SIMON V. CHR
FACTS:
In July 1990, a “Demolition Notice” was signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners), in his
capacity as an Executive Officer of the QC Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the
Office of the City Mayor and was sent and received by the private respondents (being the officers
and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said Notice, the
respondents were given a grace period of 3 days within which to vacate the premises of North
EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the PRs were informed by petitioner Quimpo
that their stalls should be removed to give way to the “People’s Park.” On July 12 1990, the group,
led by their President Roque Ferno, filed a letter-complaint with the CHR against the petitioners,
asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter addressed to then Mayor
Brigido Simon, Jr., of QC to stop the demolition. On July 23 1990, the CHR issued an order,
directing the petitioners “to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North Edsa pending
resolution of the vendors/squatters’ complaint before the Commission” and ordered said
petitioners to appear before the CHR. On Aug. 1, 1990, the CHR, in its resolution, ordered the
disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200k in favor of PRs to purchase light
housing materials and food under the Commission’s supervision and again directed the petitioners
to “desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a
citation for contempt and arrest.” On Sept. 10, 1990, a motion to dismiss (MD) filed by the
petitioners before the CHR questioned CHR’s jurisdiction. It was stated that the CHR’s authority
should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political
rights, and that “the rights allegedly violated not such rights but privilege to engage in business.”
On Sept. 25, 1990, in an order, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the “order to desist.” Also,
petitioners’ MD was denied. It opined “it was not the intention of the Constitutional Commission
to create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it should be
considered a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons within the PH.” Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE:
WON the CHR’s jurisdiction is confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political
rights.
RULING:
Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution empowered the CHR to investigate all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights. The demolition of stalls, sari-sari stores
and carenderia cannot fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and
political rights". Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity
and are the same in all parts of the world. Human rights include civil rights (right to life, liberty
and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom; rights of the accused
to due process of law), political rights (right to elect public officials, to be elected to public office,
and to form political associations and engage in politics), social rights (right to education,
employment and social services. Human rights are entitlements that inhere in the individual person
from the sheer fact of his humanity...Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by
the State but can only be recognized and protected by it.Human rights includes all the civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of
his natural birth, right, innate, and inalienable.
CIVIL RIGHTS - are those that belong to every citizen and are not connected with the organization
or administration of the government.
POLITICAL RIGHTS - are rights to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or
administration of the government.
CARINO VS. CHR
FACTS:
Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted actions”to act upon their grievances.
The “mass actions” consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang
Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an
order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work
order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged,
preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An
investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges. When their motion for
suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a walkout signifying
their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from
service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the
meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking
teachers to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the
respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain
that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their
replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely
unknown to them. While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the
cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carino’s act of issuing the return-to-work orders.
Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the “striking teachers” “were denied due
process of law; they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative
charges;” there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is
empowered to investigate.”
ISSUE:
Whether CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved
RULING:
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not
meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country or
duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact finding is not adjudication and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court
of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the fact of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To
be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions
to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function,
to repeat, the Commission does not have.
ANG LADLAD V. COMELEC
FACTS:
“Ang Ladlad” is an organization of people who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals,
or trans- genders. The Comelec dismissed the petition on moral grounds as “the definition of the
LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that it tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs.”
The COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition for registration of the petitioner on
moral grounds that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs and advocates
sexual immorality. Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating
immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it or any of its
nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or
regulations relating to the elections. Furthermore, states COMELEC, Ang Ladlad will be exposing
our youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial of accreditation by COMELEC, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
RULING:
Comelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s application was a violation
of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The
proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is, the
conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is “detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon
which depend the existence and progress of human society"), rather than out of religious
conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad
would be detrimental to society. The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its
constitutionally vested rights based on their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should
apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the
same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual
orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any international laws to which we
adhere.
TECSON V. GLAXO
FACTS:
Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson signed a contract of employment as Medical Representative with Glaxo
Welcome Philippines which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by existing
company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or
affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies and should management
find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. The
Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee is expected to inform
management of any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees
or employees of competing drug companies. If management perceives a conflict of interest or a
potential conflict between such relationship and the employee’s employment with the company,
the management and the employee will explore the possibility of a “transfer to another department
in a non-counterchecking position” or preparation for employment outside the company after 6
months. Tecson entered a romantic relationship with Bettsy, a Branch Coordinator in Albay for
Glaxo’s competitor, Astra Pharmaceuticals. Despite receiving several reminders from his District
Manager regarding the possible conflict of interest which may arise from his relationship with
Betty, Tecson married Bettsy in September 1998.
ISSUE:
Whether Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor companies is
valid
RULING:
Glaxo’s policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship with an employee of a
competitor company is a valid exercise of management prerogative. Glaxo has a right to guard its
trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and
information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly
competitive pharmaceutical industry. The prohibition against personal or marital relationships
with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the
circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company.
In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the
possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures. As held in a
Georgia, USA case, it is a legitimate business practice to guard business confidentiality and protect
a competitive position by even-handedly disqualifying from jobs male and female applicants or
employees who are married to a competitor. The Court pointed out that the policy was applied to
men and women equally and noted that the employer’s business was highly competitive and that
gaining inside information would constitute a competitive advantage. From the wordings of the
contractual provision and the policy in its employee handbook, Glaxo does not impose an absolute
prohibition against relationships between its employees and those of competitor companies. Its
employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own choosing. What
the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company
that may arise out of such relationships. The policy being questioned is not a policy against
marriage. An employee of the company remains free to marry anyone of his or her choosing. The
policy is not aimed at restricting a personal prerogative that belongs only to the individual.
However, an employee’s personal decision does not detract the employer from exercising
management prerogatives to ensure maximum profit and business success.
STARPAPER V. SIMBOL
FACTS:
Star Paper Corporation employed Ronaldo Simbol on Oct 1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also, an
employee of the company, whom he married. Before marriage, Josephine Ongsitco the manager
advised the couple that one of them must resign i f they decided to get married pursuant to a
company policy to which Simbol complied. On February 5, 1997, Comia was hired by the company.
She met Howard Comia, a co-employee, whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise
reminded them the company policy, Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.Estrella was also hired on
July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuñiga also a co-worker. Petitioners stated that Zuñiga, a married
man, got Estrella pregnant. The company allegedly could have terminated her services due to
immorality, but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999. Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint
and states that the company policy was decreed pursuant to what the respondent corporation
perceived as management prerogative. On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. In its assailed Decision dated August 3, 2004, the Court of Appeals
reversed the NLRC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the questioned policy violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution and the
Labor Code?
RULING:
The Court ruled on the side of the respondents. Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides: It
shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of
employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that
upon getting married a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her
marriage. It is significant to note that respondents were hired after they were found fit for the job,
butwere asked to resign when they married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the
marriage of Simbol to Alma Dayrit could be detrimental to its business operations. It must be
reasonable under the circumstances to qualify as a valid exercise of management prerogative. The
questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code, but it creates a
disproportionate effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in
imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee’s right to be free from arbitrary
discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one company.
YRASUEGUI VS. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES
FACTS:
THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed because
of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company. The proper weight for a
man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds,
as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL. In 1984, the weight problem
started, which prompted PAL to send him to an extended vacation until November 1985. He was
allowed to return to work once he lost all the excess weight. But the problem recurred. He again
went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988, to February 1989. Despite the lapse of a ninetyday period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained overweight. On January 3,
1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he
satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks
for weight checks, which he failed to comply with. On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally
warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight checks would be dealt with accordingly. He was
given another set of weight check dates, which he did not report to. On November 13, 1992, PAL
finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on
weight requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being discriminated as those similarly situated
were not treated the same. On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer. Notably, he
did not deny being overweight. What he claimed, instead, is that his violation, if any, had already
been condoned by PAL since "no action has been taken by the company" regarding his case "since
1988." He also claimed that PAL discriminated against him because "the company has not been
fair in treating the cabin crew members who are similarly situated." On December 8, 1992, a
clarificatory hearing was held where petitioner manifested that he was undergoing a weight
reduction program to lose at least two (2) pounds per week to attain his ideal weight.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his
ideal weight, “and considering the utmost leniency” extended to him “which spanned a period
covering a total of almost five (5) years,” his services were considered terminated “effective
immediately.” His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against PAL.
LABOR ARBITER: Held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature
of the job of petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of
dismissal since his weight did not hamper the performance of his duties. NLRC affirmed.
According to the NLRC, "obesity, or the tendency to gain weight uncontrollably regardless of the
amount of food intake, is a disease. Therefore, there can be no intentional defiance or serious
misconduct by petitioner to the lawful order of PAL for him to lose weight.” PAL moved for
reconsideration to no avail. Thus, PAL elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA).
COURT OF APPEALS: Contrary to the NLRC ruling, the weight standards of PAL are meant to
be a continuing qualification for an employee’s position. The failure to adhere to the weight
standards is an analogous cause for the dismissal of an employee under Article 282(e) of the Labor
Code in relation to Article 282(a). It is not willful disobedience as the NLRC seemed to suggest.
The relevant question to ask is not one of willfulness but one of reasonableness of the standard and
whether the employee qualifies or continues to qualify under this standard.
The weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because he
repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is obvious that the issue of
discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal
for being overweight. On May 10, 2005, the CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Elaborating on its earlier ruling, the CA held that the weight standards of PAL are a bona fide
occupational qualification which, in case of violation, "justifies an employee’s separation from the
service."
ISSUES:
WON Obesity is a ground for dismissal?
WON Petitioner was discriminated when he was dismissed while other overweight cabin
attendants were either given flying duties or promoted
RULING:
1. FIRST ISSUE ANENT THE VALIDITY OF THE CAUSE OF DISMISSAL. – The
obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. A
reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they
constitute a continuing qualification of an employee to keep the job. The dismissal of the
employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. In the case at bar, the
evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims that obesity is a disease. That he
was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him
to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during
the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that “[t]he issues
is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight, which is 172, then the answer is yes. I
can do it now.” Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the
assistance of the company physician, per the advice of PAL. In fine, the court held that the
obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes
an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from
the service. His obesity may not be unintended but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA
correctly puts it, “voluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to
the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This
element runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be a wrongful action
or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary
although it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).” 2. SEC III.
Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated against by PAL.
Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a convenient excuse to
discriminate against him. The Court is constrained, however, to hold otherwise. Since the
burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an affirmative allegation, petitioner must
prove his allegation with particularity. There is nothing on the records which could support
the finding of discriminatory treatment. Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by
simply naming the supposed cabin attendants who are allegedly
2. similarly situated with him. Substantial proof must be shown as to how and why they are
similarly situated, and the differential treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the
similarity of his situation with other employees. To make his claim more believable,
petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guaranty of the Constitution. (ALERT: This
could be the answer to Atty. AVL’s question na “Why was this case assigned?) However,
in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked. Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against
acts of private individuals. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment, which is the source of our equal protection guarantee, is consistent
in saying that the equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful. Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the
equal protection guarantee.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide
occupational qualification defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to
persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex,
religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification
is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of reasonableness of
the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid “provided it reflects
an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.” The business of
PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its passengers. To
achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck
crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing
strict norms of discipline upon its employees. The primary objective of PAL in the imposition
of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety. Separation pays, however, should be
awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so
because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral
character.
JAMES OBERGEFELL V. RICHARD HODGES
FACTS:
Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and
Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal
to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such
marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection
Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also
brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the
plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans
on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate
the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process.
ISSUE:
(1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of
the same sex?
(2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people
of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state?
RULING:
Yes, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one of
the fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same
manner as it does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial precedent has held that the right to marry is a
fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy, it protects the
most intimate association between two people, it safeguards children and families by according to
legal recognition to building a home and raising children, and it has historically been recognized
as the keystone of social order. Because there are no differences between a same-sex union and an
opposite-sex union with respect to these principles, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the
right to marry violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees the right of same-sex couples to
marry as the denial of that right would deny same-sex couples equal protection under the law.
Marriage rights have traditionally been addressed through both parts of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the same interrelated principles of liberty and equality apply with equal force to
these cases; therefore, the Constitution protects the fundamental right of same-sex couples to
marry. The Court also held that the First Amendment protects the rights of religious organizations
to adhere to their principles, but it does not allow states to deny same-sex couples the right to marry
on the same terms as those for opposite-sex couples.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, while same-sex marriage
might be good and fair policy, the Constitution does not address it, and therefore it is beyond the
purview of the Court to decide whether states must recognize or license such unions. Instead, this
issue should be decided by individual state legislatures based on the will of their electorates. The
Constitution and judicial precedent clearly protect a right to marry and require states to apply laws
regarding marriage equally, but the Court cannot overstep its bounds and engage in judicial
policymaking. The precedents regarding the right to marry only strike down unconstitutional
limitations on marriage as it has been traditionally defined and government intrusions, and
therefore there is no precedential support for making a state alter its definition of marriage. Chief
Justice Roberts also argued that the majority opinion relied on an overly expansive reading of the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment without engaging with
the judicial analysis traditionally applied to such claims and while disregarding the proper role of
the courts in the democratic process. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined
in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that the majority opinion overstepped
the bounds of the Court’s authority both by exercising the legislative, rather than judicial, power
and by doing so in a realm that the Constitution reserves for the states. Justice Scalia argued that
the question of whether same-sex marriage should be recognized is one for the state legislatures,
and that for the issue to be decided by unelected judges goes against one of the most basic precepts
of the Constitution: that political change should occur through the votes of elected representatives.
In taking on this policymaking role, the majority opinion departed from established Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence to create a right where none exists in the Constitution. Justice Thomas
joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the
majority opinion stretched the doctrine of substantive due process rights found in the Fourteenth
Amendment too far and in doing so distorted the democratic process by taking power from the
legislature and putting it in the hands of the judiciary. Additionally, the legislative history of the
Due Process Clause in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments indicates that they were meant
to protect people from physical restraint and from government intervention, but they do not grant
them rights to government entitlements. Justice Thomas also argued that the majority opinion
impermissibly infringed on religious freedom by legislating from the bench rather than allowing
the state legislature to determine how best to address the competing rights and interests at stake.
Justice Scalia joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that
the Constitution does not address the right of same-sex couples to marry, and therefore the issue
is reserved to the states to decide whether to depart from the traditional definition of marriage. By
allowing a majority of the Court to create a new right, the majority opinion dangerously strayed
from the democratic process and greatly expanded the power of the judiciary beyond what the
Constitution allows. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.