All Conditions Operations
and Innovative Cockpit Infrastructure
D1.1-2
FUTURE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
Document author(s):
J-S. Vial, J-L. Arnod (THAV)
W. Huson (U2AS)
B. Nilsson, A. Palm, J. Ertzgaard (AVTE)
J-N. Albrieux (DASS)
J. Rossiter, F. Crawford (AWUK)
D. Jordan (BAES)
J. Cahill, R. Morrison, N. McDonald (TCD)
F. Pelikán (LET)
F. Bruni (ALAE)
Responsible Partner:
Alenia Aeronautica
Dissemination Level
PU
Public
PP
Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission Services)
RE
Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission Services)
CO
Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission Services)
X
Status Released
Document Number: ALICIA/DEL/ALAE/WP1-0003
D1.1-2 - Future Operational Requirements
Document information table
Contract number:
ACP8-GA-2009-233682
Project acronym:
ALICIA
Project Co-ordinator:
AGUSTA WESTLAND
Document Responsible Partner:
Alenia Aeronautica
Document Type:
DELIVERABLE
Document number:
ALICIA/DEL/ALAE/WP1-0003
sgusmano@alenia.it
Document Title :
Future Operational Requirements
Document ID:
D1.1-2
Contractual Date of Delivery:
30.11.2009
Filename:
ALICIA-DEL-ALAE-WP1-0003_D1-1-2-FutOpsReq_v2.doc
Status:
Released
Version: 02
Actual Date of Delivery:
03.08.2010
Approval status
Document Manager
Verification Authority
Project Approval
Alenia Aeronautica S.p.A.
Westland Helicopters Ltd
PMC
Fausto Bruni
Sim Wincott
--
WP1.1 Technical Leader
ALICIA Technical Leader
--
31.05.2010
14.06.2010
25.06.2010
Dissemination Information
This publication only reflects the view of the ALICIA Consortium or selected
participants thereof. Whilst the ALICIA Consortium has taken steps to ensure that this
information is accurate, it may be out of date or incomplete, therefore, neither the
ALICIA Consortium participants nor the European Community are liable for any use
that may be made of the information contained herein.
This document is published in the interest of the exchange of information and it may be
copied in whole or in part providing that this disclaimer is included in every
reproduction or part thereof as some of the technologies and concepts predicted in this
document may be subject to protection by patent, design right or other application for
protection, and all the rights of the owners are reserved.
The information contained in this document may not be modified or used for any
commercial purpose without prior written permission of the owners and any request for
such additional permissions should be addressed to the ALICIA Coordinator (Westland
Helicopters Limited, Lysander Road, Yeovil, Somerset, BA20 2YB, UK, for the attention
of the ALICIA Programme Manager) in the first instance.
This document is produced by the ALICIA Consortium. Copyright and all other rights are reserved.
The information contained in this document may not be modified or used for any commercial purpose without the prior written
permission of the owners and any requests for such additional permissions should be addressed to the ALICIA coordinator.
Unrestricted PUBLIC Access
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D1.1-2 - Future Operational Requirements
Revision table
Version
Date
Modified Page/Sections
01a
20.11.2009
F. Bruni
initial draft version
01b
31.03.2010
F. Bruni
second draft version
01c
31.05.2010
F. Bruni
for review comments by all
Partners
01d
07.06.2010
F. Crawford
to include amended rotorcraft
section
01e
14.06.2010
F. Bruni
for PMC review
Issue 1
07.07.2010
F. Bruni
updated with PMC comments
from:
U.Hoffmamn - DASP
L.Meunier - THAV
D.Jordan / C.Hewitt - BAES
Issue 2
03.08.2010
P2 – Dissemination
Information added
All pages - footer
updated for public
access
Author
Comments
N Harris
Circulation list
Name
Company/Institution
ALICIA Consortium
ALICIA Consortium
To be filled
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Executive summary
This document is a result of the activities performed under the ALICIA Work Package
1.1. where the current and future operational context and associated requirements for
the different classes of fixed and rotary wing platforms have been defined.
This document presents:
•
a review of the outputs from other related projects, useful to capture the
evolution of the future scenarios and the associated missions
•
future roles/scenarios envisaged for different fixed and rotary wing platform
types
The future operational requirements will then be structured and consolidated in the
deliverable D1.5-1 “Consolidated Operational Requirements” (as part of the WP1.5
activities) to produce a set of common requirements applicable to all platforms.
This document is produced by the ALICIA Consortium. Copyright and all other rights are reserved.
The information contained in this document may not be modified or used for any commercial purpose without the prior written
permission of the owners and any requests for such additional permissions should be addressed to the ALICIA coordinator.
Unrestricted PUBLIC Access
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D1.1-2 - Future Operational Requirements
Partners involved in the document
No
Member name
Short
name
Check if
involved
1
Westland Helicopters Ltd (Coordinator)
AWUK
√
2
Thales Avionics
THAV
√
3
Diehl Aerospace
DASP
√
4
Airbus France
AIFR
5
Dassault Aviation
DASS
√
6
Alenia Aeronautica S.p.A.
ALAE
√
7
SAAB AB
SAAB
8
Aircraft Industries a.s.
LET
9
CAE UK Plc
CAE
10
Wytwornia Sprzetu Komunikacyjnego „PZL-Swidnik” Spolka Akcyjna
PZL
√
11
BAE Systems
BAES
√
12
GE Aviation Systems Ltd
GEAS
13
Agusta S.p.A.
AWIT
14
EADS Innovation Works
EADS
15
Jeppesen
JEPP
16
Rockwell Collins France
RCFR
17
BARCO n.v.
BARC
18
Latecoere
LATE
19
Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V.
DLR
20
Office National d'Etudes et de Recherches Aérospatiales
ONER
21
National Aerospace Laboratory NLR
NLR
22
Federal State Unitary Enterprise Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute
TSAG
23
Météo-France
FME
24
Centro Italiano Ricerche Aerospaziali
CIRA
25
Ingeniería de Sistemas para la Defensa de España S. A.
ISDE
26
IntuiLab
INTL
27
USE2ACES B.V.
U2AS
28
GTD Sistemas De Información
GTD
29
Deep Blue
DBLU
30
DBS Systems Engineering
DBSE
31
A-Volute
AVOL
32
Space & Defence Technologies
SDT
33
European Virtual Engineering
EUVE
34
AVTECH Sweden AB
AVTE
35
Technische Universitat Carolo-Wilhelmina zu Braunschweig
TUBS
36
The University of Malta
UOMT
37
University of Bologna
UBOL
38
NOT USED
39
Stirling Dynamics
SDL
40
Aydin Yazilim ve Elektronik Sanayi A.Ş
AYESAS
41
Interconsulting Ingegneria dei Sistemi S.r.l.
INTC
42
Trinity College Dublin
TCD
43
University of Southampton
SOTON
√
√
√
√
√
This document is produced by the ALICIA Consortium. Copyright and all other rights are reserved.
The information contained in this document may not be modified or used for any commercial purpose without the prior written
permission of the owners and any requests for such additional permissions should be addressed to the ALICIA coordinator.
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Table of contents
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................... 9
1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 12
2 SCOPE ...................................................................................................................... 13
3 FUTURE OUTLOOK ................................................................................................. 14
3.1 VISION 2020 ..................................................................................................................... 14
3.1.1 General .......................................................................................................................... 14
3.1.2 Responding to society needs ......................................................................................... 14
3.1.3 Policy and Regulation .................................................................................................... 15
3.1.4 The research agenda ..................................................................................................... 15
3.2 SESAR .............................................................................................................................. 16
3.3 FLYSAFE .......................................................................................................................... 18
3.4 OPTIMAL .......................................................................................................................... 19
3.4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 19
3.4.2 OPTIMAL Aircraft Approach Procedures ....................................................................... 20
3.4.2.1 Straight in Final Approach based on ABAS (APV ABAS) ...................................... 20
3.4.2.2 Straight in Final Approach based on SBAS (APV SBAS) ...................................... 21
3.4.2.3 Straight In Final GBAS PA Procedure .................................................................... 22
3.4.2.4 RNP RNAV (Straight in & Curved) Final Approach ................................................ 23
3.4.2.5 Enhanced Vision System Approach ....................................................................... 25
3.4.2.6 Continuous Descent Approach ............................................................................... 25
3.4.2.7 Dual / Displaced Threshold Approach Procedure .................................................. 26
3.4.2.8 Simultaneous Non Interfering Aircraft / Rotorcraft Operations ............................... 27
3.5 HILAS ................................................................................................................................ 32
3.5.1 HILAS themes ................................................................................................................ 32
3.5.2 Human Factors in the Lifecycle Approach ..................................................................... 33
3.5.3 Models of ‘humans in the system’ .................................................................................. 34
3.5.4 Design for Operability .................................................................................................... 35
3.5.5 Sample future operational scenario ............................................................................... 36
3.5.5.1 Enhanced reporting ................................................................................................ 36
3.5.5.2 Intelligent planning .................................................................................................. 37
3.5.5.3 Strategic alliance across lifecycle ........................................................................... 38
3.5.5.4 Collaborative safety database ................................................................................ 38
3.5.6 Contributions of Flight Deck strand ................................................................................ 39
3.6 CREDOS ........................................................................................................................... 42
3.7 CLEAN SKY ...................................................................................................................... 44
4 FIXED WING FUTURE SCENARIOS ....................................................................... 48
4.1 Mission Requirements ...................................................................................................... 48
4.1.1 Capabilities and Global Objectives ................................................................................ 48
4.1.1.1 Anticipation and avoidance of disturbances during operations .............................. 48
4.1.1.2 Robust worldwide operations capability ................................................................. 55
4.1.1.3 Delivering improved punctuality while simultaneously enhancing safety ............... 59
4.1.2 Mission profiles .............................................................................................................. 77
4.1.3 Operational environment................................................................................................ 79
4.1.3.1 Airport environment ................................................................................................ 79
4.1.3.2 Geographical environment ..................................................................................... 84
4.1.3.3 Atmospheric environment ....................................................................................... 85
This document is produced by the ALICIA Consortium. Copyright and all other rights are reserved.
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4.1.4 Stakeholders / Actors ..................................................................................................... 87
4.2 Concepts of Operations .................................................................................................... 88
4.2.1 Flight preparation ........................................................................................................... 88
4.2.2 Departure ....................................................................................................................... 89
4.2.2.1 Cockpit preparation ................................................................................................ 89
4.2.2.2 Take-off and climb out ............................................................................................ 89
4.2.3 Enroute Climb, Cruise and Initial Enroute Descent ....................................................... 89
4.2.4 Approach ........................................................................................................................ 90
4.2.5 Landing and taxi in ......................................................................................................... 90
5 ROTARY WING FUTURE SCENARIOS ................................................................... 92
5.1 Mission Requirements ...................................................................................................... 92
5.1.1 Capabilities and Global Objectives ................................................................................ 92
5.1.2 Mission Profiles ............................................................................................................ 107
5.1.3 Operational environment.............................................................................................. 108
5.1.3.1 Airport environment .............................................................................................. 109
5.1.3.2 Geographical environment ................................................................................... 113
5.1.3.3 Atmospheric environment ..................................................................................... 114
5.1.4 Stakeholders / Actors ................................................................................................... 115
6 RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER WORK .................................................... 118
7 REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 119
ANNEX A: DOCUMENT COPYRIGHT RULES ......................................................... 120
GLOSSARY/DEFINITIONS ........................................................................................ 121
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List of Figures
Figure 1 - EVS Precision Approach ............................................................................................................ 25
Figure 2 - Nominal and Optimised CDA Procedure .................................................................................... 26
Figure 3 - Displaced Threshold Approach ................................................................................................... 27
Figure 4 - SNI Straight In Parallel Approach ............................................................................................... 28
Figure 5 - SNI Straight In Convergent Approach......................................................................................... 29
Figure 6 - SNI Curved Approach ................................................................................................................. 30
Figure 7 – Human Integration into the Lifecycle of Aviation Systems ......................................................... 33
Figure 8 – Human Integration into the Lifecycle of Aviation Systems ......................................................... 41
Figure 9 - Clean Sky Integrated Technology Demonstrators (ITD) scheme ................................................ 45
Figure 10 – Test of a GRA solution ............................................................................................................. 46
Figure 11 – Representation of a candidate CLEANSKY solution ................................................................ 47
Figure 12 – SESAR trajectory proposal ...................................................................................................... 50
Figure 13 – Terminal area operations (Copyright-free picture) ................................................................... 51
Figure 14 – Routes for high-complexity terminal operations with tubes (left) or cones (right) ..................... 52
Figure 15 – Eurocontrol Generic Roadmap of Navigation Strategy ............................................................ 55
Figure 16 – Initial climb-out (Copyright-free picture) ................................................................................... 79
Figure 17 – A319 on Wilkins apron © Australian Antarctic Division 2008 ................................................... 84
List of Tables
Table 1 – HILAS Models of humans in the system ..................................................................................... 35
Table 2 – HILAS Technologies/Applications ............................................................................................... 40
Table 3 – SESAR vision of future airspace users role ................................................................................ 87
Table 4 – Additional rotorcraft actors ........................................................................................................ 116
This document is produced by the ALICIA Consortium. Copyright and all other rights are reserved.
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List of abbreviations
AAIB
ABAS
ACC
ADF
AGL
AIC
AIP
AIS
ALT
AMAN
AMC
APV
AOC
AOM
ASE
ASL
A-SMGCS
ASU
ATC
ATFCM
ATIS
ATM
ATS
CAA
CAT
Cb
CCC
CDM
CDU
CFIT
CFMU
CORA
CRM
CS
CTOT
CVFR
CWP
DA/DH
DME
DVE
DZ
EASA
ECAC
Aircraft Accident Investigation Board
Aircraft Based Augmentation System
Area Control Centre / Air Traffic Control Centre
Automatic Direction Finding
Above Ground Level
Aeronautical Information Circular
Aeronautical Information Publication
Aeronautical Information Service
Altitude
Arrival Manager Tools
Airspace Management Cell
Approach with vertical guidance
Airline/Air Operations Centre
Aerodrome Operating Minima
Automatic Stabilisation Equipment
Above Sea Level
Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System
Air Support Unit
Air Traffic Control
Air Traffic Flow and Capacity Management
Automatic Terminal Information Service
Air Traffic Management
Air Traffic Service
Civil Aviation Authority
Clear Air Turbulence
Cumulonimbus cloud
Central Control Centre
Collaborative Decision Making
Control & Display Unit
Controlled Flight into Terrain
Central Flow Management Unit
Conflict Resolution Assistant
Crew Resource Management
Certification Specification
Computed Take Off Time
Controlled Visual Flight Rules
Controller Working Position
Decision Altitude/Height
Distance Measuring Equipment
Degraded Visual Environment
Drizzle
European Aviation Safety Agency
European Civil Aviation Conference
This document is produced by the ALICIA Consortium. Copyright and all other rights are reserved.
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ECT
FAB
FAS
FATO
FDO
FIR
FL
FLIP
FMS
Ft
GA
GAT
GPS
GR
HDG
Hrs
IAS
IFR
IGE
ILS
IMC
LDP
LOC
LPV
LTM
LVP
MCA
MDA/MDH
METAR
MLS
MoD
MPH
MSA
MSP
MTCD
MTOW
N/A
NDB
NOTAM
NPA
NTOFP
OAS
OAT
OCA
OEI
Evening Civil Twilight
Functional Space Block
Final Approach Segment
Final Approach and Takeoff area
Flight Data Operator
Flight Information Region
Flight Level
Flight Information Publications
Flight Management System
Feet
General Aviation
General Air Traffic
Global Positioning System
Hail
Heading
Hours
Indicated Airspeed
Instrument Flight Rules
In Ground Effect
Instrument Landing System
Instrument Meteorological Conditions
Landing Decision Point
Localiser
Localizer Performance with Vertical Guidance
Local Traffic Manager
Low Visibility Procedures
Maritime Coastguard Agency
Minimum Descent Altitude or Minimum Descent Height
Meteorological Terminal Air Report
Microwave Landing System
Ministry of Defence
Miles Per Hour
Multi-Sector Area
Multi-Sector Planner
Medium Term Conflict Detection
Maximum Take Off Weight
Not Applicable
Non Directional Beacon
Notice to Airmen
Non Precision Approach
Net Take-off Flight Path
Obstacle Assessment Surfaces
Operational Air Traffic
Obstacle Clearance Altitude
One Engine Inoperative
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OGE
PA
PBN
PC
PF/PNF
RAF
ROA
RTA
RVR
SA
SAR
SBAS
SEG
SID
SIGMETS
SNOTAM
SOP
Sq
STAR
TCAS
TDP
TOBT
TWR
VEB
VFR
VHF
VMC
VOR
Out of Ground Effect
Precision Approach
Performance Based Navigation
Planning Controller
Pilot Flying and Not-Flying
Royal Air Force
Radius Of Action
Required Time of Arrival
Runway Visual Range
Situation Awareness
Search And Rescue
Satellite-Based Augmentation System
Special Escort Group
Standard Instrument Departure route
Significant Meteorological Information
NOTAM on Snow Conditions
Standard Operating Procedure
Square
STandard Arrival Route
Traffic Collision Avoidance System
Take -off Decision Point
Target Off Block Time
Aerodrome Control Tower
Vertical Error Budget
Visual Flight Rules
Very High Frequency
Visual Meteorological Conditions
VHF Omnidirectional Radio Range
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1 INTRODUCTION
ALICIA is a research and development IP project founded by European Commission
under the Seventh Framework Programme and started in September 2009.
ALICIA addresses the ACARE objective of increasing time efficiency and reducing the
environmental impact within the future air transport system. The aim will be to develop
a new and scalable cockpit architecture which can extend operations of aircraft in
degraded conditions – “All Condition Operations”. A key objective will be to deliver an
extensible architecture that can be applied to many aircraft types. This will necessarily
entail a new cockpit infrastructure capable of delivering enhanced situation awareness
to the crew whilst simultaneously reducing crew workload and improving overall aircraft
safety.
ALICIA will provide the European aerospace industry with an improved capability to
develop new flight-decks that embrace the principles of increased standardization and
commonality across multiple aircraft types; ALICIA defines this as the “Universal Crew
Station”. This approach will contribute to an increase in re-use of European aerospace
skills that will create product competitive advantage and reduced time to market.
Moreover, the flight-deck solutions will be capable of supporting significant
improvements in mission efficiency that will enable robust worldwide operations in all
weather conditions; ALICIA defines this as “All Condition Operations”.
The rationale for ALICIA is borne of the certainty that within the next 15 years the flightdeck design will be stressed by the introduction of new concepts such as those being
developed within the SESAR and NextGen programmes. Technologies contributing to
the delivery of an All Condition Operations capability will place additional requirements
on the (flight-deck) crew workstation design. Introduction of these technologies using a
“classical” integration approach could be very costly. It may also introduce the risk of
saturating the crew with information with consequential impact on the cost of design
and certification.
Accordingly, within ALICIA, new core concepts applicable to all new flight-decks will be
defined that facilitate the efficient introduction of a broad and expanding range of
operational conditions, whilst achieving the lowest life cycle cost.
The utility and scalability of the new concept will be demonstrated using simulation /
synthetic environments and bench testing to illustrate the feasibility of highly integrated
on board functions performing:
•
•
•
Strategic surveillance of the aircraft environment
Enhanced navigation
Robust worldwide operations in all flight conditions
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2 SCOPE
This document is a result of the activities performed under the ALICIA Work Package
1.1 where the current and future operational context and associated requirements for
the different classes of fixed and rotary wing platforms have been defined.
Within this document the future roles/scenarios envisaged for current and future aircraft
types are identified and analyzed.
This document presents:
•
a review of the outputs from other related projects, useful to capture the
evolution of the future scenarios and the associated missions
•
future roles/scenarios envisaged for different fixed and rotary wing platform
types
The future operational requirements will then be structured and consolidated in the
deliverable D1.5-1 “Consolidated Operational Requirements” (as part of the WP1.5
activities) to produce a set of common requirements applicable to all platforms.
The content of this document will be analysed by Work Package 1.5 in order to derive
a set of consolidated operational requirements, using a formal requirement analysis
process (and specific tools). They will then be organised in a structured way to
generate a set of consolidate future operational requirements for each platform and
associated role.
Work Package 1.5 will use the output of this report also in order to derive some specific
operational scenarios for both the fixed wing and rotorcraft platforms expected during
future operations
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3 FUTURE OUTLOOK
3.1 VISION 2020
The “European Aeronautics: A Vision for 2020 – Meeting society’s needs and winning
global leadership” report of the Group of Personalities, sets the agenda for the
European Aeronautics' ambition to better serve society's needs and strengthen its
quest for global leadership.
The vision has been developed by very senior personalities widely drawn from the
industry and other stakeholders. They recommend strengthening and reorganising
research and development efforts to improve competitiveness and provide a safe,
efficient and environmentally friendly air transport system.
It states: “Because aircraft are cleaner, safer and quieter, can fly, land and taxi in all
weather conditions and air traffic is very efficiently managed.”
3.1.1 General
Growth in passenger demand that air traffic will triple over the next 20 years so the air
transport system has to be improved as well as the manufacture of aircraft and
equipment.
To keep pace with the phenomenal increase in mobility and demand, Europe's air
transport system shall provide safe and reliable air travel that is essential to the
requirements of millions of people.
3.1.2 Responding to society needs
Quality and Affordability
In 2020, there shall be no more queues and interminable waiting for a delayed
departure or arrival: time spent in airports shall be no more than 15 minutes in the
airport before departure and after arrival for short haul flights, and 30 minutes for long
haul.
The benefits of the information society shall be available on demand through the
system of advanced telecommunications linking the aircraft to the world.
In 2020, the European airline system shall operate with greater efficiency and making
much better use of aircraft and flying space.
Safety
Aircraft shall drastically reduce the impact of human error: in particular, they shall
achieve a five-fold reduction in the average accident rate of global operators.
European Air Transport System
Europe shall managed to create a seamless system of air traffic management that
copes with up to three times more aircraft movements than today by using airspace
and airports intensively and safely.
Capable of flying safely in all weathers, aircraft shall be able to run on schedule 99% of
the time.
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An air traffic management system shall handle 16 million flights a year with 24-hour
operation of airports and a more flexible and efficient use of European air space.
A seamless European Air Traffic Management system shall mainly based on a civil
global satellite system.
The air transport system shall be integrated into an efficient multimodal transport one.
3.1.3 Policy and Regulation
Safety is now regulated by a pan-European Aviation Safety Authority which covers all
aspects of the safety of civil aviation, including air traffic management, airport
operations, aircraft certification and associated licensing of personnel.
A high degree of global standardisation shall be achieved for safety rules.
All European air traffic control providers, whether or not they are privatised, shall reach
world class standards of efficiency.
3.1.4 The research agenda
Transforming air travel
Technical barriers need shall be tackled in a comprehensive and coordinated manner if
substantial improvements are to be made to the Air Transport System.
Limiting the impact of weather
The weather as a disrupting factor for aircraft operations and a source of discomfort
and danger during flight shall be continued to reduce; it can’t be controlled but it’s
needed to learn to live with the elements and steadily eliminate the service disruption
that they may cause.
Integrated Air Traffic Management
New operational concepts and systems shall permit aircraft to operate in all weather
conditions, to fly closer together at lower risk so as to allow optimal and efficient
allocation of the airspace between its civil and military users, while limiting as far as
possible the construction of new airports and runways.
Among other things, aircraft systems design shall integrate with airlines, airports and
air traffic management operations and procedures so as to greatly improve the
efficiency of airspace management.
The aircraft tomorrow
Research and intelligent monitoring and control systems shall anticipate problems and
take preventative actions even before the pilot is aware anything is going wrong.
The crew's confidence that it is making the best possible decisions shall be assured by
electronic systems.
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3.2 SESAR
SESAR (Single European Sky ATM Research) is the technological dimension of the
Single European Sky. It will help create a ‘paradigm shift’, supported by state-of-the-art
and innovative technology.
The Single European Sky
The Single European Sky is an ambitious initiative launched by the European
Commission in 2004 to reform the architecture of European air traffic management
(ATM). It proposes a legislative approach to meet future capacity and safety needs at a
European rather than a local level. The Single European Sky initiative is the only way
to provide a uniform and high level of safety and efficiency over Europe’s skies.
Key objectives are:
•
to restructure European airspace as a function of air traffic flows
•
to create additional capacity
•
to increase the overall efficiency of the air traffic management system
The SESAR Project
SESAR aims to eliminate the fragmented approach to European ATM, transform the
ATM system, synchronise all stakeholders and federate resources.
For the first time, all aviation players are involved in the definition, development and
deployment of a pan-European modernisation project.
The project has adopted a phased programme which is summarized in the following:
•
The SESAR Definition Phase (2005-2008) delivered the SESAR ATM Master
Plan. It was developed by a representative group of ATM stakeholders. The
plan, based on future aviation requirements, identified the actions, from
research to implementation, needed to achieve SESAR goals.
•
The SESAR Development Phase (2008-2013) will produce the required new
generation of technological systems, components and operational procedures
as defined in the SESAR ATM Master Plan and Work Programme.
•
The SESAR Deployment Phase (2014-2020) will see the large-scale production
and implementation of the new air traffic management infrastructure, composed
of fully harmonised and interoperable components guaranteeing highperformance air transport activities in Europe.
The SESAR Joint Undertaking (SJU)
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The SESAR Joint Undertaking (SJU) was created under European Community law on
27 February 2007, with Eurocontrol and the European Community as founding
members, in order to manage the SESAR Development Phase.
The aim of the SESAR Joint Undertaking is to ensure the modernisation of the
European air traffic management system by coordinating and concentrating all relevant
research and development efforts in the Community. The Joint Undertaking also
fosters cooperation with similar programmes around the world.
From the above, it is evident that the SESAR Project represents a very large source of
information for the future scenarios.
The most significant SESAR scenario information is reported in Chapters 4 and 5.
For a better understanding of the SESAR project, please refer to the SESAR Concept
of Operations contained in the SESAR Definition Phase – Deliverable 3 – The ATM
target concept or visit the official website www.sesarju.eu.
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3.3 FLYSAFE
The project FLYSAFE “Airborne integrated systems for safety improvement, flight
hazard protection and all weather operations” intents are to design, develop,
implement, test and validate a complete Next Generation Integrated Surveillance
System and to develop, validate and test Weather Information Management Systems
to provide aircraft with weather related information and prove that they increase safety.
FLYSAFE Goals
The project goals are to provide a decisive step towards the “Vision 2020” produced by
the ACARE, for safety in airspace, with implementation of solutions particularly on
three types of threats: adverse weather conditions, traffic collision and flight into terrain,
covering all phases of flight.
Each area is considered separately, but brought together by innovative fusion functions
into a Next Generation Integrated Surveillance System, NG-ISS, that will be interfaced
with the other aircraft systems. The NG-ISS will allow the pilot to have a detailed,
accurate, homogeneous and unambiguous presentation of the aircraft safety situation
during all phases of flight. It will include such capabilities as situation awareness;
advance warning; alert prioritisation and innovative human-machine interface.
A particular emphasis is given to the weather aspects through the development of the
Weather Information Management Systems (WIMS), which will allow to provide
information about small volumes of airspace and small time periods.
FLYSAFE Overview
FLYSAFE is mainly concentrating on large transport aeroplanes operated in
commercial air transport. However, some solutions will potentially address the
commuter and helicopter market, possibilities of applications to these sectors will be
studied in the project.
Within the project the activity is related to three principal type of hazards: Weather,
Traffic and Terrain. To achieve the FLYSAFE objective the project is composed of 7
work packages: WP1 deals with the operational assessment, WP2 with atmospheric
hazards, WP3 with traffic hazards, WP4 with terrain hazards, WP5 with the
development of the NG-ISS, WP6 with the evaluation and results assessment, WP7
with exploitation, standards and dissemination. WP2, WP3 and WP4 also deal with the
development of their relative functions.
To assess the tools developed along the project, FLYSAFE includes a safety
assessment process, 2 simulation sessions and 2 flight test campaigns. The safety
assessment process is divided in 3 main sub-processes: qualitative safety assessment,
risk assessment modelling and a quantitative safety assessment. The process aims at
identifying aircraft operation hazards that can be reduced by the NG-ISS and possible
hazards generated by the system itself. Each hazard is classified according to its
severity and frequency; appropriate mitigation means are identified to ensure an
agreed level of safety to all aircraft operations.
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3.4 OPTIMAL
3.4.1 Introduction
As the volume of air traffic increases across the world, airport congestion and the
associated environmental impacts have become significant problems and are now
limiting factors at some airports. Many international hubs and major airports are
operating at maximum capacity for longer and longer periods. This situation is
expected to become more widespread as future traffic distribution patterns are likely to
generate congestion at airports that currently do not experience capacity problems.
OPTIMAL is a large scale European research project with a goal to define and validate
innovative procedures for aircraft and rotorcraft approach and landing phases. The new
procedures, if implemented, will help minimise the environmental impact caused by air
traffic and increase ATM capacity whilst maintaining and improving safety.
OPTIMAL identified a clear need to migrate from the current NPA procedures to
procedures with vertical guidance (both APV and PA) for approach and landing.
Conventional procedures are constrained by the location of ground beacons however
enhanced navigation technologies and GNSS capabilities could remove these
constraints by defining advance procedures that will allow stake holders to;
•
Increase airport throughput in low visibility conditions.
•
Allow aircraft and rotorcraft simultaneous operations so as to generate
additional capacity.
•
Reduce environmental impacts by avoiding urban areas, optimising the noise
and gas emissions during the landing phase i.e. continuous descent profiles for
aircraft and steep final segments for rotorcraft.
•
Accelerate the introduction of approach procedures with vertical guidance
(APV).
•
Take full advantage of existing RNP-RNAV capabilities.
•
Increase safety using geometric vertical guidance.
•
Get rid of ILS
interferences)
•
Accelerate the transition from existing approach procedures which have been
designed around ground beacons to approach procedures which utilise
Performance Based Navigation.
constraints
(costs,
installation
constraints,
electronic
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3.4.2 OPTIMAL Aircraft Approach Procedures
The following sections give a brief overview of the approach procedures and
operations developed and described by the OPTIMAL project, please refer to the
OPTIMAL project deliverables for a more detailed definition of the procedures, these
can be found at http://www.optimal.isdefe.es.
The procedures summarised in the following sections are as follows;
•
Straight in Final Approach based on ABAS (APV ABAS).
•
Straight in Final Approach based on SBAS (APV SBAS).
•
Straight in Final GBAS Precision Approach.
•
Aircraft RNP RNAV (Straight in & Curved) Final Approach.
•
EVS Approach.
•
Continuous Descent Approach.
•
Dual / Displaced Threshold Approach.
•
Simultaneous Non Interfering Aircraft / Rotorcraft Operation.
3.4.2.1 Straight in Final Approach based on ABAS (APV ABAS)
Procedure Overview
A straight in final LPV approach procedure is an instrument approach procedure where
lateral and vertical guidance is provided during the final approach phase. The
procedure cannot be classified as a conventional precision approach as the guidance
performance does not meet the requirements for precision approach operations.
The LPV procedure is based on RNAV (Area Navigation) and has been developed as
an “ILS look alike” to minimise the differences with conventional ILS approach
procedures. The initial and intermediate sections of the approach are defined using the
rules described in ICAO PAN OPS for RNAV trajectory, the intermediate segment is
aligned with the FAS.
The FAS is identical to an ILS PA, it is aligned with the runway centreline and
measures at least 4nm. From an operational standpoint it finishes at the DH where the
pilot must determine if sufficient visual references are available to continue the
approach, if not then a missed approach procedure must be performed.
Expected Benefits
Opening LPV procedures to ABAS capable aircraft enables aircraft to fly LPV approach
even when SBAS performance is not achieved.
A performance based approach increases capacity as airspace can be optimised with
respect to route to route separation.
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Lower minimum altitudes can be defined due to smaller obstacle clearance volumes
thus improving airport access in all weather conditions.
The notion of containment introduced by RNP ensures that aircraft remain within a
specified volume of airspace at the adequate level of probability.
Guaranteed containment also allows optimum trajectories to be defined taking into
account environmental impacts.
Implementation
The LPV ABAS procedure requires onboard ABAS capability which means an avionic
system with an ABAS hybrid algorithm.
3.4.2.2 Straight in Final Approach based on SBAS (APV SBAS)
Procedure Overview
The straight in Final SBAS / APV Approach is based on SBAS positioning information
for both lateral and vertical guidance.
FAS geometry is defined in the FAS data block and contained in the onboard
navigation database.
The instrument APV procedure has been developed as an “ILS look alike” to minimise
the differences with conventional ILS approach procedures. The intent is to apply
GNSS (SBAS) technology in such away that modifications with respect to conventional
ILS approach procedures are minimised making the transition to GNSS as the sole
means of navigation affordable.
The flight crew displays are similar to the ones used by conventional ILS PA
procedures.
FAS Data block contains the information required for the definition of the required glide
path.
Obstacle assessment is based on APV OAS taking into account that lateral guidance is
considered to have localiser performance and vertical guidance is more restrictive than
PA CAT I.
The initial and intermediate segments are also based on the RNAV concept with SBAS
as the positioning system (LNAV only).
Expected Benefits
The provision of geometric vertical guidance at airports that have no ILS capability.
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Reduce the occurrences of CFIT by providing an alternative to the “dive and drive”
navigation that is currently used for approaches without vertical guidance i.e. NPA.
Procedures with lower operational minima can be developed for airports that are
constrained by existing NPA procedures, giving improved availability for airports that
do not have an ILS capability.
The provision of a FAS with a constant descent angle helps with noise abatement and
fuel efficiency.
The temperature restrictions associated with current RNAV / Baro-VNAV procedures
can be removed.
The creation of improved flight tracks which are not anchored to the geographical
location of navigation aids.
Implementation
Although APV/SBAS operation is very similar to existing ILS procedures, some ATC
and aircrew training will be required. Operators manual need amending to reflect the
required changes to cockpit procedures. ATC must be trained in the procedures and
work processes, especially for environments where different types of RNAV
approaches are used at the same time.
3.4.2.3 Straight In Final GBAS PA Procedure
Procedure Overview
The straight in final approach procedure is based on GNSS information plus GBAS
local corrections for both lateral and vertical guidance.
FAS geometry is defined in the FAS data block and broadcast by the GBAS local
station (VDB message). Once the transmission is processed the path identifier will be
displayed allowing manual cross checks by the crew.
The instrument GBAS PA procedure has been developed as an “ILS look alike” to
minimise the differences with conventional ILS approach procedures. The intent is to
apply GNSS (SBAS) technology in such away that modifications with respect to
conventional ILS approach procedures are minimised making the transition to GNSS
as the sole means of navigation affordable.
The flight crew displays are similar to the ones used by conventional ILS PA
procedures.
The FAS Data block contains the information required for the definition of the glide
path.
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Obstacle assessment is based on OAS which is identical to ILS CAT I OAS.
The initial and intermediate segments are also based on the RNAV concept with GNSS
as the positioning system (LNAV only).
Expected Benefits
Introduces the option for performing PA procedures at airports without ILS or when ILS
is unavailable.
GBAS is able to support a maximum of 8 different FAS blocks simultaneously.
GBAS has reduced VHF frequency requirements compared to ILS.
GBAS VDB signals are less sensitive to reflections from buildings and obstacles than
ILS.
The creation of improved flight tracks which are not anchored to the geographical
location of navigation aids.
Implementation
Although GBAS straight in PA operation is quite similar to ILS from a geometry and DH
perspective, some ATC and aircrew training will be required. Operators need to amend
their Airline Operators Manual to reflect the required changes to cockpit procedures.
ATC must be trained in the procedures and work processes especially about the
interface to the GBAS ground system and the procedures for the case of a GBAS and
or GNSS failure.
3.4.2.4 RNP RNAV (Straight in & Curved) Final Approach
Procedure Overview
Final RNP-RNAV Approach procedures are defined based on RNP AR, RNP where
aircrew and operational authorisation is required (Special Aircraft and Aircrew
Authorisation Required SAAAR). RNP AR operations use high levels of RNAV
capability and must meet the relevant requirements. RNP AR uses advanced attributes
of RNP such as RNP values of less than 0.3 NM, radius to fix paths and performance
based (lateral and vertical) navigation in the FAS and lateral in the missed Approach
phase. It is considered that special authorisation will not be required when sufficient
experience and confidence is gained with such procedures.
2 types of FAS are proposed;
RNP (AR) lateral only, with vertical guidance based on Baro-VNAV
RNP (AR) lateral and vertical, although there are not any standards for the use of
vertical RNP it is considered the long term solution.
Barometric vertical navigation is a system that presents the pilot with a computed
vertical guidance referenced to a specific vertical path angle nominally 3 degrees. The
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computer resolved vertical guidance is based on barometric altitude and is specified as
a vertical path angle from the DH. The approach can only be performed in certain
temperature ranges unless the navigation system is capable of temperature
compensation.
Benefits
RNP-RNAV allows aircraft operation on any desired flight path based on geographic
waypoints improving the flexibility of the routes. RNP also enhances the repeatability
and predictability of operations.
The use of low RNP reduces the width of the obstacle evaluation areas and together
with VEB allows lower OCA values.
The use of a specified glide path opposed to the “dive and drive” technique during the
FAS will reduce noise and fuel consumption.
Implementation
Aircraft should be equipped with an RNAV-RNP system which must meet the required
performance and functional requirements.
The RNP navigation system must have the ability to monitor its performance and
provide an alerting function.
Reliability of the navigation system must be high, this type of approach will require dual
redundant equipments so that no single point failure can cause loss of guidance
compliant with the required RNP value for the approach.
Typically the aircraft should be fitted with dual GNSS sensors, dual FMS, dual ADS,
dual autopilot and a single Inertial reference unit.
The RNP-RNAV system should have a navigation database and should support each
specific path terminator.
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3.4.2.5 Enhanced Vision System Approach
Procedure Overview
EVS is usable with any approach procedure up to ILS CAT I. Use of EVS is most
beneficial where it increases the accessibility of an airport or landing zone in visibility
conditions where standard procedures cannot be implemented.
Figure 1 - EVS Precision Approach
Existing regulations for a non precision approach or CAT I PA mandate that a pilot may
not continue an approach below the specified DH (200ft for CAT I) unless at least one
of the required visual references is distinctly visible and identifiable, if none of these
references is visible then a missed approach has to be performed.
Using an EVS the aircraft can fly nearly any NPA, APV or PA in low visibility conditions
without the definition of a new procedure. EVS can be used to continue the approach
below the DH to 100ft (for CAT I) to acquire the required visual references to complete
the landing visually.
Expected Benefits
The main purpose of an EVS to improve the accessibility of airports that are not
equipped with all weather navigation aids. EVS can also be used to monitor and cross
check any instrument approach.
3.4.2.6 Continuous Descent Approach
Procedure Overview
The OPTIMAL project focused on 2 types of Continuous Descent Approach (CDA) –
“Nominal” and “Optimised”.
The “Nominal” CDA initially consists of a fixed descent path of 2 degrees, changing to
a 3 degree path below 3000ft. The CDA descent profile then transitions to a
conventional instrument final approach (see Figure 2).
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The “Optimised” CDA provides increased environmental protection as it’s flown at
relatively low speeds whilst maintaining the cleanest possible configuration. The
vertical profile will be variable depending on the actual wind conditions until a transition
to the fixed 2/3 degrees approach is made (see Figure 2).
Figure 2 - Nominal and Optimised CDA Procedure
Expected Benefits
The main purpose of the CDA procedure is to reduce the environmental impacts in and
around an airports location. Significant benefits can be achieved in terms of noise
abatement, reduced emissions and increased fuel efficiency by the appropriate design
of a descent profile and routing when compared to present day radar vectored
operations.
Implementation
Typically a CDA procedure will make use of available RNAV transition routes from TMA
entry (or IAP) to the final approach. Consequently an RNAV routing infrastructure in the
TMA is required to enable the onboard FMS to plan and execute a CDA profile.
Sufficient tools will be required by air traffic controllers to enable the operation of CDA’s
without the need to instigate changes during the descent profile for sequencing
purposes. These tools will need to consist of a good AMAN, enhanced air to ground
data link of flight plan data and Arrival sequencing / monitoring tools. The onboard FMS
will also require a RTA capability.
3.4.2.7 Dual / Displaced Threshold Approach Procedure
Procedure Overview
DT operation can be applied to airports with two closely spaced parallel runways or
with only one runway. In a two runway environment a secondary threshold (Runway 2)
is set up approximately 1500m in front of the 1st threshold (Runway 1), see Figure 3, so
that the remaining landing length on runway 2 is still suitable for a medium or light
aircraft. Keeping the original position of the FAF for the 2nd threshold makes the
intercept altitude for a 3 degree glide slope 260ft higher giving an additional altitude
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separation between the 2 approach paths, this is also known as a High Approach
Landing System.
Figure 3 - Displaced Threshold Approach
Expected Benefits
Dual / Displaced thresholds could allow the wake vortex separation distance between
heavy and medium aircraft to be reduced from 5nm to the radar minimum of 2.5nm
resulting in a higher landing capacity
Implementation
DT requires the installation of additional navigation aids, lighting systems and runway
markings. DT uses straight in precision approaches including standard transitions or
even vectoring to the final approach fixes. Both controllers and pilots need to be trained
for this kind of operation, a proper TMA route structure (RNAV transitions, trombones)
needs to be in place to facilitate sequencing. If controller support tools (AMAN, DMAN,
etc) are in use, they have to be adapted to take into account the new threshold
systems and the reduced separation distances. Coordination between AMAN and
DMAN is recommended to ensure optimal use of runway.
3.4.2.8 Simultaneous Non Interfering Aircraft / Rotorcraft Operations
SNI Procedure Overviews
The objective of Simultaneous Non Interfering operations is to remove slower IFR
rotorcraft traffic from the mainstream of faster flying fixed wing traffic by the use of
rotorcraft specific procedures that can be flown simultaneously and in a non interfering
way.
SNI is possible due to the unique manoeuvring capabilities of rotorcraft, in particular
low speed flight, steep approach and small turn radius.
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The SNI operation can use straight in approaches (Rotorcraft specific IGS) or curved
approaches. The following SNI operations are detailed in the OPTIMAL project
document deliverables;
Straight In Parallel Approach
Figure 4 - SNI Straight In Parallel Approach
The rotorcraft flies on a track parallel to the fixed wing traffic which is aligned with the
active runway, while approaching the FATO (denoted by H in Figure 4). The lateral
separation is D2 and is assumed to comply with ICAO runway separation criteria for
parallel independent approaches, i.e. at least 4300ft when SSR is available. It should
be noted that current ICAO provisions are for ILS / MLS approaches but have been
applied to this operation.
The distance D1 (lateral distance between the FATO and the runway) is equal to
distance D2 making D1 large with respect to the ICAO minimum requirements. This
results in an inefficient use of land which could make this particular type of SNI
operation unattractive for many airports in Europe.
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Straight in Convergent Approach
Figure 5 - SNI Straight In Convergent Approach
The main purpose of this procedure is to minimise the FATO distance from the runway
so as to minimise the space required for SNI operations. The rotorcraft approaches the
FATO at an angle convergent with the runway-in-use. The FATO is located at an
appropriate lateral distance D1 (See figure 5) from the runway. It should be noted that
the current minimum distance between FATO and runways defined in ICAO Annex 14
volume II are considered insufficient to support SNI operations. Because of the
convergence a turning missed approach path is required so as to avoid conflict with the
on-runway traffic (see figure 5).
Converging SNI approaches have been used successfully during the 1980s in the US
with more than 90,000 SNI landings being achieved without any primary runway
incursions. These operations were conducted under the FAA land and short hold
concept and clearly shows that the concept works, even though not covered by ICAO
regulations.
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Curved Approach
Figure 6 - SNI Curved Approach
The main objective of this procedure is to solve some of the issues associated to the
straight in and convergent SNI procedures.
The rotorcraft initially approaches on a convergent path with the runway but turns using
a fixed radius (RF) turn to steer the last part of the approach parallel to the active
runway. It should be noted that the turn has to be flown using a fixed radius turn as fly
by turn are not considered repeatable or predictable enough for the FAS.
Point-In-Space SNI Approach
The point in space procedure involves flying an IFR approach until a given point in
space. Beyond this point the flight is either continued visually or a missed approach is
initiated, the PinS is usually defined as the Missed Approach Point.
Depending on the remaining distance to the FATO, the visual segment may be
conducted under VFR or as the visual segment of an IFR approach, In this latter case,
the MAPT to FATO segment remains IFR type with specific visibility minima (less
stringent than VMC). The visual segment is also protected with respect to obstacles,
which is not the case under VFR.
The minimum MAPT to FATO distance is related to the final approach groundspeed
and to the deceleration capability of the rotorcraft.
The PinS concept provides more flexibility in the procedure design. For example when
the FATO is not (or cannot be) sufficiently separated from the runway to allow SNI IFR
landings, it is possible to end the rotorcraft FAS at a Point in Space with sufficient
distance from the active runway to avoid IFR separation issues, the final approach to
the FATO is then completed visually. This relaxes the constraints for SNI as the SNI
effectively becomes VFR (or special VFR) when approaching the airport boundaries.
The drawback is the DH is higher when the PinS is located further away from the
FATO.
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Expected Benefits for SNI Operations
SNI approach operations can be used to either increase passenger throughput at
airports without additional traffic or reduce airport congestion (and related delays) by
replacing small size turboprops with rotorcraft. Studies in the US have demonstrated
that the introduction of SNI operations in congested airports could bring a 20 to 30%
gains in passenger throughput, these figures demonstrate that SNI has a significant
potential for increasing airport passenger capacity.
SNI Implementation
The curved approach procedure requires the use of GBAS or SBAS if the final
segment is of the “ILS look alike” type, otherwise RNP navigation is used. If GBAS is
used for other approach procedures on other runways at the same airport then one
should consider the case of a GBAS failure not resulting in simultaneous missed
approaches on different runways.
Failure of the enabling equipment should be reported to ATC as well as the aircrew.
The rotorcraft RoD shall not exceed 1000fpm on the initial and intermediate segments
and shall not exceed 800 fpm on the final segment.
For the missed approach the onboard navigation system should provide track
information to the crew by automatically switching (or by pilot action) navigation routes
after the MAPt.
Care should be taken in locating the procedure such that no interference will occur with
either approaching or departing traffic. Since Departing traffic on a SID cannot receive
additional clearances to 3000ft the only option for ATC to avoid conflicts with
approaching traffic on the procedure is to delay conflicting take offs. Therefore also
departure routes will need to be scrutinised for possible conflicts.
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3.5 HILAS
The HILAS project is an integrated FP6 project involving thirty nine partners. Research
was conducted between 2005 and 2009. The consortium comprised partners
representing thirteen European countries, Israel and China. This spanned
manufacturers, airlines, maintenance organizations, research institutes, universities
and RTD companies.
3.5.1 HILAS themes
The HILAS project stands for Human Integration into the Lifecycle of Aviation Systems.
The project aims to capture, explain and explore Human Factors knowledge and
activities throughout the lifecycle of European civil aviation systems, including
specifically design, operations, and maintenance. The overall goal is to integrate
Human Factors across this full life cycle of aviation systems. Human Factors, in this
context, comprises all aspects of the relationship between human operator and
technology. It may for example have to do with how easy new technology in the cockpit
can be operated by pilots, or to what extend new hardware, rules or concepts may
interfere with operational procedures.
Overall, HILAS research demonstrates the requirement for an integrated approach to
Human Factors across the lifecycle. This involves applying the following principles both
within and between organizations:
•
A proactive approach to safety and operations management, which goes
beyond existing regulatory requirements (ICAO, 2009)
•
A model driven approach to understanding the nature of the operation and
allied improvement requirements
•
The use of real world operational and safety data to inform a model of the
operation and associated safety/risk issues
•
The requirement to optimise data integration and exploitation
As evidenced in HILAS research, this enables
•
Organisational Management (operations
organisational learning, risk mgt, safety mgt)
•
Design for operability
mgt,
performance
mgt,
Further, this in turn informs regulatory standards.
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3.5.2 Human Factors in the Lifecycle Approach
The HILAS approach creates a role for Human Factors in delivering safer and more
efficient operations across the lifecycle.
Human Integration into the Lifecycle of Aviation Systems
Figure 7 – Human Integration into the Lifecycle of Aviation Systems
The HILAS lifecycle model identifies the core functions of the aircraft lifecycle from
design to disposal and defines requirements for a shared understanding of the
operational system which enables delivering these functions in an integrated way.
It can be argued that Human Factors, as a discipline, potentially represents a unique
science and technology because it systematically represents the user of technical
systems and processes across this lifecycle. Thus all the processes and subprocesses involved in the life-cycle of systems should incorporate human factors
requirements and methods in order to represent user needs in a real and ecologically
valid manner. For our purposes, the life-cycle can be taken to include the following
processes:
•
Design
•
Certification
•
Operation
•
Maintenance
•
Regulation
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In a complex ‘system of systems’ like aviation, the human operator (pilot, cabin crew,
ATC, maintenance technician) plays and will continue to play critical role both within
and between systems. The requirements of this role cannot be simply specified in a set
of guidelines – as a recipe for ‘human centred-design’. Human Factors has moved
beyond analysing human fallibility and related performance deficits. It is increasingly
addressing how people behave in normal operational contexts and how performance in
such contexts can be better supported by design for use, by better planning and
operational management and by quality and safety management systems.
This requires an integrated approach, which systematically generates knowledge about
the human aspects of the system at the operational end and transforms this
‘knowledge about’ into an active knowledge resource for more effective management
and operational systems and better, more innovative, design. The challenge that
defined HIALS was to develop and demonstrate an integrated model of human factors
research, practice and integrated application, linking design and operation – in a
‘system life-cycle approach’.
3.5.3 Models of ‘humans in the system’
If this vision of human factors as a driver of systems innovation is to be realised, then
human factors has to develop the research capacity to play its role in understanding
existing operational systems in a way which enables the human-centred design of
future systems. Fundamental to this is the issue of modelling the role of humans in the
system. If one wants to intervene in any way to change a system, one needs a model
of that system which describes its underlying functionality and causal structure.
Models of ‘humans in the system’ can crudely be classified at different levels in terms
of the extent to which they enable understanding and support intervention, as
illustrated in Table 1, below. Many organisations manage Human Factors simply with a
set of checklists, and this is often what design engineers say they want from human
factors. However the level of inference that such taxonomies support is very weak.
Cognitive psychology has spawned many models of the human operator, either as an
individual or in a small group, which can sometimes include tools as agents or actors.
While such models can have great inferential power within their theoretical scope, they
often do not address those factors which are critical to change if the operation is to be
enabled to work better or designed to function more effectively in its environment.
Therefore it is necessary to develop ‘leverage’ models which seek to address precisely
these issues.
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Level of model
Characteristics
modelled
Operational
functions
enabled
Design
functions
enabled
Descriptive
classification of
human factors
Factors which
potentially affect
performance
Taxonomies for
incident analysis,
performance
reports
Checklist for
design support
Analytic model of
human operator(s)
How human factors
affect performance
Evaluate HMI
Analyse /
from user
diagnose
problems & events perspective
with respect to
human operator
‘Leverage’ model of
operational system
Functional
relationships which
support system
outputs
Managing system
& implementing
change
Design and
evaluate new
system concepts
Table 1 – HILAS Models of humans in the system
3.5.4 Design for Operability
Manufacturing does not just deliver technology for sale, but is providing a system (or,
more accurately, part of an operational system) which has to deliver operability. New
systems and new technologies do not change single jobs that individuals perform in
isolation, but they can transform the whole process, including how it interfaces with
related processes. It is this process transformation potential which can deliver a step
change in operability. Therefore the manufacturer has not only to engage with the
Human-Machine-Interface, but also with how the technology fits into and facilitates the
whole operational system. Today, this integration requirement is already driven to the
foreground when addressing the role of supporting information systems. Doing this
transformation in a way which pays attention to the human role in future systems must
give competitive edge.
This transformation raises new issues for the design stage of large complex
operational systems:
The commissioning and certification of the technologies to be integrated into new
systems has to address how they will be operated in order to achieve the specified
social goals. To take the issue of safety as an example, this means that the
management of safety at the design stage has to seamlessly transition into the
management of safety in the operational stage.
Business concepts for service delivery are becoming more central to manufacturers’
design strategy, forcing them to address more directly how to design and deliver
technologies which support their customer’s business model; and how to deliver value
through services to support the deployment of their technology.
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System operability goals have therefore got to be integrated into the design process.
This involves not only how to deliver availability and reliability of technologies in service
to optimise customer’s business opportunity; but also how to integrate the
manufacturer’s core technologies into smart, integrated operational systems.
The functional requirements to meet these operability goals have to fully engage with
the human role in complex operational processes, in order to understand how that
human role might best be transformed through deploying new technologies in order to
optimise system performance. This role involves not just ‘operators of technologies’ but
also co-ordinators across complex ‘systems-of-systems’.
Technology capabilities then have to meet these functional requirements to maximise
the operational impacts of the new technologies, such as efficiency or safety.
These new aspects of the design process will inevitably require a much more intense
and focussed process to engage with and reconcile different stakeholder interests.
These stakeholders will include Manufacturers, Operators, Maintainers, Customers and
Regulators. This process will need to be managed to ensure, amongst other
requirements, the integrity of the human, social and organisational requirements which
are necessary to fulfil the system goals. For example, creating a common operational
picture of the new system will require quite radical ‘knowledge transformation’ on the
part of the various stakeholders to ensure common understanding. It also requires the
ability to manage data and knowledge about the operation across the system lifecycle.
3.5.5 Sample future operational scenario
The following section summarises some sample scenarios that illustrate the philosophy
and principles of HILAS as implemented in the project work.
3.5.5.1 Enhanced reporting
Reporting is an essential part of the airline’s safety management system (SMS),
supporting airline performance management, safety/risk management and
organisational learning activities.
It is proposed that every person in the organisation/airline is an auditor of the process.
Accordingly, reporting functionality is available to both frontline and back officer
personnel, so that feedback can be elicited in relation to current problems/threats and
improvement recommendations. To this end, voluntary reports are completed by both
flight operations and non-flight operational personnel, at different points in the process.
This includes Flight Crew, Cabin Crew, Duty Manager, Flight Planning, Safety,
Training, Ground Operations, Maintenance and so forth. Central to this, is the capture
of information pertaining to (1) routine/normal operations and (2) safety critical events.
Overall, data is captured in a format that is amenable for later analysis (e.g. KSM
framework).
HILAS research suggests that the first step is to gather the right information from
operational personnel, not just about safety critical events but also about substandard
operational performance. This includes eliciting information about the ‘facts’ of an
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event, along with the crews own analysis of contributory factors. This will in turn
facilitate the assessment of procedures (e.g. are they appropriate) and the specification
of improved processes. Critically, ‘auditing’ company processes and procedures and
suggesting improvement recommendations is the responsibility of everybody in the
company – and not just safety or management personnel. This is in line with ICAO
recommendations. Further, such an approach may motivate operational personnel to
report routinely, and importantly, above and beyond what is mandated by existing
authority and company processes.
3.5.5.2 Intelligent planning
Flight Plans must be carefully designed, taking into account known operational
problems and threats. Appropriate crew management processes (e.g. crew training,
rostering and licensing) must be in place. Further, Flight Crew must have the right tools
and information to execute the flight.
Intelligent planning involves different airline functions making use of /sharing (1)
operational information and (2) intelligence/analysis information at different points in
the flight operations process timeline, to meet operational and safety goals.
Intelligence/analysis comprises both (1) operational analysis (e.g. delays, fuel
consumption etc) and (2) safety/risk/performance analysis (e.g. outputs of reactive and
prospective RM).
Accordingly, intelligent planning integrates several flight operations processes and
functions, across the flight operations process timeline, to meet these objectives. This
includes:
•
Crew management (e.g. training, performance evaluation, pairing)
•
Risk analysis undertaken by Safety personnel
•
Safety feedback to Flight Planning
•
Management of threats by flight planning and intelligent crew pairings
•
Management of threats by Dispatch
•
Depending on risk status of the proposed flight, auto dispatch or person to
person interaction between Dispatcher and Flight Crew
•
Flight Crew Threat and Error Management (TEM) at the pre-flight, flight
planning and briefing stage
•
Ongoing communication/TEM between Flight Crew and Duty Manager
•
Flight Crew reports at end of the flight, or at any time
Further, it involves information sharing/integration with
processes/functions such as Maintenance and Ground Operations.
other
relevant
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In line with the ICAO SMS specification (2006), and the broader HILAS risk framework,
the intelligent planning concept utilizes both prospective and retrospective risk
management logics.
3.5.5.3 Strategic alliance across lifecycle
Within the HILAS framework, an improvement initiative was established between an
airline partner and an independent maintenance provider in a series of 20 consecutive
checks. The aim was to collaborate to progressively implement improvement objectives
in terms of cost and safety for both partners. This required a new openness and
willingness to share information and adapt about operational challenges – including
material typically seen as internal management information not to be shared with
customers.
The overall results of the initiative in terms of meeting the objectives as laid out by
management were significant for the organisation and included the following:
•
20 aircraft were delivered ‘Early’ or ‘On-time’ (No ‘Lates’) to the customer.
•
There was improved aircraft availability for the operator by 136 hours (8.5
days) over the course of the line of 20 aircraft.
•
The contract with the customer included Bonus / Penalty payment – the
maintenance provider ended up receiving a substantial Bonus payment.
•
There was great involvement of all hangar staff Hangar and increased
morale.
•
The customer was very satisfied and complimented the programme.
This integrated approach is now part of the airlines corporate requirement in its
relationships with maintenance providers.
3.5.5.4 Collaborative safety database
The HILAS knowledge base was designed to not only benefit single operations but also
to animate organisational learning across organisations, within one domain as well as
across the lifecycle.
Integrating information and knowledge across key lifecycle stakeholders is critical to
the safe and effective operation of aviation. This will deal with the management of this
knowledge as an active resource to the industry, with the way in which such knowledge
is developed shared and used across the industry, and with the role of human factors
knowledge in developing new and better systems. In HILAS this was implemented in
clusters of excellence in which industry stakeholder openly shared their expertise and
experiences in different fields such as safety management. The future implementation
of this concept is a collaborative database to which industry partners contribute and in
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return can benchmark and improve their organisations, and as a result the industry as
a whole.
3.5.6 Contributions of Flight Deck strand
Research in the Flight Deck Strand resulted in:
•
identification of several trends in relation to future operational concepts,
•
the specification of new technology and application concepts to support these
new operational concepts,
•
a toolbox for the certification process.
The Flight Deck strand identified several trends in relation to future operational
concepts and the associated impact on future technology development. Trends
considered are in line with the ACARE Research Agenda and the Vision 2020
document.
The main issues are:
•
The introduction of Controller Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC) and
the impact on flight deck procedures
•
Moving from a two-crew concept towards fully automated flight (Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles or UAVs) with all possible intermediate steps as single pilot
and remote control concepts with/without flight attendance support.
Especially for long-haul flights the trend to a reduced crew during the enroute phases can already be observed. This allows airliners to execute flights
with longer durations (e.g. over 8 hours) whilst still adhering to the normal
duty-hours of pilots.
•
From manual tactical control towards supervisory strategic control. This
concerns mainly Air Traffic Control (ATC) in order to accommodate more air
traffic without having to split up the current control sectors into smaller units
and hence increase the controller-controller hand-over problem.
•
From ground guided Air Traffic Management (ATM) towards increased flight
deck responsibility for aircraft separation and approach sequencing). Or in
other words from the Data-link Routed Obedient Navigation Environment
(DRONE) towards the Pilot Routed Informed Decision Environment (PRIDE).
To accommodate these changes a number of technologies and applications were
investigated. See Table 1 below:
#
Technology/Application
Item
1
Application
Multi-function Overhead Panel (MOHP)
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2
Technology
Graphical Interface Device
3
Technology
Speech Systems
4
Technology
Touch Screen
5
Application
Taxi Display (for EFB)
6
Application
Dual-layer display
7
Application
Adaptive Automation
8
Technology
Head Mounted Spatial Display
9
Application
ESVS Symbology
10
Technology
2-D / 3-D / stereoscopic 3-D display
Table 2 – HILAS Technologies/Applications
As the quantity and quality of information available to the crew every increases and
with the drivers to reduce crew there is a need to improve the interface and tasking for
the crew. The proposed interface developments will enable the provision of information
in a task oriented (aligned/supportive) manner and will support the completion of
related tasks, through the same interface in a linked and timely way. This in turn will
have operational impact in several areas. The introduction of the proposed interfaces
will:
•
Improve the flight environment itself by making better use of flight deck realestate for information presentation
•
Increase overall safety on the fight deck by reducing crew error through
supporting situational awareness, enabling tasks chains to be more
successfully completed and decision support.
•
Enable a decrease in training requirements
•
Support human limitations
•
Extend operational capabilities
•
Provide direct task support
The toolbox will be used to design and evaluate (new) flight deck technologies and
applications. The content of the toolbox ranges from software tools that can be applied
during technology development to hardware tools for evaluation of new cockpit
technologies like equipment for measurement of heart rate or eye scanning behaviour.
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Human Integration into the Lifecycle of Aviation Systems
Figure 8 – Human Integration into the Lifecycle of Aviation Systems
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3.6 CREDOS
The “Crosswind Reduced Separations for Departure Operations” (CREDOS) research
is a project of the 6th Framework Programme of the European Commission in
collaboration with the Federal Aviation Authority - USA (FAA).
Background
The need to increase airport capacity is one of the major challenges facing ATM
research today.
Recent research suggests that such an increase could be achieved by reducing the
current wake turbulence separation minima while maintaining levels of safety.
Major European airports are operating close to their maximum capacity, and often face
large delays. Many operate in crosswind conditions for a significant portion of time. For
single runway operations, initial work in the S-Wake project suggested that, above a
certain crosswind threshold, vortices are blown out of the flight corridor and pose no
further threat to following aircraft.
Therefore, under certain crosswind conditions, minimum aircraft separations might be
reduced to minimum radar separations. This suggests a large potential for the tactical
use of reduced aircraft separations, leading to increased airport capacity and
reductions in mean airport delays.
The CREDOS project will study the operational feasibility of this approach by focussing
on the situation for take-off under crosswind conditions. Although this represents only
part of the scope of application, the methods and tools developed by this project can
be later used to cover arrivals and other meteorological conditions. The aim of
CREDOS is to prove that this approach to reducing separations is valid and feasible.
The CREDOS project is a result of the close collaboration between Europe and the
USA in the domain of wake vortex research through the exchange of models, data and
methods.
Objectives of the Project
The aim of this project is to research the feasibility of the use of reduced separations
for departures under certain meteorological conditions. The project will pay particular
attention to ensure that all factors which influence the real level of benefit are taken into
account. Specifically CREDOS aims:
•
to demonstrate the feasibility of a Concept of Operations allowing reduced
separations for Single Runway Departures under crosswind. This will be
achieved through appropriate application of the Operational Concept Validation
Methodology.
•
to provide all stakeholders with the required information to facilitate the
implementation of the CREDOS concept where appropriate in the near-term
(pre-2012).
Expected Results
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•
validated Operational Concept for reduced separations for crosswind
departures;
•
implementation Support Package & Guidance;
•
enhanced wake vortex behaviour models and encounter risk models capable of
use for departure situations;
•
proven wake vortex detection configuration for departures;
•
database of wake vortex recordings for departures including meteo conditions
from 2 sites;
•
documented application of validation method for reduced separations concept
(OCVM).
Structure of the Project
The project is structured into 5 work packages (WP):
•
WP1 Data Collection
o
•
WP2 Data Analysis & Wake Vortex Behaviour Modelling
o
•
Wake vortex Encounter Probability and Encounter Severity will be
assessed through risk analysis taking into account a broad range of
variables through Monte Carlo simulations and aerodynamic models.
WP4 Operational Concept & Validation
o
•
analysis of the evolution of wake vortices shed by departing aircraft
under various atmospheric conditions will be undertaken and existing
models of wake vortex behaviour will be updated to include the
departure situation.
WP3 Risk Model l ing & Risk Assessment
o
•
departure wake vortex and meteorological data from St. Louis (KSTL)
and Frankfurt (EDDF) will be collected covering the full range of
seasonal operating conditions.
A new concept of operations for crosswind departures based on the
work of the USA ConOps Evaluation Team and the European Wake
Vortex Concepts Team will be defined and validated.
WP5 Stakeholder Communications & Marketing
o
A comprehensive communication package for ANSP’s, Airports and
Airline Operators will be developed. There will also be a case study of
the implementation of CREDOS at Madrid airport.
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3.7 CLEAN SKY
Clean Sky is a "Joint Technology Initiative" that is developing breakthrough
technologies to reduce environmental impact developing a “green” Aircraft.
The Clean Sky JTI is one of the largest European research projects and will be
developed over the period 2008 – 2013 with a public-private partnership which will
speed up technological breakthrough developments and shorten the time to market for
new solutions tested on Full Scale Demonstrators.
Wide spectra of advanced enabling technologies will be developed until demonstration
phase in flight as well as on ground.
In particular, Clean Sky will demonstrate and validate the technology breakthroughs
that are necessary to make major steps towards the environmental goals sets by
ACARE - Advisory Council for Aeronautics Research in Europe - the European
Technology Platform for Aeronautics & Air Transport and to be reached in 2020:
•
50% reduction of CO2 emissions through drastic reduction of fuel
consumption
•
80% reduction of NOx (nitrogen oxide) emissions
•
50% reduction of external noise
•
a green product life cycle: design, manufacturing, maintenance and disposal /
recycling
This will be achieved by means of:
•
mature, validate and demonstrate advanced aerodynamics
•
advanced structures and materials
•
all electric aircraft architectures
•
advanced avionics architectures
•
integration of these technologies in advanced aircraft configurations
interfacing new power plants types
•
integration of technical solutions from other technical platforms of the Clean
Sky (such as energy management, Mission & Trajectory managements,
engines, Eco Design) using a multidisciplinary approach.
The Clean Sky JTI is made up of 6 Integrated Technology Demonstrators (ITD):
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¾ Three vehicle ITDs:
o Smart Fixed Wing Aircraft (SFWA): focusing on mainline a/c
applications;
o Green Regional Aircraft (GRA): focusing on regional a/c applications;
o Green Rotorcraft (GRC): focusing on helicopter applications;
¾ Three transversal ITDs:
o Sustainable and Green Engine (SAGE): focusing on engines
technologies;
¾ Systems for Green Operations (SGO): focusing on “energy
management” and “mission and trajectory management” technologies;
¾ Eco-Design: focusing on the entire process from design to disposal.
Figure 9 - Clean Sky Integrated Technology Demonstrators (ITD) scheme
A simulation network called the Technology Evaluator will assess the performance of
the technologies thus developed.
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Figure 10 – Test of a GRA solution
With the six ITD, Clean Sky is expected to lead the earlier introduction of new, radically
greener Air Transport products that will:
•
Accelerate the delivery of technologies for radically improving the environmental
impact of air transport.
•
Increase the competitiveness of European industry, thus contributing to the
Lisbon Strategy objectives.
•
Encourage the rest of the aviation world to make greener products.
The Green Regional Aircraft (GRA) ITD
The objective of the Green Regional Aircraft ITD is to mature, validate and
demonstrate the technologies best fitting the environmental goals set for the regional
aircraft entering the market in the years 2015 - 2020.
The GRA general approach is functional to the step change in environmental impact
that is sought for the regional products of the future.
It is necessary to concentrate on some very promising “mainstream” technologies, but
also draw the benefits of other technologies in an integrated view of their cumulative
and reciprocal effects.
This very productive new research approach is made possible by Clean Sky: take the
benefit of multidisciplinary integration while gathering the results of several basic
technologies.
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The activities of the ITD are organised so as to:
•
develop the most promising “mainstream” technologies (Low Weight and Low
Noise Configurations) best fitting the requirement of greening the regional
aircraft;
•
integrate technical solutions from the mainstream technologies and from other
technology domains (Energy Management, Mission & Trajectory Management,
Advanced Engines, Eco Design, New Configurations) in the Demonstrators of
the Green Regional Aircraft, using a multidisciplinary approach.
Areas of interest for ALICIA
Assessing the Clean Sky project from ALICIA point of view, the considerations about
Mission and Trajectory Management (MTM) can be particularly interesting also for
ALICIA. In fact, the studies under development by Clean Sky to optimise the routes
trajectories and the management of mission could offer interesting results and
commonalities that could be exploited inside ALICIA project.
The highest overall benefits, expected by Clean Sky, will be realised during the
approach, on-ground and departure phases, areas that also ALICIA projects
recognized as “critical”.
The main benefits that ALICIA could exploit from Clean Sky lie, therefore, in the
trajectories-related studies, that will be based on more precise, reliable and predictable
4 dimensional flight path, optimised including also agile trajectory management in
response to meteorological hazard, time and fuel consumption. These optimisations
could then be used also to improve punctuality, reducing some en-route delays.
Moreover, also the on-going studies performed by the Systems for Green Operations
ITD on a Flight Management System, able to perform a fully autonomous Continuous
Descent Approach, could be used for example to improve safety and to reduce also the
number of rejected landing, due to low visibility.
Figure 11 – Representation of a candidate CLEANSKY solution
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4 FIXED WING FUTURE SCENARIOS
4.1 Mission Requirements
4.1.1 Capabilities and Global Objectives
Defining commercial aircraft future (future here means years 2015 to 2025) missions
seems an easy task as the basic purpose of passengers or cargo transport from an
origin airport to a destination airport will remain. Nevertheless, some major changes
are expected in the way fixed wing transport aircraft perform their missions, as
environmental and capacity issues will deeply impact future ATM.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the future operational objectives of fixed
wing transport aircraft (commercial and business), with new or modified functionalities
and associated capabilities that exist or will have to be introduced in the future. As
ALICIA project focuses on all conditions operations, particular attention will be given on
related issues and future concepts.
An ALICIA objective is to develop capabilities allowing reduction of weather-related
delays by 20%. This reduction achievement has been delineated expanded in 3
objectives focusing on specific operational issues:
1. Delivering more autonomous aircraft operation, including anticipation and avoidance of
weather disturbances and other possible perturbations in-flight or on the ground;
2. Delivering a robust worldwide operations capability, allowing aircraft to use airports with
less capable ground based approach aids, in a wider range of degraded flight
conditions;
3. Delivering improved punctuality while simultaneously enhancing safety.
In order to structure the definition of objectives and capabilities, these 3 issues will be
used as a reference.
4.1.1.1 Anticipation
operations
and
avoidance
of
disturbances
during
The Global ATM Operational Concept, endorsed by 2003 ICAO 11th Air Navigation
Conference (AN-Conf/11) and published as ICAO Doc 9854, provides the framework
for the development of all regional ATM concepts. AN-Conf/11 also endorsed a number
of technical recommendations affecting navigation, including the harmonization of air
navigation systems between regions, frequency planning, the transition to satellite
based air navigation, curved RNAV procedures, and the use of multiple GNSS signals
and the rapid implementation of approaches with vertical guidance.
The ICAO Performance Based Navigation (PBN) Manual was developed in direct
response to an AN-Conf/11 recommendation. In September 2007, the ICAO 36th
General Assembly issued resolutions urging States to:
•
Complete PBN implementation plans by 2009;
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•
Implement RNAV and RNP operations (where required) for en route and
terminal areas; and
•
Implement approach procedures with vertical guidance (APV) (Baro-VNAV
and/or augmented GNSS) for all instrument runway ends, either as the primary
approach or as a back-up for precision approaches, by 2016 (with 30 per cent
by 2010 and 70 per cent by 2014).
In order to comply with the ICAO Global ATM Operational Concept, European
countries have initiated the SESAR research and development program. SESAR has
identified three Implementation Packages (IP) to address short term improvements, the
concept up to 2020 and long term goals post 2020. These IPs comprise operational
improvements requiring P-RNAV in IP1, trajectory management and initial 4D in
accordance with Master Plan available for operations from 2013 in IP2, and 4D
trajectory contract in IP3, as well as safety and capacity improvements at aerodromes
in low visibility conditions.
The following aims to describe SESAR related scenarios in terms of trajectory
management and initial 4D, focusing in particular on the weather anticipation and
avoidance issue, providing the operational objectives (at least for ECAC area
operations) and related airborne capacities to be considered for commercial aircraft in
the ALICIA project.
In the SESAR ATM concept, a collaborative planning process involving operators,
ANSPs and airports leads to the publication of a Reference Business Trajectory (RBT).
When published, the RBT does not represent a clearance but is the goal to be
achieved and which will be progressively authorised, either as a clearance by the
ANSP or as a function of aircraft crew/systems depending on whether the ANSP or the
flight crew is the designated separator (ASAS application).
The trajectory based operations will be based on that the aircraft FMS computed 4D
trajectory will be downlinked to ANSP after pre-flight. This forms the basis for the RBT.
The RBT will be amended as per requirements from ANSP and uplinked directly to the
FMS. Upon acceptance by the aircrew this becomes the active flight plan and will be
downlinked to concerned ANSPs again as the contracted trajectory. Modifications to
the contract must be negotiated and accepted and in general only occur for safety
reasons. The aircraft as well as the ANSPs shall have means to alarm if the Aircraft
strays off the trajectory (deviates from any or all Dimensions of the RBT with TBD NM /
feet / seconds).
The RBT can be described in terms of ATM capability level:
•
For ATM-1 level aircraft (2009-2013), the RBT is very close to the current ATC
flight plan. It is described by:
o
2D route;
o
requested/cleared level and any en-route planned level changes;
o
applicable level constraints (e.g. altitude min/max windows for Standard
Instrument Departure/Standard Arrival (SID/STAR));
o
applicable time constraints (e.g. CTA);
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o
•
estimates / profile level/speed at waypoints and trajectory change points.
For ATM-2/3 level aircraft (2013-2020), the RBT is described as above except
for:
o
3D route when applicable;
o
estimates/profile level/speed at waypoints and ATM significant points;
o
relevant containment parameters.
Flight operations
During flight, requirements to change the RBT may come from ground or air; reasons
include in particular weather and all abnormal or emergency conditions, but also
separation provision, sequencing, new airspace user business needs, changing arrival
constraints (arrival times, arrival runways and applicable arrival routes and procedures)
or the inability to comply with the conditions of a constraint on the RBT (e.g. CTA). The
RBT will be progressively updated and shared and successive segments of the RBT
will be cleared1.
It shall be mentioned here that the captain will remain the person who is responsible for
the safety of the flight. The ultimate authority to accept another trajectory or even to
deviate (and inform other parties later) from an initially agreed trajectory remains with
this person.
Figure 12 – SESAR trajectory proposal
Global performance will be improved by being able to anticipate the impact of weather
on the operations. This will be accomplished through the transmission of consistent
and integrated accurate weather information into ATM, air traffic control, operators’
flight operations center, as well as into flight deck to support tactical and strategic
operational decision-making.
Improvements will be developed to define weather impact, provide improved weather
observations and better forecasts. These will enable operators’ access to consistent
weather information, which will promote common situational awareness. The improved
1
The target in RTCA SC-214 / EUROCAE WG-78 Standards for Air Traffic Data Communication Services
is to find means to allow initial clearance of a full RBT in order to really form a contracted 4D Route.
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forecasts, including improved characterization of uncertainty, will assist operators in
safely planning and conducting 4D, gate-to-gate, trajectory-based operations that avoid
weather hazards (e.g. storms, CAT, severe icing, etc.) and provide acceptable, safe
and comfortable flight conditions. Decision-support functions will directly incorporate
weather data and define weather impact.
Improvements will be forthcoming in four functional areas: Weather information
integrated into decision-support tools; weather sensing capability 2 required for better
forecasting; weather forecasting and processing; and the universal and common
access of needed information that will be made available to the full spectrum of users.
Terminal area operations
Figure 13 – Terminal area operations (Copyright-free picture)
In high density traffic terminal areas (depending on the airport and/or the time), an
efficient airspace organisation combined with advanced capabilities will be deployed to
deliver the necessary capacity, ensure safe separation and minimise the environmental
impact.
Optimum spacing on the approach to optimise runway throughput will be achieved
through controller spacing instructions followed by the flight crew. Hopefully this means
use of time based separation (not use of auto flight system basic modes, as of today).
2
Improvement of on board weather sensing can only give tactical information to own ship, but if
transmitted to the ground it may enhance forecasting for following aircraft.
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Use of time based separation will require improved FMS functionality and HMI as well
as improved information distribution that will allow ATM to plan the flow and aircraft to
follow the planned flow autonomously with high accuracy3. Revision to the flight plan
must be performed as changes to the 4D trajectory (essentially waypoint and time) to
allow full use of the FMS and distributed information, not only about actual position, but
the intent. Any use of basic modes (Hdg / VS / Alt / Speed) will inhibit the intent
information that will be essential for flow planning, flow supervision and separation
control. Integrated Arrival and Departure Management sequencing tools will be used in
conjunction with airborne spacing capabilities.
Specific cases will have to be addressed, for instance the capability to deal with heavy
traffic flows with showers crossing the area necessitating dynamic use of airspace.
Under those “unplanned” conditions other optimisation criteria are needed, like
flexibility of routing with minimum loss of capacity. Maintaining current proficiency and
self confidence for air traffic controllers and pilots in these conditions will become a
factor to be regarded as well.
Low/medium density terminal area operation will be characterised by optimal profiles
for all trajectories. Multiple arrival routes that include curved route segments will
converge through successive merging points for each runway. The number of merging
points and proximity to the runway will depend on the distribution of traffic flows and
environmental constraints. Ideally, the controlled times of arrival would be set at the
runway threshold (to focus on the optimisation of runway throughput) but in reality a
merging point further out is more likely to be practicable.
Figure 14 – Routes for high-complexity terminal operations with tubes (left) or cones (right)
Various techniques and procedures will be in place to increase runway throughput and
utilisation such as:
3
•
Datalink exchange of the aircraft intended trajectory to assist ANSP in the
separation task;
•
Reducing dependency on wake vortex separation by the re-classification of
aircraft into a wider range of wake vortex categories, dynamic pair-wise
This has been shown to work well at Stockholm ARN airport the last couple of years.
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separations considering prevailing wind conditions and stability of the air mass,
improved prediction and detection of wake vortex;
•
Re-sequencing of the traffic flow to group similar categories of aircraft (refer as
an example to current operations in Amsterdam airport);
•
Minimizing runway occupancy time by runway and runway exit design
improvements and improvement of the procedures to vacate at an agreed turnoff whether supported by systems or not (When the crew has to do this without
a system it is essential that pilots will have means for early anticipation of the
location of the agreed (high speed) exit and more specific for distance
awareness along the runway to assist in locating themselves. This in itself limits
this capability to certain values of visibility if it is based on outside visual
detection);
•
Accurate and more consistent final approach spacing achieved by time-based
separation4 taking into consideration wake vortex by either controller tools or
onboard tools like ASAS;
•
Reducing departure spacing by better wake vortex management, runway
design and improved departure management tools;
•
Optimising runway configuration/mode of operation in case of multiple runways;
•
Interlaced take-off and landing procedures (mixed mode operations);
•
Increased runway utilization during Low Visibility Conditions (LVC) by mitigating
the ILS signal disturbance issues and by tools to enhance ground controller and
pilots’ situation awareness in low visibility conditions;
•
Improved weather forecasting;
•
Redesign of runways and taxiways to avoid runway crossing.
4
Time based separation with RTA over threshold may cause separation infringement further out if the
stabilized speed differs significantly. Procedures / rules have to be established that prevent this.
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Operations on and around Airports
Airports will be fully integrated into the ATM network, with particular emphasis being
placed on turnaround management, runway throughput and improved environmental
performance.
The provision of separation between aircraft and hazards on the airport will continue to
be achieved through visual means5. However, better situational awareness for the
controller, aircrew and vehicle drivers including conflict detection and warning functions
will enhance airports’ surface safety and will also create "room" for surface movement
capacity expansion (this expansion will likely be very different between
runways/taxiways and aprons) and improve throughput in low visibility conditions. The
dimensioning situation is zero visibility with all (operating) aircraft and ground vehicles
fully equipped (manoeuvring area). This is necessary to avoid ground operation from
severely limit the flow and cause intrusion hazards in low visibility conditions. It seems
fully feasible with the improved systems and displays being developed.
Worldwide operations
The here above description focuses on the SESAR future ATM context, as it will be the
reference frame for all future operations in the ECAC area. Although ALICIA is a
European project, concepts that will be developed cannot consider operations only
within the ECAC area. A large part of aircraft flying within this area are flights that come
from non-ECAC countries, or are flights with their destination being a non-ECAC
country. It is then obvious that interoperability of European ATM concept with other
parts of the world is a major issue.
Specific business jets operations
Aside to the SESAR future ATM improvement, and onboard functions that will allow
more autonomous aircraft operation in all flight phases of commercial aviation, ALICIA
shall provide better situation awareness, including weather, traffic and terrain including
obstacles in all types of airspace, i.e. including unmanaged airspaces.
In the following are listed some new fixed wing transport aircraft operational capabilities
that shall support the achievement of ALICIA’s objective to deliver more autonomous
aircraft operation, including anticipation and avoidance of weather disturbances and
other possible perturbations in-flight or on the ground:
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall be able to support 4D trajectory-based
operations (tactical and strategic operational trajectory management) based on
the transmitting/receiving consistent and accurate information about traffic,
weather and other essential parameters.
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall provide the crew with improved flight
information and guidance to follow the planned 4-D trajectory, like full time use
of Flight Path Vector information with associated Flight Guidance cues.
5
There are 2 types of hazards, collaborative – like other aircraft and vehicles; and non-collaborative – like
animals and non-equipped traffic. In real low visibility conditions, safe separation to non-collaborative
hazards must be ensured by proper fencing and regulations.
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•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall be able to support wake vortex avoidance
based on Wake Vortex prediction and detection.
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall, for all ground and flight operations be able to
support required information to the crew of all environmental factors that may
affect the execution of the flight (including surrounding traffic)
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall be able to vacate at an agreed runway turnoff.
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall be able to support airport surface movement
capacity expansion and improve throughput in low visibility conditions.
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall be able to support interoperability between
regions where ATM context and related means and procedures are
inconsistent.
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall be able to operate in IMC conditions in
uncontrolled airspace (class F, G), including taxi, take off, cruise, approach and
landing operations.
4.1.1.2 Robust worldwide operations capability
The following describes SESAR related scenarios in terms of approach and landing
Navaids infrastructure, the operational objectives (at least for ECAC area operations)
and related airborne capabilities to consider for commercial aircraft in the ALICIA
project:
Figure 15 – Eurocontrol Generic Roadmap of Navigation Strategy
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2009-2015
•
Aircraft ILS equipage is universal and most airports needing precision
instrument approaches have ILS ground equipment. ILS will remain the prime
source of guidance for approaches and Cat I landings and will continue to
support all categories of airspace users. Cat I GLS (GBAS/GPS) will become
available (where feasible, airports will publish RNP/GLS procedures). ILS will
remain the only means for Cat II/III operations, however, toward the end of the
period, depending on Research and Development results, there may be a
limited availability of Cat II/III GLS capability (using a GNSS/GBAS capability
augmented by on-board systems) at runways with Cat II/III lighting. This might
increase the rate of implementation of GBAS based landing as a back up to ILS
to cater for maintenance/system failures.
•
The NPAs (both conventional and RNAV) will gradually be eliminated in
accordance with the decisions of the ICAO Assembly to be replaced by
Approaches with Vertical Guidance (APV) either based on SBAS or BaroVNAV. This is expected to be completed early in the period 2015-2020 with the
provision of APV to all IFR runway ends. The continued provision of DME as a
backup to GNSS is consistent with this objective.
•
Runways presently not equipped with Precision Approach and Landing system
may consider SBAS (e.g. LPV 200) or Cat I GLS (GBAS/GPS) systems with
airport lighting system upgrades as needed. Some CAT I ILSs may be replaced
by SBAS APV or CAT I GLS. Business case for such changes will depend upon
nature of traffic and availability of aircraft with certified GNSS based approach
and landing systems.
•
Where necessary and once agreed by ICAO, ILS modified to overcome
multipath problems will be available to maintain Cat II/III capability at some
runway ends.
•
Where a business case can be made (e.g. improved capacity for Low visibility
procedures (LVP) or where the ILS modifications (above) cannot overcome
multipath) MLS CAT III may be implemented as an alternative or replacement to
ILS.
2015-2020
•
ILS will remain the major source of guidance for approaches and landings.
Where necessary and once agreed by ICAO, ILS modified to overcome
multipath problems will be available to maintain Cat II/III capability at some
runway ends.
•
MLS, Cat I GLS and LPV 200 will continue to be introduced where required.
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•
Cat II/III GLS (GBAS/Multi-constellation Dual Frequency) will be available. With
the increased equipage of airports with GBAS ground station and aircraft with
GLS capability, GLS procedures will be increasingly used.
•
Need will be considered to require carriage of RNP APCH/LPV approach
system to allow the removal of all conventional NPA procedures and the
decommissioning of associated NAVAIDs.
•
RNP APCH AR (Authorisation Required) will have increasing application where
RNP operations cannot be undertaken with RNP APCH procedures.
•
Where necessary and once agreed by ICAO, ILS will be modified to overcome
multipath problems to maintain Cat II/III capability
BEYOND 2020
•
ILS will remain a significant source of guidance for approaches and landings.
Where necessary, ILS will be modified to overcome multipath problems to
maintain Cat II/III capability.
•
MLS, Cat I GLS and LPV 200 will continue to be introduced where required.
•
Equipage of GLS aircraft capability will be increased together with the provision
of GLS GBAS procedures (Cat I/II/III) at more airports. This is expected to be
accompanied by the decommissioning of ILS CAT I systems, where the
Business and Safety Case can be established. ILS Cat II/III will be retained 6 to
provide backup to GLS to address potential availability issues (deliberate
jamming and solar activity).
•
RNP APCH/LPV/GBAS for RNAV approach will be require if ILS not available.
•
Increased equipage of aircraft with combined GPS/GALILEO/SBAS reception
will lead to the introduction of LPV procedures at most runway ends.
•
RNP AR APCH will continue to have increasing application where RNP
operations cannot be undertaken with RNP APCH procedures.
General evolution to more satellite based navigation suits the need to rely less on
ground based navaids with the concepts of APV and LPV approaches. Future ground
based augmented GNSS systems (GLS) shall also provide the same level of
performance and integrity as current ILS installations for a much smaller maintenance
cost, enabling smaller airports to provide all weather operation capacity.
6
If the FMS is allowed to use ILS information to enhance the accuracy of a defined approach
trajectory, the IRS memory could be used to compensate for any temporary or permanent loss
of the ILS at a late stage of the approach. It should be investigated if this could alleviate the
need for Cat II/III ground installation switch over times etc., and only retain the requirement on
beam accuracy.
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More specifically, beyond the minimum visibility figures targeted by the various future
navigation systems, business and (at least) some part of commercial aviation are
interested to reach lower figures by using new technologies, like: enhanced flight crew
vision systems following the Equivalent Visual Operation concept, developed by
NextGen.
EVO concept is defined by NextGen as the improved information availability allowing
aircraft to conduct operations without regard for visibility or direct visual observation.
This capability, in combination with the crew, enables increased accessibility, both on
the airport surface and during arrival and departure operations, leading to more
predictable and efficient operations.
The EVO concept has been awarded with the first operational gains in the USA by the
sole utilization of the Enhanced Vision System (EVS). This system, implemented on
some US manufactured business aircraft, allows approaches with no direct visual
runway observation until 100 ft.
The EVO concept shall be pushed further by ALICIA by integrating various new vision
sensor technologies, Synthetic Vision Systems (SVS) or other systems to achieve new
operational gains (e.g. SVS might (partly) replace the need to upgrade the airport
lighting).
Below are listed some new fixed wing transport aircraft operational capabilities that
shall support the achievement of ALICIA’s objective to deliver robust worldwide
operations capability, allowing aircraft to use airports with less capable ground based
approach aids, in a wider range of degraded flight conditions:
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall be able to support ILS cat I/II/III autoland (or
manual alternatives) and MLS autoland at least until 2020, and likely beyond.
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall be able to achieve approaches and landings
in equivalent to CAT I conditions7, based on satellite navigation augmented by a
ground based system (e.g. GPS/GBAS).
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall be able to achieve approaches in equivalent
to CAT II/III conditions, on runways equipped with Cat II/III lighting, based on
satellite navigation augmented by a ground based system (e.g. GPS/GBAS).
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall be able to achieve approaches in CAT I
conditions, based on satellite navigation augmented by a satellite based system
and vertical guidance(e.g. LPV 200/SBAS).
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall be able to achieve steep segmented
automatic approaches (within safe limits of aircraft performance) and/or curved
approaches (based on required navigation performance), either “public”
7
CAT 1 / II / III refers to minima using one particular approach aid, the ILS. The minima assigned to
different navaids or combination of navaids could be different and need a different nomenclature.
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(published and available to all operators) or “private” (requiring authority’ special
authorization).
Other future operational capabilities, based on the EVO concept, shall be addressed by
ALICIA to deliver a robust worldwide operations capability :
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall support flight crew to descend below the
currently published Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) or the Decision Height
(DH) without direct visual observation of the runway on IFR approaches (either
Non precision Approaches or Approaches with Vertical guidance), based on
enhanced and synthetic vision systems.
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall support flight crew to descend below the 200
ft decision height without direct visual observation of the runway on an
approach with CAT I ILS or GLS infrastructure, based on enhanced and
synthetic vision systems.
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall be able to perform ground operation and take
off with lower RVR on airports without CAT II / III lighting, with help of enhanced
and synthetic vision systems.
4.1.1.3 Delivering
enhancing safety
improved
punctuality
while
simultaneously
4.1.1.3.1 FSF & ALAR Approach & Landing Assessment
A Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction (ALAR)
Task Force was created in 1996 as another phase of the Controlled Flight Into Terrain
(CFIT) accident reduction program launched in the early 1990s. In parallel, U.S.
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) developed and recommended interventions
in order to enhance commercial aviation safety during the approach and landing phase
of flight.
The FSF and CAST ALAR Task Forces collected and analyzed data related to a
significant set of approach-and-landing accidents, including those resulting in
controlled flight into terrain CFIT).
The Task Forces developed conclusions and recommendations for practices that
would improve safety in approach-and-landing, in various domains as ATC (training
and procedures, airport facilities), aircraft equipment, aircraft operations and training.
All conclusions and recommendations were data-driven and supported by factual
evidence of their relevance to the reduction of approach-and-landing incidents and
accidents.
These conclusions identify the following operations and training issues as frequent
causal factors in approach-and-landing accidents, including those involving CFIT:
•
Standard operating procedures;
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•
Decision-making in time-critical situations;
•
Decision to initiate a go-around when warranted;
•
Rushed and unstabilized approaches;
•
Pilot/controller understanding of each other’ operational environment;
•
Pilot / controller communications;
•
Awareness of approach hazards (visual illusions, adverse wind conditions or
operations on contaminated runway);
•
Terrain awareness.
Based on the conclusions and recommendations of the FSF and CAST working
groups, the following set of Approach-and-Landing operational recommendations and
training guidelines shall be considered in the frame of ALICIA project in order to
achieve the safety enhancement objective, leading also the definition of future
scenarios and missions profiles that will support the development and then the
evaluation of ALICIA’s solutions.
•
•
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
o
SOPs shall be developed regarding the use of automation during the
approach and landing phases and provide training accordingly (Errors in
using and managing the automatic flight system and/or the lack of
awareness of the operating modes are causal factors in more than 20 % of
approach-and-landing accidents),
o
Role of the pilot-in-command (commander) in complex and demanding
situations shall be addressed (Training should address the practice of
transferring flying duties during operationally complex situations),
Decision-making in time-critical situations
o
•
Decision to initiate a go-around when warranted
o
•
An effective tactical decision-making model for use in time-critical situations
shall be developed,
Well-defined go-around gates for approach and landing operations shall be
specified. Go-around parameters should include visibility minima required
for the approach and landing operation, assessment at the final approach fix
(FAF) or outer marker (OM) of crew and aircraft readiness for approach,
and minimum altitude at which the aircraft must be stabilized,
Flying Stabilized Approaches
o
Currently, all flights should be stabilized by 1000-ft (300m) height above
airfield elevation in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and by 500-ft
(150m) above airfield elevation in visual meteorological conditions (VMC).
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An approach is today considered stabilized when all of the following
conditions are met:
1. The aircraft is on the correct flight path;
2. Only small changes in heading/pitch are required to maintain the correct
flight path;
3. The aircraft speed is not more than VREF + 20 knots indicated airspeed
and not less than VREF;
4. The aircraft is in the correct landing configuration;
5. Sink rate is no greater than 1,000 feet per minute; if an approach
requires a sink rate greater than 1,000 feet per minute, a special briefing
should be conducted;
6. Power setting is appropriate for the aircraft configuration and is not
below the minimum power for approach as defined by the aircraft
operating manual;
7. All briefings and checklists have been conducted;
8. Specific types of approaches are stabilized if they also fulfil the
following: instrument landing system (ILS) approaches must be flown
within one dot of the glideslope and localizer; a Category II or Category
III ILS approach must be flown within the expanded localizer band;
during a circling approach, wings should be level on final when the
aircraft reaches 300 feet above airport elevation;
•
o
Unique approach procedures or abnormal conditions requiring a deviation
from the above elements of a stabilized approach require a special briefing.
For the future, it is interesting to even question the use of different
stabilization altitudes depending on met conditions. Indeed, it introduces a
factor of judgment that is detrimental and not needed. Preferably, the
approach / landing system should provide energy bleed off rate guidance
throughout the approach to ensure stabilization at the required (and
optimum) altitude (preferably 500 ft), alternatively predict and alert the crew
as early as possible if the stabilization criteria cannot be met.
o
The implementation of certified constant-angle procedures for non-precision
approaches should be expedited globally,
Pilot / Controller Communications
o
The following should be emphasized in pilot-controller communication:
ƒ
Use of standard phraseology8,
8
With data link communication and use of colours/ symbols in lieu of phrases, standard use of such
becomes even more important.
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o
•
Adhere to confirmation/correction process in the communication
loop,
ƒ
Prevent simultaneous transmissions,
ƒ
Listen to party-line communications9
Considering the future environment, introduction of CPDLC in terminal
areas will widely impact the communication issue. It is then very important
to keep these statements in mind when defining and assessing future
communication concepts that will mix data and voice links.
Awareness of approach and landing hazards (Low Visibility, Visual Illusions and
Energy Management particularly for operations on Contaminated Runway
Operations)
o
•
ƒ
Flight crews should make operational use of a risk-assessment checklist to
identify approach and landing hazards,
Terrain awareness
o
o
Terrain awareness can be defined as the combined awareness and
knowledge of the following:
ƒ
Aircraft position
ƒ
Aircraft altitude and intended flight path
ƒ
Applicable minimum safe altitude
ƒ
Terrain location and features
ƒ
Other hazards (man-made obstacles…)
Any future application that will be developed in the frame of weather-related
delays reduction objective will have to be assessed considering the above
definition and demonstrate at least non regression, at best an improvement
in terrain awareness.
4.1.1.3.2 FSF Runway Excursions Assessment
At the request of several international aviation organizations in late 2006, the Flight
Safety Foundation initiated a project entitled Runway Safety Initiative (RSI) to address
the challenge of runway safety. After reviewing all areas of runway safety from 1992
until 2006, the RSI group focused on runway excursions as they discovered that 97%
of runway accidents were caused by excursions (veer-offs, in which an aircraft goes off
the side of a runway, and overruns, in which an aircraft runs off the end of a runway).
They also found that over the past 14 years, there had been almost 30 excursions per
year for commercial aircraft (over 25% of all accidents). The study also noted that
9
This must in future scenarios be supported by other and better means of situation awareness.
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although the percentage of excursions that included fatalities was low, the sheer
number of excursions still meant that there were a high number of fatalities.
Independent of the FSF effort, IATA’s Safety Group had identified runway excursions
as a significant safety challenge to address.
The following prevention strategies have been proposed by FSF to address the risk
factors involved in runway excursions (the following list is not exhaustive and
corresponds to the recommendations corresponding to ALICIA project scope):
•
A mishandled rejected takeoff (RTO) increases the risk of takeoff runway
excursion
o
operators should emphasize and train for proper execution of the RTO
decision (CRM and adherence to SOPs are essential in time-critical
situations such as RTOs)
o
emphasis shall be put on recognition of takeoff rejection issues
o
sudden loss or degradation of thrust
o
tire and other mechanical failures
•
flap and spoiler configuration issues
•
decision making done at or just before reaching V1 is a critical issue
o
•
•
presently, total and accurate information about runway surface conditions is
of limited value as the requirement and method to correct for the most
significant parameter – runway friction – is totally inadequate. Solving the
friction measurement problem is very important for runway safety but it is
out of scope for ALICIA. For example; following certification procedure and
rejecting a takeoff from the decision speed V1 may lead to departing the
certification distance at > 70% of V1 when the runway friction is, by present
definition, GOOD (>0,45 my).This cannot be solved unless present
regulations are improve as no single airline is willing to assume the payload
penalty of safe corrections for reason of competition.
Takeoff performance calculation errors increase the risk of a takeoff runway
excursion
o
operators should have a process to ensure a proper weight-and-balance,
including error detection
o
operators should have a process to ensure accurate takeoff performance
data
o
operators should have a process to ensure a proper application of the
required thrust level for a safe takeoff
Unstable approaches increase the risk of landing runway excursions
o
operators should define, publish, and train the elements of a stabilized
approach
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o
•
•
flight crews should recognize that fast and high on approach, high at
threshold, and fast, long touchdowns are major factors leading to landing
excursions
Failure to recognize the need for and to execute a go-around is a major
contributor to runway excursion accidents
o
operator policy should dictate a go-around if an approach does not meet the
stabilized approach criteria
o
operators should implement and support no-fault go-around policies
o
an energy advisory system (basically a function of runway condition and
ground speed) could enhance timely decision to perform a go around.
Contaminated runways increase the risk of runway excursions
o
Flight crews should be given accurate, useful, and timely runway condition
information
o
A universal, easy-to-use method of runway condition reporting should be
developed to reduce the risk of runway excursions
o
Manufacturers should provide appropriate operational and performance
information to operators that accounts for the spectrum of runway conditions
they might experience
o
Thrust reverser issues increase the risk of runway excursions. Controllability
issues are mentioned in manuals and sometimes at rather long intervals
trained for in simulators now. Noise awareness issues at busy hubs result in
the frequent use of idle reverse thrust only. Although better than not
selecting reverse, the crews tend to “forget” that they have higher
decelerating capability on board that can save lives in certain conditions.
Nevertheless, without general use of reverse thrust to assist stopping, the
overrun accident rate would certainly be much higher. The bonus in terms of
landing safety brought by this system is amazing and widely exceed the few
cases when it has been a causal or contributing factor to an accident.
•
Combinations of risk factors (such as abnormal winds plus contaminated
runways or unstabilized approaches plus thrust reverser issues) synergistically
increase the risk of runway excursions
•
Establishing and adhering to standard operating procedures (SOPs) will
enhance flight crew decision making and reduce the risk of runway excursions
•
The survivability of a runway excursion depends on the energy of the aircraft as
it leaves the runway surface and the terrain and obstacles it will encounter
prior to coming to a stop
o
All areas surrounding the runway should conform to ICAO Annex 14
specifications
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•
o
All runway ends should have a certified runway end safety area (RESA) as
required by ICAO Annex 14 or appropriate substitute (e.g., an arrestor bed)
o
Aircraft rescue and fire fighting (ARFF) personnel should be trained and
available at all times during flight operations
Universal standards related to the runway and conditions, and comprehensive
performance data related to aircraft stopping characteristics, help reduce the
risk of runway excursions.
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4.1.1.3.3 Fixed­wing transports Accidents Assessment
In addition to the FSF highly valuable inputs, a proper accidents/serious incidents
survey has been done in the frame of ALICIA project, with the kind participation of a
NLR staff member who permitted a search within the NLR safety database. Regarding
the fixed wing transport category mishaps, the search focused on accidents & serious
incidents that have occurred over the last 10 years with western built aircraft type
certificated 1982 or later. The keywords looked for were runway excursion, runway
incursion, fog, low visibility, weather minima.
The search has resulted in the down-selection of 8 cases of unstabilized approach and
or landing, 4 cases of overrun and / or lower friction, 4 cases of late rejected takeoffs, 3
cases of approach and or landing on the wrong runway, 3 cases of take-off from the
wrong runway and finally 2 cases of loosing visual cues during landing (refer to the
following table).
Major accident
contributor
category
Location
Type of aircraft
Event
Rwy excursion after
an unstabilized
AIRBUS - A340-600
approach and a
hard landing
Quito
CANADAIR - CL600
Rwy excursion after
an unstabilized
approach and a
hard landing
Yogyakarta
BOEING - 737-400
Rwy excursion after
an unstabilized
approach and a
hard landing
London City
BRITISH
AEROSPACE –
BAE 146-200
Rwy excursion after
an unstabilized
approach and a
hard landing
Cleveland
EMBRAER - E170
The aircraft ran off
the end of the
runway, No G/S;
Descended below
MDA, heavy snow
Ottawa
EMBRAER - E145
Rwy excursion after
an unstabilized
approach and a long
& high speed
Providence
Unstabilized
approach and/or
flare
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landing
BOEING - MD-11
Rwy excursion
during Landing roll,
long misjudged
flare, tailwind
BOEING - 757-200
Rwy excursion after
an unstabilized
approach, visual
reference lost and a
hard landing
BRITISH
AEROSPACE –
BAE 146-200
The aircraft ran off
the end of the
runway, Ground
spoiler not
deployed;
malfunctioned, wet
Chicago
BOEING - 737-700
The aircraft ran off
the end of the
runway, Braking
action, Heavy snow
Toronto
The aircraft ran off
the end of the
AIRBUS - A340-300
runway, Braking
action, Severe TS &
Rain, Reduced vis
Jamaica (NY)
Gerona
Bergen
Overrun and lower
friction
McDonnell Douglas
- MD-80
The aircraft ran off
the end of the
runway, tailwind,
wet, flare long
CANADAIR - CL600
The aircraft ran off
the end of the
runway RTO, late
abort, no rotation
possible, Mass &
Balance problem
Groningen
McDonnell Douglas
- MD-80
The aircraft ran off
the end of the
runway RTO, late
abort, no rotation
possible, Out of trim
TO
Manassas
DORNIER - 328
The aircraft ran off
the end of the
Solo
Teterboro
Late RTOs
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JET
Wrong runway
approach and
landing
runway RTO, Pitot /
static system
blocked, late abort
Detroit
AIRBUS - A320
The aircraft ran off
the end of the
runway RTO, late
abort, no rotation
possible, Out of trim
TO, wet runway
Seattle
BOMBARDIER DHC8
Wrong runway
selected , during
Landing
Marseille
AIRBUS - A319
Wrong runway
selected , during
Final approach
Seattle
BOEING - 737-300
Wrong runway
selected , during
Final approach
Lexington
CANADAIR - RJ
SERIES 100 / 200
Wrong runway
selected , during
Take-off
Chicago
BOEING - 777-200
Wrong runway
selected , during
Take-off
Calgary
McDonnell Douglas
- MD-80
Insufficient visual
cues during the
landing
Denver
McDonnell Douglas
- MD-80
Aircraft collision with
approach/runway/ta
xiway lights , during
approach
Wrong runway takeoff
Visual cues lost
during landing
The objective of this document is not to provide a complete analysis of each of the here
above accidents (the interested reader should find most of all official safety reports
from the web). In the frame of ALICIA, two main outputs have been sought: the
definition of highly valuable operational scenarios (aircraft, trajectory, type of approach,
type of airport, weather conditions, environment in general…) that could serve as
reference for the foreseen ALICIA operational assessments, and the identification of
general operational issues, capabilities or recommendations that can ensue from the
safety recommendations written in the reporting of these accidents by national bodies
like NTSB, BEA, TSB or other.
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4.1.1.3.3.1 Approach & Landing Considerations
The following analysis comes mainly from the analysis report of the A340-300 runway
run-off in Toronto (AVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT A05H0002) and defines
approach and landing in marginal weather conditions clear understanding and
recommendations ALICIA project may build-up on.
Approaches into Convective Weather
Aircraft penetration of thunderstorms on approach occurs throughout the industry and
has contributed to a number of accidents worldwide. Many operators, including Air
France, do not provide their crews with specific criteria, such as distance-based
guidelines, for the avoidance of convective weather during final approach and landing.
Environment Canada advises that thunderstorms can present significant risks to the
safe operation of an aircraft. These risks include the following:
•
low ceiling and poor visibility due to intense precipitation below the
thunderstorm cloud, which often seriously limits visibility;
•
rapid changes in surface pressure that can lead to altitude errors;
•
lightning, which increases in frequency proportionally to the storm’s intensity
and which also affects visibility;
•
hail, both within and outside the cloud;
•
icing, particularly in the upper part of a mature cell;
•
rapid changes in wind speed and direction, which may quickly and suddenly
exceed an aircraft’s crosswind or other limits;
•
potentially damaging wind gusts;
•
downdrafts due to microbursts;
•
contaminated runway surfaces in rain and/or hail;
•
turbulence; and
•
difficulty in conducting a missed approach safely.
The severity of these hazards will vary between thunderstorms and are difficult to
predict because the weather around a thunderstorm can change rapidly.
All operators train their crews on the hazards associated with thunderstorms,
emphasizing that they are best avoided whenever possible. Regardless, TSB research
following this accident has clearly demonstrated that the penetration of convective
weather in the terminal area during an approach to land is a practice that is occurring
industry-wide. This implies that pilots are either aware of the hazards presented by
convective weather on approach but accept the perceived level of risk to facilitate
landing at destination, or conversely, that they cannot readily assimilate, comprehend,
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and react to the hazards created by the rapidly changing nature of a thunderstorm.
Consequently, approach and landing accidents due to convective weather occur
regularly worldwide.
On the accident flight, the crew had information that clearly indicated that there was
significant weather over the airport: the aircraft’s weather radar display was painting
severe weather close to the runway; there were pilot reports of poor braking action;
they could see lightning in the vicinity of the airport; and several pilot and air traffic
services (ATS) reports indicated that the winds were increasing and changing direction.
However, the knowledge that they would fly in close proximity to a thunderstorm was
not sufficiently compelling to justify discontinuing the approach. It should be noted that
the acceptance of the risk of approaching in close proximity to convective weather was
not limited to the accident aircraft. Other aircraft had landed nine, six, and four minutes
before the arrival of Air France Flight 358 (AFR358), and there was at least one
additional aircraft on approach behind AFR358 at the time of the accident. Clearly, the
danger was not perceived to be ominous enough for those other crews either.
Therefore, there is a need for clear standards for
during approach and landing. This will reduce
making in the face of a rapidly changing weather
factors such as operational pressures, stress, or
decision to conduct an approach.
the avoidance of convective weather
the ambiguity involved in decision
phenomenon, and the likelihood that
fatigue will adversely affect a crew’s
Therefore, the Board recommends that:
The Department of Transport establish clear standards limiting approaches and
landings in convective weather for all air transport operators at Canadian
airports.
Therefore, the Board recommends that:
France’s Direction Générale de l’Aviation Civile and other civil aviation
authorities establish clear standards limiting approaches and landings in
convective weather.
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Pilot Decision Making
In accordance with standard investigation practice, the accident pilots’ decision-making
processes, as well as the actions of other pilots involved in similar accidents, were
analysed. However, the temptation to judge the quality of a pilot’s decisions by the
outcome must be guarded against. Fairness to the individual and the advancement of
transportation safety require that the actions of the pilots be understood within the
context in which they were operating at the time, if we are to reduce the risk of
recurrence.
Based on cues perceived or understood, cockpit decisions can be described as having
two components: situation assessment and selection of a course of action. Cues, or
information about the situation, can vary between clear and ambiguous. Clear cues
allow for an easy decision-making process. Ambiguous cues are much more difficult to
capture, understand, and assimilate. Therefore, the more ambiguous or complex a cue
is, the greater the likelihood of a decision that is less than ideal.
The decision-making process in this occurrence required that the crew assess the
situation and choose between continuing to the airport under severe atmospheric
conditions or proceeding to the alternate. The second course of action would have
entailed some inconvenience for the passengers. Therefore, either solution was less
than ideal. However, the mounting cues available to them as they arrived on short final
were not compelling enough to change their decision to continue with the landing.
Once individuals select a particular course of action, it takes very compelling cues to
alert them to the advisability of changing their plan. Having made their decision to land,
the crew members used all their energy to concentrate on this task and missed cues
that should have warranted a review of that decision. The cues included the following:
the runway looked like a lake; the aircraft deviated above the glide path; the landing
was going to be farther down the runway than usual; the wind speed was reportedly
increasing and the wind direction was changing; braking action was reported as poor;
and the visibility became close to nil near the threshold.
Much has been written on the issue of pilot decision-making processes regarding
landing. Nevertheless, this occurrence and others give a clear indication that there are
still risks associated with this task. The Board believes that the ability to capture and
interpret cues that are essential in the decision-to-land process is inadequate,
especially when the cues are ambiguous or not immediately compelling. Consequently,
pilots will continue to land in deteriorating weather once the landing decision has been
made, in spite of cues that indicate that a go-around or balked approach should be
executed.
Therefore, the Board recommends that:
The Department of Transport mandate training for all pilots involved in Canadian
air transport operations to better enable them to make landing decisions in
deteriorating weather.
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The Board also recommends that:
France.s Direction Générale de l’Aviation Civile and other civil aviation
authorities mandate training for air transport pilots to better enable them to make
landing decisions in deteriorating weather.
Landing Distance Considerations
The crew was not aware of the landing distance required to land safely on a
contaminated runway. This was due in part to some ambiguities in the landing distance
information provided to the crew and an absence of direction by Air France regarding
the need for crews to determine landing distances required.
When the aircraft was on departure from Paris, the Air France Octave system provided
the crew with a maximum permissible landing weight value for the aircraft’s arrival at
Toronto. This weight was 190 000 kg, which was the maximum allowable weight based
on structural considerations. It appears that this was the only landing performance
calculation carried out during the operation of AFR358.
In the latter portions of the approach, the crew actions indicate a concern regarding
landing distance when faced with landing on Runway 24L. From the investigation, it is
clear that the pilots were aware of the landing distance available for Runway 24L.
There is no indication that they had calculated the landing distances required for the
arrival, nor are there any direct and specific Air France procedures that would require
such calculations by the crew.
A review of the landing performance charts available to the crew revealed some
potential problems. For example, the application of some of the corrections such as the
use of thrust reversers and other variables were not necessarily intuitive and were
sometimes applied incorrectly.
This accident clearly shows the need for pilots to know the landing distance required by
their aircraft for the conditions to be encountered at the expected time of landing, and
to compare this figure to the length of the runway assigned for the landing. It is
essential that both figures be known to enable crews to calculate the margin of error
available so that they are better prepared to make the correct decision when they
encounter deteriorating conditions. In this occurrence, the crew members realized at
some time during the landing sequence that the landing was going to be long. Had they
known that the margin for error was slim, or indeed non-existent, the crew would likely
have executed a go-around.
On 08 December 2005, a Boeing 737 aircraft slid off the departure end of Runway 31C
while landing in snowy conditions at the Chicago Midway International Airport, Illinois,
United States. Reports indicated that, on arrival at Chicago, there was poor braking
action and there was a tailwind component of greater than 5 knots. At the time of the
accident, arrival landing distance assessments were not required by regulations. As a
result of this accident and investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board
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(NTSB), on 04 October 2007, recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA):
Immediately require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart
K operators to conduct arrival landing distance assessments before every landing
based on existing performance data, actual conditions, and incorporating a minimum
safety margin of 15 percent (A-07-57) Urgent.
From the Air France MANEX performance information, the predicted landing distance
needed for the landing in Toronto on a contaminated runway with zero wind and no
thrust reverser was 8780 feet. For Runway 24L, the extra margin was only 220 feet.
This very small landing distance margin was eaten up by the long flare during the
landing. With a tailwind, there was negative margin, which would mean an overrun.
The pilots were not aware that the MANEX. predicted landing distance when landing
with a tailwind exceeded the length of Runway 24L.
In the absence of knowledge of the required landing distance under varying
performance conditions, crews will not be aware of rapidly developing overrun
situations. Because of this, there is a high potential that crews will make inadequate
go/no-go decisions, thereby increasing the risk of damage to persons, property, and
the environment.
Therefore, the Board recommends that:
The Department of Transport and other civil aviation authorities require crews to
establish the margin of error between landing distance available and landing
distance required before conducting an approach into deteriorating weather.
4.1.1.3.3.2 Runway Incursions/Excursions Considerations
The following analysis presents some conclusion of a summary/analysis of the August
27, 2006 Comair Flight 5191 accident in Lexington (KLEX), Kentucky, by ALICIA EEAG
member Christoph Vernaleken. This analysis highlights causes and recommendations
for runway incursions and excursions cases.
Probable Cause
The official NTSB investigation, which consumed approximately 13,000 hours,
encountered difficulties in determining the probable cause of the accident because of
the human performance issues involved.
Eventually, the Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the accident was
the flight crew’s failure to use available cues and aids to identify the airplane’s location
on the airport surface during taxi and their failure to cross-check and verify that the
airplane was on the correct runway before take-off.
Since it was, according to the Safety Board, likely that the 40 seconds of non-pertinent
conversation led to “a loss of positional awareness” [sic], the flight crew’s non-pertinent
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conversation and the Federal Aviation Administration’s failure to require that all runway
crossings be authorized by specific ATC clearances were given as the two factors
contributing to the accident. Safety Board Member Hersman, who led the investigation,
filed a concurring statement on the investigation report, but criticised the narrow focus
of the findings on crew performance.
The NTSB also concluded that the implementation of cockpit moving map displays or
cockpit runway alerting systems on air carrier aircraft “would enhance flight safety by
providing pilots with additional awareness about the runway and taxiway environment.”
Consequently, one of the safety recommendations made by the NTSB to the FAA was
that air carrier aircraft should be fitted with cockpit moving map displays or an
automatic system alerting pilots “when take-off is attempted on a taxiway or a runway
other than the one intended.” In addition, the board recommended enhanced taxiway
centreline markings near holding positions and procedural changes, most notably a
crew procedure for positive confirmation and cross-checking an airplane’s location at
the assigned departure runway. On the ATC side, the board recommended prohibiting
performing administrative duties for controllers while aircraft are moving in their area of
responsibility, and issuing take-off clearances to taxiing aircraft before the aircraft has
crossed all intersecting runways.
Flight Deck Instrumentation Aspects & Conclusion
In this accident, at first glance human error seems so egregious that it appears to offer
an easy explanation of the events. For a meaningful conclusion with respect to flight
deck instrumentation, however, it is essential to understand why the perceptions and
decisions of the flight crew appeared to make sense at the time (local rationality), and
what prevented the flight crew from maintaining adequate situational awareness.
Therefore, based on the investigation results, the analysis section has attempted to
reveal the complexity of the situation and the potentially conflicting information that
eventually mislead the Comair flight crew into believing they were on the correct
runway.
Doubtlessly, non-pertinent conversation is a distraction and may thus be detrimental to
maintaining adequate situational awareness. However, there are no indications that
pilots were completely absorbed by this conversation, which occurred on a virtually
straight segment of taxiway A while passing the intersection with the taxiway signed as
A-6, and the NTSB does not provide any detailed explanation on how the non-pertinent
conversation contributed to disorientation, or why this should be given any more weight
than the apparent airport charting and NOTAM deficiencies. Of course, a potential
scenario is that the non-pertinent discussion initiated by the first officer disturbed the
captain in resolving the apparent conflict resulting from the fact that this taxiway was
not documented on their charts, and thus fostered disorientation. But even then,
inaccurate airport charting information would still be at the root of disorientation.
In summary, there is no conclusive factual evidence to what extent the non-pertinent
conversation was a factor leading to the erroneous line-up on RWY 26, and it is
therefore not fully satisfactory as main explanation for the disorientation. Besides, the
fact that other flight crews experienced confusion at Lexington as well may serve as an
indication that this accident is less related to individual flight crew performance, but
more to systemic issues such as inaccurate airport charting and inadequate NOTAM
information.
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Another concern with respect to non-pertinent conversation as a key factor leading to
disorientation is that maintaining a cockpit environment completely free of distractions
or parallel tasks is virtually impossible. Surprisingly, performing checklist activities,
which kept the first officer head-down for most of the taxiing, is not even mentioned in
the findings of the NTSB investigation. Besides, there are several further valid
operational reasons, such as cabin readiness, slot discussions with ATC, weather
concerns or technical problems that might equally divert a flight crew’s attention during
taxiing. In fact, distraction by weather-related considerations has also been identified
as a potential reason for the disorientation in the Taipei accident. Therefore, the
Lexington accident once more documents the vulnerability of an adequate level of
situational awareness towards degradation in an airport environment under less than
optimum circumstances.
Consequently, the main systemic issue is not the occurrence of distraction or
disorientation, but the inadequacy of current flight deck instrumentation and procedures
to reliably detect, manage and resolve surface navigation errors, irrespective of their
cause, i.e. independent of whether they result from e.g. low visibility, operational
distractions, non-pertinent conversation or erroneous aeronautical information. In
conclusion, the underlying cause of the Lexington accident was not that distraction and
disorientation occurred, but that this problem was not detected and corrected.
From a flight deck instrumentation perspective, it is unlikely that the flight crew of
Comair Flight 5191 would have opted for take-off in the presence of a device providing
them with continuously updated information on their current position on the airport,
such as an airport moving map as recommended by the NTSB. Even if the flight crew
had not paid any attention to this device, the accident could still have been prevented if
the crew had been made aware of the fact that they were lined up and attempting takeoff on the wrong runway by an alerting system of some kind.
An aspect not explicitly addressed by the NTSB recommendations is that an airport
moving map display would have shown airport information based on largely the same
sources of information as the conventional charts. Consequently, an airport moving
map would not automatically have addressed the charting discrepancies or missing
NOTAM information, which the author believes played a significant role in the
disorientation causing this accident.
However, for the purpose of Runway Incursion avoidance, an airport moving map is
believed to be more robust against taxiway charting discrepancies than paper charts,
provided that it offers sufficient positional integrity and as long as the runway
information presented is correct. Provided that the flight crew can trust the presented
ownship position, this will probably enable pilots to detect the perceived
inconsistencies as charting discrepancies, rather than attempting to fit the inconsistent
information somehow in the perception of their position.
It is not the purpose of ALICIA to focus exclusively on safety issues. However, it is very
important that all ALICIA contributions consider the safety aspects, and that is why
reduction of weather-related delays objective considers also safety enhancements. The
description here above highlights safety issues in current contexts and operations but
shall be considered for future contexts and operations as focus points in order to
assess the safety impact of introduction of new applications. As a result, here below
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are listed some commercial aircraft operational capabilities that shall support the
achievement of ALICIA’s objective to deliver improved punctuality while simultaneously
enhancing safety:
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall be able to provide energy decrease rate
guidance throughout the approach to ensure stabilization at the required
altitude, alternatively predict and alert the crew as early as possible if the
stabilization criteria cannot be met.
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall be able to support and improve flight crew
situation awareness of approach and landing hazards (e.g. low visibility, visual
illusions, energy management on contaminated runway, terrain, obstacles,
wake vortices, microburst, etc.)
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall support flight crew recognition of take-off
rejection issues.
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall support take-off performance proper
calculation and application.
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall support flight crew recognition of the need for
and the execution of a go around (energy advisory should be considered).
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall support flight crew awareness of actual
runway conditions (in particular friction) through accurate, useful and timely
information.
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall support flight crew awareness and decision
making on combinations of approach and landing risk factors.
Considering outputs from safety reports analysis, the following operational capabilities
may be explored in the frame of ALICIA:
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall provide flight crew with appropriate cues to
better enable them to make landing / go-around decisions especially in
deteriorating weather.
•
Fixed wing transport aircraft shall support flight crew to establish the margin
between landing distance available and landing distance required before
conducting an approach into deteriorating weather. It shall provide the
necessary alerting during the approach and landing to “recommend” the crew to
seriously consider a go-around.
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4.1.2 Mission profiles
In order to be able to define the (large) transport aircraft future mission profiles, the
existing airline business models can be considered:
•
Network airlines: These are mainly former flag airlines that maintain hub and
spoke networks, consolidating traffic at key hub airports. The Hub and Spoke
system allows the airlines to maximize aircraft capacity on each flight by
offering connections to both regional and international destinations. This more
complicated route system provides customers with a much larger number of
route options, which in turn maximizes revenue opportunities. The downside to
this is the increase in aircraft wait time and lower aircraft utilization time, which
increases the airlines' unit cost.
•
Charter airlines: Traditionally these airlines have carried passengers at low unit
costs, targeting holiday travellers. Most European charter airlines now form part
of vertically integrated organisations incorporating a tour operator, travel agency
chain, airline and, often hotels and providers of ground transportation.
•
Low cost airlines: This business model has evolved in different directions, some
airlines keeping to a more solid model involving low frequency services to
secondary airport, others adapting to the higher-yielding business market
serving higher frequencies.
•
Regional airlines: These airlines (often associated commercially to former flag
carriers operating the major hubs) tend to operate shorter sectors both point to
point and feeding network airline hubs, usually with aircraft of less than 100
seats.
Mission profiles for (large) transport aircraft will not dramatically evolve in the future,
and the above description of the different business models shall still be considered for
the years to come.
Based on the classical business aviation mission profiles defined in the Current
Operational Requirements D1.1-1 deliverable, different foreseen improvements are
listed for each of those.
•
•
Shuttle flight between a large airport and a small airport
o
Daily operation on a CAT II or III equipped airport with regular degraded
weather conditions will be possible until at least CAT II equivalent condition
with limited specific crew training and the costly specific airborne equipment
required for CAT II / III operations. Initial and recurrent crew training costs
are very high for a small business aircraft operator.
o
Daily operation on a small airport with basic lighting system and without ILS
will become possible until at least CAT II equivalent condition. Similarly,
ground operation and take off in low visibility condition will be enabled.
Taxi flight to any destination
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•
o
The occurrence of a diversion from the destination airport will diminish,
increasing the customer satisfaction.
o
For intercontinental flight with an intermediate stop, the choice of the
stopover airport will be larger, and the duration of the whole trip will be
optimized.
EMS evacuation
o
•
Emergency Medical Services [EMS] evacuation will be possible with more
degraded weather conditions on departure and arrival airport. Access to
airport in uncontrolled airspace (for instance in the Third World) will be
safer.
Maritime Patrol and Search and Rescue
o
New airborne awareness systems and a better cockpit integration delivered
by ALICIA will improve safety for maritime patrol and search and rescue
[SAR] missions in general and in case of degraded weather conditions
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4.1.3 Operational environment
The operational environment for commercial aircraft will likely be modified in the
coming years in terms of airport facilities and related services (refer to SESAR ATM
concept description). Nevertheless, it is obvious that natural environment will not
evolve (geographical features or weather phenomena will still exist…or even be worse)
and some parts of the world will not follow the same evolution rhythm as European or
North American and other western countries. The changes in operational environments
for the coming years will depend on those areas where particular future ATM contexts,
related new airport and ATC facilities services will be implemented.
Figure 16 – Initial climb-out (Copyright-free picture)
4.1.3.1 Airport environment
4.1.3.1.1 ATC Services around airports
As stated here above, commercial aircraft will be confronted on one hand to airport
environment that will be equivalent to nowadays (especially for some part of the world
e.g. third world), and on the other hand to a very different airport environment,
matching with the future ATM contexts implemented (and currently defined within the
European SESAR and US NextGen programs). One challenge for the future will be to
allow safe and efficient operations within airspaces and environments, including
airports, with heterogeneous practices, personel training and levels of equipments.
The following lists the ATC services around airports which shall be considered to
describe the future operational environment for air transport aircraft:
•
Primary and/or secondary surveillance radar (some parts of the world still miss
completely the use of radar). Radar vectoring practices vary a lot depending on
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continents or even countries but are one of the main enabler for all conditions
operations around airports,
•
Air traffic control procedures. ACO require special procedure (Low visibility
procedure LVP) for the ATC and all services on airport (e.g. maintenance,
security). In particular, LVP establishes protection of the ILS sensitive area by
control of ground movements and adequate separation between 2 aircraft on
approach or one aircraft on approach and another on take-off, leading to the
runway capacity reduction. Another important factor leading to capacity
reduction at an airport under LVP is that there is no guarantee that crews will be
able to see and avoid other traffic during ground operations. Future all
conditions operations will require amendment of existing or definition of new low
visibility procedures.
•
ATC radio management: Future ATC services will still be based, even if not
completely, on radio management (voice link). Hence environment with
frequency congestion or controller overload caused by high density traffic or by
a single controller operating tower and ground frequencies are likely to be
observed. A critical scenario will be communication with mixed equipage when,
at least, those operating with voice communication will be left out of the
communication loop from other aircraft (party line).
•
Terminal area CPDLC: Controller to Pilot Data communications will be deployed
in the terminal areas. The objective is to provide routine and strategic
information to the pilot and automating certain routine tasks for both the pilot
and controller:
o
A decreased number of voice communications would reduce radio
frequency congestion and eliminate verbal miscommunication – safety
improvement that will reduce operational errors.
o
Providing changes to radio frequencies and other information, such as local
barometric pressure and required weather advisories, by data
communications link could reduce errors, particularly if (parts of) this
information stream is also “machine readable” for fault free entry into
appropriate avionics systems.
These future CPDLC applications within terminal areas are expected to increase in
frequency, so in the end careful processing of this information stream will have to be
properly integrated in all the other tasks of the flight crew. The attention of the crew will
be required to properly fly thereafter to properly navigate and finally to properly
communicate (n pilots terms: Aviate, Navigate, Communicate). It is clear that
developing a suitable policy to handle the different tasks at their proper priority
constitutes an important flight deck design integration task. CPDLC cockpit functions
will need a very good integration with the user applications (building of 4D trajectories,
ASAS implementation, implementation of short term targets …) to be acceptable in
terms of workload. Back up / fall back / abnormal and emergency situations will also
have to be considered.
4.1.3.1.2 Airport Information Services
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The airport Information services that are currently involved in ACO management and
that shall be considered also for the future are:
•
Weather information services: weather services are and will remain available
through preflight planning sources and Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) in which
preflight planning information can be loaded before flight. Further information is
derived from in-situ weather observations and data from aircraft weather sensor
systems (i.e., airborne weather radar, winds and temperatures, turbulence, etc),
from other aircraft and VOLMET and hopefully machine readable ATIS
transmissions. Some States make weather information available through
access to the Internet facilitating the review and download of preflight planning
information (approved government and commercial services) by pilots.
•
Aeronautical Information: the future AIS will be based on centralised reference
databases of digital aeronautical information with fully integrated access (an
example is the European AIS Database EAD). Electronic based AIS with
machine readable information to be used by future avionics systems for optional
presentation at flight displays in a natural way will help all actors in the data
chain reference the same data in the same format, promoting accurate and fast
exchange. The users will have direct access to worldwide NOTAM, SNOWTAM,
ASHTAM, AIP or even charts for briefing purposes through electronic Pre-flight
Information Bulletins (e-PIB),
•
AIS/MET datalink: The main objective of AIS and MET data-link service is to
provide the necessary information on board and in all flight phases for pilot
decision support. This will thus contribute to collaborative decision making
between ground services, flight crews, ATC and, as appropriate, airline
operations in all flight environments. Change notifications and timely warnings
and alerts of threats (e.g. weather hazards) to the safe and efficient conduct of
flight will be enabled by these services. The ultimate goal is to provide access
to on-line, real-time, quality NOTAM like information for optional presentation at
flight displays in a natural way and weather services to any aviation user, any
time, anywhere.
4.1.3.1.3 Airport visual and instrument landing aids
Airport visual and non-visual landing aids are a major part of the operational
environment an air transport aircraft is confronted with. Obviously, these airport
facilities will be part of the global ATM evolution but as it is said above, the coming
years will show an increasing variability in terms of equipments encountered
throughout the world. Based on Eurocontrol navaids infrastructure roadmap, the
following syntheses the landing aids configuration that are likely to be encountered by
transport aircraft (focus on ECAC area):
2009-2015
•
Runways equipped with ILS ground equipment supporting CAT I/II/III
approaches will remain numerous. Some airport with modified ILS to overcome
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multipath problems will be available to maintain Cat II/III capability at some
runway ends.
•
Some runways may be equipped with MLS CAT III as an alternative or
replacement to ILS.
•
Runways equipped with Cat I GLS (GBAS/GPS, including appropriate lightning
system) will become available.
•
Airport providing a limited availability of Cat II/III GLS capability (using a
GPS/GBAS capability augmented by on-board systems) at runways with Cat
II/III lighting may become available.
•
Runways equipped with navaids supporting conventional NPAs will remain.
•
Runways allowing approaches with Vertical Guidance (APV) either based on
SBAS or Baro-VNAV will become available.
2015-2020
•
Airport equipped with ILS ground equipment supporting CAT I/II/III approaches
will remain numerous. Some airport with modified ILS to overcome multipath
problems will be available to maintain Cat II/III capability at some runway ends.
•
MLS and Cat I GLS will continue to be introduced where required.
•
Runways equipped with Cat II/III GLS (GBAS/Multi-constellation Dual
Frequency) will be available.
•
Forecast for this period is that no airport with conventional NPA procedures will
remain (including decommissioning of associated NAVAIDs), considering that
approach capability will be supported by RNP APCH/LPV or RNP AR APCH.
BEYOND 2020
•
Number of airport equipped with ILS ground equipment supporting CAT I/II/III
approaches will remain significant. Some airport with modified ILS to overcome
multipath problems will be available to maintain Cat II/III capability at some
runway ends.
•
MLS and Cat I GLS will continue to be introduced where required.
•
Runways equipped with Cat II/III GLS (GBAS/Multi-constellation Dual
Frequency) will increase. This is expected to be accompanied by the
decommissioning of ILS CAT I systems. ILS Cat II/III will be retained to provide
backup to GLS in case of availability issues (deliberate jamming and solar
activity).
4.1.3.1.4 Runway characteristics and conditions
Airport environment includes the taxiways and runways characteristics and conditions.
SESAR concept defines some objectives regarding the future of such facilities: runway
exit design to minimize occupancy time and redesign of runways and taxiways to avoid
runway crossing. In the frame of ALICIA project, these future characteristics should be
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considered. Nevertheless, the present characteristics or conditions directly related to
all conditions operations will still be a reality.
Runway conditions that may affect the all conditions operations are:
•
Contamination with standing water, slush, snow or ice;
•
Heavy rubber deposit in touchdown zone affecting wheel spin-up as well as
braking at the low speed end;
•
Insufficient water drainage or runway surface condition leaving water puddles
after rain;
•
Undulated surface in any area that requires heavy wheel braking (e.g.
touchdown zone).
Taxiways characteristics and conditions that may affect the all conditions operations
are:
•
High-speed-exit taxiways;
•
Absence of parallel taxiway, thus requiring back track on the active runway;
4.1.3.1.5 Bird Hazard
Airport environment may also be characterized by frequent and/or massive bird flocks
converging and creating a hazard to aircraft taking off and landing.
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4.1.3.2 Geographical environment
By its global nature, an air transport aircraft may be confronted to any type of
geographical environment (e.g. A319 operated by the Australian Antarctica Division,
picture here below) and this will remain true for the future.
Figure 17 – A319 on Wilkins apron © Australian Antarctic Division 2008
4.1.3.2.1 Surrounding Terrain
All conditions operations in a complex terrain environment are generally more
demanding for all the actors of air transport. The main aspects of surrounding terrain
environment that shall be considered are:
•
High surrounding terrain,
•
High elevation airport,
•
Topographical features requiring unusual procedures to retain safety level,
•
Terrain features resulting in GPWS activation during approach,
•
Trees or man-made obstacles (antennas…),
•
Published SID can not be followed after failure of an engine. The flight path to
be followed in such a case is dependent on an analysis of a particular airline
performance department and may even vary within an airline from type to type.
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4.1.3.3 Atmospheric environment
4.1.3.3.1 Visibility conditions
Commercial aircraft will sometimes be confronted with any type of visibility conditions
as low visibility due to any atmospheric phenomenon (rain, fog, mist, haze, smoke…).
4.1.3.3.2 Visual Illusions
Visual illusions take place when conditions modify the pilot’s perception of the
environment relative to his/her expectations. Visual illusions may result in landing
short, hard landing or runway overrun, but may also result in spatial disorientation and
loss of control. The following key points need to be emphasized:
•
Awareness of weather factors;
•
Awareness of surrounding terrain and obstacles;
•
Awareness and assessment of approach hazards (i.e., conditions that may
cause visual illusions, such as “black hole”);
•
Adherence to defined PF/PNF task sharing for acquisition of visual references
and for flying the visual segment, this includes:
•
monitoring by PF of outside visual cues while transiently referring to instruments
to support and monitor the flight path during the visual segment; and,
•
monitoring by PNF of head-down cues for effective cross-check and backup
(e.g., for calling any excessive-parameter-deviation).
4.1.3.3.3 Wind conditions
Wind conditions may affect deeply aircraft operations, whatever the flight phase. Main
wind characteristics that shall be considered are:
•
Shifting or gusty wind, crosswind or tail wind;
•
Severe wind shear on final approach of specific runway under adverse weather
and / or wind conditions.
•
Crew procedures in strong and or gusty wind conditions require the use of extra
speed during approach. Certain current windshear escape systems will result in
higher approach speeds with particular windshear phenomena. Under specific
conditions this may result in long landings sometimes even resulting in runway
excursions.
4.1.3.3.4 Low temperature operation
Outside air temperature is a major element defining the atmospheric environment. In
particular, it usually exists an OAT threshold below which, a temperature correction on
published altitudes is required.
Anti-icing and De-icing:
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Anti-icing is a precautionary procedure, which provides protection against the formation
of frost or ice and the accumulation of snow on treated surfaces of the aircraft, for a
limited period of time (holdover time).
De-icing is a procedure by which frost, ice, slush or snow is removed from the aircraft
in order to provide clean surfaces. This may be accomplished by mechanical methods,
pneumatic methods, or the use of heated fluids.
When aircraft surfaces are contaminated by frozen moisture, they must be de-iced
prior to dispatch. When freezing precipitation exists and there is a risk of precipitation
adhering to the surface at the time of dispatch, aircraft surfaces must be anti-iced. If
both anti-icing and de-icing are required, the procedure may be performed in one or
two steps. The selection of a one or two step process depends upon weather
conditions, available equipment, available fluids and the holdover time required to be
achieved. Note that under certain conditions operations have to be stopped completely
if maximum attainable holdover times are not enough to guarantee a ice–free and safe
takeoff and departure.
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4.1.4 Stakeholders / Actors
Changes in roles for ANSP personnel and flight operators are expected for the future
ATM environment. New tasks will be performed by automation to support the decision
making process and the shift in focus from tactical separation between individual
aircraft to the strategic management of traffic flows in high-density airspace. (e.g. the
4D track management ATM using TBO (Time-Based Operation) for flow planning). This
will be based on accurate aircraft information used and distributed, Information transfer
(ADS-B) all using future adapted regulations10.
This new high level of automation is required to achieve the levels of safety and
performance expected. However, the humans shall at all times remain the managers of
the automation. This means that the humans will choose what is to be done, delegate
the execution of the task(s) to the automation and be able to intervene if required.
Strategic decision making will be more distributed among ANSP personnel, flight
crews, and flight planners, with significant increases in information exchange.
Flight crew will have the main role in many of the tactical flight management tasks. In
addition, the flight crew will take on a more strategic flight management role, building
on aircraft automation.
Table 3 – SESAR vision of future airspace users role
10
It must be expected that much higher requirements will be put on all actors to follow – and not deviate –
from a defined time line in order to meet “contractual” slot times.
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4.2 Concepts of Operations
(e.g. operational functions to be performed to execute the mission, activities expected to be
conducted in a typical mission, etc..)
Purpose of this chapter is to describe at an operational level what would be an air
transport aircraft mission profile in the future operational context considered by the
ALICIA project. The following description is widely inspired by SESAR and NextGen
programs targeted operational concepts.
4.2.1 Flight preparation
Operators will access all related information on the current status of the airspace
system through a single source (information that can affect the intended trajectory
including trajectories to alternate airport(s) as well as likely en route emergency
alternates. None-related airspace information should be filtered out.). This information
will include airspace blocked (e.g. military, space or security operations), other
airspace limitations, such as those due to current or forecast weather or congestion. It
also will show the status of facilities, such as closed runways, blocked taxiways, and
out-of service navigational aids. This will allow users to begin the planning process with
a full picture of potential limitations on their flights from ground operations to the
intended flight path trajectory. For scheduled air carrier operations this task is and will
be performed by the airline’s AOC or by a local handling agent on behalf of the airline’s
AOC. When the flight crew reports for the subsequent flight they are offered the results
of this preparation work. After reviewing the result the commander will sign to indicate
that she / he is accepting the planning for this flight.
A new risk based intelligent flight plan might be advanced to provide Pilots with all
relevant task information – facilitating information sharing across all
stakeholders/agents involved in the flight operation and exploiting the outputs of an
airline’s safety/risk analysis programme. In addition to the above, the new flight plan
might provide flight specific risk assessment information to Pilots, to support crew
teamwork, situation assessment/threat and error management, and workload
management. This risk assessment might be based on an evaluation of different sets
of analysis data, each pertaining to the flight situation. That is, it might be based on an
overall integration of intelligence data across the different stakeholders involved. For
example, this might include data related to:
1) the existing flight situation/context (e.g. dynamic, to include the latest airline real
time operational and safety reports)
2) what is known from airline safety/risk management analysis reports (e.g.
retrospective risk analysis)
3) what is known from airline operational analysis reports (e.g. Flight Operations
trending reports)
4) what is known from ATC analysis reports
5) what is known from airport operator analysis reports
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4.2.2 Departure
4.2.2.1 Cockpit preparation
Before flight time the reference trajectory is published and accessed by the aircraft as a
data message to pilots. The aircraft becomes the prime source of the trajectory.
As the flight progresses towards take-off, the trajectory may be updated to account for
various constraining factors which can only be known at or shortly before the time of
operation (e.g. Weather situation in the takeoff and departure area, taxi route,
departure runway and departure route).
When the predicted take-off time is known with sufficient accuracy, the first airborne
segment of the reference trajectory will be cleared.
4.2.2.2 Take-off and climb out
Multiple departure paths from each runway will be available. This will allow each
departing aircraft to be placed on its own, separate path, keeping the aircraft safely
separated from other aircraft and wake vortices. These multiple paths also will be an
important aid to circumnavigating thunderstorms and other severe weather in the
airport vicinity.
These precise departures can also be designed to support airports that are now limited
by terrain and other obstacles or during periods of reduced visibility. Precise paths will
reduce flight time, fuel burn and emissions. They may also decrease the impact of
aircraft noise to surrounding communities.
4.2.3 Enroute Climb, Cruise and Initial Enroute Descent
During flight, requirements to change the reference trajectory may come from ground
or air; reasons include in particular weather and certain abnormal or emergency
conditions, but also separation provision, sequencing, new airspace user business
needs, changing arrival constraints (arrival times, arrival runways and applicable arrival
routes and procedures) or the inability to comply with the conditions of a constraint on
the reference trajectory (e.g. CTA).
The reference trajectory will be progressively updated and shared and successive
segments will be cleared: the controller will send the pilot via data link the clearance
update for a particular segment of the RBT which may include a proposed change of
the RBT. When pilot and controller have agreed on the change, the change will be
loaded into both the ground and aircraft systems.
Improvements also will extend to oceanic operations as the system assures that each
aircraft will enter oceanic airspace on its most optimal trajectory. Airspace entry will be
specified by entry time, flight path and assigned altitude. As weather and wind
conditions change above the ocean, both individual reroutes and changes to the entire
route structure will be managed via a data communications link.
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4.2.4 Approach
Information such as
exchanged with the
path. The final flight
there is an efficient
airspace operation.
proposed arrival time, sequencing and route assignments will be
aircraft via a data communications link to negotiate a final flight
path will ensure that the flight has no potential conflicts, and that
arrival to the airport, while maintaining overall efficiency of the
Where feasible, equipped aircraft will be able to fly precise vertical and horizontal
paths, called optimized profile descents, from cruise down to the runway, saving time
and fuel while reducing noise. Airports and their surrounding communities will benefit
from these reduced environmental impacts.
4.2.5 Landing and taxi in
Before the flight lands, both the preferred runway exit to be used for leaving the runway
and the taxi path to the assigned parking will be available to the flight crew via a data
communications link.
Additionally, appropriate surface and gate area vehicle movements will be shared
between air traffic control, flight operation/dispatch offices, and the airport authority.
This information will let operators in ramp areas know the projected gate arrival times
for inbound flights.
Additional considerations
The following factors that may contribute to approach-and-landing accidents shall be
considered for the definition of mission profiles and scenarios:
•
Flight crew fatigue;
•
Type of approach;
•
Approach charts;
•
Airport information services;
•
Airport air traffic control services;
•
Airport equipment;
•
Terrain and man-made obstacles;
o
Aircraft position;
o
Aircraft altitude;
o
Applicable minimum safe altitude (MSA);
o
Terrain location and features; and,
•
Visual illusions;
•
Visibility;
•
Wind conditions;
•
Runway condition;
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•
Runway and taxiways markings;
•
Low temperature operation;
•
Bird-strike hazards.
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5 ROTARY WING FUTURE SCENARIOS
5.1 Mission Requirements
5.1.1 Capabilities and Global Objectives
The fundamental roles of the rotorcraft are unlikely to change significantly in the future
compared to the current roles, as rotorcraft will continue to operate in managed and
unmanaged airspace from small/medium (and less commonly large) airports and
perform a variety of roles that require:
•
•
vertical take-off and/or landing capability
o
to/from unprepared sites
o
in constrained areas
o
to/from moving platforms
an extended hovering flight capability
o
near obstacles
o
in degraded visual environments (DVE)
•
low airspeed performance and/or handling
•
loading operations without landing
o
under-slung load operations
o
winching operations
However the impact of the expected changes within the future ATM environment
coupled with the aspirations for the extension of rotorcraft operations into degraded
visual environments means that some major changes must be expected in the way that
rotorcraft perform their missions.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and discuss the rotorcraft specific
operational objectives, with expected capabilities that are being, or will have to be,
introduced in the future. As the ALICIA project focuses on all condition operations
(ACO), particular attention has been given to degraded visual environment (DVE)
related issues and future concepts.
Two European projects mentioned in the introductory chapters of this document are
expected to have a significant impact on the operations of all aircraft, including
rotorcraft, in the future. These are the SESAR project and the OPTIMAL project. Thus
the discussion of rotorcraft operational capabilities and objectives will begin with a
discussion of the impact of these projects, before entering into a broader discussion of
the more general issues and objectives of future rotorcraft.
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Review of OPTIMAL, a rotorcraft perspective11
OPTIMAL is a large scale European research project with a goal to define and validate
innovative procedures for aircraft and rotorcraft approach and landing phases. The new
procedures, if implemented, should help minimise the environmental impact caused by
air traffic and increase ATM capacity whilst maintaining and improving safety.
Rotorcraft tend to operate from small airports / airfields with minimal ATC services and
are generally required to utilise the same approaches (i.e. PA and NPA) as fixed-wing
aircraft at all airports. This can cause disruption at busy airports due to the slow speeds
associated with rotorcraft.
OPTIMAL identified a clear need to migrate from the current NPA procedures to
procedures with vertical guidance (both APV and PA) for approach and landing.
Conventional (navigation beacon based) procedures are constrained by the location of
ground beacons, however enhanced navigation technologies such as GNSS could help
to remove these constraints.
The impact of OPTIMAL on rotorcraft operations is likely to be felt only at medium and
large airports, where the need to optimise throughput is likely to be greatest. However
it is possible that some OPTIMAL approaches will be adopted at smaller airports (with
suitable ATC services) in order to minimise rotor noise pollution and to provide a
greater operational capability.
A study of OPTIMAL suggests that at prepared landing sites (airports):
11
•
Existing Non-Precision Approaches (NPA) will be replaced with Approaches
with Vertical guidance (APVs), where the required level of navigation
performance is based on GNSS with augmentation provided by satellite
systems (SBAS), ground based systems (GBAS) or on-board augmentation
(ABAS).
•
Large airports may mandate curved approaches, which will require an
appropriate level of navigation performance (an RNP of 0.3nm seems likely),
which may be achieved with the same type of system as above (i.e. GNSS +
augmentation). Curved approaches may be required to support Simultaneous
Non-Interfering (SNI) approaches for rotorcraft or may be mandated for all air
traffic at specific airports.
•
Large airports interoperating rotary wing platforms and fixed wing platforms may
utilise Simultaneous Non-Interfering (SNI) approaches to minimise the
disruption caused by rotorcraft (due to slow approach speeds). These
approaches will require that rotorcraft are equipped with suitable navigation
solutions (an RNP of 0.3nm seems likely).
•
Suitably equipped airports (currently CAT I, but OPTIMAL suggests that this
might be extended to NPA) may provide EVS approaches to enable suitably
equipped aircraft a descent below the currently authorised decision heights,
which are higher than those possible through the use of EVS.
See section 3.4 for an overview of OPTIMAL, some parts are also repeated here.
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•
Airports may utilise increased glide slope landings (steep approaches) to
minimise rotorcraft noise pollution. These may be implemented using
conventional ILS, or APV which implies a level of vertical navigation
performance that is not required for the existing NPAs.
It is likely that these requirements will not impact most of the small airports / airfields
that currently operate using VFR procedures (ie have minimal / no ATC services)
without significant regulatory changes which are not considered under the OPTIMAL
programme. However these requirements are likely to be adopted, and hence impact,
all aircraft operating from larger airports (i.e. those with ATC services above basic flight
information services), and elements of these procedures / approaches will be adopted
at various helipads, such as offshore sites (e.g. the North Sea) and hospital helipads,
to improve safety and degraded visual landing capability, such as APV or EVS
approaches.
The primary impact for rotorcraft appears to be that GNSS with the capability to receive
augmentation data (GBAS or SBAS) should be considered for all rotorcraft in the future
to support at least APV, SNI, steep, and potentially curved approaches. However it
should also be noted that OPTIMAL suggests that it may be possible to extend the use
of EVS approaches to NPA, which would potentially have a significant and positive
impact on rotorcraft operations which generally operate from small airports with, at
best, NP approaches. Finally the HEDGE project recommends that for these OPTIMAL
approaches (indeed for all point-in-space approaches) an FMS and auto-pilot are used
to minimise error on the final approach to the MDA/MDH.
Review of SESAR, a rotorcraft perspective
The main goal of SESAR is to provide an implementation roadmap for the concepts
outlined in the ICAO documents: Global Air Navigation Plan for Communications
Navigation Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) Systems (Global Plan,
Doc 9750) and Global ATM Operational Concept (Doc 9854). Thus SESAR is focussed
on the future European Air Traffic Management (ATM) System, and has the following
objectives for 2020:
•
To enable a 3-fold increase in capacity which will also reduce delays, both on
the ground and in the air;
•
To improve the safety performance by a factor of 10;
•
To enable a 10% reduction in the effects flights have on the environment;
•
To provide ATM services at a cost to the airspace users which is at least 50%
less.
SESAR has decomposed these high level objectives to produce a Concept of
Operations which has the following principal features:
•
Trajectory Management that is introducing a new approach to airspace design
and management
•
Collaborative planning continuously reflected in the Network Operations Plan
(NOP)
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•
Integrated Airport operations contributing to capacity gains
•
New separation modes to allow for increased safety, capacity, and efficiency
•
An increased reliance on airborne and ground based automated support tools
•
System Wide Information Management (SWIM) integrating and properly
disseminating all ATM business related data
•
Humans who will be central in the future European ATM system while their role
is evolving to managing and decision-making.
From the above objectives the primary focus of SESAR must be assumed to be on the
operations of commercial aircraft operating in busy, managed airspace as the prime
goals and objectives relate to the improvement of airport throughput and the efficiency
of the ATM system through the introduction of a new ATM regulatory and operational
framework. This new framework is intended to allow aircraft to optimise their flight
trajectories and to reduce delays through the usage of negotiated 4-D aircraft
trajectories. The SESAR concept recommends that all aircraft trajectories are shared to
ensure that situational awareness is maintained, and that data-link is enabled on all
aircraft - which also enables non-voice ATC messaging and access to the SWIM for
weather and traffic information. In addition it requires that the current position of the
aircraft is known both in relation to the 4D trajectory and to enable collision avoidance
should the trajectory not be adhered to.
In the SESAR ATM concept, a collaborative planning process involving operators,
ANSPs and airports leads to the publication of a Reference Business Trajectory (RBT).
When published, the RBT does not represent a clearance but is the goal to be
achieved and which will be progressively authorised, either as a clearance by the
ANSP or as a function of aircraft crew/systems depending on whether the ANSP or the
flight crew is the designated separator ("self" separation using an ASAS application).
The trajectory based operations will be based on the assumption that the aircraft FMS
computed 4D trajectory is down-linked to ANSP after pre-flight. This forms the basis for
the RBT. The RBT will be amended as per requirements from ANSP and uplinked
directly to the FMS. Upon acceptance by the aircrew this becomes the active flight plan
and will be down-linked to concerned ANSPs again as the contracted trajectory.
Modifications to the contract must be negotiated and accepted and in general only
occur for safety reasons. The aircraft as well as the ANSPs shall have means to alert if
the aircraft deviates from the RBT, which is likely to be flown using an auto-pilot where
feasible.
The impact of the future environment for rotorcraft envisaged by SESAR is both
profound and yet potentially minimal, as SESAR is designed solely around managed
airspace and is aimed more at the large, commercial fixed wing aircraft than small and
rotary wing aircraft. Nevertheless any aircraft operating within managed airspace must
conform to the ATM environment that SESAR will mandate.
Finally it should be noted that the equipment fit for SESAR compliance could have a
significant cost impact, particularly for rotorcraft - who potentially gain the least from the
adoption of this technology as it stands.
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Interactions with ATC
Under the SESAR concept managed airspace will be controlled through the use of
reference business trajectories (RBTs), with all aircraft operating within the managed
airspace having submitted, negotiated and agreed an RBT prior to take-off. These
RBTs are flexible, being subject to change and renegotiation when required (such as a
delayed take-off, or on encountering weather that requires a diversion from the original
RBT). They aim to define both the current position, velocity vector, and intent of a given
aircraft and to define a time-linked flight path (essentially 4D) from "gate to gate". The
interaction, modification and negotiation of RBTs will form the backbone of the new
ATM framework under SESAR, with the support of suitable navigation, surveillance
and communications technologies for both the ground based and airborne segments.
However it must be recognised that not all aircraft that are likely to operate in, or
interact with, managed airspace will be suitably equipped to provide an RBT due to the
complexity and cost of the equipment required. Thus small aircraft and rotorcraft that
currently operate under VFR will continue to have a need to interact with managed
airspace, whether it be to cross "flight corridors" or land at a specific airport.
This implies that either such aircraft will be unable to fly, unable to interact with
managed airspace, or that ATC will have to provide a set of services to such aircraft to
enable them to operate safely within the managed airspace environment - presumably
by generating an RBT for them. Even if ATC has generated an RBT for such aircraft,
they must be capable of maintaining that RBT and knowing that they are maintaining it,
and must be capable of informing other airspace users as to their position, velocity
vector and intent. This in turn implies a minimum equipment fit potentially for all aircraft
operating with unmanaged airspace of ADS-B out and GPS/GNSS.
It is for this category of aircraft, with occasional interaction with managed airspace (e.g.
to cross air corridors), that the cost of the mandated equipment will be the critical factor
as it otherwise provides them with least benefit to their operations, as the minimal fit
only provides a benefit in terms of navigation situational awareness.
Operations in managed airspace
As previously noted the impact of SESAR is that all aircraft intending to operate within
managed airspace will be mandated to fit a communication, navigation, surveillance
system of a specified minimum criteria to enable the use / interoperate with RBTs. This
consists of the capability to maintain the RBT and to send/receive information to/from
other airspace users, ATC, and ATC services (including weather and traffic
information) for the duration of the flight in managed airspace (in unmanaged airspace
it is assumed that the current systems and procedures will apply, essentially VFR). It is
perceived that in order to optimise the effectiveness of the RBT, it will need to be
stored in an FMS and potentially flown via an auto-pilot to ensure consistent and
precise control.
The nature of the RBT is that although it is flexible enough that it can be modified, it is
essentially a pre-agreed contract that should be generated days (or weeks) in advance
to ensure that the required capacity planning has been performed. Unfortunately this is
not possible in all cases, especially for rotorcraft performing emergency service roles
which will require a priority RBT to be rapidly negotiated as this is a high tempo
operation where time is of the essence. Similarly such emergency service roles will
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also require weather and traffic data in a timely manner to support the operational
tempo.
Naturally the benefit of the mandated equipment must be such that it outweighs the
cost of purchase and ownership. This is undoubtedly true for large commercial air
transport aircraft, but is less certain for the majority of small aircraft and rotorcraft. For
although the systems may provide a greater level of situational awareness through the
provision of accurate navigation, traffic and weather data, it does not necessarily
enable the aircraft to perform its operational mission unless that mission is fully
covered by an RBT in managed airspace to and from airports with a high level of ATC
service (i.e. landing aids).
Operations in partially managed airspace
Currently there are some many areas that are best described as partially managed
airspace, where ATC cannot directly track aircraft and hence the separation of aircraft
is covered by procedure - air corridors and flight levels. In the future airspace
environment many of these areas will essentially become managed airspace with
separation provided by RBTs and ADS-B. However there will also be areas that are
unlikely to become managed airspace, where the flight operations are currently untracked and comparatively low level (such as offshore rotorcraft flights).
It is perceived that such areas could either be fully managed, or become partially
managed - especially where a tracking service is available (such as the use of multilateration from transponder returns and/or ADS-B data).
If such areas were to be partially managed then the data from the tracking service (i.e.
multilateration or ADS-B data) would need to be provided to ATC. It would then be
directly provided to the aircraft in the area to ensure situational awareness, or ATC
would manage the aircraft separation.
Whereas if such areas were to follow the future managed airspace model, then the
aircraft would need to be equipped to the same level as for any other managed
airspace and the aircraft safety and separation would be managed through RBTs.
Both of these options would mean that all aircraft operating within these areas would
have to have a specific equipment minima to ensure separation assurance (ADS-B out
for example), although the cost of the equipment requirements would be quite different.
Operations in unmanaged airspace
The future of high density, managed airspace is relatively well established and is the
focus of the SESAR programme. However the impact of projects such as SESAR on
low density, unmanaged (i.e. category G) airspace remains unclear as unmanaged
airspace and VFR flights are not covered by the SESAR programme in detail. Although
SESAR suggests that a low end minimum equipment fit for all aircraft might be
required for interoperability purposes.
It is still an expectation that in such operational environments the existing rules of the
air will remain in place, with the traffic operating under VFR. However, as one of the
goals of ALICIA is to investigate the potential for all condition operations it is vital that
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the requirements for operation within low density, unmanaged airspace are adequately
defined for degraded visual environments.
At the current time, there is no specific regulatory framework for such operations
(degraded visual environment operations in unmanaged airspace (i.e. under VFR) are
not permitted) and hence the requirements for operating under such conditions can
only be guessed at. The current thoughts are that operating in such an environment will
require a navigation system to enable accurate navigation and trajectory to be
determined; combined surveillance and data-link systems (i.e. ADS-B) to enable both
the transmission and reception of navigation data (for surveillance purposes);
appropriate stability and instruments to ensure safe, stable flight; suitable systems to
enable an appropriate landing to be performed; and systems to ensure the overall
safety of the aircraft. In addition it is expected that any aircraft operating in such an
environment would need to communicate with ATC in a suitable manner. This would
still mandate that an augmented VFR methodology would be required in DVE
conditions, and hence safety/avoidance would be the responsibility of the pilot.
Naturally it is expected that aircraft lacking such an equipment fit would be unable to
operate within the environment (i.e. DVE, unmanaged).
The challenges of operations in degraded visual conditions in unmanaged airspace are
discussed in greater detail in the ACO section.
Impact of SESAR on Rotorcraft Future Operational Requirements
The overall impact of SESAR on rotorcraft is dependent on the ATM environment in
which they will operate, however it is likely that the following will be mandated.
Small rotorcraft, operating primarily in unmanaged airspace, are likely to require:
•
a navigation solution (ie GPS or GNSS)
•
broadcast surveillance output (ie ADS-B out)
•
voice communications
Larger rotorcraft, operating at least partially within managed airspace (TMAs and
controlled airports), are likely to require:
•
a suitable navigation system providing the capability for at least APV
approaches and enabling, ultimately, 4D trajectories to be carried out
o GNSS with augmentation, probably ABAS or SBAS
•
a data-link capable of supporting weather data, traffic information, navigation
data and routing and ATM messaging
o for example System Wide Information Management
•
reversionary voice communications
•
a flight management system capable of supporting complex interactions and
negotiations between ATM actors
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o to support reference business trajectories (RBTs)
•
an airborne surveillance capability to enable aircraft tracking, traffic awareness
and potentially separation assistance
o ADS-B in/out, and SSR
o TCAS
ACO Operations
The term "All Condition Operations" is best defined, for rotorcraft, as :
the ability to perform taxi, take-off, en-route, hover, approach and landing tasks
within managed and unmanaged airspace in all weather, lighting and
atmospheric conditions and in proximity to the terrain and obstacles without
limitation.
Thus ACO includes the requirements to:
•
Operate within the future managed airspace environment
•
Operate within the future unmanaged airspace environment
•
Operate in close ground and/or obstacle proximity
•
Operate in degraded visual conditions / environments, including low light levels
(e.g. night, cloud, fog, etc)
•
Operate in and around, including the avoidance of, weather (e.g. rain, snow,
storms, etc)
•
Perform landings at prepared and unprepared sites with varying levels of ATC
services, lighting equipment and landing aids
However all condition operations also aim to optimise the efficiency of such operations
and to deal with / minimise any perturbations to such flight operations, regardless of
source.
As the operation within the future managed and unmanaged airspace environment has
previously been discussed in the review of SESAR, the next most significant issues for
rotorcraft relate to operations within degraded visual environments.
Operations in Degraded Visual Environments
A degraded visual environment is one in which ocular visibility (your ability to see with
the naked eye) is reduced due to light levels (e.g. night), weather phenomena (e.g. fog,
clouds, precipitation) or atmospheric conditions (e.g. haze, dust or smoke).
Due to the nature of certain rotorcraft operations the likelihood of encountering such
degraded visual conditions can be significant (i.e. marine SAR are likely to encounter
fog, rain and sea-spray; mountain SAR could encounter cloud and snow; and North
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Sea offshore transport often encounter rain and fog) and hence the provision of a
capability to operate within such environments is considered to be a key goal for
ALICIA for the rotorcraft community. In addition many of the operations that are likely to
encounter degraded visual environments are performed outside of ATC control, within
unmanaged airspace (i.e. marine SAR).
In addition accident data has suggested that inadvertent IMC flights is one of the major
causes of rotorcraft accidents - with the majority of accidents being down to spatial
disorientation (and subsequent loss of control) and CFIT.
As operations in unmanaged airspace whilst in degraded visual environments have yet
to be appropriately addressed within the regulatory framework and are not currently
being addressed within SESAR or other programmes, it follows that ALICIA must
consider this requirement from both a technological and regulatory perspective.
The primary issues of performing operations within degraded visual environments are
the same whether the aircraft is in managed or unmanaged airspace. These are:
•
airborne separation and collision avoidance
•
terrain and obstacle separation and collision avoidance
•
spatial disorientation
•
and landing
These are discussed in the sections below.
Airborne Separation and Collision Avoidance
This is the maintenance of clear air separating aircraft operating within the same
airspace and the provision of timely directives to enable the avoidance of mid-air
impacts when separation has not been maintained.
In managed airspace, airborne separation is currently provided through the use of air
corridors and flight levels; a/c flight plans; and the tracking and management of aircraft
by ATC - with collision avoidance provided through the use of TCAS or ACAS systems.
In the future ATM environment (as put forward by SESAR) the use of air corridors,
flight levels and flight plans will be replaced by RBTs. The use of RBTs and the
associated equipment required to support their usage will provide a more precise
separation method and better situational awareness, and hence should minimise (but
not obviate) the need for collision avoidance - which will still be based on the use of
TCAS type systems using ADS-B or SSR transponders and accurate navigation
solutions.
In unmanaged airspace, the current method of airborne separation and collision
avoidance is based on VFR and hence is a "see and avoid" mechanism. It appears that
unmanaged airspace will not be directly addressed by SESAR and hence the future
method of airborne separation and collision avoidance will remain unchanged (i.e. "see
and avoid").
However it is not feasible to perform VFR "see and avoid" separation within degraded
visual environments for the simple reason that there is insufficient visibility. Thus it is
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necessary to consider other methods of airborne separation assurance in such an
environment, such as ADS-B - which SESAR currently suggests be mandated as the
minima for interoperability with managed airspace (ADS-B out and GPS/GNSS).
As making ADS-B out and GNSS mandatory for all aircraft operating in unmanaged
airspace enables the position and velocity vector of all aircraft within range to be known
for aircraft (or ground systems) equipped with ADS-B in, it thus provides the potential
for a "detect and avoid" mechanism to be implemented.
However in order for such a "detect and avoid" mechanism to be effective, all
unmanaged air traffic operating within degraded visual conditions would require ADS-B
in/out and GNSS to be fitted to ensure separation between aircraft operating within
degraded visual conditions; and all unmanaged air traffic would require to be fitted with
ADS-B out and GPS/GNSS to ensure separation that aircraft exiting degraded visual
conditions could successfully avoid those operating within good visual conditions.
Because only part of the air traffic within unmanaged airspace would be mandated to fit
the full system, the status of the aircraft equipment fit would also need to be
communicated via ADS-B to cope with the potential issue of inadvertent flight in IMC
(such that fully equipped aircraft can still detect and avoid partially equipped aircraft).
Conceptually this may provide a means of airborne separation assurance, but such
widespread use of ADS-B is not without challenges, as there remains concerns over
frequency congestion (especially with the extended squitter implementation), the
security of ADS-B, and the implementation to be mandated. In addition the mandating
of this equipment provides little benefit to aircraft operating outside of DVE, in the same
way that it provides little benefit when operating outside of managed airspace.
Finally it should be noted that ADS-B is not the only means of providing airborne
situational awareness (and collision avoidance), and that other techniques may be
applied: multilateration of transponder returns; TIS-B; TCAS/ACAS; FLARM; access to
traffic information from SWIM. However because it appears likely to be mandated by
SESAR, ADS-B is considered that starting point for the discussion.
Terrain and Obstacle Separation and Collision Avoidance
This is the maintenance of clear air separating aircraft from the ground / obstacles, and
the provision of timely directives to enable the avoidance of CFIT when separation has
not been maintained.
In managed airspace, terrain and obstacle separation is currently provided through the
knowledge of the aircraft's barometric height, position and it's flight plan coupled with
terrain elevation data; and the tracking and management of aircraft by ATC when
within TMAs - with terrain collision avoidance provided through the use of TAWS,
EGPWS, or GPWS. In the future ATM environment (as put forward by SESAR) the use
of RBTs will provide a more precise navigation solution and 4D flight plan, and hence
should minimise the need for collision avoidance - which will still be based on the use
of TAWS and E/GPWS. However it should be noted that for the majority of managed
airspace we rely on the fact that the flights operate at a significant altitude above the
terrain and obstacle plane (the exceptions being over high altitude terrain which is
procedurally covered) and during approach and landing.
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In unmanaged airspace, the current method of terrain and obstacle separation and
collision avoidance is based on VFR ("see and avoid" the terrain / obstacles) and a
minimum height clearance (based on barometric altitude sensors) - neither of which
are likely to be directly affected by a future ATM environment.
It should also be noted that HTAWS systems are likely to be mandated in the US for
EMS rotorcraft in the near future - to provide a "safety net" function to detect and warn
of a potential CFIT.
However it is not feasible to perform VFR "see and avoid" separation within degraded
visual environments for the simple reason that there is insufficient visibility. Thus it is
necessary to consider other methods for terrain and obstacle separation assurance
within such environments. Although it would be possible to adopt the current IFR
(managed airspace) requirements whereby the aircraft is required to maintain a
minimum height clearance from the highest obstacle within a given range of the aircraft
(based on the aircraft's barometric altitude, position and a knowledge of the elevation
of the terrain / obstacles), this is not always appropriate for rotary wing operations,
particularly those that have a need to operate in proximity to the terrain (such as
mountain rescue).
It should be recognised that there are potential equipment limitations with many of the
existing Terrain Awareness Systems. Currently such systems are highly reliant on both
the aircraft navigation solution and the system's terrain / obstacle databases - which
are of insufficient integrity (and provenance) to be relied upon for terrain avoidance. In
addition such systems are notoriously poor at determining intent for helicopters, as
such aircraft can be deliberately operating in close proximity to the ground, and
consequently can have unacceptable false alarm rates. However such database based
systems can be useful tools for gross terrain avoidance, allowing for a suitable
minimum terrain clearance to be maintained - and if the issues noted above could be
suitably resolved (both technologically and procedurally) then such systems could aid
in terrain separation.
In addition to the capabilities of TAWS, it is possible to utilise passive or active sensors
that have the ability to provide imagery (or data) to the pilot and/or system - such as
infrared electro-optic systems. These systems could be used in conjunction with TAWS
systems to help minimise the TAWS system errors and to detect obstacles that are not
within the database; or in isolation, to provide imagery of the terrain along the flight
path of the aircraft. Due to the nature of the rotorcraft and its unique low speed
performance, this potentially enables a rotorcraft to operate in conditions that would
otherwise be unacceptable for flight operations.
Spatial Disorientation
In order to safely operate within a degraded visual environment the aircraft must be
suitably certified for instrument flight, providing all the required cues for operation
without reference to the normal world references. As expected instrument flying tends
to incur an increased workload compared to visual flight commensurate with the loss in
situational awareness, and can be disorienting, especially for operators who are used
to flying using visual references. Thus it is mandatory to have received suitable training
and have an aircraft suitably certified in order to perform such operations.
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However it should be recognised that as technologies continue to be developed the
potential for significant improvement to existing instruments exists with respect to
minimising spatial disorientation in degraded visual environments.
These technologies tend to focussed in the following areas:
•
Improvements to the aircraft handling qualities
Improving the handling qualities of the aircraft makes it easier to control and
hence reduces the chances of mishandling of the aircraft. The cross-coupling of
visual reference to flight control strategy should not be underestimated and
hence improving the HQR of the aircraft will provide a positive benefit when the
visual cues are reduced. Specific examples of handling qualities improvements
include side-sticks, stability augmentation (AFCS), and auto-pilot modes.
•
Provision of lost visual cues
Replacing the lost visual cues that the pilot uses to control the aircraft is a
simple idea, but in practice is a non-trivial task. The main methods of providing
these lost cues are to provide an artificial world view, a sensor imagery view, or
artificial cues or references. Specific examples of such systems are SVS, EVO
and conformal symbology systems.
•
Improved situational awareness
The aim of improving the situational awareness of the pilot in a degraded
environment is to mitigate for the loss of visual cues. This may, for example, be
achieved by providing an improved set of instruments or display formats.
•
Reduction in workload
The task of maintaining safe flight in degraded visual conditions is, generally, a
higher workload task than in good visual conditions. The aim of reducing the
pilot workload is to enable the pilot to perform the primary task better. Generally
workload reduction is a holistic improvement.
Landing at sites with ATC services
The airports that rotorcraft tend to operate from are those that have the lower end of
sophistication of ATC services and equipment (medium / low density), rather than the
higher end (high density), although some roles operate heavily in / around high density
airspace (ie VIP transport). At landing sites with ATC services rotorcraft will need to be
equipped to the same level of sophistication as fixed wing aircraft and interoperate
seamlessly within such an environment. Hence they will need to be able to generate
and fly an RBT in IMC, and to perform a landing using techniques ranging from NPA at
present to APV or RNP APCH/LPV/GBAS in the future.
The issues associated with landing at sites with ATC services in degraded visual
conditions are:
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•
Ability to ensure separation from other air / ground traffic
Airborne separation is currently managed, and landing clearances given, by
ATC where infrastructure exists (managed airspace with tracking facilities).
However such infrastructure does not necessarily provide monitoring and
separation from ground traffic (which must thus be performed visually).
•
Ability to ensure that landing site is clear of obstruction and suitable for a
landing
Currently the determination of the clearance of the landing site is performed
visually (and/or via inspection). In degraded visual environments it is potentially
impossible for the flight crew to ensure that the landing site is clear of
obstructions (ie ground vehicles, obstacles, FOD, contaminants, etc) and
suitable (ie slope, surface, etc) at a sufficient distance / height to remain safe.
Thus the determination of the suitability of the landing site must be a
partnership between the flight crew and the ground / ATC services to ensure
safety.
•
Ability to safely abort landing
The current procedures aim to ensure that a go-around can be performed in the
absence of visual cues in a safe manner (i.e. with sufficient terrain / obstacle
clearance). This capability is provided by the MDA, the mapping of obstacles
around the airport, and ATC management of other air traffic.
•
Ability to safely perform a landing manoeuvre
The current procedures aim to define a minimum descent altitude and runway
visual range which are determined from the visual cue environment required to
safely land a fixed wing aircraft on the runway (i.e. if you cannot see the runway
at the MDA, you would not be able to perform a safe landing).
•
Ability to ensure terrain / obstacle separation at all points along approach until
touch down
Naturally part of the requirement for a safe landing is to be able to ensure that
the approach to the landing site is clear of obstructions. This assurance is
provided by the approach path at landing sites with ATC infrastructure.
Landing at sites with minimal or no ATC services
Many rotorcraft operate from landing sites with minimal or no ATC services, whether it
be an unprepared site (such as for EMS or SAR operations), or a small airfield /
helipad without ATC services (such as an offshore rig heli-deck). The nature of these
types of operation are often such that there are significant consequences of an inability
to land, even in degraded visual conditions (i.e. SAR). Thus rotorcraft have a desire (or
need) to land at sites with minimal or no ATC services even in degraded visual
conditions.
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However it is currently only possible to land at sites with significant ATC infrastructure
in degraded visual conditions for the following reasons:
•
Inability to ensure separation from other air / ground traffic
Where there are minimal or no ATC services, traffic must currently be visually
separated. In degraded visual conditions there is no means to ensure
separation without additional equipment mandated for all aircraft / ground traffic
to provide situational and intent awareness (i.e. ADS-B out or ADS-B in/out)
and for ATC (ADS-B in) at such sites.
•
Inability to ensure that landing site is clear of obstruction and suitable for a
landing
As the determination of the clearance of the landing site is performed visually
without ATC services, it is potentially impossible in degraded visual
environments to ensure that the landing site is clear of obstructions (ie ground
vehicles, obstacles, FOD, contaminants, etc) and suitable (ie slope, surface,
etc) at a sufficient distance / height to remain safe.
•
Inability to safely abort landing
Where there are minimal or no ATC services, the abort procedure must
currently be performed visually. Naturally in the absence of visual cues such a
visual abort procedure may not be possible in a safe manner (i.e. with sufficient
terrain / obstacle clearance).
•
Inability to safely perform a landing manoeuvre
Without ATC services and approach aids the minimum descent altitude and
runway visual ranges are unlikely to support degraded visual landings.
•
Inability to ensure terrain / obstacle separation at all points along approach until
touch down
Without a defined approach path (such as an NPA), the ability to ensure that
the approach to the landing site is clear of obstructions must be performed
visually and hence is lessened in degraded visual conditions.
A requirement for ALICIA (for rotorcraft) is thus to provide the capability to enable
rotorcraft to land in degraded visual conditions. There are two potential methods of
enabling / achieving such a requirement - one of which is regulatory and the other
technological - although in reality it is likely that both methods will need to be
harmonised.
Additionally it should be noted that rotorcraft do not fly in the same way as fixed wing
aircraft and do not require forward movement in order to generate lift. Rotorcraft are
also able to arrest their descent with greater ease than fixed wing aircraft and are able
to hover. However rotorcraft specific approach profiles are rare and the current
approach and landing procedures (esp for degraded visual environments) take little
account of the unique capabilities of this aircraft type. It is feasible that rotorcraft with
suitable equipment (to enable maintenance of spatial orientation) could operate to a
lower descent and runway visual range than fixed wing as they have a greater
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capability to abort and to perform low speed landing manoeuvres. This capability is
complemented by the technological advances in Equivalent Visual Operation (EVO)
systems, such as EVS and EFVS. Such systems can, potentially, provide a sensor
based picture of the landing site from a range that is sufficient to ensure safety, but
reduced compared to the current minima for all landing sites - although such systems
would be significantly enhanced through the provision of suitable lighting at the landing
sites.
ACO Operations - Conclusions
All condition operations cover not just the future ATM environment, but also the
meteorological and atmospheric conditions that the aircraft operates in, and the
physical and geographic environment where the aircraft operates, including its
operating base and landing site.
The operational environment for rotorcraft in the future will continue to vary greatly with
role, and rotorcraft will continue to operate at low altitudes ("contact flying") in
unmanaged airspace (outside of direct ATM control under VFR flight rules). Rotorcraft
will tend to operate from small airports / airfields with a minima of ATC support
infrastructure and are likely to be equipped with sophisticated landing aids only where
mandated. In many roles rotorcraft will be required to operate close to the ground
and/or obstructions, in degraded visual environments, and may be required to land at
unprepared sites without any ATC support.
When operating within the future ATM framework at prepared sites, rotorcraft
requirements are likely to depend on the nature and size of the airport, where the
operational environment for landing is dependent on the infrastructure and certification
associated with the airport.
It is noted from SESAR and OPTIMAL that small airports with minimal infrastructure
could mandate a fixed wing APV approach and landing (which would require GNSS
with augmentation to a defined RNP); medium/large airports will aim to support
precision approaches, and could request SNI landings with steep approaches to
minimise noise pollution and maximise a/c throughput; and rotorcraft specific airfields
could specify steep approaches.
Finally it should be noted that rotorcraft tend to perform take-off and landing
manoeuvres that are unlike fixed wing aircraft, generally being steep and with greatly
reduced landing distances. In addition they tend to have specific limitations on their
landing / take-off profiles to avoid rotorcraft specific effects, such as vortex ring state
and "dead-mans" curve (autorotation limits).
Atmospheric Awareness: Weather Detection, Forecasting and Avoidance
It is known that rotorcraft suffer from problems associated with operations due to poor
weather and in particular degraded visual environments, a part of this problem can be
overcome or mitigated through a better knowledge of the current and future weather
and to a lesser extent the avoidance of weather. One of the problems that currently
exists for rotorcraft with regards to weather is that of forecasting and timely weather
data, as many of the aircrafts operating environments are relatively remote (potentially
with minimal infrastructure support). This may require the use of a weather sensor (i.e.
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weather radar) to provide a direct measurement of the weather conditions ahead of the
aircraft.
The future operating environment is expected to provide improvements that aid in the
acquisition of timely, accurate weather data, including the definition of weather impact,
provision of improved weather observations and better forecasts. These improvements
will enable operators’ access to consistent weather information, which will promote
common situational awareness. The improved forecasts, including improved
characterization of uncertainty, will assist operators in planning and conducting flights
in weather limited operational environments (e.g. the North Sea).
It is expected that improvements will be forthcoming in four main functional areas:
Weather information integrated into decision-support tools; weather sensing capability
required for better forecasting; weather forecasting and processing; and the universal
and common access to all required information that will be made available to the full
spectrum of users.
The weather and forecast data that is required by rotorcraft consists of both data for
the airspace surrounding aircraft and for registered route of aircraft - both of which
must be supplied in a timely manner. This infers that the data should be available in all
phases of flight, in both a strategic (long term) and tactical (immediate and short term)
timeframe to ensure that appropriate decisions can be made (planning and avoidance
decisions) as weather data is likely to be used to support automated in-flight route replanning to avoid bad weather (and reduced separation in managed airspace). In
addition, due to the nature of rotorcraft operations, the weather data that they require
tends to be for the lower flight levels (ground to approximately 10,000ft, which an
emphasis on ground to 3,000ft) - which is not generally the case for fixed wing aircraft.
Naturally the weather data needs to be processed into a single cohesive picture for
rapid interpretation and decision making (i.e. processing, fusion and display), and this
weather display needs to be suitably integrated into the overall situational awareness
picture to ensure that all appropriate data is available for decision making when
required.
5.1.2 Mission Profiles
Future civil helicopter missions are still likely to fall into the following operational roles /
categories:
•
•
•
•
Emergency response roles, such as marine SAR, mountain rescue and
emergency medical services (EMS)
Taxi, transport and commuter roles, such as VIP transport, and offshore oil/gas
rig transport
Surveillance such as police operations, TV broadcast, border patrol, fire watch,
pipeline survey
Lifting such as fire fighting, and mobile crane
As the nature of the mission remains broadly unchanged, it is best to discuss the
impact on the mission profiles in general rather than specifically for a given role.
•
Take off
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Currently the visibility minima can preclude the possibility of take-off, especially
if the airport lacks the required ATC services. In addition the weather conditions
(visibility) at the destination (bearing in mind this might be a VFR only site), or
en-route (if flying VFR), can preclude the ability to take off regardless of the
capability of the ATC services at the departure point.
•
Landing
The visibility minima for landing is largely dependent on the ATC services
available (which at small airports are minimal) and the equipment fit for the
aircraft. Rotorcraft, due to their operational role, will only fit precision landing
aids if it is likely to provide a significant benefit - which is rarely the case unless
the rotorcraft is performing transport operations between well equipped airports.
There are a number of well known helicopter landing requirements that illustrate
this issue well, such as landing at unprepared sites (for EMS), landing at
offshore platforms (which lack sophisticated landing aids), and landing at
helipads (which tend to lack sophisticated landing aids).
•
En-route
The main issues with en-route flight for rotorcraft is that they tend to operate
close to the ground under VFR. This implies that if the visibility conditions are
insufficient to allow for VFR flight, then the aircraft cannot operate. In additional
rotorcraft have the same desire to avoid poor weather as the fixed wing
community and a desire to access accurate weather predictions to enable them
to plan operations (esp. North Sea).
•
Operational Mission
The main difference between fixed and rotary wing operational requirements
stem from the roles performed by the aircraft. Fixed wing aircraft tend to take-off
from one prepared site and land at another, normally performing a
transportation role. Rotorcraft, although they perform this role, also perform
roles in which they deliberately fly (or hover) close to the ground / obstructions
(e.g. SAR, or pipeline survey) and also operate from unprepared sites (e.g.
EMS) or constrained sites (e.g. offshore platforms, forestry operations).
In addition rotorcraft can be specifically requested to operate in poor weather
conditions or degraded visual environments (e.g. marine SAR, mountain
rescue).
5.1.3 Operational environment
It is known that the operational environment for all aircraft is likely to be modified in the
coming years in terms of both airport facilities and related services. Nevertheless, it is
obvious that natural environment will not evolve (e.g. geographical features and
weather phenomena will still exist… although weather phenomena may get worse) and
that different parts of the world will follow different evolutionary rhythms (e.g. the level
of ATM services will vary across the world). As part of this changing environment it is
expected that the airspace categorisation will be simplified, ultimately to two categories
of airspace - managed (intended traffic environment) and unmanaged (unknown traffic
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environment) as suggested by the "EUROCONTROL Airspace Strategy for the
European Civil Aviation Conference States" document.
The operational environment for the coming years will thus be dependent on whether
particular future ATM concepts, related new airport and ATC facilities, and ATC
services have been implemented in a specific area of the world, or not.
5.1.3.1 Airport environment
Airport ATC services
As stated previously, aircraft will be confronted with a range of different levels of airport
ATC services, from the rudimentary (airfields with limited ATC services); to airport
environments equivalent to current airports (especially for some part of the world such
as third world airports); through to a very different airport environment, matching with
the future ATM contexts implemented (and currently defined within the European
SESAR and US NextGen programs).
One challenge for the future will thus be to allow safe and efficient operations within
airspaces and environment, including airports, with heterogeneous practices and levels
of equipments.
The following lists the airport ATC services that shall be considered to describe the
future operational environment for high density airspace (i.e. major airports) as stated
in the fixed wing section. This equates to a SESAR ATM capability level 3.
•
Primary and/or secondary surveillance radar (some part of the world still
completely lack the use of radar). Radar vectoring practices vary a lot
depending on continents or even countries but are one of the main enabler for
all conditions operations around airports,
•
Air traffic control procedures. ACO require special procedure (low visibility
procedure LVP) for the ATC and all services on airport (e.g. maintenance,
security). In particular, LVP establishes protection of the ILS sensitive area by
control of ground movements and adequate separation between 2 aircraft on
approach or one aircraft on approach and another on take-off, leading to the
runway capacity reduction. Future all conditions operations will require
amendment of existing or definition of new low visibility procedures,
•
ATC radio management: Future ATC services will still be based, even if not
completely, on radio management (voice link). Hence environment with
frequency congestion or controller overload caused by high density traffic or by
a single controller operating tower and ground frequencies are likely to be
observed.
•
Terminal area CPDLC: Controller to Pilot Data communications will be deployed
in the terminal areas. The objective is to provide routine and strategic
information to the pilot and automating certain routine tasks for both the pilot
and controller:
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o A decreased number of voice communications would reduce radio
frequency congestion and eliminate verbal miscommunication – safety
improvement that will reduce operational errors.
o Providing changes to radio frequencies and other information, such as
local barometric pressure and required weather advisories, by data
communications link could reduce errors.
o When weather impacts numerous flights, clearances for data
communications capable aircraft could be sent all at once, increasing
controller and operator efficiency.
These future CPDLC applications within terminal areas are expected to
increase in frequency, so in the end constitute one of the main tasks of the
crew, and in any case will require a good reactivity from the airborne segment.
On that purpose, the CPDLC cockpit functions will need a very good integration
with the user applications (building of 4D trajectories, ASAS implementation,
implementation of short term targets …) to be acceptable in terms of workload.
Back up / fall back situations will also have to be considered.
The following lists the airport ATC services that shall be considered to describe the
future operational environment for low density airspace (i.e. small airports / controlled
airfields). This equates to a SESAR ATM capability level 1 to 2.
•
Secondary surveillance radar or ADS_B (input) to enable the airport to track the
aircraft. Although ADS-B is dependent on the aircraft having a navigation
solution of the required accuracy to ensure that ATC can keep safe separation
distances. This could be achieved if the navigation solution status (current
accuracy / errors) were provided via ADS-B (or datalink).
•
Air traffic control procedures. It is expected that small airfields will mandate /
utilise NPA or APV protocols using GNSS systems (such as RNP APCH, or
baro-VNAV, or SBAS).
•
ATC radio management: Future ATC services will still be based, even if not
completely, on radio management (voice link). Due to the relatively small size
and hence limited traffic at such airports frequency congestion or controller
overload is unlikely to be an issue.
•
Terminal area CPDLC: Controller to Pilot Data communications could be
deployed in the terminal areas, although the cost would be a significant factor.
The main reasons and objectives for this in a small airport would be:
o Eliminate verbal miscommunication – safety improvement that will reduce
operational errors.
o Automation of changes to radio frequencies and other information, such
as local barometric pressure and required weather advisories, by data
communications link could reduce errors.
o CPDLC could be mandated in the future and hence all airports and all air
traffic would be required to use it.
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The following lists the airport ATC services that shall be considered to describe the
future operational environment for low density airspace terminal areas without ATC
infrastructure (i.e. dirt strips). This equates to a SESAR ATM capability level 0.
•
The surveillance capability of a dirt strip or very small airfield is likely to be nonexistent, and hence all traffic would operate under VFR. It is possible that such
an airfield could have a limited tracking and monitoring capability if ADS-B out
were mandated in the future and the airfield suitably equipped. The cost of such
an installation would, however, have to be affordable.
•
The air traffic control procedures available from such a airport would be nonexistent or remain limited to flight information services, although the airfield
should have a terminal area zone airspace. All take-offs and landings would be
done under VFR.
•
The future ATC services will still be based, even if not completely, on radio
management (voice link) and remain limited to flight information services if in
existence. Due to the small size and hence limited traffic at such airports
frequency congestion or controller overload is unlikely to be an issue.
•
Terminal area CPDLC: Controller to Pilot Data communications will not be
deployed in the terminal areas unless mandated.
These very small airports without ATC essentially drive the need for greater
situational awareness to be built into all platforms, and hence ADS-B and
accurate autonomous navigation systems to become mandatory in order to
increase safety.
5.1.3.1.1 Airport Information Services
Under the auspices of future programmes such as SESAR and FlYSAFE it is
envisaged that future operations will be able to make use of a data-link service (such
as SWIM) to receive data both in-flight and pre-flight. This data-link is expected to be
able to provide:
•
Weather information services: The data-link (such as WIMS) will provide
strategic and tactical timescale forecasts, and nowcasts that will be derived
from weather observations, aircraft sensor data, and MET forecasts and will
include not just precipitation, wind and storm data, but also turbulence data.
The coverage of the weather data and the weather data-link network will be
sufficient to enable routes to be planned in the vast majority of cases.
•
Aeronautical Information Services: the data-link will provide direct access to
worldwide and local NOTAM, SNOWTAM, ASHTAM, AIP or even charts for
briefing purposes.
•
Air Traffic information Services: the data-link will provide access to TIS-B data
and localised traffic information to ensure that all aircraft have a suitable level of
situational awareness.
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5.1.3.1.2 Airport visual and instrument landing aids
Airport visual and non-visual landing aids are a major part of the operational
environment a rotorcraft is confronted with.
As noted in the fixed wing section (4.1.3.1.3), these facilities will be part of the global
ATM evolution in managed airspace but that there will be an increasing variability in
terms of equipments encountered throughout the world.
The Eurocontrol navaids infrastructure roadmap, provides an overview of the landing
aids configuration that are likely to be encountered by in the future.
However it is perceived that the Eurocontrol infrastructure does not address the needs
of aircraft operating from small airfields with minimal ATC services, thus the following
attempts to capture the relevant aspects of the Eurocontrol roadmap from a rotorcraft
perspective as well as the needs of rotorcraft at landing sites with minimal ATC
services.
2009-2015
•
Runways equipped with Cat I GLS (GBAS/GPS, including appropriate lightning
system) should become available.
•
Airport providing a limited availability of Cat II/III GLS capability (using a
GPS/GBAS capability augmented by on-board systems) at runways with Cat
II/III lighting may become available.
•
Runways equipped with navaids supporting conventional NPAs will remain.
•
Runways allowing approaches with Vertical Guidance (APV) either based on
SBAS or Baro-VNAV will become available.
•
LED lighting (IR compatible) will become available that will support low cost
lighting for small airfields, rigs and minimally prepared sites.
•
EVO approaches will become available for APV approaches
2015-2020
•
Runways equipped with Cat II/III GLS (GBAS/Multi-constellation Dual
Frequency) should be available.
•
Forecast for this period is that no airport with conventional NPA procedures will
remain (including decommissioning of associated NAVAIDs), considering that
approach capability will be supported by RNP APCH/LPV or RNP AR APCH.
•
EVO approaches will become available for RNP APCH/LPV or RNP AR APCH
approaches
•
EVO approaches will become available for NPA / "VFR" approaches
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BEYOND 2020
•
Cat I GLS will continue to be introduced where required.
•
Runways equipped with Cat II/III GLS (GBAS/Multi-constellation Dual
Frequency) will increase.
The perception is that low cost LED lighting, with appropriate IR sensor compatibility, in
conjunction with EVO systems could enable helicopter landings to be performed at
landing sites with minimal ATC services, using modified NPA-type (i.e. PINS)
approaches.
5.1.3.2 Geographical environment
By its nature, a rotorcraft may be confronted by any type of geographical environment.
However as future rotorcraft will still tend to operate in close proximity to the ground /
surface (and hence to obstructions), they will still be particularly concerned with this
environment and the possession of an accurate SA picture of it.
Surrounding Terrain
All condition operations in a complex terrain environment are generally more
demanding for rotorcraft. The main aspects of surrounding terrain environment that
shall be considered are:
•
Surrounding terrain
This includes the nature of the surrounding terrain, including its composition
(e.g. sand, grass, water), topography (e.g. high or rising ground), features (e.g.
ditches, lumps and humps), etc. This also includes nearby structure if the
landing site is man-made (e.g. oil / gas platforms and building top helipads).
•
Landing sites, both prepared and unprepared
This includes the size, shape, surface (including composition), and slope at the
landing site, as well as any contamination (dust, water, slush, snow, animals),
obstacles and/ or hazards (including natural, man-made and animal hazards).
•
High elevation operating site
High elevation locations reduce the power and thrust margins associated with
the aircraft and it's autorotation capability, and hence influence the available
profiles for the aircraft.
•
Topographical features requiring unusual procedures and reduced safety
margins
This includes all topographical features that could affect the approach and
landing tasks, including height variations between landing site and surrounding
terrain, approach and landing site material composition and contamination (e.g.
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dust, water, slush, snow, animals), and the approach and landing site specific
features (e.g. slope, size, shape).
•
Natural (trees, cliffs, waves, rocks, etc) or man-made obstacles (antennas,
wires, etc)
This includes all natural and / or man-made features and obstructions that could
affect the hover, approach, landing, or take-off tasks, including trees, waves,
antennas, wires, buildings, vehicles, animal hazards, etc.
•
Loose article hazards and terrain contamination
This includes FOD, animal hazards (flocks of birds), as well as the local terrain
composition.
5.1.3.3 Atmospheric environment
Visibility conditions and Visual Illusions
A rotorcraft may be confronted with any type of visibility conditions, such as darkness
or low visibility due to atmospheric phenomenon (rain, fog, mist, haze, smoke, cloud
base, etc), as well as downwash derived phenomenon (brown-out, white-out, seaspray, etc).
Given that the rotorcraft role may require operation specifically within these
environmental condition and in close proximity to the ground / obstacles, this is seen as
a major area of concern for rotorcraft operations. It should be noted that the
appropriate regulatory framework for the operation of rotorcraft in unmanaged airspace
whilst in degraded visual environments safely has yet to appropriately addressed and
there are currently no future plans to address this omission.
Visual illusions take place when conditions modify the pilot’s perception of the
environment relative to his/her expectations. Visual illusions may result in CFIT
accidents, spatial disorientation, and loss of control.
The following key points need to be emphasized:
•
Awareness of weather and weather factors;
•
Awareness of surrounding terrain and obstacles;
•
Awareness and assessment of approach / hover hazards (i.e., conditions that
may cause visual illusions);
•
Adherence to defined PF/PNF task sharing for acquisition of visual references
and for flying the visual segment, this includes:
o monitoring by PF of outside visual cues while transiently referring to
instruments to support and monitor the flight path during the visual
segment; and,
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o monitoring by PNF of head-down cues for effective cross-check and
backup (e.g., for calling any excessive-parameter-deviation).
Wind conditions
Wind conditions may affect deeply rotorcraft operations, whatever the flight phase.
Main wind characteristics that shall be considered are:
•
Shifting or gusty wind, crosswind or tail wind;
•
Wind shear and / or downdrafts in close proximity to the ground;
•
Turbulence and close obstacle proximity;
•
Storms and strong winds
Temperature and Pressure
Outside air temperature is a major element defining the atmospheric environment. It is
of particular concern to rotorcraft where the temperature affects the rotorcraft lift and /
or the engine power, or where icing conditions exist
Outside air pressure and altitude pressure is also of importance to rotorcraft as the air
pressure defines the rotor lift capability - naturally this is affected by the air
temperature.
Icing
De-icing is a procedure by which frost, ice, slush or snow is removed from the aircraft
in order to provide clean surfaces. This may be accomplished by mechanical methods,
pneumatic methods, or the use of heated fluids.
When aircraft surfaces are contaminated by frozen moisture, they must be de-iced
prior to dispatch. Rotorcraft that operate in icing environments are normally equipped
with a de-icing capability , such as heated blade elements, although operational
procedures exist to allow rotorcraft without such equipment to operate in a limited
fashion in icing conditions.
5.1.4 Stakeholders / Actors
The actors and stakeholders for the rotorcraft community are similar to those of the
fixed wing community (section 4.1.4), in that the roles of the flight operators and ANSP
personnel will be similar - especially in managed airspace.
However as the aircraft do not always operate within managed airspace, there are
additional actors and stakeholders to consider for unmanaged airspace operations.
These are:
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Actor
Main Tasks
Operation
Individual
Operations in DVE
Flight Crew
Conduct flight according to
applicable rules
Ensure separation
Avoid collisions
Minimise delays
Landing Support operations
Landing site personnel
Lighting
Aircraft monitoring
12
Table 4 – Additional rotorcraft actors
In addition, the future role of ATC for managed and unmanaged airspace must be
considered likely to include the following to support mixed equipment level operations
and unmanaged airspace support:
•
provision of support services to managed airspace, including:
o the capability to enable mixed SESAR compliant and non-compliant
aircraft operations within / crossing managed airspace
ƒ
through the provision of temporary RBTs for non-compliant
aircraft
o a ground based surveillance capability to track / monitor non-compliant
aircraft
ƒ
ƒ
ƒ
ADS-B in (if all aircraft are equipped with ADS-B out), and SSR
radar tracking
multi-lateration
o the capability to provide information services for non-compliant aircraft
ƒ
to enable access to SWIM data for all aircraft
o the designation of priority status to RBTs for emergency services
•
provision of support services to unmanaged airspace, including:
o a ground based surveillance capability to track / monitor aircraft
ƒ
ADS-B in
12
The categorisation in "Table 2 - SESAR vision of future airspace users roles" does not
provide a full understanding of the issues for rotorcraft operating within unmanaged airspace.
Hence the layout of the rotorcraft stakeholders / actors table is subtly different for unmanaged
airspace - for managed airspace it can be assumed to be the same as for fixed wing (ie. Table
2)
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ƒ
multi-lateration
o capability to provide information services for all aircraft
ƒ
access to SWIM data
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6 RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER WORK
It had been expected that much of the input for this document would come from other
programmes, in particular SESAR.
This has proven to be correct, but it has become evident that the SESAR Project can
only provide a wealth of information on requirements for operation in controlled
airspace.
Very little information covering flight in uncontrolled airspace is currently available and
additional work is still in progress to improve the situation.
Therefore it is envisaged that this document will require to be reissued to integrate the
additional knowledge which is being gathered from different sources. This on-going
review might require also a document re-organization.
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7 REFERENCES
European Aeronautics: A Vision for 2020 – Meeting society’s needs and winning global
leadership” Report – European Commission – January 2001.
SESAR JU – Concept Story Board – Edition 01.00.00 – 2nd June 2009.
SESAR Definition Phase – Deliverable 3 – The ATM target concept – DLM-0612-00102-00a - September 2007
EUROCONTROL - NAVIGATION APPLICATION & NAVAID INFRASTRUCTURE
STRATEGY FOR THE ECAC AREA UP TO 2020 – Edition 2.0 – 15th May 2008.
Getting to grips with Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction - A Flight Operations
View Issue, 1 October 2000 - AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Flight Operations Support –
Customer Services Directorate
Flight Safety Foundation - Flight Safety Digest - Killers in Aviation: FSF Task Force
Presents Facts About Approach-and-landing and Controlled-flight-into-terrain
Accidents - Volume 17/No 11-12 – Volume 18/No 1-2 Nov.-Dec.98/Jan.-Feb.99
Flight Safety Foundation - Reducing the Risk of Runway Excursions - Report of the
Runway Safety Initiative – May 2009
FAA NextGen website:
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/nextgen/
Eurocontrol EAD website:
http://www.eurocontrol.int/ead/public/subsite_homepage/homepage.html
OPTIMAL project public deliverables can be found at http://www.optimal.isdefe.es
HILAS project public deliverables can be found at http://www.hilas.info/
Transportation Safety Board of Canada - AVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT
A05H0002 RUNWAY OVERRUN AND FIRE - AIR FRANCE AIRBUS A340-313 FGLZQ TORONTO/LESTER B. PEARSON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, ONTARIO 02 AUGUST 2005 - Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada 2007,
Cat. No. TU3-5/05-3E ISBN 978-0-662-47298-8.
ALICIA/DEL/ALAE/WP1-0002 - D1.1-1 Current Operational Requirements
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Annex A: Document Copyright Rules
The responsible partner identified in the document information table is accountable for
producing the document but the contents within this document is subject to the following rules:
All information contained in this document shall be treated in accordance to ALICIA project
agreements.
No partner has identified the need for specific copyright protection.
Partner Code (as annotated
within the document)
Partner
Legend
N/A
N/A
N/A
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Glossary/Definitions
Actor
the person, organization or system which play the
System or drive its actions; usually, an actor is
also System User.
Action Flow
a sequence of activities and operational
procedures needed to perform a mission with
respect to a specific context.
Aerodrome
a defined area on land or water (including
buildings, installations and equipment) intended to
be used either wholly or in part for the arrival,
departure and surface movement of aircraft.
Aerodrome Operating Minima
Criteria used by pilots to determine whether they
may land or take off from any runway at night or in
Instrument Meteorological Conditions. For further
details, see D1.1-1 “Current Operational
Requirements”.
Aeronautical Information Circular a notice containing information that does not
qualify for the origination of a NOTAM or for
inclusion in the AIP, but which relates to flight
safety, air navigation, technical, administrative or
legislative matters.
Aeronautical Information Publications a publication issued by or with the authority
of a State and containing aeronautical information
of a lasting character essential to air navigation.
For further details, see D1.1-1 “Current
Operational Requirements”.
AIRMET
a message containing information issued by a
meteorological watch office concerning the
occurrence or expected occurrence of specified
en-route weather phenomena. For further details,
see D1.1-1 “Current Operational Requirements”.
Air Traffic Control service
a service provided for the purpose of preventing
collisions and expediting and maintaining an
orderly flow of air traffic. For further details, see
D1.1-1 “Current Operational Requirements”.
AMAN
a Decision Support Tool that provides the
controller with information on a calculated
sequence to the runway and supports the delivery
of an optimised arrival sequence for an aerodrome
A-SMGCS
A system providing routing, guidance and
surveillance for the control of aircraft and vehicles
in order to maintain the declared surface
movement rate under all weather conditions within
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the aerodrome visibility operational level while
maintaining the required level of safety
ATM
the aggregation of the airborne functions and
ground-based functions (air traffic services,
airspace management and air traffic flow
management) required to ensure the safe and
efficient movement of aircraft during all phases of
operations.
ATM System
a system that provides ATM through the
collaborative integration of humans, information,
technology, facilities and services, supported by
air, ground and/or space-based communications,
navigation and surveillance.
Automatic Direction Finding
an electronic aid to navigation that identifies the
relative bearing of an aircraft. For further details,
see D1.1-1 “Current Operational Requirements”.
Bird Strike
a collision between a bird and an aircraft which is
in flight or on a take off or landing roll. For further
details, see D1.1-1 “Current Operational
Requirements”.
Boundary
system limits/borders, what is internal and
external. It defines also how the system interacts
which the outside entities.
Capability
the ability to execute a specified course of action.
A capability may or may not be accompanied by
an intention.
Clear Air Turbulence
a turbulence which is not associated with cloud
and therefore cannot be detected visually or by
conventional Weather Radar. For further details,
see D1.1-1 “Current Operational Requirements”.
Clear Ice
ice formed by large super cooled water droplets.
For further details, see D1.1-1 “Current
Operational Requirements”.
Context (of Use)
the overall description of a realistic environment in
which the relevant operations occur to be used to
identify and develop the solutions. It describes the
general (geographical, environmental, political,
legal, etc…) situation, the involved actors and
stakeholders, the events that occur and the
existing constraints and assumptions. The context
can also be used to define the System
boundaries.
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Control Area
a Controlled Airspace extending upwards from a
specified limit above the earth. The lateral and
vertical extent of control areas is detailed in the
appropriate national AIP.
Controlled Airspace
an airspace of defined dimensions within which air
traffic control services are provided to IFR flights
and to VFR flights in accordance with the airspace
classification. For further details, see D1.1-1
“Current Operational Requirements”.
Controlled Flight Into Terrain
event that occurs when an airworthy aircraft under
the complete control of the pilot is inadvertently
flown into terrain, water, or an obstacle. For
further details, see D1.1-1 “Current Operational
Requirements”.
Controlled Visual Flight Rules
flight rules used in locations where aviation
authorities have determined that Visual Flight
Rules flight should be allowed, but that ATC
separation and minimal guidance are necessary.
For further details, see D1.1-1 “Current
Operational Requirements”.
Control Sector
A subdivision of a designated control area within
which responsibility is assigned to one controller
or to a small group of controllers.
Control Zone
a Controlled Airspace extending upwards from
the surface of the earth to a specified upper limit.
The lateral and vertical extent of control zones is
detailed in the appropriate national AIP.
Crew Resources Management
the effective use of all available resources by
flight crew personnel. For further details, see
D1.1-1 “Current Operational Requirements”.
Cross Wind Landing
Landing with adverse (cross) wind conditions. It’s
one of the major causes of runway excursions.
For further details, see D1.1-1 “Current
Operational Requirements”.
Cumulonimbus
a heavy and dense cloud of considerable vertical
extent in the form of a mountain or huge tower,
often associated with heavy precipitation, lightning
and thunders. For further details, see D1.1-1
“Current Operational Requirements”.
Customer
who pays for the System development, it’s a
stakeholder.
Decision Altitude/Height
a specified altitude or height in the Precision
Approach or approach with vertical guidance at
which a Missed Approach must be initiated if the
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required visual reference to continue the
approach has not been established. For further
details, see D1.1-1 “Current Operational
Requirements”.
Dew
a condensation of water directly onto a surface
Dew Point
the air temperature at which a sample of air would
reach 100% humidity based upon its current
degree of saturation. For further details, see D1.11 “Current Operational Requirements”.
Distance Measuring Equipment
an equipment usually coupled with a VOR beacon
to enable aircraft to measure their position relative
to that beacon. For further details, see D1.1-1
“Current Operational Requirements”.
Drizzle
the lightest form of precipitations, consisting of
water droplets which are just large enough to
acquire a readily measurable terminal velocity.
For further details, see D1.1-1 “Current
Operational Requirements”.
Environment
All factors (natural or induced) which may impact
system performance must be identified and
defined; these factors can include meteorological
conditions, temperature ranges, topologies and
geographical area, biological, time.
Flight Information Publications
guides produced by commercial organizations to
meet the need to provide authoritative
documentation in a convenient form for use in
flight. For further details, see D1.1-1 “Current
Operational Requirements”.
Flight Information Service
a service provided for the purpose of giving
advice and information useful for the safe and
efficient conduct of flights. For further details, see
D1.1-1 “Current Operational Requirements”.
Flight Management System
an
on-board
multi-purpose
navigation,
performance, and aircraft operations computer.
For further details, see D1.1-1 “Current
Operational Requirements”.
Fog
a surface cloud causing low visibility conditions.
For further details, see D1.1-1 “Current
Operational Requirements”.
Freezing Fog
a fog comprising super cooled water droplets
which freeze on contact with a surface. For further
details, see D1.1-1 “Current Operational
Requirements”.
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Freezing Rain
rain which freezes on contact with cold surfaces.
For further details, see D1.1-1 “Current
Operational Requirements”.
Functional requirement
a specification that describes an activity or
process that the System must perform.
General Air Traffic
encompasses all flights conducted in accordance
with the rules and procedures of ICAO. These
may include military flights for which ICAO rules
satisfy their operational requirements.
General Aviation
a term usually used to describe aircraft operation
other than commercial air transport and military
operation. For further details, see D1.1-1 “Current
Operational Requirements”.
Gust Front
the boundary between cold air, flowing down and
out from a Cumulonimbus cloud, and warmer air
ahead of the storm. For further details, see D1.1-1
“Current Operational Requirements”.
Hail
pellets of ice. For further details, see D1.1-1
“Current Operational Requirements”.
Hoar Frost
event that occurs when a sub-zero surface comes
into contact with moist air. For further details, see
D1.1-1 “Current Operational Requirements”.
Ice Fog
fog comprising of tiny ice crystals. For further
details, see D1.1-1 “Current Operational
Requirements”.
In-Flight Icing
ice accretion formed during flight. For further
details, see D1.1-1 “Current Operational
Requirements”.
Instrument flight rules
regulations and procedures for flying aircraft by
referring only to the aircraft instrument panel for
navigation. For further details, see D1.1-1
“Current Operational Requirements”.
Instrument Landing system
a ground-based instrument approach system that
provides precision guidance to an aircraft
approaching and landing on a runway. For further
details, see D1.1-1 “Current Operational
Requirements”.
Instrument meteorological conditions meteorological conditions expressed in terms
of visibility, distance from cloud, and ceiling, less
than
the
minima
specified
for
visual
meteorological conditions. For further details, see
D1.1-1 “Current Operational Requirements”.
Interface
what the System exchange and with who.
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Jet Efflux Hazard
Hazards associated with the force or wind
generated behind a jet engine, particularly on or
before take-off when high/full power is set, but also
when the aircraft is taxiing. For further details, see
D1.1-1 “Current Operational Requirements”.
Jet Stream
Fast flowing, narrow, currents of air located at the
boundary between air masses and just below the
Tropopause. For further details, see D1.1-1
“Current Operational Requirements”.
Key Performance Parameters
those minimum attributes or characteristics
considered most essential for an effective
Capability.
Low level Wind shear
sudden change of wind velocity and/or direction.
For further details, see D1.1-1 “Current
Operational Requirements”.
Low Visibility Procedures
procedures applied at an aerodrome for the
purpose of ensuring safe operations during
Category II and III approaches and Low Visibility
Take-offs. For further details, see D1.1-1 “Current
Operational Requirements”.
METAR
Meteorological Terminal Air Report (METAR) Aerodrome routine meteorological reports.
Microburst
Downburst created by an area of significantly raincooled, descending, air that, after hitting ground
level, spreads out in all directions producing strong
winds. For further details, see D1.1-1 “Current
Operational Requirements”.
Minimum Descent Altitude/Height a specified altitude or height in a Non-Precision
Approach or Circling Approach below which
descent must not be made without the required
visual reference. For further details, see D1.1-1
“Current Operational Requirements”.
Minimum Safe Altitude
an altitude below which it is unsafe to fly owing to
presence of terrain or obstacles. For further
details,
see
D1.1-1
“Current
Operational
Requirements”.
Mission
a set of tasks, with the specific objectives, to be
performed by each actor. A mission has wellspecified starting conditions and will end with a
final status. A mission is performed by a number
of systems. A mission is subject to different
scenarios.
Mountain Waves
oscillations to the lee side (downwind) of a
mountain caused by the disturbance in the
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horizontal air flow caused by the high ground. For
further details, see D1.1-1 “Current Operational
Requirements”.
Non-Directional Beacon
radio beacon operating in the MF or LF bandwidths. For further details, see D1.1-1 “Current
Operational Requirements”.
Non-Precision Approach
an instrument approach and landing which utilizes
lateral guidance but does not utilize vertical
guidance. For further details, see D1.1-1 “Current
Operational Requirements”.
Operational Air Traffic
encompasses all flights which do not comply with
the provisions stated for general air traffic (GAT)
and for which rules and procedures have been
specified by appropriate national authorities. Also,
military traffic which does not comply with ICAO
rules and procedures.
Operational Requirement
an established need justifying the timely allocation
of resources to achieve a Capability to accomplish
objectives or missions.
Pilot Flying
the Pilot Flying is a pilot who takes direct
responsibility for flying the aircraft for a certain
sector. For further details, see D1.1-1 “Current
Operational Requirements”.
Pilot Not-Flying
the Pilot Non-Flying is a pilot who carries out
supporting duties such as communications and
check-list reading. For further details, see D1.1-1
“Current Operational Requirements”.
Platform
a fixed or a rotary wing aircraft.
Requirement engineering
process to extract requirements from stakeholders
expectations.
Requirement
a statement that identifies a System, product or
process’ characteristic or constraint, which is
unambiguous, clear, unique, consistent, standalone (not grouped), and verifiable.
Runway Excursion
event that occurs when an aircraft fails to confine
its take off or landing to the designated runway.
For further details, see D1.1-1 “Current
Operational Requirements”.
Runway Incursion
any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the
incorrect presence of an aircraft vehicle or person
on the protected area of a surface designated for
the landing and take off of aircraft. For further
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details,
see
D1.1-1
Requirements”.
“Current
Operational
Runway Visual Range
the range over which the pilot of an aircraft on the
centre line of a runway can see the runway surface
markings or the lights delineating the runway or
identifying its centre line. For further details, see
D1.1-1 “Current Operational Requirements”.
Scenario
the scenario is a description of how the System
works; it describes the behaviour of the Users and
of the System of Interest, the interactions between
the two and the wider context.
Standard Instrument Departure Route a Standard Instrument Departure Route is a
standard ATS route identified in an instrument
departure procedure by which aircraft should
proceed from take-off phase to the en-route phase.
For further details, see D1.1-1 “Current
Operational Requirements”.
Standard Arrival Route
a Standard Arrival Route is a standard ATS route
identified in an approach procedure by which
aircraft should proceed from the en-route phase to
an initial approach fix. For further details, see
D1.1-1 “Current Operational Requirements”.
SIGMET
information issued by a meteorological watch office
concerning the occurrence or expected occurrence
of specified en-route weather phenomena. For
further details, see D1.1-1 “Current Operational
Requirements”.
Situation Awareness
the perception of the elements in the environment
within a volume of time and space, the
comprehension of their meaning and the projection
of their status in the near future. For further details,
see D1.1-1 “Current Operational Requirements”.
Stabilized Approach
the set of minimum acceptable criteria for the
continuation of an approach to land. For further
details,
see
D1.1-1
“Current
Operational
Requirements”.
Stakeholder
a party (person, organisation or system) having a
right, share or claim in the System or in its
possession of characteristics that meet that
party’s needs and expectations (e.g., Users,
Actors, Customers, Managers, etc…).
Stakeholder requirement
formal stakeholders’ expectations.
Standard Operating Procedure
in an ATC Unit are a specific set of procedures that
specify how the unit’s controllers’ ATC
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responsibilities are to be coordinated. For further
details,
see
D1.1-1
“Current
Operational
Requirements”.
System
a combination of interacting elements organized
to achieve one or more stated purposes
System Requirement
a requirement pertaining to a System that
specifies an externally observable behaviour of a
System or the System has to conform to.
Take Off Block Time
the time that an aircraft operator/handling agent
estimates that an aircraft will be ready, all doors
closed, boarding bridge removed, push back
vehicle connected, ready to commence push back
and start up immediately upon reception of an ATC
clearance.
Task
a discrete unit of work, not specific to a single
organization, weapon system, or individual, that
enables
missions
or
functions
to
be
accomplished.
Terminal Control Area
a Control Area normally established at the
confluence of ATS Routes in the vicinity of one or
more major aerodromes.
Thunderstorm
a convective cloud with associated heavy
precipitation, typically heavy rain, heavy snow, or
Hail, Thunder, and Lightning. For further details,
see D1.1-1 “Current Operational Requirements”.
Traceability
a dependency that indicates a historical or
process relationship between two elements that
represent the same concept without specific rules
for deriving one from the other.
Turbulence
event caused by the relative movement of
disturbed air through which an aircraft is flying. For
further details, see D1.1-1 “Current Operational
Requirements”.
User
the person, organisation or system which gets the
advantages of the System actions.
Visual Flight Rules
a set of regulations which allow a pilot to operate
an aircraft in weather conditions generally clear
enough to allow the pilot to see where the aircraft
is going. For further details, see D1.1-1 “Current
Operational Requirements”.
Visual Meteorological Conditions the meteorological conditions expressed in terms
of visibility, distance from cloud, and ceiling equal
to or better than specified minima. For further
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details,
see
D1.1-1
Requirements”.
Volcanic Ash
“Current
Operational
phenomena composed by clouds of very small
particles of rock ejected from a volcano during an
eruption. For further details, see D1.1-1 “Current
Operational Requirements”.
VHF Omnidirectional Radio Range an aircraft navigation system operating in the
VHF band. For further details, see D1.1-1 “Current
Operational Requirements”.
Wake Vortex Turbulence
turbulence which is generated by the passage of
an aircraft through the air. For further details, see
D1.1-1 “Current Operational Requirements”.
Weather Radar
a type of radar used to locate precipitation,
calculate its motion and estimate its type and
intensity. For further details, see D1.1-1 “Current
Operational Requirements”.
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