Gonzales, Kristine Rose G. Bhopal Gas Tragedy: A Case Study Bhopal gas tragedy is considered to be the worst industrial disaster in India's history. 37 years ago, on the night of December 2, 1984, plumes of poisonous gas leaked from an American firm chemical pesticides company named Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) in the densely populated town of Bhopal in central India. The UCIL plant was established in 1969 where 51% of it was owned by Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) and 49% by Indian authorities. Due to its central and convenient location to transportation infrastructure, the company chose Bhopal as the location for the factory. However, the land was not zoned for hazardous industry but for light industrial and commercial usage only. The plant manufactured Sevin, a pesticide marketed by UCIL. Due to declining demand for pesticides, the factory was only producing one-quarter of its capacity in 1984. Its reduced profitability led the company to instruct local managers to close the factory and prepare it for sale by July 1984. Unfortunately, no willing buyer could be found, therefore the facility continued to operate the plant, but safety standards were given the least amount of consideration due to low profits.2 The local government was aware of the safety issues, but was hesitant to impose substantial industrial safety and pollution control responsibilities on the failing business because it was concerned about the economic consequences of losing such a large industry. While most of Bhopal's one million residents were sleeping at 11 p.m. on December 2, 1984, a plant operator discovered a tiny leak of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas and an increase in pressure within a storage tank.4 The disaster happened when water accidentally entered a methyl isocyanate storage tank triggering an uncontrollable chemical reaction and blasting a cloud of toxic gases across nearby slums.3 2,000 people died instantly, and up to 300,000 were injured, out of the 800,000 people who lived in Bhopal at the time. 4 Basically, the Bhopal disaster was a result of many operational, safety, management and human failures all which contributed to cause this industrial disaster. Operational and Safety Failures. On the night of December 3rd, 1984, the majority of the safety systems were dysfunctional. Three weeks before, the vent-gas scrubber, a safety device designed to neutralize poisonous discharge from the MIC system, had been turned off. A malfunctioning valve caused one ton of water for cleaning internal pipes to combine with forty tons of MIC.2 A 30-ton refrigeration unit that ordinarily operated as a safety component to keep the MIC storage tank cool had been drained of its coolant and repurposed for use elsewhere in the plant.2 The gas flare safety system has been out of function for three months. Because of corrosion, there was also iron in the tank, and the high temperature warning was not working.1 In addition, tank temperatures were not monitored.1 Gonzales, Kristine Rose G. Bhopal Gas Tragedy: A Case Study Management Failures. The UCIL appears to have been attempting to cut costs by sacrificing health and safety regulations. There is no regard for the environment or the well-being of the people who live around the factory. Members of the fire and rescue squad (emergency squad) were not qualified or trained to deal with such an incident.1 Furthermore, more unqualified employees were employed, and the six-month training requirement was dropped.1 The night shift also lacked a maintenance supervisor. Union Carbide had a history of safety failures, but they never seemed to put any effort into addressing those defects and lapses. The safety measures were poor, and the management failed to pay attention to the overall operations of the factory. Data logging of both technical and general operations was not enforced by management.1 Although the firm bears the most of the blame for the tragedy, the state has also played a role. The Indian government should not have consented to the construction of a plant in such a densely populated area. They should not have accepted the project due to environmental concerns and the lack of a safety analysis. In addition, the Indian government failed to detect risks and impose safety regulations. There were no written reference manuals or instructions available for the workers' use.1 Human Errors. The operator failed to notice that water had entered the MIC tank. When the pipes were washed, no slip bind was utilized. Even after the shift began, the former operator neglected to notify the current operator of the increased pressure, resulting in a miscommunication between the staff.1 The tragedy's ethical implications and consequences for the people of Bhopal were totally neglected. UCC has tried to alter, conceal, and hide scientific facts to the detriment of victims at every point.2 Despite all of the evidence that the plant was not up to standard and that its safety devices were faulty and poorly prepared, UCC argued that the disaster occurred due to sabotage during the time when the plant was left unattended in the course of shift. The company has been tight-lipped about what was in the toxic cloud that engulfed the city that December night. As further insult, UCC shut down its Bhopal factory after the catastrophe, but failed to thoroughly clean up the industrial site. The plant continues to leak poisonous chemicals and heavy metals, which have made their way into nearby aquifers, adding to the company's legacy for the residents of Bhopal. The events in Bhopal demonstrated that rapid industrialization in developing nations without corresponding changes in safety laws can result in disaster. The incident highlighted the need for internationally enforceable environmental safety standards, as well as preventative initiatives to avert future mishaps and industrial disaster preparedness. It should not have allowed Gonzales, Kristine Rose G. Bhopal Gas Tragedy: A Case Study a hazardous facility to operate in such a densely populated region. Uniform international operating norms for hazardous industries, if enforced, would have resulted in a major increase in safety in Bhopal. Risk reduction in plant location and design, as well as safety legislation, should all be part of the prevention strategy. In the event of an industrial accident, industry and government must provide adequate financial support to local communities so that they can provide medical and other necessary services, reducing morbidity, mortality, and material damage. When hazardous companies select locations for manufacturing plants, existing public health infrastructure must be considered. Communities that lack the infrastructure and technical expertise to respond appropriately to industrial catastrophes should not be chosen as hazardous industry sites. Even if the factory is located within the city, the state is responsible for closely monitoring its operations to ensure that safety standards are met. In the event of an emergency, the state should have a plan in place. A gas leak is a rather predictable occurrence. The government should have obtained information about the company's gas usage. It should have held practice drills and made sure the public was aware of the risks. In the event of non-compliance, aggressive actions should have been applied. The Bhopal Tragedy went down in history as one of the deadliest chemical disasters. Both the human tragedy and the blatant technical negligence struck the chemical industry as a slap in the face, prompting widespread changes and emphasizing process safety as a critical and indispensable element at both the technical and managerial levels. Perhaps it is too late to find out "who" was responsible for such a catastrophe, as the power struggle between poor laborers and multinational corporations will only add another chapter to our book of human agony. Nonetheless, it is critical to examine the disaster and attempt to overcome all of the faults that contributed to it, which the chemical industry has done so successfully in recent decades.
