MMDA vs. Garin G.R. No. 130230
At issue in this case is the validity of Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924 creating the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA), which authorizes it to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver's licenses
in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations.
The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a
traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driver's license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street,
Binondo, Manila, on 05 August 1995.
Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter2 to then MMDA
Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference for his
case to be filed in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint contending that, in the absence of any
implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion
to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the
deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The respondent further
contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative
authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified – and therefore unlimited - fines
and other penalties on erring motorists.
In support of his application for a writ of preliminary injunction, Garin alleged that he suffered and
continues to suffer great and irreparable damage because of the deprivation of his license and that, absent
any implementing rules from the Metro Manila Council, the TVR and the confiscation of his license have
no legal basis.
For its part, the MMDA, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, pointed out that the powers
granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing, collection and imposition of fines
and penalties for traffic violations, which powers are legislative and executive in nature; the judiciary
retains the right to determine the validity of the penalty imposed. It further argued that the doctrine of
separation of powers does not preclude "admixture" of the three powers of government in administrative
agencies.4
The MMDA also refuted Garin's allegation that the Metro Manila Council, the governing board and policy
making body of the petitioner, has as yet to formulate the implementing rules for Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No.
7924 and directed the court's attention to MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 dated 15 April
1995. Respondent Garin, however, questioned the validity of MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95001, as he claims that it was passed by the Metro Manila Council in the absence of a quorum.
On 14 August 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision5 in favor of the herein respondent and
held that:
a.
There was indeed no quorum in that First Regular Meeting of the MMDA Council held on March
23, 1995, hence MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, authorizing confiscation of driver's licenses
upon issuance of a TVR, is void ab initio.
b.
The summary confiscation of a driver's license without first giving the driver an opportunity to be
heard; depriving him of a property right (driver's license) without DUE PROCESS; not filling (sic) in Court
the complaint of supposed traffic infraction, cannot be justified by any legislation (and is) hence
unconstitutional.
In filing this petition, the MMDA reiterates and reinforces its argument in the court below and contends
that a license to operate a motor vehicle is neither a contract nor a property right, but is a privilege subject
to reasonable regulation under the police power in the interest of the public safety and welfare. The
petitioner further argues that revocation or suspension of this privilege does not constitute a taking without
due process as long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation.
To buttress its argument that a licensee may indeed appeal the taking and the judiciary retains the power
to determine the validity of the confiscation, suspension or revocation of the license, the petitioner points
out that under the terms of the confiscation, the licensee has three options:
1. To voluntarily pay the imposable fine,
2. To protest the apprehension by filing a protest with the MMDA Adjudication Committee, or
3. To request the referral of the TVR to the Public Prosecutor's Office.
The MMDA likewise argues that Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 was validly passed in the presence
of a quorum, and that the lower court's finding that it had not was based on a "misapprehension of facts,"
which the petitioner would have us review. Moreover, it asserts that though the circular is the basis for the
issuance of TVRs, the basis for the summary confiscation of licenses is Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 itself,
and that such power is self-executory and does not require the issuance of any implementing regulation or
circular.
ISSUE
issue in this case is the validity of Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924 creating the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA), which authorizes it to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver's licenses
in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations.
HELD
Court deems it appropriate to make the following observations:
1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the exercise of its police
power.
The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a
privilege granted by the state, which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its police
power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare, subject to the procedural due process requirements.
The MMDA is not vested with police power.
In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,14 we categorically stated that Rep.
Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its
functions are administrative in nature.
Tracing the legislative history of Rep. Act No. 7924 creating the MMDA, the court concluded that the
MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power, and, unlike
its predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community.
Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised by any group or body of
individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power
to the president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or
local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are
conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991.15 A local
government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial
control of local affairs."16 Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays,
which exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the passage of
Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative
region" and the administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a
development authority" referred to as the MMDA. Thus:
. . . [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with
the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and
the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan
area. All its functions are administrative in nature
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given
to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of
the MMDA's functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general
welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis
Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by the petitioner
to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses without need of any other
legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police power.
3.
Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations.
Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom
legislative powers have been delegated (the City of Manila in this case), the petitioner is not precluded –
and in fact is duty-bound – to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the exercise of its
mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and implementation of all
traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs
he MMDA is a development authority created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating
with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations
and the private sector, which may enforce, but not enact, ordinances.
Further the petitioner must be reminded that its efforts in this respect must be authorized by a valid law, or
ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate source.
Social Justice Society, et. Al. vs. Atienza
G.R. No. 156052 February 13, 2008
Mandamus is a judicial remedy in the form of an order from a court to any government, subordinate
court, corporation, or public authority, to do some specific act which that body is obliged under
law to do, and which is in the nature of public duty, and in certain cases one of a statutory duty.
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of
a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila reclassified the area from
industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed to cease and
desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies
Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that “the scaling down of the Pandacan
Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.” In the MOU, the oil companies were required to
remove 28 tanks starting with the LPG spheres and to commence work for the creation of safety buffer and
green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. In exchange, the City Mayor and the DOE will enable
the oil companies to continuously operate within the limited area resulting from joint operations and the
scale down program. The Sangguniang Panlungosod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.
Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and
order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.
Issue
Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal
of the Pandacan Terminals.
Ruling
Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because the Local Government
Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to “enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city.” One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the
duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by
the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.
In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an
alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public
business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and
ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional.
Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
Bishop Vicente M. Navarra posted two (2) tarpaulins, each with approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′)
in size, for public viewing within the vicinity of San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. One of the tarpaulins
stated: “Conscience Vote” and lists of candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark or
“(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark.The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote
on the adoption of the RH Law.
Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who
voted against it form “Team Buhay.
When the said tarpaulin came to the attention of Comelec, it sent a letter to Bishop Navarra ordering the
immediate removal of the tarpaulin because it was in violation of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 as the
lawful size for election propaganda material is only two feet (2’) by three feet (3’); otherwise, it will be
constrained to file an election offense against the latter.
Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free speech, Bishop Navarra, et
al. prayed for the Court to declare the questioned orders of Comelec as unconstitutional, and permanently
restraining the latter from enforcing them after notice and hearing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the controversial tarpaulin is an election propaganda which the Comelec has the power to
regulate; otherwise its prohibition shall constitute an abridgment of freedom of speech.
RULING:
It is not election propaganda.
While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this
does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return
for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
Personal opinions, unlike sponsored messages, are not covered by the second paragraph of Sec. 1(4) of
Comelec Resolution No. 9615 defining “political advertisement” or “election propaganda.”
The caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech. That petitioners chose to categorize
them as purveyors of death or of life on the basis of a single issue—and a complex piece of legislation at
that—can easily be interpreted as an attempt to stereotype the candidates and party- list organizations. Not
all may agree to the way their thoughts were expressed, as in fact there are other Catholic dioceses that
chose not to follow the example of petitioners.
But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our Constitution is an enumeration of our fundamental liberties. It is
not a detailed code that prescribes good conduct. It provides space for all to be guided by their conscience,
not only in the act that they do to others but also in judgment of the acts of others.
PBM Employees Org. vs. PNB Co.
51 SCRA 189
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union
composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., with the officers and
members of the petitioner Uuion.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on
March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in
the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to
4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their
proposed demonstration.
The parties stipulated that the company, after learning the mass demonstration, informed the union panel
that they even if the demonstration is an inalienable right granted by the Constitution, it should not unduly
prejudice the normal operation of the company. As such, they warned the PBMEO representatives that
workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the
Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to
report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation
of the existing CBA (collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees)
particularly Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE’; and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal
strike.
Because the petitioners and their members proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the
respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration
and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration, respondent
Company charged the petitioners with a “violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as
well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for ‘No Strike and No Lockout.’ ”
In their answer, petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the
respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass
demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of
some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not
directed against the respondent firm.
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M.
Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in
bad faith and herein petitioners, as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice were
considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company.
Issue:
Whether the respondents’ act of concluding that the petitioners acted in bad faith for proceeding with the
demonstration and expelling them from the company is unconstitutional.
Held:
No. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage
would not spell the difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its management.
While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. Because these freedoms are “delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our
society” and the “threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application
of sanctions,” they “need breathing space to survive,” permitting government regulation only “with
narrow specificity.”
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition
against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent
firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution —
the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The condition in which the employees found
themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual
existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The
debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in
monetary terms.
The primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances — over property rights has to be sustained.
There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of
the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to
regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the
company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is
unconstitutional.
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the
respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged
police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for
redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in
relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right “to engage in concert activities for … mutual aid
or protection”; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three.” The insistence on
the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shift should not participate in
the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, “a potent means of inhibiting
speech.”
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to
petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal constitutes a denial of social justice
likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the
Constitution imposes upon the State “the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all of the people,” which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article
XIV of the Constitution that “the State shall afford protection to labor …”. Respondent Court of Industrial
Relations as an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these
constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would
be merely a lot of “meaningless constitutional patter.” Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of
Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law “to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest
by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose
of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being.” It is most
unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very governmental agency
designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission — its
raison d’etre — as ordained and directed by the Constitution.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic
understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the
local police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees
in their fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is
sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent company assaulted
the immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure and implement selfishness, if not greed.
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism such as in the Republic
Savings Bank vs CIR, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no less,
such recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the
more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against the
company nor any of its officers.
Balacuit v. CFI
G.R. No. L-38429, June 30, 1998
The Municipal Board of the City of Butuan pass an ordinance penalizing any person, group of persons,
entity, or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public
exhibitions, games, contests, or other performances to require children between seven (7) and twelve (12)
years of age to pay full payment for admission tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half
of the value of the said tickets.
The Petitioners, theater owners, aggrieved by said ordinance, they file a complaint before the Court of First
Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City assailing the constitutionalit of Ordinance No. 640.
The Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan constitutional and valid.
ISSUE:
WON Ordinance No. 640 is a valid exercise of police power
HELD:
NO. Ordinance No. 640 infringes theater owners’ right to property.
Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if We could
assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been
fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of
citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising
police power, be upheld as valid.
The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of
the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive,
partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the
bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be
oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A
lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by
the exercise of police power.33 A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation
of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property
rights.34 The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent
attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause."" Hence, the
proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of
admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay
away.
Lozano vs. Matinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986)
The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing
Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by these petitions for decision.
Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is the alleged conflict between
the statute and the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. It is contended that the
statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states, "No person shall be imprisoned for
debt or non-payment of a poll tax." Petitioners insist that, since the offense under BP 22 is consummated
only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is presented to the drawee bank, the statute
is really a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-payment of the check,
not the act of issuing it. The statute, it is claimed, is nothing more than a veiled device to coerce payment
of a debt under the threat of penal sanction.
ISSUE:
WON enactment of BP 22 repugnant of the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt and
therefore is an invalid exercise of police power.
RULING:
NO. police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of changing times. There
are occasions when the police power of the state may even override a constitutional guaranty. For example,
there have been cases wherein we held that the constitutional provision on non-impairment of contracts
must yield to the police power of the state. Whether the police power may override the constitutional
inhibition against imprisonment for debt is an issue we do not have to address. This bridge has not been
reached, so there is no occasion to cross it.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust
of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them
in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
The SC finds that the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
Carlos Superdrug Corporation vs. DSWD, et. Al.
G.R. No. 166494, June 29, 2007
Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines.
Public respondents, on the other hand, include the DSWD, DOH, DOF, DOJ, and the DILG, specifically
tasked to monitor the drugstores’ compliance with the law; promulgate the implementing rules and
regulations for the effective implementation of the law; and prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring
drugstore establishments.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9257 otherwise known as the “Expanded
Senior Citizens Act of 2003.”
Sec. 4(a) of the Act states that The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: (a) the grant of twenty
percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar
lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments
for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of
senior citizens;
Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of
private property. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a
loss of profit and capital because according to them drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on
branded medicines, and the law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated
for the discount.
ISSUE:
WON RA 9257 is constitutional.
HELD:
YES. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely
veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest
benefits.
The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical industry and the competitive pricing
component of the business. While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the
realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a
business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process.
Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
extending as it does to all the great public needs. It is [t]he power vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for
the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow
to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to
general welfare. Without sufficient proof that Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the
continued implementation of the same would be unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the Court will
refrain from quashing a legislative act
Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators vs. City Mayor
20 SCRA 849, 1967
FACTS:
The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 for being violative of the due
process clause, contending that said ordinance is not only arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also
vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise allege the invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty
against self-incrimination.
Ordinance No. 4760 has the following provisions:
1. Refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in
the lobby in open view;
2. prohibiting admission of less than 18 years old;
3. imposition of P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels
4.It is unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours.
5. Automatic cancellation of license for subsequent violation of the Ordinance.
The lower court ruled in favor of Ermita-Manila Hotel. Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.
HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in this case
Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this
case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the
ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was
precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution.
The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also
increases the revenue of the LGU concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well.
The due process contention is likewise untenable, There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It has a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of
life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which
must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal
infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively
put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the
ordinance’s nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not
violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by
law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the
peace and order of society and the general well-being.
The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and lifted the injuction on the Ordinance in question
CRUZ Vs. PARAS
123 SCAR 569, 1983
Facts:
1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended
that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a
lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process
and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect
withdrawn without judicial hearing.
2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or
City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain
Places
of
Amusement
within
Their
Respective
Territorial
Jurisdictions.'
The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power
to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing
schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of
amusement
within
its
territorial
jurisdiction:
On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise
"Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938.
3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go as far as
to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit.
The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition.
4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to a
constitutional question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and
dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid Ordinance No. 84
NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but
an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.
1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result
in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was
prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and
safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such
competence extending to all "the great public needs.
In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible
interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such
grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that would affix
the seal of doom certainly commends itself.
3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night
clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an
exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to
apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses
could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to
allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the
meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would
amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business.
4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an
assumed power to prohibit.
Velasco vs. Villegas
120 SCRA 568 1983
Facts: In their own behalf and in representation of the other owners of barbershops in the City of Manila,
petitioners challenge the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, which
prohibited the business of massaging customers of a barber shop. They contend that it amounts to a
deprivation of property of their means of livelihood without due process of law.
Issue: Whether said ordinance was unconstitutional, and therefore an improper exercise of police power
Held: No. The attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of respondentsappellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: “(1) To be able to impose
payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as
amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of
barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of
separate rooms for massage of customers.”
The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. As far back
as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the significance and
scope of such a clause, which “delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. As above
stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the
particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the
progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence.”
Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties
234 SCRA 255, 1994
FACTS:
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance,
including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building
belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to
inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.
Then Mayor Magtajas together with the city legislators and civil organizations of the City of Cagayan de
Oro denounced such project.
In reaction to this project, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted two (2) ordinances
prohibiting the issuance of a business permit and canceling existing business permit to establishment for
the operation of casino (ORDINANCE NO. 3353) and an ordinance prohibiting the operation of casino and
providing penalty for its violation. (ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93).
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor
and supplemental petitioner.
Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their
enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied against petitioners.
Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
WON Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are a valid exercise of police power.
HELD:
NO. The ordinances enacted are invalid. Ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipal
governments are merely agents of the National Government. Local Councils exercise only delegated
powers conferred by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal powers higher than those
of the latter. PD 1869 authorized casino gambling. As a statute, it cannot be amended/nullified by a mere
ordinance.
As to petitioners attack on gambling as harmful and immoral, the Court stressed that the morality of
gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical
to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing
gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it
sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it
without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may
consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting, and horse-
racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority
to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting
theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the
wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only
by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government.
That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own
conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.
City of Manila v. Judge Laguio
G.R No. 118127, April 18 2005
FACTS:
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in
Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993,
MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of
Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila
(City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its
prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is entitled–
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES
PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN
THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were committed
by the lower court in its ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and
oppressive exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of all
kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance,
as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance
to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must
be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City
Council acting as agent of Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the LGC, known
as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
A. The Ordinance contravenes the Constitution
The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and
repugnant to general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the
people to due process and equal protection of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law
in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and
to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private
rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even
under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values
of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the
scope of the City Council’s police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were
unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community’s social ills can be
achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather
than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into
businesses “allowed” under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its
purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and
promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills
of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of
the community. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason
alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood
or a naked assumption.
If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead
impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the
conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for
these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to
reasonably accomplish the desired end.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the
governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person’s fundamental right
to liberty and property.
Modality employed is unlawful taking
It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable
purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just
compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A “possessory” taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. A “regulatory” taking occurs when the
government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it
leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
expectations for use. When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has
suffered a taking.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the “prohibited” establishments three (3) months from
its approval within which to “wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the ErmitaMalate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area.” The directive
to “wind up business operations” amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of
property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an
“allowed” business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering
dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner
that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
-Malate area or to convert into
violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a “taking” of private property.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance,
although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a “wholesome” property to a use which can not
reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. Private
property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without
compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we know them. The police
powers of local government units which have always received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be
stretched to cover this particular taking.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down
establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no
conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as
the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should
have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance does
not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments “tend to disturb the community,” “annoy the
inhabitants,” and “adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community.”
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide
the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due
process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
business.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause
In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing
lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and
inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification in
the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair
relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the ErmitaMalate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if
located outside the area.
The standard “
women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the discrimination is invalid.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely empowers local government
units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and
other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate
them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and
prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing
the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one
which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or
comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven
in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary
abatement without judicial intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499.
As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a
commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial
establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service
station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be
valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact but the
same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal
privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to
enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Ortigas vs. Feati Bank
94, SCRA 719
FACTS:
Ortigas and Co. is engaged in real estate business developing and selling lots to the public. It sold to
Augusto Padilla and Natividad Angeles Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision,
Mandaluyong by sale on instalments. The vendees then transferred their rights and interests over the
aforesaid lots in favour of one Emma Chavez. The agreements of sale on instalment and the deeds of sale
contained the restriction that “The parcel of land subject of this deed of sale shall be used by the Buyer
exclusively for residential purposes, and she shall not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel
from it or any other lots belonging to the Seller.”
Feati Bank and Trust Co. later bought said lots from Emma Chavez in the name of Republic Flour Mills.
Ortigas and Co. claims that the restrictions were imposed as part of its general building scheme designed
for the beautification and development of the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of its big landed
estate. Feati Bank, on the other hand, maintains that the area along the western part of EDSA from Shaw
Boulevard to Pasig River has been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per Resolution No. 27 s-1960
of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal. Later on, Feati Bank commenced construction on the said
lots for a building devoted to banking purposes. It refused to comply with the demands of Ortigas & Co.
to stop the said construction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Resolution No. 27 s-1960 can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed by
the defendant.
HELD:
Yes. While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has
to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e. “ the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety of the general welfare of the people.”
This general welfare clause shall be liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as to give more power to local
governments in promoting the economic conditions, social welfare and material progress of the people in
the community. The only exceptions under Section 12 of the Local Autonomy Act (R.A. 2264) are existing
vested rights arising out of a contract between a province, city or municipality on one hand and a third
party on the other hand. Said case is not present in this petition.
Resolution No. 27 s-1960 declaring the western part of EDSA as an industrial and commercial zone was
passed in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and
general welfare of the people in the locality.
Presley vs. Bel-Air Village Associations
201 SCRA 13
Spouses Almendras were the registered owners of the property while Presley as lessee of the property, is
the owner and operator of Hot Pan de Sal Store. A complaint for specific performance was filed by Bel-Air
Village Association, Inc. against the spouses (deceased, substituted by petitioner) for violating a Bel - Air
Subdivision restriction that the subject house and lot shall be used only for residential and not for
commercial purposes, and for non-payment of association dues to them.
The RTC rendered decision in favor of respondent which was affirmed by the CA Motion for
reconsideration was denied hence this petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the deed of restriction can be enforced by BAVA against the petitioner.
RULING:
No. The contractual stipulations on the use of the land even if said conditions are annotated on the torrens
title can be impaired if necessary, to reconcile with the legitimate exercise of police power. Like all contracts,
subject to the overriding demands, needs, and interests of the greater number as the State may determine
in the legitimate exercise of police power. The jurisdiction of the court guarantees sanctity of contract and
is said to be the 'law between the contracting parties,' (Civil Code, supra, art. 1159) but while it is so, it
cannot contravene 'law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.' (supra, art. 1306). Above all,
it cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and
enhance the common good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary.
Jupiter Street has been highly commercialized since the passage of Ordinance No. 81-01. The records
indicate that commercial buildings, offices, restaurants, and stores have already sprouted in the area. The
Court saw no reason why the petitioner should be singled out and prohibited from putting up her hot pan
de sal store.
Knights of Rizal vs. Torre de Manila
DMCI Project Developers, Inc. acquired a 7,716.60-square meter lot in the City of Manila, located near Taft
Avenue, Ermita, beside the former Manila Jai-Alai Building and Adamson University. The lot was
earmarked for the construction of DMCI-PDI’s Torre de Manila condominium project. DMCI-PDI secured
its Barangay Clearance to start the construction of its project. It then obtained a Zoning Permit and Building
Permit.
The City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of the Building Official to
temporarily suspend the Building Permit of DMCI-PDI, citing among others, that “the Torre de Manila
Condominium, based on their development plans, upon completion, will rise up high above the back of
the national monument, to clearly dwarf the statue of our hero, and with such towering heights, would
certainly ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point.
Subsequently, both the City of Manila and DMCI-PDI sought the opinion or the National Historical
Commission of the Philippines on the matter. The NHCP maintained that the Torre de Manila project site
is outside the boundaries of the Rizal park and well to the rear of the Rizal Monument, and thus, cannot
possibly obstruct the frontal view of the National Monument.
Following an online petition against the Torre de Manila project that garnered about 7,800
signatures, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 146, reiterating its directive enjoining the City
of Manila’s building officials to temporarily suspend the Building Permit.
The City Council of Manila a resolution ratifying and confirming all previously issued permits, licenses
and approvals issued by the City. The KOR, a “civic, patriotic, cultural, nonpartisan, non-sectarian and
non-profit organization” created under Republic Act No. 646, filed a Petition for Injunction seeking a
temporary restraining order, and later a permanent injunction, against the construction of DMCIPDI’s
Torre de Manila condominium project. The KOR argues that the subject matter of the present suit is one of
“transcendental importance, paramount public interest, of overarching significance to society, or with farreaching implication” involving the desecration of the Rizal Monument.
Further, the KOR argues that the Rizal Monument, as a National Treasure, is entitled to “full protection of
the law” and the national government must abate the act or activity that endangers the nation’s cultural
heritage “even against the wishes of the local government hosting it.”
Next, the KOR contends that the project is a nuisance per se because “the despoliation of the sight view of
the Rizal Monument is a situation that annoys or offends the senses’ of every Filipino who honors the
memory of the National Hero Jose Rizal. It is a present, continuing, worsening and aggravating status or
condition. Hence, the PROJECT is a nuisance per se. It deserves to be abated summarily, even without need
of judicial proceeding. “
The KOR also claims that the Torre de Manila project violates the NHCP’s Guidelines on Monuments
Honoring National Heroes, Illustrious Filipinos and Other Personages, which state that historic
monuments should assert a visual “dominance” over its surroundings, as well as the country’s
commitment under the International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and
Sites, otherwise known as the Venice Charter.
DMCI-PDI argues that the KOR’s petition should be dismissed on the following grounds: that this
honorable court has no jurisdiction over this action; that KOR has no legal right or interest to file or
prosecute this action; that Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se; that DMCI acted in good faith in
constructing Torre de Manila; and that KOR is not entitled to a temporary restraining order and/or a writ
of preliminary injunction.
The City of Manila also asserts that the “issuance and revocation of a Building Permit undoubtedly fall
under the category of a discretionary act or duty performed by the proper officer in light of his meticulous
appraisal and evaluation of the pertinent supporting documents of the application in accordance with the
rules laid out under the National Building Code [and] Presidential Decree No. 1096,” while the mandamus
is available only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court can issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the City of Manila to stop
the construction of DMCI-PDI’s Torre de Manila project.
RULING:
No. There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila. The Court has allowed or upheld
actions that were not expressly prohibited by statutes when it determined that these acts were not contrary
to morals, customs, and public order, or that upholding the same would lead to a more equitable solution
to the controversy. However, it is the law itself – Articles 1306 and 1409(1) of the Civil Code – which
prescribes that acts not contrary to morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are allowed if also
not contrary to law.
In this case, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila project is “contrary to morals, customs,
and public order” or that it brings harm, danger, or hazard to the community. There is no law prohibiting
the construction of the Torre de Manila due to its effect on the background “view, vista, sightline, or setting”
of the Rizal Monument.
Mandamus does not lie against the City of Manila. The Rules on Civil Procedure are clear that mandamus
only issues when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled
to perform an act, and when the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such
act.
In the present case, nowhere is it found in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule for that
matter, that the construction of a building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if the building is within the
background sightline or view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is no legal duty on the part of the City of
Manila “to consider,” in the words of the Dissenting Opinion, “the standards set under Ordinance No.
8119” in relation to the applications of DMCI-PDI for the Torre de Manila since under the ordinance these
standards can never be applied outside the boundaries of Rizal Park.
The KOR also invokes this Court’s exercise of its extraordinary certiorari power of review under Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution. However, this Court can only exercise its extraordinary certiorari power if
the City of Manila, in issuing the required permits and licenses, gravely abused its discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Tellingly, neither the majority nor minority opinion in this case has found
that the City of Manila committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the permits and licenses to DMCIPDI.
In cases where the question of constitutionality of a governmental action is raised, the judicial power that
the courts exercise is likewise identified as the power of judicial review – the power to review the
constitutionality of the actions of other branches of government. The judicial review that the courts
undertake requires:
1) there be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
2) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement;
3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lismota of the case.
There is, however, no clear legal duty on the City of Manila to consider the provisions of Ordinance No.
8119 for applications for permits to build outside the protected areas of the Rizal Park.
It is the policy of the courts not to interfere with the discretionary executive acts of the executive branch
unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Mandamus does not lie against the legislative and executive branches or their members acting in the
exercise of their official discretionary functions. This emanates from the respect accorded by the judiciary
to said branches as co-equal entities under the principle of separation of powers.
It can easily be gleaned that the Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se. The Torre de Manila project cannot
be considered as a “direct menace to public health or safety.”
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA vs. BOT
119, SCRA 597, 1982
FACTS: To insure that only safe and comfortable units are used as public conveyances and in order that
the commuting public may be assured of comfort, convenience, and safety, the Board of Transportation
(BOT) issued Memorandum Circular phasing out the old and dilapidated taxis. Pursuant to OT circular,
respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular formulating
a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. The
Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation filed a petition for
"Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order", to
declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular of the BOT and Memorandum Circular of the BLT.
ISSUES: Whether or not the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars
violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to (1) Equal protection of the law; (2) Substantive due process;
and (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard.
HELD:
On Procedural and Substantive Due Process: Petitioners cannot justifiably claim that they were deprived
of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of
other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars for the Board gave a wide range of choice
in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not
mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other
documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the
Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Furthermore, as public contend it is impractical to
subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door
to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable
standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six
years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully
depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally
dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they
are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that
standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met.
On Equal Protection of the Law: The law being enforced in Metro Manila only and was directed solely
towards the taxi industry does not violate their right to equal protection of the law for the traffic conditions
are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection
clause can hardly be successfully claimed. The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It
can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights.
In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify
the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that
their interests are disregarded". In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other
transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply
that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons identically or similarly
situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable
or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal
means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment
both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing
criteria.
Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity.
To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear, categorical and
undeniable. Hence, the Writs prayed for are denied and was dismissed.
PPA vs. Cipres Stevedoring
G.R. No. 145742, July 14, 2005