CONTENTS
ARTICLE I (pp. 2-4)
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW I
A COMPILATION OF
CASES AND DOCTRINES
E. L. VILLAMIEL
ALS Block G | 2021
ARTICLE II (pp. 5-18)
ARTICLE VI (pp. 18-72)
ARTICLE VII (pp. 72-104)
ARTICLE VIII (pp. 105-130)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
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CASES AND DOCTRINES
CONTINENTAL SHELF
Article I. The National Territory
Sec. 1. The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all
the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over
which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its
terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the
seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The
waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal
waters of the Philippines.
INTERNAL WATERS
TERRITORIAL SEA
CONTIGUOUS ZONE
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
Absolute sovereignty; waters
around, between, and connecting
the islands of the archipelago,
regardless
of
breadth
and
dimensions, including waters in
bays, rivers, and lakes. Rights:
1. Right of Archipelagic
Sealanes Passage
2. Right of Innocent Passage
3. Right
to
Fish
by
Traditional Foreigners
12nm from the baseline (UNCLOS);
Paris Treaty (221.8 miles West,
283.18 miles East)
24nm from the baseline; limited
jurisdiction over customs, fiscal,
immigration, or sanitary laws
200nm (above seabed) from the
baseline; per UNCLOS, we have
limited
sovereignty
over
exploration, exploitation, and
management of natural resources,
whether living or non-living; but
accdg to RP Law, we have absolute
sovereignty
EXTENDED CONTINENTAL SHELF
200nm
(underwater)
from
baseline; according to Petroleum
Act,
absolute
sovereignty;
according to UNCLOS, limited
sovereignty
over
shelf
for
exploration and exploitation of
natural resources
350nm from baseline; overlaps
with neighboring states; should file
a claim; per UNCLOS, we have
limited sovereignty over shelf for
exploration of natural resousrces
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (UNCLOS):
1. Archipelagic State – constituted wholly by one or more
archipelagos and may include other islands
2. Archipelago – group of islands, including parts of islands,
interconnecting waters, and other natural features which are so
closely interrelated that such form an intrinsic geographical
economic and political entity, or which historically have been
regarded as such
MAGALLONA v. ERMITA
August 16, 2011 | RA 9522 (New Baselines Law of 2009)
GIST: Petitioners Magallona et al assailed RA 9522’s constitutionality as it
reduces PH maritime territory, which is a violation of Art I of the 1987
Constiutiton. That, even what was set by the Treaty of Paris was abandoned
in adopting the said Baseline Law. More importantly, petitioners forward
that 9522’s classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) as well as the
Scarborough Shoal as a “regime of islands” results in the loss of a large
maritime area which essentially prejudices the livelihood of fishermen living
along the waters. SC dismissed the petition, ruling that such baseline law is
not a means to acquire or lose territory.
DOCTRINE: What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is
the international law principle on:
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1.
Occupation – territory may have never belonged to any state
abandoned by any previous state or sovereignty. There should be
an intention to occupy in a peaceful and continuous manner
2. Accretion – added through natural causes
3. Cession – state transfers its territory from one state to another
4. Prescription – continued and long time possession (peaceful,
public, and long time)
Regarding the KIG, SC held that with these islands being able to generate
their own maritime zones, they in fact contributed to the increased
maritime area of the PH in consonance with RA 9522.
essentially caused permanent and irreparable harm to the coral
reef system
DOCTRINE: UNCLOS comprehensively governs parties’ respective rights to
maritime areas in the South China Sea. Any claims contrary to UNCLOS is
deemed invalid.
IN THE MATTER OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION
July 12, 2016 | Sovereignty over Several Maritime Features in the South
China Sea
GIST: This case revolves around the dispute between PH and China on the
legal basis of maritime rights and entitlements in the South China Sea, the
geographic features found in the maritime area, and the lawfulness of
certain actions performed by China in it’s exercise of “sovereignty” over the
South China Sea, as far as the following are disputed:
1. China’s historic right claim (nine-dashed line) – Tribunal ruled that
China’s historic right claim is bereft of legal basis
2. Geologic Features in the Spratlys – Tribunal ruled that none of the
geologic figures (rocks and islands) in the Spratlys are capable of
human habitation or economic life of its own so as to be entitled to
a 200nm EEZ
3. China-Occupied Geologic Features in Spratlys – Tribunal ruled that:
a. High tide elevation reefs are entitled to 12nm territorial
sea
b. Low tide elevation reefs are not entitled to territorial sea
4. Scarborough Shoal – Tribunal ruled that, the Scarborough Shoal is
a high tide elevation and as such, is entitled to 12nm territorial sea;
it is a traditional fishing ground of various fishermen from the
region and China CANNOT prevent Filipino fishermen from fishing
5. Harm to the Environment – Tribunal ruled that China violated its
obligations under UNCLOS for having dredged and built islands on
reefs, having prevented harvest of endangered species, which
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Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies
KILOSBAYAN v. MORATO (MR)
November 16, 1995| Legal Value of Article II
GIST: In a previous ruling of the SC, the Contract of Lease for certain
equipment between the PCSO and the PGMC was invalidated, for reasons
that it was in contravention with the PCSO charter. Now, an Equipment
Lease Agreement was entered instead, but was likewise assailed as being
the same as the former Contract of Lease. Petitioners invoked Article II
Sections 5 (maintenance of peace and order), 12 (rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and development), 13 (vital role of the youth in nationbuilding, and 17 (promotion of total human liberation and development) as
ground to render the said ELA as unconstitutional. SC denied the MR, the
provisions of the Constitution being invoked by the petitioners are not selfexecuting, they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights,
and they merely serve as guide for the legislature in their lawmaking.
DOCTRINE: Whether or not a provision in itself is self-executing depends on
the way it is formulated. Time and again, the Court has ruled that generally,
provisions of Article II are not self-executing. They are merely statements of
principles and policies. To give them effect, legislative enactment is
required. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights
but guidelines for legislation
TONDO MEDICAL v. CA
July 17, 2007 | Not self-executory provisions
GIST: DOH launched a Health Sector Reform Program (HSRA) which
essentially provides government hospitals fiscal autonomy, which involved
collection of user fees and restructuring. Petitioners assail the program for
inaccessible to economically disadvantaged Filipinos. That, it is
discriminating and is violative of equal protection of the law. To support
their claim, petitioners invoke the following provisions of Article II: Sections
5 (maintenance of peace and order, protection of life x x), 9 (just and
dynamic social order), 10 (social justice in all phases of national
development), 11 (dignity of every human person), 13 (vital role of youth in
nation-building), 18 (labor as a primary social economic force), among
others. SC ruled that such provisions are not self-executory and therefore,
without other proof as to how these constitutional guarantees are
breached, it shall remain valid.
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are
considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation for their
enforcement. For if they are not treated as such, the mandate of the
fundamental law can easily be nullified by Congress. This provides for
exceptions, as some provisions of Article II are categorized as not selfexecuting.
BCDA v. COA
August 6, 2002 | Not source of rights
GIST: Petitioners in this case assail RA 7227, which created the BCDA and
provided for a compensation and benefit scheme for its employees, and the
board of directors. Such provision referring to the year end benefits (YEB) of
the board of directors and consultants was being attacked for being contrary
to Art II of the Constitution, particularly Secs: 5 (maintenance of peace and
order), and 18 (labor as a primary economic force). SC ruled that such claims
are without merit, for the provisions invoked are not source of rights.
However, as far as the YEB is concerned, it must be noted that the board of
directors are not salaried officials of the government, and therefore they are
not entitled to YEB. As for the consultants, YEB and other benefits are
granted in addition to salaries. Being fringe benefits, they must only be paid
when basic salary is paid. Since in this case BCDA does not pay them basic
salary, they are likewise not entitled to YEB.
DOCTRINE: By its very title, Article II is a statement of general ideological
principles and policies, it is not a source of enforceable rights. Moreover, it
was previously held in the Tondo Medical case, that Sections 5 and 18 are
not self-executing provisions.
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Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and Republican State. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
ACCFA v. CUGCO
November 29, 1969 | Unincorporated Government Function
GIST: ACCFA, a government agency, entered into a CBA with the Supervisor’s
Association (ASA) and the Worker’s Association (AWA), but a protest
occurred when there were alleged violations and non-implementation of
the said agreement. Eventually, the Union filed a complaint against
petitioner for unfair labor practices, violation of the CBA, the right to selforganization, discrimination against members in the matter of promotions
and refusal to bargain. With CIR’s grant that the Union be an Exclusive
Bargaining Unit (EBU), ACCFA (now ACA) assailed its jurisdiction. SC ruled
that, with the ACA performing government functions now and not
ministrant, then it cannot have an EBU, as Sec 11 of RA 876, the governing
law for ACA, prohibits strikes against the government.
DOCTRINE: The growing complexities of modern society have rendered the
traditional classification of government functions (constituent or ministrant)
quite unrealistic. The difference between constituent and ministrant:
1. Constituent (required) – compulsory functions which constitute the
very bonds of society (8 were enumerated in Bacani v. NACOCO);
such as determination of contractual rights of individuals
2. Ministrant – optional functions of government intended for
achieving a better life of the community; such as public works
VFP v. REYES
February 28, 2006 | Government; sovereign function
GIST: VFP assails the control and supervision that DND exercised over them
and claims that it is not a GOCC under the DND, but a private one. VFP
further claims that it does not posses elements to qualify as a public office,
their funds are not public funds, VFP is a private, civilian federation for
veterans voluntarily formed by veterans themselves, the Admin Code did
not mention VFP as a public corporation, and that DBM declared it as a nongovernment organization and that they are not given funds from it. SC
dismissed the case, citing constitutional provisions and the fact that RA 2640
itself mentions that it is in fact, a public corporation. As regards its sovereign
function, which is the most important characteristic in determining if an
office is public, the SC ruled that VFP’s core duty of protecting war veterans
being that of promotion of social justice, is a sovereign function, hence VFP
is a public corporation. (in short, it may be controlled and supervised by the
DND)
DOCTRINE: Such delegation of sovereign function is the most important
characteristic in determining whether a position is a public office or not.
Such portion of sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive, or
judicial, must attach to the office for the time being, to be exercised for the
public benefit.
JAVIER v. SANDIGANBAYAN
September 11, 2009 | Private sector
GIST: RA 8047 (Book Publishing Industry Development Act) has for its goals
the promotion and continuance of the development of the book publishing
industry through active participation of the private sector. To achieve this
purpose, the law provided for the creation of the National Book
Development Board (NBDB), composed of 5 government officers and 6 from
the private sector. With Javier, an appointee from the private sector, given
travel authority to attend a Book Fair in Spain, to which she did not go to,
she is being asked to remit her travelling expenses. With her failure to do so,
a case was filed against Javier before the Sandiganbayan, to which she assail,
for lack of jurisdiction since she comes from the private sector. SC dismissed
the case and ruled that Javier is a public officer to the extent of her
performance of her duty for the benefit of the public, as far as the NBDB is
concerned.
DOCTRINE: The NBDB is a statutory government agency and persons who
participated therein, even if they come from the private sector, are public
officers to the extent that they are performing their duty for the benefit of
the public.
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MIAA v. CA
July 20, 2006 | Government instrumentality vested with corporate powers;
not GOCC
GIST: MIAA assails the removal of the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC) of their real estate tax exemption provided for under Sec 21
of the Local Government Code (LGC). SC held that MIAA is a government
instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently
government functions, and not a GOCC. It is not organized as a stock or a
non-stock corporation and has no capital dividends. Moreover, the real
property of MIAA are owned by the Republic; it is a property of public
domain. MIAA does not have members, which is required, if it were to be
considered as a non0stock corporation. Despite MIAA being a juridical
person, subject to the withdrawal of tax exemptions per Sec. 193 of the
Local Government Code, they are still exempted from real estate tax, as such
taxing powers do not extend to the national government, its agencies, and
instrumentalities.
DOCTRINE: A GOCC has the following characteristics:
1. Organized stock or non-stock corporation
2. Has capital dividends
3. Has members required in a non-stock corporation
4. Property is not owned by the Republic
FUNA v. MECO
February 4, 2014 | Sui generis entity
GIST: Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) is a corporate entity
entrusted by the PH Government to foster friendly relations with Taiwan.
Upon Funa’s request that the same be audited by the COA, the latter issued
a memorandum stating that MECO is not audited by the same. Funa went
to court, claiming that COA neglects its constitutional duties of not auditing
GOCCs and government instrumentalities (according to him, MECO is a
GOCC). SC ruled in the negative. MECO is a sui generis entity, it has consular
function and corporate objectives in relation to our OFWs in Taiwan. A nonstock corporation and the mere performance of public functions is not
sufficient to consider MECO a GOCC. One vital requirement is that it has to
be owned by the government, which in this case, is not present.
DOCTRINE: A GOCC is a stock or non-stock corporation vested with
governmental functions relating to public needs that are owned by the
government directly though its instrumentalities.
PHIL SOCIETY v. COA
September 25, 2007 | Quasi-public corporation; private but with public
character; charter test not applicable
GIST: Phil Society, created by Act No. 1285, is created for protecting animal
rights and welfare, and is authorized to arrest people who display cruelty to
animals, as well as entitle them to a 50% share of the collected penalty
imposed to those arrested. Commonwealth Act 148 lessened their arrest
power, as well as their privilege to retain portion of the penalty. EO 63 was
later issued by Quezon, which completely removed their arresting power.
When COA moved to audit the petitioners, they filed a case claiming that it
is a private corporation and therefore not within the ambit of the COA. SC
ruled that Phil Society is indeed a private corporation. The charter test is not
applicable to them as the same is not retroactive, and shall not be applied
in determining whether or not a corporation was public or private. Likewise,
it is clear that a corporation or entity is public just because it is impressed
with public interest. Such is called a quasi-public corporation.
DOCTRINE: Charter test – the test used to determine whether a corporation
is government owned or controlled, or private in nature. Is it created by its
own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under
the general corporation law?
The fact that a corporation is created for the public good does not render its
privacy it might be considered a quasi-public corporation that render public
services and supply public wants.
SERANA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
January 22, 2008 | Government functions exercised through state
universities
GIST: Serana is an appointed student regent of UP, to which funds were
given for their project to renovate the Vinzons Hall Annex. With such project
failing to materialize, succeeding student regent Bugayong et al. filed a
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complaint for malversation of public funds and property with the
Ombudsman, who recommended the case to the Sandiganbayan. Sereno
now claims that Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the case as
she is not a public officer as she merely represented her peers when she was
a student regent. She even said she didn’t receive compensation from the
government. SC ruled against her petition and said that the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over the case. With the administration of UP being a
sovereign function and the same being maintained by the government, a
student regent is held to be a public officer.
DOCTRINE: Sereno is within the ambit of Sec 4(A)(1) of PD 1606 which
defines who are those who are public officers, as she performs a function
similar to that of a board of trustee. That, compensation is not an essential
element of public office. It is the investment of sovereign power to one
individual that makes him a public officer.
CO KIM CHAM v. VALDEZ TAN KEH
September 27, 1945 | Government; de facto
GIST: Following Gen. Douglas McArthur’s proclamation that invalidates and
nullifies laws, regulations, and processes of any government in the PH, the
court refused to take cognizance of the case under the defunct state of the
Republic of the PH in absence of a law granting such authority. A case was
therefore filed to question whether the proceedings during the Japanese
period would still apply or continue after the said occupation. SC ruled in the
affirmative, and said that governments established in the PH under the
names of the PH Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto
governments. It is classified as a de facto government of the second kind or
a government of paramount force. Judicial acts and proceedings of courts of
justice of those governments, were good and valid, and with respect to the
international law principle of postliminy, it remained good and valid after
the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines.
DOCTRINE: Kinds of de facto government:
1. That Government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by
force or by voice of majority, rightful legal government and
maintains itself against the will of the latter
2.
3.
That which is established and maintained by the military forces
who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of
war
That which is established as an independent government by
inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against a parent
state
LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PUNO
June 29, 1992 | Government; revolution
GIST: In light of the EDSA Revolution which brought reorganization of the
entire government including the judiciary, Assoc. Justice Puno assails the
reorganization of the judiciary as mandated by EO 33, which was issued by
Pres. Cory Aquino. He claims that, contrary to his supposedly ranking with
reference to the Intermediate Appellate Court (rank 11), he was placed
down to rank 26. SC ruled that such EO, establishing the CA, is valid. The CA
is a new entity, it is distinct from the Intermediate Appellate Court, that
existed prior to EO 33.
DOCTRINE: A revolution is defined as the complete overthrow of the
established government in any country or state by those who were
previously subject to it.
REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN
July 21, 2003 | Rights not operative during interregnum
GIST: The AFP Anti-Graft Board investigated the “unexplained wealth” of
Major General Ramas, and a search warrant was issued for the residence of
his alleged mistress (Dimaano). Communications equipment, jewelry, land
titles, money, and weapons and ammunition were seized. Ramas denied
allegations, and Dimaano assumed ownership of the seized items. In this
case, Ramas claims a violation of his rights under the Bill of Rights, to which
petitioner counters: during the interregnum (which was the time when the
property was obtained from the residence), the Bill of Rights was not
operative. SC agreed, but held that the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were still effective, which
essentially accorded Filipinos almost the same rights available from the Bill
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of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The items seized not specified in the
search warrant were deemed inadmissible in evidence.
DOCTRINE: During the interregnum, a person could not invoke any
exclusionary right under the Bill of Rights because there was neither a
Constitution nor a Bill of Rights then. Nevertheless, the Filipino people
continued to enjoy, under the ICCPR and the UDHR, almost the same rights
found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
Sec. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.
TAÑADA v. ANGARA
May 2, 1997 | Tax and treaties; GATT-WTO
GIST: Petitioners assail the validity of the General Agreement of Tariffs and
Trade (GATT-WTO) as it requires the placement of nationals and products of
member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products. In the
same manner, the claim that such agreement violates the mandate of the
Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos (aka Filipino First Policy). SC upheld the
agreement’s validity, following the doctrine of incorporation. GATT-WTO,
being an international agreement, must be complied with by the PH in the
virtue of pacta sunt servanda.
DOCTRINE: By the doctrine of incorporation, a country is bound by the
generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to
be automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most
fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda (international
agreements must be performed in good faith). A treaty engagement is not a
mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on parties.
BAYAN v. ZAMORA
October 10, 2000 | Tax and treaties; VFA
GIST: The US and the PH entered into the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
after conducting the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) and the Mutual
Defense Treaty (MDT). Note, the VFA was approved by FVR together with
Ambassador Hubbard, after the exchange of notes of US Defense Assistant
Secretary for Asia Pacific and the Foreign Affairs Secretary of the PH. Estrada
ratified the treaty during the same year through the Secertary of Foreign
Affairs. Petitioners now assail the binding effect of such treaty. SC held that
by virtue of Art. 2 Sec. 2, upon ratification of the VFA, such treaty is binding.
With the generally accepted principles of international law rendered to be
part of the law of the land, under the principle of pacta sunt servanda, every
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treaty in force is binding upon parties to it, and must be complied with in
good faith.
BAYAN v. ROMULO
February 1, 2011 | RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement; Notes
DOCTRINE: Ratification is generally an executive act undertaken by the head
of state or of the government, as the case may be, through which the formal
acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A state may provide in its domestic
legislation the process of ratification of the treaty. In our jurisdiction, the
power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in
the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding
its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
GIST: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the RP-US Non-Surrender
Agreement, as far as the exchange of notes, E/N BFO-028-03 is concerned.
Such note was finalized by Ambassador Ricciardone with the US Embassy.
Such agreement is basically that of which aims to protect what it refers to
and defines as persons of the PH and the US from harassment suits that
might be brought against them in international tribunals. Petitioners claim
that there was grave abuse by respondents in concluding and ratifying the
Agreement by mere exchange of notes. SC ruled that such exchange is within
the scope of the doctrine of incorporation, which is as explained by Art 2 Sec
2 of the Constitution, is where the PH accepts generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land. With the exchange of
notes being synonymous with executive agreements in the scope of
international law, the court deemed it as a valid medium in concluding the
assailed agreement.
SAGUISAG v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
January 12 and July 26, 2016 | Tax and treaties; EDCA
GIST: Petitioners assail the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
(EDCA), entered into by both PH and the US, for being violative of certain
Constitutional provisions. EDCA entails the use of US of the agreed locations
of the PH territory. In such areas, the US shall conduct security operation
exercises, joint and combined training activities, and humanitarian disaster
relief activities. Such agreement is being assailed due to the fact that the
Senate did not concur to ratify the said agreement. SC held that EDCA is
constitutional, it is an executive agreement. As such, it need not be
submitted to the Senate for concurrence, as compared to such requirement
for a treaty. EDCA merely involves adjustments in the detail in the
implementation of the MTD and the VFA—existing treaties between the PH
and the US, which were accordingly concurred by the Senate and have met
the requirements as mandated by the Constitution.
DOCTRINE: Executive Agreements need not be concurred by Senate. The
President can enter into executive agreements on foreign military bases
troops or facilities:
1. If such agreement is not the instrument that allows entry of such
2. If it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of incorporation is where the PH adopts generally
accepted principles of international law and international jurisprudence as
part of the law of the lands and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation,
and amity with all nations.
DEUTSCHE BANK v. CIR
August 23, 2013 | Pacta sunt servanda; Tax treaty
GIST: At the onset, petitioner filed with the BIR Large Tax Payers Assessment
and Investigation Division an administrative claim for refund or issuance of
its tax credit certificate for the overpayment it made of its Branch Profit
Remittance Tax (BPRT), at around Php 22.5M. Along with it was a request to
the International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) for a conformation of its
entitlement to a preferential tax rate of 10%, mandated under the RPGermany Tax Treaty. Upon BIR’s inaction, petitioners raised it to the CTA,
who denied it on the ground that the tax treaty relief was not first filed
before the ITAD, hence a violation of Revenue Memo No. 1-2000. SC ruled
that petitioner must not be denied of their claims. By virtue of the
aforementioned treaty, the preferential rate of 10% BPRT must be granted
to them.
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DOCTRINE: Tax treaties are entered into to reconcile the national
legislations of the contracting parties and in turn, help the taxpayer avoid
simultaneous taxations in two different jurisdictions. There is nothing in the
RMO which would indicate a deprivation of entitlement to a tax treaty relief
for failure to comply. CTA’s outright denial of the relief is not in harmony
with the objectives of the contracting state.
CBK Power v. CIR
January 14, 2015 | Pacta sunt servanda
GIST: CBK Power entered into loans with several foreign banks for financing
its development and operation of the Caliraya, Botocan, and Kalayaan
hydroelectric power-generating plants in Laguna. Later on, CBK filed for the
refund of its excess final withholding taxes allegedly erroneously withheld
and collected for the years 2001 and 2002 with the BIR. With CTA decreasing
the amount to be refunded by CBK in compliance with the requirements set
by the BIR, the petitioners filed the present case. SC ruled that such act of
BIR is not in consonance with the tax treaty; it cannot add a requirement
that isn’t found in the income tax treaties signed by the PH before a taxpayer
can avail of the said amounts. The obligation to comply with a tax treaty
must take precedence over the objective of an internal memorandum. Not
only is the additional requirement illogical, but is also an imposition that is
not found at all in any applicable tax treaties.
DOCTRINE: The time-honored international principle of pacta sunt servanda
ademands the performance in good faith of treaty obligations on the part of
the states that enter into the agreement. In this jurisdiction, treaties have
the force and effect of law.
LIM v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
April 11, 2002 |Balikatan Exercises; International law in municipal law
GIST: Petitioner Lim assails the constitutionality of the Balikatan 02-1, the
largest combined training operations involving the PH and the US, which is
an avenue for conceptualization of new techniques. Petitioners likewise
sought to clarify the meaning of the term “activities” in the said agreement
and that if it is in harmony with the VFA. SC dismissed the case and upheld
the constitutionality of the said agreement. “Activities” must be interpreted
as it was used in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) as
matters of self defense. Baikatan is a step on adhering to the Mutual
Defense Treaty that was earlier agreed upon. Moreso, such agreement is
compliant with Sec 2 Art 2 of the Constitution, where the PH renounces war
and adopts generally accepted principles of international law.
DOCTRINE: From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is
favored over municipal law pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to invoke provisions of its internal
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. However it must be
taken into account that provisions of a treaty are always subject to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the
police power of the state.
SHANGRI-LA v. DEVELOPERS
March 31, 2006 | Intellectual property rights
GIST: Petitioners filed with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks, and
Technology Transfer (BPTTT) a petition to cancel the registration of the mark
and the logo as issued by the Developers Group of Companies (DGCI) on the
ground that the same was illegally obtained and appropriated for the latter’s
restaurant business. DGCI on the other hand claims that ever since, they
have had the prior and exclusive use of the logo and mark in question for its
restaurants. SC ruled that, insofar as the ownership of the mark and logo is
concerned, it would do injustice to adjudge the petitioners as infringing their
own created mark. The SC recognized the equal footing of municipal law
(Intellectual Property Code) and international law (Paris Convention), and
that what shall be considered is the use of the logo and the mark in the
Philippines. However, in consideration of the time as to when DGCI applied
for the trademark, it was RA 166 which was in effect, which contradicts what
is indicated in the Paris Convention, which mandates recognition of
internationally known marks or devises. With the IPC having no retroactive
effect, the SC is indeed bound to rule in favor of the petitioners as it will be
contrary to RA 166 if it ruled for the respondents.
DOCTRINE: The fact that international law has been made part of the law of
the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over
national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as
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applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing
equal not superior, to national legislative enactments.
MIJARES v. RANADA
April 12, 2005 | Recognition of foreign judgments; Alien Torts Act
GIST: After a class suit (over 10,000 HR victims) was instituted in the District
Court of Hawaii against the Marcos Estate for human rights violations in
relation to the Alien Torts Act, a final judgment of over $2B was awarded.
With claims that such decision must be recognized and enforced in the PH
pursuant to Sec 50 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a petitioner filed a
complaint in the RTC for its enforcement. The same was assailed by
respondents for failure to pay the correct filing fees. SC ruled that judgment
of the said decision may be enforced here. Regarding the filing fees, the case
is incapable of pecuniary estimation for being an enforcement of a foreign
judgment, hence filing fees are not based on the amount of damages. This
case is not grounded solely on the letter of the procedural rule. SC adverted
to the internationally recognized policy of preclusion as well as principles of
comity, utility, and convenience of nations as basis for the evolution of the
rule for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
convention states that state parties should take appropriate measures to
diminish infant and child mortality, among others. DOH then issued the
assailed Administrative Order No. 2006-0012, or the Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Executive Order No. 51 (RIRR), which includes
the prohibition on advertisements of breastmilk substitutes. This is assailed
for having expanded the coverage of EO 51. SC held that it indeed expand
the provisions of the law, as it created the RIRR based on the WHA
Resolutions and not on the EO itself, which included the prohibition of
formula milk advertisements. With the WHA Resolution as merely a soft law,
it cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be
implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by
the legislature.
DOCTRINE: Soft law include recommendations which generally are not
binding, but carry moral and political weight.
DOCTRINE: There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions
that requires PH to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for
the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution,
form part of the law of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. The principle recognizing foreign judgments has attained the
status of opinion juris in international practice.
PHARMACEUTICAL v. DOH
October 9, 2007 | Soft law; World Health Assembly resolutions
GIST: EO 51 (Milk Code) seeks to give effect to the International Code of
Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World
Health Assembly (WHA). WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted, and protected, hence
nutrition and health claims are not to be permitted for breastmilk
substitutes. With the PH ratifying the ICCPR, a provision of the said
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Sec. 3. Civilian authority is at all times, supreme over the military. The
armed forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the
State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of
the national territory.
Sec. 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the
people. The government may call upon the people to defend the State and
in fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under the conditions
provided by law, to render personal military or civil service.
IBP v. ZAMORA
August 15, 2000 | Civilian Supremacy
Sec. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty,
and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for
the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
GIST: In the light of the alarming increase of violent crimes in Metro Manila,
the President issued a verbal directive ordering the PNP and marines to
conduct joint visibility patrols to prevent and suppress crime. PNP
formulated a Letter of Instruction (LOI) to detail the manner by which the
joint visibility patrols would be made. President directed AFP Chief of Staff
and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for proper deployment and
utilization of marines in assisting the PNP. Such deployment is being assailed
by the petitioners for being a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of
the Constitution. SC disagreed and ruled that the deployment of marines
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement.
Such deployment does not destroy the civilian character of the PNO, as the
AFP chief does not exercise power and authority over the PNP. Real
authority still lies with the PNP, as stated in the LOI
DOCTRINE: Marine deployment does not unmake the civilian character of
the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the
military task of law enforcement.
Sec. 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Sec. 7. The state shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations
with other states the paramount consideration shall be national
sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self
determination.
Sec. 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and
pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.
Sec. 9. The state shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will
ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people
from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services,
promote full employment, a rising standard of living and an improved
quality of life for all.
Sec. 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.
Sec. 11. The state values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government.
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IMBONG v. OCHOA
April 8, 2014 | RH Law; family life and right of the unborn
GIST: With the RH Law being enacted by Congress came the petitioners who
assail the constitutionality of the same, for being violative of the rights of
the mother and the unborn, in light of Art II Sec 12, as far as abortion is
concerned. In ruling this matter, SC differentiated implantation, which is the
entry of the fertilized ovum to the uterus and fertilization, or the meeting of
the female ovum and the male sperm. Such is important to be discussed as
the question of where life begins is being debated on. And with the SC being
of the opinion that life begins at fertilization, it consequently ruled that
contraceptives mentioned under the RH Law are not violative of the
constitutional right to life of the mother and the unborn, and is consistent
with the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution.
DOCTRINE: By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb, RH Law
does not intend to mean at all that life begins only at implantation.
WISCONSIN v. YODER
May 15, 1972 | Compulsory education
GIST: Respondents Yoder et al are members of the amish religion, and as
practiced, they refuse to enroll their children aged 14 and 15 in public or
private schools upon completion of Grade 8. This was assailed as in violation
of the Wisconsin Statute, which provides for compulsory attendance of
children until the age of 16. SC held that such compulsory education statute
st
th
violates the rights of the respondents under the 1 and 14 amendment of
the US Constitution. The SC arrived with such ruling after conducting a
balancing of interest test, for the compelling state interest, for education, as
against the religious upbringing of the children insofar as their Amish
religion is concerned.
Sec. 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building
and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual,
and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Sec. 14. The state recognizes the role of women in nation-building and shall
promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social
well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
GARCIA v. DRILON
June 25, 2013 | Equality of men and women
GIST: Rosalie Drilon and Jesus Garcia have 3 children. In the duration of their
marriage, Jesus controlled Rosalie’s actions, any contravention to his
command would be tantamount to physical and emotional abuse. In the
long run of fights they went through, Rosalie finally filed for a TPO pursuant
to RA 9262. This is now assailed in court by Garcia for being unconstitutional
as it is discriminatory and is against husbands or fathers. SC held that there
is a present substantial distinction between men and women as far as far as
their unequal power relationship is concerned. This puts women at inferior
ground and thus more subjected to gender bias and violence. Therefore, RA
9262 is constitutional.
DOCTRINE: The guaranty of equal protection of laws is not a guaranty of
equality in the application of laws upon all citizens of the state. Equal
protection simply requires that all persons, or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed.
DOCTRINE: The State’s power is subject to a balancing test when it impinges
on fundamental rights such as that of the Free Exercise Clause and the
traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of
their children.
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Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.
Sec. 16. The state shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.
OPOSA v. FACTORAN
July 30, 1993 | Inter-generational justice and responsibility
GIST: Petitioners are minors duly represented and joined by their respective
parents, who are basically assailing the Timber License Agreements (TLAs)
granted to several corporations. They claim that such grant constitutes
massive abuse to the rainforest of our country, hence tantamount to a
violation of public interest to a healthful and a balanced ecology. While
respondents assail the standing of such minors, the SC held that the suit filed
is in line with the inter-generational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
DOCTRINE: Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. A minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment, at the
same time, is the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection
of that right for the generations to come.
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS v. SECRETARY REYES
April 21, 2015 | Right to a balanced and healthful ecology
GIST: JAPEX conducted oil exploration, examination, and sampling, among
others, in the Tañon Strait, which was declared as a Critical Area. Later on,
they were required to have an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)
to continue their project. In the duration of the project, reports showed that
there was a drastic drop in fish catch by 50-70% which then prompted
petitioners to file a case before the court, assailing SC-46, which covers the
agreement between the DOE and JAPEX for the project. With respondents
challenging the locus standi of petitioners, SC held that such stewards,
among others, may be part of the citizen suit, in filing for environmental
cases before the court. This is in consonance with the ruling in Oposa, as well
as the constitutional policy on the right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
Regarding SC-46, the SC held that in relation to other laws, it is bereft of
basis to support its constitutionality. With Tañon Strait being a critical area
to which an ECC is required before such activity may be performed, SC-46 is
not sufficient, it is just a service contract.
DOCTRINE: The right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does
not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from
the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment.
PAJE v. CASINO
February 3, 2015 | Writ of Kalikasan
GIST: Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) and Taiwan Cogeneration
Corporation (TCC) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
expressing their intent to build a coal-fired power plant in Subic Bay. DENR
issued an ECC in favor of the said project, and thereafter, several groups
opposed the implementation of the said project. Respondent filed a Petition
for Writ of Kalikasan against petitioners, with claims that such project would
cause environmental damage and adverse effect on the health of the
residents of Subic, Zambales, Morong, Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo.
SC held that since there is failure to prove that the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology was violated or threatened, the Writ of
Kalikasan was not granted because of the following reasons: the witnesses
presented were not experts on technology or on environmental matters, the
scientific studies or articles were obtained through the internet, the alleged
thermal pollution of coastal waters, air pollution due to dust and
combustion, are extensively addressed in RP Energy’s Environmental
Management Plan (EMP).
DOCTRINE: Under Section 1 of Rule 7, the following requisites must be
present to avail of the extraordinary remedy that is the Writ of Kalikasan:
1. There is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right
to a balanced and healthful ecology
2. The actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or
entity
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3.
The actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health, or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces
INTERNATIONAL SERVICE v. GREENPEACE
August 8, 2016 | Right to a balanced and healthful ecology; precautionary
principle
GIST: Field trials were conducted for bioengineered eggplants (Bt talong)
and the same was assailed by respondents by filing a Petition for Writ of
Kalikasan and a Writ of Continuing Mandamus with prayer for Temporary
Environmental Protection Order. They claim that, such field trials was
violative of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology for
the absence of an ECC prior the trials, among others. That, since the
scientific evidence as to the safety of Bt talong remained insufficient or
uncertain, and that preliminary scientific evaluation shows reasonable
grounds for concern, the precautionary principle should be applied, hence
such experiment. SC held that indeed the precautionary principle shall be
applied, since all three conditions are met. Petitioners are now ordered to
cease and desist in conducting such trials. In the MR that was filed, the SC
ruled in the mootness of the case, because the trials have already stopped.
DOCTRINE: In order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation. This should be
treated as a principle of last resort as should be used only where application
of regular Rules of Evidence would cause an inequitable result from the
environmental plaintiff, such as when:
1. Risk of harm is uncertain
2. Harm might be irreversible and what may be lost is irreplaceable
3. Harm that might result will be serious
WEST TOWER v. PIC
June 6, 2015 | Right to a balanced and healthful ecology
GIST: This case revolves around the TEPO imposed over FPIC enjoining their
operations on their pipelines within the vicinity of West Tower. Leaks were
discovered in the basement of West Tower Condominium, which was
reported to the authorities and raised to the SC, through a petition for a Writ
of Kalikasan, which other organizations have vied to join, as they claim to be
real parties in interest insofar as their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. The standing of the petitioners were challenged, for
they were not parties in interest as they were not directly affected by the
disaster. When the case reached the SC, it was ruled that the TEPO be lifted,
but that there must be conditions that PIC must follow in order to avoid such
Incident to happen again. As regards the standing of the petitioners, the SC
ruled that it is provided in the Rules of Procedures of Environmental Cases
(Sec 7) that it is not a requirement to be directly affected by the
environmental disaster before you can actually file.
DOCTRINE: Sec 1 Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure of Environmental Cases
does not require that a person be directly affected by an environmental
disaster. The rule allows juridical persons to file a petition on behalf of
persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
violated, or threatened.
LNL ARCHIPELAGO v. AGHAM PARTYLIST
April 8, 2014 | Right to a balanced and healthful ecology
GIST: In the pursuit of their daily operations for mining, LNL Archipelago was
alleged to violate environmental laws when they cut down mountain trees,
which would result to flattening of the mountain, that serves as a natural
protective barrier from typhoons and floods of Zambales and some parts of
Pangasinan. Respondent partylist filed a Petition for the Writ of Kalikasan
invoking the petitioner’s violation of Sec 16 Art II of the Constitution. SC held
that petitioners did not violate the Rvised Forestry Code and the Philippine
Mining Act, that there was no mountain involved, and that since LNL
Archipelago was in fact compliant with all the ECC requirements, it was
clean. Essentially, the writ was not granted.
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DOCTRINE: The Rules are very clear, in a Writ of Kalikasan, the petitioner
has the burden to prove the:
1. Environmental law, rule, or regulation that is violated or is
threatened to be violated;
2. Act or omission complained of; and
3. The environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the
life, health, or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces
Sec. 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology,
arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate
social progress and promote total human liberation and development.
Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
Sec. 19. The state shall develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Sec. 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector,
encourages private enterprise and provides incentives to needed
investments.
Sec. 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and
agrarian reform.
Sec. 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous
cultural communities within the framework of national unity and
development.
Sec. 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental community-based,
or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.
Sec. 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and
information in nation-building.
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of Local Governments.
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
Sec. 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in public service and
take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.
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Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
POLLO v. CONSTANTINO
April 8, 2014 | Requirement of privacy rights
GIST: There was an anonymous letter of complaint sent to the CSC
Chairperson, alleging that petitioner Pollo has been offering legal assistance
to the people with administrative cases with the CSC. Chairman David’s
recourse was then to inform an IT Team to investigate Pollo’s computer and
files and make a back up of them for further examining—which was what
Pollo found violative of his constitutional rights to privacy and due process
because of lack of reasonableness of the search. After being found guilty of
the complaint alleged, he was dismissed by the CSC. He went to the CA who
dismissed his petition, then appealed to the SC who affirmed the CA’s
decision, holding that no constitutional violation was made by the said
government agency.
DOCTRINE: Some government offices may be so open to fellow employees
or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable
PS BANK v. SENATE IMPEACHMENT COURT
February 9, 2012 | Secrecy of foreign deposit
GIST: This case is in relation to the impeachment trial of former SC CJ Renato
Corona, where CJ Corona’s foreign bank accounts during the trial are being
investigated. PS Bank and its President (Garcia) filed before the SC an
application for TRO, among others. This was to stop the Senate, sitting as
impeachment court, from further implementing the Subpoena Duces
Tecum. SC ruled in favor of the petitioners and held that, there is a clear
right to maintain the confidentiality of the foreign currency deposits of the
CJ, as provided for under Sec 8 of RA 6426 (Foreign Currency Deposit Act of
the Philippines). This law establishes the absolute confidentiality of foreign
currency deposits.
DOCTRINE: Under RA 6426 lies a single exception to the rule on
confidentiality, that is, a written waiver from the depositor himself. In the
absence of such, the records on the said foreign bank accounts cannot be
obtained. In the dissent of CJ Sereno, she expressed that public interest
should be upheld over private and economic interests. She highlighted the
duty of public officers to fully disclose their assets and liabilities to the
public. For all public officers, what is absolute is not the confidentiality
privilege. By granting the TRO, the absurd and absolute protection of bank
accounts is now available for everyone including public officers as long as
they convert their PH currency to foreign currency.
IN RE: PRODUCTION OF COURT RECORDS
Feb 14, 2012 | Rules on public disclosure of court records
GIST: SC received various letters asking for permission and subpoena et
duces tecum to examin rollos of several cases in relation to the
impeachment proceedings against CJ Corona. SC in this case held that the
right to information is absolute. The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court
(IRSC) prohibits disclosures of the following:
1. Results or raffle of cases if they are cases involving bar matters,
administrative cases, and criminal cases involving penalty of life
imprisonment
2. Actions taken by the Court including the agenda of the Court’s
session (only after the official release of the resolution embodying
the Court action may that action be made available to the public)
3. Deliberations of Members in court sessions on PENDING cases and
matters of deliberative process privilege
The SC held that public officials and employees are not required to present
documents provided for subpoena duces tecum because appearing in court
may interrupt, hamper public business, and because of the presumption of
confidence in public officers or employees that they will discharge their
several trusts with accuracy and fidelity
DOCTRINE: Deliberative process privilege is intended to prevent the chilling
of deliberative communications by senators, justices, among others, who
may invoke the privilege when asked about information related to exercising
their public functions. To qualify for protection under this privilege, the
agency must show that the document is both:
1. Predecisional – communications are predecisional if they were
made in attempt to reach a final decision
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2.
Deliberative – disclosure of information would discourage candid
discussion within the agency
Article VI. The Legislative Department
Sec. 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the congress of the
Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by provision
on initiative and referendum.
RUBI v. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
March 7, 1919 | Grant of quasi-legislative power; LGU
GIST: What is being assailed in this case is Resolution 25, which is in
concurrence with Sec. 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1979. This
Resolution, as implemented by the Provincial Board of Mindoro in terms of
assigning reservation areas for the Mangyanes, forced petitioner Rubi and
her companions to move into the new settlement in Lake Naujan, which was
provided for by the Government. Petitioners of this case claim that such
action of the Provincial Board does not constitute due delegation. In the
present case, such delegation is allowed given that the local government
acted in good faith. Given that there is a need for the local government to
implement the laws that would help the backward people in Mindoro, they
are compelled by law to implement the Administrative Code.
DOCTRINE: Normally, the power to legislate is conferred in the legislature,
but it can permit local administers to pass administrative legislation in their
area especially for the purpose of maintaining law and order that will protect
the citizens in their area.
SEC v. INTERPORT
October 6, 2008 | Grant of quasi-legislative power; Administrative bodies
GIST: Interport Resources Corporation (IRC) had an agreement with Ganda
Holdings Berhard (GHB) that the former that the former will acquire the
latter’s Ganda Energy Holdings, Inc. (GEHI) and that the latter will help IRC
to acquire 67% of the capital stock of Philippine Racing Club in exchange of
55% of its capital stock. With IRC claiming it issued a press release with
regard to this agreement, SEC claims to have not received it; which led the
latter to say that IRC did not report its business developments and its
directors. SEC’s hearing resulted in the finding that IRC violated the Rules of
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Material Facts, as well as Secs. 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, for
basically going behind the directors. As defense, IRC forwards that there is
an absence of any implementing rules and regulations (IRRs) regarding such
disclosure, insider trading, and the Revised Securities Act, hence SEC cannot
conduct further investigations. SC ruled in favor of the petitioners, and said
that despite the absence of such IRRs, Secs. 30 and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act is binding, and further investigations conducted by the SEC are
valid.
DOCTRINE: It is a well settled doctrine that every law has in its favor the
presumption of validity. Mere absence of IRRs cannot effectively invalidate
provisions of a law especially when there is a reasonable construction that
will support the law and its effects.
AGUSTIN v. EDU
February 2, 1979 | Requisites of valid delegation; test
GIST: Petitioner, an owner of a Volkswagen Bettle Car, is assailing the
validity of LOI No. 229 enacted by the LTO, which requires all vehicles to be
equipped with early warning devices. The LOI was enacted in response to
PH’s membership to the Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals,
which is a response to the increasing number of vehicular accidents. Agustin
in this case claims that such LOI was enacted by virtue of undue delegation
of police power, which is for the sole benefit of EWD vendors. SC held that
the enactment of the LOI is benchmarked on the purpose of promoting
public safety.
DOCTRINE: To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a
standard which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines
matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. A standard thus
defines legislative policy, marks it, maps out its boundaries, and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be affected. The executive or administrative office
then designated of the same may promulgate supplemental rules and
regulation.
ARANETA v. GATMAITAN
April 30, 1957 | Details for implementation
GIST: In response to the depletion of marine resources of San Miguel Bay as
well as the destruction of shrimp specie in the said area, the League of
Mayors filed a motion to ban trawl fishing at certain times of the year, and
to ban trawl operations in general. As a response, the President, through
DENR, issued EO 22 (prohibits trawl fishing), EO 66 (amended EO 22,
allowing trawl fishing during typhoon season), and EO 80 (revived EO 22) at
this point, note that trawl fishing is prohibited. A group of trawl operations
filed an injunction of the EOs, and challenged the same for being fruits of
the exercise of undue delegation. SC upheld the validity of the EOs, and
stated that the Fisheries Act provided for the details for the implementation
of regulations with regard to marine resources. The issuance was complete
in itself because the Congress already passed the Fisheries Act, which is said
to regulate the same, and passes the responsibility of enforcing such law to
the DENR. As far as the protection of fish fry or fish egg is concerned, the
Fisheries Act is complete in itself, leaving the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources the power to promulgate rules and regulations to carry
into effect the legislative intent.
DOCTRINE: When a law does nothing more but to the give administrative or
executive agencies power to make rules and regulations to carry into effect
the force of the law, then the law is complete in itself.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD
November 3, 2008 | Completeness
GIST: The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (RA 9165) was
assailed in this case for constituting undue delegation of power after
mandating drug testing on: (1) candidates of public office; (2) students in the
secondary, tertiary, and public schools; (3) private employees; and (4) those
charged with an offense by the prosecutor. SC held that the said law does
not constitute undue delegation for being complete in itself. With respect
to issues on (2) and (3), the SC upheld its constitutionality for the presence
of guidelines. But for (1) and (4), the SC held it unconstitutional for adding a
qualification beyond what the constitution requires for a candidate, and for
lacking the requisite of the test being random.
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DOCTRINE: With the presumption that the legislature is not capable of
addressing everything with respect to the needs of the community, it is
acknowledged that legislative power may be duly delegated. However, it
shall be subject to limitations as mandated by the constitution: it shall be
complete in the sense that it shall , and it shall fix a standard.
DISINI v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
April 22, 2014 | Completeness
GIST: Cybercrime law is the government’s way to regulate the access and
use of the cyberspace, which prohibits acts which may be abused by illminded people with the agenda of destroying or destructing or violating
other people’s rights. Petitioners in this case assail the law for constituting
undue delegation, particularly that of which establishes the Cybercrime
Investigation and Coordinating Center and defines its powers and functions.
SC held that the Cybercrime law is complete in itself, and that, it provided
sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided for the definition
of cybersecurity.
DOCTRINE: In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of
legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests:
1. Completeness test – the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches
the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is enforce it
2. Sufficient standard test – mandates adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot
PEOPLE v. ROSENTHAL
June 12, 1939 | Sufficient standard
GIST: After being held liable for the violation of the Blue Sky Law (Act No.
2581) after selling shares of ORO Oil Co. and South Cebu Oil Co. without the
permit or license from the Insular Treasurer, Rosenthal and Osmeña assailed
the same law for constituting undue delegation, that it did not possess a
sufficient standard. SC held that public interest in this case is a sufficient
standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter
pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits. The
purpose of the said act is to protect the public interest against speculative
schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of the blue sky, and
such sales of stock in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold
mines, and other fraudulent exploitations.
DOCTRINE: The sufficient standard test mandates adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES v. POEA
October 18, 1988 | Discretion as to substantive contents
GIST: Vitaliano Saco was the Chief Officer of MV Eastern Polaris when he
died in an unfortunate accident in Tokyo. His widow, respondent Kathleen,
sued for damages under EO 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). With the judgment
of rendering to Kathleen Php 192,000.00 for the tragic accident to be paid
by petitioner Eastern Shipping as its employer, the latter assailed the said
Memorandum Circular for being violative of the principle of non-delegation
of legislative power. SC upheld the constitutionality of the circular, that,
POEA may implement the broad policy laid down by EO 797 in a statute by
filling in the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide, given their large scope.
DOCTRINE: With the proliferation of specialized activities and their peculiar
problems, the legislature has found it more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general
provisions of the statute. This is called the power of subordinate legislation.
TABLARIN v. GUTIERREZ
July 31, 1937 | Establishment of medical educational requirements
GIST: MEC Order No. 52, made in consonance of the Medical Act (RA 2382),
established a uniform admission test called the NMAT as an additional
requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into
medical schools. Petitioners failed in the said tests, and now seek to enjoin
the said Order as it constitutes undue delegation under Sections 5(a) and (5)
of RA 2382, which basically creates and defines the powers of the Board of
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Medical Education (who basically mandated the NMAT). SC upheld the
validity of the said Order, as it was based on the standards provided for by
the RA 2382, which is the standardization and regularization of medical
education.
DOCTRINE: With the growing complexities of modern life, the multiplication
of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the
delegation of greater power by the legislature, and toward the approval and
the practice of the courts. So long as the tests of completeness and sufficient
standards are met, there is valid delegation of legislative power.
VIOLA v. ALUNAN
August 15, 1997 | Fixes a standard ; power to create positions
GIST: Petitioners in this case assail the validity of Secs. 1-2, Art. III of the
Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the
st
nd
rd
Liga ng mga Barangay Officers, for providing the election of 1 , 2 , and 3
VPs and for auditors—basically additional positions not specifically provided
for by the Local Government Code (LGC) (which only mentioned the
following elective positions: President, VP, 5 members of the board of
directors per chapter at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political
subdivision, and national levels). SC held that there was no undue delegation
of power by the Congress in this case, as the creation of such additional
positions is authorized by the LGC in Sec. 493 so long as such positions are
deemed necessary for the management of the chapter. As such act passing
both the sufficient standard and the completeness test, the Court upheld
the validity of the assailed Sections.
DOCTRINE: The LGC sufficiently fixes the standard. The delivery of
government services to the local districts will not be possible if there are
missing positions that would make the Liga not as efficient and as effective
as expected.
ABAKADA v. ERMITA
September 1, 2005 | Fixes a standard ; ascertainment of facts
GIST: Petitioners of this case assail the VAT Law (RA 9337) for constituting
undue delegation, as it imposes 10% VAT on the Secs. 4 (sale of goods and
properties), 5 (importation of goods), and 6 (sale of services and use or lease
of properties). They claim that all these sections have a similar proviso
authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, to raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12% after the concurrence of the
following conditions:
1. VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds
2.8%
2. National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous
year exceeds 1.5%
SC ruled that there was no undue delegation of legislative power to the
President, for the proviso in question does not contain a delegation of
legislative power, but simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts. It is
evident that the 12% VAT is contingent of the conditions that are obviously
outside the control of the executive.
DOCTRINE: The legislature has the power to delegate to executive bodies
the power to determine certain facts or conditions where the law can be
implemented. However, the law delegating the same must still pass both
the sufficient standards and the completeness test.
BELTRAN v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH
November 5, 2005 | Promotion of public health; sufficient guideline
GIST: In response to the concern for the safety of blood and blood products
intensified due to the proliferation of AIDS, the National Blood Services Act
of 1994 (RA 9919) provides supply of safe blood in the country. Section 7 of
the said law mandates the closure of commercial blood banks, to which DOH
responded to, by promulgating AO No. 9, which contains the IRR.
Petitioners, commercial blood bank operators, assail the constitutionality of
the law and its IRR, for constituting undue delegation to the DOH in terms
of giving it power to close down commercial blood banks. With the clear
mandate of the assailed law to safeguard the health of the people and the
express standard provided that is the promotion of public health by
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providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood
donation, the SC upheld the its constitutionality. The power to implement
the closing of commercial blood banks and the power to ascertain the
existence of facts and conditions upon which the Secretary may effect a
period of extension for the said phase-out ca be delegated by the Congress
to the DOH.
DOCTRINE: In testing whether a statute constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power, it is essential to inquire as to whether the statute is
complete and if it establishes a sufficient standards. Except as to matters of
detail that may be left to be filled in by the rules and regulations to be
adopted by executive or administrative bodies, an act is incomplete and
invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the
delegates may be guided.
ABAKADA v. PURISIMA
August 4, 2008 | Fixes a standard
GIST: The Attrition Act of 2005 (RA 9335) was enacted to improve the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC by
implementing a system of rewards (if they collect more than the year’s
target) and sanctions (if they collect less than the year’s target). In
consonance with the law is the creation of the Rewards and Incentives Fund.
Petitioners assail the said law as it is an undue delegation of power and lacks
sufficient standards in giving the President the power to fix revenue targets.
SC upheld the validity of the law and ruled that RA 9335 perfectly stated
policies and standards (optimization of revenue generation capability
through a system of rewards) to guide the President in fixing revenue targets
and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law.
DOCTRINE: A law sets out sufficient standards when it provides adequate
boundaries to map out the delegate’s authority and prevent them from
running riot.
FERNANDEZ v. STO. TOMAS
March 7, 1995 | Filling in the details
GIST: Petitioners in this case assail Resolution No. 94-3710, as it merges the
Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit (OPIA), the Office of Personnel
Relations (OPR), and the Office of Career Systems and Standards (OCSS) into
one, as the Research and Development Office. They claim that such abolition
of public offices is something that can only be done by the same legislative
authority who created those public offices in the first place. SC held that the
Administrative Code provides that changes can be done in the above offices
if the necessity rises. In the present case, there is an undeniable necessity to
streamline services that compelled the reorganization of such offices.
DOCTRINE: When the Administrative Code defined the offices under the
CSC, they did not mean to cast them in stone and freeze them in place. In
fact, the legislative authority expressly authorized the Commission to carry
out changes in the organization should the need for such changes arises.
CHIONGBIAN v. ORBOS
June 22, 1995 | Filling in the details
GIST: The Organic Act (RA 6734) called for a plebiscite to create the
autonomous region; Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi said
yes to, hence became the ARMM. The same law provides for the power of
the President to, by administrative determination, merge regions that do
not vote for inclusion in the ARMM. Consequently, the President issued EO
429 which provided for the said reorganization. The petitioners, aggrieved,
went to court claiming that such act constitutes undue delegation. SC ruled
in the negative, and held that the President has the power to merge or
reorganize. By virtue of RA 5435, the President is authorized, with the
assistance of the Commission on Reorganization, to reorganize the different
executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, among others. This
essentially lead the court to confirm the presence of a sufficient standard in
RA 5435 therefore nullifying the claim of the petitioners of the presence of
undue delegation.
DOCTRINE: Such power of the President to reorganize executive offices,
branches, institutions, and filling details are administrative in nature, vested
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to him by RA 6734 in order to ensure simplicity, economy, and efficiency of
government services.
PICHAY v. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
July 24, 2012 | Authority to reorganize and appropriate funds
GIST: GMA enacted EO 12, which created the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) to investigate or hear administrative cases on graft and
corruption of presidential appointees. 2010, PNoy issued EO 13, which
basically abolishes PAGC, and transfers its functions to the Office of the
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODELSA), particularly to the
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD). A case against petitioner
Pichay (Chairman, Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities
Administration [LWUA]) was filed before the IAD-ODELSA, the alleged
purchase by LWUA of 445,377 shares of stock of Express Savings Bank. As a
defense, he claims that the same case is already filed and is in fact pending
before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB). Later on, he assailed EO 13,
claiming it constituted undue delegation as it usurped the power of
legislature in terms of creation of a public office, appropriation of funds, and
delegation of quasi-judicial powers. SC ruled that EO 13 is valid, as it is within
the ambit of the powers of the President to enact such EO, without usurping
the powers of the legislature.
DOCTRINE: The President exercises continuing authority to reorganize
under the Administrative Code of 1987. The President merely fills up the
details in the Administrative Code when it enacts Executive Orders as far as
reorganization, transfer, and restructuring the Office of the President
Proper, or any other Administrative or Executive Department or Agency.
ARROYO v. DOJ
September 18, 2012 | Filling in the details
GIST: This consolidated case consists of petitioners who assail the COMELEC
Resolution No. 9266 on the COMELEC and DOJ joint investigation on the
alleged election offenses during the 2004 and 2007 elections, as well as the
Joint Order NO. 001-2011 creating a joint DOJ-COMELEC fact finding team,
among others. Petitioners claim that the joint panel is a new office, and
therefore outside the scope of the COMELEC, for it is solely the legislature
who has the power to create such body. SC held that the assailed Resolution
creating the joint team is valid, as it did not create another new public office,
contrary to the claim of the petitioners. The COMELEC has the power to
investigate and prosecute violations of election laws and the DOJ is
mandated to administer the criminal justice system; combining these two
does not create a new public office—no new power is given.
DOCTRINE: The power of both the COMELEC as well as the DOJ to engage in
a preliminary investigation is well found in the Constitution, existing
statutes, and the Rules of Court. With such power already preexisting prior
the creation of the said joint team, there can be no basis when claiming that
a new office vested with new powers is created.
PEOPLE v. VERA
November 16, 1937 | Undue delegation
GIST: What is being assailed in this case is The Probation Act (Act No. 4221),
which enables provincial boards to exercise discretion as to whether or no
the said Act will apply in its province or not. In this case, a certain Mariano
Cu Unjieng was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years
of prision correctional to 8 years of prision mayor and costs, in his case
against HSBC. He eventually applied for probation, which was granted by
respondent Judge. The Manila Fiscal and private prosecutor opposed the
probation, and finally assail Act No. 4221, for being an undue delegation of
legislative power. SC ruled that there is indeed undue delegation. There are
no rules that can serve as a guide to the provincial boards in terms of their
exercise of their discretionary power when determining whether or Act No.
4221 will apply in their respective provinces.
DOCTRINE: In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power, it is usual to inquire whether the statute is complete in all
its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that
nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the
legislature.
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US v. BARRIAS
September 24, 1908 | Undue delegation
there is undue delegation - a rule cannot change the penalty prescribe by law
GIST: Barrias was charged of a violation of Circular No. 397, issued by the
Collector of Customs, after navigating along the Pasig River in a Maude using
bamboo poles to push the small vessel along the water. The law mandated
that such vessels should be permitted in the Pasig River ONLY when being
towed by steam or moved by other adequate power. Barrias’ counsel
challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 70 which provides for the
prohibition, for being a form of undue delegation. SC held that there is no
undue delegation to fix the penalties. With Act No. 1136 authorizing the
Collector of Customs to license crafts engaged in lighterage or harbor
business essentially entitles the said office to impose such necessary rules
and regulations to implement it.
DOCTRINE: There is a necessity to authorize the local authority with regard
to the framing, changing, and enforcing of harbor regulations. So long as the
delegate acts within the matter of the legislation, then there is no undue
delegation.
US v. PANLILIO
December 8, 1949 | Undue delegation
GIST: What is being assailed in this case is Act NO. 1760, which has for its
purpose the prevention of the introduction in the PH of dangerous
communicable animal diseases, and the spread of such diseases, among
others. Respondent Panlilio was found to have in his possession carabaos
with a dangerous and contagious disease that is rinderpest. After being held
penalized of violating the said law, Panlilio assails it and claims that it is a
form of undue delegation of legislative power to the DOA. SC held that there
is indeed undue delegation, because the said law does did not provide for
penalties, and therefore DOA should have no authority to impose the same
to Panlilio.
DOCTRINE: The power to criminalize or penalize may be delegated only if
the law itself provides that specific violations are punished or if a violation
is made a penal offense under the law.
PEOPLE v. MACEREN
October 18, 1977 | Undue delegation
GIST: What is being assailed in this case is Fisheries Administrative Order
(AO) No. 84, which was created in consonance with the Fisheries Law, which
prohibits obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing. What the AO
contained was a prohibition of electro fishing in PH waters. One morning of
March 1969, 5 persons were accused of performing electro fishing in
Laguna. The accused argued that such law is a form of undue delegation, as
the Fisheries Law never included electro fishing as one of the forbidden
modes of fishing, but that the disputed AO in this case expressly provides for
a prohibition and a corresponding penalty. SC held that the Secretary of
Agriculture exceeded his authority in issuing such AO. Electro fishing was
held not to be found in the law, and the Fisheries Law contained a penal
provision that may be used as recourse for the offenders.
DOCTRINE: When the delegate fails to implement a regulation that is
germane to the purpose and objects of the law and likewise fails to conform
with the standard that the law prescribes, there is undue delegation of
legislative power.
PEOPLE v. DACUYCUY
May 5, 1989 | Undue delegation
GIST: Hindang, Motando, CAval, and Zanoria, are public school teachers that
were alleged to be in violation of the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, and hence subjected to Sec. 32 of the said code. They challenge
the said provision for imposing cruel and unusual punishment. SC ruled that
indeed there is an undue delegation of legislative power, because the
duration of the penalty of imprisonment is left to the court as if the latter
were the legislative department of the government. In the absence of
legislature, Judge Dacuycuy, even if with reference to the Magna Carta, has
no power to fix the term of imprisonment.
DOCTRINE: It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no
points of reference have been provided for by the legislature.
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YNOT v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
March 20, 1987 | Undue delegation
clearly this is what paved the way for DOH to implement the RIRR; absence
of standards.
GIST: President Marcos issued EO 626-A prohibiting the movement of
carabaos and the slaughtering of the same. Ynot was transporting carabaos
(carabeef) in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo, where he was caught, and
so they were confiscated. Petitioner claims that such EO is unconstitutional
for constituting undue delegation of legislative power, when it contained a
provision where the authorities had discretion as to where the confiscated
items would go. SC held that it indeed constitutes undue delegation, as it
provides for a provision that renders seized property to be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
Meat Inspection Commission “may see fit”—this gives the delegate broad
power in determination of the proceeds of the confiscated item.
DOCTRINE: In the absence of the legislature in terms of fixing or imposing
fines, a delegate cannot provide for such fines to be suddenly present in its
implementing rules—such will constitute to undue delegation of legislative
power.
DOCTRINE: A roving commission is a wide and sweeping authority that is
not canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing; this is a clear
profligate and therefore an invalid delegation of legislative powers.
PHARMACEUTICAL v. DOH
October 9, 2007 | Undue Delegation
GIST: EO 51 (Milk Code) seeks to give effect to the International Code of
Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World
Health Assembly (WHA). WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted, and protected, hence
nutrition and health claims are not to be permitted for breastmilk
substitutes. With the PH ratifying the ICCPR, a provision of the said
convention states that state parties should take appropriate measures to
diminish infant and child mortality, among others. DOH then issued the
assailed Administrative Order No. 2006-0012, or the Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Executive Order No. 51 (RIRR), which includes
the prohibition on advertisments of breastmilk substitutes. This is assailed
as far as the power of DOH to impose fines is concerned. SC held that Sec.
46 of the RIRR is invalid. Neither the Milk Code nor the Revised
Administrative Code grants the DOH any authority to fix or impose
administrative fines and therefore there is no standard to be followed—
There in undue delegation -
ABAKADA v. PURISIMA
exercises discretion to approve/
August 14, 2008 | Undue delegation disapprove the IRR (only
judicial power)
GIST: The Attrition Act of 2005 (RA 9335) was enacted to improve the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC by
implementing a system of rewards (if they collect more than the year’s
target) and sanctions (if they collect less than the year’s target). In
consonance with the law is the creation of the Rewards and Incentives Fund.
Petitioners assail the said law as it is an undue delegation of power and lacks
sufficient standards in giving the President the power to fix revenue targets.
SC upheld the validity of the law and ruled that RA 9335 perfectly stated
policies and standards (optimization of revenue generation capability
through a system of rewards) to guide the President in fixing revenue targets
and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law.
DOCTRINE: A law sets out sufficient standards when it provides adequate
boundaries to map out the delegate’s authority and prevent them from
running riot.
PHIL. COCONUT v. REPUBLIC
January 24, 2012 | Undue delegation
GIST: Upon declaration of martial law in 1972, several PDs were issued to
improve the coconut industry through the collection and use of the coconut
levy fund. One of which is PD 755, which authorized the Philippine Coconut
Administration (PCA) to utilize collections and to acquire a commercial bank
and to deposit the levy collections in the said bank, which was withdrawable
only when the bank attained a certain level of sufficiency in its equity capital.
The plan was, the shares of the said commercial bank is to be distributed to
coconut farmers for the “advancement of national policy.” Now during the
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Aquino Administration, the PCGG was established, with the goal to recover
ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. Focusing on the coco levy laws relevant
to the case at bar, PCGG assails PD 755, among others, for constituting
undue delegation in terms of allowing PCA to promulgate rules and
regulations governing the distribution of UCPB of its shares to coconut
farmers. SC held that there was indeed undue delegation, as PD 755 allowed
PCA to promulgate its own rules and regulations without a fixed standard;
the decree does not state who are to be considered coconut farmers, it did
not identify any condition as to how the disposition of the shares will
redound to the advancement of national policy, and it did not provide any
guideline, standard, condition, or restriction as to how the shares are to be
distributed to farmers.
DOCTRINE: One of the tests for there to be a valid delegation of legislative
power is the sufficient standards test, which must specify the limits of the
delegates’ authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify conditions
under which it is to be implemented.
BELGICA v. OCHOA
October 18, 1988 | Discretion as to substantive contents
GIST: What is being assailed in this case is the constitutionality of the
Congressional Pork Barrel (Priority Development Fund, or PDAF, for brevity)
and the Presidential Pork Barrel (Malampaya Fund). Briefly, the SC discussed
its history of the PDAF:
1. Pre-Martial Law Era (Act 3044) – appropriations for public works,
as approved by the joint committee elected by Senate and HoR;
post enactment legislator participation broadened areas of fund
release
2. Martial Law Era – 500k allotted for Local Development Projects;
projects for public works (hard projects) and non-public works
(soft projects—education, health, livelihood)
3. Cory Aquino Admin – Davao Development Fund (480M); Visayas
Development Fund (240M); Countrywide Development Fund
(2.3B); CDF funds released directly to implementing agencies
subject to submission of list of projects and activities
4. FVR Admin – first time that VP had an allocation (20M); list of 50%
of projects submitted to DBM, the rest of the 50% to be submitted
6 months after); no funds appropriated for projects not in list
submitted to DBM; Congress had power to direct how, where, and
when appropriations were to be spent
5. ERAP Admin – CDF removed from GAA, and PDAF appeared (funds
released directly to implementing agency under consultation with
appropriate district representative; allocation may be realigned as
necessary to ANY expense category; no amount shall be used to
fund personal services and other personal benefit – LOL)
6. GMA Admin – PDAF to be used to fund priority programs for the
10-point agenda; Program Menu Concept was implemented (list of
general programs and implementing agencies where PDAF may be
spent); NGOs formally allowed to participate in implementation of
Govt Projects (250M-500M)
7. PNoy Admin – Representatives (70M); Senators and VP (200M);
LGU allowed to be an implementing agency (can use PDAF)
For the history of the Presidential Pork Barrel:
1. Malampaya Fund – special fund under Sec 8 PD 910 (Marcos era);
strengthen govt efforts relating to exploitation of energy resources
vital to economic growth
2. Presidential Social Fund – Sec 12, PD 1869; a special funding facility
managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff
where President provides direct assistance to priority programs
and projects not funded under regular budget
Petitioners assail its constitutionality on the claim that there is undue
delegation for it provides post enactment measures to its delegates. SC
ruled that indeed, there is undue delegation, as it gives the power of
appropriation to legislators (individually), through post-enactment
authority, which involves allowing them to determine how much of the fund
will go to a specific project.
DOCTRINE: The power of appropriation is constitutionally delegated to the
Congress and exercising this power in an individual capacity is not conferred
by fundamental law. Legislative power is vested in the Congress alone,
except for exceptions of having it delegated to: local governments, who are
allowed to legislate on purely local matters; and the President, in times of
war or other national emergency.
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Sec. 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four senators who shall be
elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be
provided by law.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section.
Sec. 3. No person shall be a senator unless:
(1) He is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
(2) On the day of the election is at least thirty-five years of age
(3) Able to read and write
(4) A registered voter
(5) And a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years
immediately preceding the day of the election.
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY v. COMELEC
October 6, 2001 | Not mandatory to fill in the seats
Sec. 4. The term of office of the senators shall be six years and shall
commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth of
June next following the election. No senator shall serve for more than two
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party-list. For
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half
of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
GIST: May 1998 was the first party-list election, and COMELEC proclaimed
13 party-list representatives from 12 parties and organizations. After the
special elections, COCOFED was likewise entitled to a seat. PAG-ASA filed a
petition to fill up the number of seats as mandated by the constitution, it
claims that the 20% membership of the HoR mandatory, and that the literal
application of the 2% vote requirement and the 3-seat limit under RA 7941
would defeat this constitutional provision (note that in this case, only 25
nominees would be winners, pretty much short of the 52-seat
“requirement,” as claimed by PAG-ASA). SC ruled in favor of the validity of
the assailed law and held that the 52 seats are not required to be filled. The
2% requirement is valid insofar as this threshold is the gatekeeper for the
qualification of party-lists to additional seats.
DOCTRINE: The 20% requirement is merely a ceiling, and that it was not
required to be filled. If there is no sufficient number of participating parties,
organizations, or coalitions that could garner the 2% vote threshold and fill
up the 20% party-list allocation in the House, then such allocation cannot be
filled up completely. (no discussion of the formula here as it is completely
overturned in the case of Banat v. COMELEC)
PHIL. GUARDIANS v. COMELEC
April 29, 2009 | Party-list representation
GIST: Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) seeks to nullify
COMELEC resolutions which delisted PGBI from the roster of registered
national, regional, or sectoral parties under the party-list system. The Partylist System Act (RA 7941) provided for a requirement that such party-lists
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any partylist who fails to participate in the last 2 preceding elections OR fails to obtain
at least 2% of the votes cast under the party-list system for 2 preceding
elections for the constituency it has registered. COMELEC issued Resolution
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8679, which deleted several party-list groups (along with petitioner PGBI,
who was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 AND
it did not participate in the 2007 elections. SC held that such delistment is
bereft of basis, for the two grounds mentioned in RA 7941 are separate
grounds; hence, (1) that it failed to participate only in one elections and not
in two, and that (2) it failed to secure the percentage of 2% in one but not in
two preceding elections, it must be declared to be qualified to be voted
upon as a party0list group for the May 2010 elections.
DOCTRINE: The two separate grounds for delistment as provided for by RA
7941 are as follows:
1. The party-list failed to participate in the last 2 preceding elections;
or
2. The party-list failed to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast
The use of the disjunctive word “or” provides a plain, clear, and
unmistakable language of the law which provides two independent reasons
for delisting (no accumulation is needed).
BANAT v. COMELEC
July 8, 2009 | Apportionment and representation
GIST: June 2007, Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transpararency (BANAT) filed before the National Board of Canvassers
(NBC) a petition to proclaim the full number (20%) of party-list
representatives as provided for by the Constitution. COMELEC in this case
previously proclaimed 13 parties as winners, and announced that it would
compute the number of seats in accordance with the Veterans formula. This
was assailed by the petitioners for being unconstitutional. Contradictory to
the ruling in Veterans, the SC held that the 2% threshold should not be the
determining factor in terms of the additional seats to be given to party-lists
who have qualified; such requirement is unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE: Party-list representatives shall be allocated using the following
guidelines:
1. Those who garnered 2% and above shall be guaranteed with 1 seat
each
2. For the remaining seats, additional seats is given to those who got
2% and above, by determining the whole number obtained when
3.
the percentage share of the party-list group is multiplied by the
remaining number of seats (formula for step 2: Total Party-List
Votes x Remaining Seats = no rounding off, just get whole number)
Should there still be remaining vacant seats, all party-lists are
ranked from highest to lowest in terms of vote turnout, and are
given one seat each, until all vacant seats are taken. (3-seat limit
will apply)
ANG LADLAD v. COMELEC
April 8, 2010 | Disapproval due to moral issues
GIST: Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of the LGBT community,
whose application for accreditation was denied due to its lack of members;
but upon trying once again, they claim that the LGBT community is a
marginalized and underrepresented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation. Unfortunately, their
petition was denied once again by COMELEC, but this time, based on moral
grounds; they even cited the Bible and the Koran as basis, and said that in
representing the LGBT community, sexual immorality is forwarded. Further,
COMELEC found that the said party-list violated provisions of the Civil Code
on nuisance, and such representation would be tantamount to exposure to
the youth an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our
faith. SC held that Ang Ladlad has complied with the requirements as
provided for by RA 7941 and the Constitution, and therefore there is no
reason to have denied such application for accreditation. SC likewise held
that denial of application based on moral issues is insufficient; not to
mention, violative of constitutional rights enshrined in Art. 3.
DOCTRINE: Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of an organization from
participation in the party-list system.
MAGDALO v. COMELEC
July 19, 2012 | Qualification as a regional political party
GIST: Petitioner Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its petition
for registration with the COMELEC, which was denied after the COMELEC, in
citing Art IX-C Section 2(5) of the Constitution, which denies the application
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for registration of organizations who seek to achieve their goals through
violence or unlawful means, took into account the fact that some of its
members took part in the Oakwood mutiny. They further claim that they
have been granted amnesty, and therefore, having a clean slate, their
application should have been granted. SC held that there has been no grave
abuse of discretion by COMELEC in its denial of such application; with the
constitutional mandate that outright denial must be given to organizations
who seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means. With
reference to the Oakwood incident per se, it is clear that such organization
used violence and unlawful means. Moreover, despite the fact that they
have been granted amnesty, they must still submit, individually, affidavits
renouncing the use of violence or other harmful means to achieve the
objectives of their organization.
DOCTRINE: Sec. 2 Art. IX of the Constitution provides a mandate of refusal
of the registration of organizations, political parties, or coalitions which seek
to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means.
Two other important terms used in this case which might come in handy:
1. Registration – act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of
our election laws
2. Accreditation – relates to the privileged participation that our
election laws grant to qualified registered parties
DAYAO v. COMELEC
January 29, 2013 | Party-list representation
GIST: Petitioners of this case are individual dealers of different brands of
LPG, alongside with the Federation of Philippine Industries, Inc. (FPII), an
association comprised of entities engaged in various industries in the
country. LPG Marketing Association (LPGMA) is a non-stock, non-profit
organization of consumers and small industry players in the LPG and energy
sector. LPGMA sought for party-list accreditation with COMELEC, who
approved the same. Petitioners now filed a petition for cancellation of
LPGMA’s accreditation, claiming that it does not represent a marginalized
sector of the society because its incorporations, officers, and members are
not marginalized or underrepresented citizens; they are marketers and
independent re-fillers of LPG who control 45% of the national LPG retail
market and have significant ownership interests in LPG refilling plants.
COMELEC dismissed their petition. COMELEC on the other hand argues that
such ground used by petitioners is not among what was enumerated in RA
7941, and that such complaint is a belated opposition since LPGMA’s
registration was approved with finality on January 2010. For the first issue,
SC held that such registration may still be cancelled, since the Resolution
granting their request is not a perpetual and indefeasible right to its
accreditation. As for the second issue, the Court held that nowhere in RA
7941 does it say that an opposition to the petition for registration be
interposed so that a complaint or cancellation be made, hence it should
have been entertained.
DOCTRINE: Sec. 6 of RA 7941 states that COMELEC may, upon verified
complaint, refuse or cancel the registration of a party on any of the following
grounds:
1. It is a religious sect/denomination, org, or association, organized
for religious purposes
2. Advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal
3. A foreign party or organization
4. Receiving support from any foreign government, political entity,
whether directly or indirectly through any of its officers or
members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes
5. Violates or fails to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating
to elections
6. Declares untruthful statements in its petition
7. Has ceased to exist for at least a year
8. Fails to participate in the last 2 preceding elections OR fails to
obtain at least 2% of the votes cast under the party-list system in
the 2 preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered
ATONG PAGLAUM ET. AL.
April 2, 2013 | New guidelines for party-list; controlling rule
GIST: 52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions in an
effort to reverse resolutions by the COMELEC disqualifying them from the
Ma 2013 race. Such were cancelled for failing to present a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, and that their nominees did not come from a
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marginalized or underrepresented sector, and /or some of the organizations
or groups are not truly representatives of the sector they intend to
represent in Congress. SC ruled that COMELEC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in their disqualification; however, the Court ordered that
COMELEC follow the new parameters for the party-list system.
DOCTRINE: New guidelines for the new parameters of the party-list system:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system
(national parties, regional parties, and sectoral parties)
2. National and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent the
marginalized or underrepresented
3. Political parties can participate in the party-list elections provided
that they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in the legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its
sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list
system. Such wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is
linked to a political party through a coalition
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking in well-defined constituencies. What
is important is that their political advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack
well-defined constituencies include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority number of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented must belong to
the marginalized or underrepresented sector they represent. The
nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented or that represent those who
lack well defined political constituencies either must belong to their
respective sectors or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sector. The nominees of national and regional must be
bona fide members of the said parties or organizations.
6.
National, regional, and sectoral parties shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified provided that they have at
least one nominee who remains qualified.
ABANG LINGKOD v. COMELEC
October 22, 2013 | Proof of track record
GIST: Petitioner is a sectoral organization that represents the interest of
peasant farmers and fisherfolks, who unfortunately failed to get a seat in
the 2010 elections. Upon manifesting before the COMELEC its intent to
participate in the 2013 elections, their registration as a party-list group was
cancelled. COMELEC reasoned out that petitioner failed to established its
track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and
underrepresented. SC ruled that, in insisting that petitioner present
evidence showing such track records is unconstitutional. There is no
mention in RA 7941, moreso in the new and controlling guidelines as
established in the case of Atong Paglaum.
DOCTRINE: There is no mention that sectoral organizations intending to
participate in the party-list elections are still required to present a track
record, since they may either be marginalized and underrepresented, or
may lack well-defined constituencies. It is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to special interests and concerns of their sector. Such
track record is only required when the party is representing a sector where
they do not belong.
LICO v. COMELEC
September 29, 2015 | Expulsion
GIST: Petitioner Lico is part of Ating Koop, a pary-list that was given a seat
at the House of Representatives. Their party had a term sharing agreement,
and Lico was the first to sit. Lico did not live up to the said agreement, which
resulted to the party’s decision to expel Lico from the organization for
disloyalty, which was upheld by the COMELEC. Now Lico assails that
COMELEC does not have jurisdiction over this case. SC held that COMELEC
indeed did not have jurisdiction as to the expulsion of Lico from Ating Koop.
In this case, the petition for Lico’s expulsion from the HoR is anchored on
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this expulsion from Ating Koop, which necessarily affects his title as member
of the Congress.
DOCTRINE: The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the
HRET are not parallel concepts that do not intersect. Rather, the operation
of the rule on intra-party matters is circumscribed by Sec. 17 Art. VI of the
Constitution and jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunals.
Such jurisdiction is exclusive; the HRTE is given full authority to hear and
decide the case on any matter touching the validity of the title of the
proclaimed winner.
TOBIAS v. ABALOS
December 8, 1994 | Reapportionment through special law; Mandaluyong
GIST: Petitioners who are taxpayers and residents of Mandaluyong, assail
the constitutionality of RA No. 7675, which converts the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong. Prior to such
enactment, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to
only one legislative district. They claim that such law violates Secs 5(1) and
(4) of Art. VI concerning the number of members of the Congress and the
reapportionment of legislative districts. SC held that there was no violation
of any constitutional provision in the enactment of RA 7675, and hence, the
validity of the said law is upheld.
DOCTRINE: The present limit of 250 members is not absolute. There was a
phrase in the provision that says, “unless otherwise provided by law.”
Hence, the present composition of the Congress could be increased if it so
mandates via legislative enactment.
MARIANO v. COMELEC
March 7, 1995 | Reapportionment through special law; Makati
GIST: Petitioners of this case are assailing RA 7854, which converts the
Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City of Makati, as it attempts
to create another legislative district in Makati. With the premise that
reapportionment is not allowed through special law and that Makati’s
population is only 450,000 as of 1999, they forward that such enactment is
unconstitutional. The SC upheld the constitutionality of the assailed law,
with reference to Tobias v. Abalos, wherein it was settled that
reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through special law.
As to the issue on the population, the Constitution provides for a minimum
requirement for legislative districts to have at least a population of 250,000
for cities—clearly, Makati has met the minimum population requirement.
DOCTRINE: With reference to the case of Tobias v. Abalos, it is a well settled
doctrine that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through
special law.
SEMA v. COMELEC
July 16, 2008 | Reapportionment through special law
GIST: RA 9054 was passed, amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it
with power to create provinces, municipalities, cities, and barangays.
Pursuant to this law, ARMM created Shariff Kabunsuan, which comprises of
st
the municipalities of the 1 district of Maguindanao, with Cotabato City as
st
an exception. In line with the 2007 elections, COMELEC stated that the 1
district is now only made of Cotabato City, which was later amended stating
st
that status quo should be retained for this elections, and so the 1 district
shall be known as Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City. Petitioner Sema is
st
a (losing) congressional candidate for the 1 legislative district, and he is
arguing that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district. He claims
that it is a constitutional mandate that provinces shall gain legislative
representation and that Shariff Kabunsuan’s merge with Cotabato City as
st
the 1 district is a deprivation of it’s right to have a representative in the
Hor. SC held that RA 9054 is unconstitutional, ARMM cannot validly create
Shariff Kabunsuan province, it may only, in the purview of the Local
Government Code (LGC), create barangays within their jurisdiction. ARMM
cannot create provinces, unless there is a law stating otherwise.
DOCTRINE: The creation of provinces, cities, municipalities, or barangays,
must comply with the following conditions:
1. The creation of a local government must follow the criteria fixed in
the LGC
2. Such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution
3. There must be a plebiscite in the political units affected
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* power to
create
barangays subject to
LGC.
* power to
create a
province and
cities - under
Congress
because it
involves power
to create
legislative
district.
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MONTEJO v. COMELEC
March 16, 1995 | Mere minor adjustments
st
GIST: Petitioner Montejo, the representative of the 1 district of Leyte,
pleads for the annulment of Sec. 1 of Resolution No. 2736, redistricting
certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of
equality of representation. Leyte, together with Tacloban and Ormoc is
composed of 5 districts, with 14 municipalities under it. Pursuant to the LGC,
the subprovince of Biliran became a regular province. With Biliran being
rd
under the 3 district, the latter got reduced to 5 municipalities. To remedy
the distribution of inhabitants with the hopes of evening them out,
COMELEC transferred certain municipalities to different districts. Petitioner
claims, that the COMELEC’s power to transfer certain municipalities to
different districts is bereft of legal basis. SC held that the COMELEC does not
possess powers to legislative apportionment, which is lodged in the
Congress.
DOCTRINE: COMELEC may only perform minor adjustments of the
reapportionment. The power to reapportion districts solely lies on the
Congress. Minor adjustments include adjustment in the correct name of a
municipality, among others.
HERRERA v. COMELEC
November 17, 1999 | Rules on apportionment
GIST: What is being assailed by petitioner Herrera in this case is the splitting
of Guimaras to two provincial districts, which was due to the two new
municipalities added to it. Herrera claims that such is an unfair division. SC
upheld the validity of the Resolution and the act done by COMELEC pursuant
to the law; and hence such adjustment well within the purview of its powers.
It could be surmised that the COMELEC adjusted districts in accordance with
the law, especially that the municipalities of Guimaras that are grouped
together are contiguous or adjacent, based from the map of Guimaras.
DOCTRINE: Adjustment is manifest when what is being reapportioned are
contiguous, adjacent, and compact municipalities within a district. Such
reapportionment is allowed by the Congress to be exercised by the
COMELEC.
SAMSON v. AGUIRRE
September 22, 1999 | Population size; absence of certification to income,
population, and area not fatal; presumed valid; Novaliches
GIST: Petitioner Samson forward that there was an absence of certifications
to support the passage of RA 8535, which created the City of Novaliches.
Further, that there was an absence of a certification attesting that the
creation of Novaliches as a city will not affect its mother city, Quezon City,
as far as income, population, and land area is concerned. SC upheld the
constitutionality of RA 8535, not only because of its presumption of validity,
but also because of its compliance with the requirements as set by the Local
Government Code Sec. 7, as interpreted in its IRR:
1. Income – not less than 20M for the immediately preceding 2
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices as verified by the
DOF (Novaliches earned 26.9M)
2. Population – not less than 150,000 as certified by NSO (their
population was at 347,310)
3. Land area – must be contiguous and at least 100km as certified by
the LBM of the DENR (not considered, per Art. 11 of the IRR, the
petitioner need only to comply with income, population, OR land
area)
With regard to the certification on the absence of adverse effects to QC, the
SC held that such was not necessary, as the officials of QC were present
during the hearing in the Congress, and did not even raise a finger against
the creation of the City of Novaliches.
DOCTRINE: In reference to the IRR of LGC Sec. 7, petitioners applying for the
creation of highly urbanized cities must prove to have qualified the income,
population, or land area requirement.
There is a presumption of validity despite absence of certificates and various
documents when during the hearing in the Congress for a creation of a
particular city, the DBM, DILG, and other officials of Quezon City and other
relevant authorities are present.
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ALDABA v. COMELEC
January 25, 2010 | Population size; Malolos City
NAVARRO v. ERMITA
April 12, 2011 | Land area as a factor
GIST: Petitioners of this case assail the enactment of RA 9591, which created
a legislative district for Malolos City. What petitioner was sceptic about was
the fact that there was failure to meet the 250,000 requirement as
mandated by the Constitution, because the undated certification submitted,
which was issued by a Regional director of the NSO, was merely a projection,
which stated that their population will be 254,030 by the year of 2010. SC
held that such enactment was indeed unconstitutional; such document has
no legal effect because the NSO Regional Director has no authority to issue
such certification.
GIST: The petitioners of this case assail the enactment of RA 9355, which
creates the province of Dinagat Islands. SC upheld the validity of RA 9355,
holding that the Dinagat Islands is exempt of the land area requirement for
being composed of separate islands. This erroneous decision was dissented
by J. Carpio, who said that the IRR basically expanded what the law clearly
provided for and that therefore, such grant of exemption insofar as the land
requirement is concerned, must be invalid. It is evident that what Dinagat
Islands only met was the minimum income requirement. Dinagat Island’s
population was only at 106,951, and its land area didn’t meet the
requirement, which was deemed important by the court, because without
it, it would reduce provinces to the level of a rich municipality unable to host
otherwise qualified new smaller local government units for sheer lack of
space.
DOCTRINE: Certifications on demographic projections can only be issued by
the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB), or the NSO Administrator
or his designated certifying officer.
AQUINO v. COMELEC
April 7, 2010 | Population size; Camarines Sur
GIST: Petitioners of this case assail the enactment of RA 9716, which seeks
to reapportion the province of Camarines Sur. Prior to the enactment,
st
CamSur had 4 districts, with the 1 district having 417,304 people. RA 9716
led to its division into 2 districts, creating 5 districts in total for CamSur. What
st
petitioners argue in this case is that, in the splitting of the 1 district, it is
apparent that there will be less than 250,000 people per district, which is
violative of the constitutional requirement as far as population is concerned.
SC upheld the validity of RA 9716, there being no constitutional requirement
that was violated, because provinces need not meet the 250,000 population
requirement as set by the Constitution.
DOCTRINE: Sec. 5(3) Art. VI draws a plain and clear distinction between the
entitlement of a city and a province for a representatives. The use of the
comma before the words “or each province” shows that cities must first
show that they have the 250,000 requisite, as compared to the provinces,
who are not required to present the same.
DOCTRINE: In accordance with Art. 461 of the LGC, the following are the
requirements for the creation of provinces:
1. Minimum income requirement
2. Either the minimum land area OR minimum population
requirement
BAGABUYO v. COMELEC
December 8, 2008 | No need for plebiscite in apportionment or
reapportionment
GIST:CDO’s then Congressman Jaraula filed and sponsored HB No. 5859 (aka
RA 9371), which provides for the apportionment of the lone district of CDO,
which increased CDO’s legislative district from 1 to 2. In 2007, COMELEC
promulgated a Resolution implementing the said Act, to which the
petitioner assailed, as there is an absence of the plebiscite requirement
provided for in Sec. 10 Art. X of the Constitution. SC held that RA 9371 is a
reapportionment legislation and not a creation, division, merger, abolition,
or alteration of a local government unit, which requires plebiscite.
DOCTRINE: Reapportionment legislation done by virtue of Sec. 5(4) Art. VI
does not require for a plebiscite, as such is only required when a local
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government is created, divided, merged, abolished, or altered, by virtue of
Sec. 10 Art. X of the Constitution. Legislative apportionment is basically the
allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; it is
the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting
power among districts. This is brought about by the changes in population,
which is mandated by the Constitutional requirement of equality and
representation.
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the
election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and,
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in
which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
BENGSON III v. HRET
May 7, 2001 | Recovery of natural-born citizen status
GIST: Cruz is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, who later enlisted in
the US Marine Corps and took his oath of allegiance to the US (as
consequence, lost PH citizenship, by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 63,
Sec. 1[4], which provides for the loss of PH citizenship by, among others,
rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a
foreign country). Later, Cruz reacquired his PH citizenship through
repatriation, in accordance with RA 2630. He then ran and won as
nd
Representative of the 2 district of Pangasinan. Now, petitioner Bengson
filed a case before the HRET claiming that Cruz is not qualified as a member
of the HoR because of his failure to meet the requirement of being a naturalborn citizen. SC held that Cruz’ repatriation in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 63 allowed him to recover his original status of
being a natural-born citizen, and hence the challenge on his qualification as
a member of the HoR is debunked.
DOCTRINE: A natural-born citizen is a person who must be a Filipino citizen
since birth, and someone who does not have to perform any act to obtain
or perfect his Philippine citizenship. Those who still need to perform any act
to obtain citizenship are naturalized citizens.
Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registering the said oath in the Local Civil
Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or has resided.
This will result to the recovery of the original nationality of the person.
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AQUINO v. COMELEC
September 18, 1995 | Domicile of origin
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v. COMELEC
September 18, 1995 | Abandonment of domicile
GIST: Petitioner Aquino filed his COC for the position of representative of
nd
the 2 legislative district of Makati City, wherein he declared he resided in
Makati for 10 months. Respondents Move Makati and Mateo Bedon et al.
filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that he lacked residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman. Aquino filed an amended COC,
which stated that he resided in Makati for 1 year and 13 days. Petitioner
won the elections, and after an exchange of pleadings COMELEC declared
that Aquino was not qualified at all. Hence, COMELEC proclaimed the
nd
candidate in the 2 place. This is now assailed by petitioner before the
court, as COMELEC does not have jurisdiction over the case, since he already
won, and that it was the HRET who was supposed to hear the case, and that
nd
COMELEC made a mistake of proclaiming the 2 placer. SC ruled that,
COMELEC had jurisdiction, because Aquino was not proclaimed yet, and
therefore, not yet a member of the HoR. However it must be noted that they
nd
cannot proclaim the person who got 2 place. Moreover, SC ruled that
petitioner failed to prove that he established that Makati was his domicile.
GIST: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her COC for the position of
st
Representative of the 1 district of Leyte for the 1995 elections, and
indicated that she has been residing in the said constituency for 7 months.
st
Incumbent 1 district representative filed a petition for cancellation and
disqualification, alleging that Imelda lacked the requirement for residency
of 1 year. 6 days later, Imelda amended her COC and changed it to “since
childhood.” The Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte denied the
acceptance of her amended COC as it was filed beyond the deadline. She
opposed the petition of Montejo and argued that such indication of “7
months” was a result of an honest misrepresentation, that, she had always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. SC held that Imelda
met the 1-year residency requirement, despite being born in Manila, and
despite having various properties in a span of different decades, there was
no showing of any intention to abandon her domicile of origin, that is
Tacloban.
DOCTRINE: For the issue on jurisdiction, take note that a candidate who has
not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said
to be a member of the HoR, and therefore that same person is not yet under
the jurisdiction of the HRET.
For the issue on qualification as far as residence/domicile is concerned, just
remember that the place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home where no matter where he may be found at any given time
he intends to return and remain, shall be called his domicile, which is what
the Constitution refers to when it speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law.
For the issue of the second placer being proclaimed, take note of the fact
that the second placer is just a second placer; he lost the elections, he could
not be proclaimed a winner as he could not be considered first among the
qualified candidates.
DOCTRINE: While residence is the indication of a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary, domicile denotes a fixed residence to which, when
absent, one has the intention of returning. A man can have but one domicile
for the same purpose at any time, but may have numerous places of
residence. But take note, that residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile; therefore it imports not only intention to
reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.
DOMINO v. COMELEC
July 19, 1999 | Mere lease of house
GIST: 1998, petitioner Domino filed her COC to represent Sarangani, where
she indicated that she resided in Sarangani for 1 year and 2 months
immediately preceding the election. Respondents filed petition to deny due
course to or cancel the said COC, claiming that Domino is not a resident,
much less a registered voter of Sarangani. As a defense, Domino argues that
he has complied with the 1-year residency requirement, and even provided
as proof his lease contract with Nora Dacaldal as lessor. COMELEC
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disqualified Domino, and hence a case was filed in court. SC ruled in this case
that Domino indeed failed to meet the residence requirement as set by law.
There was a failure on Domino’s end to establish his new domicile with
definite acts; as what he showed was merely a contract of lease, which lacks
the permanence required for abandonment of original domicile.
DOCTRINE: To show a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. Actual removal or actual change of domicile
2. Bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
3. Establishment of a new domicile and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose
PEREZ v. COMELEC
October 28, 1999 | Registration in another district
rd
GIST: Aguinaldo filed his COC for representative of the 3 district of Cagayan
in the 1998 elections. Such was challenged by petitioner Perez, who filed a
petition for disqualification on the ground that he has not been a resident
of the district for at least a year immediately before the day of the elections.
Petitioner claims that, Aguinaldo resides in Gattaran, which is outside the
rd
3 district, and that he is a registered voter there. Aguinaldo on the other
rd
hand forwards that he has apartnments in the 3 district (Tuguegarao),
where his mistress is hidden. SC held that Aguinaldo met the residency
requirement as provided for in the Constitution, for lack of basis of the
allegations against him that have proven nothing but the fact that Aguinaldo
met the requirement.
DOCTRINE: Place of voter’s registration is not conclusive of one’s domicile.
Considering the purpose of the residency requirement, to ensure that the
person elected is familiar with the needs and problems of his constituency,
it is enough that there is proof of the requirements on domicile (see doctrine
of Domino v. COMELEC).
FERNANDEZ v. HRET
December 21, 2009 | Domicile and residence
GIST: Fernandez filed his COC for the 2007 elections, as candidate for
st
representative of the 1 district of Laguna. Vicente filed a Petition to Deny
Due Course and/or to Cancel the COC and a Petition for Disqualification
st
against petitioner, with claims that he was not a resident of the 1 district,
th
as his address was located in the 4 district of Laguna. The petitions were
initially denied and Fernandez was proclaimed as the winner. Vicente, still
full of determination, filed a petition before the HRET that Fernandez be
ineligible to hold office for the same ground (1-year residency requirement).
Fernandez claims that he no longer resides in his Cabuyao address, that he
resides in Sta. Rosa since 2006 (he submitted proof: he sent his kids to school
in Sta. Rosa, he had business ties here also, and he offered witnesses who
resided in Villa de Toledo, which is in, Sta. Rosa). With HRET ruling in favor
of Vicente, a petition was filed before the SC, who held that Fernandez was
able to comply with the residency requirement, for reasons that the
evidence presented by Vicente was not enough to prove that Fernandez
failed to comply with the 1-year residency requirement.
DOCTRINE: The residency requirement as provided for in the Constitution
was intended to prevent a stranger/newcomer from holding office on the
assumption that such stranger or newcomer would be insufficiently
acquainted with the needs of his prospective constituents.
TAGOLINO v. HRET
March 19, 2013 | One-year residency requirement
GIST: Richard Gomez field his COC for the 2010 elections as representative
th
of the 4 district of Leyte under the Liberal Party. Such was assailed by his
rival candidate, Juntilla, who argues that Gomez resides in San Juan, Metro
Manila and not in Leyte, and therefore short of the residency requirement
as mandated by the constitution. With the COMELEC granting the petition
of Juntilla, Richard moved for reconsideration but was denied. Lucy TorresGomez filed her COC together with a Certificate of Nomination and
Acceptance from LP endorsing here as the substitute of Richard, which was
approved. Now the same is being assailed by Juntilla. However during the
pendency of the case, Richard’s name was found still in the ballots, and since
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Lucy was the substitute, the votes were credited in her favor. With Richard
garnering the highest votes, Lucy was proclaimed the duly-elected
representative. Juntilla’s claims primarily boils down to the fact that Lucy
cannot validly substitute Richard, who’s COC is rendered void ab initio. SC
held that indeed, Lucy cannot validly substitute Richard, who had his COC
denied due course and cancelled—which has to its effect as if he has not
been a candidate at all.
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for
a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law,
at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No
Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
DOCTRINE: The Omnibus Election Code provides for remedies to assail a
candidate’s bid for public office:
1. Petition for disqualification (Sec. 68) – a candidate disqualified
under Sec. 68 is technically still considered to have been a
candidate, however, his statutory eligibility is denied
2. Petition to deny due course and/or to cancel a COC (Sec. 78) – a
candidate disqualified under Sec. 78 is deemed not to have been a
candidate at all; a cancelled COC is considered void ab initio, it does
not give rise to a valid candidacy, and necessarily, to valid votes.
Sec. 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the
Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held
on the second Monday of May.
REYES v. COMELEC
June 25, 2013 | One-year residency requirement
GIST: Reyes filed his COC to run as representative for the Province of
Marinduque, where Tan filed a petition to deny due course or cancel the
COC on ground that she is actually an American citizen (who possess an
American passport); and that she is a permanent resident or an immigrant
of the US, hence unable to satisfy the residency requirement. A case was
filed before the court after COMELEC’s cancellation of Reyes’ COC. SC held
that Reyes indeed did not meet the residency requirement as mandated by
the constitution, and that she does not hold Filipino citizenship. Taking an
oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as Provincial
Administrator of Marinduque is not sufficient so as to satisfy the “positive”
acts requirement of RA 9225.
DOCTRINE: Upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225,
one must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines
through positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from
the time he made it his domicile of choice.
Sec. 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives,
a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner
prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
LUCERO v. COMELEC
July 20, 1994 | Requisites of special elections
nd
GIST: Lucero and Ong were 2 of the 5 candidates for the 2 legislative
district of Northern Samar, where Ong won by 204 votes according to the
Canvass of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar. Such
results, however, did not tally the results from Precinct No. 7 of the
Municipality of Silvino Lobos, which were held to be illegible; Precinct No.
13 of Silvino Lobos, because the ballot boxes were snatched and no election
was held; and Precinct No. 16, because all copies of the election returns
were actually missing. COMELEC then ordered a counting of the ballots in
Precinct 7 and 16, and a special election for Precinct 13, if necessary. SC
ordered a recount of all the ballots, except for Precinct 13. If the difference
in the total number of votes between the two congressmen is less than the
total voters of precinct 13, there would be a special election because the
results can affect the winner.
DOCTRINE: The requisites for Special elections:
1. That there is a failure of election
2. That such failure would affect the results of the election
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Sec. 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of
all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
approving such increase.
Sec. 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the congress is in session. No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate
in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
PEOPLE v. JALOSJOS
February 3, 2000 | Convicted legislator
GIST: Petitioner Jalosjos is a member of the Congress now confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts
and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The case arose
when he filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the
duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite him having been convicted in the first instance
of a non-bailable offense. He likewise claims that with his reelection, the
people’s clamour for representation cannot be ignored as it is the mandate
of sovereign will, which therefore points to him in his exercise of the
functions of a Congressman. SC held that his confinement or imprisonment
is not a constraint to his mandate as a legislator. In fact, the members of the
Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason
for absence is legitimate (in this case, Jalosjos’ confinement is not merely
authorized by law, but also based on the constitution).
DOCTRINE: Members of the Congress cannot compel absent members to
attend sessions if the reason for absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than 6 years is not merely authorized by law, it
likewise has constitutional foundations. One rationale behind confinement,
whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is that of public selfdefense.
TRILLANES v. PIMENTEL
June 27, 2008 | Re-election to office and criminal charge
GIST: In light with the Oakwood mutiny, Trillanes along with several others
were charged with coup d’etat as defined under Art. 134-A of the RPC. 4
years later, petitioner Trillanes ran and won a seat in the Senate. Now prior
to the commencement of his term, Trillanes filed with the RTC a motion
requesting that he still be allowed to go to the Senate and exercise his
official functions, that he be allowed to set up a working area in his
detention place in Fort Bonifacio, with a computer, that he be allowed to
receive members of his staff in the same premises, among others. Such
motion was denied, and hence an appeal was made, citing in particular the
case of Jalosjos and how his case is different, because he still enjoys his civil
and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor,
and that, the denial of such motion was tantamount to removing him from
office. Moreso, Trillanes claims that his reelection is a form of condonation.
SC held that this case is no different to the case of Jalosjos, especially as to
the fact that both rape and coup d’etat are punishable by reclusion
perpetua, and hence the same ruling shall apply. In his claims of
condonation, the SC held that his reelection after the Oakwood mutiny is
not condonation. There is no deprivation of people of proper presentation,
denial of the people’s will and more so no repudiation of the people’s
choice.
DOCTRINE: (first doctrine similar to Jalosjos case) As for the re-election
issue, it is important to note that the doctrine being invoked by Trillanes,
that a public official cannot be removed for administrative conduct
committed during a prior term, since his reelection to office operates as a
condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off
the right to remove him, applies only to cases administrative in nature.
JIMENEZ v. CABANGBANG
August 3, 1966 | Parliamentary freedom of speech and debate
GIST: Cabangbang was a member of the HoR and is the Chairperson of the
Committee of National Defense. He wrote a letter to the President while the
Congress was not in session, which he likewise published in several
newspapers of general circulation in the country. The letter enumerates and
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describes 3 operational plans that include politicking, coup d’etat, and a
loyalty parade, where it included the names of Jimenez et. al. As defense,
Cabangbang claims that such publication is considered as privileged
communication and is thus protected. SC held in the negative and said that
the publication was not done in performance of his official duty either as a
member of the Congress or as an officer of any of the Committees, and
therefore it shall not be counted as privileged speech.
DOCTRINE: Parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a
vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its
magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Parliamentary
immunity is not an individual privilege accorded to the individual members
of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a
privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents
them.
DOCTRINE: Protected speech as referred to in Sec. 11 Art. VI is that of the
utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the
halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in
Congress, whether the same is in session or not. It likewise refers to other
acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises
housing its offices in the official discharge of their duties as members of the
Congress.
POBRE v. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
August 25, 2009 | Parliamentary freedom of speech and debate
such was privileged - but Senate may discipline
GIST: Pobre sent a letter to the Court inviting the latter’s attention to the
excerpts of Senator MDS’ speech delivered on the Senate floor, which
contained words such as “I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court”, and that, “I would rather
be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots.” Without
denial of the statements, MDS claims that such statements were covered by
parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the
discharge of her duty as member of the Congress or its committee. That,
such speech was made to address the controversial anomalies in the
governance with future remedial legislation, because she wanted to expose
the “unjust acts” of the JBC. Despite taking into account the sentiments of
MDS as far as her concerns with the JBC are concerned, the SC nevertheless
held that her speech is not covered by parliamentary immunity; she crossed
the limits of decency and good professional conduct. Her statements were
intemperate and highly improper in substance. No lawyer who has taken an
oath to maintain the respect due to courts should be allowed to erode the
people’s faith in the judiciary.
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Sec. 12. All members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall,
upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and
business interests. They shall notify the house concerned of a potential
conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation
of which they are authors.
Before Sec. 13 to apply, it is important that the second office or employment
is under the government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality.
Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold
any other office or employment in the government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may
have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term
for which he was elected.
LIBAN v. GORDON
July 18, 2011 | Disqualifications
GIST: Petitioner Liban filed a case before the SC for the forfeiture of the seat
of Gordon in the Senate, after he was elected as Chairman of the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC) during the time that he was a Senator. He claims
that, upon acceptance of such role, Gordon has ceased to be a Senator, as
provided for by Sec. 13 Art. VI of the Constitution. Gordon on the other hand
challenges the legal standing of Liban and likewise submits that PNRC is not
a GOCC and therefore is not under the control of the State, which nullifies
the argument of Liban as far as Sec. 13 is concerned. SC ruled that Liban
indeed does not have standing, and that PNRC is a private organization
performing public functions, hence the petition of Liban shall fail. PNRC was
created in compliance with the Geneva Convention, which has for its mission
to bring compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable. In
order to be recognized as a member of the National Society of the
Movement, the PNRC has to be autonomous, neutral, and independent—
hence, it is privately owned.
DOCTRINE: According to Sec. 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual
may commence such action if he claims to be entitled to the public office
allegedly usurped by another, in which case he can bring the action in his
own name.
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Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
personally appear as counsel before any Court of Justice or before the
electoral tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its
subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit or where he
may be called upon to act on account of his office.
body can just simply acquire a minimal participation in the interest of the
client and then intervene anytime.
PUYAT v. DE GUZMAN
March 25, 1982 | Appearing “in intervention” on one’s behalf
GIST: A case was filed after the election of the directors for the International
Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) was held, where the Acero group claims
that the stockholder’s votes were not properly counted. In the same case,
the Puyat Group claim that Fernandez, a member of the interim Batasang
Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for the Acero group. In the
SEC case, Assemblyman Fernandez was disqualified as counsel, as it is in
contravention with the constitutional mandate that they cannot appear as
counsel before an administrative body (which in this case is SEC). After such
disqualification, Assemblyman Fernandez purchased 10 shares of stock of
IPI in order to be qualified to run as Director, in which he won. The day after
his purchase he entered a motion to intervene in the SEC. Now a separate
case was filed in the CFI to annul the sale of stocks to Fernandez, and in that
same case note that Fernandez once again appeared as counsel. Fernandez
on the other hand claims that his appearance is justified as he owned 10
shares. SC ruled that he cannot intervene in the said SEC case without
violating the Constitutional prohibition on members of Batasang Pambansa
from appearing as counsel in any court without appellate jurisdiction. It was
noted that he only acquired the stocks after his disqualification.
DOCTRINE: Members of the Batasang Pambasa are not allowed to appear
as counsel before an administrative body. Especially so so if he merely enters
as an intervenor, and claims he has interest over the case right after buying
stocks the moment he was disqualified to appear as counsel. Without this
prohibition, an assemblyman who would like to influence an administrative
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Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday
of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and
shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine
until thirty days before the opening of its regular session, exclusive of
Saturdays, Sundays, and Legal Holidays. The President may call a special
session at any time.
Sec. 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of
Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective
members.
Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
(2) A majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do business, but
a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the
attendance of absent members in such manner, and under such penalties,
as such house may provide.
(3) Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its
members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of two-thirds
of all its members, suspend or expel a member. Penalty of suspension,
when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
(4) Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to
time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect
national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the
request of one-fifth of the members present, be entered in the journal.
Each house shall also keep a record of its proceedings.
(5) Neither house during the sessions of the Congress shall, without
consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other
place than that in which the two houses shall be sitting.
AVELINO v. CUENCO
July 18, 2011 | Disqualifications
GIST: On the day that Senator Tañada was to deliver his privilege speech
before the senate, Senator Sanidad filed Resolution 68 with the Senate
Secretary, which enumerated charges of graft and corruption against then
Senate President Avelino. Take note, in this session, 22 of the 24 senators
attended; with 1 confined in a hospital and the other was in the US. To
hinder Tañada in delivering his speech, Avelino and supporters had delaying
tactics (arriving late, speaking slow). With Tañada agitated by being denied
of his right to deliver the speech, Avelino announced that he would order
arrest of any senator who would speak without being recognized; and about
the same time, Senator David moved for adjournment of the session, which
was seconded by Cuenco, who moved that it be submitted to a vote.
Suddenly, Avelino banged the gavel, and walked out, with his supporters (10
left, including Avelino). What is now being assailed is the fact that Cuenco
was voted as Senate President with only 12 of them present in the session.
SC held that it does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter, as it solely
lies in the Senate Session Hall to have it resolved. But as far as the question
as to whether a quorum was present, SC answered in the affirmative. They
noted that, the session started with a quorum (22), and a minority of 10
leaving will not prevent the 12 from passing a resolution.
DOCTRINE: When the Constitution declares that a majority of each House
shall constitute a quorum, the House does not mean all the members. A
quorum is based on actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge
their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction
of the house or for other causes which make attendance of the member
considered impossible, even through coercive process which each house is
empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the session. (in this
case we shall use the formula that a quorum is 50% + 1, and in essence since
only 23 [the senator in the US is out of the picture] are counted, the quorum
is 12)
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA v. SENATE
October 18, 2011 | Supermajority vote in violation of the Constitution
GIST: The Organic Act of ARMM (RA 6734) was amended by RA 9054, which
nd
set the holding of elections on the 2 Monday of September, but that before
the said date, it was moved to November 26, 2001 through RA 9140. 4 years
later, RA 9333 fixed the date of regular elections, which is to be held on the
nd
nd
2 Monday of August 2005. Finally, it was changed to the 2 Monday of
May by RA 10153. The case started rolling when the petitioner claims that
RA 9140, RA 9333, and RA 10153 were not compliant with the twin
requirements of RA 9054 as far as amendments are concerned. It provided
that there should be an approval of the 2/3 of the members (supermajority)
of the HoR and the Senate separately, and that such voted bill is to be
submitted to ARMM for plebiscite. SC held that such supermajority vote set
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as a requirement to amend such law runs afoul to the Congress’ power
barring it to pass irrepealable laws. Such high threshold for amending it will
make it difficult to repeal, which is contrary to the Congress’ power.
DOCTRINE: With the supermajority vote trumping on the Congress’ power
to amend laws, such is in clear violation of the Constitution, as it gives the
law a nature of essentially being impossible to repeal.
ARROYO v. DE VENECIA
August 14, 1997 | Determination of Rules
GIST: During the process of making RA 8240 (which imposes “sin taxes”),
both houses tried to reach a compromise between contested parts of RA
8240, which originally came from the HoR. In the bicameral conference, Rep.
Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum, which lead to a roll call only to
find out that a quorum was present, hence they continued. One Mr. Albano
moved to ratify the conference committee report, which was approved by
Deputy Speaker Daza, without noticing that Mr. Arroyo asked what the
question was. With the session suspended for a minute, upon resumption it
was adjourned to the following week. The bill was deemed already certified
as the bill was signed by both the House Speaker and the Senate President,
and certified by the respective secretaries for both chambers. Eventually,
such enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos. With the case
picking up from the “violation of internal rules of procedure of the house”,
the SC ruled that it lacked jurisdiction. There was no private right that was
violated, and so instead, such case must be filed before the House.
DOCTRINE: Parliamentary rules are procedural and with their observance,
the courts have no concern. The rules re subject to the whims of the House
so they can change, modify, or waive the rules entirely.
OSMEÑA v. PENDATUN
October 28, 1960 | Disorderly behavior
the veracity of the charges against the President made by Cong. Osmeña,
and to summon him to substantiate his charges; that, should he fail to
substantiate such claims, he is required to show cause why he should not be
punished by the House. Petitioner Osmeña assails such Resolution for being
violative of his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches
delivered in the House. Contrary to his claims, SC upheld the validity of the
Resolution as it is within the ambit of the Congress’ powers to question its
members.
DOCTRINE: The House of Representatives can determine disorderly
behavior presented before them. They have full legislative powers and
prerogatives as restricted by the Constitution.
SANTIAGO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
April 18, 2001 | Order of suspension
GIST: Several complaints were filed by employees of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) against their Commissioner (Miriam
Defensor-Santiago, for an alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (RA 3019), when MDS approved the legalization of the stay of
aliens who were disqualified from being legalized, among others.
Sandiganbayan ordered for the preventive suspension of MDS for 90 days,
to which the latter assailed because it Sandiganbayan had no authority to
render such order of preventive suspension to a senator. SC held that
Sandiganbayan has the authority to suspend Santiago, as provided for by RA
3019, where any incumbent public officer charged for violating its provisions
shall be suspended from office.
DOCTRINE: A preventive suspension is not a penalty because it is not
imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official
concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension. The difference of this to the
suspension by Congress is that, the former is not a penalty, while the latter
is.
GIST: Osmeña delivered a privileged speech entitled, “A Message to Garcia,”
where he claimed reports that presidential pardons could be bought
regardless of gravity or seriousness of the criminal case. House Resolution
59 was created, which created a committee of 15 members to investigate
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US v. PONS
August 12, 1916 | Journal and records
which renders it conclusive upon courts as regards the tenor of the measure
passed by Congress.
GIST: Beliso, Pons, and Lasarte were charged with illegal importation of
opium, which is in violation of Act No. 2381. Pons assails such Act since it
was passed on March 1, 1914, but the last day of the Special Session for the
Philippine Legislature of 1914 was only until February 28, therefore it shall
be void. SC held that the Act is valid, as Pon’s claim would require the Court
to go behind the journals, to take in extraneous evidence, which is contrary
to what it is allowed to look at, that is by simply referring to the legislative
journals. In this case, there was no indication in the journal that the Congress
stopped the clock midnight of February 28, 1914.
DOCTRINE: Should there be any mistake in the printing of the bill before it
was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive, the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
DOCTRINE: Journals are conclusive on the Court and to question its
truthfulness would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic
laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to
invalidate a coordinate and independent department of Government, and
to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the legislature.
CASCO PHIL. COMMERCIAL CO. v. GIMENEZ
July 18, 2011 | Journal and records
GIST: In consonance with the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law (RA 2609),
the Central Bank issued circulars fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on
foreign exchange transactions. CB likewise issued a memorandum
establishing the procedure for the application for exemption from payment
of the said fee, as provided for by the said law. Petitioner Casco, who was
engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used in plywood
production, with raw ingredients “urea and formaldehyde,” paid the margin
fee with their 2 import transactions, wherein the claim that per RA 2609,
they are entitled to avail of the exemption from payment. The Auditor of the
Bank did not accept their request, because what was stated in Sec. 18, RA
2609 was “Urea formaldehyde” and not “urea and formaldehyde.”
Petitioner now contends that such term must be construed as “urea and
formaldehyde.” SC held that “Urea formaldehyde” is a finished product, and
is very different from “urea” and “formaldehyde,” which are raw materials
in the manufacture of resin glues, and therefore the former cannot be
construed as the latter. Even the enrolled bill included “urea formaldehyde,”
ASTORGA v. VILLEGAS
April 30, 1974 | Journal and records
GIST: House Bill No. 9226, a bill dealing provisions on the powers, rights, and
duties of the Vice Mayor, was filed with minor amendments (Roxas’
amendments) for the first reading. For the second reading, there were
substantial amendments (Tolentino’s Amendments) which were approved
by the Senate. Note that in this case, Roxas’ amendments were not found in
the journal of the Senate Proceedings. Upon passing it back to the HoR citing
that it contained Roxas’ amendments, the HoR then approved it and
eventually HB 9226 became RA 4065. Knowing this, Tolentino issued a press
statement saying that the enrolled copy of the bill was the wrong version
that was approved by the Senate, as a response, the President likewise
officially withdrew his signature on the said Bill. Now the dispute arose when
Mayor Villegas and Vice Mayor Astorga are contending whether or not the
said law was enacted, because Villegas was already issuing circulars to
disregard the law. As counter, Villegas argued that RA 4065 never became a
law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the
entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be
decisive in the resolution of the issue. SC ruled that the journals of the
Congress may be resorted to determine whether the text of the House Bill
signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses, to
which they found out that indeed, the documents approved by the Senate
was no the same as to the one that was signed by the President and the
Senate President. Ultimately, in light with the withdrawal of the signatures
of both the Senate President and the Chief Executive, the SC held that the
bull did not become law as it was not duly enacted.
DOCTRINE: Journals of Congress may be resorted to determine whether
laws signed by the Chief Executive were the same text passed by both
chambers of Congress.
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ABAKADA v. ERMITA
September 1, 2005 | Bicameral committee
GIST: Petitioners of this case assail the VAT Law (RA 9337) for constituting
undue delegation, as it imposes 10% VAT on the Secs. 4 (sale of goods and
properties), 5 (importation of goods), and 6 (sale of services and use or lease
of properties). They claim that all these sections have a similar proviso
authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, to raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12% after the concurrence of the
following conditions:
1. VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds
2.8%
2. National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous
year exceeds 1.5%
The issue arose when the Bicameral Conference Committee put new
provisions to resolve the conflicting ones, from both the house and senate
bills. SC ruled that the irregularities raised by petitioners consist mostly of
internal rules of Congress and so the Court is not the proper forum for their
enforcement. With the Bicameral Conference Committee as the proper
avenue, SC held that all changes or modifications made by such body, being
germane to subjects of the provisions referred to it for reconciliation, is not
tantamount to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
DOCTRINE: The Bicameral Conference Committee is created for purposes of
prompt and efficient legislative action; it is mandated to settle the
differences between the disagreeing provisions of a House Bill and Senate
Bill
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
electoral tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. Each
electoral tribunal shall be composed of nine members, three of whom shall
be justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.
The senior justice in the electoral tribunal shall be its chairman.
ANGARA v. ELECTORAL COMMISSION
July 13, 1936 | Nature and Power
GIST: Angara and Ynsua were candidates for members of the National
st
Assembly for the 1 district of the Province of Tayabas. Angara won. On
December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8 saying
that those who haven’t received an election protest, were approved and
confirmed as members. Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission (EC) a
Motion of Protest on December 8. December 9, the EC through Resolution
9 fixed the said date as the last day for filing election protests,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation by the National Asembly. Angara
filed a Motion to dismiss the petition of Ynsua, claiming that he can no
longer protest, because the Electoral Commission has no jurisdiction of the
case, it being nullified by the resolution of the National Assembly. SC ruled
in favor of the Electoral Commission, and hence, Resolution No. 8 of the
National Assembly did not deprive the Electoral Commission of its
jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed within the time that
might be set by its own rules.
DOCTRINE: The Electoral Commission is a constitutional organ, created for
a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. The
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise
of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed
by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.
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REYES v. COMELEC
June 25, 2013 | Jurisdiction of the electoral tribunal
by the SC as not an election protest, which essentially relieves the electoral
tribunal of any jurisdiction it may possess as far as this case is concerned.
GIST: Reyes filed his COC to run as representative for the Province of
Marinduque, where Tan filed a petition to deny due course or cancel the
COC on ground that she is actually an American citizen (who possess an
American passport); and that she is a permanent resident or an immigrant
of the US, hence unable to satisfy the residency requirement. What posts as
a relevant issue in this subject matter is the contention as to which body has
jurisdiction in hearing this case: the COMELEC or the HRET? SC ruled that it
is the COMELEC; HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of the
petitioner’s qualifications and assailed COMELEC resolutions, because Reyes
was not yet able satisfy the requirements of being a member of the HRET:
1. A valid proclamation
2. A proper oath
3. The assumption of office
DOCTRINE: An election contest is when a defeated candidate challenges the
qualifications of the proclaimed winner with interest to claim the seat of the
latter.
DOCTRINE: Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualification ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
VERA v. AVELINO
August 1, 1946 | Definition of election protest
GIST: In line with the terrorism and violence that was apparent in Pampanga,
Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, and Tarlac, voting in the said regions did not reflect
the true and free expression of the popular will. The senate convened
regarding the matter and issued a Pendatun Resolution, which basically
states that the candidates who received the highest number of votes
proclaimed by the COMELEC shall not be sworn, nor seated as members of
the Senate. Petitioners, being part of the list, assail this resolution before
the electoral tribunal. SC held that the electoral tribunal cannot take full
cognizance of the case at bar as the petitioner candidates have not assumed
office yet. More so, the tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited as to election
contests. Since what happened in the case is the refusal of the Senate to
allow the proclaimed candidates to assume office, the case was determined
GUERRERO v. COMELEC
July 26, 2000 | Substitution
GIST: Ruiz sought to perpetually disqualify Fariñas as a candidate for the
position of Congressman, claiming that Fariñas had been campaigning
despite failure to file a COC for the said office; that he be declared as a
nuisance candidate. Eventually, Fariñas filed his COC substituting a certain
nd
candidate Chevylle Fariñas, who withdrew last month. COMELEC 2 division
dismissed the petition of Ruiz for reasons that there is nothing on record to
consider Fariñas as a candidate; there is no COC to be cancelled. Fariñas won
the elections, and Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration contending that
Fariñas could not validly substitute Chevylle Fariñas since the latter was not
the official candidate of Lakas ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino (LAMMP), but
an independent candidate. His contention basically is that, another person
cannot substitute for an independent candidate. COMELEC dismissed the
case, stating that its jurisdiction over the issue ceased as Chevylle already
won. SC held that COMELEC’s contention is correct. While the COMELEC is
vested the power to declare a COC valid or invalid, its refusal to exercise
power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by Fariñas
is a recognition of the boundaries separating the COMELEC and the HRET.
DOCTRINE: The HRET has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests
relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House
of Representatives . Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken
his oath, and assumed office as a member of the HoR, COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
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ABAYON v. HRET
February 11, 2010 | Jurisdiction over party-list
GIST: A case was filed against Petitioner Abayon, the first nominee of the
Aangat Tayo party-list organization who won a seat in the HoR in the 2007
elections, by respondents Lucaban et al. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was
not eligible for a party-list seat in the HoR as it did not represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, moreover, that Abayon herself
was not qualified as she did not belong to the said marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, as she is the wife of an incumbent congressional
district representative. As far as the question on jurisdiction is concerned,
the SC held that HRET had jurisdiction because petitioners Abayon et al.,
even though not elected per se, are part of the party-list that was elected,
who chose them as their representative under their internal rules.
DOCTRINE: From the Constitution’s point of view, it is the party-list
representatives who are elected into office, not their parties or
organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that
peculiar party-list system. This is the reason why they are within the ambit
of Sec. 17 Art. VI, since the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the HoR.
ABBAS v. SET
October 27, 1988 | Judicial and legislative participation
GIST: Petitioner Abbas et al. filed before the SET an election contest against
22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect
in the 1987 May elections. They then filed a motion to disqualify 6 senators
who are members of the SET from hearing the issues on the ground that all
of them were interested parties to the case they previously filed, which
leaves only 3 members in the SET, with all of them Justices. SC ruled that the
SET cannot hear and dispose of the case with only 3 Justice-members. It is
evident in the Constitution that there is a clear mandate of both judicial and
legislative components to be present in the SET. Litigants faced with
situations such as this must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication
in the fairness and sense of justice of the members of the SET, singly and
collectively.
DOCTRINE: The Constitution intended that both judicial and legislative
components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators.
BONDOC v. PINEDA
September 26, 1991 | Non-partisan
GIST: Pineda (LDP) and Bondoc (NP) were rival candidates for the position
th
of Representative for the 4 district of Pampanga, where the former was
proclaimed a winner. Bondoc filed a protest with the HRET, which at that
time, was composed of 9 members (3 SC justices, 6 members of the House
chosen on basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations). HRET rendered a decision declaring that
Bondoc won by 23 votes against Pineda. LDP members of the Tribunal
insisted on a recount, which delayed the finalization of the decision by 4
months. Basically what LDP did was they plotted moves to neutralize the
pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal, by changing the party’s representation
in the HRET, one of which was the removal of Cong. Camasura, which was
due to him voting for Bondoc (he was removed for “disloyalty” to LDP). SC
ruled that such act would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the
aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of the
SC and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop.
DOCTRINE: HRET proceedings would be considered a farce if the HoR, or the
majority party, may shuffle and manipulate the political component of the
HRET, to serve the interests of the party in power.
LERIAS v. HRET
October 15, 1991 | Election returns; best evidence
GIST: Lerias and Mercado were candidates for the position of
Representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte. Mercado won,
excluding the certificate of canvass (COC) from the Municipality of Libagon,
which have been alleged by Mercado to be tampered with. In the If we are
to count the Provincial Board of Canvasser’s (PBOC’s) copy of the COC for
Libagon, Lerias would have won by 146 votes. In this case, PBOC asserts that
such erasures, alterations, and superimpositions present in the COCs of
Libagon is the reason why they cannot be used as basis of the canvass.
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Lerias’ counsel then, agreed to use the COMELEC copy of the COC. But seen
were discrepancies, where the COMELEC copies and the PBOC copies had a
difference of 100 votes. With Mercado being proclaimed as winner, Lerias
now filed an election protest with the HRET, who still declared Mercado as
winner, with the use of the COMELEC copy. SC held that the HRET should
have used the election returns as basis for their decision, because as far as
election contests are concerned, where what is involved is the correctness
of the number of votes of each candidate, the best and most conclusive
evidence are the ballots themselves. Lerias won.
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the
President of the Senate, as ex-officio chairman, twelve senators and
twelve members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House
on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The Chairman of the Commissions shall not vote, except in case of
a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within
thirty session days of the congress from their submission. The Commission
shall rule by a majority vote of all the members.
DOCTRINE: Under the best evidence rule, there can be no evidence of a
writing, the contents of which are the subject of inquiry, other than the
original writing itself, except in the cases enumerated in the Rules of Court.
DAZA v. SINGSON
December 21, 1989 | Political alignment
GIST: After the elections, HoR apportioned its 12 seats in the Commission
on Appointments (CoA) in accordance with the political parties represented,
per Sec. 18 Art. VI. Daza (LP) was one of the appointed members. September
16, 1988, there was a political realignment where 24 members of LP joined
LDP, which led HoR to revise its representation, removing Daza from the HoR
and placed Singson. Petitioner Daza hence assailed his removal in the light
of Cunanan v. Tan, where it was held that appointment is political and is not
within the ambit of HoR’s powers. SC held in the negative and ruled that HoR
may, in consideration of the rule on political alignment, change its
representation in the CoA.
DOCTRINE: The HoR may change its representation in the CoA to reflect at
any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do
not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving
severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts
of allegiance from one political party to another.
COSETENG v. MITRA
July 12, 1990 | Proportional representation
GIST: In the 1987 Congressional elections, the HoR was filled with candidates
with political parties such as PDP-Laban, LB, LP, NP-Unido, KBL, Panghusga,
KAIBA, and some independents. Petitioner Coseteng was the only candidate
under the banner of KAIBA. In the formation of the CoA, after electing 11
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members, the House elected Honorable Kablan (KBL) who was the Minority
th
Floor Leader as the 12 member of the CoA. A year later, LDP was organized,
and thus with the count of members of the House formally affiliated with
LDP, there was a need to change the CoA composition to reflect proportional
representation. Coseteng now avers that she be appointed as member of
th
the CoA and the HRET, but was denied as Ablan was retained as the 12
member to represent the minority members. SC held that in line with the
rule that the CoA representation is based on proportional representation
and considering the fact that KAIBA having only Coseteng as a lone member
represents .4% of House membership only—this does not in any way entitle
her to a seat the CoA.
DOCTRINE: It is NOT mandatory to elect 12 senators in the CoA. What the
Constitution requires is that there be at least a majority of the entire
members.
DOCTRINE: The composition of the House membership in the CoA is always
based n proportional representation of the political parties in the HoR.
GUINGONA v. GONZALES
October 20, 1992 | Undue reduction of representation of another party
GIST: The 1992 National Senatorial Elections yielded the following result:
LDP (15 senators), NPC (5), Lakas-NUCD (3), and LP-PDP-LABAN (1). In
compliance with the rules agreed by the parties, the CoA proportional
representation should be decided by this mathematical formula:
No. of senators of a political party x 12 seats
Total number of senators elected
This resulted in the following percentage per party: LDP (7.5 members), NPC
(2.5), Lakas-NUCD (1.5), and LP-PDP-LABAN (.5). Romulo, Majority Floor
Leader, nominated for and on behalf of LDP, 8 senators for CoA
Appointments. This was objected, and so a compromise was held: LDP (8),
NPC (2), LP-PDP-LABAN and Lakas-NUCD (1 each).This arrangement was
strongly opposed, hence Guingona filed a petition assailing the membership
th
of Senator Romulo as 8 member of LDP, and Senator Tañada as the lone
member of LP-PDP-LABAN in the CoA. SC held that indeed such round up for
LDP was a violation of Section 18, as it is no longer in compliance with its
mandate as to proportional representation, same ruling would go for
Tañada’s membership, which would entail an anomaly of having 13 senators
where the Constitution only 12 in the CoA.
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Sec. 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall
be constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the
President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet
only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its chairman or a
majority of all its members, to discharge such powers and functions as are
herein conferred upon it.
Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
representatives committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Sec. 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be
preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such
books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish
annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for
each member.
GIST: Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on
the railway project of the North Luzon Railways corporation with the China
National Machinery and Equipment Group. Such hearing was sparked by a
privilege speech from Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged
overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North
Rail Project. Senate Committee on National Defense and Security issued
invitations to AFP Officials (Lt. Esperon, Vice Admiral Mayuga). Drilon
received from Exec. Sec. Ermita a letter requesting for the postponement of
the hearing to which various officials of the Executive Department, in order
for them to have an opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues,
to which he denied. GMA then issued EO 464, which “prohibits Department
Heads and Senior Officials of Executive Departments, who in the judgment
of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals
and flag officers of the AFP, and such other officers who in the judgment of
the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; PNP Officers with
rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by executive privilege; Senior
National Security Officials who in the judgment of the National Security
Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and such other officers as may
be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted
by Congress without first securing the President’s approval.” Such EO is
invoked by Gen. Senga to get away with the investigation of the Senate.
Those who pushed through were reprimanded by GMA for defying EO 464.
SC held that:
1. Section 1 (Appearance of Department Heads before the Congress)
- Unconstitutional. It does not require prior determination by any
official whether or not they are covered by EO 464. Such coverage
is not even made to depend on the Department Head’s possession
of any information which might be covered by executive privilege.
Sec 1 and Sec 2(a): valid
SENATE v. ERMITA
April 20, 2006 | Power of inquiry
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2.
This cannot be applied to appearances of Department Heads in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect refusal of a Department Head to appear in
such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is made by President
or the Executive Secretary
Section 3 (Appearance of Other Public Officials before Congress) in
relation to Section 2(b) (Who are covered by the EO) –
Unconstitutional. It only requires that there be consent without the
necessity of a rationale on why it must be considered as
confidential; it severely frustrates the power of Inquiry of the
Congress.
DOCTRINE: When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
Department Heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are Department
Heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power—the
President, on whom executive power is vested, hence beyond the reach of
Congress except through the power of impeachment. Basically, the
infirmities in EO 464 boil down to its blanket requirement of prior consent
on executive officials.
GUIDANI v. SENGA
August 15, 2006 | Power of inquiry
GIST: Petitioners who are high-ranking military officers of the AFP assail EO
464, as it enjoins them from testifying before Congress without the
President’s consent. In the present case, the Senate is investigating on the
anomalies of the 2004 elections and an excerpt of a phone conversation
between PGMA and COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano. Petitioner Gudani,
Senga, and Balutan were invited to the hearing, but requested for
postponement. Before the following day, a message was transmitted from
the office of Gen. Senga, stating, “PER INSTRUCTION OF HER EXCELLENCY
PGMA, NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL
HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL” Senga didn’t appear in the hearing, as
he wasn’t granted approval by President to appear before them. The two
others who attended (Gudani and Balutan) were held to have disobeyed a
legal order (Articles of War 65 [Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer]). SC
ruled that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of
her power as Commander-in-Chief, and that indeed such defiance
constitutes an officer to be liable under military justice.
DOCTRINE: In reference to Senate v. Ermita, the President may not issue a
blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by
the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. Such privilege must be
formally invoked on specific grounds. However, such ability of the President
to prevent military officers from testifying does not actually refer to
executive privilege; rather, to the Chief Executive’s power as commanderin-chief. Note however, that the President’s refusal to allow members of the
military to appear before the Congress is nevertheless subject to judicial
relief.
NEG. O. II ELEC. COOP. v. SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD
November 5, 1987 | Nature and essence
GIST: The Ad Hoc Committee of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete
issued a subpoena to Torres (Chairman) and Umbac (General Manager) of
petitioner NORECO, who is an electric cooperative based in Dumaguete.
NORECO contended that the Sangguniang Panlungsod does not possess any
power to compel their attendance and testimony, nor the power to order
the arrest of witnesses who disobeyed its subpoena. Sangguniang
Panlungsod on the other hand, contended that inherent to its legislative
functions included the power to conduct investigation in aid of legislation
and the power to punish for contempt in inquiries. SC held that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod does not possess such legislative function; their act
of mandating NORECO is an ultra vires act. The exercise by the legislature of
the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that branch of the
government with the legislative power asserts its authority and punishes
contempt. Such contempt power of the legislature is sui generis and local
legislative bodies cannot correctly claim to possess it for the same reasons
that the national legislature does. The power attaches to the character of
the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of
government. It cannot be said that the local legislative bodies possess the
same.
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DOCTRINE: There should be a distinction between the powers of Congress
and those that may be exercised by the legislative bodies of LGUs. The latter
are mere creatures of law that possess delegated legislative power.
STANDARD v. SENATE
December 27, 2007 | To prevent future fraudulent activities
GIST: After Sen. Ponce-Enrile’s privilege speech on “Arrogance of Wealth”
which was based on Atty. Bocobo’s letter, which denounced petitioner
Standard Chartered for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of
the Securities Regulation Code (SRC), an inquiry in aid of legislation
commenced in the Senate. Standard was issued a subpoena and was
compelled to appear in the Senate, to which the former assailed as an act of
encroachment upon the judicial powers, since they were already facing
pending court cases. SC held that The Senate Committee can still proceed
with the inquiry despite the cases pending in court. Such inquiry is important
so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.
DOCTRINE: The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before
a court or quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of an
inquiry in aid of legislation. Otherwise, it would be easy to subvert an
intended inquiry by Congress through convenient ploy of filing a criminal or
administrative complaint.
DE LA PAZ v. SENATE
February 13, 2009 | In aid of legislation
GIST: A Philippine delegation of 8 senior PNP officers arrived in Moscow,
th
Russia to attend the 77 General Assembly Session of the International
criminal Police Organization (ICPO)-INTERPOL in St. Petersburg, Russia. Gen.
De la Paz was one of the delegates, and unfortunately he was apprehended
by local Moscow authorities for failure to declare certain sums of money
found in his possession (over Php 10M). Upon return to the PH after being
detained for quite a while in Moscow, petitioner De la Paz was issued a
subpoena from the Senate, who planned to investigate on the matter. They
assail the same and claim that it cannot validly investigate the Moscow
incident. SC ruled that the Senate Committee can in fact investigate the
incident. Not only can this incident create ripples in the relations between
PH and Russia, but it must also be remembered that it affects PH
international obligations. Being a state party to conventions dealing with
movement of considerable foreign currency across boarders, this incident
could reflect on our country’s compliance with the obligations required of
state-parties under these conventions.
DOCTRINE: The Senate Rules included a creation of a Committee on Foreign
Relations, which concerns all matters relating to relations of the PH with
other nations generally; diplomatic and consular services; ASEAN; UN and
its agencies; multi-lateral organizations, all international agreements, and
obligations and contracts; and overseas Filipinos.
ROMERO v. ESTRADA
April 2, 2009 | Sub judice rule
GIST: Petitioner Romero received an invitation from the Senate Committee
asking him to go to a hearing to answer inquiries by the Senate involving the
investment of Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) funds in
the Smokey Mountain Project. Such inquiry is for purposes of enlightening
the Senate in the review and possible amendments in the Migrant Workers
Act (RA 8042). Romero requested to be excused from appearing, but a
service of subpoena ad testificandum was serviced to him. Now the case
commenced when Romero filed an urgent plea for a TRO, claiming among
others, that when Sen. Estrada called on him as a resource person, the latter
spoke of facts and issued raised in Chavez v. NHA, and none was discussed
regarding the subject of the inquiry. That, the subject matter of the
investigation is sub judice owing to the pendency of the Chavez case; the
investigation was to ascertain Romero’s criminal liability for plunder in
relation to the case. SC ruled that the Senate Committee’s inquiry is not
injury sub judice; the case was already decided with finality last 2008; when
this case was decided on 2009. Even assuming that there is pending final
adjudication by the SC, still, the circumstance would not bar the Senate
Committee’s investigation; Senate Rules provide that the filing or pendency
of any prosecution or administrative action should not stop or abate any
inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose (as discussed in Standard v. Senate).
DOCTRINE: The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing
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the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. Courts and juries
should be immune from extraneous influence.
GARCILLANO v. HOUSE
December 23, 2008 | Publication on rules on inquiry
GIST: After the privilege speech of Minority Leader Escudero, regarding the
Hello Garci tapes (wiretapped convo between GMA and Garcillano), which
led to the HoR Committees to review the said tapes. Upon petitioner
st
Garcillano’s 1 case for prohibition, the committees stopped the discussion
on the tapes. 2 years later, Sen. Lacson revived the said issue with a privilege
nd
speech which promised the public the truth regarding the tapes. A 2 case
was filed to bar the Senate from conducting legislative inquiry on the tapes.
In sum, the petition of Garcillano moves for the prevention of the playing of
the tapes in the House and the subsequent inclusion thereof in committee
reports; and that the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the tapes be stopped
and prohibited. SC ruled that indeed, the Senate cannot be allowed to
continue with the inquiry without duly published rules of procedure in clear
derogation of the constitutional requirement. As mentioned in the case of
Neri v. Senate, every Congress must publish its rules of procedure governing
inquiries in aid of legislation. With the rules on inquiry in aid of legislation
being published only last 2006, SC said senate rules were only published in
1995 and 2006, and not during the pendency of the case (2007).
DOCTRINE: The Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently
in the conduct of its day-to-day business compared to the Senate of the
Congress before it. The rules of the Senate even provides, that all pending
matters and proceedings shall terminate upon expiration of 1 Congress, but
may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time.
NERI v. SENATE
September 4, 2008 | Executive privilege
GIST: NEDA Sec. Neri testified before the Senate Committee for 11 hours on
matters concerning the NBN project awarded by the DOTC to ZTE. Neri
disclosed that then COMELEC Chair Abalos offered him Php 200M in
exchange of his approval of the said project. That, he informed GMA of the
bribery attempt and that she told him to decline. Senate Committee further
probed on GMA, and Neri refused to answer, invoking executive privilege,
the following questions:
1. Whether or not GMA followed up on the NBN Project?
2. Whether or not she directed him to prioritize it?
3. Whether or not she directed him to approve it?
Neri was invited once again to appear but he did not appear anymore,
invoking executive privilege, and so he was held in contempt. SC held that
such move by the Committee of holding him in contempt is unconstitutional,
as the three questions are indeed covered by executive privilege. The
context in which such privilege is being invoked is that the information
sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic
relations with People’s Republic of China. Given the confidential nature of
this information, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of
this conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed
to protect.
DOCTRINE: Elements of presidential communications privilege before its
exercise can be said valid:
1. The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and
non-delegable presidential power
2. The communication is limited only by the doctrine of operational
proximity
3. The President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely based on
a generalized interest; and likely contains an important and
compelling need to be kept confidential
ARNAULT v. NAZARENO
July 15, 1950 | Subject of inquiry
GIST: PH Govt, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought 2 estates:
Buenavista (Php 4.5M) and Tambobong (Php 500k). Initially, the two estates
were to be sold to Burt, but since he was only able to pay for the
downpayment (Php 10,000.00/estate), it was later on sold to RPA. What is
peculiar in this case was the fact that despite the Php 20,000.00 interest of
Burt, he was paid by RPA the amount of Php 1.5M. Burt was found to have
deposited the check to PNB, and later on he drew checks amounting to Php
500k, which he transferred to the account of Associated Agencies, Inc. and
Php 440,000.00, which he encashed. In the pursuit of figuring out where the
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440k went, the Senate committee adopted Resolution No. 8, which created
a special committee to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates
Deal. Petitioner Arnault was one of the witnesses who was called for by the
special committee, who refused to answer. After being cited in contempt,
he was held in custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms. Arnault assails his
deprivation of liberty for being held in contempt, and that he shouldn’t be
punished for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person who
received the Php 440,000.00, that it is not the subject of the inquiry in the
first place. SC held that Senate Resolution No. 8 was created specifically to
determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong
Estates deal—names of those involved are hence important as it is the
subject of the inquiry.
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed
statutes.
Contempt power of Congress is based on reason and policy which is
considered implied or incidental to the exercises of legislative power. This is
the way a legislative body could obtain the knowledge and information on
which to base a legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of
such knowledge and information if it is important to punish a defiance of its
proper authority.
DOCTRINE: It is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every
question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible
legislation; what is required is that it be pertinent to the matter under
inquiry.
SABIO v. GORDON
October 17, 2006 | Contempt and detention
GIST: Senator MDS introduced the PH Senate Resolution No. 455, directing
an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the POTC,
PHILCOMSAT, and PHC, due to alleged improprieties in their operations by
their respective Board of Directors. Sabio, Chairman of the PCGG, was
repeatedly invited by the Senate to appear during the inquiry, but declined,
invoking Sec. 4(b) of EO 1. Upon being held in contempt for not participating
in the inquiry, the petitioners showed their dissent when they argued that
EO 1 was disregarded, and that the Committee is not vested with the power
of contempt. SC noted that, 4(b) of EO 1 is well repealed already by the
Constitution. Hence, the Senate Committee acted within the ambit of their
powers. As for the issue on holding one in contempt, the SC ruled that such
power is given to the legislature, and hence their citing of Sabio for content
is valid.
DOCTRINE: A mere provision of law cannot impose a limitation to the broad
power of Congress, especially in the absence of constitutional basis. The
power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the
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Sec. 22. The Heads of Departments may upon their own initiative, with the
consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules
of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such house on
any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be
submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance.
Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover
matters related thereto, when the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing the appearance
shall be conducted in Executive Session.
SENATE v. ERMITA
April 20, 2006 | Congress and heads of departments
GIST: Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on
the railway project of the North Luzon Railways corporation with the China
National Machinery and Equipment Group. Such hearing was sparked by a
privilege speech from Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged
overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North
Rail Project. Senate Committee on National Defense and Security issued
invitations to AFP Officials (Lt. Esperon, Vice Admiral Mayuga). Drilon
received from Exec. Sec. Ermita a letter requesting for the postponement of
the hearing to which various officials of the Executive Department, in order
for them to have an opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues,
to which he denied. GMA then issued EO 464, which “prohibits Department
Heads and Senior Officials of Executive Departments, who in the judgment
of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals
and flag officers of the AFP, and such other officers who in the judgment of
the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; PNP Officers with
rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by executive privilege; Senior
National Security Officials who in the judgment of the National Security
Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and such other officers as may
be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted
by Congress without first securing the President’s approval.” Such EO is
invoked by Gen. Senga to get away with the investigation of the Senate.
Those who pushed through were reprimanded by GMA for defying EO 464.
SC held that Sec. 1 of EO 464 unconstitutional. It does not require prior
determination by any official whether or not they are covered by EO 464.
Such coverage is not even made to depend on the Department Head’s
possession of any information which might be covered by executive
privilege. This cannot be applied to appearances of Department Heads in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to
respect refusal of a Department Head to appear in such inquiry, unless a
valid claim of privilege is made by President or the Executive Secretary.
DOCTRINE: Sec. 21 and 22, while closely related and complementary to each
other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of
Congress. The former specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information which may be
used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a
question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in the pursuit
of Congress’ oversight function. For under Sec. 22 Art. VI, the appearance of
department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.
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Sec. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both houses in joint
session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare
the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper
to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
SANLAKAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
February 3, 2004 | To prevent future fraudulent activities
GIST: On July 27, 2003, several armed junior officers from the AFP stormed
into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati, and demanded the
resignation of PGMA and other executive officials due to corruption. PGMA,
pursuant to her extraordinary powers, issued Proclamation 427 (Declaring a
State of Rebellion) and GO 4 (Directing the AFP and PNP to suppress
Rebellion). The mutiny only lasted for a day, but GMA only lifted the state of
rebellion on August 1, through Proclamation 435. In the interim, several
petitions were filed assailing the Proclamation 427 and GO 4 for going
beyond the Constitution. SC held that GMA’s declaration of a state of
rebellion is constitutional, as it was well within her powers as the Chief
Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President does not need to make
a declaration of a state of rebellion to exercise the calling out power, the
criterion needed for the President to call the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, among others, is that it should be done whenever
it becomes necessary.
DOCTRINE: The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out
the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive
and Commander-in-Chief powers—which are purely executive powers
vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Art. VII, as opposed to the
delegated legislative powers contemplated by Sec. 23(2) of Art. VI.
DAVID v. ARROYO
May 3, 2006 | Emergency powers in relation to Sec. 18 Art. 7
th
GIST: As the nation celebrated the 20 Anniv of the EDSA 1, PGMA issued
PP 1017, declaring a state of national emergency. As basis, she cited that
over the past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired
with authoritarians of the extreme Left and the extreme Right, who are now
in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy,
over a broad front, to bring down the PGMA Administration. On the same
day, PGMA Issued G.O. No. 5, implementing PP 1017, where she called the
AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless
violence in the country. During this time, the offices of “The Daily Tribune
and Malaya” were raided by the CIDG, where all anti-GMA articles and writeups were released. A week after, PGMA lifted PP 1017 by issuing
Proclamation No. 1021. 2006. A case was hence filed with the SC, to which
claims that such PP 1017 is violative of the Constitution (zoom in to relevant
fact in relation to this provision: the raid and confiscation in the Daily
Tribune and Malaya). SC held that the President alone can declare a state of
national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take
over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist
warranting the take over. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has
no power to point out the type of business affected with public interest that
should be taken over.
DOCTRINE: The exercise of emergency powers, such as taking over of
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest
requires delegation from Congress. Framers of the Constitution have
provided conditions that must concur prior to the grant of emergency
powers to the President:
1. There must be war or other emergency
2. The delegation must be for a limited period only
3. The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress
may prescribe
4. The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national
policy declared by Congress
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AMPATUAN v. DILG SEC. PUNO
June 7, 2011 | Emergency powers in relation to Sec. 18 Art. 7
2.
GIST: On the day of the Maguindanao Massacre, GMA issued Proclamation
1946, placing the provinces of Magindanao and Sultan Kudarat under a state
of emergency, where she directed the AFP and PNP to undertake measures
to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence. She likewise issued
AO 273, transferring supervision of ARMM to the Office of the President to
the DIG (Puno). Petitioners Ampatuan et al filed this petition claiming that
the deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes
invalid exercise of the President’s emergency powers. OSG commented and
said that GMA’s issuance was pursuant to her calling out power as
commander-in-chief under Sec. 18 Art. 7 of the Constitution. SC held that
GMA validly exercised her emergency powers. SC held that GMA did not go
beyond her powers as provided for by Sec. 23(2) of Art. VI of the
Constitution, as what was proclaimed was not a national emergency, but
only a state of emergency.
DOCTRINE: The calling out of the AFP was to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, which is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the
President specifically in Sec. 18 Art. 7 of the Constitution. As such, she need
not be given congressional authority to exercise the same.
3.
4.
LAGMAN v. MEDIALDEA
July 6, 2017 | Emergency powers in relation to Sec. 18 Art. 7
GIST: This case is about Duterte’s enactment of Proclamation 216, which
suspends the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, and declares Martial
Law in the entirety of Mindanao. With allegations that such enactment was
done without sufficient factual basis, petitioners Lagman et al. filed
complaints before the Court to prove that there was arbitrariness in
Duterte’s acts. There were 9 issues raised in this case (see doctrine)
DOCTRINE:
1. Was the petition proper for the SC to review? Yes, Art. VII(18)
merely requires that it be made in an appropriate proceeding, that
is, it is filed by any citizen. Since such is present in this case, the SC
5.
6.
may now determine the sufficiency of factual basis of the Martial
Law proclamation.
Is the SC’s review power independent of Congress’ power to
revoke? Yes. Although it is in the same trajectory, that is to nullify
the proclamation, both can simultaneously be done. The significant
distinction from the two is that the former is a passive duty, which
can only commence upon a citizen filing a case, while the latter is
automatic.
Does judicial power of review to extend to President’s decision
which of the 3 graduated powers he will avail of? No. Such
graduation is only based on scope and effect. It does not in anyway
restrict the President as to which of the three he chooses to
perform.
3 EXTRAORDINARY POWERS
FORMUILA
Calling out power (AFP)
Necessary + lawless violence/
invasion/rebellion
Suspension of the privilege of Public safety + invasion/
the writ of Habeas Corpus
rebellion
Declaration of Martial Law
Public safety + invasion/
rebellion
Can Proclamation 216 be void for being vague? No. That challenge
only applies to free speech cases. Moreover, even assuming that it
can be looked into, the context provides that looking “at other
rebel groups” is not vague, as it is surrounded with the context in
this case.
Will the nullification of Proclamation 216 also nullify Proclamation
55? No. The two have independent powers. If you would like to
nullify Proclamation 55, file a separate proceeding.
What is the scope of the SC in the review or declaration of Martial
Law or Suspension for privilege of the privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus? SC is only limited to ascertaining the sufficiency of
factual basis. This is to ensure that the President complied with
Constitutional guidelines, that he didn’t act arbitrarily. In using
sufficiency of factual basis test, the SC acknowledges that the
President has sole discretion as to the facts written in the
Proclamation. He cannot be forced to divulge information that will
compromise our military efforts. In determining the sufficient
factual promise, the entirety of the Proclamation is be considered,
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7.
8.
9.
and absolute correctness is not necessary, given the urgency of the
situation.
What are the parameters of the sufficiency of factual basis? The
Court enumerated such parameters as follows:
a. Actual invasion or rebellion – as defined by the RPC, an
uprising against the government to remove allegiance or
deprive the government of its powers
b. Public safety requires it
c. Concurrence of requirement A and B.
d. Probable cause for the President to believe there is actual
rebellion/ invasion
Did SC find sufficient basis for Proclamation 216? Yes. President, in
consideration of the facts, had probable cause that rebellion was
committed and that public safety required such declaration. Once
again, there is no need for absolute correctness of the facts, as such
mandate will only frustrate the President’s decision-making
regarding the urgent matter at hand.
Does public safety require such proclamation? Yes. Marawi
provides easy access to other parts of Mindanao, lawless groups
used provinces adjourning Marawi as escape routes. Marawi is a
vital cognizance attaining the long-standing goal that is the
absolute control over the entirety of Mindanao.
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase
of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose
or concur with amendments.
TOLENTINO v. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
August 25, 1994 | Revenue bill; consolidation
GIST: HB 11197 was eventually approved and was sent to the Senate.
Following the same was SB No. 1630, and so to reconcile both documents,
they were sent to the Bicameral Conference Committee, to which a whole
new bill emerged. With the Conference Committee Bill being approved by
both Houses and eventually, by the President, it became what we now know
as RA No. 7716, which seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system
and enhance its administration by amending the NIRC. This particular law is
now being assailed for not originating from the House of Representatives—
which according to the petitioners is in contravention of Sec. 24, Art. VI of
the Constitution, which refers to the mandate that all appropriation,
revenue or tariff bills, among others, shall exclusively originate from the
HoR. SC held that RA No. 7716 is constitutional, as it is not the law but the
revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively
from the HoR.
DOCTRINE: It is the bill that is required to originate from the HoR. Even if
such bill was completely revised by the Senate, so long as it originated from
the HoR, it is valid. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which
initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law
must substantially be the same as the House Bill would deny the Senate’s
power not only to “concur with amendments” but also to “propose.”
PASCUAL v. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS
December 29, 1960 | Incidental advantage
GIST: This case started rolling when Pasig Provincial Gov. Pascual assailed
the appropriation of Php 85,000 under RA 920 for the construction, repair,
extension, and improvement of the Pasig feeder road terminals. He alleges
that such road terminals do not connect to any government premises and
that the Antonio subdivision that belongs to Senator Zulueta, and that
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through this project, the senator’s property will greatly be enhanced. SC
held that such appropriation is indeed appropriation of public funds is null
and void; the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for
anything but a public purpose.
DOCTRINE: Incidental advantage to the public or to the state, which results
from the promotion of private interests and the prosperity of private
enterprises or business does not justify their aid by the use of public money.
The test of constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is:
WoN the statute is designed to promote public interests, as opposed to the
furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to
individuals may incidentally serve the public.
Sec. 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as
specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of
the budget shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in
its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall
strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other
departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is
intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by
the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue
proposed therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be
disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate
vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass
the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general
appropriations law of the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted
and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is
passed by the Congress.
10 rules on appropriation:
(1) All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate
exclusively in the HoR, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
(2) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the
President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget.
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(3) The Congress may not clutter the general appropriation law with
provisions not specifically related to some particular item of appropriation,
and every such provision shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation item to which it relates.
(4) Congress may not adopt a procedure for approving appropriations for
itself different from the procedure for other appropriations.
(5) Special appropriation bills must specify the purpose for which they are
intended and must be supported by funds certified as available by the
National Treasurer. If the funds are not actually available, the special
appropriation bill must provide a corresponding revenue proposal.
(6) Congress has limited discretion to authorize transfer of funds.
(7) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be
disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers
and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
(8) Congress cannot cripple the operation of government by its failure or
refusal to pass a general appropriations bill.
(9) Expenditure of public money or property for religious purposes is
prohibited.
(10) The general appropriation law must be based on the budget prepared
by the President.
FARINAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
December 10, 2003 | Liberal construction
GIST: The petitioners of this case challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 14
of RA 9006 (The Fair Election Act) for being a rider. They claim this particular
provision which actually repeals Secs. 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election
Code, which in effect does not render an elective official not ipso facto
resigned from office upon his filing of CoC is a not germane to the subject
matter of the law, and that it discriminates appointive officials. The SC
upheld the validity of the said provision on the basis of liberal construction;
it held that such provision may be considered in furtherance of such subject,
providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. The
title and objectives of RA 9006 is comprehensive enough to include the
repeal provided for in Sec. 14.
DOCTRINE: Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles
of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the
power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical
construction.
GARCIA v. MATA
July 30, 1975 | Prohibition on “riders” in appropriation bills
BELGICA v. OCHOA
November 19, 2013 | Special Purpose Fund; PDAF
GIST: In this case, petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of Sec. 11 of
RA 1600 (Appropriation Bill for the fiscal year 1656-1957). Because contrary
to the nature of the appropriation bill, the said particular provision refers to
the fundamental governmental policy matters of the calling to active duty
and the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP. It is
evident that the incongruity and irrelevancy continued throughout the
entire paragraph. SC held that such provision was a non-appropriation item
inserted in an appropriation measure, which is in violation of the
Constitutional prohibition against riders to the general appropriation act.
GIST: What is being assailed in this case is the constitutionality of the
Congressional Pork Barrel (Priority Development Fund, or PDAF, for brevity)
and the Presidential Pork Barrel (Malampaya Fund). Briefly, the SC discussed
its history of the PDAF (see page 26 for the full history). Petitioners assail its
constitutionality as far as the special purpose fund and discretionary fund is
concerned, they claim that such lump sum discretionary funds wherein
legislators (individually/collectively) control certain aspects of utilization of
funds through post-enactment measures and/or practices is violative of Sec.
25 Art. VI of the Constitution. SC held in their favor and ruled that such
interference after the GAA is passed is clearly beyond the oversight function
of the Congress, and hence an encroachment of the executive power.
Moreover, with this being a special purpose fund, Sec. 25(4) Art. VI requires
that the appropriation bills must specify the purpose for which it is intended,
and shall be supported by funds available as certified by the National
DOCTRINE: A rider in an appropriation act is that provision inserted that is
totally incongruent and irrelevant; as it is completely not an appropriation
item. Such provision shall be inoperative; it shall confer no right and shall
afford no protection; as if it has never been passed.
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Treasurer or raised by a corresponding revenue proposal—such is absent in
this case as there was no specific purpose for which the appropriations were
intended, only “projects.”
DOCTRINE: With the functional definition of the Congressional Pork Barrel
providing the Congress with post-enactment authority, point blank
separation of powers is violated. Providing the Congress, among others, with
discretion as to special purpose funds by not indicating which projects the
funds will go to is tantamount to giving them powers beyond the ambit of
what the Constitution provides.
DEMETRIA v. ALBA
February 27, 1987 | Transfer of funds; par. 5; direct violation
GIST: What is being assailed by the petitioners in this case is Sec. 44 of PD
1177 (Budget Reform Decree of 1977), as it authorizes the “illegal transfer
of public funds.” Specifically, it allows the President to have the authority to
transfer any fund appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices, and agencies of the Executive Department included in the GAA to
any program, project, or activity of any department, or office included in the
GAA or approved after its enactment. SC held that such provision is
unconstitutional, as it is indeed violative of Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI, which
specifically prohibits the transfer of an appropriation from one item to
another.
DOCTRINE: Should the subject provision be held constitutional, it will open
the floodgates for the enactment of unfunded appropriations, results in
uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses accountability for budgetary
performance and entrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling party may
well expand public money not on the basis of development priorities but on
political and personal expediency.
LIGA v. COMELEC
May 5, 1994 | Par. 5; unused funds
public funds in a manner contrary to the Constitution and the law, with the
COMELEC allegedly re-allocating large sums of money in order to fund the
forthcoming Barangay Elections. SC found no basis on the complaint as it
was not even confirmed; such reports were mere proposals. In OSG’s
comment though, it is seen that this particular scheme is allowed, provided
that what will be augmented are savings, or unused funds.
DOCTRINE: Savings are portions of balances of any programmed
appropriation free from nay obligation or encumbrance still available after
the satisfactory completion or unavoidable discontinuance or abandonment
of the work, activity, or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized,
or arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant
positions and leaves of absence without pay.
SANCHEZ v. COA
April 3, 2008 | par. 5; DILG; augmentation
GIST: What is being assailed by the petitioners in this case is the Special
provisions of the Capability Building Program of the DILG in RA 7180, which
empowered the DILG Secretary to administer and manage the funds. It is
through these provisions that the DILG approved the funding of a particular
task force, with a budget amounting to Php 2,388,000.00. SC held that such
augmentation is invalid as there was no savings to which the funds are to be
taken from, given that it was only the beginning of the fiscal year. Moreover,
it is held by the court that there was no legal basis for the creation of the ad
hoc task force.
DOCTRINE: For an augmentation to be valid, the following requisites must
concur:
ü There must be savings in the programmed appropriation of the
transferring agency
ü There must be an existing item, project, or activity with an
appropriation in the receiving agency to which the savings will be
transferred
GIST: Petitioners of this case filed a complaint based on reports made in
Manila Bulletin with an article entitled, “Barangay Poll Funds Found.” They
claim that there is a threatened illegal transfer, disbursement, and use of
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BELGICA v. OCHOA
November 19, 2013| Discretionary funds; PDAF
GIST: What is being assailed in this case is the constitutionality of the
Congressional Pork Barrel (Priority Development Fund, or PDAF, for brevity)
and the Presidential Pork Barrel (Malampaya Fund). Briefly, the SC discussed
its history of the PDAF (see page 26 for the full history). Petitioners assail its
constitutionality as far as the special purpose fund and discretionary fund is
concerned, they claim that such lump sum discretionary funds wherein
legislators (individually/collectively) control certain aspects of utilization of
funds through post-enactment measures and/or practices is violative of Sec.
25 Art. VI of the Constitution. SC held in their favor and ruled that the
discretionary funds were unconstitutional; it is in this case where the PDAF
is to be divided among individual legislators who would receive lump sum
allocations which they can appropriate AFTER the GAA has been passed.
Administrative Code, and the GAAs of 2011-2013. However, contrary to this
claim, SC ruled that such funds were unconstitutional, as there is an absence
of a law authorizing the President to transfer such funds within their
respective offices, as provided for in Sec. 25(5) Art. VI of the Constitution.
Verily, the “bases” claimed by DBM are not sufficient. Further, with such
augmentations also made to the legislative and non-executive agencies,
there is a cross-border augmentation, which is likewise unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE: When the President augmented funds to the legislature and to
non-executive agencies, it violated the rule on Sec. 25(5) Art. VI, as it is
beyond his office (of the executive), and is therefore tantamount to a crossboarder augmentation. It is likewise vital to note that such funds were
augmented from slow-moving projects—not from savings, which is
unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE: Discretionary funds are required by Sec. 25(6) Art. VI of the
Constitution to be disbursed only for public purposes supported by
appropriate vouchers and subject to guidelines as prescribed by law.
ARAULLO v. AQUINO III
February 3, 2015 | Discretionary funds; DAP
GIST: This entire case revolves around the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP), which was implemented during the Aquino administration,
which has for its purpose to fast track public spending as to push economic
growth by investing on high impact budgetary programs, activities, and
projects, in response to the improving fiscal deficit of .5% in the GDP shortly
when Aquino assumed office. The major contention in this case was that
such funds were used as incentive for those legislators voting in favor of the
impeachment of CJ Corona, which was first let out in the open by the
privilege speech of Jinggoy Estrada. This was countered by DBM Secretary
Abad, who explained that such funds were released from the DAP, which
was used to accelerate economic expansion; that such was a response to
letters of request by various Senators. DBM claimed, among others, such
funds were sourced from savings generated by the government, and from
unprogrammed funds; that the legal bases of such savings included the
authority of the President to augment an item for his office in the GAA, the
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Sec. 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed
three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final
form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage,
except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon last reading of a
bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall
be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the
Journal.
CORDERO v. CABATUANDO
October 31, 1962 | Subject and title of bills—general prohibition of riders
GIST: Cordero is assailing the constitutionality of Secs. 19 and 20 of RA 2263
(An Act Amending Certain Sections of RA 1199, Otherwise Known As The
Agricultural Tenancy Act Of The Philippines). He claims that by amending
Secs. 53 and 54 of RA 1199, such sections shall be null and void for being
violative of Sec. 26(1) of the Constitution, as the title does not cover the said
provisions, which are in fact riders. SC upheld the constitutionality of such
provisions of RA 2263; the title of the said law need not be construed
technically to determine compliance with the constitutional mandate.
DOCTRINE: It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably
to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishing of the object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title
need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
PHILCONSA v. GIMENEZ
December 18, 1965 | Subject and title of bills—general prohibition of
riders
GIST: Philconsa challenges the constitutionality of RA 3836 (An Act
Amending Subsection [C], Section 12 of the Commonwealth Act No. 186),
for it allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave
to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses.
SC held that such law is indeed unconstitutional, as CA 186 establishes the
GSIS and provides for retirement and insurance benefits to its members—
and that since RA 3836 is extended to all elective officials, even those not
members of the GSIS. This is held by the Court to be not germane to the
subject of the law, and is therefore a rider.
DOCTRINE: The purpose of the requirement that the subject of an act should
be expressed in its title is:
1. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the Legislature; and
2. To fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislation
that are being considered, in order that they may have the
opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise, if they
shall so desire.
ALALAYAN v. NPC
July 29, 1968 | Subject and title of bills—general prohibition of riders
GIST: Alalayan and PH Power and Development Company are both franchise
holders of electric plants in Laguna, they both have contracts with NPC, for
their re-supply, re-distribution, and re-sale of electric power and energy at
fixed rate schedules. Sometime in June 1960, an act was authorized to
increase the capital stock of the NPC to 100M, which was amended by RA
3043 to further the authorized capital stock. Petitioners Alalayan et al. assail
Sec. 3 of RA 3043 (An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act No. 120, as
amended by RA 2641), which enables the NPC to franchise a holder receiving
at least 50% of its electric power and energy. They claim that this provision
is a rider, which goes against the constitutional prohibition of the same. SC
held that the subject provision is constitutional, and is not a rider. To say
that it is a rider is to construe the particular provision as to cripple or impede
proper legislation. It must be deemed sufficient that the title be
comprehensive enough to include the general object which the statute
seeks to effect without expressing each and every means necessary for its
accomplishment.
DOCTRINE: The Constitution does not require the Congress to employ in the
title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index, or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.
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INSULAR LUMBER COMPANY v. CTA
May 29, 1981 | Subject and title of bills—general prohibition of riders
GIST: Insular Lumber Company purchases manufactured oil and motor fuel
which it used in the operation of its forest concession on which specific tax
was paid. It then filed for a refund of Php 19,921.37, representing 25% of
the specific tax paid on the said purchases pursuant to the provisions of Sec.
5 of RA 1435 (An Act to Provide Means for Increasing the Highway Special
Fund). Such is being assailed by respondent CIR for being violative
constitutional prohibition on riders, as such provision allows refunds by the
CIR when such oils and fuel are sued by miners or forest concessionaires in
their operations. SC found no merit in such argument, such provision is in
effect a partial exemption from the imposed increased tax. The said proviso,
which has reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is not a deviation from
the general subject of the law.
DOCTRINE: Exceptions to the general rule do not necessarily express
deviation from the germane purpose of the law.
TIO v. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
June 18, 1987 | Subject and title of bills—general prohibition of riders
GIST: The petitioners of this case challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 10
of PD 1987 (An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board), for not being
covered by the title of the law and not germane to the same, as it imposes
a tax of 30% on gross receipts payable to the local government for the sale,
lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion
picture or audiovisual program, among others. SC upheld its
constitutionality and said that the constitutional requirement is satisfied
because the challenged provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the general object of the decree, which
is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory
Board, as expressed in its title. The express purpose of the decree to include
taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the
theretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident in the
preambular clauses of the law.
DOCTRINE: A tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that
general subject and title. As a tool for regulation is simply one of the
regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the decree.
PHIL. JUDGES ASSOCIATION v. PRADO
November 11, 1993 | Subject and title of bills—general prohibition of
riders
GIST: What the petitioners assail in this case is Sec. 35 of RA 7354, which
basically withdraws the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs, MTCs, and
the Land Registration Commission and its Register of Deeds, along with
certain other government offices. Petitioners of this case claim that such
provision is a rider, and that it is discriminatory and encroaches on the
independence of the judiciary, among others. SC held that while the
provision is germane to the subject of the law because withdrawal of
franking privileges is in accord with the purpose of the law for creating a
more efficient and effective postal service system, it shall be struck down as
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause of the
constitution, as it withdraws such privilege to from the judiciary, who
REALLY needs it. That, the withdrawal of such privilege specially to those
who need it the most is contrary to the purpose of the enactment of such
law.
DOCTRINE: While a provision survives the challenge of it being a rider, it may
still be struck down when it violates the equal protection clause as provided
for in Sec. 1 Art. III of the Constitution.
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Sec. 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall before it becomes a law,
be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it;
otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the
House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its
Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two
thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall
be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the
Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes
of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the
Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President
shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated
within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall
become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items
in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the
item or items to which he does not object.
ABAKADA v. ERMITA
September 1, 2005 | Passage of bills; BCC
GIST: This case is about the challenge of constitutionality of the passage of
RA 9337, which was accomplished after the Bicameral Conference
Committee reconciled the two conflicting bills from both the Senate and the
HoR. The BCC allegedly exceeded its authority by (1) inserting the stand-by
authority in favor of the President, (2) deleting entirely the n pass-on
provisions found in both the HB and SB, (3) inserting the prvision imposing
a 70% limit on input tax to be credited against the output tax, and (4)
including the amendments introduced only by the SB regarding other kinds
of taxes in addition to the VAT. SC held that the BCC did not exceed its
authority, as such bill passed by the said body is well within the internal rules
of the Congress. It is in this light that the SC said that such changes or
modifications made by the BCC were germane to the subjects of the
provisions referred to it for reconciliation, hence no grave abuse of
discretion.
DOCTRINE: To reconcile or harmonize disagreeing provisions, the BCC may
then:
1.
2.
3.
Adopt the specific provisions of either the HB or SB
Decide that neither provisions in the HB or SB would be carried into
the final form of the bill, and/or
Try to arrive at a compromise between the disagreeing provisions
CIR v. CTA
May 14, 1990 | Presidential veto; Item in a revenue bill
GIST: With Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc. contesting that it should have
been exempt from payment of privilege taxes (Php 32,000.00) because the
provision that includes the basis of the CIR’s tax assessment which is Sec. 42
of RA 6110 was vetoed by Marcos. On the other side, CIR contends that the
entire provision was not vetoed, that it was only the words, “hotels, motels,
resthouses” that were actually vetoed, on the ground that it might restrain
the development of hotels which is essential to the tourism industry. SC held
that such veto was unconstitutional. With RA 6110 initially a revenue bill,
the President is only allowed to veto items, and by vetoing the entire thing,
Marcos went beyond his power and therefore such act is of no effect—it’s
as if there was no veto at all. This in effect entitles CIR to validly oblige
Manila Golf to satisfy its tax debt.
DOCTRINE: An “item” in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section
imposing a particular kind of tax, but rather to the subject of the tax and the
tax rate. To construe the word “item” as referring to the whole section
would tie the President’s hand in choosing either to approve the whole
section at the expense of also approving a provision therein which he deems
unacceptable or veto the entire section at the expense of foregoing the
collection of the kind of tax altogether.
GONZALES v. MACARAIG
November 19, 1990 | Presidential veto; general provision
GIST: When the GAA for 1989 was passed, it was noted that the President
vetoed seven special provisions and sec. 55 (a general provision). For
context, sec. 55 basically talks about the prohibition against the restoration
or increase of recommended appropriations disapproved and/or reduced by
Congress.Now the petitioners assail such veto of sec. 55 as it is not within
the ambit of the constitutional item-veto power of the President. SC held
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that such provision is a general provision which essentially is a nonappropriation item—it does not set apar by law a certain sum of money from
the public revenue for a specific purpose. While it appears to be a true
condition or limitation, it is actually a general law measure more appropriate
for a separate legislation.
DOCTRINE: A general provision in an appropriation bill may be validly vetoed
by the President despite it not being an “item.”
PHILCONSA v. ENRIQUEZ
August 19, 1994 | Presidential veto; “inappropriate provision”
GIST: In the process of the passage of RA 7663 (GAA of 1994), the President
delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the special provisions of
the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions. Such is now
being assailed by the petitioners for being unconstitutional as the provision
that was vetoed was a special provision in the appropriation for debt service
and the refusal to spend the allocation in CAGFU. SC held that the President
did not exceed his veto power, and that there was nothing constitutional in
his imposition of conditions. Being an inappropriate provision of an
appropriation bill, such act of the President was constitutional.
of either accepting the entire amount which may or may not be consistent
with his national agenda or rejecting the entire PDAF which endangers
legitimate projects to take effect. There must be a line by line budget or
amount per program, activity, or project, per implementing agency to allow
auditors to stringently determine if there has been proper utilization of
funds. Indicating the budget’s flexibility in terms of providing contingency is
not an excuse of the Constitution’s requirement.
DOCTRINE: The President’s power to veto an item written into an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress through
a process called bill resentment is found in Sec. 27(2) Art. VI. For the
execution of this power, it is essential that an appropriation bill must have
specific appropriations and not general provisions. An item must be
characterized of a specific singular amount for a specific singular purpose or
line item. Item veto may be applied to special purpose funds and
discretionary funds as long as they follow the rule on singular
correspondence.
DOCTRINE: In an appropriation bill, Congress is bound to include provisions
that relate specifically to some particular appropriation and that it be limited
in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. Necessarily, any
provision which does not relate to a particular item can be vetoed separately
from an item.
BELGICA v. OCHOA
November 19, 2003 | Presidential veto; PDAF
GIST: What is being assailed in this case is the constitutionality of the
Congressional Pork Barrel (Priority Development Fund, or PDAF, for brevity)
and the Presidential Pork Barrel (Malampaya Fund). Briefly, the SC discussed
its history of the PDAF (see page 26 for the full history). Petitioners assail its
constitutionality as far as the item-veto power of the President is impaired
due to the general provisions found in the 2013 PDAF article. SC held that
this indeed hinders the president’s item veto, as it only gives him the option
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Sec. 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation.
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
CIR v. LINGAYEN GULF
August 4, 1988 | Uniformity of taxation
GIST: The case was brought about when Lingayen Gulf contested the BIR’s
tax assessment for the respondent’s alleged deficiency of taxes and
surcharges in 1946-1954. Such claim was based on their franchise
agreement with the municipalities, which only imposed 2% at most,
contrary to BIR’s assessment of 5%. In the pendency of the case, RA 3843
was passed, which granted Lingayen a legislative franchise on their
operations, and in particular, Sec. 4 of the said law provided that respondent
only pay 2% franchise tax. The CIR’s claim was that, such provision is
unconstitutional for being violative of the “uniformity and equality of
taxation” clause of the Constitution, they forward that it is the NIRC which
shall apply, which basically provides for the 5% franchise tax. SC upheld the
validity of RA 3843, and said that Lingayen is only liable for 2% franchise tax,
and such is a valid exercise of legislative power well within Sec. 28 Art. VI, as
the Congress may not only impose subjects of taxation, but likewise to grant
exemptions. There is nothing discriminatory nor invalid in such legislative
enactment, since RA 3843 applies to those granted with municipal
franchises.
DOCTRINE: A tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect
in every place where the subject of it is found. Uniformity means that all
property belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike.
ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE v. AQUINO
June 15, 1988 | Tax exemption
GIST: Petitioner filed a complaint to declare void the “Notice of Seizure” and
“Notice of Sale” which involved their lots, for allegedly not being able to pay
real estate taxes and penalties totaling Php 5,140.31. The petitioner school
is recognized by the government and is offering education from Primary
level up to College, and has a population of over a thousand; elementary
pupils are housed in a 2-storey building across the street; HS and college
nd
students are in the main building; the Director and his family is in the 2
floor of the main building; the ground floor of the college building is used
and rented by a commercial establishment, the Northern Marketing Corp.,
for the school caf; and the annual gross income of the school is beyond Php
100,000.00. In this light, petitioners forward that the said lots are used for
educational purposes for the college. SC held that, while the use of the
second floor of the main building in this case for residential purposes of the
Director and his family, may find justification under the concept of incidental
use, which is complimentary to the main or primary purpose of the entire
entity—educational, the lease of the first floor cannot by any stretch of the
imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education.
DOCTRINE: Exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. The use
of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither
contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence.
JOHN HAY PEOPLE’S ALTERNATIVE COALITION v. LIM
October 24, 2003 | Express exemption
GIST: RA 7227 created the BCDA, and the Subic Special Economic Zone,
which was granted incentives ranging from tax and duty-free importations,
exemption of businesses therein from local and national taxes, among
others. Further to this, President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 420, which
established a SEZ on a portion of Camp John Hay. Sec. 3 of the said
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Proclamation granted the same tax exemption to the John Hay SEZ that was
enjoyed by the Subic SEZ through RA 7227. This was being assailed for being
unconstitutional, as it contravenes to Sec. 28(4) Art. VI of the Constitution,
which exclusively vests the power to grant exemptions only to the
legislature. SC held that such assailed exemption is indeed unconstitutional,
since RA 7227 made no mention or any indication at all for any tax
exemption to be afforded to Camp John Hay. Should it be intended by the
Congress, it could have expressly done so. The grant of tax exemption to the
John Hay SEZ would circumvent the Constitution’s imposition that a law
granting any tax exemption must have the concurrence of a majority of all
the members of Congress.
DOCTRINE: It is the legislature, unless limited by a provision of the
Constitution, that has full power to exempt any person or corporation or
class of property from taxation. Other than the Congress, the Constitution
may itself provide for specific tax exemptions, or local governments may
pass ordinances on exemption only from local taxes.
DOCTRINE: The test to determine WoN an enterprise is charitable is
whether it exists to carry out a purpose recognized in law as charitable or
whether it is maintained for gain, profit, or private advantage. To determine
whether an enterprise is a charitable institution/entity or not, the elements
which should be considered include:
1. The statute creating the enterprise
2. Its corporate purposes
3. Its constitution and by-laws
4. The methods of administration
5. The nature of the actual work performed
6. The character of the services rendered
7. The indefiniteness of the beneficiaries
8. The use and occupation of the properties
LUNG CENTER v. QC
June 29, 2004 | Elements to consider for exemption
GIST: Lung Center is a non-stock and non-profit entity, who is the registered
owner of a parcel of land in QC, which had in the middle of the lot a hospital
popularly known as the Lung Center of the Philippines. A huge portion of the
ground floor is leased to private parties, for canteen and small store places,
and to medical or professional practitioners who use the same as their
private clinics for their patients whom they charge for their professional
services. A huge portion on the right side is being leased for commercial
purposes to a private enterprise known as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden
Center. Eventually, it was assessed for real property tax amounting to Php
4,554,860.00, to which they contested and claim to be exempted, as it is a
charitable institution—this was denied. The case was then brought up
before the SC, who held that while it is a charitable institution, only the
following portions are exempted from real property tax: portions occupied
by the hospital, and those portions used for paying or non-paying patients.
The rest, which refer to the portions leased to private entities and private
individuals shall be subject to real property tax.
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Sec. 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any
priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces, or to nay penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be
treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose
for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the
balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the
Government.
GUINGONA v. CARAGUE
April 22, 1991 | Fiscal powers of Congress
GIST: What are being assailed in this case are the 3 PDs issued by Marcos
pursuant to RA 4860, which authorizes him to obtain foreign loans and credit
for financing approved economic development purposes or projects or for
relending to private purposes. These PDs automatically appropriates funds
for servicing foreign debts. With the further implementation of the 3 PDs
manifest in the automatic appropriation for debt service during former
President Cory’s term, the 3 PDs relating to automatic debt servicing were
constitutionally challenged for being violative of Art. VI of the Constitution.
SC held that such PDs are constitutional; such automatic appropriation
provides the flexibility for the effective execution of debt management
policies. Absent an automatic appropriation clause, if the PH Government
has to await and depend upon Congressional action, by the time it comes, it
may no longer be responsive to the intended conditions and result to
delayed payments and circumstances may worsen our debt service-to-total
expenditure ration in the budget due to penalties and/or demand for
immediate payment even before due dates.
DOCTRINE: Lawful authorizations or appropriations constituted in RA 4860
as amended by the 3 PDs are valid unless otherwise amended by the
Congress.
BELGICA v. OCHOA
November 19, 2003 | Fiscal powers of Congress; PDAF
GIST: What is being assailed in this case is the constitutionality of the
Congressional Pork Barrel (Priority Development Fund, or PDAF, for brevity)
and the Presidential Pork Barrel (Malampaya Fund). Briefly, the SC discussed
its history of the PDAF (see page 26 for the full history). Petitioners assail its
constitutionality as far as the safeguards of the fund being used in strictly
for public purpose is concerned. SC held that through the post-enactment
authority, the Congress is left with minimal checks as far as the
appropriation of funds is concerned. At the onset, the PDAF is already held
unconstitutional for giving the Congress such post-enactment authority to
determine where the funds will be used for.
DOCTRINE: When money is collected on any tax levied for a special purpose,
it shall be treated as a special fund and thus must be paid out for such
purpose only. This feature is absent in the PDAF, as it essentially has no
purpose yet—with the projects yet to be determined by the legislature.
PHILIPPINE COCONUT v. REPUBLIC
January 24, 2012 | Coco levy as public fund
GIST: Upon declaration of martial law in 1972, several PDs were issued to
improve the coconut industry through the collection and use of the coconut
levy fund. One of which is PD 755, which authorized the Philippine Coconut
Administration (PCA) to utilize collections and to acquire a commercial bank
and to deposit the levy collections in the said bank, which was withdrawable
only when the bank attained a certain level of sufficiency in its equity capital.
The plan was, the shares of the said commercial bank is to be distributed to
coconut farmers for the “advancement of national policy.” Now during the
Aquino Administration, the PCGG was established, with the goal to recover
ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. Focusing on the coco levy laws relevant
to the case at bar, PCGG assails PD 755, among others, for constituting
undue delegation in terms of allowing PCA to promulgate rules and
regulations governing the distribution of UCPB of its shares to coconut
farmers (since instead of the farmers, the funds went to private individuals).
SC held such PD invalid, as it’s as if the coco levy funds were not treated as
taxes—which is the very nature of the said funds. SC took note that the coco
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levy was imposed in the exercise of the State’s inherent power of taxation.
It is in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose. It cannot,
therefore, be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given for free to
private individuals—such is in direct contravention to the essence of which
the law was created in the first place.
DOCTRINE: PDs made during the martial law classifying the coconut levy
fund as a private fund to be disbursed and/or invested for the benefit of
private individuals in their private capacities is contrary to the original
purpose for which the fund was created.
Sec. 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and
concurrence.
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS v. CA
March 10, 1994 | Invalid increase in appellate jurisdiction
GIST: Mariwasa Company questioned the decision of the BOI that allowed
First Lepanto’s application to amend its BOI certification of registration to
amend their product line from “glazed floor tiles” to “ceramic tiles.” With
the decision not being in their favor, Mariwasa went to the CA to question
the said approval, to which Firs t Lepanto contended was wrong, because it
is the SC and not the CA that has jurisdiction of the case, pursuant to BP 120.
SC initially held that per Circular No. 1-91, the CA had jurisdiction. First
Lepanto filed the present MR and contended that the Omnibus Investments
Code should be followed, and not the Circular No. 1-91, therefore SC shall
have jurisdiction of this case. SC held once again against their favor, ruling
that no law can be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC in
the absence of it’s advice and concurrence; which in this case, is in fact
absent.
DOCTRINE: The rationale behind this constitutional mandate is to give the
SC control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction and to prevent
an enactment of Congress enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of the SC that
can unnecessarily burden the same.
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Sec. 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted.
Sec. 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of
initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the
people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or
law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after
the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of
the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
thereof.
SBMA v. COMELEC
September 26, 1996 | Initiative and referendum; requisites
GIST: RA 7227 was enacted by Congress, which provided for the Subic SEZ,
and Sec. 12 therof provided for the creation of Special Economic and Freeport Zones in Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, among others. In this
light, the LGUs mentioned shall signify their concurrence to their inclusion
to the Zone. Through Reso. No. 10, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong
expressed absolute concurrence. Later, respondents Garcia filed a petition
with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul the said Reso. In response,
the SB of Morong promulgated Reso. No. 18 Serye 1993, requesting
Congress to amend certain provisions of RA 7227, in accordance with the
Garcia petition, to revert back to Bataan the Virgin Forests and the Grande
Island, among others. Not satisfied, respondents Garcia resorted to their
power of initiative provided for under the LGC. COMELEC then denied the
petition for local initiative, and promulgated a Calendar of Activities for local
referendum and providing for rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of
such. Petitioners now claim that COMELEC committed grave abuse, as their
initiative was ignored and what the COMELEC made preparations for a
referendum only. SC agreed to the petitioner’s contention, and ruled that,
the COMELEC, in an initiative, must see to it that the matter or act submitted
to the people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily
understood and voted upon, it cannot control or change the substance or
content of the legislation.
DOCTRINE: Initiative is defined as the power of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations
through an election called for the purpose. On the other hand, referendum
is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an
election called for the purpose.
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO v. COMELEC
March 19, 1997 | Implementing legislation
GIST: Atty. Delfin filed a petition to amend the Constitution by lifting the
term limits of Elective Officials by People’s Initiative, specifically the limits
provided for in the Constitution for Senators, Representatives, the President
and VP, and of local officials. COMELEC then passed Reso. No. 2300 to
govern the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. This was opposed by Sen. Miriam
Defensor-Santiago et al through a special civil action for prohibition, on the
basis that there is no implementing legislation—the constitutional provision
on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented
by law to be passed by Congress, and as of that moment there was only a
pending bill for that, no actual law. That, the people’s initiative is limited to
amendments to the constitution, and not for the revision of the same. SC
held that indeed, a law is needed for the people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution (basically, the constitutional provision they claim the right
stems from is not self-executory). RA 6735, the law Atty. Delfin et al uses as
basis is not sufficient to be the implementing legislation.
DOCTRINE: While the Constitution has recognized or granted the right to
amend the Constitution, the people cannot exercise it if the Congress does
not provide for the implementing legislation
LAMBINO v. COMELEC
October 25, 2006 | Failure to inform the purpose of the amendment
GIST: Atty. Lambino et al (Lambino group) began to gather signatures for an
initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution (they want to modify Arts.
VI, VII, and a new set of transitory provisions to accommodate the changes
[the meat of the change refers to the shift to a unicameral-parliamentary
form of government]), and then come before the COMELEC claiming they
had support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least 12% of all
registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of
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its registered voters. After COMELEC’s denial of the petition, this case was
brought to Court. SC held that the Lambino Group’s initiative petition is not
even compliant to Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution, which refers to
amendments to the Constitution. Even if there were 6.3M signatures, not all
were aware of the amendments to be done. There were only 100,000 copies
of the draft of the new Constitution whch was distributed, and hence there
was a tacit admission that not everyone knew what they “signed up” for.
The proposed new provisions were not even in the sign up sheets; this puts
the people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the
entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains
two choices.
DOCTRINE: An initiative that gathers signatures from people without
showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most
likely a deception, a gigantic fraud on the people. This is why the
Constitution requires that an initiative be directly proposed by the people,
in a petition.
Article VII. The Executive Department
Sec. 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.
MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS
October 27, 1989 | Residual Power
GIST: (This case is unique. It should not create a precedent.) On his
deathbead, dictator Marcos wished to return to the Philippines, however
this request is denied by President Cory. The Marcos family filed for a
petition for mandamus and prohibition, for them to be issued travel
documents and to enjoin Pres. Cory’s decision to bar their return. They claim
that their right to return has been violated, which is vested to they by virtue
of the Bill of Rights, the UDHR, and ICCPR. SC held that while there is a right
to travel from the Philippines to other countries and/or within the PH is a
vested right, there is no right that accorded to the Marcoses as far as their
claims of returning is concerned. Such right to return to one’s country is not
among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats
only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but the right to return
may be considered as a generally accepted principle of international law and
under the Constitution, is part of the law of the land. SC likewise held that
even if such power is not vested by the Constitution to the President, the
Marcoses may be barred by Pres. Cory by virtue of her residual powers. It is
evident that in this decision-making process, what was considered was the
request to return to the country of the deposed dictator and his family at
whose door the travails of the country are laid down and form whom billions
of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered (not to
mention, the human rights violations they made).
DOCTRINE: The President has residual powers, those that are not specifically
provided for in the Constitution, but he may avail of, for purposes of keeping
the peace of the nation. Wide discretion within the bounds of law in fulfilling
presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the
relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief
provision.
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WEBB v. DE LEON
August 3, 1995 | Prosecution of crimes; not quasi-judicial function
GIST: This is about the rape case of Webb et al. Among other pertinent facts,
what is relevant to us in this topic is the sworn statement made by the
principal witness Alfaro in this case. What is being assailed the case at bar is
the failure of the DOJ to include Alfaro in the information that was filed
before the RTC. Petitioners claim that the DOJ intruded the judicial
prerogative when it failed to charge her in the information, that they should
have considered her participation. However, respondents base their
defense on RA 6981, which provides for a witness protection program, and
that a court with jurisdiction may opt not to include the witness in the
criminal complaint or information. SC held that the DOJ has the power to
determine who may qualify as a witness to be protected in the program, and
likewise who may be granted immunity from the prosecution. Sec. 9 Rule
119 of the ROC does not exclusively label this power as an inherent judicial
prerogative.
DOCTRINE: Under the ROC, the court is given the power to discharge a state
witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over both the crime
and the accused. The discharge therefore, of an accused is part fo the
exercise of the court having jurisdiction, not a recognition of an inherent
judicial function.
DJUMANTAN v. DOMINGO
January 30, 1995 | Deportation
GIST: Djumantan is an Indonesian, who married Bañez (a married man)
arrived in NAIA and appeared as “guests” of the latter. The wife of Bañez
then discovered the true relationship of her husband to Djumantan, and
then filed a complained with the MTC. 1982 marked the change of the
immigration status of Djumantan as a permanent resident under the
Immigration Act. Bañez’ eldest son filed a letter-complaint to the OMB, who
referred the letter to the ID, who detained Djumantan. Through this case
she was basically in the process of being deported, to which she moved to
dismiss as she was already married to a Filipino. SC held that there was
blatant abuse of our immigration laws because her entry and change of
immigration status were obtained through misrepresentation. The civil
status of an alien applicant for admission as temporary visitor is a matter
that could influence the exercise of discretion on the part of the immigration
authorities. They would have been less inclined to allow her entry had they
known she was entered into marriage with a married Filipino. (however
though, in this case it is also to be noted that the right of the CID to deport
Djumantan has prescribed, and therefore the TRO against the CID Order is
made permanent).
DOCTRINE: The right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose
presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute and
unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country.
Since aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into the territory is a
matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates no obligation
on the part of the PH government to permit them to stay.
PONTEJOS v. OMBUDSMAN
February 22, 2006 | Power to grant immunity to state witnesses
GIST: Before the Court is a case filed by Aquino against HLURB Officials
(Pntejos, Imperial, Atos) and Ngo. It is in his claims that such people were
guilty of committing conspiracy to exact money from him in exchange for a
favorable decision in a case pending in the HLURB against Ngo. With the
testimony of Atos found to be necessary to build the case against Pontejos
et al, the OMB found it proper to extend to her immunity from criminal
prosecution and be discharged as a state witness. Hence, in the filing of the
case with the RTC, Atos wasn’t included in the accused parties. This is now
being contested by Pontejos, with claims that OMB has no power to grant
immunity as such pertains solely to the courts, and not to the prosecution
which only has recommendatory powers. SC held that OMB can grant
immunity to Atos, as such power is an executive function and the OMB is
vested with such power.
DOCTRINE: The question on whether to prosecute and whom to indict is
executive in character this proecutorial power necessarily includes the
discretion of granting immunity to an accused in exchange for his testimony
against another. The power to grant immunity is essentially a tactical
decision to forego prosecution of a person for the government to achieve a
higher objective.
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BANDA v. ERMITA
April 20, 2010 | Power to reorganize
GIST: The National Printing Office (created through EO No. 285) has
exclusive printing jurisdiction on all standard and accountable forms of
national, provincial, city, and municipal governments, including government
corporations; officials ballots; OG, GAA, Philippine Reports, among others.
Now, PGMA issued EO 378, which amended the previous EO creating the
NPO, by removing the exclusive printing jurisdiction of the latter over
printing services requirements of government agencies and
instrumentalities. Now, they have to compete with the private sector except
in the printing of election paraphernalia. They contend that such EO is
beyond the executive powers of PGMA. SC held that such EO is well within
the executive power of the President, with the said entity part of the Office
of the President, she essentially has the power to reorganize the same to
address current situations and to improve the services of the government.
Besides, there was neither an abolition of the NPO nor a removal of any of
its functions.
DOCTRINE: It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President
has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive
department in line with the President’s constitutionally granted power of
control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the
legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.
LAUREL v. GARCIA
July 25, 1990 | Alienation of government property
GIST: PH Government acquired 4 parcels of land in Japan under the
Reparations Agreement, one of which is the Roppongi Property. These
properties were procured from the Japanese Government as part of the
indemnification to Filipinos for their losses of life and property during the
WWII. RA 1789 (Reparations Law) prescribes the national policy on
procurement and utilization of reparations and development loans. With
the Roponggi property acquired under the heading “government sector,”
such became the site for the PH Embassy until the embassy was transferred
to the Napeidai property (another one of the 4 given by Japan to us). Due to
the failure to provide necessary funds, the Roponggi property has remained
undeveloped since. Then, a proposal was sent to Pres. Aquino to lease the
property to a Japanese Firm, to which Pres. Addressed by the issuance of EO
296, which entitled non-PH citizens or entities to avail of the reparation’s
capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease, or disposition. With the
Executive’s decision to sell the subject lot, petitioners of theis case argues
that such property is part of public dominion, as far as Art. 420 of the CC is
concerned, and that being such, no ownership by anyone can attach to it,
not even by the State because it is outside the commerce of man. SC held
that indeed, such property is of public dominion, with reference to the
Reparations Agreement and the contract of procurement between PH and
Japan. It necessarily follows that the Roponggi lot cannot be alienated, as it
is outside the commerce of man.
DOCTRINE: It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the
government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be
authorized and approved by a law enacted by Congress. It requires executive
and legislative concurrence.
REVIEW CENTER v. ERMITA
April 2, 2009 | Power of President over administrative agencies
GIST: During the administration of the PRC of the Nursing Board
Examinations, licensure applicants wrote to the PRC to report that copies of
leakage were in circulation during the examination period, which allegedly
came from the RA Gapuz Review Center and the Inress Review Center. It was
eventually traced back to two Board of Nursing members. Consequently,
PGMA replaced all members of the PRC’s Board of Nursing and ordered
examinees to re-take the exams, through her issuance of EO 566. The same
EO was assailed as it authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment
and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the PH. They
challenge it with the ground that CHED’s coverage only goes as far as public
and private institutions of higher education as well as degree-granting
programs in post-secondary educational institutions—review centers are
not within the ambit of such power. SC ruled against the constitutionality of
EO 566 due to its unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative
power in expanding CHED’s jurisdiction. A review center is an authorized
entity intending to offer to the public and/or specialized groups whether for
a fee or for a few a program/course that is intended to refresh and enhance
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the knowledge and competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in the
formal school setting in preparation for the licensure exams given by the
PRC. Hence, a review center is not an institution of higher learning; it does
not offer a degree-granting program.
DOCTRINE: There is no law granting the President the power to amend the
functions of CHED. Even if the President can issue administrative orders or
acts which relate to particular aspects of government operation in
pursuance of his duties as the administrative head, these must be in
harmony with law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the
law.
BIRAOGO v. TRUTH COMMISSION
December 7, 2010 | Power of the President to investigate
GIST: After his win over the May 2010 elections, Aquino established the
Truth Commission through EO 1, which formed an ad hoc body under the
Office of the President which primarily shall investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees,
accomplices, and accessories during the previous administration and after,
submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress, and the
OMB. The same EO was being assailed with claims that the investigating
power of the President is allegedly misplaced. SC struck down the said
argument on the ground that such findings of the said commission is not
conclusive, as it merely is a recommendation. However, the EO was held to
be unconstitutional as it violates the equal protection clause, as it focuses
only on the Arroyo administration, which is essentially part of a class (past
administrations); such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective
retribution.
DOCTRINE: The President’s power to conduct investigations to ensure that
laws are faithfully executed is well recognized by Sec. 17 Art. VII. This is not
a quasi-judicial power and is very different from the power to adjudicate,
which leads to a judicial determination of a fact.
US v. NIXON
July 24, 1974 | General claim of executive privilege
GIST: After President Nixon was issued a subpoena duces tecum to produce
certain tape recordings and documents relating to his conversations with
aides and advisers, in relation to the case concerning the conspiracy to
defraud the US and to obstruct justice, his counsel filed a special appearance
and a motion to quash the said subpoena, accompanied by a formal claim of
privilege. Such request was denied, hence the petition before the court,
assailing the denial of such motion grounded on the valid need for
protection of communications between high government officials and those
who advice and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties, and
the independence of the Executive Branch within its own sphere which
insulates a President from a judicial subpoena in an ongoing criminal
prosecution, and hereby protects confidential Presidential communications.
SC held that such subpoena shall prevail as. To read the powers of the
President as providing an absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential
to the enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a generalized claim
of the public interest in confidentiality of non-military and non-diplomatic
discussions would upset the constitutional balance of a workable
government and gravely impair the roles of the courts.
DOCTRINE: Absent any claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or
sensitive national security secrets, it is difficult to accept the argument that
even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential
communications is significantly diminished by production of such material
for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be
obliged to provide.
ALMONTE v. VASQUEZ
May 23, 1995 | EIIB information not subject of privilege
GIST: In response to an anonymous letter from an EIIB employee and a
concerned citizen that EIIB savings had been illegally disbursed, OMB issued
a subpoena duces tecum against Almonte (former Commissioner of the
EIIB). Petitioners Almonte et al. now contest the said subpoena on the round
that the disclosure of the documents in question is resisted on the ground
that the knowledge of EIIB’s documents relative to its Personal Services
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Funds and its plantilla will necessarily lead to knowledge of its operations,
movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being—that
this would destroy the EIIB. SC held that the petitioners cannot be directed
to produce the documents that are confidential in nature, however, since
what was requested of are those relating to the personnel of EIIB, there is
an absence of any military or diplomatic secret that will be disclosed in the
production of such records. Further, even if the subpoenad documents are
treated as presumptively privileged, this decision would only justify ordering
their inspection in camera but not their nonproduction. This will entail the
examination of records to be made in trict confidence by the Ombudsman
himself.
National Security Officials who in the judgment of the National Security
Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and such other officers as may
be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted
by Congress without first securing the President’s approval.” Such EO is
invoked by Gen. Senga to get away with the investigation of the Senate.
Those who pushed through were reprimanded by GMA for defying EO 464.
SC held that Sec. 1 of EO 464 unconstitutional since the said EO gives the
executive the power to invoke privilege without specifying any justification
as to the keeping of the secret as to whether it is kept for military,
diplomatic, or any other purpose.
DOCTRINE: If the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to
protect military, diplomatic, or other national security secrets but on a
general public interest in the confidentiality of his conversations, courts
have declined to find in the Constitution an absolute privilege.
DOCTRINE: The Congress needs to know why such invocation is proper, in
this absence, the Congress is deprived of it’s processes to investigate. There
must be a formal claim. With EO 464 requiring consent of the President as
to what information is protected by privilege WITHOUT any rationale behind
it, it must be struck down as unconstitutional.
SENATE v. ERMITA
April 20, 2006 | Executive privilege; EO 464
NERI v. SENATE
March 25, 2008 | Executive privilege; ZTE-NBN deal
GIST: Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on
the railway project of the North Luzon Railways corporation with the China
National Machinery and Equipment Group. Such hearing was sparked by a
privilege speech from Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged
overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North
Rail Project. Senate Committee on National Defense and Security issued
invitations to AFP Officials (Lt. Esperon, Vice Admiral Mayuga). Drilon
received from Exec. Sec. Ermita a letter requesting for the postponement of
the hearing to which various officials of the Executive Department, in order
for them to have an opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues,
to which he denied. GMA then issued EO 464, which “prohibits Department
Heads and Senior Officials of Executive Departments, who in the judgment
of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals
and flag officers of the AFP, and such other officers who in the judgment of
the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; PNP Officers with
rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by executive privilege; Senior
GIST: NEDA Sec. Neri testified before the Senate Committee for 11 hours on
matters concerning the NBN project awarded by the DOTC to ZTE. Neri
disclosed that then COMELEC Chair Abalos offered him Php 200M in
exchange of his approval of the said project. That, he informed GMA of the
bribery attempt and that she told him to decline. Senate Committee further
probed on GMA, and Neri refused to answer, invoking executive privilege,
the following questions:
4. Whether or not GMA followed up on the NBN Project?
5. Whether or not she directed him to prioritize it?
6. Whether or not she directed him to approve it?
Neri was invited once again to appear but he did not appear anymore,
invoking executive privilege, and so he was held in contempt. SC held that
such move by the Committee of holding him in contempt is unconstitutional,
as the three questions are indeed covered by executive privilege. The
context in which such privilege is being invoked is that the information
sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic
relations with People’s Republic of China. Given the confidential nature of
this information, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of
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this conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed
to protect.
under any exception. Such type of communication shall continue to be
privileged even if they do not involve national security.
DOCTRINE: Elements of presidential communications privilege before its
exercise can be said valid:
4. The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and
non-delegable presidential power
5. The communication is limited only by the doctrine of operational
proximity
The President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely based on a
generalized interest; and likely contains an important and compelling need
to be kept confidential
AKBAYAN v. AQUINO
July 16, 2008 | Executive privilege; JPEPA
DOCTRINE: Deliberative process privilege covers documents reflecting
advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations comprising part of
a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. The
privileged status of such documents rests not on the need to protect
national security but on the obvious realization that officials will not
communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item
of discovery and front page news, the objective of the privilege being to
enhance the quality of agency decisions.
GIST: Petitioners of this case filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition
to heed to their request of the full text of the JPEPA including the PH and
JPN offers submitted during the negotiation process, alongside with all
pertinent attachments and annexes. They further claim that failure to
accommodate such request is violative of their right to information on
matters of public concern and public interest; that the non-disclosure of the
same documents undermines their right to effective and reasonable
participation in all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making.
Despite the denial of such request though, the full text of JPEPA when it was
finally ready was released to the public. SC held that despite such release,
the case is not entirely moot as what was requested by the petitioners were
the negotiations that transpired in the preparation of the JPEPA. However,
the denial of such request was upheld by the Court as it is witin the ambit of
executive privilege. While the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept
perpetually confidential, the offers exchanged by the parties during the
negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. A
ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should now be open to
public scrutiny would discourage future PH representatives from frankly
expressing their views during negotiations. By hampering the ability of our
representatives to compromise, we may be jeopardizing higher national
goals for the sake of securing less critical ones. Diplomatic negotiations shall
be recognized as privilegted in this jurisdiction, with the JPEPA not falling
GIST: Luis Beltran was sued for libel by Pres. Aquino for writing an article
that she hid under her bed in Malacañang during one of the coup attempts.
Beltran challenges the ability of the President to sue, since according to him,
she is immune from suit. That, this would indirectly defeat her privilege of
immunity from suit by testifying on the witness stand, as she would expose
herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. SC held that the rationale
for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction. Following this, there is nothing in our laws that
would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. If the President
decides to do so, it is solely in her prerogative.
SOLIVEN v. MAKASIAR
November 14, 1988 | Immunity from Suit; Who has the right to invoke
DOCTRINE: With the immunity from suit vested to the President alone by
virtue of her office, it may be invoked only by her as the holder of the office,
and not by any other person in her behalf.
CLINTON v. JONES
May 27, 1997 | Unofficial conduct
GIST: Respondent Jones sued petitioner Clinton after the latter made
abhorrent sexual advances to which the former vehemently rejected, which
happened during an official conference held at the Excelsior Hotel, Arkansas.
Clinton filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of Presidential immunity.
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The Court granted the request to defer the proceedings, but then Jones
challenged this before the court as it is claimed to be an unofficial act and
therefore, not within the ambit of the immunity. The Court held that indeed,
such acts were unofficial and are not covered by the presidential immunity
suit, since such immunity is given to the Office and not to the person.
DOCTRINE: The principal rationale for affording Presidents the immunity
from damages actions based on their official acts provides no support for an
immunity for unofficial conduct.
GLORIA v. CA
August 15, 2000 | Cabinet member
GIST: Petitioner Sec. Gloria recommended to the President that Dr. Icasiano
be reassigned as Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and
Technology, to fill up a vacuum created by the retirement of its current
Superintendent—just when Icasiano was appointed Schools Division
Superintendent. Icasiano requested a reconsideration for such
reassignment, which was denied. This was then challenged by Icasiano as
violative of his security of tenure through a petition. As defense, petitioner
Gloria contends that such petition for prohibition is improper because as
part of the cabinet, such attack is improper and therefore violative of the
presidential immunity from suit. SC held that such argument of the
petitioner is untenable for the very reason that the petition is directed
against Gloria, and not the President, therefore the case shall push through.
DOCTRINE: The Presidential immunity from suit is enjoyed by the President
and himself alone. He is the only person vested by the constitution of the
same, and therefore when a suit is directed against a member of the cabinet,
he cannot invoke such immunity in order to get away from it.
Eventually, Articles of Impeachment was transmitted from the HoR to the
Senate, which formally marked the beginning of the impeachment
proceedings. During one of the sessions, a vote of 11-10 was ruled against
the opening of a certain “second” envelope which allegedly contained
evidence showing that ERAP held Php 3.3B in a secret bank account under
the alias Jose Velarde. Such decision sparked the outburst of anger that hit
the streets of the metro, which eventually led to EDSA II. AFP, PNP, and some
cabinet secretaries and undersecretaries, and bureau chiefs defected and
withdrew their support from the administration. On January 20, 2001,
negotiations for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power started in
Malacañang; CJ Davide administered the oath of Arroyo as President of the
Philippines, which was followed by the laving of ERAP and his family from
Malacañang, to which he issued a statement acknowledging GMA’s oath as
President. On the same day, ERAP signed another letter invoking Sec. 11 Art.
VII of the Constitution, and transmitted that he is unable to exercise the
powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the
Constitution, the VP shall be Acting President. The following day, Arroyo
immediately discharged her powers and duties as the President. This ignited
several cases filed against ERAP with the OMB for bribery, graft and
corruption, plunder, forfeiture, among others. ERAP is now challenging
these cases and claim that he is immune from suit, because the
impeachment trial did not continue, it being functus de officio. SC held that
he isn’t covered by such immunity; the termination of the impeachment trial
and its non-resolution does not bar ERAP’s prosecution. Presidents, while
incumbent, are immune from suit, but only there—it does not extend to
post-Presidency.
DOCTRINE: Immunity from suit is not a blanket guarantee for public officers
to do wrong. After all, public office is a public trust. With ERAP’s resignation,
he has no claim whatsoever on such presidential immunity.
ESTRADA v. DESIERTO
April 3, 2001 | Immunity from Suit; Impeachment
DAVID v. ARROYO
May 3, 2006 | Case against Pres. Arroyo
GIST: Through the accusation of Gov. Singson that ERAP, his family, and
friends received millions of jueteng money, there was an initiative that came
from the HoR as regards the move to impeach him. With the calls for his
resignation all around the country, the cabinet members started to resign.
GIST: As the nation celebrated the 20 Anniv of the EDSA 1, PGMA issued
PP 1017, declaring a state of national emergency. As basis, she cited that
over the past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired
with authoritarians of the extreme Left and the extreme Right, who are now
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in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy,
over a broad front, to bring down the PGMA Administration. On the same
day, PGMA Issued G.O. No. 5, implementing PP 1017, where she called the
AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless
violence in the country. During this time, the offices of “The Daily Tribune
and Malaya” were raided by the CIDG, where all anti-GMA articles and writeups were released. A week after, PGMA lifted PP 1017 by issuing
Proclamation No. 1021. 2006. A case was hence filed with the SC, to which
claims that such PP 1017 is violative of the Constitution (zoom in to relevant
fact in relation to this provision: the raid and confiscation in the Daily
Tribune and Malaya). Of course, this comes with PGMA claiming she cannot
be sued by virtue of her Presidential immunity. SC held that the President
alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether
exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over. Nor can he
determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise,
without legislation, the President has no power to point out the type of
business affected with public interest that should be taken over. Looking
even closer, without any definition of “terrorism,” such Proclamation may
be subject to the abuse by enforcement officers. Although it is a fact that
the President cannot be sued so as not to interrupt her duties in Office, it
does not negate the premise that she may be held accountable of her
actions.
DOCTRINE: Even if the President is immune from suit, like any other official,
the she still remains accountable to the people but she may be removed
from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.
Sec. 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least
forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
POE-LLAMANZARES v. COMELEC
March 8, 2016 | Citizenship of a foundling
GIST: Grace Poe was found as a newborn in Iloilo by one Edgar Militar, who
reported her as a foundling in their Civil Registrar who then gave her a
Foundling Certificate and a Birth Certificate. Upon reaching 5 years, FPJ and
Susan Roces filed a petition to adopt her, which was granted. She eventually
became a registered voter in San Juan, and then finally was issued a PH
Passport. Initially, she studied in UP but continued her studies in Boston
College, as a Political Studies Major. She then married Daniel Llaanzares, a
dual-citizen of the PH and US. After their wedding here in the Philippines,
they returned to the US. Eventually, Poe became a naturalized American
Citizen and obtained a US passport. To show her support for her father’s
presidential campaign, she went back to the PH but returned to the US
shortly after. Because of the deteriorating medical condition of FPJ, Poe
rushed back to the PH and eventually stayed until after he died to take care
of the funeral arrangements and the settlement of her father’s estate.
Because of FPJ’s death, she and her husband decided to move and reside
permanently in the PH. This decision was coupled with their acquisition of
TIN from the BIR, their children transferring to PH schools, and her husband
staying in the US for a bit longer to finish pending projects and to sell their
family home there. They initially stayed with Roces until they were able to
purchase a condo at One Wilson Place. 2006, Poe took her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to RA 9225; it is under
this act that she filed a sworn petition to reacquire her PH citizenship with
petitions to derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor children. She
was able to once again secure a new PH Passport. She was then appointed
by PNoy as the Chairperson of the MTRCB, but before assuming her post,
she executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the USA and
Renunciation of American Citizenship, to satisfy the legal requisites of RA
9225. She later exdecuted before the Vice Consul of the US Embassy in
Manila an Oath or Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United
States. 2012, she ran for Senator for the 2013 elections and won. On 2015,
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she filed for her COC for Presidency for the May 2016 elections. This
triggered several COMELEC cases to be filed against her, assailing mainly her
citizenship. SC held that Poe is not disqualified from running, she is a naturalborn citizen by virtue of both municipal and international law. It may be seen
in the OSG’s official statistics that, from the years 1965-1975, the total
number of foreigners born in the PH was 15,986 while the total number of
Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278—from this it may be inferred
that there is a statistical probability of 99.83% that any child born in the
Philippines in that decade is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
DOCTRINE: As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born
citizens. While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with
respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers.
It must be noted that both municipal and international laws recognize such
premise.
Sec. 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same
qualifications and term of office and be elected with and in the same
manner as the President. He may be removed from office in the same
manner as the President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such
appointment requires no confirmation.
FUNA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
February 19, 2013 | Exception to the general rule of prohibition to hold
other government offices
GIST: PGMA appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice, following the
vacancy of the same post. Agra was likewise appointed as the Acting
Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity. This was challenged by Funa on
the basis that such appointment or designation is violative of Sec. 13 Art. VII
of the Constitution. Notwithstanding the different factual milieu offered by
Agra in Court, the SC held that while all other appointive officials in the civil
service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government
during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions
of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies, and assistants
may only do so when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. With
Agra’s designation as Acting Secretary of Justice not being in an ex officio
capacity, which he would have been validly authorized to concurrently hold
with the other position he has, such appointment is deemed
unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE: There are only two exceptions against holding of multiple offices
which is expressly authorized by the Constitution:
1. Those provided for under Sec. 3 Art. VII, authorizing the VP to
become a member of the Cabinet
2. Those specified in Sec. 13, Art. VII, without additional
compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of the officials’ offices.
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Sec. 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote
of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at
noon of the same date six years thereafter. The president shall not be
eligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded as President and
has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election
to the same office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full
term for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and
Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly
certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be
transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon
receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall not
later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates
in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint
public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity
and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the
votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed
elected, but in case two or more of them shall have an equal and highest
number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a
majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or VicePresident, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
PIMENTEL v. JOINT COMMITTEE
June 22, 2004 | Congress as National Board of Canvassers
determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass and preliminary canvass of the votes cast for the Presidential and
Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 2004 elections, because the
Congress has adjourned its sessions on June 11, 2004. SC found no merit in
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Pimentel’s claims and ruled that the term of the present 12 Congress did
not terminate and expire upon the adjournment sine die of the regular
session of both Houses on June 11. Consequently, there being no law to the
th
contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present 12 Congress to which the present
legislators belong cannot be said to have passed out of legal existence.
th
DOCTRINE: The legislative functions of the 12 Congress may have come to
a close upon the final adjournment of its regular sessions but this does not
affect its non-legislative functions, such as that of being the National Board
of Canvassers. The joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened
by express directive of Sec. 4 Art. VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes
for and to proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-President has not,
and cannot adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally
mandated tasks.
LOPEZ v. SENATE
June 8, 2004 | Rules for canvassing
Joint Committee - Congress can have their own rules
GIST: In this case, Cong. Lopez challenges the constitutionality of Sec. 13,
Rule VII of the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Conress (Canvassing Rules),
which created a Joint Committee that will conduct a preliminary canvass of
the votes of the candidates for President and Vice-President during the 2004
elections. Petitioner claims that the Canvassing Rules were adopted by both
Houses with grave abuse of discretion, as it constitutes an amendment of
Sec. 4 Art. VII of the Constitution, among others. SC held that there was no
grave abuser of discretion when the Congress came up with the Canvassing
rules.
DOCTRINE: It is expressly provided in the Constitution that the Congress has
the power to promulgate its rules for canvassing the certificates.
GIST: This case is about Pimentel’s claim that the Joint Committee of
Congress must cease and desist its continued existence and its
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TECSON v. LIM
March 3, 2004 | Need for post election issue
conferment of full authority to the SC is equivalent to the full authority given
to the HRET and SET.
GIST: FPJ filed his CoC for the position of President under KNP Party, where
he stated that he was a natural-born citizen of the PH, aong others. This
triggered petitions to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
CoC upon the ground that FPJ made a material misrepresentation when he
indicated that he was a natural-born citizen when in fact his parents were
foreigners, and that even considering that his father was a Filipino, he could
not have transmitted his citizenship to FPJ since he was an illegitimate child
of an alien mother. Side-by-side with the ruling on the merits of this case, it
must be noted that the SC said that it has no jurisdiction over the first two
cases filed against FPJ, as only a registered candidate for President and VP
nd
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who received the 2 or 3 highest number of votes may contest the election
with the SC acting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, which may be done
only after the election has been conducted. In this case, the elections have
barely started, and the petitions were not even filed by candidates.
DOCTRINE: The PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the SC, albeit
it has functions peculiar only to the tribunal. It is evident tha the PET was
constituted in implementation of Sec. 4 Art. VII of the Constitution, and it
faithfully complies—not unlawfully defies the constitutional directive.
plenary in character - they can promulgate their own rules
DOCTRINE: Contest as contemplated in Sec. 4 Art. VII refers to a postelection scenario, to which the SC shall acquire jurisdiction on such cases
only after the elections are held. It shall be the COMELEC where the cases
shall be filed if there are any contentions as far as the qualifications are
concerned, should it be challenged prior to the election proper.
MACALINTAL v. PET
November 23, 2010 | Presidential or Vice-Presidential Controversies
GIST: This case is about the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET) which was raised by Atty. Macalintal, on the basis that such is
violative of Sec. 4 Art. VII of the Constitution. He claims that, although the
SC is authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose, he forwards that a
separate tribunal complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set of
personnel and confidential employees, must be made to satisfy the
constitutional mandate. SC upheld the constitutionality of the PET, on the
basis of statutory construction rules. The plain reading of Sec. 4 Art. VII
readily reveals a grant of authority to the SC sitting en banc. Though not
expressly specified, the grant of power is also not limited, such that the
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Sec. 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President,
the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take the following oath or
affirmation:
“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously
fulfill my duties as President (or Vice-President or Acting President) of the
Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do
justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So
help me God.” (In case of affirmation, the last sentence will be omitted.)
Sec. 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the
President and Vice-President shall be determined by law and shall not be
decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which
such increase was approved. They shall not receive during their tenure any
other emolument from the Government or any other source.
Sec. 7. The President-elect and the Vice-President-elect shall assume office
at the beginning of their terms.
If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice-President-elect shall act as
President until the President-elect shall have qualified.
If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice-President-elect shall act
as President until a President shall have been chosen and qualified.
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall
have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the Vice-Presidentelect shall become President.
Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall
have been qualified, or where both shall have died or become
permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act as
President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and
qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to
act as President shall be selected until a President or a Vice-President shall
have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the
officials mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.
Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or
resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the
President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and
Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until
the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of
death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He
shall serve until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected
and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and
disqualifications as the Acting President.
ESTRADA v. DESIERTO
April 3, 2001 | Succession
GIST: Through the accusation of Gov. Singson that ERAP, his family, and
friends received millions of jueteng money, there was an initiative that came
from the HoR as regards the move to impeach him. With the calls for his
resignation all around the country, the cabinent members started to resign.
Eventually, Articles of Impeachment was transmitted from the HoR to the
Senate, which formally marked the beginning of the impeachment
proceedings. During one of the sessions, a vote of 11-10 was ruled against
the opening of a certain “second” envelope which allegedly contained
evidence showing that ERAP held Php 3.3B in a secret bank account under
the alias Jose Velarde. Such decision sparked the outburst of anger that hit
the streets of the metro, which eventually led to EDSA II. AFP, PNP, and some
cabinet secretaries and undersecretaries, and bureau chiefs defected and
withdrew their support from the administration. On January 20, 2001,
negotiations for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power started in
Malacañang; CJ Davide administered the oath of Arroyo as President of the
Philippines, which was followed by the laving of ERAP and his family from
Malacañang, to which he issued a statement acknowledging GMA’s oath as
President. On the same day, ERAP signed another letter invoking Sec. 11 Art.
VII of the Constitution, and transmitted that he is unable to exercise the
powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the
Constitution, the VP shall be Acting President. The following day, Arroyo
immediately discharged her powers and duties as the President. This ignited
several cases filed against ERAP with the OMB for bribery, graft and
corruption, plunder, forfeiture, among others. ERAP is now denying that he
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resigned or that he suffers from permanent disability; he submits that the
Office of the President was not vacant when Arroyo took her oath. He
forwards that there were no acts of relinquishment coming from his end,
since he did not write any formal letter of resignation. However, the SC held
that, while he didn’t write such formal letter, the totality of the prior,
contemporaneous, and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence show
that he actually resigned. This in turn points us to the constitutional
character of the succession of GMA from Vice-President to President.
DOCTRINE: It is very clear in Sec. 8 Art. VII of the Constitution that the VicePresident shall become President to serve the unexpired term, in case the
President dies, is permanently disabled, removed from office or is resigned.
Both houses accepted and recognized Arroyo as P
Sec. 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President
during the term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a
Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority
vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
Sec. 10. The Congress shall, at ten o’clock in the morning of the third day
after the vacancy in the offices of the President and the Vice-President
occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and
within seven days enact a law calling for a special election to elect a
President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days
nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such
special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26,
Article VI of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on
third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall
be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from
the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of this Constitution.
The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special
election postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy
occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential
election.
Sec. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration
that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until
he transmit them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and
duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting
President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate
and to the Speaker of the House o Representatives his written declaration
that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his
office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker
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of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall
convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with
its rules and without need of a call.
If the Congress within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration,
or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble,
determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall
continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.
Sec. 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be
informed of the state of his health. The Members of the Cabinet in charge
of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be denied access to the
President during such illness.
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil
degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of
bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.
RAFAEL v. EMBROIDERY & APPAREL CONTROL BOARD
September 29, 1967 | Designation and ex-officio capacity
GIST: RA 3137 was enacted, creating an Embroidery and Apparel Control and
Inspection Board and providing for a special assessment to be levied upon
all entities engaged in an amount to be fixed by the Board. In compliance
with the provisions of the said law with regard to the composition of the
Board, Quintin Santiago was named as the representative from the private
sector (while being the President of the Philippine Association of Embroidery
and Apparel Exporters, Inc. Rafael, through the Chamber of Embroidery and
Apparel Producers, Inc., questioned such representation, and argued that
the Congress cannot specify who can can be appointed. Since RA 3137
prescribes that the chairman and the members of the Board should come
from specified offices, it is equivalent to a declaration by Congress as to who
should be appointed, which infringes the appointing power of the President.
SC held that with the law specifically providing that they only sit in an exofficio capacity, no new appointments are really made. Those composing
the board must already be holding positions in the offices mentioned.
DOCTRINE: When a person is asked to sit in an ex-officio capacity, it is not
equivalent to an actual appointment, where he is required to relinquish his
old post for the new one. The duties performed in ex-officio capacity are
only in addition to those they perform under their original appointments.
CLU v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
February 22, 1991 | Stricter prohibition on the President’s official family
against multiple offices
GIST: The petitioners of this case assail EO 284, on the basis that it allows
members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries to
hold other government offices or positions despite the limitation as
provided for in Sec. 13 Art. VII. Petitioners likewise allege that despite being
absolute and self-executing provisions Secretary of Justice Ordonez
construed this particular provision in relation to Sec. 7(2) Art. IX-B and issued
Opinion 73, which declares that Cabinet members, their undersecretaries,
and assistant secretaries may hold other public offices, including
membership in the boards of government corporations and enumerates the
instances when this is allowed. This Opinion, lumped together with the 2
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constitutional provisions were allegedly addressing a distinct and separate
group of public officers, namely the President and her official family, as well
as public servants in general. In totality, this combination is being argued by
the petitioners as to have abolished the clearly separate, higher, exclusive,
and mandatory constitutional rank assigned to the prohibition against
multiple jobs for the President, Vice-President, Cabinet, and their deputies,
among others. SC held EO 284 as unconstitutional, that the practice of
holding multiple offices or positions in the government led to abuses by
public officials who took advantage of it for purposes of self-enrichment.
The more strict prohibition in Art. VII is based on the fact that the President
and members of his Cabinet exercise more powers, so more checks and
restraints on them are called for. Given this difference, the qualifying phrase
in Sec. 13 “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,” cannot possibly
refer to the broad exceptions under Art. IX-B
DOCTRINE: Although Art. IX-B already contains a blanket prohibition against
holding of multiple offices subsuming both elective and appointive, the
Constitutional Commission intended to impose a more strict prohibition on
the President and his official family, thus the creation of Sec. 13, Art. VII.
DE LA CRUZ v. COA
November 27, 2001 | Alternates of Cabinet member are also not entitled
to additional compensation
GIST: Petitioners, who are members of the NHA Board as alternates to the
NHA Board of Directors, assail the denial of the NHA Auditor through the
Notice of Disallowance of their payment of representation allowances and
per diems. The NHA Auditor disallowed in audit the payment of
representation allowances per diems of the Cabinet members who were exofficio members of the NHA Board and their respective alternates who
actually received their payments, which was based on the ruling of the case
of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary (this case declared EO 284
unconstitutional as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants
to hold other offices, in addition to their primary offices, and to receive
compensation. SC held that the petitioners are indeed not entitled to
receive compensation, as it was previously held by the Court that the
prohibition against holding multiple offices under Sec. 13 Art. VII is not to be
interpreted as covering opsitions held without additional compensation in
ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of the concerned official’s office. This being said, the employment
of the executive officials in the NHA Board is primarily a function attached
to the office of the said officials—they need not be compensated
independently for such employment. The reason is that these services are
already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal
office.
DOCTRINE: The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation
part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right
to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position.
FUNA v. ERMITA
February 11, 2010 | Prohibition against Holding another Office or
Employment
GIST: What is being assailed in this case is the concurrent positions of
Bautista, as both Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) and then as the OIC of Maritime Transport of
Philippines (MARINA). The petitioners of this case claim that such
designations are unconstitutional, for being violative of Sec. 13 Art. VII. SC
held that indeed, Bautista’s designation in the MARINA is unconstitutional.
It was previously held by the Court in the CLU case that EO 284 is
unconstitutional, as it allows Members of the Cabinet, among others, to hold
multiple offices or employment, which is directly in contravention with Sec.
13 Art. VII. Bautista, being then appointed as the Undersecretary of DOTC is
thus covered by the constitutional prohibition and cannot in any way invoke
an any exception wherein holding another office is allowed. Her designation
in the MARINA as OIC is not in an ex-officio capacity, so she cannot fit under
the exception as provided for in Sec. 7(2) of Art. IX-B.
DOCTRINE: To hold an office means to possess or occupy the same, or to be
in possession and administration, which implies nothing less than the actual
discharge or the functions and duties of the office. The disqualification in
Sec. 13 is aimed at preventing the concentration of powers in the Executive
Department officials, specifically the President, Vice-President, Members of
the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.
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ESPIRITU v. LUTGARDA
October 15, 2014 | Prohibition against Holding another Office or
Employment
GIST: This case is essentially about the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,
wherein after being denied an application for exemption with the
Department of Agrarian Reform, petitioners have filed an appeal before the
Office of the President (OP). The OP, through the Deputy Executive Secretary
for Legal Affairs (Gaite), dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, which led the
petitioners to appeal once again but now before the CA, who finally ruled in
their favor. Now the adverse party filed an appeal before the SC, claiming
that Gaite had no authority in any manner to sign the decision, and that it
shall not be valid. It was claimed that prior to the decision, he was appointed
as a Commissioner to the SEC. SC held that the decision promulgated by
Gaite is effective and binding, due to the lack of proof presented before the
Court as to when he accepted the appointment, when he took his oath of
office, or when he assumed the position. After all, he can still be considered
a de facto officer at the time he rendered the decision.
DOCTRINE: A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one
having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office,
and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in
possession of an office and is discharging its duties under color of authority,
by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however
irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is a mere volunteer.
FUNA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
February 19, 2013 | Prohibition against holding another Office or
Employment
GIST: PGMA appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice, following the
vacancy of the same post. Agra was likewise appointed as the Acting
Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity. This was challenged by Funa on
the basis that such appointment or designation is violative of Sec. 13 Art. VII
of the Constitution. Notwithstanding the different factual milieu offered by
Agra in Court, the SC held that while all other appointive officials in the civil
service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government
during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions
of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies, and assistants
may only do so when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. With
Agra’s designation as Acting Secretary of Justice not being in an ex officio
capacity, which he would have been validly authorized to concurrently hold
with the other position he has, such appointment is deemed
unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE: There are only two exceptions against holding of multiple offices
which is expressly authorized by the Constitution:
1. Those provided for under Sec. 3 Art. VII, authorizing the VP to
become a member of the Cabinet
2. Those specified in Sec. 13, Art. VII, without additional
compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of the officials’ offices.
DOROMAL v. SANDIGANBAYAN
September 7, 1989 | Other prohibitions; Participation in a contract with
the government; indirect interest
GIST: Doromal in this case was alleged to have violated the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) in relation with his shareholdings and as
President and Director of the Doromal International Trading Corporation
(DITC) which submitted bids to supply Php 61M worth of equipment to the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and the National
Manpower and Youth Council (NMYC). It was claimed by respondents that
while being the President of DITC, he was likewise the PCGG Commissioner.
As a defense, Doromal claims that in the absence of a preliminary
investigation, his right to due process was violated. SC held that Doromal
has not only violated RA 3019, he also violated Sec. 13 Art. VII of the
Constitution, which prohibits the President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants shall not during
their tenure directly or indirectly participate in any business.
DOCTRINE: Indirect participation in any business and holding any position
as mentioned in Sec. 13 Art. VII is prohibited.
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Sec. 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain
effective, unless revoked by the elected President, within ninety days from
his assumption or reassumption of office.
Sec. 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not
make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service
or endanger public safety.
DE CASTRO v. JBC
May 17, 2010 | Reversal of the Valenzuela ruling
GIST: This case revolves around the appointment of the successor of Puno
as his compulsory retirement was on May 17, 2010, days after the 2010
Presidential elections. There was a dilemma as to the following conflicting
provisions:
• Sec. 15 Art. VII, “Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments x x x”
• Sec. 4(1) Art. VIII, “The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. x x x Any vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof”
SC held that the incumbent President can appoint the successor of CJ Puno
upon his retirement on the ground that the prohibition against presidential
appointments under Sec. 15 Art. VII does not extend to judiciary
appointments. Had it been otherwise intended by the framers of the
Constitution, they would have made the provision applicable to the judiciary
as well, which in this case didn’t apply.
DOCTRINE: The SC in the Valenzuela initially held that the President cannot
fill any vacancy in the RTC during the prohibition period. However, this is
now overturned by the present case, wherein the Court recognized the
premium that Art. VII played in terms of it essentially referring to the
executive, rather than to the judiciary. In simpler terms, when the two
articles are in conflict as far as judicial appointments are concerned, Art. VIII
is to be followed.
Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
GOVERNMENT v. SPRINGER landmark
April 1, 1927 | Power to appoint as executive
case
GIST: This case revolved around the question as to whether or not the
Senate President and the House Speaker may validly vote. On the side of the
affirmative, it is claimed that being the owner of 99% of the stocks, the two
naturally must be divested with voting rights. However on the negative side,
they claim that the two cannot be divested with voting rights not only
because it is executive in nature, but also due to the issuance of EO 37, which
vests the power to appoint the Board of Directors of the National Coal
Company (this is the GOCC, and it is the power of voting of the Board
Members that is being contested here) to the Governor-General. The SC in
this case upheld the validity of EO 37 and held that the Senate President and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives cannot be given the power to
vote as it will be tantamount to the power to appoint, which is essentially
executive in nature.
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that appointing power is vested on the
executive department alone, with some exceptions as provided for by law.
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DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
February 28, 2012 | Interpretation of power of the President to appoint
OICs
GIST: The Organic Act of ARMM (RA 6734) was amended by RA 9054, which
nd
set the holding of elections on the 2 Monday of September, but that before
the said date, it was moved to November 26, 2001 through RA 9140. 4 years
later, RA 9333 fixed the date of regular elections, which is to be held on the
nd
nd
2 Monday of August 2005. Finally, it was changed to the 2 Monday of
May by RA 10153. The relevant issue in this case is that of when the bill
provided for interim officials appointed by the President to act as OICs for
the meantime. This was being contested, as it is claimed to be
unconstitutional as the President has no power to appoint OICs to govern
the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period, and that, by allowing such
appointment, the elective and representative character of the ARMM
positions are destroyed. SC held that the President may validly appoint
officers, with his appointment in this case falling squarely in the group that
refers to the those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint. As to the second issue, the Court held that what the President
merely appointed are OICs, which is very different from appointing ARMM
officials.
DOCTRINE: OICs are officers who shall perform the functions pertaining to
the said offices until the officials duly elected shall have qualified and
assumed office.
1. authority to
instrumentalities, including GOCCs that were made on or after March 11,
2010, including those bearing dates prior to March 11 where the appointee
has accepted, or taken his oath or assumed public office on or after that
date. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of EO 2, which the SC
upheld, as it recognizes the appointments made outside the allowable
period as invalid.
DOCTRINE: For an appointment to be valid, it must be made outside the
prohibited period, or failing that, fall under the specified exception.
PIMENTEL v. ERMITA
October 13, 2005 | Acting Secretaries
GIST: What is assailed in this case are the ad interim appointments for
secretaries of several departments issued by PGMA through her Executive
Secretary (Ermita) after the Congress has adjourned. The petitioners of this
case claim that such appointments are unconstitutional, they being made
without the consent of the Commission on Appointments due to the fact
that they were no longer in session. SC upheld the validity of the
appointments made by GMA and stressed on the fact that the exercise of
the power to appoint is executive and not legislative. After all, it is well
provided for by the Constitution that such ad interim appointments, which
are essentially temporary in nature, are only effective until disapproved by
the Commission on Appointments.
DOCTRINE: The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
appoint
2. transmittal
VELICARIA-GRAFIL v. OP
legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power
September 7, 1989 | Revocation of GMA appointments 3. vacant position except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to
4. acceptance
interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed
GIST: The controversy on this case arose when PGMA issued more than 800
strictly against the legislature.
appointments to various positions in several government offices prior to the
conduct of the May 2010 elections. With March 10, 2010 as the cut-off date
SARMIENTO III v. MISON
for the valid appointments, those made the following day, onwards, were
December 17, 1987 | “Alone”
considered already midnight appointments. While the petiitoners of this
case claim that the appointments were validly made, PNoy eventually issued
GIST: What is being assailed in this case is the appointment of Mison as the
EO 2, which recalled and revoked these appointments. In this particular EO,
commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, for reasons that it was not
midnight appointments are defined as that made by the former President
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, and is therefore violative
and other appointing authorities in departments, agencies, offices, and
of the constitution. SC upheld the appointment of Mison, as it falls squarely
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in the third group of appointments, which covers those whom the President
may be authorized by law (in this case, RA 1937 and PD 34) to appoint. It is
clear that such appointments need not require the consent of the
Commission on Appointments.
DOCTRINE: There are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:
1. The Heads of Executive Departments, Ambassadors, other Public
Ministers and Consuls, Officers of the Armed Forces from the rank
of Colonel or Naval Captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution (CA consent
required)
2. All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided by law (CA consent not required)
3. Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint
(CA consent not required)
4. Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress made by
law vest in the President alone (CA consent not required)
BAUTISTA v. SALONGA
April 13, 1989 | “Other officers”
GIST: 1987, President Cory designated Bautista as Acting Chariman of the
CHR, to which she eventually extended permanent appointment to. Bautista
then immediately discharged the functions and duties of the Office of the
Chairman of the CHR, which she originally held merely in acting capacity. She
later received a letter from the Commission on Appointments, to submit
certain information and documents pursuant to their rules in relation to
their confirmation of her appointment. This was basically what was
contended with this case, because Bautista claims that the Constitution
excluded the CHR from the enumeration of the constitutional commissions
subject to its confirmation, and hence, the Commission on Appointments
did not have jurisdiction to review her appointment. SC held that Bautista
cannot be required to submit her appointment for confirmation before the
CA; as there is no provision in the Constitution that provides for such rule.
This being said, the appointment in this case belongs to the second group.
(refer to doctrine of the Sarmiento case for the complete list)
DOCTRINE: Out of the four groups of officers as mentioned in Sec. 16 Art.
VII of the Constitution, it is only the first group which is mandated to be
made with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Those not
belonging to this group may be validly appointed even without such
consent.
QUINTOS-DELES v. CA
September 4, 1989 | “Other officers”
GIST: Petitioner Quintos-Deles is among those who were appointed as
sectoral representatives by the President, pursuant to Sec. 16 Art. vII and
Sec. 7 Art. XVIII of the Constitution. Due to the opposition of the members
of the Commission on Appointments, they were not able to take their oaths
and discharge their duties. This was challenged by petitioner, who claims
that her appointment as a Sectoral Representative for Women by the
President does not require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments to qualify her to take her seat in the House of
Representatives. SC ruled against her favor and emphasized on the fact that
the seats reserved for the sectoral representatives may be filled by the
President upon the express provision under Sec. 7 Art. XVIII, hence
considered as part of the first group of officers in Sec. 16 Art. VII, who need
to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. (refer to ratio of the
Sarmiento case for the complete list)
DOCTRINE: Since the appointment of sectoral representatives are provided
for in Sec. 7 Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it necessarily falls under the first
group of Sec. 16 Art. VII, which essentially refers to those officers whose
appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution, whose
appointments are subject to confirmation.
POBRE v. MENDIETA
July 23, 1993 | “Those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint”
GIST: This case is basically about the contention as to which one must be
followed: the Power of the President to appoint the PRC Commissioner, or
the rule on succession as provided for in Sec. 2 of PD 223, which says that it
is the most senior Associate Commissioner which will take over once there
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is such vacancy. This scenario materialized when Francia’s term as PRC
Commissioner expired, and Mendieta was his senior Associate
Commissioner. After Pres. Cory appointed Pobre as the new PRC
Commissioner, Mendieta contested the same as it is a violation of PD 223,
which points to him being the next in line, as the person who is rightful to
fill in the vacancy. SC held that such vacancy, if filled by succession or by
operation of law, will deprive the President of his power to appoint a new
PRC Commissioner—which is an encroachment of the executive power.
Besides, such provision of PD 223 only refers to an unexpired term is
present. Since in this case there was no unexpired term, Pobre’s
appointment was held valid.
DOCTRINE: Whenever any vacancy is filled by succession or by operation of
law, the same is tantamount to an encroachment of the executive power to
appoint, which shall be struck down as unconstitutional.
FLORES v. DRILON
June 22, 1993 | “All other officers whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint”
GIST: What is being assailed in this case is Sec. 13(d) of RA 7227 (Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992). Apparently, this particular
provision provides that for the first year of the operations from the
effectivity of the said act, the Mayor of the City of Olongapo (who in this
case is Gordon) shall be appointed as the Chairman and Chief Executive
officer of the SBMA. It is being contended that such provision is an express
violation of Sec. 16 Art. VII, which says that the President shall appoint all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. SC held that such appointment of Gordon, a Mayor, through the
assailed provision of RA 7227 is unconstitutional. This provision basically
directs the President to appoint an elective official to other government
posts, which is precisely what the constitutional provision seeks to prevent.
The Court likewise debunked the “ex-officio” argument, as such post is not
even automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor.
DOCTRINE: When it is the law who determines who the President shall
appoint, it shall be struck down as unconstitutional as it precludes the
President from exercising his discretion to choose the appointee. The power
of appointment with no power to choose is no power at all, which goes
against the vary nature and essence of appointment.
RUFINO v. ENDRIGA
July 21, 2006 | “Whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law”
GIST: Marcos issued EO 30 creating the CCP as a trust governed by a Board
of rustees of 7 members to preserve and promote Philippine culture. PD 15
was issued by Markos, creating the CCP Charter. During the Ramos
Administration, the CCP Board included the Endriga group, which were
replaced by ERAP of 7 new trustees (for brevity let’s call them the Rufino
group). The Endriga group assailed the appointment of ERAP of the 7 new
members on the ground that according to PD 15, the CCP Board shall be
filled by a vote of a majority of the trustees, and that only when the Board
is entirely vacant will the President be able to fill such vacancies. SC held that
the provisions of PD 15 on the manner of filling vacancies in the Board is
unconstitutional, as it is in direct contravention of the appointing power
vested in the President in Sec. 16 Art. VII of the Constitution. The Congress
cannot determine the manner of appointment of the president.
DOCTRINE: The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except
in those instances when the Constitution provides otherwise. Usurpation of
this fundamentally executive power by the legislative and judicial branches
violates the system of separation of powers that inheres in our democratic
republican government.
CALDERON v. CARALE
April 23, 1992 | NLRC; list is exclusive
GIST: RA 6175 was passed which amended the labor code, and it provided
that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners, and other
commissioners of the NLRC shall be appointed by the President, subject to
the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Pursuant to this law,
Pres. Aquino appointed the Chairman and the Commissioners, not
submitted to the Commission on Appointments for its confirmation. These
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appointments were latter questioned by Calderon saying that without the
confirmation, such appointments were in violation of RA 6715. SC held that
such appointments were still valid despite the absence of the consent from
the Commission, because the list enumerated by the Constitution cannot be
expanded by Congress. Such is tantamount to an encroachment to the
appointing power exclusively vested upon the President, which is provided
for by the Constitution.
DOCTRINE: The congress cannot by law require the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments of any other officers for officers created
subsequent to the 1987 Constitution.
TAROSA v. SINGSON
May 25, 1994 | Central Bank; list is exclusive
that they were no longer in session. SC upheld the validity of the
appointments made by GMA and stressed on the fact that the exercise of
the power to appoint is executive and not legislative. After all, it is well
provided for by the Constitution that such ad interim appointments, which
are essentially temporary in nature, are only effective until disapproved by
the Commission on Appointments.
DOCTRINE: An ad interim appointment is extended only during a recess of
Congress, and is latter submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation or rejection. On the other hand, an appointment in an acting
capacity may be extended any time there is a vacancy, and is not submitted
to the Commission on Appointments. The latter is a way of temporarily filling
the vacancies of important offices, which if abused, may be way of
circumventing the need for the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
GIST: Singson was appointed as Governer of the BSP by President Ramos.
This was then questioned by Tarrosa, as the appointment was without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, which was specifically
provided for by Sec. 6 of RA 7653. Singson on the other hand as defense
claims that such legislative act encroached the executive power of the
President to appoint, which must accordingly be struck down as
unconstitutional. SC held that indeed, the appointment of Singson requires
no confirmation by the Commission on appointments. This case is very
similar to that of Calderon.
DOCTRINE: The Congress cannot by law expand confirmation powers to the
Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of
other government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of
Sec. 16 Art. VII of the Constitution.
PIMENTEL v. ERMITA
October 13, 2005 | Ad interim v. acting capacity
GIST: What is assailed in this case are the ad interim appointments for
secretaries of several departments issued by PGMA through her Executive
Secretary (Ermita) after the Congress has adjourned. The petitioners of this
case claim that such appointments are unconstitutional, they being made
without the consent of the Commission on Appointments due to the fact
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Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
LACSON-MAGALLANES v. PAÑO
November 17, 1967 | Presidential power to reverse decision of heads of
executive positions; what is non-delegable is what the President has to
exercise in person
GIST: A case as to who the actual occupants were of a particular parcel of
land is what this case is all about. On one side, Magallanes claims to be the
actual occupant, who ceded his rights to Lacson-Magallanes Co.—this same
land was released from a Forest zone and is declared as an agricultural land.
On the other side, Paño et al claims that they are the actual occupants and
farmers. The ruling of the Director of Lands was in favor of Magallanes,
which led for respondents Paño et al to appeal before the President, to
which the Executive Secretary granted. This in turn made the petitioner
Lacson assail the legal force and effect of the decision of the Executive
Secretary, on the basis that it is only the President who has the power to
reverse a decision promulgated by the Director of Lands. SC held that since
the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President, he
may act on and in behalf and by the authority of the President and corollary
has the jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order.
DOCTRINE: It is not correct to say that the Chief Executive may not delegate
to his Executive Secretary such acts which the Constitution does not
command that he perform in person, for the President is not expected to
perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative
functions.
ANG-ANGCO v. CASTILLO
November 30, 1963 | Distinguish President’s power over “acts” and
“person” of appointee in classified service
GIST: Due to the act of authorizing the release of Pepsi-Cola concentrates
which allegedly lacked approval from the necessary authorities, Ang-Angco
was charged with grave neglect of duty, which led to his suspension. He was
reinstated once again, but investigation regarding the issue continued.
Later, Executive Secretary Castillo considered him resigned after finding him
guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. An appeal
before the President was filed, which was denied by Castillo. This was again
made in a form of a memorandum, to which was once again denied by
Castillo. Now Ang-Angco contests the authority of Castillo and his
cognizance of the case, and claims that the President cannot take direct
action of the case of Ang-Angco, who belongs to the classified service. SC
held that indeed, the President is devoid of such power, by virtue of the Civil
Service Act of 1959, which says that the Commissioner of Civil Service has
original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases of all
officers and employees in the classified service.
DOCTRINE: The power of control of the President over the employees under
classified service only goes as far as setting aside the judgment or action
taken by the subordinate in performance of their duties, and not the
removal of such person from office.
VILLALUZ v. ZALDIVAR
December 31, 1965 | Power to remove Presidential appointee in
unclassified service
GIST: Villaluz was formerly appointed as Chief of the Motor Vehicle Office
(now LTO), but was suspended due to his alleged gross mismanagement and
inefficiency in the discharge of his duties, which resulted to huge losses to
the government, among others. An investigating committee was created by
Executive Secretary Castillo to deep dive this case, and eventually, Villaluz
was suspended, and later was removed from office by virtue of the issuance
of AO No. 332 by the President. This is now assailed by Villaluz, who
contends that the President had no jurisdiction to remove him, since he was
an appointee of the same. SC held that he is well under the jurisdiction of
the President, he particularly belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified
service of government, to which the President has jurisdiction over.
DOCTRINE: The power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint, and
since a Presidential appointee is well within the jurisdiction of the President,
after investigation and due hearing, should the Chief Executive find grounds
to do so, he may remove the said appointee from office.
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JOSON v. TORRES
May 20, 1998 | Power to discipline local officials
KMU v. DIR. GEN. OF NEDA
April 19, 2006 | Also under faithful execution clause
GIST: During a meeting at the Provincial Capitol where Vice-Governor Tinio
and other members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) attended, Gov.
Joson barged into the hall and kicked the door and chairs, and uttered
threatening words. This was an alleged threat because Joson’s legislative
measure was turned down by Tinio and the SP, which was basically about
the acquisition of a loan amounting to Php 150M from the PNB, which was
opposed because they are already drowning with debts and could not afford
more loans. A complaint before the OP was filed for Joson’s grave
misconduct and abuse of authority, which led to President Ramos to have
the Secretary of Interior and Local Government (Barbers) to investigate on
the matter. Joson was eventually placed under preventive suspension by
Executive Secretary Torres, pending the investigation against him. This was
assailed by Joson on the ground that the DILG Secretary did not have
authority in this case and that it is the President, who is the Disciplining
Authority. SC held that DILG’s delegation of power is valid, and that it did
not impair the President’s Disciplining authority. What is delegated is the
power to investigate, not the power to discipline.
GIST: This case is about the issuance of PGMA of EO 420, which directs all
government agencies and GOCCs to adopt a uniform data collection and
format for their existing ID system. Respondent Dir. Gen. of NEDA is
authorized to streamline and harmonize all government IDs, call on other
government agencies and form technical support groups to provide
assistance when necessary, enter into agreements with local governments,
COMELEC, other branches of government to ensure government-wide
adoption of the system and to promulgate the IRR to meet the objectives of
the said EO. Petitioner assails this particular EO on the ground that it is an
encroachment of the legislative power by the President, and that such
infringes privacy rights of citizens. SC upheld the EO’s constitutionality and
held that it is purely an administrative matter which does not involve
exercise of legislative power at all. It applies only to government entities that
issue ID cards as part of their functions, which aims to adopt a uniform data
collection and format to reduce costs, among others. No right to privacy is
infringe because the EO narrowly draws the data collection, recording, and
exhibition while prescribing comprehensive standards.
DOCTRINE: As Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived
from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local
government officials. However, AO No. 23 delegates the power to
investigate to the DILG, which is still valid. Under the doctrine of qualified
political agency, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts
of the Executive Department, the Heads of the various Executive
Departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and except in
cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or by law to
act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments,
and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.
DOCTRINE: Pursuant to Sec. 17 Art. VII, the President can, in the exercise of
functions under the law, adopt a uniform data collection and ID format to
achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, and convenience. This is an avenue for
the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
DRILON v. LIM
August 4, 1994 | Power of DOG Sec. to declare illegal a City Code is mere
exercise of supervision
GIST: Sec. 187 of the Local Government Code has authorized the Secretary
of Justice to have cognizance over any question on the constitutionality or
legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures. In line with this, when
certain oil companies appealed Ordinance 7794 (Manila Revenue Code), the
Secretary of Justice decided on the merits of the case and found such
Ordinance as invalid. The City of Manila filed a petition for certiorari before
the RTC, which held that Sec. 187 of the LGC was unconstitutional as it
vested the Secretary of Justice with power of control over local
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governments. SC held that such provision did not give the Secretary of
Justice the power to control, but merely the power to supervise. It merely
authorizes the SOJ to review an assailed tax ordinance when questions on
its constitutionality and legality arises, and if warranted, to revoke it. There
was no power vested in the SOJ to replace such enacted measure with his
own.
DOCTRINE: An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If
they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or redone by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision
does not cover such authority, as it merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the
discretion to modify or replace them.
NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE ALMARIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
July 16, 2013 | Faithful execution clause
GIST: The NCAA was created through RA 7356, it was vested with the power
to advise the President on matters pertaining to culture and arts, including
the creation of a special decoration or award for persons who have
significantly contributed to the development and promotion of PH culture
and arts. This entity, together with the CCP Board of Trustees, jointly
administered the National Artists Award, which through joint efforts,
created a National Artist Award Secretariat. Such duty of the NCAA and CCP
to advise the President on the conferment of the Order of National Artists
was mentioned in EO 435, hence deliberations began until they came up
with a shortlist. The issue arose when the Office of the President received
nominations from various sectors. This allegedly influenced the President’s
deliberations and among the four in the shortlist by NCAA and CCP,
everyone was conferred the said award, sans Santos. SC held that there was
grave abuse of discretion on the part of PGMA when she exercised
discretion by allowing other groups’ endorsements to weigh in her decision
as to who the award shall be given to. The discretion as to who it must be
given therefore, must be limited to the recommendations of the NCAA and
CCP Board, it is not a free-spirited stallion that runs and roams wherever it
pleases but is rined in to keep it from straying.
DOCTRINE: The President’s power must be exercised in accordance with
existing laws. Sec. 17 Art. VII prescribes faithful execution of the laws by the
President. A mere administrative regulation has the force and effect of law,
binding upon executive and administrative agencies, including the President
as chief executor of laws, until set aside.
OCAMPO v. ENRIQUEZ
November 8, 2016 | Faithful execution clause
GIST: In line with Duterte’s campaign promise to allow the burial of Marcos
at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB), preparations were then held
regarding the former dictator’s interment. This was assailed by the
petitioners, on the ground that there has been grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the President when he allowed the such thing, because it is in
violation of the AFP Memorandum Circular G 161-375, the Constitution, the
law, and jurisprudence. SC held that there was an absence of grave abuse of
discretion by Duterte, because Marcos was apparently qualified and has met
what was enumerated in G 161-375 (being a medal of valor awardee, a
veteran, among others). For the Constitutional issue, the SC held that such
violations had no relation at all to the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As
for the Human Rights Violation Victims, it was held by the Court that
extending the effect of the said law (RA 10368) to the prohibition on Marcos’
interment at the LNMB would be tantamount to extending the law beyond
what it actually contemplates. Marcos is not disqualified from being interred
at the LNMB, the claims of the petitioners of his dismissal from office and
removal as President, among others, “have no basis.” The ouster of Marcos
during the EDSA is not tantamount to dishonorable separation, reversion,
or discharge from the military service.
DOCTRINE: Faithful execution clause is not violated when the President or
any other government officer acts within the limitations of the Constitution
and other pertinent laws.
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Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces
of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out
such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires
it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members
in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension,
which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the
initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following
such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of marital
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution
nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies,
nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent or in directly
connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested
or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he
shall be released.
LANSANG v. GARCIA
August 27, 1971 | Habeas corpus reviewable by SC
GIST: After the Plaza Miranda bombing incident, Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 889, which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus for the persons presently detained as well as others who may be
thereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion. This
was later on further amended by Proclamation No. 889-A, which lifted the
suspension of the privilege of the writ in some of the provinces and cities.
Petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus were then filed by
persons who were arrested without warrant and then detained upon the
authority of the said proclamation—they likewise allege the validity of the
proclamation, on the ground that it is violative of Sec. 18 Art. VII of the
Constitution. SC held that it may take cognizance of the case on the ground
that the findings of the executive as to the basis for the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not conclusive, and may be
reviewed. With the existence of rebellion obvious in the present case, the
Court upheld the validity of Proclamation No. 889.
DOCTRINE: Sec. 18 Art. VII vests in the Executive the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. What goes
hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the
Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if
and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Constitution, and
the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the
Judicial Department, which in this respect is constitutionally supreme.
DAVID v. ARROYO
May 3, 2006 | Commander-in-chiefship
th
GIST: As the nation celebrated the 20 Anniv of the EDSA 1, PGMA issued
PP 1017, declaring a state of national emergency. As basis, she cited that
over the past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired
with authoritarians of the extreme Left and the extreme Right, who are now
in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy,
over a broad front, to bring down the PGMA Administration. On the same
day, PGMA Issued G.O. No. 5, implementing PP 1017, where she called the
AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless
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violence in the country. During this time, the offices of “The Daily Tribune
and Malaya” were raided by the CIDG, where all anti-GMA articles and writeups were released. A week after, PGMA lifted PP 1017 by issuing
Proclamation No. 1021. A case was hence filed with the SC, to which claims
that such PP 1017 is violative of the Constitution (zoom in to relevant fact in
relation to this provision: the raid and confiscation in the Daily Tribune and
Malaya). SC held that the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The
President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist
warranting the take over. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has
no power to point out the type of business affected with public interest that
should be taken over.
DOCTRINE: The exercise of emergency powers, such as taking over of
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest
requires delegation from Congress. Framers of the Constitution have
provided conditions that must concur prior to the grant of emergency
powers to the President:
1. There must be war or other emergency
2. The delegation must be for a limited period only
3. The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress
may prescribe
The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress
AMPATUAN v. DILG SEC. PUNO
June 7, 2011 | Commander-in-chiefship
GIST: On the day of the Maguindanao Massacre, GMA issued Proclamation
1946, placing the provinces of Magindanao and Sultan Kudarat under a state
of emergency, where she directed the AFP and PNP to undertake measures
to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence. She likewise issued
AO 273, transferring supervision of ARMM to the Office of the President to
the DIG (Puno). Petitioners Ampatuan et al filed this petition claiming that
the deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes
invalid exercise of the President’s emergency powers. OSG commented and
said that GMA’s issuance was pursuant to her calling out power as
commander-in-chief under Sec. 18 Art. 7 of the Constitution. SC held that
GMA validly exercised her emergency powers. SC held as well, that GMA did
not go beyond her powers as provided for by Sec. 23(2) of Art. VI of the
Constitution, as what was proclaimed was not a national emergency, but
only a state of emergency.
DOCTRINE: The calling out of the AFP was to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, which is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the
President specifically in Sec. 18 Art. 7 of the Constitution. As such, she need
not be given congressional authority to exercise the same.
LAGMAN v. MEDIALDEA
July 6, 2017 | Commander-in-chiefship
GIST: This case is about Duterte’s enactment of Proclamation 216, which
suspends the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, and declares Martial
Law in the entirety of Mindanao. With allegations that such enactment was
done without sufficient factual basis, petitioners Lagman et al. filed
complaints before the Court to prove that there was arbitrariness in
Duterte’s acts. There were 9 issues raised in this case (see doctrine)
DOCTRINE:
1. Was the petition proper for the SC to review? Yes, Art. VII(18)
merely requires that it be made in an appropriate proceeding, that
is, it is filed by any citizen. Since such is present in this case, the SC
may now determine the sufficiency of factual basis of the Martial
Law proclamation.
2. Is the SC’s review power independent of Congress’ power to
revoke? Yes. Although it is in the same trajectory, that is to nullify
the proclamation, both can simultaneously be done. The significant
distinction from the two is that the former is a passive duty, which
can only commence upon a citizen filing a case, while the latter is
automatic.
3. Does judicial power of review to extend to President’s decision
which of the 3 graduated powers he will avail of? No. Such
graduation is only based on scope and effect. It does not in anyway
restrict the President as to which of the three he chooses to
perform.
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3 EXTRAORDINARY POWERS
Calling out power (AFP)
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
FORMUILA
Necessary + lawless violence/
invasion/rebellion
Suspension of the privilege of Public safety + invasion/
the writ of Habeas Corpus
rebellion
Declaration of Martial Law
Public safety + invasion/
rebellion
Can Proclamation 216 be void for being vague? No. That challenge
only applies to free speech cases. Moreover, even assuming that it
can be looked into, the context provides that looking “at other
rebel groups” is not vague, as it is surrounded with the context in
this case.
Will the nullification of Proclamation 216 also nullify Proclamation
55? No. The two have independent powers. If you would like to
nullify Proclamation 55, file a separate proceeding.
What is the scope of the SC in the review or declaration of Martial
Law or Suspension for privilege of the privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus? SC is only limited to ascertaining the sufficiency of
factual basis. This is to ensure that the President complied with
Constitutional guidelines, that he didn’t act arbitrarily. In using
sufficiency of factual basis test, the SC acknowledges that the
President has sole discretion as to the facts written in the
Proclamation. He cannot be forced to divulge information that will
compromise our military efforts. In determining the sufficient
factual promise, the entirety of the Proclamation is be considered,
and absolute correctness is not necessary, given the urgency of the
situation.
What are the parameters of the sufficiency of factual basis? The
Court enumerated such parameters as follows:
a. Actual invasion or rebellion – as defined by the RPC, an
uprising against the government to remove allegiance or
deprive the government of its powers
b. Public safety requires it
c. Concurrence of requirement A and B.
d. Probable cause for the President to believe there is actual
rebellion/ invasion
Did SC find sufficient basis for Proclamation 216? Yes. President, in
consideration of the facts, had probable cause that rebellion was
9.
committed and that public safety required such declaration. Once
again, there is no need for absolute correctness of the facts, as such
mandate will only frustrate the President’s decision-making
regarding the urgent matter at hand.
Does public safety require such proclamation? Yes. Marawi
provides easy access to other parts of Mindanao, lawless groups
used provinces adjourning Marawi as escape routes. Marawi is a
vital cognizance attaining the long-standing goal that is the
absolute control over the entirety of Mindanao.
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Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the Congress.
this allowed Ocampo to reassume his governorship. Llamas is now
challenging the Resolution issued by Orbos on the ground that executive
clemency could only be granted by the President in criminal cases, not in
administrative cases. SC held that the Constitution provides no distinction
between criminal and administrative cases, and that the President has the
power to grant executive clemency in this case.
DIEGO v. PEOPLE
April 8, 2015 | Pardoning power as discretionary; beyond control of the
court
DOCTRINE: The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases
executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole
exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency
may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to
provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Sec.
19 Art. VII of the Constitution.
GIST: Grace San Diego, an accountant of Obando Fisherman’s Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc. was charged for qualified theft, after having discovered
that there were discrepancies in her financial report when she acted as
cashier of the said Cooperative to relieve her colleague, Teresita Gonzales.
RTC found her guilty of reasonable doubt, and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for forty years without pardon before the
lapse of 40 years, among others. This is now challenged by San Diego on the
ground that the RTC is does not have the authority to impose a penalty
which precludes pardon. SC ruled in her favor and stated that, while she may
be found guilty of the said crime she committed, the RTC cannot be
controlled by the legislature or reversed by the court.
DOCTRINE: The exercise of pardoning power is discretionary in the President
and may not be controlled by the legislature or reversed by the court, save
only when it contravenes the limitations set forth by the Constitution.
LLAMAS v. ORBOS
October 15, 1991 | Clemency on administrative penalties
GIST: Llamas, an incumbent Vice-Governor of Tarlac assumed the
governorship after Ocampo was suspended from office, after being found
that the latter entered into a Loan Agreement with Lingkod Tarlac
Foundation, Inc. (a non-stock non-profit organization headed by the
Governor and his family), which was not even authorized by the Provincial
Board (loan amounted to Php 20,000,000.00). In the pendency of the case,
Executive Secretary Orbos issued a Resolution which gave Ocampo an
executive clemency, which reduced the period of his 90-day suspension—
TORRES v. GONZALES
July 23, 1987 | Violation of conditional pardon
GIST: Petitioner Torres was convicted for the crime of estafa, and later was
granted a conditional pardon, on the condition that he would not again
violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines, and that should this be
violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law—
this was accepted by Torres. Fast forward to the following years, alas, he
was charged once again with estafa before the RTC, and the crime of
sedition. This in turn led for the cancellation of his conditional pardon by the
President, which led to his arrest and recommitment. This very act was
assailed by Torres on the ground that he cannot be validly arrested without
conviction of a crime by final judgment. SC held against his favor and ruled
that in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned
and who is alleged to have breached the conditions, the Executive
Department has two options, to wit:
1. Sec. 64(i) of the Revised Administrative code, or (this is what the
President chose in this case)
2. Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code
DOCTRINE: The Executive is faced with two options when a convict
previously conditionally pardoned breaches the conditions:
1. Sec. 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code provides that there is
no need of a judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime,
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2.
much less a conviction by final judgment, in order that a convict
may be recommended for the violation of his pardon
Sec. 159 of the RPC provides that the parolee or convict who is
regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be
charged, prosecuted, and convicted by final judgment before he
can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed
PEOPLE v. CASIDO
March 7, 1997 | Amnesty
GIST: During the pendency of the appeal of Casido and Alcorin, they were
extended a conditional pardon and amnesty, after requesting for the same,
together with an application for amnesty before the National Amnesty
Commission. This was rendered void and therefore they were re-arrested.
The Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release, or Pardon claims
that their application for conditional pardon was recommended to the
President after the Secretariat had evaluated that the crimes for which they
had been charged were in pursuit of their political belief. The OSG
commented that the question on the premature pardon must be rendered
moot and academic due to the amnesty they likewise applied for. SC held
that, while the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during
the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment, their
application for amnesty and the grant thereof was still valid.
DOCTRINE: Let us take a closer look at the two important concepts provided
for in this provision:
PARDON
AMNESTY
A private act granted by the Chief A public act by proclamation of the
Executive which must be pleaded Chief
Executive
which
the
and proven by the person Concurrence of Congress is
pardoned because the courts do needed, which the courts should
not take cognizance
take judicial notice
Granted to one after conviction
Granted generally before tor after
the institution of the criminal
prosecution
Looks forward and relieves the Looks backward and abolishes and
offender from the consequences of puts into oblivion the offense itself,
an offense of which he has been it also overlooks and obliterates
convicted, that is, it abolishes or
forgives the punishment, and for
that reason it does not work the
restoration of the rights to hold
public office, among others
the offense with which he is
charged that the person released
by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he did not
commit an offense
CRISTOBAL v. LABRADOR
December 7, 1940 | Absolute pardon; restoration of full political and civil
rights
GIST: CFI found Santos guilty of estafa and sentenced him to 6 months of
arresto mayor and to return to the injured parties the swindled amounts,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He was confined in the
provincial jail of Pasig, Rizal, and paid for the corresponding costs. This did
not deter him being a registered voter. However, upon the passage of
Commonwealth Act 357 (Election Code), those who were declared by final
judgment guilty of any crime against property were disqualified from voting,
including Santos. He then applied for absolute pardon, which was granted,
and effectively restored his full and civil political rights, except that with
respect to the right to hold public office or employment. Petitioner Cristobal
then filed a petition for the exclusion of Santos in the list of eligible voters in
Presinct 11 of Malabon by virtue of Sec. 94(b) of the Election Code, which
was denied. SC ruled that the decision of the CFI was correct in terms of
sustaining the right of Santos to remain in the list of the registered voters;
his pardon restored his full political rights—including the right to vote. The
Election Code cannot in any way weigh more than such constitutional rights.
DOCTRINE: An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but
removes all disabilities resulting from the convictions. When granted after
the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is
left of the consequences of conviction.
MONSATO v. FACTORAN
February 9, 1989 | Reinstatement of former rights
GIST: Monsato, then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City, was convicted by
the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of
public documents, with the corresponding penalties as provided for in
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criminal law. She was later on extended an absolute pardon by Marcos, to
which she accepted. By reason of such, she wrote to the Calbayog City
Treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post since the same
was still vacant—this was granted, without the necessity of a new
appointment not earlier than the date she was extended absolute pardon.
This was now being assailed on the ground that the lower court erred in
granting her reinstatement without appointment. SC held that she must go
through the process and apply for reappointment to the office which was
forfeited by reason of her conviction. Further, in considering her
qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her
offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to
determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with public
funds.
whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the pardon, and therefore,
does not by itself operate to make its effectivity contingent upon the
fulfillment of the aforementioned commitment.
DOCTRINE: The right to seek public elective office is recognized by law as
falling under the whole gamut of civil and political rights. Both law and
jurisprudence maintains that the right to seek public elective office is
unequivocally considered as a political right.
DOCTRINE: While pardon may remit all penal consequences of a criminal
indictment if only to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a
presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action,
the same does not blot out the guilt of an individual and that once he is
absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. It cannot bring back
lost reputation for honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.
RISOS-VIDAL v. COMELEC
January 21, 2015 | ERAP’s absolute pardon
GIST: ERAP was convicted for the crime of plunder, but he was extended
executive clemency, by way of absolute pardon, by PGMA—to which the
former accepted. ESTRADA then filed his CoC for presidency, which earned
several complaints before the COMELEC, who dismissed them on the ground
that the pardon restored his right to vote/be voted for a public office. He
didn’t win, so the following elections he filed his CoC for Manila City Mayor.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a disqualification case against him, on the ground
that he was convicted of plunder by the Sandiganbayan. During the
pendency of the case, ERAP won as Mayor, which led to Alfredo Lim
(opponent) to intervene in the present case, and contended that he shall be
disqualified. SC held that by the pardon extended to ESTRADA, his civil and
political rights are fully restored. The whereas clauses of the pardon which
indicated that ERAP committed to no longer seek any elective position or
office is not at all binding which makes the pardon a conditional one. The
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Sec. 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the
Monetary Board, an subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter
of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its
decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the
Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which
would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other
matters as may be provided by law.
HONTIVEROS v. TRB
February 23, 2015 | Power to contract or guarantee foreign loans
GIST: This is a very complicated case! Zeroing in to the factual milieu relevant
to our topic, the TRB (entity that supervises and regulates the collection of
toll fees) and PNCC (entity that has the right, privilege, and authority to
construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities in the North and South Luzon
Toll Expressways) entered into a Toll Operation Agreement (TOA) which
prescribed operating conditions of the right granted to PNCC. PNCC then
entered into an agreement with CITRA (Indonesian company) to provide
PNCC with a pre-feasibility study on the proposed project. After the said
study, PNCC and CITRA submitted through the TRB a Joint Investment
Proposal (JIP) to the Republic of the Philippines (RP), containing the
implementation schedule for the financing, design, and construction of the
Metro Manila Skyway (MMS) in 3 stages: North, South, and Central—this
also gave birth to the Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation (CMMTC).
Upon the completion of the first phase, the RP through the TRB, CMMTC
and PNCC executed an Amendment to the STOA (ASTOA), which was
approved by DOTC Secretary Mendoza by virtue of EO 49714. His approval
of the said ASTOA was being assailed, on the ground that the DOTC has no
power to be involved in a contract granting the loan agreement. SC held that
by virtue of the qualified political agency (see doctrine of Joson v. Torres),
the approval of the DOTC Secretary had the same effect as the approval by
the President. This is constitutionally valid, since by virtue of Sec. 20 Art. VII,
the President may contract or guarantee foreign loans.
DOCTRINE: There can be no question that the act of the Secretary is the act
of the President, unless repudiated by the latter. The power to grant
franchises or issue authorizations for the operation of a public utility is not
exclusively exercised by Congress. Except where the situation falls within
that special class that demands the exclusive and personal exercise by the
President of the Constitutionally vested power, the President acts through
alter egos whose acts are as if the Chief Executive’s own.
LAND BANK v. ATLANTA INDUSTRIES
July 2, 2014 | Power to contract or guarantee foreign loans
GIST: Land Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) entered into a Loan Agreement to implement the
latter’s Support for Strategic Local Development and Investment Project.
Land Bank then entered into a SLA with the City Government of Iligan to
finance the development and expansion of the city’s water supply system.
The SLA expressly provided that the goods, works, and services to be
financed out of the proceeds of the loan with Land Bank were to be procured
in accordance with the IBRD Procurement Guidelines, among others.
Following, Iligan City Government, through its Bids and Awards Committee
(BAC) conducted a public bidding for the supply of the water pipes and
fittings. Atlanta Industries participated, and came up with the second to the
lowest bid. However, the bidding according to the BAC was declared a failure
due to IBRD’s non-concurrence with the Bid Evaluation Report, and that
Atlanta was disqualified due to documentary deficiencies. A rebidding was
conducted, which was declared null and void by the MTC due to
noncompliance with RA 9184, which prescribes the proper procedure. This
was being contested by Land Bank on the ground that the SLA is an executive
agreement similar to the Loan Agreement with IBRD, and that it should be
exempted from RA 9184. SC held in the affirmative and ruled that since the
SLA is an accessory contract of the Loan Agreement, it is from there which it
receives life, it cannot be under the scope of RA 9184, rather, it should be in
accordance with the IBRD Guidelines—so in simpler terms, the MTC
incorrectly held the rebidding null and void.
DOCTRINE: An international agreement is one concluded between states in
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a
single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its
particular designation.
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Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
GONZALES v. HECHANOVA
October 22, 1963 | Nature of executive agreements
GIST: Executive Secretary Hechanova authorize the importation of 67K tons
of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a rice
procurement committee to implement the same. Gonzales, a rice planter
(Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Assoc. President) assailed the same, for being
violative of RA 3452, which explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and
corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.
On the other side, Hechanova claims that such importation is not governed
by the said RA, rather, it was authorized by the President in the issuance of
Commonwealth Act No. 1 (for military stock pile purposes). Respondent
Hechanova further claims that, such preventive measure is justified by virtue
of CA No. 1, and that the PH has already entered into 2 contracts for the
purchase of rice (Vietnam and Burma), which essentially are executive
agreements that are governed under international law. SC held that such
contracts to import are not executive agreements because the parties to the
contracts do not appear to have regarded the contracts as executive
agreements. Even assuming that they are, it still is inconsistent with RA
3452. Although the President may enter into executive agreements without
previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter
into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior.
stations in the Philippines, but that they declined to assist. Respondents
claim on the other hand, that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals
were dealt with in the San Francisco Treaty of 1951 and the Bilateral
Reparations Agreement of 1956. SC in this case held that the Executive
Department did not commit grave abuse of discretion for not forwarding the
claims of the petitioners against Japan, for the reason that such claims were
already waived in the Treaty of Peace of 1951 and that, such decision was
not for the courts to question. The Executive Department determined that
to espouse the claims of the petitioners would be inimical to the foreign
policy interests and could disrupt the country’s relations with Japan.
DOCTRINE: It is well established that the conduct of foreign relations of our
government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative, which are the political departments of the government. The
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to the judicial inquiry or decision.
Sec. 22. The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty-days from
the opening of every regular session, as the basis of the general
appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing,
including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.
Sec. 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its
regular session. He may also appear before it at any other time.
DOCTRINE: The executive cannot defeat legislative enactments that have
acquired the status of law by indirectly repealing the same through an
executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act
prohibited by said laws.
VINUYA v. ROMULO
August 12, 2014 | Termination of Treaty; Other Foreign Affairs Power
state is the sole judge to decide when it’s protected is to be granted, to what extent and the basis
GIST: The members of the MALAYA LOLAS claimed that since 1998, they
have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG,
requesting for assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and
military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women
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Article 8. Judicial Department
Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of nay branch or instrumentality of the Government.
MARBURY v. MADISON
February 24, 1803 | Essence of judicial duty
GIST: Jefferson defeated the incumbent President Adams in the 1800
elections, the latter remained in power until 1801. During his remaining
months, he established 10 new district courts, new circuit courts, and
appointed new judges—one of which was Marbury. While these
appointments were approved en masse by the Senate, such commissions
had to be delivered to those appointed, which was the task of the Secretary
of State (Madison). Jefferson upon swearing in as President then ordered his
acting Secretary of State (until Madison could assume the post) not to
deliver the remaining appointments. This was then assailed by Marbury et
al, since until the undelivered commissions, such appointments will be
rendered void. When a case was brought before the court through a petition
of mandamus to compel Madison to issue the commission, SC held that,
although Madison et al. have the right to the commission, it cannot issue
the mandamus for the purpose that they did not receive the case in their
exercise of appellate jurisdiction, but original. The Court in this case went on
to explain the essence of judicial duty, in cases when the constitution is in
conflict with the law (see doctrine).
DOCTRINE: It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict
with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law
be in opposition to the constitution; if both law and constitution apply to a
particular case, so that the court must either decide that the case
conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the
constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these
conflicting rules govern the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
SANTIAGO v. BAUTISTA
March 30, 1970 | Concept of judicial function
GIST: Teodoro Santiago (grade 6) at Sero Elementary School was ranked as
rd
the 3 Honor in his class, as decided by the Committee on the Rating of
Students for Honor. This rank was assailed by the mother and father as
counsel in the CFI, and claims, among others, that their son has been a
consistent honor pupil, and those who ranked above him (Medina
specifically) was tutored during the summer break by their would-be English
teacher, which put her to an advantage. When the case eventually ending
up in the through a petition for certiorari SC after being dismissed in the CFI,
it ruled that the case be dismissed on the ground that a certiorari under
Rule 65 was not a proper remedy, because the tribunal that acted in excess
of its jurisdiction (as claimed by the petitioners, as that of the Committee on
Rating of Students or Honor) does not exercise judicial power, which is an
essential requisite for a certiorari to even be considered in the first place.
DOCTRINE: Judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers;
the exercise of judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of
the action of the court. The following circumstances must exist:
1. There must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or
property, and said controversy is brought before a tribunal
2. The tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce
judgment and render a decision
3. The tribunal, board, or officer must pertain to that branch of
sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary
RADIOWEALTH v. AGREGADO
May 22, 1950 | Implied power; acquisition of equipment
GIST: The Clerk of the SC certified the purchase of a Webster Teletalk, Model
206 MA and Webster Telehome speakers, which were to be installed at the
nd
rd
2 and 3 floors of the Malacañang Annex which houses the SC. Dacanay
(Chairman, Property Requisition Committee) disapproved of the said
purchase and installation for being contrary to EO 302 and the policy
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adopted by the Cabinet on discontinuing market purchases, among others.
SC held that the independence of the courts were violated when the
purchase and installation was denied. It must be noted that, being one of
the coordinate branches of the government, the judiciary’s preservation in
its integrity and effectiveness is necessary. Alongside with the two other
branches, the three all in all exhibit interdependence. Basically, the Court’s
certification of purchase and installation of the sound system is valid: the
court can do so as it may deem fit so long as it is necessary in the
administration of justice.
DOCTRINE: The power to determine what is essential and what is not
essential for the administration of justice lies within the judiciary and not in
any other branches of the government.
IN RE: LAURETA
March 12, 1987 | Power to preserve its honor
GIST: Atty. Laureta (counsel of Ilustre) sent letters to the Justices of the SC
after they did not rule in her favor in a case she was handling. The letter was
basically like a reconsideration of some sort of the minute-resolution that
was issued—to which the Court, after reviewing the case once again, found
no reason to take action. Laureta once again sent letters to various Justices
of the Court, but this time with a warning that no action will lead to her
exposing the case to another forum of justice (she was referring to the
Ombudsman). She circulated her complaint to the press, without any copy
furnished with the Court, nor to the Justices charged (who apparently, she
charged with graft and corruption). SC now charged Ilustre with contempt
and held Laureta administratively liable. As a defense, they claim that such
letter were private communication, and that since there was no intent
whatsoever to dishonor the court, they cannot be charged. SC held that it
was just proper to hold Atty. Laureta administratively liable, since it is the
SC’s authority and duty to act to preserve its honor from attacks by an irate
lawyer mouthed by his client.
DOCTRINE: The Court must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the
scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard
the morals and ethics of the legal profession.
IN RE: BORROMEO
February 21, 1995 | Contempt power
GIST: Borromeo has read some law books and has come to believe that he
is aware of legal principles and procedural rules—he has been instituting
and prosecuting cases in various courts, and in fact, he has been
representing himself. With the results being not in his favor, he made
scandalous comments against the courts, judges, their employees, and
opposing counsels. What is relevant in this case is when he spread an open
letter and several flyers to and about SC justices, judges, and lawyers, calling
them ignorant, corrupt, among others. Copies of these documents reached
the Cebu City Chapter of the IBP, who found that such letters contained
highly libelous and defamatory remarks against the SC and the whole justice
system. All these allegations were baselessly denied by Borromeo THEN he
claims he cannot be cited for contempt. SC held that he is liable for contempt
for his abuse of and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross
disrespect to courts and judges, and improper conduct directly impeding,
obstructing, and degrading the administration of justice.
DOCTRINE: Even without the power of a public prosecutor, the power or
duty of the court to institute a charge for contempt against itself is essential
to the preservation of its dignity and of the respect due it from litigants,
lawyers, and the public.
ECHEGARAY v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
January 19, 1999 | Power to delay execution of sentence
GIST: Echegaray was charged with death penalty after being found guilty for
committing rape against the 10-year old daughter of his common law wife.
With the SC issued a resolution temporarily restraining his execution, which
was countered by the SOJ. It claims that since there has already been a final
judgment, the SC does not have jurisdiction over the case anymore and
therefore, it cannot issue such resolution. SC held that, it does not lose its
jurisdiction over Echegaray’s case, and that it may still restrain the execution
of the final judgment.
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DOCTRINE: The rule on finality of judgment cannot divest the SC of its
jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment—finality of a
judgment does not mean that the Court lost all its powers over the case.
RE: LETTER OF UP LAW FACULTY
June 7, 2011 | Contempt power
GIST: 2010, members of the Faculty of UP Law published a statement on
allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the SC’s decision
in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. SC ordered the UP Faculty Law professors
to show cause as to why they should not be disciplined as members of the
Bar for their violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as when
they alleged plagiarism charges against J. Del Castillo. The parties
contending that such Show Cause imputes indirect contempt on their part.
SC held that there was no finding of indirect contempt; but, when the Court
chooses to institute an administrative case against a respondent lawyer, the
mere citation or discussion in the orders or decision in the administrative
case of jurisprudence involving contempt proceedings does not transform
the action from a disciplinary proceeding to one for contempt.
DOCTRINE: When the Court initiates contempt proceedings and/or
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers for intemperate and discourteous
language and behavior directed at the courts, the evil sought to be
prevented is the same, the degradation of the courts and the loss of trust in
the administration of justice.
PICHAY v. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
July 24, 2012 | ODES no power to try and decide cases; EO 13 empowering
it is unconstitutional
GIST: PGMA issued EO 12 creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission
(PAGC), and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear administrative
cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, against presidential
appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the President.
PNoy issued EO 13 abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to IADODELSA. Respondent filed before the IAD-ODELSA a complaint for grave
misconduct against Pichay. Petitioner received an Order requiring him to
submit respective explanations under oath. With the same case pending
before the Ombudsman, the petition filed a Motion to Dismiss. Likewise, the
petitioner assailed the constitutionality of EO 13 in the light of its usurpation
of powers of the Ombudsman as well as the capacity of the IAD-ODELSA to
hear administrative cases. SC held that the IAD-ODELSA cannot try and
resolve cases, its authority being limited to the conduct of investigations,
preparations of reports and submission of recommendations. IAD-ODELSA
is a fact-finding and recommendatory body, that is not vested with quasijudicial powers. It cannot try and resolve cases as its authority is limited to
the conduct of investigation, preparation of reports, and submission of
recommendations.
DOCTRINE: Fact finding is different from adjudication; it cannot be likened
to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency
or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the
facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the
act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally, and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law.
TAN v. MATSURA
January 9, 2013 | Power to review findings of prosecutor preliminary
investigator
GIST: Tan filed a complaint affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor
(OCP) charging Matsuura et al with falsification, when they pre-signed a
blank deed to transfer shares, to doctor an intra-corporate dispute involving
him and the respondent. OCP dismissed the case for the lack of probable
cause against Matsuura et al, which led Tan to file the case before the
Secretary of Justice (SOJ), who denied the petition and held that no evidence
was shown that the information stated above were merely inserted by
respondents. MR was filed, which led to the SOJ to find probable cause to
indict the respondents. Tan et al went to the CA hoping to have the case
ruled in their favor but to no avail. Now before the Court they challenge the
authority of the CA when it reviewed their case from the SOJ. SC held that
such act of the CA is valid, as it only exercised its power to review, it being
the proper and most prudent course to take after the SOJ has successively
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issued several resolutions with varying findings of fact and conclusions of
the law on the existence of probable cause. Hence, the ruling of the CA
finding no merit in Tan’s argument is just valid, and necessarily within the
bounds of the Constitution.
DOCTRINE: Although the determination of probable cause is an executive
function vested in the SOJ, it is equally settled that the courts retain the
power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary investigations in a
mere few exceptional cases showing grave abuse of discretion. Courts
should not shrink from exercising their power when the circumstances
warrant to determine whether the prosecutor’s findings are supported by
facts or by the law.
GARCIA v. DRILON
June 25, 2013 | Power granted to Punong Barangay/Kagawad to issue TPO
not judicial but executive function
GIST: Rosalie Drilon and Jesus Garcia have 3 children. In the duration of their
marriage, Jesus controlled Rosalie’s actions, any contravention to his
command would be tantamount to physical and emotional abuse. In the
long run of fights they went through, Rosalie finally filed for a TPO before
the Punong Barangay/Kagawad pursuant to RA 9262. This is now assailed in
court by Garcia for being unconstitutional as it delegates judicial power to
Barangay Officials by allowing them to issue TPOs. SC upheld the validity of
the issuance of the TPO, and held that besides it being necessary to prevent
further acts of violence against women, etc. Further, such issuance is purely
executive in nature and in pursuance of his duty under the Local
Government Code to enforce all laws and ordinances, and to maintain public
order in the barangay.
DOCTRINE: The difference between judicial and executive power:
JUDICIAL POWER
EXECUTIVE POWER
Includes the duty of the courts of Generally defined as the power to
justice
to
settle
actual enforce and administer laws. It is
controversies involving rights the power of carrying the laws into
which are legally demandable and practical operation and enforcing
enforceable, and to determine their due observance.
whether or not there has been a
grave
abuse
of
discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the
Government
CITY OF MANILA v. GRECIA-CUERDO
February 4, 2014 | Power of CTA to issue auxiliary writs (ex: certiorari)
GIST: Respondents of this case are assailing the local business taxes that
were held collectible againast them, which was assessed by the petitioner
City of Manila through its treasurer Toledo. Before the RTC, a complaint for
Refund or Recovery if Illegaly and/or Erroneously Collected Local Business
Tax together with a TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed, and
was granted. Petitioners feeling agreeved filed a special civil action for
certiorari befefore the CA, who dismissed the same for lack of jurisdiction.
CA further ruled that, it was the CTA that had appellate jurisdiction over the
tax refund complaint, pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under RA 9282,
hence, the petition for certiorari should accordingly be filed there. SC held
that it is indeed the CTA which has jurisdiction over a special civil action for
certiorari in assailing an interlocutory order (which in this case, is the
injunction from the RTC).
DOCTRINE: Since RA 9282 grants appellate jurisdiction on local tax cases to
the CTA, it is deemed implied that petitions for certiorari shall be filed there,
and not with the CA. Conferring such power to the CA would create a splitjurisdiction situation, which is anathema to the orderly administration of
justice.
NOBLEJAS v. TEEHANKEE
April 29, 1968 | No power to discipline officers in other branch with
equivalent rank of judge
GIST: Petitioner Noblejas was then the Commissioner of Land Registration,
a position created by RA 1151. The same law provides that such officer is
entitled to the same compensation, emoluments, and privileges as those of
a Judge of the CFI. For approving or recommending approval of subdivision,
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consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in
excess of the areas covered by the original titles, the Noblejas was about to
face a disciplinary action when Secretary of Justice Teehankee. He assailed
this and claimed that as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments, and
compensation of a Judge of the CFI, he could only be suspended and
investigated in the same manner as him—in other words, he claims it is the
SC who shall discipline him pursuant to the Judiciary Act (RA 296) and
Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. SC held that it cannot investigate
Noblejas in view of the privilege he obtained from RA 1151. To accept this
would necessarily result in the same right being possessed by a variety of
executive officials whom the legislature had indiscriminately conferred the
same privileges. It is tantamount to a curtailment by legislative grant of the
President’s power to discipline and remove administrative officials who are
presidential appointees. SC can only exercise those powers over the
members of the judiciary, to which a Commissioner of Land Registration is
clearly not.
DOCTRINE: The legislature did not intend to grant executive officials such
privileges of being under the disciplinary powers of the SC when it granted
them the same compensation, emoluments, and privileges as to that of a
judge of the CFI.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS v. ANG CHO KIO
June 23, 1970 | No power to give advisory opinions or recommended
executive action
GIST: Ang Cho Kio was charged, tried, and convicted for offenses to which
after serving 6 ½ years of his sentence he was granted conditional pardon,
with condition that he would never come back to the Philippines—to which
he accepted (he then went to Taiwan). Later on he was on his way to
Honolulu but then there was a layover of 72 hours in the Philippines. He
stayed at the El Presidente Hotel and contacted some friends, who
convinced him to stay longer. He requested for a 14-day extension from the
Bureau of Immigrations—who unluckily recognized him as the person who
was deported years ago. He was then arrested, and ordered to be
recommitted to prison to serve the rest of his sentence. He filed a MR with
the Executive Secretary, which was denied; a case before the CFI, which was
denied, and an appeal to the CA which affirmed the CFI decision but added
a recommendation (pursuant to RPC, Art. 5) that he should be sent out at
once from the country and that he be allowed to leave prison under guard
when he has booked an outward flight at the Manila International Airport.
SC ruled that the CA erred when it made a recommendation to allow
respondent Ang Chio Kio to leave the country on the first available flight. It
is not the function of the judiciary to give advisory opinions.
DOCTRINE: Art. 5 of the RPC does not empower the court to suggest to the
President or to express an opinion that would reflect on the wisdom or
propriety of the action of the Chief Executive on matters purely political in
nature. It would violate the principle of separation of powers.
SBMA v. COMELEC
September 26, 1996 | No controversy when resolution is at proposal stage
GIST: RA 7227 was enacted by Congress, which provided for the Subic SEZ,
and Sec. 12 therof provided for the creation of Special Economic and Freeport Zones in Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, among others. In this
light, the LGUs mentioned shall signify their concurrence to their inclusion
to the Zone. Through Municipal Resolution No. 10, the Sangguniang Bayan
of Morong expressed absolute concurrence. Later, respondents Garcia filed
a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul the said Reso. In
response, the SB of Morong promulgated Municipal Resolution No. 18 Serye
1993, requesting Congress to amend certain provisions of RA 7227, in
accordance with the Garcia petition, to revert back to Bataan the Virgin
Forests and the Grande Island, among others. Not satisfied, respondents
Garcia resorted to their power of initiative provided for under the LGC.
COMELEC then denied the petition for local initiative, and promulgated a
Calendar of Activities for local referendum and providing for rules and
guidelines to govern the conduct of such. Petitioners now claim that
COMELEC committed grave abuse, as their initiative through the Resolution
was ignored and what the COMELEC made preparations for a referendum
only. SC did not find merit in their arguments and held that indeed, such is
premature and conjectural because at this point, the resolution is just a
proposal.
DOCTRINE: The Courts may decide only on actual controversies. It cannot
determine grave abuse on discretion when it comes to an absence of such
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controversies. Courts shall remand the case back to the concerned executive
departments which exercise quasi-judicial functions for proper
determination.
IN RE: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT
January 21, 2015 | Supreme Court can’t declare a proposed bill
unconstitutional; no right arises therefrom
GIST: A bill was proposed abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund and
replacing it with the Judicial Support Fund (JSF) which shall be remitted to
the national treasury and Congress shall then determine how the funds will
be used. Mijares issued a Mandamus to compel the SC to exercise its judicial
independence, and prays that such bill be struck down as unconstitutional
for being in contravention of existing laws affecting the judicial
independence and fiscal autonomy as mandated under the Constitution. SC
held that it cannot speculate on the constitutionality of a bill that the
Congress may or may not pass. No rights arise from a bill, therefore there is
no judicial controversy present in this case—therefore this must be
dismissed.
DOCTRINE: The power of judicial review is subject to certain requirements
before the Court may take cognizance of a case:
1. Actual case of controversy which is ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory; otherwise it will just be an advisory
opinion
2. Standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement
3. Constitutionality issue must be raised at the earliest opportunity
4. Constitutionality issue must be the lis mota of the case
PHILCONSA v. GPH
November 29, 2016 | Justiciable Controversy; FAB in relation to MOA-AD
GIST: This case basically revolves around the constitutional challenge against
the FAB and CAB, which are entered between the GPH and the MILF, to
which the SC did not decide on for being premature. With the hopes of
attaining a comprehensive, integrated, and holistic peace process with
Muslim rebels in Mindanao, several Eos from different administrations were
issued. The pertinent issuances in this case is EO 3 (which led to the birth of
the MOA-AD) and eventually, the FAB and the CAB. Prior to moving forward,
it is important to note that the FAB and CAB (preliminary peace
agreements), are not to take effect until the successful passage of the BBL.
However, several petitions were filed before the SC challenging its
constitutionality. SC held that there is an absence of judicial controversy in
this case, which led them to dismiss the petitions. This ruling came with the
reasoning that such preparatory peace agreements (FAB and CAB) did not
yield any form of enforceable rights as their effectivity depended on the
passage of the BBL, which as of the moment, has not been passed yet. In
comparison with the MOA-AD, which is an enforceable agreement in itself,
the present case cannot move forward unless an actual issue is raised.
Basically, this is one of those cases held to be premature.
DOCTRINE: The power of judicial review comes into play only after the
passage of a bill, and not before.
TANO v. SOCRATES
August 21, 1997 | Hierarchy of courts
GIST: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa City enacted
Ordinances banning shipment of all live fish and lobster, as well as
Ordinance No. 2, which prohibits catching, gathering, possessing, buying,
selling, and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms. The
implemented ordinances deprived all fishermen of the whole province of
Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood,
and other marine merchants from performing their lawful occupation.
Having found to violate the said ordinances, petitioners were led to file a
petition before the SC invoking their right to due process of law, their
livelihood, and the undue restriction from practice of trade. SC dismissed
the case as it was held to be premature, and that even granting that the
petitioners have a cause of action ripe for the extraordinary writ of
certiorari, there is a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts, and no special
and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been
adduced why direct recourse to the SC should be allowed.
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DOCTRINE: There is a hierarchy of courts, which is determinative of the
value of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for extraordinary writs.
Sec. 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5
hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the
security of tenure of its Members
MALAGA v. PENACHOS
September 3, 1992 | Injunctions against infrastructure projects
GIST: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries caused the bidding for the
construction of its Mirco Laboratory Bidding. B.E. Construction and Best
Built Construction, through petitioners Malaga and Najaro, submitted their
pre-qualification requirements before deadline. However, they were not
allowed to participate in the bidding as they were considered late. The
bidding began, with the petitioners going to the RTC and claiming that they
were unjustly not included in the bidding despite submitting requirements
on time, to which the RTC issued a restraining order to prohibit the conduct
of the bidding and awarding. Respondent Penachos then filed a motion to
lift the restraining order on the ground that the Court was prohibited from
issuing restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and preliminary
mandatory injunctions, on any per PD 1818. SC held that although it is true
that PD 1818 is applicable, such prohibition only applies to administrative
acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical
cases, not to questions of law.
DOCTRINE: PD 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny
irregularities committed by administrative agencies.
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Sec. 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the
Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount
appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be
automatically and regularly released.
Sec. 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in
divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or
executive agreement, or law, and all other cases which under the Rules of
Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the
constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations,
shall be declared with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon.
(3) Cases on matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with
the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no
case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When
the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc:
Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed
except by the court sitting en banc.
FORTRICH v. CORONA
August 19, 1999 | Involves “matters”
GIST: What the parties assail in this case is the previous SC resolution
wherein the members voted 2-2 on separate MRs of an earlier decision.
When the respondents lost the earlier case, they filed a MR to which the
vote of the division was in a tie—this made them think that such tie decision
does not constitute a resolution to the issue proposed in the MR; hence it
should’ve been passed to the SC en banc. SC held that there was no necessity
to have the case referred to the SC en banc, such is only required when the
required number of votes per division are not obtained.
DOCTRINE: If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision—this then
shows no other way but to refer the case to the SC en banc. On the other
hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and a losing party
files a MR, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie
in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision
which must stand in the view of the failure of the members of the division
to muster the necessary vote for this reconsideration.
REPUBLIC v. GARCIA
July 12, 2007 | Modification of doctrine; Sandiganbayan can’t re-examine a
doctrine
GIST: There was a civil case on a petition for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired
properties, with a verified urgent ex-parte application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment, filed by the Republic of the Philippines
against Garcia. The petitioner of this case sands ground that as a sovereign
political entity, it was exempt from filing the required attachment bond.
Later, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution ordering the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment against the properties of the Garcias upon the
filing of the Republic of a Php 1M attachment bond. Republic then filed a
MR claiming that it was exempt in filing an attachment bond on the ground
of Tolentino v. Carlos. In a resolution, it held that there was nothing in the
Rules of Court that exempted the Republic from filing the bond. SC held that
the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it rejected
the claim of exemption from the filing of an attachment bond. Basing from
the case of Tolentino, the Court held that the State as represented by the
government is exempt from filing an attachment bond on the theory that it
is always solvent. Sandiganbayan in rejecting the claims of the Republic
transgressed the Constitution and arrogated upon itself a power that it did
not by law possess.
DOCTRINE: Sec. 4(3) Art. VIII mandates that only the SC sitting en banc may
modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division. Any court, the Sandiganbayan
included, which renders a decision in violation of this constitutional precept
exceeds its jurisdiction.
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Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll,
or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua
or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public
interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six
months without the consent of the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with
the Civil Service Law.
PACU v. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
October 31, 1955 | Also under locus standi
GIST: Petitioner PACU assails Act NO. 2706 also known as “An Act making
the inspection and recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for
the Secretary of Public Instruction” on the ground that it deprives owners of
schools and colleges of liberty and property and due process, the parents of
their rights and duties to rear their children for civic efficiency, and that such
law constitutes unlawful delegation of legislative power. SC held that PACU
does not have standing; mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education
might, under the law, withdraw the permit of one of the petitioners does
not constitute justiciable controversy. Petitioners have permits to operate
private schools and they did not show that the Secretary would unduly
invoke it. Further, they suffered no wrong under the terms of the law.
DOCTRINE: The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only
when the interests of a litigant require the use of that judicial authority for
their protection against actual interference; a hypothetical threat is
insufficient.
TAN v. MACAPAGAL
February 29, 1972 | Also taxpayer’s suit
GIST: Tan filed a declaratory relief as a taxpayer, and challenged the LaurelLeido Resolution, dealing with the range of authority of the 1971
Constitutional Convention. That, it must be declared without power to
consider, discuss, and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present
Constitution through the adoption of a form of government other than the
form now outlined in the present Constitution, merely empowered to
propose improvements of the present Constitution without altering the
general plan laid down therein. SC held that the petitioners do not possess
legal standing in assailing the validity of the said Resolution. Further, the
Court said that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have
a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Moreover, since the
amendments are just on its proposal stage, there is no justiciable
controversy yet.
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DOCTRINE: The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement
SUPLICO v. NEDA
July 14, 2008 | ZTE contract moot
GIST: This case revolves around cases which prayed, among others, for the
production of the certified true copy (CTC) of the ZTE-DOTC NBN Project
contract and its discontinuance, among others. When the OSG was informed
by DOTC’s Legal team of the discontinuance, it filed a Manifestation and
Motion before the SC to dismiss the case. This was opposed by petitioner
Sulpico on the ground that among others, the SC may still take cognizance
of this case despite the ZTE contract being moot, on the basis of Gonzales v.
Chavez, wherein the SC previously held that it took cognizance of cases
which were moot because of the SC’s symbolic function of educating the
bench and the bar by formulating, guiding, and controlling principles,
precepts, doctrines, and rules. SC agreed that since what were prayed for
were already complied with when the CTCs of the contract was made
available in the Senate hearings on the project, and when PGMA informed
China’s President of such discontinuance, the case is indeed moot.
DOCTRINE: Its fundamental task as the ultimate citadel of justice and
legitimacy is the judiciary’s role of strengthening political stability
indispensable to progress and national development. Resolving on issues
that no longer constitute an actual case or controversy will do more harm
than good to the nation as a whole.
DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC
January 21, 2015 | Opinion of COMELEC may be basis to question
GIST: Diocese of Bacolod posted two large tarps on the walls of Bacolod
Catherdra (Team Buhay and Team Patay—which consists of names of
electoral candidates who are in favor of or against the RH Law). COMELEC
asked to put down such tarps as it is violative of the size requirements of the
electoral ads. It is now claimed by the COMELEC that the petitioners violated
the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case was not
brought first before the COMELEC en banc or any of its divisions. SC ruled in
the negative, and said that the right on exhaustion of remedies is not proper
in this case, as the petitioner’s right to free speech, given the message and
their medium, had understandable relevance especially during elections. In
this light, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as suggested prolongs
the violation of their freedom of speech.
DOCTRINE: The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies may be
disregarded when cases are already ripe for adjudication, or when such
principle will further violate the constitutional right of a petitioner as
enumerated for by Art. 3.
CONCEPCION v. COMELEC
June 30, 2009 | Aggrieved party
GIST: NAMFREL filed a Petition for Accreditation to conduct the Operation
Quick Count with COMELEC, with the petitioner as one of the signatories of
the NAMFREL petition as its Chairman. The COMELEC approved its
accreditation with the condition that petitioner step down from his position,
as he being the Barangay Chairman of Barangay Forbes, cannot be a member
or an officer in such organization pursuant to Resolution 7798. NAMFREL
has accepted this condition, however the petitioner filed the present case
assailing the validity of the said Resolution. SC held that Concepcion did not
have standing; he was not an aggrieved party to the present case. In the
absence of personality to file, the Court deemed it proper to dismiss the
case.
DOCTRINE: The requirement of personality or interest is sanctioned by no
less than Sec. 7 Art. IX of the Constitution, which provides that a decision,
order, or ruling of a constitutional commission may be brought to the SC
once certiorari by the aggrieved party.
An aggrieved party, is defined under the Rules of Court Sec. 65 as the one
who was a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the original
action on certiorari under Rule 65.
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GALCITO v. AQUINO
December 29, 1960 | No material interest in future increases in benefits
GIST: In the light of the allegations that officials and governing boards of
various GOCCs and GFIs have been granting themselves unwarranted
allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and other benefits, PNoy
issued EO 7. This EO ordered a moratorium on the increases in the salaries
and other forms of compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011
and EO 900. This is assailed by EO 7 for the reason that it is beyond the
powers of the President to issue it. He claims that as a PhilHealth employee,
he is affected by the EO’s implementation, which was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. SC dismissed
the case and held that above all others, Galcito did not have locus standi.
Him being an employee of PhilHealth does not demonstrate that he has a
personal stake or material interest in the outcome of the case because his
interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere expectancy. The
curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but
be characterized as contingent events or expectancies.
DOCTRINE: As to the element of injury, such aspect is not something that
somebody with some grievance or pain may assert. It has to be direct and
substantial to make it worth the court’s time, as well as the effort of inquiry
into the constitutionality of the acts of another department or government.
If the asserted injury or is more imagined than real, or is merely superficial
and insubstantial, then the courts may end up being importuned to decide
a matter that does not really justify such an excursion into constitutional
adjudication.
LEGASPI v. CSC
May 29, 1987 | Access to records
GIST: Legaspi’s request for information on the civil service eligibilities on
certain persons (Sibonghanoy and Agas) employed as sanitarians in the
Health Department of Cebu City was denied by the CSC. He now files a
petition for mandamus to compel the CSC to disclose the information
requested, on the ground that he has the right to be informed of the
eligibilities of the two as provided for by the Constitution. SC granted the
petition, for it being a public concern, his right to information may be
invoked by mandamus. Moreso, SC such mandamus was granted for reasons
that the party aggrieved has a legal right. In this case, this was clearly seen
when Legaspi anchored his case upon the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern, which is, by its very nature, a public right.
DOCTRINE: In recognizing the right of the people to be informed, the
Constitution expressly mandates the duty of the State and its agents to
afford access to official records, documents, papers, and in addition,
government research data used as basis for policy development, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law. To say that only those who have
a present and existing interest of a pecuniary character in the particular
information sought are given to the right to inspection is to make an
unwarranted distinction.
JOYA v. PCGG
August 24, 1993 | Private funds
GIST: What is being assailed by the petitioners in this case is the conduct of
th
an auction sale by the PCGG of the Old Masters Paintings, and the 18 and
th
19 Century Silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan
Museum of Manila, which were allegedly part of the ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses. SC held that the petition does not comply with the legal requisites
for the court to exercise its power of judicial review. While it is claimed that
the paintings were donated by private persons to the Museum, and that the
silverwere were given to the Marcoses as gifts, the petitioners are not the
legal owners, or that such property has become publicly owned—hence they
do not have any legal right to question its allegedly unauthorized
disposition.
DOCTRINE: For the court to exercise its review power, there must be
compliance with its legal requisites:
1. The question must be raised by the proper party; he must have
legal standing. XPN: when citizen brings case for mandamus to
procure enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public
right recognized by the Constitution; and when a taxpayer
questions validity of governmental act authorizing disbursement of
public funds
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2.
3.
4.
There must be an actual case or controversy – when it involves
conflict of legal rights, and that when the case is not moot or
academic
The question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
The decision on the constitutional or legal question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself
BOARD OF OPTOMETRY v. COLET
July 30, 1996 | Unregistered organizations
GIST: The Revised Optometry Law (RA 8050), is assailed in this case on the
ground that the said law has surreptitious and unauthorized insertion and
addition of provisions in the Reconciled Bill which were made without the
knowledge and conformity of the Senate Panel and that it derogates and
violates the right of Filipinos to reasonable safeguards against deprivation
of life, liberty, and property without due process. Respondent Judge Colet
issued a TRO enjoining the Board of Optometry to implement RA 8050, to
which the petitioners assail on the ground that the respondent associations
did not have standing to assail RA 8050. SC ruled in favor of the petitioner
and held that respondent associations do not have the requisite personal
and substantial interest to assail the said law since they (the presidents of
the said associations) are not duly registered optometrists as certified
optometrists as certified by the PRC. Since they failed to show that they are
juridical entities, they must be deemed to be devoid of legal personality to
bring an action such as the present case.
DOCTRINE: For a party to have locus standi to question the validity of a
statute, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury of its enforcement.
TONDO MEDICAL v. CA
July 17, 2007 | Standing is determined by merits of case even in cases of
transcendental importance
GIST: DOH launched a Health Sector Reform Program (HSRA) which
essentially provides government hospitals fiscal autonomy, which involved
collection of user fees and restructuring. Petitioners assail the program for
inaccessible to economically disadvantaged Filipinos. That, it is
discriminating and is violative of equal protection of the law. To support
their claim, petitioners invoke the following provisions of Article II: Sections
5 (maintenance of peace and order, protection of life x x), 9 (just and
dynamic social order), 10 (social justice in all phases of national
development), 11 (dignity of every human person), 13 (vital role of youth in
nation-building), 18 (labor as a primary social economic force), among
others. SC ruled that petitioners do not have standing to file the case, non
of the petitioners were removed from public service, nor did they identify
any action taken by the DOH that would unquestionably result in their
dismissal.
DOCTRINE: Constitutional questions which are of transcendental
importance cannot be invoked where a party’s substantive claim is without
merit.
ANAK MINDANAO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
August 29, 2007 | Abstract claims
GIST: PGMA issued EO 364, which transformed the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) to the Department of Land Reform (DLR), placed the
Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP) and the National
Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) unde their supervision. EO 379
was latter issued, which made NCIP an attached agency of the DLR. EO 456
was then issued by PGMA to change DLR back to DAR. In the present case,
what is being assailed by the petitioners (Anak Mindanao aka AMIN, and
Mamalo Descendants Organization Inc aka MDOI) is the constitutionality of
EO 364 and 379, on the ground that the placing of NCIP under the DAR and
making it an attached agency to it is unconstitutional as it violates the
principle of separation of powers. As to the question of locus standi, while
AMIN was held to have, MDOI did not. SC held that its claim that there is a
negative impact of NCIPs being an attached agency of the DAR is vague, and
it cannot afford MDOI with standing.
DOCTRINE: To be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental
importance, the following requisites must be satisfied:
1. Public character of the funds or assets involved
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2.
3.
Presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of
government
Lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising
the questions being raised
2.
3.
Civil cases – constitutional question may be raised for the first time
on appeal, if it appears that the determination of the question is
necessary to a decision of the case
Other cases – constitutional question may be raised by an appellate
court at any time, where it involves jurisdiction of the court below
PEOPLE v. VERA
November 16, 1937| Exception to the rule on earliest opportunity
TORRECAMPO v. METROPOLITAN
May 30, 2011 | Executive policy
GIST: What is being assailed in this case is The Probation Act (Act No. 4221),
which enables provincial boards to exercise discretion as to whether or no
the said Act will apply in its province or not. In this case, a certain Mariano
Cu Unjieng was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years
of prision correctional to 8 years of prision mayor and costs, in his case
against HSBC. He eventually applied for probation, which was granted by
respondent Judge. The Manila Fiscal and private prosecutor opposed the
probation, and finally assail Act No. 4221, for being an undue delegation of
legislative power. Although the attack on the Act’s constitutionality is
attacked for the first time only then when the case was elevated to the SC
on certiorari, the Court ruled that it can still rule on the matter. The Court
recognized the general rule that it cannot decide on questions of
constitutionality unless it was properly raised and presented in the proper
courts, however, there are certain exceptions, such as in the case at bar.
Where the Act seriously affected numerous persons and extensive property
rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity of actions, SC exercised its
discretion to bring the issue to the act’s validity promptly before it and
decide in the interest of the orderly administration of justice. Act No. 4221
was held to be unconstitutional
GIST: MWSS and DPWH was in the works to implement the C-5 Extension
project, which will connect SLEX to NLEX. This was assailed by Capt. Beda
Torrecampo, on the ground that if it will be allowed to continue, 3 aqueducts
of the MWSS will be put to a great risk. As an alternative, he insists that the
RIPADA area in UP is a better alternative to the lots utilized by both MWSS
and DPWH. MWSS on the other hand explained that under its charter, it
owns and has jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all waterworks and
sewage systems with the development path of the expanding Metro Manila
area, and that PGMA issued PP 1395 which declared and reserved certain
parcels of land of RAPIDA as access highway for the road alignment of the C5 Project. SC held that since the petition of Torrecampo would be
tantamount to the Court delving into matters that are exclusively within the
wisdom of the executive branch, it cannot prosper. The determination of
where between the two possible routs, to construct a road extension is
obviously not within the province of the Court.
DOCTRINE: Although the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not
be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and
presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the
case, there is an admission of certain exceptions, where the Court may
exercise sound discretion to determine when a constitutional question of a
statute should be presented:
1. Criminal cases – constitutional question may be raised for the first
time at any stage of the proceedings, either in trial court or on
appeal
DE AGBAYANI v. PNB
April 29, 1971 | Operative fact
DOCTRINE: Judicial review of a question of executive policy is a matter
entirely outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Proper recourse
should be made before the executive department, and its offices.
GIST: De Agbayani loaned from PNB and secured it with a Real Estate
Mortgage (REM), which was due 1944. It was only on 1959 when PNB
instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding, which De Agbayani
assailed on the ground that PNB’s right to do so has already prescribed, since
15 years have already elapsed from the date of maturity. This was contested
by PNB on the ground that prescription did not run from March 10, 1945 to
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July 26, 1948 due to EO 32 which suspended payment of all debts and other
monetary obligations. De Agbayani furthers that since this EO was held
unconstitutional in the case of Rutter v. Esteban, it shall not toll the
prescriptive period. SC held that by virtue of the operative fact, the EO’s
effects cannot be ignored, as there was factual justification of the
moratorium during that period when it was still valid.
DOCTRINE: The existence of a statute prior to such a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to the invalidity ay have
to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations,
individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.
PHILIPPINE COCONUT v. REPUBLIC
January 24, 2012 | Retroactive application to avoid injustice
GIST: Upon declaration of martial law in 1972, several PDs were issued to
improve the coconut industry through the collection and use of the coconut
levy fund. One of which is PD 755, which authorized the Philippine Coconut
Administration (PCA) to utilize collections and to acquire a commercial bank
and to deposit the levy collections in the said bank, which was withdrawable
only when the bank attained a certain level of sufficiency in its equity capital.
The plan was, the shares of the said commercial bank is to be distributed to
coconut farmers for the “advancement of national policy.” Now during the
Aquino Administration, the PCGG was established, with the goal to recover
ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. Focusing on the coco levy laws relevant
to the case at bar, PCGG assails PD 755, among others, for constituting
undue delegation in terms of allowing PCA to promulgate rules and
regulations governing the distribution of UCPB of its shares to coconut
farmers (since instead of the farmers, the funds went to private individuals).
SC held such PD invalid, however, such unconstitutionality shall not retroact
due to its adverse effects to the farmers, such that it would be prejudicial to
those who contributed to the fund but was not able to receive a share.
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, statutes which are rendered unconstitutional
cannot be a source of legal rights, with an exception that is the operative
fact. But, this exception cannot apply if it would be grossly unfair or immoral.
CIR v. SAN ROQUE POWER CORPORATION
October 8, 2013 | Effect of unconstitutionality; operative fact doctrine
GIST: San Roque Power, Taganito Mining, and Philex Mining filed for tax
credit refund for their excess input VATs before the CIR. Before moving
forward though, note that pursuant to the Tax Code, a company could apply
for a refund to the CIR within 2 years after the close of the taxable quarter
when the sales were made. That, after the submission of the necessary
documents, CIR has 120 days to render its decision, and upon its decision OR
if it does not render a decision within the 120-day period, the company has
30 days to appeal to the CTA. Now going back to the case at bar, all three
companies were not able to comply with the 120-day waiting period: San
Roque filed 13 days after the CIR decision, Taganito Mining filed 3 months
before the 120-day waiting period, and Philex Mining filed after the 30-day
period allowed for the appeal to the CTA. Standing on their claims that they
are still eligible for the tax refund, they proceed to the SC claiming that the
BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 waives the 120-day period, and thus due to the
doctrine of operative fact, they shall be granted the refund. SC held that the
120-day period is mandatory, and that any petition made in violation of such
shall be rendered void. Further, effect of the BIR ruling is set aside because
even prior to that, the violation was already committed by the said
companies. It is important to note, that the BIR ruling is merely an
administrative issuance, which hinders the benefit accorded to by the
doctrine of operative fact, that requires it to be in the form of a law or
executive issuance.
DOCTRINE: For the doctrine of operative fact to apply, there must be a
legislative or executive measure that is invalidated by the court. An
administrative issuance does not count.
ARAULLO v. AQUINO
July 1, 2014 | Effect of unconstitutionality; operative fact doctrine
GIST: This entire case revolves around the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP), which was implemented during the Aquino administration,
which has for its purpose to fast track public spending as to push economic
growth by investing on high impact budgetary programs, activities, and
projects, in response to the improving fiscal deficit of .5% in the GDP shortly
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when Aquino assumed office. The major contention in this case was that
such funds were used as incentive for those legislators voting in favor of the
impeachment of CJ Corona, which was first let out in the open by the
privilege speech of Jinggoy Estrada. This was countered by DBM Secretary
Abad, who explained that such funds were released from the DAP, which
was used to accelerate economic expansion; that such was a response to
letters of request by various Senators. DBM claimed, among others, such
funds were sourced from savings generated by the government, and from
unprogrammed funds; that the legal bases of such savings included the
authority of the President to augment an item for his office in the GAA, the
Administrative Code, and the GAAs of 2011-2013. However, contrary to this
claim, SC ruled that such funds were unconstitutional, as there is an absence
of a law authorizing the President to transfer such funds within their
respective offices, as provided for in Sec. 25(5) Art. VI of the Constitution.
However, the Court recognized the application of the doctrine of operative
fact in this case, on the ground that declaring the DAP unconstitutional
without recognizing that its prior implementation constituted an operative
fact that produced consequences in the real as well as juristic worlds of the
government and the nation is to be impractical and unfair. To count the
positive results may be impossible, but the visible ones, like public
infrastructure, could easily include roads, bridges, and homes, among
others. Not applying this doctrine would literally cause the physical undoing
of such worthy results by destruction. Nonetheless, J. Brion has pointed out
that it shall not apply always; in this case, it will only apply to programs,
activities, or projects that can no longer be undone, and whose beneficiaries
relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP.
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the
law or executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as
an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be
erased, ignored, or disregarded.
KALIPUNAN v. ROBREDO
July 22, 2014 | Implementation of infrastructure project not subject to
judicial review
GIST: Navotas, San Juan, QC LGUs sent Kalipunan et al notices of eviction
(w/o judicial approval) pursuant to Sec. 28(a) and (b) of RA 7279, to give way
to the implementation and construction of infrastructure projects in the
areas they illegally occupied. Such is being assailed by the petitioners on the
ground that such demolition and eviction order must come from the court.
SC held that such contention is not subject to judicial review due to the fact
that the petitioners not only violated the hierarchy of courts, but also
because the petitioners likewise failed to show the necessity of examination
of the said RA; as it was already previously held by the Court in the case of
Magkalas v. NHA that, by virtue of PD 1472, informal settlers may be
summarily ejected and that eviction and demolition orders may be validly
carried out even without a judicial order.
DOCTRINE: Courts will not determine the constitutionality of a law unless
the following requisites are present:
1. The existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict
of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination
2. Existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the
party raising the constitutional question
3. Recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity
4. The resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to
the decision of the case
SAMEER v. CABILES
August 5, 2014 | Re-enactment of a void law declared unconstitutional
cannot be done
GIST: Respondent Cabiles was hired and signed a 1-year employment
contract administered by Sameer (recruitment and placement agency) for
quality control in Taiwan Wacoal, only to find out she was put to work into
a cutter instead. According to the petitioner, one Mr. Huwang (Wacoal
employee), informed Cabiles that she was terminated, and that she prepare
for immediate repatriation. This led for Cabiles to file a complaint for illegal
dismissal before the LA against Sameer and Wacoal, which was dismissed.
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Fortunately, the NLRC reversed the said decision, and was later affirmed by
the CA on the ground that Sec. 10 of RA 8042 (Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) provides full reimbursement of the
placement fee in case one is illegally dismissed, including salaries for the
unexpired portion of employment or for 3 months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less. However, the clause “or 3 months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” was held to be
unconstitutional in the case of Serrano v. Gallant, for being violative of the
equal protection clause and substantive due process. But then, this was
again reinstated in RA 10022. This is being contended by Cabiles, who claims
that she is entitled to full reimbursement, and not that of which is provided
in the clause reinstated in RA 10022. SC held that the reincorporation of a
previously declared unconstitutional cannot be upheld in a new law. Hence,
the declaration of the particular clause as unconstitutional in the Serrano
case is binding, and its reinstatement by RA 10022 is deemed a nullity.
Necessarily, the claim of Cabiles of full reimbursement is granted.
DOCTRINE: When a law or provision of law is null because it is inconsistent
with the Constitution, its nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or
reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. XPN: when there is a
change in the circumstances as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
FILM DEV. COUNCIL v. COLON HERITAGE
June 16, 2015 | Acted in good faith, so, operative fact applied
GIST: What is being assailed in this case is Sec. 13 and Sec. 14 of RA 9167,
which provided hat producers shall be entitled to an incentive equivalent to
the amusement tax imposed and collected on the graded films, Grade A
(100%) and Grade B (65%). Petitioner Film Dev. Council of the Philippines
(FDCP) sent demand letters for the collection of corresponding unpaid
amusement tax rewards due to the producers of such films. 2009, petitioner
received a letter from Regal Entertainment, inquiring on the status of its
receivables for tax rebates in Cebu Cinemas for all their Grade A and B films,
followed by the same request filed by Star Cinema. Due to the persistent
refusal of proprietors and cinema operators to remit the said amounts as
FDCP demanded, the city finally filed a petition for declaratory relief with
application for a writ of preliminary injunction seeking the said provisions to
be struck down as unconstitutional. RTC held RA 9167 to be unconstitutional
and ordered the return of all amounts paid by respondent Colon Heritage to
FDCP by way of amusement tax. While it was incorrect for the RTC to render
the said RA as unconstitutional as there was no attack on the rest of the
provisions, the SC maintained the unconstitutionality of Sections 13 and 14.
But, all amusement taxes remitted to petitioner FDCP prior to the date of
finality of this particular SC decision shall remain legal and valid under the
operative fact doctrine, for reason that it was deemed as a compliance in
good faith while the law was still valid.
DOCTRINE: When a declaration of unconstitutionality of a particular law or
executive issuance will impose an undue burden on those who have relied
on the invalid law/executive issuance, the doctrine of operative fact is
applied as a matter of equity and fair play. Hence, what was deemed
compliance during the assailed law/executive issuance’s effectivity prior its
declaration of unconstitutionality need not be undone.
PEOPLE v. MATEO
July 7, 2004 | Automatic review
GIST: Efren Mateo (partner of Imelda’s mom) allegedly committed 10 counts
of rape of Imelda Mateo. Upon the finding of the RTC that Efren Mateo is
indeed guilty, he appealed before the SC on the basis that there was lack of
merit in Imelda’s claims enough for his conviction. This was supported by
the OSG on the ground that indeed, the factual findings of the trial court
were not sufficient; while it may be argued that Efren’s moral ascendency
over Imelda was enough to intimidate her to suffer in silence, was
improbable for a victim who had been raped no less than 10 times not to
make a simple outcry against her unarmed rapist when she had every
opportunity to do so. By virtue of the automatic review as provided for in
the Constitution, the SC took cognizance of the case, but found it necessary
to remand it to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.
DOCTRINE: Although the Constitution provides for in Sec. 5 Art. VIII that the
Court has the power to review, revise, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher, it does not preclude the court, in the exercise
of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or review in
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favor of the accused (which in turn, in this case, was the reason why the
Court remanded the case to the CA).
PEOPLE v. GUTIERREZ
November 26, 1970 | Transfer of venue
GIST: A group of armed men set fire to inhabited houses in Ilocos Sur. 2
criminal cases were filed against the accused in this case. For reasons of
security and personal safety, he prosecution then moved for the respondent
judge to transfer the cases in in the Circuit Criminal Court (CCC), invoking AO
226, which authorized Gutierrez to do so. This was being assailed by the
respondent Judge himself, for reasons that there was no mandate from the
said Administrative Orders, which only provided for authorization. SC held
that respondent Judge failed to consider the contention of the witnesses
that the cases should be transferred to the CCC because a miscarriage of
justice was impending, in view of the refusal of the prosecution witnesses to
testify in the court sitting in Ilocos Sur, where they felt their lives would be
endangered. In consideration of the circumstances then, it is but proper to
transfer the cases.
DOCTRINE: The Constitution has vested the judicial power in the SC and such
inferior courts as may be established by law. Such power connotes certain
incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an effective
administration of justice. One of these is the powers of courts of transferring
the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring
site, whenever imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of
preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands.
SANTERO v. CFI-CAVITE
September 14, 1987 | Rules of Court v. Civil Code
GIST: Pablo had two partners, and he had children with both. Let’s divide it
into groups for easier comprehension of the case:
1. Anselma Diaz, with children Victor, Anselmina, and Miguel
(Anselma spawns)
2. Felixberta Pacursa, with children Princesita, Federico, and Willy
(Felixberta spawns)
Now, Anselma spawns filed a Motion for Allowance before the CFI, which
was granted. This was assailed by Felixberta spawns through a certiorari
before the SC. While this was pending, Ansela spawns filed another Motion
for Allowance before the CFI, which was granted, which was later reversed
due to the Urgent Motion to Direct the Administrator to Withhold
Disbursement of Allowance to the Movants, which was filed by the
Felixberta spawns. The Felixberta spawns argue that Anselma spawns are
not entitled to any allowance since they had already attained majority age,
which was grounded on Sec. 3 Rule 83 of the Rules of Court. However, the
adverse party argues that Art. 290 of the Civil Code entitles them to support.
SC ruled that in consideration of the two provisions of law, it is the Civil Code
that shall govern. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow
and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code
gives the surviving spouse and his or her children the same, without
distinction. Hence, the private respondents Anselma spawns are entitled to
such allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from
Pablo.
DOCTRINE: Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the
surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support during the
liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by
Sec. 3 Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, which is merely a procedural rule.
DAMASCO v. LAQUI
September 30, 1988 | Prescription of crimes v. Rules of Court
GIST: Damasco was charged with the crime of grave threats, when he did so
against one Rafael Somadohat, when he said, “Bakit mo ako ginaganito?
Magbabayad ka. Papatayin kita. Mayroon akong baril, babarilin kita,
tagadiyan lang ako.” Trial commenced, and respondent Judge Laqui found
that the evidence presented did not establish the crime of grave threats,
rather, only a light threat, to which he was convicted. Damasco then filed a
Motion to Rectify and Set Aside the dispositive part of the Judge’s decision
and claimed that he cannot be conficted of light threats, since the
information against him only included grave threats; and since he wasn’t
guilty of it, acquittal was proper. SC held in Damasco’s favor, and ruled that
he cannot be adjudged to be guilty of a lesser offense includible within a
graver offense originally charged against him if such lesser offense has
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already prescribed. It shall be noted though that prescription in this context
means the loss or waiver of the State of its right to prosecute an act
prohibited and punished by law. This is entirely based on the Court’s
previous ruling in the case of Francisco v. CA, where it held that where an
accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible
within the graver offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser
offense if it has already prescribed. Despite the Memorandum that
circulated in accordance with the ruling of the same Court in feline Reyes v.
IAC (which abandons Francisco v. CA’s doctrine), it was held by the SC that
such act of departing form the Francisco ruling can be done only through an
overhaul of some existing rules on criminal procedure to give prescription a
limited meaning.
virtue of its rule-making power, anything invoked on the basis of any
legislative act is of no merit.
DOCTRINE: While the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleadings, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the integrated bar, and the legal assistance to the
underprivileged, such rules shall not however diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights.
GIST: Perpetual Help Community Cooperative (PHCCI) requested the
issuance of a court order to clarify and implement the exemption of
cooperatives from the payment of court and sheriff’s fees pursuant to RA
6938, as amended by RA 9520 (The Philippine Cooperative Act of 2008).
PHCCI claims exemption to such fees, pursuant to Sec. 6 Art. 61 of RA 9520.
SC however ruled that, cooperatives are not exempt from payment of court
and sheriff’s fees. The exemption of cooperatives from payment of court
and sheriff’s fees no longer stands.
BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS v. HON. CORTES
February 26, 2010 | Congress cannot repeal SC rules
GIST: Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BMV) filed before
the RTC a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure under the Real Estate
Mortgage Law (Act No. 3135). BMV likewise sought exemption from paying
the legal fees, based on Art. 62(6) of the Cooperative Code, which exempts
cooperatives from payment of all court and sheriff’s fees payable to the
Philippine Government for and in connection with all actions brought under
the said Code. SC held that BMV cannot be held exempt from payment of
legal fees, even on the basis of the Cooperative Code, because the petition
for extrajudicial foreclosure is outside the ambit of the same. The
Cooperative Code does not pertain to the legal fees imposable to the
petitioner by virtue of Act 3135, rather, such exemption of fees refer to
those incurred under the Cooperative Code. Moreover, the petitioner is not
even the Cooperative Development Authority, which can claim the
exemption. With the waiver of the legal fees belonging to the judiciary by
DOCTRINE: The exclusive power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice,
and procedure is one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional
independence. The payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules
promulgated by the SC concerning pleading, practice, and procedure; it
cannot be validly annulled, changed, or modified by the Congress.
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF CLARIFICATION OF EXEMPTION FROM
PAYMENT OF ALL COURT AND SHERIFF’S FEES OF COOPERATIVES
March 13, 2012 | Legal fees
DOCTRINE: Since payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules
promulgated by the SC concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, it
cannot be validly annulled, changed, or modified by the Congress. Such may
only be amended or revised by the Court, by virtue of its exclusive power.
IN RE: CUNANAN
March 8, 1954 | Admission to the bar
GIST: This case basically revolves around RA 972 (Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953).
The admission to the bar is governed by the Rules of Court (basically the rule
was, you need to get an average of 75 in all subjects, without falling below
50 in any subject), but it has lowered the passing rate in the past depending
on the circumstances. This was used by unsuccessful postwar bar candidates
in their petitions for admission to the bar. SC held that having inadequate
preparation, admitting such bar flunkers would be contrary to public
interests. Qualifying 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate
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preparation for the practice of law could create a serious social danger. The
public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and
efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times and have
become more difficult.
DOCTRINE: The ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to the SC, and the law passed by Congress on the matter
is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the
minimum conditions for the license. Congress may repeal, alter, and
supplement the rules promulgated by the SC, but the authority and
responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the
SC.
PNB v. ASUNCION
June 30, 2009 | Procedural v. substantive rights
GIST: PNB granted Fabar Inc. various credit accommodations and advances
by way of insurance premiums covering chattels securing these. These are
secured by the joint and several signatures of Jose, Carmen, Tomas, and
Manuel Barredo. When the obligation was due, despite PNB’s repated
demands, respondents failed to pay. This led for PNB to file a case for
collection against all respondents. In the pendency of the case, Manuel died.
CFI then dismissed the case on the ground that the present suit is for a
money claim, which does not survive the death of Manuel, in accordance
with Sec. 6 Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. SC held that the case was
wrongfully dismissed, the reliance of the CFI on the provision of the Revised
Rules of Court was erroneous, as it reveals nothing that prevents a creditor
from proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors. It was noted that,
this particular provision merely sets up the procedure in enforcing collection
in case a creditor chooses to pursue his claim against the estate of the
deceased solidary debtor.
DOCTRINE: To require the creditor to proceed against the estate, making it
a condition precedent for any collection action against the surviving debtors
to prosper, would deprive him of his substantive rights provided by Art. 1216
of the New Civil Code. Procedural law cannot be made to prevail over
substantive law.
PEOPLE v. LACSON
April 1, 2003 | Time bar rule
GIST: Petitioners of this case filed the present Motion for Reconsideration
claiming that the time bar rule shall not apply to Lacson in his case where
he, together with his co-accused, were charged with multiple murder for the
shooting and killing of the members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. It was
previously held by the Court in this case that Lacson was able to satisfy the
time bar rule when he himself moved for provisional dismissal when he filed
his Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and for Examination
of Witnesses. With this MR, the SC found it proper to remand the case to
the RTC for the proper determination of the facts, so as to arrive at a better
verdict on whether or not the time bar rule applies to this case. Lacson
stands firm on his argument that he himself moved for the provisional
dismissal of the criminal cases, citing the resolution of Judge Agnir stating
that he filed separate but identical motions for the dismissal of the said
criminal cases. After deliberations, SC held that the time-bar rule does not
apply in this case as Lacson failed to satisfy the requisites provided for in Sec.
8 Rule 117. (basically, Lacson wants the time bar rule to apply because if it
does, his case can no longer prosper, it being beyond the 2-year period) It
was stressed by the SC that such requirements were necessary for the time
bar rule to apply for the reason that it will bar an accused to assail the revival
of the case on the basis of double jeopardy. More importantly, such law
cannot retroactively be applied to his case for reasons that it would work
injustice and would involve intricate problems of due process. To apply it
retroactively so that the 20-year period commenced to run on March 31,
1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of
Judge Agnir dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the
intendment of the new rule. Essentially, it would lessen the period with
which the Court will have to revive the criminal cases. (instead of 2 years, it
will only have 1 year and 3 months).
DOCTRINE: Remedial legislation designed to enhance and implement the
constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings may be applied
retroactively depending upon several factors, such as the history of the new
rule, its purpose and effect, and whether the retrospective application will
further its operation, the particular conduct sought to be remedied, and the
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effect thereon in the administration of justice and of criminal laws in
particular.
ESTIPONA v. LOBRIGO
August 15, 2017 | Plea-bargaining under DDA
GIST: Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the accused to enter into a Plea
Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and enter a
pleay of guilty for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, with a penalty of
rehabilitation in view of him being a first time offender and the minimal
quantity of the drug seized from him. In this manner, he is likewise assailing
Sec. 23 of RA 9165, which prohibits plea bagainiang in all of its violations, as
according to him it is violative of Sec. 5(5) Art. VII of the Constitution, as it
encroached upon the powers of the SC to promulgate its rules of procedure.
SC held that indeed it was, plea bargaining is a procedural rule, since the
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure is in the
exclusive domain of the SC, any form of legislation can in no way trump such.
given exclusive administration and supervision over all courts and
personnel. It must be noted then, that the fact that Ampong committed the
offense before her appointment to the judicial branch does not remove her
case out of the administrative reach of the SC. What the CSC can do per
standard operating procedure in this case is to bring its complaint against
before the Office of the Court Administrator. (it must be noted though, that
the ruling of the CSC is upheld based on estoppel, since Ampong is basically
estopped from attacking the CSC’s jurisdiction because she fully participated
in the hearing of the case before the CSC, and even admitted to her offense)
DOCTRINE: Administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the
SC, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after
employment in the judiciary.
DOCTRINE: The SC asserts its discretion to amend, repeal, or even establish
new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive
branches of the government. Always take note, the Court’s authority to
promulgate rules on pleading practice, and procedure is exclusive and one
of the safeguards of our institutional independence.
AMPONG v. CSC
August 26, 2008 | Exclusive supervision
GIST: Ampong, a former public school teacher, was later transferred to the
RTC as Court Interpreter III. It was later discovered that she took and passed
the examinations under the name of Evelyn Decir back when she was still a
teacher, hence a case was filed against her and Decir, for Dishonesty Grave
Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
Ampong voluntarily admitted to her mistake and waived her right to avail
services of counsel. Upon dismissal by the CSC after having found guilty,
Ampong appealed assailing the jurisdiction of the Commission over her case.
She claims that she belongs to the judiciary and the only authority who may
discipline her is the SC. SC held that, while the CSC has administrative
jurisdiction over the civil service, the Constitution provides that the SC is
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Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all
courts and the personnel thereof.
MACEDA v. VASQUEZ
April 22, 1993 | Falsification
GIST: Petitioner Judge Maceda allegedly falsified his Certificate of Service by
indicating in it that he was able to comply with the 90-day requirement in
terms of deciding on the civil and criminal cases submitted to him for the
month of January 1998 when in fact, there were about 5 civil and 10 criminal
cases have no decision yet. Respondent claims that petitioner Judge has
been continuously doing this for over 17 months now. With the case against
him filed by the respondent before the OMB, petitioner Judge assails its
jurisdiction on the ground that it is the SC who has supervision over his
performance as a judge as far as his official duties are concerned and that
such investigation by the OMB will constitute encroachment to the SC’s
constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts. SC held that the
OMB cannot entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a
judge’s certification of service submitted to the SC. Sec. 6 Art. VIII of the
Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all
courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the
lowest municipal trial court clerk.
DOCTRINE: When a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court
employee arises from their administrative duties, the OMB must defer
action on the said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination
whether the said Judge or court employee acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.
Sec. 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or
any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years
of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower
court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower
courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen
of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine ar.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity, and independence.
Sec. 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, and a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
(2)The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President
for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the
Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three
years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the
private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the
Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as
may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall
provide in its annual budget the appropriations of the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and
duties as the Supreme Court may assign it.
CHAVEZ v. JBC
July 17, 2012 | Interpretation of “a representative of Congress”
GIST: After the unexpected departure of CJ Corona and the nomination of
former Sol Gen Chavez as his potential succession, a clamor to rid the
process of appointments to the Judiciary form political pressure created the
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need to create a separate, competent, and independent body to
recommend nominees to the President. This body is now called the Judicial
and Bar Council. The Congress from the creation of the JBC designated one
representative to sit in as one of the ex officio members. Perhaps in order
to give equal opportunity to both houses, the HoR and Senate would send
alternate representatives. During 1994 though, the composition of the JBC
was substantially altered, 2 representatives from Congess sat with the JBC
(one from the Senate and one from the HoR, each having ½ of a vote). Then,
in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, it decided to allow
representatives from the Senate and the HoR to 1 full vote each. The
contention was that, Sec. 8 Art. VIII only requires 1 representative from the
Congress as a whole. This was agreed to by the Court, thus it held the current
composition of the JBC as unconstitutional. The use of the singular letter “a”
preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room
for any other construction.
DOCTRINE: The Constitution mandates that the JBC shall be composed of 7
members only. As for the representative coming from the Congress, he may
either be from the HoR or from the Senate; in no way can there be 1
representative per House.
JARDALEZA v. CJ SERENO
August 19, 2014 | Unanimity rule
GIST: Assoc. Justice Abad’s compulsory retirement led to the JBC
announcing the vacancy and application or recommendation for the said
position. Petitioner Jardaleza was nominated, and was included in the set of
candidates. Justice Lagman, a JBC member, informed the petitioner that CJ
Sereno would be invoking Sec. 2, Rule 10, JBC-009 against him. In the
shortlist, it was established that out of the five supposedly qualified
candidates, there was one who wasn’t included as the rule above was said
to be invoked—this rule pertains to the unanimous vote that is required,
when what is being considered in the candidate is his integrity. Aggrieved,
the petitioner sought recourse from the SC who ruled in his favor despite
the validity of the rules of the JBC, so as to avoid the impairment of the right
to due process.
DOCTRINE: The JBC’s provision on the unanimity rule is vague and unfair and
therefore, can be used or abused resulting in the deprivation of an
applicant’s right to due process. Its invocation is effectively a veto power
over the collective will of the majority. Integrity as a ground has not been
defined or described, which is basically why it is vague, nebulous, and
confusing. It should also explicitly provide who can invoke it as a ground. On
top of it all, it shall meet the minimum requirements of due process.
VILLANUEVA v. JBC
April 7, 2015 | Judicial and Bar Council
GIST: Petitioner Judge Villanueva directly filed a Petition for Prohibition,
Mandamus, Certiorari, and Declaratory Relief under Rules 65 and 63 of the
Rules of Court, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO to assail the policy of
the JBC on the requirement of 5 years of service for first-level court judges
prior to qualifying as an applicant to a second-level court, as it is issued with
grave abuse of discretion. Note, he has been a judge for only more than a
year, and it’s his removal from the list is what made him file the present
case. SC held that, JBC’s policy on the 5-year requirement is constitutional.
While the Constitution has provided the qualifications of the members of
the judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules
and procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate. The
adoption of the 5-year requirement is necessary and incidental to the
function conferred by the Constitution to the JBC.
DOCTRINE: With the JBC’s ultimate goal being to recommend nominees and
not simply fill up judicial vacancies in order to promote and efficient and
administration of justice, a specific set of uniform criteria in order to
ascertain whether an applicant meets the minimum constitutional
qualifications and possesses the qualities expected of him in his office is may
be validly promulgated by the JBC.
AGUINALDO v. JBC
November 29, 2016 | Judicial and Bar Council
GIST: With the 6 Associate Justice positions in the Sandiganbayan being
vacant, the JBC arrived with 37 nominees (which in this case, were already
clustered per division, so nominees were already grouped by the JBC so that
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the President will only have to choose from them, instead of filling the 6
vacancies in a pool of 37 nominees). However, when the President
disregarded the clustering of the JBC nominees for the 6 vacancies, the
appointments of Econg and Musngi were assailed. JBC maintained that
submitting 6 shortlists for 6 vacancies was in accordance with the clear and
unambiguous mandate of Sec. 9 Art. VIII of the Constitution. SC held in this
case that, the clustering of nominees for the 6 vacancies in the
Sandiganbayan by the JBC indeed impaired the President’s power to appoint
members of the Judiciary and to determine the seniority of the newlyappointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. By doing so, it can prejudice a
qualified employee when he is paired with a strong candidate. Which in this
case could have been apparent.
DOCTRINE: The following situations are the reasons why clustering may
impinge upon the President’s appointing power:
1. Once the President had appointed a nominee from one cluster, he
is proscribed from considering the other nominees in the same
cluster for the other vacancies
2. All the nominees applied for and were found to be qualified for
appointment to any of the vacant Associate Justice Positions in the
Sandiganbayan, but the JBC failed to explain why one nominee
should be considered for appointment to the position assigned to
one specific cluster only
3. Correspondingly, the nominees’ chance for appointment was
restricted to the consideration of the one cluster in which they
were included, even though they applied and were found to be
qualified for all the vacancies
Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall
be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within
ninety days from the submission of the list.
Sec. 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During
their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.
NITAFAN v. CIR
July 23, 1987 | No tax exemption
GIST: Petitioners, Judges of RTCs in the NCR Judicial Region, seek to enjoin
respondents (CIR and the Financial Officer of the SC) from making
deductions of withholding taxes from their salaries, on the basis that it is
violative of Sec. 10 Art. VIII of the Constitution, mandating that such
withholding tax is considered a decrease in their salary. SC held that
deductions of withholding tax from salaries do not constitute diminution of
salaries. Heeding from the intent of the framers, it is found in the
deliberations that the debates, interpellations, and opinions expressed
regarding the constitutional provision in question disclosed that there was
actually an intent to make the salaries of the members of the judiciary
taxable.
DOCTRINE: The Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing
another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be
higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if
lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It
would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption
from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.
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Sec. 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts
shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy
years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The
Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon.
directs, the section prohibits. With this going against the Constitution’s
directives, it was held to be unconstitutional. To disqualify any of the
constitutional component members of the Court is nothing short of pro
tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the
fundamental law. Further, with Sec. 14 likewise gives the President power
to designate justices to temporarily sit as Justice of the SC—this fails to meet
the Constitutional requirement of appointment.
VARGAS v. RILLORAZA
February 26, 1948 | Temporary replacement; uninterrupted security of
tenure
DOCTRINE: There is nothing which authorizes by mere legislation any
change in the constitutional composition of the SC, or the performance of
its functions by any but its constitutional members.
GIST: Congress of the Commonwealth of the PH set up the People’s Court to
decide on charges of collaboration with the occupying Japanese forces
during WWII. Vargas now assails the People’s Court Act, specifically Sec. 14,
which states:
“Any Justice of the Supreme Court who held any office or position under the
Philippine Executive Commission or under the government called Philippine
Republic may not sit and vote in any case brought to that court under section
thirteen thereof in which the accused is a person who held any office or
position under either or both the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Philippine Republic or any branch, instrumentality, and/or agency thereof.
If, on account of such disqualification, or because of any of the grounds of
disqualification of judges in Rule 126, section 1 of the Rules of Court, or on
account of illness, absence, or temporary disability the requisite number of
Justices necessary to constitute a quorum or to render judgment in any case
is not present, the President may designate such number of Judges of First
Instance, Judges-at-large, of First Instance, or Cadastral judges, having none
of the disqualifications set forth in said section one hereof, as may be
necessary to sit temporarily as justices of said Court, in order to form a
quorum or until a judgment in said case is reached”
With several constitutional challenges, the one related to our topic is the
part of the provision referring to the adding of pre-existing grounds for
disqualification of an SC Justice, the Court used the test of comparing the
operation of this section against Sec. 6 Art. 8 of the 1935 Constitution. SC
found that if Sec. 14 of the PCA were to be effective, those who held any
office/position under the PH Exec. Comm. Or under the Philippine Republic
will be disqualified from sitting or voting. Basically what the Constitution
PEOPLE v. GACOTT
July 13, 1995 | En banc decision to discipline
GIST: A complaint for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law (CA No. 108) was
filed against respondents Strom and Reyes, who filed a Motion to
Quash/Dismiss on the ground that the City of Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa
had no authority to file such complaint, since it is the Anti-Dummy Board
who exclusively has such power. As response, Prosecution filed an
opposition pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board was already abolished
by Letter of Implementation No. 2, but despite this opposition, respondent
Judge Gacott granted the motion ruled in favor of the accused. He held that,
only a law can repeal another law, and the Letter of Implementation is
merely an administrative issuance. This was assailed, on the ground that PD
No. 1 in fact abolished the Anti-Dummy Board, and even if the fiscal failed
to cite the same, it is his responsibility as the Judge to be vigilant about the
current laws and executive issuances, among others. Due to this, he was
nd
administratively disciplined by the SC 2 Division. Now in his defense,
Gacott claims as well that it is the SC en banc and not the division that should
hear and decide on his case. SC held that indeed, Judge Gacott gravely
abused his discretion in granting the motion to quash in the criminal case.
His error, is tantamount to gross ignorance of the law. With his failure to
check the citations used by the prosecution, he failed to see the entirety of
the claim, which could have been the reason as to why he overlooked PD 1.
Further, his contention that only the en banc may administratively punish
him is likewise without merit; the Constitution does not provide of such.
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DOCTRINE: Only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are
specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of
the need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges against
members of the judiciary.
Sec. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasijudicial or administrative functions.
Sec. 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it
for decision en banc or in division shall b reached in consultation before
the case is assigned to a Member for writing of the opinion of the Court. A
certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a
copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the
parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained form a
decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The same
requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts.
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis
therefor.
AIR FRANCE v. CARRASCOSO
September 28, 1966 | Appellate conclusions: ultimate facts
GIST: Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was issued a first class round trip ticket
from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, he was in first class. But, at
Bangkok, the manager of Air France forced Carrascoso to vacate his seat
because a white man had a better right to it. He obviously refused, which
led to a commotion inside the plane, which made the passengers nervous.
He filed a civil case before the CFI to which was ruled in his favor, to which
the CA affirmed, with a modification to the refund (decreased for about 10
pesos) of the difference in the fare between first class and tourist class from
Bangkok to Rome. Now, Air France seeks for the SC to review all the findings
of the CA and claims that the CA failed to make complete findings of fact on
all the issues properly laid before it, because it did not state the contentions
of Air France as well as the reasons as to why it was not deemed sufficient.
SC held that the CA did not fail to make complete findings of fact, a court of
justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of
evidence presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised.
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DOCTRINE: A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity,
if not confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the CA contains the
necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said court to
withhold therefrom any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence
for the defense because there is no law that so requires.
FRANCISCO v. PERMSKUL
May 12, 1989 | Memorandum decision
GIST: Petitioner Francisco leased his apartment in Makati to respondent
Permskul for a year. Pursuant to the lease contract, a deposit of Php
9,000.00 was made by Permskul to settle unpaid rentals or any damage done
to the leased premises. When respondent vacated the property and
requested the refund minus Php 1,000.00 representing the rental for the
additional 10 days of occupancy after expiration of the lease, the same was
rejected on the ground that he still owes Francisco electricity and water bills,
and Php 2,500.00 for repainting of the leased premises. In the case filed
before the MTC, Francisco was ordered to pay Php 7,750.00 representing
the balance of the deposit after the deduction of the water and electricity
charges, and the sum of Php 1250.00 as attorney’s fees, plus costs. This was
appealed by Francisco before the RTC, who merely affirmed the MTC
decision through a memorandum decision. This was raised then to the CA
by Francisco, which was likewise denied. Now he comes before the SC and
assailed the RTC decision for being done in a Memorandum decision, which
violated Sec. 14 Art. VIII of the Constitution. SC ruled in the affirmative, since
such a decision did not at all contain the legal basis as to how the RTC arrived
with their judgment on the case at bar.
DOCTRINE: The purpose of Sec. 14 Art. VII has always been the same: to
inform the person reading the decision, and especially the parties, of how it
was reached by the court after consideration of the pertinent fats and
examination of the applicable laws. The parties are entitled to no less than
this explanation if only to assure them that the court rendering the decision
actually studied the case before pronouncing its judgment.
DEUTSCHE BANK v. CIR
August 28, 2013 | Applies only to decisions and not minute resolutions
GIST: At the onset, petitioner filed with the BIR Large Tax Payers Assessment
and Investigation Division an administrative claim for refund or issuance of
its tax credit certificate for the overpayment it made of its Branch Profit
Remittance Tax (BPRT), at around Php 22.5M. Along with it was a request to
the International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) for a conformation of its
entitlement to a preferential tax rate of 10%, mandated under the RPGermany Tax Treaty. Upon BIR’s inaction, petitioners raised it to the CTA,
who denied it on the ground that the tax treaty relief was not first filed
before the ITAD, hence a violation of Revenue Memo No. 1-2000, which was
essentially based on the SC’s minute resolution in the earlier case of Mirant
Corporation v. CIR. SC ruled that it’s minute resolution on Mirant is not a
binding precedent. The Court even previously held that when a minute
resolution denies or dismisses a petition for failure to comply with formal
and substantive requirements, the challenged decision, together with its
findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained. However, with
respect to the same subject matter and the same issues concerning the
same parties, it constitutes res judicata. But, if other parties or another
subject matter is involved, the minute resolution shall not be a binding
precedent. (for the ruling on substantive issues, refer to the notes provided
for under Sec. 2 Art. II)
DOCTRINE: The constitutional requirement under the Sec. 14(1) of the
Constitution that the facts and the law on which the judgment is based must
be expressed clearly and distinctly applies only to decisions, not minute
resolutions. A minute resolution is signed only by the clerk of court by
authority of the justices. It forms no binding effect when it is used as
precedent by other parties.
SALAZAR v. MARIGOMEN
October 19, 2007 | When content of decision is insufficient
GIST: Judge Marigomen was charged with gross ignorance of the law, bias,
conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service and rendering a decision
violative of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and the Constitution, in
relation to an election case. Zenaida Salazar, mayoralty candidate, filed an
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election contest against the proclaimed winner (Mancio) before the RTC,
which Marigomen dismissed then proclaimed Mancio as the winner. On
st
appeal, COMELEC 1 Division reversed and declared Zenaida as the duly
elected mayor. Petitioner Doroteo Salazar then claims that Marigonem
admitted in evidence uncertified photocopies-exhibits for Mancio in
deciding the case, which among others, was the reason he was charged of
gross ignorance of the law. SC then held that, Marigonem’s decision was not
based on factual and legal bases that were shown in the decision he
promulgated. He dismissed the contest while invalidating 90 votes against
Salazar, which was made without indicating factual and legal bases as to why
it was even done.
DOCTRINE: Time and again, the Court has instructed judges to exert effort
to ensure the decisions would present a comprehensive analysis or account
of the actual and legal findings that would substantially address the issues
raised by parties.
For Articles X to XII and XVI to XVIII, please refer to the written reports of
your classmates. Thank you, and good luck to all of us! J
Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from
date of submission for the Supreme Court, and unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three
months for all lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution
upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this
effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be
issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and
served upon the parties. The certification shall state why decision or
resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court,
without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in
consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted
thereto for determination, without further delay.
Sec. 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of
each regular session of the Congress, submit to the President and the
Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the Judiciary.
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