COVID-19 pandemic
Before the advent of this present pandemic, the world had some experiences of coronavirus in
the past. The two most recent experiences, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, which
happened in China in 2002, 2003 and the Middle-East Respiratory Syndrome, which occurred in
some Middle East and some other countries outside the Middle-East in 2012 (Zhong et al.,
2003). However, Previous Coronaviruses did not cause devastating consequences. They caused
“mild infections in immunocompromised people and were not considered to be highly
pathogenic in humans until they circulated in the Guangdong province of China in 2002 and
2003 during the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak” (Zhong et al., 2003).
The cumulative number of infections recorded was 8437. Out of this number, 813 (9.6%) of the
cases were fatal while 7452 (90.4%) of the cases recovered (WHO, 2003).
Another wave of coronavirus known as the Middle East respiratory syndrome was experienced
between 2012 and 2013. “The first documented cases of MERS occurred in Jordan in early 2012.
Globally, to date, there has been a total of 55 cases confirmed by laboratory testing. Out of these,
40 have occurred in KSA, and the rest have been reported from other countries in the Middle
East (Qatar and the United Arab Emirates), from Tunisia in North Africa, and France, Germany,
Italy and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Europe” (WHO, 2013).
Despite having a limited number of cases, the death rate of MERS was about sixty per cent
(60%) (WHO, 2013). Thus, the combined cases of infections from SARS and MERS amounted
to 8492.
The coronavirus, also known as COVID-19, which began in China in 2019, was linked to a novel
Coronavirus that was named SARS-CoV-2 (Zhu et al., 2020). It is pertinent to note that “the new
strain of coronavirus had not been previously identified in humans and the disease associated
with it has been dubbed Coronavirus diseases 2019 (COVID-19) by the WHO (Bawazir et al.,
2020). The virus has spread to over 155 countries, causing severe morbidity and mortality since
its emergence in 2019 (Wu et al., 2020). However, as of 14th May 2020, the world had witnessed
five million, one hundred and three thousand, and six (5, 103, 006) cases of COVID-19
(following the applied case definitions and testing strategies in the affected countries),
including 109, 536 fatalities, representing 2.15% of the infections. The results also indicate
that 74,256 of the infections are from Africa, 182,278 are from South East Asia, 2,282,488 are
from America, as well as 1,987,657 from Europe and 172,696 from Western Pacific, among
others. The fatalities associated with the different continents as of 14th May 2020 were 2504
(Africa), 5119 (South-East Asia), 62,221 (America) and 21,413 (Europe). As of October 2021;
barely one year after the commencement of the COVID-19 pandemic, the total confirmed cases
rose to 34,804,348 with 1,030,738 (2.96%) fatalities globally (WHO, 2020a; 2020b). This partly
explains why COVID-19 appears to have attracted more global attention in terms of sensitisation
and lockdowns than the previous cases.
Nigeria's COVID-19 outbreak and responses
The first confirmed case of COVID-19 in Nigeria was detected in a traveler who arrived in
Lagos from Europe on February 27, 2020 (NCDC, 2020). In response, the government invested
in preparedness measures, including a US$27 million increase in funding for the Nigeria Center
for Disease Control (NCDC) to strengthen laboratory testing and isolation capacity (IMF,
2020a). The government also launched public education campaigns emphasizing handwashing,
maintaining physical distance from people, and avoiding large gatherings.
Fig. 1 shows average daily increases in confirmed COVID-19 infections in Nigeria, and provides
a timeline of major policy responses, especially at the federal level of government.
The government's response was coordinated by a Presidential Task Force, established in early
March (Ameh, 2020), that worked closely with the NCDC. The NCDC was made responsible for
public health campaigns and for overall management of the testing, isolation, and treatment of
patients. Nigeria's government was quick to recognize the potential scale of COVID-19's
economic costs and was among the first developing countries to announce fiscal and stimulus
measures to cushion economic impacts. These measures included reducing government spending
in anticipation of lower revenues, and providing US$130 million to support households and
small and medium-scale enterprises (FMBNP, 2020).
More importantly, Nigeria's government was among the first on the subcontinent to enforce
social distancing. All schools in the country were closed in mid-March, and several states and
local authorities instituted bans on public and social gatherings. After a second case was
confirmed in Lagos, Nigeria instituted bans on foreign travelers from 13 “highly-infected”
countries and stopped issuing visas on arrival. By late-March, with 44 confirmed cases, the
government closed its land and air borders to all travelers for an initial period of 4 weeks, and
suspended all passenger rail services (Ogundele, 2020).
On 29 March, President Buhari announced specific restrictions for Lagos, FCT, and Ogun States,
which together contain 14% of Nigeria's population. These “lockdown” measures restricted the
movement of residents outside of their homes. They also closed many business operations, as
well as the borders linking the lockdown states to the rest of the country. Passenger air travel was
also suspended nationwide (FGN, 2020a). Shortly afterwards the Presidential Taskforce issued
exemptions for medical services, agricultural activities, food manufacturers and retailers,
telecommunications, and certain financial services (PTF, 2020). The president also announced
some palliative measures, mainly food distribution and a 2-month advance payment of the
conditional cash transfers made by the government to vulnerable citizens. On 13 April, President
Buhari announced a 2-week extension of the federal lockdown policies, which were also
expanded to include Kano state.
Although it was the federal government that directed lockdown measures in four states,
numerous other states implemented their own lockdown policies, sometimes predating the
federal policies. States with significant social distancing measures included Akwa Ibom, Borno,
Edo, Ekiti, Kwara, Taraba, Niger, Ogun, Ondo, Oyo, and Rivers. These lockdowns generally
started with school closings, limited trading hours in informal markets, and restrictions on large
social gatherings, including religious and sporting events. Restrictions were gradually expanded
until they largely resembled the federal lockdowns (e.g., stay-at-home orders and the closing of
businesses and state borders).
By the end of April, the group of states under lockdown measures accounted for almost twothirds of the national economy. Under growing pressure to relax restrictions, the President
announced that lockdowns would be eased in Lagos, FCT and Ogun states starting from around
mid-May, but that the lockdown in Kano would be extended until early June. During June, and
despite continued increases in daily cases, the government lifted restrictions on domestic airlines
and interstate travel and allowed schools to reopen for graduating students. The number of new
cases peaked at the end of June and fell during July and August. On 3 September, the
government lifted all remaining restrictions on local markets.
Expected impacts of lockdown policies.
To gauge the expected impacts for Nigeria, we interviewed key informants including
government officials, private sector actors, and development partners. We also reviewed news
reports, public announcements, and security updates related to COVID-19. This review revealed
that the COVID-19 impact is transmitted via three major impact channels, with potentially
significant adverse effects on household incomes, demand for goods and services, and the
economy's output in 2020.
The first major impact channel is the expected shortfall in federal budget revenue due primarily
to the plunge in oil prices. Likewise, on the expenditure side, there are substantial unanticipated
spending needs associated with COVID-19 in the form of increased health costs, new stimulus
packages for businesses, and increased social support for vulnerable households. The second
channel is the expected decline in private remittances into Nigeria as COVID-19 affects the wellbeing of Nigerian workers living abroad and remitting income back home. The third channel is
the impact of domestic policies that restrict movement of people and business activities,
particularly in the lockdown zones of Abuja FCT, Lagos, and Ogun States. These measures
imposed, simultaneously, a demand-side shock as people were only permitted to buy essential
goods and a supply-side shock as only essential businesses were permitted to operate. We
consider each of these impact channels in more detail below.
Oil revenues and the government budget
With the pandemic expected to continue for most of 2020, the global economic slowdown will
have consequences for Nigeria's oil-dependent economy. Air and ground travel have effectively
come to a halt in most parts of the world, and oil prices have fallen by 45% to around US$30 per
barrel in the first quarter of 2020 (Akanni and Gabriel, 2020). A direct consequence for Nigeria's
federal government is a sharp decline in revenues. Oil revenues contribute more than 60% of
government revenues, and projected revenues for 2020 were based on a benchmark oil price of
US$57 per barrel (BudgIT, 2020; CBN, 2020; PWC, 2020). The Ministry of Finance, Budget,
and National Planning (MFBNP) estimated that, due to COVID-19, government's monthly oil
receipts would decline from USD 2.3 billion to around US$1 billion by September 2020
(FMBNP, 2020).
Apart from a revenue shortfall, the federal government also faced significant pressures to raise
spending in areas not previously budgeted for, including US$300 million toward disease
preparedness and response and stimulus payments of US$700 million (CBN, 2020). The
government undertook a significant budget revision (FMBNP, 2020; PWC, 2020), and
announced that revenue shortfalls would lead to cuts to capital spending rather than recurrent
spending and social transfers (Onyekwena and Amara Mma, 2020). The government also applied
for new loans from the African Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank, the IMF, and
the World Bank (FMBNP, 2020).
Private remittances
Nigeria is the largest recipient of foreign remittance incomes in Sub-Saharan Africa, and these
comprise about 5% of Nigerian GDP (Nevin and Omosomi, 2019; World Bank, 2018, World
Bank, 2019). The Economist (2020) reports that Nigeria relies on “major lockdown economies,”
such as Britain, France, Italy, Spain, and the United States of America, for 54% of remittance
incomes. Remittances from these countries declined dramatically in early-2020; for example,
some payments companies in Europe reported declines of 80–90% in remittance payments to
Africa. The World Bank (2020b) provides a longer-term perspective, predicting that remittance
flows into Nigeria will decline by 25% this year due to COVID-19. This is at the upper-end of
the 5–25% range decline anticipated by Kuhlcke and Bester (2020) based on an analysis of
remittance flows during past crises, although they warn that the high proportion of remittances
coming through informal channels makes it difficult to assess the true impact.
Remittances are also not evenly distributed across different socioeconomic groups. The Nigeria
SAM used in our analysis reveals that net foreign remittance incomes (remittances payments are
only about 1.5% of remittance receipts) account for 6.1% of consumption expenditure in Nigeria.
However, remittance receipts account for a much larger share of consumption expenditure for
urban households (9.6%) than rural households (2.7%), and a staggering 98.7% are to nonpoor
households. As such, the expectation is that remittance income shocks will have mostly affected
the well-being of nonpoor and urban-based consumers.
Domestic lockdown measures
The third major impact channel includes the direct effects of policies adopted to mitigate the
spread of the coronavirus, specifically the 5-week restrictions on movement and economic
activity imposed by the federal government on the Abuja Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Lagos
State, and Ogun State, as well as the extended lockdowns in other states, such as Kano. These
restrictions directly reduce economic output and household incomes for a large share of the
residents who are unable to work and earn an income. Consumer demand is also curtailed
directly through measures that prevent consumers from spending money on non-essential goods
and services.
Lockdown measures were not applicable to sectors considered “essential.” The federal
government issued exemptions for medical services provided by public and private hospitals and
pharmacies, food retail in markets during restricted hours, supermarkets and grocery shops, and
prepared foods for delivery. The policies allowed farms, food and drug manufacturers, and food
distributors to continue their activities. Other services considered essential, and therefore exempt,
included fuel stations, private security companies, and limited financial services to maintain cash
availability and to allow for online transactions. Public utility services, news companies, and
telecommunications providers were also exempted.
Sectors or subsectors that were not exempt from the lockdown measures were significantly
affected. The impact on a sector or subsector at the national level depends on the share of
productive activities that take place within the lockdown zones. Likewise, the immediate overall
impact on the national economy depends on the importance of the sector in terms of its share of
GDP or employment. We conclude this section by describing some of the anticipated effects of
lockdown measures on different subsectors.
Manufacturing: Many nonfood manufacturing activities were suspended during the lockdown
period and in the lockdown zones. The Lagos and Ogun State industrial clusters account for
about 60% of manufacturing in Nigeria, according to some estimates, and the Apapa Port in
Lagos serves as the point of entry for primary and intermediate manufacturing inputs. As such,
we anticipate a major negative shock for the manufacturing sector. Affected industries include
manufacturers of cement, basic and fabricated metals, plastics, glass, and furniture products.
While port and cargo operations were exempted from movement restrictions, port operators and
manufacturers still reported that the lockdown almost immediately resulted in a backlog of
containers and increased congestion at the port, as interstate movement restrictions and fear of
harassment led to reduced trucking services. Moreover, although manufacturers of food, drugs,
pharmaceuticals, among others, were exempted from restrictions, anecdotal evidence suggests
that security concerns and supply chain disruptions resulted in companies operating below
capacity.
Construction: There were no exemptions for private or public construction works in the affected
areas. Moreover, movement restrictions, locally imposed curfews, and state border closures
affected construction activity outside of the affected areas as well due to difficulties in obtaining
important inputs such as cement or other building materials. We therefore a modest, but
nationwide, decline in the construction activity as a result of domestic policies.
Transportation, storage, and cargo handling: With the nationwide closure of bus services,
passenger rail services, and phone-based taxi services, the movement restrictions curtailed most
ground transportation in the affected areas. Transportation was limited to essential trips for food
or medicines or to seek medical treatment. Although port cargo handling, air cargo services, and
associated services, such as storage and warehousing, continued to operate, insecurity and fear of
harassment on transport routes reduced operations for exempted services.
Hotels, catering, and food services: COVID-19 policy responses severely affected the business
of hotels, restaurants, and catering services. Movement restrictions included bans on visiting
restaurants. The lack of a “food delivery culture” in Nigeria implied a near-total shutdown of
urban food services during the lockdown period.
Repair services: The bulk of repair services are carried out either in repair shops in markets as
part of Nigeria's large informal sector, or by itinerant repair workers. This sector suffered
severely from restricted movement and the closure of market centers.
Domestic workers and other personal services: Domestic workers (e.g., cooks, childcare
providers, cleaners, gardeners, private security guards etc.) form a large share of the working
population within the lockdown zones. While some domestic workers reside at their places of
work, those who live outside were no longer able to commute to work. We estimated that about
half of these workers are live-in workers and will continue to work and earn a living during the
lockdown period.
Empirical review
The global COVID-19 pandemic has trapped economic activities, schools are shut down, places
of worship have been deserted, international flights have been very limited, if not completely
stopped, there is a near total lockdown as people are encouraged to stay at home (Gever and
Ezeah, 2020). Governments of countries have placed restrictions on movement both locally and
internationally while Peoples’ sources of livelihood have been threatened.
Studies on the impacts of COVID-19 global pandemic on social life, interaction, and human
activities have been conducted around the world [21,22]. The recent COVID-19 epidemic has
generated much scholarly concernsin different parts of the world and researchers have continued
to assess its global impact on different areas [23-25]. Some assessed the impact of the global
pandemic on household welfare [26] others evaluated its impact on organizations [27,28] and
people’s daily life [21,22].
Empirical evidences on the impact of disease outbreak in the past have recorded diverse ways
through which such outbreaks affect people’s social life and interactions. A Netherland study
found that 80% of people reduced their outdoors activities; that 44% of workers started or
increased the amount of hours working from home and 30% have more remote meetings; that
Students and school pupils, however, are mostly not happy with following education from home;
the amount of trips and distance travelled dropped by 55% and 68% respectively when compared
to the fall of 2019.
The above finding however, revealed that 27% of home-workers expect to work from home
more often in the future and 20% of people will cycle and walk more and 20% expect to fly less
in the future. These findings show that the coronavirus crisis might result in structural
behavioural changes [9].On the contrary, Yezli, et al. [29] noted that even after the COVID-19
pandemic, social interactions continued among the population of Saudi Arabia, especially in the
evenings, which ultimately required authorities to declare a partial curfew to restrict movement.
Therefore, based on the above studies and coupled with the effect of COVID-19 pandemic on a
global level, this paper fills a gap in understanding of how COVID-19 pandemic affected the
social life, interaction and general welfare of people living in Nigeria.
Socio-Economic Implications on Nigerians
What began as a health crisis - with grave impact on populations - will within days become an
economic and fiscal crisis with a high risk of negative social implications.
Oil Prices Falling by Almost 60%
The decline in oil prices by 55 percent between the end of 2019 to March 2020, is one of the
most serious economic shocks that Nigeria has faced in its memory, especially as the oil sector
contributes 65 percent and 90 percent to government and total export revenues, respectively.
As of 18 March, 2020, the price of crude oil dipped to US$29.62/barrel. Given that the Federal
budget estimates for 2020 have pegged oil prices at US$57/barrel and production at 2.18 million
barrels per day, if prices continue to remain at this level, it would translate to a decline in 48
percent of expected revenue from oil sales per month. This alone could reduce fiscal revenue by
close to $10B and export earnings by $19B.9 The decline in export revenues is projected to have
a combined effect of 0.55 percentage points drop in GDP.
The lack of demand could also reduce domestic oil production (supply) in the short to medium
term. As such, fiscal space could be narrowed significantly further limiting the Government’s
ability to cope with an emergency response. These estimates, however, do not consider the
adverse effects of the virus and related disturbances to other economic activities such as
domestic trade and services which account for the bulk of GDP. The agricultural sector may not
be seriously impacted immediately assuming that the virus does not spread to rural areas before
the agricultural season starts next month.
Disruptions could occur to supply chain distributions, value addition and services in the event of
restrictions to movement of people. In such an event, the Nigerian economy could fall back into
a recession with a negative growth rate of 1.58% for 2020.
Significant Job Losses could amplify the Crisis
As the outbreak intensifies, Nigeria’s services, trade and financial sectors would suffer
significant disruptions. Together, the three sectors contribute over 30% to GDP. Contraction in
these sectors could result in significant job losses both in the formal and informal job markets.
This could be a severe blow and could be a threat to instability as
youth
unemployment/underemployment is already high at 55%.
Implications on Peace and Social Cohesion
The implications of the economic impact of the pandemic could cultivate conditions for
disgruntlement and social unrest. Pandemics have a bearing on the social fabric of society - stress
initiated by economic losses often result in visible cracks where incidences of once socially
unacceptable norms become more frequent. Evidence suggests that health related pandemics
have the potential to increase the risks of: domestic violence – with police reports in China
showing that domestic violence tripled during the epidemic; violence against health workers due
serious stress levels that the pandemic places on patients; and abuse and exploitation of women
and girls – especially care givers. Furthermore, frustrations resulting from economic loss could
also play into existing regional fault lines within Nigeria. Restrictive non-pharmaceutical
measures, for example isolation, social distancing and quarantine implemented
in contexts already characterized by fragility in conflict and humanitarian situations will remain
a key policy challenge. In such contexts, social connectedness is the currency that nurtures the
much-needed resilience for communities to persevere in the face of crisis. As such, social
networks and systems which provide support and regulate well-being are often weakened
through restrictive non-pharmaceutical measures. Implementing isolation measures without
taking regard of the local context can further exacerbate the situation, lead to stress disorders,
mental health and in some cases protracted violence.
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