Tijam vs Sibonghanoy
[G.R. No. L-21450. April 15, 1968]
Facts: On July 19, 1948 petitioners Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced a civil case in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to
recover the sum of P1,908.00, plus legal interests and additional costs. Later, respondent company
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. was referred to by the spouses Sibonghanoy as their surety. About a
month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect, depriving the Court of First
Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than
P2,000.00. (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. No. 296.). Despite the enactment of RA 296, throughout the
resolution of the case over the next fifteen years in the Cebu CFI and later the court of appeals,
respondent Surety did not dispute the jurisdiction of the courts, whether directly or indirectly. Later, in
January 1963 receiving the decision of the CA affirming the CFI’s writ of execution, respondent filed a
motion to dismiss, alleging that the petitioner’s action was filed just one month after the enactment of date
RA 296, and that Section 88 of said Act placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts
all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed
P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the CFI therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide
the case.
Issue: W/N Surety is correct in asserting that CFI had no jurisdiction over the case due to the enactment
of RA 296?
Held:
No. CA ruling upheld. A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and
for different reasons. Estoppel is divided into either estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record,
and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. A party cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. In the current case, from the time the
Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction
of the CFI since the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the
proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts
to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after
an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally raised the question of
jurisdiction.
Gonzaga vs CA (Remedial Law)
SPS. RENE GONZAGA and LERIO GONZAGA
vs.
CA, HON. QUIRICO G. DEFENSOR, and LUCKY HOMES, INC.
G.R. No. 144025; December 27, 2002; CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
Sometime in 1970, Sps. Gonzaga purchased a parcel of land from private respondent Lucky
Homes, Inc., situated in Iloilo and containing an area of 240 square meters. Said lot was
specifically denominated as Lot No. 19 under a TCT and was mortgaged to the Social Security
System (SSS) as security for their housing loan.
Petitioners then started the construction of their house, not on Lot No. 19 but on Lot No. 18, as
Lucky Homes Inc mistakenly identified Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Upon realizing its error,
private respondent informed petitioners of such mistake but the latter offered to buy Lot No. 18
in order to widen their premises. Thus, petitioners continued with the construction of their house.
However, petitioners defaulted in the payment of their housing loan from SSS. Consequently,
Lot No. 19 was foreclosed by SSS and petitioners’ certificate of title was cancelled and a new
one was issued in the name of SSS.
Sps. Gonzaga then offered to swap Lot Nos. 18 and 19 and demanded from Lucky Homes that
their contract of sale be reformed and another deed of sale be executed with respect to Lot No.
18, considering that their house was built therein. However, private respondent refused. This
prompted petitioners to file, on June 13, 1996, an action for reformation of contract and damages
with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 36.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It held that when Lot No. 19 was foreclosed
and sold at public auction, the reformation, or the swapping of Lot 18 and Lot 19, was no longer
feasible considering that Sps. Gonzaga were no longer the owners of Lot 19. Thus, Lucky Homes
would be losing Lot 18 without any substitute therefore. Furthermore, the RTC ruled:
"The logic and common sense of the situation lean heavily in favor of the defendant. It is evident
that what plaintiff had bought from the defendant is Lot 19 covered by TCT No. 28254 which
parcel of land has been properly indicated in the instruments and not Lot 18 as claimed by the
plaintiff. The contracts being clear and unmistakable, they reflect the true intention of the parties,
besides the plaintiff failed to assail the contracts on mutual mistake, hence the same need no
longer be reformed.”
A writ of execution was issued. The petitioners filed a motion to recall said writ on the ground
that the RTC lack jurisdiction as pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers
Protective Decree), it was vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Consequently,
Sps. Gonzaga filed a new complaint with the HLURB, and also a petition for annulment of
judgment with the CA, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The CA dismissed the petition, relying on the doctrine of estoppel laid down in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy.
ISSUE:
WON the Sps Gonzaga are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC to try the case
HELD:
Yes. The SC held that the doctrine in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, as reiterated in numerous cases, is
still controlling. In explaining the concept of jurisdiction by estoppel, the Court quoted its
decision in said case, to wit:
"It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question
that same jurisdiction x x x x [T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is
barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive
as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated–– obviously for
reasons of public policy."
Furthermore, the Court said that it was petitioners themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the
court a quo by instituting an action for reformation of contract against private respondents. It
must be noted that in the proceedings before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their
cause from start to finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the court’s
jurisdiction during the entire proceedings which lasted for two years. It was only after the
trial court rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution against them in 1998 did
petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction ─ and it was only because said decision was
unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to question the court’s
jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Petition for review is denied.
Manchester Development Corporation v. CA
FACTS:
A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development Corporation
against City Land Development Corporation to compel the latter to execute a deed of sale in
favor Manchester. Manchester also alleged that City Land forfeited the former’s tender of
payment for a certain transaction thereby causing damages to Manchester amounting to
P78,750,000.00. This amount was alleged in the BODY of their Complaint but it was not
reiterated in the PRAYER of same complaint. Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00 only.
Said docket fee is premised on the allegation of Manchester that their action is primarily for
specific performance hence it is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The court ruled that there is
an under assessment of docket fees hence it ordered Manchester to amend its complaint.
Manchester complied but what it did was to lower the amount of claim for damages to P10M.
Said amount was however again not stated in the PRAYER.
ISSUE: Should the amendment complaint be admitted?
HELD:
No. The docket fee, its computation, should be based on the original complaint. A case is
deemed filed only upon payment of the appropriate docket fee regardless of the actual date of
filing in court. Here, since the proper docket fee was not paid for the original complaint, it’s as if
there is no complaint to speak of. As a consequence, there is no original complaint duly filed
which can be amended. So the any subsequent proceeding taken in consideration of the amended
complaint is void.
Manchester’s defense that this case is primarily an action for specific performance is not
merited. As maybe gleaned from the allegations of the complaint as well as the designation
thereof, it is both an action for damages and specific performance. The docket fee paid upon
filing of complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for
specific performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation is
obviously erroneous. Although the total amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of
the complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the complaint totalling in the amount of
P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee.The Supreme Court
ruled that based on the allegations and the prayer of the complaint, this case is an action for
damages and for specific performance. Hence, it is capable of pecuniary estimation.
Further, the amount for damages in the original complaint was already provided in the
body of the complaint. Its omission in the PRAYER clearly constitutes an attempt to evade the
payment of the proper filing fees. To stop the happenstance of similar irregularities in the future,
the Supreme Court ruled that from this case on, all complaints, petitions, answers and other
similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of
the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the
filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
Heirs of Renato Dragon vs. Manila Banking Corp,
G.R. No. 205068, March 6, 2019
DOCTRINE:
Under Rule 141, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, filing fees must be paid in full at
the time an initiatory pleading or application is filed. Payment is indispensable for
jurisdiction to vest in a court.
FACTS:
Dragon obtained several loans from Manila Banking. Manila Banking was placed under
receivership by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. The bank’s receiver sent Dragon several
demand letters requiring him to pay his outstanding loans, the final letter being dated August 12,
1998. In a Statement of Account attached to the final letter, Manila Banking computed the
amount Dragon owed as P44,038,995.00, consisting of the principal amount of P6,945,642.00,
plus accrued interest, penalties, and attorney’s fees as of July 31, 1998.
Dragon failed to pay his outstanding obligation. Thus, Manila Banking filed before the
Regional Trial Court a Complaint for collection of sum of money.
RTC issued a Decision in Favor of Manila Banking. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed
RTC’S decision.
Meanwhile, he Heirs of Dragon, represented by Patricia Angeli D. Nubia, filed before
this Court a Notice of Death with Motion for Substitution of Petitioner and a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Review under Rule 45. The Heirs of Dragon stated that
Dragon died on October 22, 2012. They further prayed for an additional 30 days within which to
file their Petition for Review.
Petitioners claim that Manila Banking concealed the true amount it claimed to mislead
the trial court’s clerk of court and, thus, avoid paying the correct docket fees. Petitioners argued
that RTC lack jurisdiction for failure to pay the filing fee in full.
ISSUE:
Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over Manila Banking’s claims for
interests, penalties, and attorney’s fees despite its failure to pay the correct docket fees
RULING:
NO. Under Rule 141, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, filing fees must be paid in full at
the time an initiatory pleading or application is filed. Payment is indispensable for jurisdiction
to vest in a court.
The amount must be paid in full. Nonetheless, in Magaspi v. Ramolete despite insufficient
payment of filing fees, a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession was deemed
docketed as there had been an “honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be
paid.”