Outcome Evaluation of Local Governments’
Relocation Assistance from 2013 to 2018:
Recommendations for Balik-Probinsya
A research proposal submitted in
partial fulfillment of the requirements in
Demography 230:
Population Program and Evaluation
Sanny Boy D. Afable
Master of Arts in Demography
UP Population Institute
11 August 2020
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1.
Background
Until recently, Philippine administrations had not promoted or carried out a well-
defined and nationally coordinated policy on internal migration (Abad, 1981). The movement
of people has been left largely to the forces of the economy (Pernia et al. 1983), population
pressure (Amacher et al., 1984; Cruz, 1983), migrant networks (Ogena, 2012; Tabuga, 2018), and
nature (Bordey, et al., 2013; UN, 2016). An explicit and constrictive internal migration policy,
after all, is out of the question, as the 1987 Constitution enshrines the freedom of movement
(liberty of abode and of changing the same) except in the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health. Being the latter case, the ongoing coronavirus disease (COVID-19)
pandemic has necessitated the government to freeze the short- and long-distance movement
of people through community quarantine measures of varying intensities (Sabillo, 2020), as
well as plans for moving forward under the so-called new normal.
Among such policies is Executive Order (E.O.) No. 114, S. 2020, which institutionalizes
the Balik Probinsya, Bagong Pag-Asa Program (BP2) “as a pillar of balanced regional
development.” Signed by President Rodrigo Duterte a few months into the pandemic on May
6, 2020, E.O. 114 is a strategy to “decongest” the NCR and other congested metropolises, which
have been the hotspots of COVID-19 cases in the country. This decongestion is by way of
“reversing” the migration of Filipinos to these areas1, or sending individuals or families back to
their home provinces, through the provision of transportation and cash assistance in the
immediate; jobs, housing, education, and healthcare in the medium term; and the creation of
urban centers and economic zones, among others, in the long term (Escalada cited Kabagani,
2020). As of June 17, about 89,000 individuals have registered to the program2, half of whom
are aged 18-25 and intending to travel alone (Rita, 2020).
It must be said that an ongoing migration out of NCR has been observed in the past decades partly as a
result of suburbanization in provinces surrounding Metro Manila (Flieger, 1977). The 2018 National
Migration Survey (NMS) also finds that that between 2013 and 2018, NCR’s out-migrants outnumbered its
in-migrants.
2
The program’s implementation has been suspended indefinitely to prioritize assistance to locally
stranded individuals (Merez, 2020).
1
A number of experts and commentators, however, have raised reservations, if not
outright cynicism, on the program (Ordinario, 2020; Gonzales, 2020). BP2 recently earned
widespread criticisms after reports in provinces of COVID-19 cases that were imported from
Metro Manila, although the government later clarified that these cases were not from the takers
of Balik-Probinsya, which remains indefinitely suspended, but from locally stranded
individuals (LSIs) who were assisted by the separate Hatid-Probinsya Program (Ordinario,
ibid.). In any case, the pandemic and the actions taken by the government in response to it
highlight the precarious situation of many Filipino movers, who in the past have been met with
hostility, partly through forms of balik-probinsya (Arn, 1995). Critics, thus, point to the
“failures” of various balik probinsya or relocation assistance programs, primarily the lack of
economic opportunities and social services in the countryside that results in the re-migration
of beneficiaries to the city after some time (ibid.; Lee-Brago, 2005; Gabieta, 2009).
To better inform the pending implementation of E.O. 114 and other initiatives for
Filipino movers, this paper evaluates the direct and indirect outcomes of direct balik-probinsya
or relocation assistance by LGUs between 2013 and 2018, using data from the 2018 National
Migration Survey. In particular, it aims to: 1) characterize the beneficiaries of government
assistance; 2) assess the types and level of assistance received; and 2) evaluate how
government interventions during their migration changed the employment situation and
migration intention of program beneficiaries.
1.2.
Scope and delimitation
This paper is limited by the data available to the researcher. First, for the purposes of
this study, all direct forms of relocation assistance are taken as a single balik probinsya
initiative, and no assessment is made about a specific program by a particular implementing
unit. Second, and as a consequence of the former, it evaluates the impacts of balik probinsya
without reference to certain pre-defined targets or baseline figures. Third, this paper is limited
to the evaluation of balik probinsya programs’ direct and indirect outcomes in the short- and
medium-term. A causal assessment of the interventions’ input, process, and longer-term
impacts on the status of the beneficiaries are beyond the scope of this paper.
2. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
The end of the Second World War saw the influx of migrants from the countryside
towards the reconstructed Manila and surrounding provinces, which had a comparative
advantage in industrial activity (Pernia et al. 1983). This exerted pressure on the cities’ capacity
to provide social services, particularly housing (Storey, 1998). In response, balik probinsya
seeped into government parlance as a hostile and sporadic response to urban “squatters”—as
informal settlers are until now derogatively called. From the 1950s up to the early 1960s,
around 7,724 squatter families were forcibly evicted and relocated; at least 15,000 in 1963
alone (Arn, 1995).
In 1976, the then Department of Industry created the Balik-Probinsya Investment
Program “to stimulate development in depressed regions” (DTI, 1976). From being an
economic program, this morphed into a social policy, with then Metro Manila Governor Imelda
Marcos allocating Php 1 million (or about Php 17 million in real terms) in 1980 to support the
relocation of squatter families back to their hometowns (Official Gazette, 1980). In truth,
however, many of the evicted families were merely relocated to nearby provinces such as
Laguna and Cavite, as in the case of 48,186 families in 1981, a third of whom soon returned to
the slums of NCR (Arn, 1995).
At any rate, the program became an extension of the human settlements project of the
dictatorship, which also criminalized and oversaw the violent eviction of the “eyesores” that
were informal settlers through Presidential Decree 772 (Ortega, 2016). Since then, balik
probinsya has served various ends, insomuch as it has been shaped by them.
After the People Power revolution toppled the dictatorship in 1986, the government of
Corazon Aquino offered the balik probinsya side by side with the Balik-Baril strategy to rebel
surrenderees, as part of the National Reconciliation and Development Program (PMS, 1992a).
In the form of financial assistance, the reorganized Department of Social Welfare and
Development also offered the balik probinsya to urban poor families and individuals who
wanted to go back to their home provinces (NEDA, 1989), and to victims of calamities and
disasters (VDCs) (OP, 1992b).
The leadership of Fidel V. Ramos carried on with the program as part of DSWD’s
Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services, particularly for VDCs (Bautista,
1997). Off-site resettlement was also offered to the beneficiaries, although not necessarily in
their home provinces (Memo Order No. 471, s. 1998).
Balik probinsya took a similar form under the Gloria Arroyo administration, which
introduced it to families displaced by infrastructure projects. In the case of the Northrail
Project, a “housing financial assistance” worth Php50,000 was given to each beneficiary family,
who apparently may opt to return to their provinces or move to a different area of choice
(NEDA, 2004). Between 2001 and 2006, a total of 19,012 households reportedly availed of the
balik-probinsya program, or about a third of the total families displaced by the project3 (Villero,
n.d.). However, the disbursement of Php30 million-worth of grants was stopped in 2005 after
the government noted that most of the beneficiaries eventually went back to squatting (LeeBrago, 2005).
Meanwhile, after Typhoon Ondoy devastated Metro Manila in 2009, former President
Arroyo proffered the program to VDCs who wanted to return to Leyte, although no less than
the DSWD head of Eastern Visayas expressed doubts on this initiative, noting that a similar
program had been launched in the past but failed because beneficiaries returned to Manila
after some time (Gabieta, 2009). In a report by the Commission on Audit (COA), it was found
that of the 300 intended family-beneficiaries in Pasig, only 169 or 56.3% actually received the
Php23,000 balik probinsya grant, with others claimed to have failed to satisfy documentary
requirements, such as proofs of occupancy/residency and inclusion in the census master list of
families (COA, 2015).
The government of Benigno Aquino III, on the other hand, took a different approach to
the balik probinsya program, subsuming it under the National Convergence Initiatives for
Sustainable Rural Development. Geared at reducing poverty through sustainable countryside
development (NCI, n.d.a), this body consisted of the Department of Agriculture, Department of
It must be noted, however, that the housing financial assistance reported by NEDA (2004) was tallied
separately from the balik-probinsya in HUDCC’s report (as cited in Villero, n.d.).
3
Agrarian Reform, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and the Department of
Interior and Local Government, and left out the DSWD, which had handled previous
administrations’ versions of balik probinsya. Under this scheme, informal settler families were
encouraged to return to their provinces and were provided livelihood opportunities, primarily
agro-enterprises and greening activities (DILG R3, n.d.; NEDA RDC IV-A, 2014). Proximity to
Metro Manila, however, was cited as among the challenges in implementing the program (NCI,
n.d.b). And while pilot sites had been identified and developed, no executive order was issued
to institutionalize the program.
It can be said that prior to its institutionalization this year, balik probinsya’s
implementation was ad hoc and subject to the prevailing development agenda of each
administration—from the Marcoses’ Manila-centric “beautification” campaign, C. Aquino’s
reconciliation and unification efforts, Ramos’ basic sectors perspective to governance,
Arroyo’s infrastructure program, and B. Aquino III’s community-driven development and
bottom-up approaches (NAPC, 2019). While these efforts may be well-intentioned, they served
to reinforce the notion of the urban poor as a “surplus population”—unwanted and expendable
(Arn, 1995; Ortega, 2016). This is especially evident in various LGUs’ implementation of their
self-styled balik probinsya programs. In 2006, the Cebu City LGU offered a P100,000 balik
probinsya grant to each municipality and city in the province of Cebu to “keep people off the
streets” during the ASEAN summit (Ocao, 2006). The Quezon City LGU, meanwhile, extended
its balik probinsya program to 130 drivers of ‘kuliglig,’ an informal and illegal model of city
transportation, they apprehended during a massive operation in February (Cruz, 2020). The
Davao City LGU also expressed its interest in duplicating the QC LGU’s balik probinsya in order
to “decongest” the city (Revita, 2018).
Underlying these balik probinsya initiatives is the pervading of view of the urban
problem as an offshoot of abject poverty and conflict in the countryside, a structural imbalance
against which rural-urban migration has become an “adaptive mechanism” (Abad, 1981). This
view, however, is now being challenged. For one, a 2017 World Bank study found that a majority
of the urban poor in Metro Manila have lived in Metro Manila since childhood, and argued that
migration alleviates poverty—contrary to the belief that migrants are synonymous with the
urban poor (Singh and Gadgil, 2017). Urban poor groups have also pointed out that balik
probinsya is a “wrong solution,” demanding in-city housing instead (“Urban poor groups”,
2011).
An indirect, non-coercive policy to “reverse” migration is not unique to the Philippines.
The introduction of BP2 seems overdue when compared with international examples.
Indonesia, for instance, implemented such policy in 1966 to redistribute its population, but it
ended with a high failure rate (Oberai, 1980). On the other hand, around the same period,
Malaysia focused on developing 918,000 acres of rural land, which, combined with other rural
development programs, was found to have increased rural production and incomes, and
lowered rural-urban migration (ibid.). Other countries such as Japan undertook a strategy of
“dispersed” urbanization (ibid.).
Mobility or relocation assistance programs have also been tried in a few countries, with
varying objectives and levels of success. In Sweden, a relocation assistance program was
implemented from 1959 to 1987 to curb unemployment, but was found not to have increased
out-migration from the high-unemployment areas (Westerlund, 1998). An evaluation of a
similar program in Germany found that the participants had their incomes increase by 25% and
had more stable jobs than non-participants (Caliendo et al., 2017).
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1.
Evaluation Framework
Inputs
Resources
Promotion
Interprovincial
Coordination
.
.
.
Impacts
Outcomes
Activities
Outputs
Relocation
assistance
Direct
outcomes
Indirect
outcomes
Logistics
Extent of
assistance
Improvement
in employment
status
Decrease in
unemployment
Migration
intentions
.
.
.
Information
Employment
assistance
Characteristics
of migrant
beneficiaries
Decline in
rural-urban
migration
Figure 1. Evaluation Framework
The evaluation framework in Figure 1 demonstrates that relocation assistance yield
direct outcomes, which may or may not result in indirect outcomes. These components
respectively correspond to activities, outputs, and outcomes in a basic input-to-impact model,
but the inputs and impacts are beyond the scope of this paper. Based on the literature and
available data, I identify the following outcomes and corresponding measures, with the first
two referred to as direct outcomes and the rest as indirect outcomes:
3.1.1. Outcome 1: The program catered to migrants in need.
Outcome measures:
•
Percentage of movers who received any direct government assistance
during relocation
•
Profiles of migrant beneficiaries vs. non-beneficiaries
•
Reasons for moving of migrant beneficiaries vs non-beneficiaries
3.1.2. Outcome 2: Comprehensive packages of assistance were given to the migrant
beneficiaries.
Outcome measure:
•
Percentage of movers who received multiple forms of assistance during
relocation
3.1.3. Outcome 3: There was an improvement in the employment status of the
beneficiaries.
Outcome measures:
•
Change in pre-migration and post-migration income of beneficiaries
•
Difference between mean change in income of beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries
•
Percentage of beneficiaries who gained relatively stable employment
after moving
3.1.4. Outcome 4: Migrants were more likely to have stayed in their current locations.
Outcome measure:
•
3.2.
Percentage of migrants who expressed intention to move in the future.
Data
This paper uses data from the 2018 National Migration Survey by the Philippine
Statistics Authority (PSA) and the University of the Philippines Population Institute (UPPI). The
survey gathered responses from 46,387 individuals aged 15 and over, of whom 3,147 or 14.8%
(weighted) ever moved since January 1, 2013 up to the time of the survey. An overwhelming
majority or 84.5% of these migrants moved within the country. Those who moved in the last
five years were asked about their pre-migration situation and motives for moving, the
assistance they received from various entities, their current jobs/business and remittances,
and their migration intentions.
3.3.
Statistical analysis
Methods for evaluation will be descriptive for outcomes 1 and 2. For outcome 3, I test
against the hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the change in incomes of
balik-probinsya beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Logistic regression analysis will be done
to assess outcome 4, controlling for known factors. All tests of significance are set against
0.05% level of significance. All statistical procedures will be done in SPSS Version 21.
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