if
there are two transfers—reserva troncal)
What rules should apply? Legitimes? Partial
Intestacy?
Use dark ink.
You may now proceed to test your skills. Try the following
sample exam questions. 
If a new partition is made, it shall affect neither those who
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Page 71 of 73
QUESTIONS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
A final decree of probate forecloses objections to the
will on the ground of preterition. T or F?
Full and half‐blood siblings instituted in a will inherit
equally unless otherwise provided. T or F?
It is not necessary to institute an heir by name. T or
F?
A person without testamentary capacity may not
revoke a will. T or F?
An illiterate person does not have testamentary
capacity. T or F?
In some case, the testator is presumed insane. T or F?
A will need not always be witnessed. T or F?
A holographic will cannot be probated on the basis
solely of testimonial evidence. T or F?
Supervening Incapacity does not invalidate a will but
deprives the testator the power to revoke it. T or F?
Republication of a will that is formally void cannot be
done by mere reference. T or F?
The date of a holographic will need not be written at
the bottom. T or F?
The testator may delegate the revocation of his will. T
or F?
A deaf‐mute person may execute a will but cannot
witness one. T or F?
If there is preterition, all testamentary dispositions
are considered not written. T or F?
A will and a codicil have identical formal
requirements. T or F?
Preterition can never occur if testator died without a
will. T or F?
The attestation clause must be in a language known
to the testator. T or F?
A blind man can neither make nor witness a will. T or
F?
A minor can neither make nor witness a will. T or F?
A convicted thief has competence to witness a will. T
or F?
A foreigner may witness a will. T or F?
A testamentary disposition in favour of a witness
does not affect his competence as a witness. T or F?
A probated will may be ineffective. T or F?
An undated will is not ipso facto void. T or F?
Robert died intestate, with an estate worth 6M. He is
survived by his wife Diane, their only child, Big Bird,
and Robert’s 3 illegitimate children: Elmo, Oscar and
Ernie. How should Robert’s estate be divided?
On his way to the library, Ranulfo, single, childless,
died when a meteorite fell on him. He left a will which
gave 1/3 of his estate to his girlfriend, Marjorie, and a
legacy of P600,000 to the UP Astronomical Society
(UPAS). He was survived by his parents Cornelio and
Maiska who now contends that the will is ineffective
because they are left with nothing. Ranulfo’s estate is
worth 900,000
a. Is their contention correct?
b. How much will Marjorie and UPAS get?
John was married to Shelan but after 60 years of
marriage the couple were childless. Shelan had 3
sisters: Claire (full‐blood), Lindsey (half‐blood) and
Lorely (half‐blood).
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
The sisters had children:
a. Claire: Skull and Spike
b. Lindsey: Mahinhin, Makahiya, Makisig and Maliksi
c. Lorely: Serafin and Salvi
In 2004, Shelan made a will giving ¼ of his total
estate to her 3 sisters, with simple substitution of any
of them in favor of their respective children.
All three sisters predeceased Shelan.
When Shelan died in 2007, survived by her husband,
nephews and nieces, she had an estate valued at 24M.
How should it be apportioned?
28. Jaypee and Amirah, both natives of Surigao, have
been married for 30 years. They have one daughter,
Jamie, 27 yeasr old, single, no children and a junior
executive at Hope Cigarettes Corp.
One day in May, Warla invites her parents to spend
the weekend with her and her fiance, Nick in a
cottage on the beach of San Fabian, Pangasinan. The 4
of them leave Manila at dawn on Saturday in Nick’s
new car. In Tarlac, they met a terrible accident: a
south‐bound ten‐wheeler truck driven by Cari hits
them head on.
Nick dies on the spot. The three others survived and
were rushed to the hospital where, that evening,
Jaypee expired. Amirah and Jamie are transferred to
Manila for better treatment.
Jamie lingers on for a week but the trauma proves too
much and she dies on Monday. Amirah raliies and
actually regains consciousness, but unexpected blood
clot forms in the brain three weeks after her
daughter’s death and she too dies on Friday.
The ill‐starred family are survived by Korina and
Enrique (Amirah’s parents), Rosalyn and Karren
(Jaypee’s sisters), and Jantzen and Jess (Amirah’s
siblings).
Jaypee owned a piece of land (Surigao property)
worth 6M pesos – that was his only property
inherited by him from his parents. Amirah owned
nothing. Jamie owned a lot in Alabang (Alabang
property) worth 3M – he had bought from his
bonuses from Hope.
To whom shall the two pieces of property go?
ANSWERS: (The samplex did not have answers. The
following aswers are not necessarily correct. –Rea)
1. F. A decree of probate only concerns the
extrinsic validity of a will.
2. T. Distinction between full‐ and half‐blood has no
application in testamentary succession. Unless
the contrary clearly appears, there is a
presumption of equality.
3. T. What is essential is that the heir be
identifiable.
4. T. A will is revoked with the participation of the
testator only in two ways: by another
Page 72 of 73
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
will/codicil or by physical destruction. Both
require testamentary capacity.
F.
T. See Art. 800 par 2.
T. Holographic wills.
T. The will itself (or a copy) must be presented.
T. The testator must have testamentary capacity
to revoke a will. See also Art. 801.
T. Art. 835.
T. The law does not require a specific location for
the date of the holographic will. (Labrador v CA)
T. Physical destruction.
T. Art. 820.
F. Only institution of heir is annulled; legacies
and devises remain valid so long as they are not
inofficious. See Art. 854.
T. Art. 826.
T. If there is no testamentary disposition, the
compulsory heir would always receive
something through intestacy. (But what if the T
disposed all properties by donation inter vivos?
My stand is that there is still no preterition
because the donations impinging on the legitime
will be inofficious per Art 752. I’m not sure.
Really not sure.)
F. The AC is not the business of the testator.
F. A blind man may make a will!
T. 1)No testamentary capacity; 2) Not qualified
to be a witness.
T. See Art. 821.
T.
T. The dispositions are void unless there are 3
other witnesses.
T. If the will is intrinsically invalid.
T. Attested wills need ot be dated.
Diane: 1.714M
Big Bird: 1.714M
Elmo: 0.857M
Oscar: 0.857M
Ernie: 0.857M
a. Yes. They are preterited. (1/3 of estate that
will go to Marjorie = 300,000 plus legacy of
600,000 to UPAS equals 900,000. The parents,
who are Oyie’s compulsory ehirs are left with
nothing.)
b. Marjorie will get nothing because in
preterition, the institution of heir is annulled .
Legacy to UPAS remains valid but should be
reduced to 450,000 because it exceeds the free
portion.
PARTIAL INTESTACY
Will: ¼ = 6M
This will pass to nephews and nieces by
substitution. (2M per set of substitutes)
Legitime:
John: 1/2 of the estate as his legitime
Remaining ¼ goes to nephews and nieces goes
by intestacy and by virtue of their right to
representation (with distinction between full
and half‐blood—2:1:1=3M:1.5M:1.5M)
Hence,
John = 12M
Skull and Spike = 2.5 each
Mahinhin, Makahiya, Makisig and Maliksi = 875k
each
Serafin and Salvi = 1.75M each
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE
REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
28. First, Jaypee’s estate: 6M Surigao property
By intestacy,
Jamie = ½ = 3M
Amirah = ½ = 3M
Next, Jamie’s estate: Ayala property (3M) plus
3M from Jaypee = 6M
By intestacy,
The whole estate goes to Amirah
Finally, Amirah’s estate: ½ of Surigao property
from Jaypee + Ayala property (3M) from Jamie +
second‐half of Surigao property from Jamie
which the latter got from Jaypee = 9M
BUT the second‐half of Surigao property is
subject to reserva troncal hence, will go to
Rosalyn and Karren (1/4 each).
Remaining 6M will pass on to Amirah’s intestate
heirs: Korina and Enrique (3M each). Jantzen and
Jess are excluded.
Therefore,
Surigao property: Korina, Enrique, Rosalyn and
Karren = ¼ undivided interest each
Ayala property: Korina and Enrique = ½
undivided interest each.
Page 73 of 73