Alex Gatopoulos, 4-1-2022, "The battle for the Pacific: The countries competing for supremacy," No
Publication//CM,
https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/4/19/the-battle-for-the-pacific-the-countries-competing-for-c
ontrol
While China’s colossal fishing fleets scour the ocean for seafood, competition for the untapped oil and gas lying beneath the ocean floor focuses
China’s attention on the desolate islets lying closer to its coast. From
island chains in the South China Sea to the islets off
the southernmost tip of Japan, China has pushed for ownership in an attempt to expand its control over
the region. China’s rise as a regional power has its neighbours worried. Aggressive naval patrols and overflights of
disputed territory by Chinese air force jets are seen as provocative. China says it is merely asserting its rights over areas it considers to be part of
China. Small islands, most barely habitable, have become flashpoints in this new cold war between China and its neighbours. Nowhere
is
this regional tension more pronounced than in the South China Sea.
Pham Ngoc, 2022, "Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea," Global Conflict Tracker//CM,
https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea
The United States has a role in preventing military escalation resulting from the territorial dispute. Washington’s defense
treaty with Manila could draw the United States into a potential China-Philippines conflict over the substantial natural gas deposits or lucrative
The failure of Chinese and Southeast Asian leaders to resolve the disputes by
diplomatic means could also undermine international laws governing maritime disputes and encourage destabilizing arms
buildups.
fishing grounds in disputed territory.
Mario Caruso, 2017, "," No Publication//CM,
https://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CASD/IM/CeMiSS/DocumentiVis/Osservatorio_Strategico_2017/01_2017/
OS_01_2017_Eng.pdf
If globalization had a clear positive effect on the economy and trade of ASEAN, it is strange to see a weak
commitment of the
organisation on a key topic for the future of the region: security. Many years of successful development and economic
cooperation have failed to consolidate a stable legal and political framework within which the various member countries could find a peaceful
(co)existence. The possible instability of ASEAN regularly emerges in political debates and academic researches concerning the organization: if
the economic integration is proceeding with an efficient pace, security is still lagging behind. Among the members there are some open
controversies if not rivalries, as in the case of the South China Sea: China's
behaviour in this area, further contributes to divide
the unity of ASEAN between states asking for stronger actions, states which want to be neutral and finally states closer to Beijing's
positions. The uncertainty about the future direction of ASEAN, however, is one of the main limitations of the organisation itself, and it reflects
the political divisions of its members. The future of ASEAN presents some options, ranging from the most optimistic to the most pessimistic
scenario; at least in the short term, it is unlikely that ASEAN will collapse, but it
is also unlikely that the organisation will be able
to push an ambitious political agenda concretely able to tackle some of the open disputes and rivalries. ASEAN
is a regional organization that looks more inclined to favour the development of the different markets than actually capable of leading this
process: the hope for the next years is that the increased trade interaction and development will increasingly reduce the possibility of conflicts
or the use of force to resolve the possible controversies, which nevertheless may have causes and origin even outside the ASEAN region or its
members.
Glen Sidaras, 2018, “From Militarism to Pacifism: Understanding the Need to Revise Japan’s Article 9”,
Joint Advanced Warfighting School, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=815873 //CM
The SCS is a prime example of the changed security environment since World War II. ASEAN is an organization formed with the purpose of
“accelerating economic growth” and “promoting regional peace and stability” in the SCS.36 The aggressive and unlawful actions of the PRC in
the SCS has the potential to destabilize the Indo-Pacific region which ASEAN was formed to resist. With ten member states surrounding the SCS,
except the PRC, ASEAN suggests the importance of alliances or partnerships to deter aggression, but no single member of ASEAN has nearly the
military strength to openly challenge the PRC. In November 2016, the PRC impounded nine armored vehicles from the Singapore Army after an
exercise with Taiwan; similar to the illegal seizure of a U.S. P-3 on Hainan island in 2001.37 The
growth of ASEAN military power is
important as it allows the credible enforcement of international law. In July of 2016, the Hague Tribunal ruled
unanimously that China has no legal basis whatsoever for its so-called nine-dash line and favored the Philippines’ claim. Yet, the PRC remains
illegally. Despite this recent legal UN support, ASEAN and the Philippines are unable, and maybe unwilling, to enforce the ruling.38 One reason is
that ASEAN
lacks the military forces compared to the PRC. Vietnam attempted to challenge PRC authority in 1974, but was
forcibly removed by the PRC from the Paracels. Yet, Vietnam’s capacity is increasing, as evident from U.S.-Vietnam naval exercises and a U.S.
carrier port visit.39 While
ASEAN supports the rule of law, there is no credible endemic military force to
actively deter the PRC and to balance power. Japan is carefully adopting defense relationships with ASEAN, providing assistance
to countries in ASEAN since the 1950s.40 They recently designed a defense initiative, called “Vientiane Vision” that describes specific strategic
end states that align with Japanese and ASEAN interests. 41 Aimed at increasing defense cooperation, the JSDF executed dozens of
capacity-building assistance events, multi-lateral exercises, and defense exchanges with ASEAN over the past few years. 42 This past June, the JS
Izumo deployed to the SCS in support of Indo-Pacific regional security. Japan has no claims to the SCS, and does not seek to regain outdated
claims. Yet, with
an Article 9 revision, Japan would be in a position to protect Japanese and Indo-Pacific
security concerns in the SCS. ASEAN has an opportunity to leverage the one regional power capable of
challenging the PRC directly, and thereby has every reason to support the Japanese revision to Article 9.
The Indo-Pacific security environment has changed. Robust, real threats in the region exist today against Japan. Japan exercises routinely with
U.S. allies throughout the region, including former enemies like the ROK. Contested islands are the forefront of destabilizing scenarios that could
rapidly lead to miscalculations. The Article 9 revision evolves the JSDF in accord to today’s security environment by giving them the necessary
flexibility in such regional situations. And the flexibility could also lead to other opportunities for the JSDF in security cooperation across the
globe. In
most cases, the PRC desire for hegemony goes undeterred because of a lack of endemic, credible
military forces and overwhelming economic power.
Aizawa, 7-1-2020, "RESOLVED: Japan Is Well-positioned to Counterbalance China in Southeast Asia," No
Publication//CM,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/resolved-japan-well-positioned-counterbalance-china-southeast-asia
Despite these trends, Japan is well-positioned to counterbalance China in Southeast Asia. Below are three areas in
which Japan will be able to make a difference in preventing a Sino-centric Asia. The first area is in the geoeconomic/political arena. One of
China’s significant diplomatic strengths is its ability to frame its relationships vis-à-vis smaller Southeast Asian states into asymmetric power
relationships. This is especially the case for countries with lesser connectivity to the global market, such as Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, as
China attempts to fold them into a Sino-centric economic structure. On the other hand, Japanese engagement in Southeast Asia is stronger with
countries that have larger economies and more regional economic connectivity: Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines. Japanese
engagement is connecting intra-regional business and governmental networks in Southeast Asia, preventing China from taking advantage of
these countries and mitigating the creation of a China-led system. In the geopolitical realm, the asymmetric reality in military capability between
China and Southeast Asia is even clearer. Given limitations to military cooperation, Japan can counter China in the region primarily through
diplomatic and technological primarily through diplomatic and technological support. Diplomatically,
it can raise issues in
regional institutions on behalf of Southeast Asia regarding Chinese assertive actions that are too risky for
Southeast Asian leaders to raise themselves. For example, Japan is well-positioned to be a vocal actor in meetings such as the
ASEAN plus three (APT) and ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) plus. Second, security issues are increasingly evident in non-traditional
domains and so-called “gray zones,” for example, through the use of fishing boats to support maritime sovereignty claims. Japan can provide
technological support to strengthen the maritime domain awareness (MDA) of Southeast Asian countries.
Jennifer Jie Li, 2017 "," No Publication//CM,
https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir
=1&article=3777&context=isp_collection
The first section of this paper includes a review of relevant scholarly works in order to situate the topic in existing academic research and
present the complexities of the region today. The subsequent section on research methodology explains how the information analysis was
conducted. The third section provides a description of the various factors that matter in the South China Sea, including the strategic geopolitical
importance of the region, customary international laws related to the disputes, and the strengths and weaknesses of ASEAN. The fourth and
fifth sections trace the evolution of maritime claims, including attempts at resolution and ASEAN’s role in addressing the conflict. Then,
I
assess two potential approaches to resolving the dispute, both of which shed light on the region in the coming decade: 1)
the effectiveness of ASEAN thus far and its continuing efforts to engage in dialogue with external actors, including China,
and 2) the inclusion of a US-Japan security alliance in negotiations. After examining the future of the SCS, I conclude
that the group should continue its role in maintaining stability in the region and take the lead in creating
a peaceful consensus alongside the US and Japan
Kiyoshi Sugawa, 7-1-2000, "Time to Pop the Cork: Three Scenarios to Refine Japanese Use of Force,"
Brookings//CM,
https://www.brookings.edu/research/time-to-pop-the-cork-three-scenarios-to-refine-japanese-use-of-fo
rce/
Constitutional revision then, for the New Realists, will offer Japan greater negotiating leverage, both in its
international relations and particularly in the alliance relationship. If New Realist thinking prevails in the next decade, the Alliance may
experience tough times as it goes through a restructuring. The American side has not been accustomed to hearing such demands from the
Japanese, which may worsen the relationship initially. However, if the two sides fail to develop a closer and more reciprocal coordination
mechanism, the negative long-term implications for the alliance are even more significant.
Any initiative from Tokyo for a regional security mechanism lacks persuasive power if Japan bans its overseas
use of force and offers only financial support for the regional organization. By lowering restraints on the
use of force through constitutional revision, Tokyo can begin implementation with a more positive and
active role in promoting regional security organizations.
Michael A. Panton, 2010, "," No Publication//CM,
https://sites.temple.edu/ticlj/files/2017/02/24.1.Panton-TICLJ.pdf
The diplomatic currency of a revised constitution may indirectly increase Japan’s influence and ability to determine outcomes. That is probably
the most important underlying factor encouraging revision. A stable nation that consistently does not aggressively exercise its military options
has the capability to gather significant support and respect in the international community.291 If Japan revises its constitution, it must continue
to move cautiously and with reserve in the deployment of the SDF to keep from appearing overly threatening. Japan,
if it revises Article
9, will increase its diplomatic influence by being considered a world power that is operating primarily
under U.N. mandates. Japan then will have accomplished its goal of achieving global respect while
championing pacifism. If the revision happens, it will then mark Japan as a new type of global leader.
Lynn J. Ishii, 2013, "," No Publication//CM, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA589524.pdf
Moreover, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe plans to increase military spending to strengthen its military power to defend Japan’s territories
unilaterally. Additionally, Prime Minister Abe wants to lift Japan’s ban on the right to exercise collective self defense for a wider array of
scenarios than the four cases suggested by his advisory panel five years ago. The four cases restricted Japan’s military actions to repel attacks
against a U.S. fleet on open seas; to intercept ballistic missiles fired toward the United States; to guard foreign troops engaged in international
If Japan is
successful in revising Article 9 of its constitution, it will also be able to leverage new partners and
alliances and exercise collective defense
peacekeeping operations with Japan; and to provide logistics support to other countries for peacekeeping operations.
Juliana Velasco, 2013, "," No Publication//CM,
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3701&context=etd
regional organizations are 6.728 times more
likely to craft an agreement that is not broken for at least 5 years. 95 The return of significance on regional
The most significant outcome is that when accounting for all other variables,
organizations with the addition of the other variables not only reinforces hypothesis 2. It also reinforces the theory in general
Uptin Saiidi, 2018, “Here’s why the South China Sea is highly contested,” CNBC//CM,
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/07/heres-why-the-south-china-sea-is-highly-contested.html
Firstly, the South China Sea is a prominent shipping passage with $5.3 trillion worth of trade cruising
through its waters every year. That’s nearly one-third of all global maritime trade.
Gabriel Honrada, 3-22-2022, "China fully militarizes key South China Sea features," Asia Times//CM,
https://asiatimes.com/2022/03/china-fully-militarizes-key-south-china-sea-features/
China’s objectives in the South China Sea can be summed up in three main points. First, China wants to transform the South
China Sea into a sanctuary for its nuclear ballistic missile submarines, which need to operate in the Western Pacific to ensure
nuclear deterrence against the US. Second, China intends to transform the South China Sea into a buffer zone
between itself and the US in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Third, China aims to control the South China
Sea’s underwater resources, namely oil, gas, and fisheries, as well as secure its own maritime trading routes.
Nikita Kwatra, 4-1-2022, "GDP impact of South China Sea disputes," mint//VY,
https://www.livemint.com/news/world/gdp-impact-of-south-china-sea-disputes-116061901766
48.html
Major trading economies in the Asia-Pacific region could suffer an average GDP loss of over 12%
if an escalation blocks shipping via key waterways in the region, finds the study by Kerem Coşar and Benjamin
Thomas of the University of Virginia. The study was published as a working paper by the US National Bureau of Economic Research.
Claire Anderson, 7-24-2021, "South China Sea warning: 'Miscalculation' all it takes to spark all-out
conflict in region," Express.co.uk//CM,
https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1465444/south-china-sea-conflict-fishing-beijing-EEZ-Philippine
s-world-war-3-latest-vn
South China Sea warning: 'Miscalculation' all it takes to spark all-out conflict in region CONFLICT in the South China
Sea would be sparked by "a miscalculation" or if Beijing decided to make a huge power play, an expert has claimed. China has made its
intentions clear after claiming to own the entirety of the South China Sea. But the Philippines, Brunei,
China, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam have competing for claims of sovereignty in the disputed water, a conduit
for goods in excess of $3trillion (£2.2trillion) every year. Bill Hayton, an Associate Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House, has
explained how conflict could be sparked in the region despite all sides knowing how "disastrous" it would be.
Slater 2017 (Jerome Slater, Professor Emeritus of political science, SUNY Buffalo,
1-4-2017, A Coming War With China?," Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jerome-slater/a-coming-war-with-china_b_13949580.ht
ml, Accessed: 1-22-2017, /Kent Denver-MB)
Because of these two recent developments—the expanding U.S. naval presence in the South China Sea and the growing assertion
by China of what it considers to be its national rights in the region—there have been an increasing number of alarming incidents
between the military forces of the two countries. It
would seem to be only a matter of time before shots are fired. And
outright military clashes, no matter how limited they initially may seem to be, [which] contain the wholly unacceptable risk of
escalating into a major war—and even a nuclear war.
Nori Katagiri, 3-14-2021, "From cyber denial to cyber punishment: What keeps Japanese warriors from
active defense operations?," Taylor & Francis//CM,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14799855.2021.1896495?journalCode=fasi20
What was surprising about the incident was not the vulnerability of Japan’s defense system but the absence of a “real” response to prevent
further attacks.2 After locating the attack origin in China, the Japanese government decided against urging Beijing to stop or taking retaliatory
strikes, and instead did what it had always done – deny incidents and beef up defense. Japan’s cautiousness was in stark contrast to the growing
openness of Western governments to the option of countermeasures – defined here as acts of proportionally responding to cyber attackers to
compel them to desist – measures that include honeypots to lure in attackers for observation and quarantine, “hacking-back” at the origin of
attacks, and “dye-packs,” a malware in its networks’ decoy file that traces attackers.3 Today, the contrast looks even more stark when we
consider the fact that, while Japan is among many countries with the ability to launch cyber countermeasures,4 there is no record that it has
ever used it. That creates a puzzle; if Japan is capable of attacking back to deter cyber attacks, why does it not use it? What makes it unwilling to
use the power that others have used elsewhere? Is it because Japan’s defense is simply weak? Probably not, because Japanese technocrats do
have skills to operate as refined hackers. How about international legal restrictions? Not quite, because international law has little power to
enforce rules on cyber retaliations. While there are many academic works on Japan’s defense policy and capability, there has been a marked
hole in the literature on Japan’s cyber deterrence strategy. In fact, analysis of Japan’s security policy, particularly one in the Western scholarship,
has been so focused on the military aspects of it that the scholarship on Japan’s cyber defense has been under-developed.5 In this paper, I seek
to fill the void by explaining why Japan has been unwilling to launch countermeasures as a means of deterring cyber attacks. My answer to the
puzzle consists of three dimensions. First, Japan’s
current defense system has not worked well to deter cyber
attacks. Granted, cyber deterrence is known to be extremely hard, and Japan’s case is no exception. Data shows that the average
number of breaches per attempts on Japanese networks is extremely high at 96.8%, a near certainty that
a cyber attacks would hit the target. The number of attack attempts has been mostly steady over the years, meaning that there is a
constant flow of incoming attacks. In other words, while Japan’s cyber defense strategy may be denying some illicit traffic, it is not
deterring new attackers. Had the current strategy have been working, we would have seen an overall reduction of attack incidents.
Second, the failure to deter cybercrimes has much to do with the passive nature of cyber strategy best characterized as “denial defense,” a
strategic posture designed to deny foreign attacks by defensive methods. Denial defense centers on the use of “passive defense” actions to
minimize damage, rather than “active defense” that involves attacking back. This is because Japan has spent decades building denial defense
capability through new laws, organizational reform, government-wide training systems, and collaboration with the private sector. While denial
defense is useful for rejecting hostile actions, it does little to deter them – by imposing such costs on attackers that they cease operations.
Instead, it is active defense that carries this retaliatory ability. The primary reason why Japan’s cyber deterrence strategy has not worked well is
because it has invested exclusively in passive defense. Finally, I point out three factors that keep Japan’s cyber warriors from active defense
operations. The first is the way the law works. The legal system, including the constitution, is the cornerstone of passive defense. Consistent with
the postwar doctrine of defensive defense, or senshu boei, 6 the existing legal system keeps cyber strategy strictly in line with passive defense.
The legal constraint on active defense is buttressed by the second factor – the enormous technical constraints that cyber warriors face on the
use of force. The constraints come from the difficulty of sending credible threats to target audiences, which leads to the challenge of reassuring
the public that they will not be attacked and controlling cyberspace escalation. In other words, the legal, technical, and socio-political hurdles
are the reason why Japanese cyber strategy is stuck with passive defense operations.
Brad Medairy, “THE FUTURE OF CYBERSECURITY: THE BEST DEFENSE IS A GOOD OFFENSE”,
https://www.boozallen.com/s/insight/blog/future-of-cybersecurity.html //DX
Too many organizations wait to be notified that they’ve been breached. Yet with the increasing number and scale of cyberattacks—and the
sophisticated techniques threat actors are using to mask their activities—the traditional approach of
“building bigger fences” will no longer suffice. The recent hack of Equifax has posed one of the most significant risks to personally sensitive
information in years, potentially exposing data for as many as 143 million Americans, according to the New York Times. High-profile, large-scale
breaches like the one at Equifax serve as reminders that a defensive cyber approach is no longer sufficient. In today’s unpredictable
environment, filled with rapidly evolving threat actors and emerging technologies, the
only way organizations can [to] protect
themselves is
by unleashing offensive cyber techniques to uncover advanced adversaries on their
networks. The most effective approach—Threat hunting—is essential to any organization that wants to stop and prevent attacks in its networks.
Nori Katagiri 22 (Associate Professor of political science and director of international studies at
Saint Louis University), 3-13-2022, "Assessing Japan’s cybersecurity policy: change and
continuity from 2017 to 2020," Taylor & Francis,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23738871.2022.2033805?journalCode=rcyb20
//DX
Through close observation of Japanese cybersecurity policy between 2017 and 2020, I
demonstrate that changes made to the [cybersecurity] policy during the period were kept to a modest
level largely by the resilience of existing [Article 9’s] constraints on the use of force. Investigating a set of key
Japanese government documents such as the Cybersecurity Strategy, National Defence Programme Guidelines and Midterm Defence
Programme, I show that, while Japan did much to reduce its vulnerability to hostile cyber operations and enhance long-term security through
organisational overhaul and operational redesign, the developments turned out to be more cumulative than revolutionary in nature. That is,
Japan’s traditionally defensive defence posture continued to retain the restrained core of its
cyber strategy, observable in the status-quo orientation of the legal system and compliance with the way the international community
expects countries to behave in cyberspace. As such, I contend that structural impact will only emerge across government-led performance in the
long run. The modest changes reflect Tokyo’s established preference to adopt a patchwork approach to enduring problems in cyberspace.
Yoshino 21; Naoya Yoshino[ the Tokyo-based head of Nikkei's political news group], Nikkei Asia,
7-8-2021, In age of cyberwar, Japan's pacifist charter could spell defeat,"
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Comment/In-age-of-cyberwar-Japan-s-pacifist-charter-could-spell-defe
at, accessed 3-19-2022// aab
TOKYO -- Cyberattacks,
unfolding out of the public eye, resemble an undeclared war, and losing such
warfare can plunge a nation into crisis -- a point Japan has failed to grasp despite rising stakes. In a news
conference after his first summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin in mid-June, U.S. President Joe Biden told Putin that "certain critical
infrastructure should be off-limits to attack -- period -- by cyber or any other means." Without directly responding to Biden's demand, Putin
asserted in a separate news conference that "most cyberattacks in the world come from U.S. cyberspace." The exchange came the month after a
ransomware attack temporarily shut down one of America's largest oil pipelines, a major energy artery between the South and the Northeast.
Cyberattacks ballooned ninefold from 2015 to 2020, according to a survey by Japan's National Institute of Information and Communications
Technology. There is no shortage of examples of cyber incidents that have rocked the world. The U.S. and Israel are suspected of involvement in
a 2010 attack that took out Iranian uranium enrichment centrifuges. Widespread blackouts in Ukraine in 2015 are believed to have been caused
by a Russian hack of the country's power grid. Infrastructure has not been the only target. After the 2016 U.S. presidential race between Donald
Trump and Hillary Clinton, Washington concluded that Moscow had used hacking, among other means, to meddle in the election. Interfering in
the selection of a country's next leader, and potentially affecting the outcome, represents an infringement on sovereignty. In modern times,
wars are often preceded by an official declaration and conducted in accordance with international laws of warfare. But
cyberattacks are
launched silently, and it can be difficult to pin down who is responsible -- a country, an organization, an
individual, or even a nonstate actor with state backing. How prepared is Japan for this new era of
warfare? A study of countries' cyber capabilities released in late June by the London-based International
Institute for Strategic Studies put Tokyo [Japan] in the third and lowest tier -- behind the U.S. in the top
tier and such countries as the U.K., China and Russia in the middle. The report cited Article 21 of Japan's constitution,
which it says "severely limits the extent to which the government can collect signals intelligence and consequently conduct cyber
reconnaissance." Article 21 states that "the secrecy of any means of communication [shall not] be violated." Washington and Tokyo agreed in
2019 that cyberattacks could trigger Article 5 of their security treaty, which obliges the U.S. to defend Japan if it is attacked. This relies on
effective intelligence sharing, but a strict reading of Article 21 would keep Tokyo from providing information to Washington. "The U.S. infiltrates
and monitors networks in potentially hostile nations even during peacetime, thwarting potential cyberattacks against the U.S. as they arise,"
said Motohiro Tsuchiya, a professor in the Graduate School of Media and Governance at Keio University. "We can't do this in Japan due to Article
21 of the constitution, Article 4 of the Telecommunications Business Act, the Act on Prohibition of Unauthorized Computer Access, and other
legislation," he said. "Intelligence-gathering activities are not considered an exception to these rules, so we cannot take actions that would fall
under a gray zone." Japan's
legal system is clearly ill-equipped to deal with the modern threat of cyberattacks.
The importance of cyberdefense is putting a different spin on Japan's long-running debate on whether to
preserve or amend the war-renouncing Article 9 of the constitution. "Beyond secrecy of communication, there is the
issue of the right to self-defense," said George Shishido, law professor at the University of Tokyo. "Is the right to exercise self-defense in
cyberspace permissible? Will a preemptive attack be permissible?" "In a society where cyber and physical are integrated, what should be the
nature of human rights and government authority?" Shishido said. "Cyberdefense should be debated head-on." But there is no evidence that
the constitutional panels in the upper or lower house of Japan's parliament have seriously debated the constitutional implications of
cyberdefense. Much as the coronavirus pandemic has shown, there is no room for inaction against the waves of globalization and digitization.
Political inaction is synonymous with negligence, which could lead to a defeat in a cyberwar. To prevent such an outcome, all political parties
should spell out their stances on the constitution in relation to cyberdefense ahead of the coming elections and roll out a swift response.
Ken Jimbo 21, 8-29-2021, “Japan has no time to waste in boosting its cyberdefenses”, Japan
Times,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2021/08/29/commentary/japan-commentary/japan-infr
astructure-cyberattacks/ //DX
In protecting critical infrastructure, the Japanese government places top priority on assuring their functions. It provides a risk
management system by supporting defense capabilities of critical infrastructure operators in 14 sectors and encouraging
cooperation among them. But as new [cyber] threats are emerging regarding critical infrastructure, is
passive defense — a model of cooperation among operators to assure functions — sufficient
enough? In the case of Colonial Pipeline, U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration managed to recover $2.3 million of the ransom paid in
cryptocurrency to a criminal cybergroup. FBI investigators, the Justice Department’s new Ransomware and Digital Extortion Task Force, and
financial authorities closely cooperated and used a blockchain explorer to identify a virtual currency wallet that the hackers used to collect
payment from Colonial Pipeline. Such
a success sends a signal to cybercrime groups that cyberattacks will
be more costly with less returns. The Japanese government currently lacks such task forces that can
quickly respond to incidents. It is necessary to prepare for a situation in which critical
infrastructure is hit by large-scale cyberattacks, threatening people’s lives and leading to other
damage. A day might come in the not-so-distant future when cyberattacks on the nation’s critical infrastructure take control of flights,
trains, transportation and electricity supply systems, causing injuries and even fatalities. If such a situation occurs, depending only on
passive defense aimed at assuring functions of infrastructure could mean a substantial lack of
ways to effectively prevent future attacks. To cope with new threats to critical infrastructure, the government should adopt
a system of active defense, including directly approaching attackers, in addition to strengthening existing passive defense measures and the
resilience of critical infrastructure. Specifically, the government must look out for signs of cyberattacks by monitoring potential attackers, boost
capabilities to attribute the source of the attacks, have the ability to negotiate with attackers or make a countercharge against them, prepare to
designate cyberattacks as contingencies according to the level of threats and cooperate internationally, especially with the U.S. Introducing
deterrence The
first stage of active defense is boosting deterrence by detection. By detecting and
identifying the movements of potential attackers, the government can make them aware that they are being monitored
constantly, thus reducing the possibility of them behaving opportunistically. The second stage is deterrence by denial. Japan can lower the
incentive to attack if it is able to present multilayered defense systems and the capability to recover quickly from cyberattacks. The
third
stage is to introduce deterrence by punishment, including criminal prosecution and counterattacks, so
that cybercrime groups will give up attacking Japan in fear of having to pay a high price. The
government is planning to compile a new cybersecurity strategy by the end of this year and will launch a new digital agency in September to
accelerate the digitalization of the economy. At
this crucial time, the government must update its crisis awareness toward
defending critical infrastructure, strengthen measures including active defense, propose necessary legal
revisions and systems and clarify responsibilities, authorities and the sharing of roles among different organizations. A draft for the new
cybersecurity strategy calls for the improvement of deterrence against cyberattacks and proposes boosting the capability to prevent the use of
cyberspace by attackers and dealing with attacks through such steps as criminal prosecution. If Japan is really serious about adopting active
defense, it is necessary to promote such measures in a more systematic manner. The government should also focus more on protecting
cutting-edge technologies and the defense industry from the standpoint of economic security.
Kristin Houser 19, 8-20-2019, “SCIENTIST: MAJOR CYBERATTACK COULD BE AS BAD AS NUCLEAR
WAR”, The Byte, https://futurism.com/the-byte/major-cyberattack-nuclear-war //DX
We already know what kind of damage a nuclear weapon attack can do — and according to a computer science expert, a cyberattack could now
be just as devastating. “As someone who studies cybersecurity and information warfare, I’m concerned that a
cyberattack with
widespread impact… could cause significant damage, including mass injury and death rivaling the death toll of a
nuclear weapon,” Jeremy Straub, an assistant professor of computer science at North Dakota State University, wrote in a newly
published post in The Conversation. Power Problem In the post, Straub cites numerous examples of hackers [by]
targeting [critical infrastructure such as] water treatment plants, power grids, and even nuclear
facilities as examples of the form a nuclear weapon-level cyberattack might take.