G.R. No. L-9005
June 20, 1958
ARSENIO DE LORIA and RICARDA DE LORIA,
petitioners, vs. FELIPE APELAN FELIX, respondent.
BENGZON, J.:
FACTS:
Matea dela Cruz and Felipe Felix lived together as wife
and husband in Pasay City. They acquired properties but
had no children. Matea became seriously ill. Knowing
her critical condition, Carmen Ordiales and Judith
Vizcarra visited and convinced her to go for confession.
They fetched Father Bautista, Catholic priest of Pasay
and the latter upon hearing the confession of the bedridden Matea and knowing that she is living with Felipe
without the benefit of marriage then ratified the union of
the two by solemnizing their marriage in articulo mortis
with the consent of Felix. Matea recovered from her
illnes but died subsequently after few months. Arsenio
and Ricarda de Loria, granchildren of Matea’s sister filed
a complaint and complete delivery of the property of the
deceased contending that they are the succeeding heirs
of the deceased and that the marriage of the latter is not
valid because of lack of marriage contract signed by the
contracting parties. Felix resisted the action standing his
rights as the widower. CFI ruled in favor of the
complainants but was reversed by the CA.
usually required for the issuance of a marriage license.
The first practically substitutes the latter. Now then, if a
marriage celebrated without the license is not voidable
this marriage should not also be voidable for lack of such
affidavit.
a. Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate
or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
b. Between step-parents and step-children;
c. Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
d. Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
e. Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent
and the adopted child;
f. Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and
the adopter;
g. Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the
adopter;
h. Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
i. Between parties where one, with the intention to marry
the other, killed that other person’s spouse, or his or her
own spouse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Matea to Felix in articulo
mortis is valid.
HELD:
YES. The marriage is valid. Its celebration in articulo
mortis, where all the requisites are present renders its
validity. The failure of the solemnizing priest to make and
file an affidavit as required under Sec 20 and 21 of the
Marriage Law does not affect the validity nor renders the
nullity of said marriage.
Identical remarks apply to the priest's failure to make
and file the affidavit required by sections 20 and 21. It
was the priest's obligation; non-compliance with it,
should bring no serious consequences to the married
pair, specially where as in this case, it was caused by
the emergency.
The mere fact that the parish priest who married the
plaintiff's natural father and mother, while the latter was
in articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate
said marriage, since it does not appear that in the
celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not
present, the forwarding of a copy of the marriage
certificate not being one of the requisites.
The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without
marriage license; but it requires the priest to make the
affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the data
1
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versusJOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
G.R. No. 175581, THIRD DIVISION, March 28, 2008
Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986, the same
year when the marriage occurred. In her defense, Felisa
denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of
their marriage.
CHICO-NAZARIO,J.
For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is necessary
thereto that the man and the woman must have attained
the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa
have not lived together for five years at the time they
executed their sworn affidavit of cohabitation and
contracted marriage. Even the Republic admitted that
Jose and Felisa started living together only in June
1986, or barely five months before the celebration of
their marriage.
It cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and
Felisa were celebrated without the formal requisite of a
marriage license nor did Jose and Felisa meet the legal
requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, so
as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage
license.
FACTS:
The records disclose that on November 24, 1986, Jose
Dayot (Jose) and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa) were
married at the Pasay City Hall. In lieu of a marriage
license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit of
marital cohabitation attesting that both of them had
attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried,
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years.
According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986.
Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in
Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Felisa
requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall,
ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by
her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall,
upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing
three folded pieces of paper approached them. They
were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the
package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused
to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that
his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother
who had learned about their relationship.
However, on July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with
the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna (RTC). He
contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham
claiming that no marriage ceremony was celebrated
between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn
affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband
and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to
the marriage was secured through fraud. According to
The RTC ruled that based from the testimonies and
evidence presented by both parties, the marriage
celebrated between Jose and Felisa was valid. Likewise,
the Court of Appeals (CA) did not accept Jose’s
assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for
the lack of a marriage license ruling that under Article 76
of the Civil Code, a marriage may be solemnized with
the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between a
man and a woman who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years. Aggrieved, Jose filed a
Motion for Reconsideration. The CA granted Jose’s
motion and set aside its earlier decision. The appellate
court relied on the ruling of the Supreme Court in Niñal
vs Bayadog.
The CA ratiocinated the importance of the five year
continuous cohabitation period before they may avail of
the exception in acquiring a marriage license under the
Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the affidavit of marital cohabitation
executed by Jose and Felisa does not affect the validity
of their marriage (NO)
RULING:
Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as
a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably
construed. For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is
necessary thereto that the man and the woman must
have attained the age of majority, and that, being
unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have
not lived together for five years at the time they executed
their sworn affidavit of cohabitation and contracted
marriage. Even the Republic admitted that Jose and
Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely
five months before the celebration of their marriage.
The insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the
statements in the parties’ affidavit will not affect the
validity of the marriage since all the parties’ affidavit will
not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential
and formal requisites were complied with deserves scant
consideration. It cannot be denied that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa were celebrated without the
formal requisite of a marriage license nor did Jose and
Felisa meet the legal requirement in Article 76, that they
should have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, so as to be excepted from the
requirement of a marriage license.
2
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad
Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID
NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL, and PEPITO NIÑAL, JR.,
Petitioners, -versus- NORMA BAYADOG,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 133778, FIRST DIVISION, March14, 2000
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners may question the
validity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma (YES)
(2) Whether or not the marriage between Pepito and
Norma is valid (NO)
YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A
voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except
in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be
attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can
be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if
the marriage had been perfectly valid.
The marriage between Pepito and Norma lacks the
requisite of a marriage license. To compensate for this
fact, they executed an affidavit wherein they state that
they have been cohabiting as husband and wife, without
legal impediment to marry, for more than 5 years.
However, it can be gleaned from the records that Pepito
and Norma married only one year and eight months after
the death of the former’s first wife. Thus, it can be said
that the affidavit executed by Pepito and Norma is false
and as such, their marriage must be declared void for
lacking a marriage license.
FACTS:
Pepito Niñal (Pepito) was married to Teodulfa Bellones
on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born
herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting
in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog
(Norma) got married without a marriage license. In lieu
thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a
car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito
to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for
lack of a marriage license.
RULING:
(1) The lower court erred in applying Article 47 of the
Family Code. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods
and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit
for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent
as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical.
A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise
declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab
initio is considered as having never to have taken place
and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or
prescription while the other can never be ratified.
A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally
except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can
be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages
can be questioned even after the death of either party
but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if
the marriage had been perfectly valid.
(2) The marriage between Pepito and Norma lacks the
requisite of a marriage license. To compensate for this
fact, they executed an affidavit wherein they state that
they have been cohabiting as husband and wife, without
legal impediment to marry, for more than 5 years.
However, it can be gleaned from the records that Pepito
and Norma married only one year and eight months after
the death of the former’s first wife. Thus, it can be said
that the affidavit executed by Pepito and Norma is false
and as such, their marriage must be declared void for
lacking a marriage license.
In response, Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that petitioners have no cause of action since
they are not among the persons who would file an action
for annulment of marriage under Article 47 of the Family
Code.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled that petitioners
should have filed the action to declare null and void their
father's marriage to respondent before his death,
applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which
enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate
an action for annulment of marriage.
3
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, Petitioner, -versusJUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta,
Pangasinan, Respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, FIRST DIVISION, March 8,
2001
DAVIDE, JR, J.
For this Article 34 of the Family Code to apply, the
following requisites must concur:
(1) The man and woman must have been living together
as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage;
(2) The parties must have no legal impediment to marry
each other;
(3) The fact of absence of legal impediment between the
parties must be present at the time of marriage;
(4) The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they
have lived together for at least five years; and
(5) The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn
statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of
the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to
their marriage.
However, in this case, not all of these requirements are
present. The fact that Manzano and Payao had been
living apart from their respective spouses for a long time
is immaterial as their marriage bonds with their legal
spouses have not been severed. Respondent judge
knew or should have known that a subsisting previous
marriage is a diriment impediment which would make the
subsequent marriage null and void.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides a situation in
which a marriage license is no longer necessary for the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and
without any legal impediment to marry each other. For
this provision to apply, the following requisites must
concur:
(1) The man and woman must have been living together
as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage;
(2) The parties must have no legal impediment to marry
each other;
(3) The fact of absence of legal impediment between the
parties must be present at the time of marriage
(4) The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they
have lived together for at least five years; and
(5) The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn
statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of
the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to
their marriage.
However, in this case, not all of these requirements are
present. The fact that Manzano and Payao had been
living apart from their respective spouses for a long time
is immaterial as their marriage bonds with their legal
spouses have not been severed. Respondent judge
knew or should have known that a subsisting previous
marriage is a diriment impediment which would make the
subsequent marriage null and void. Respondent judge
cannot deny the knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s
subsisting previous marriages as it was clearly stated in
their affidavits.
FACTS:
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the
late David Manzano (Manzano), having been married to
him on May 21, 1966. However, on March 22, 1993, her
husband contracted another marriage with one
Luzviminda Payao (Payao) before respondent Judge.
When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he
knew or ought to know that it was void and bigamous, as
the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting
parties were “separated”. Respondent Judge, on the
other hand, claims in his Comment that when he
officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he
did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he
knew was that the two had been living together as
husband and wife for seven years already without the
benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge may be held
administratively liable for solemnizing the marriage of
David Manzano who is validly married with petitioner
(YES)
RULING:
4
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, versus- REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent. G.R. No. 174689, October 19, 2007
CORONA, J.
The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done
by the birth attendant by examining the genitals of the
infant. Without a law recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person’s sex at the time of birth is
immutable, if not attended by error.
FACTS
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, a Filipino, was born
male per his birth certificate. Feeling trapped in a man’s
body, he underwent sex reassignment surgery in
Bangkok, Thailand and transformed himself into a
“woman”. Since then, Rommel lived as a female and is
in fact engaged to his American fiancé. To allow him to
marry his fiancé under Philippine law, Rommel filed a
petition to change his name from “Rommel Jacinto” to
“Mely”, and his sex from “male” to “female” in his birth
certificate.
Thereafter, the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner,
holding that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. On
appeal, the CA rendered a decision in favor of the
Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked
legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either
name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of
sex reassignment through surgery. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied.
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and
family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity
and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil
Code provides: ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to
the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws. But there is no such special law in the
Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.
This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and
wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences.
First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was
but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage
to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most
sacred social institutions, is a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman. One of
its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To
grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and
family relations. It will allow the union of a man with
another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a
male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second,
there are various laws which apply particularly to women
such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women, certain felonies under the
Revised Penal Code and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore
the public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be
granted.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not a person’s first name can be changed on
the ground of sex reassignment. (NO)
RULING
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first
name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make
his first name compatible with the sex he thought he
transformed himself into through surgery. However, a
change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or
civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first
name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than
avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for
his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he
must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he
must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his
true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or
even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a
result of using his true and official name.
5
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, -versusJENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, respondent.
G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008
development. Nature made him male over time and Jeff
simply chose what nature has given him.
QUISUMBING, J.
Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be
what the intersexed person, having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Here,
respondent thinks of himself as a male and considering
that his body produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen), there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male.
FACTS
Jennifer B. Cagandahan was born and registered as a
female in her birth certificate. She was later diagnosed
with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition
wherein a person is genetically female but secretes male
hormones. Because of Jennifer’s very rare condition,
she has both male and female sex organs, did not
develop breasts or ovaries, and never had her monthly
period. Feeling that she has become a male person in
mind and body, she filed a Petition to change her name
from “Jennifer” to “Jeff”, and her sex from “female” to
“male”.
ISSUE
Whether or not Jennifer can change her sex or gender,
from female to male, on the ground of her medical
condition known as CAH, and her name from ‘Jennifer’
to ‘Jeff’. (YES)
RULING
The current state of Philippine statutes apparently
compels that a person be classified either as a male or
as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere
appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates
such rigid classification. Where the person is biologically
or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, like Jennifer
(now Jeff), having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of
himself as a male and considering that his body
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen),
there is preponderant biological support for considering
him as being male. Sexual development in cases of
intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such
persons, like respondent, is fixed. Since the gender of
intersexed persons is fixed only at maturity, the original
entries in the birth certificate are thus correctible under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
In this case, intersexed Jeff lets nature take its course
without taking unnatural steps to interfere with such
6
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, Complainant, -versusJUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, Respondent.
A.M. NO. MTJ-96-1088, SECOND DIVISION, July 19
1996
ROMERO,J.
Article 41 of the Civil Code clearly provides that the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in the Family Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee. Even if the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead, a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to
contract a subsequent marriage. In the case at bar,
Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of his first wife’s presumptive death. Absent
this judicial declaration, he remains married to his first
wife.
As provided for in Article 8, a marriage can be held
outside of the judge’s chambers or courtroom only in the
following instances: (1) at the point of death; (2) in
remote places in accordance with Article 29; or (3) upon
request of both parties in a sworn statement to this
effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or Del
Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place.
Moreover, the written request presented addressed to
the respondent Judge was made by only one party.
Although Judge Domagtoy was not clothed with
jurisdiction to solemnize the marriage, it does not affect
the validity of the marriage.
FACTS:
The complainant in this administrative case submitted
evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by
respondent Municipal Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross
misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law.
First, it is claimed that respondent judge solemnized the
wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F.
Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely
separated from his wife. Second, it is alleged that he
performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano
Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. Del Rosario outside his
court’s jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.
court’s jurisdiction and that Article 8 thereof applies to
the case in question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Domagtoy showed gross
misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law in solemnizing the two marriages
(YES)
RULING:
With regard to the first act, Judge Domagtoy’s assertions
that a joint affidavit is sufficient proof of the presumptive
death of Tagadan’s first wife is without merit. Article 41
of the Civil Code clearly provides that the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in the Family Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee. Even if the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead, a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to
contract a subsequent marriage. In the case at bar,
Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of his first wife’s presumptive death. Absent
this judicial declaration, he remains married to his first
wife. Thus, the second marriage contracted by Tagadan
is bigamous and void.
The second issue involves the solemnization of a
marriage outside the jurisdiction of Judge Domagtoy. As
provided for in Article 8, a marriage can be held outside
of the judge’s chambers or courtroom only in the
following instances: (1) at the point of death; (2) in
remote places in accordance with Article 29; or (3) upon
request of both parties in a sworn statement to this
effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or Del
Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place.
Moreover, the written request presented addressed to
the respondent Judge was made by only one party.
Although Judge Domagtoy was not clothed with
jurisdiction to solemnize the marriage, it does not affect
the validity of the marriage.
The said acts performed by Judge Domagtoy shows his
lack of comprehension of the law. Such neglect or gross
ignorance is not allowed with lawyers much especially to
the members of the judiciary who is presumed to know
and understand the law.
In response to the charges against him, respondent
judge claims that in the first act, he merely relied on an
Affidavit confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his
first wife had not seen each other for almost seven
years. With respect to the second charge, he maintains
that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and
Del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, Paragraph 1 of
the Family Code which states that marriage may be
solemnized by any member of the judiciary within the
7
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versusMARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 221029, EN BANC, April 24, 2018
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce obtained by the respondent
abroad should be recognized in the Philippines (YES)
PERALTA,J.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of a divorce validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry. Based on a clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly
obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It
does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the
petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding. As such, the Court is bound by the words of
the statute.
The provision is a corrective measure to address an
anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under
the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino
spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a
favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have
the same result: The Filipino spouse will effectively be
without a husband or wife.
FACTS:
Respondent Marelyn Manalo was previously married in
the Philippines to a Japanese national named Yoshino
Minoro. However, a case for divorce was filed by the
respondent in Japan and after due proceedings, a
divorce decree was rendered by the Japanese Court. By
virtue of this judgment, respondent and her divorced
Japanese husband are no longer living with each other.
On January 10, 2012, respondent filed a petition for
cancellation of entry of marriage in Registry of San Juan,
Metro Manila, by virtue of divorce rendered by a
Japanese Court.
The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit ruling
that the divorce obtained by the respondent in Japan
cannot be recognized in pursuant of Article 15 of the
Civil Code. They held that the Philippine law does not
afford Filipinos the right for a divorce, whether they are
in the country or living abroad, if they are married to
Filipino or to foreigners, or if they celebrated marriage in
the Philippines or in another country.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals overturned the decision
of the trial court holding that Article 26 of the Family
Code of the Philippines is applicable even if it was
Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese
husband because the decree they obtained makes the
latter no longer married to the former, thereby
capacitating him to remarry.
RULING:
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of a divorce validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry. Based on a clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly
obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It
does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the
petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding. As such, the Court is bound by the words of
the statute.
The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce
decree that is effective in a country where it was
rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
The provision is a corrective measure to address an
anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under
the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino
spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a
favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have
the same result: The Filipino spouse will effectively be
without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in
like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving
end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the
subject provision should not make a distinction. In both
instances, it is extended as a means to recognize the
residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos
whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operation of the latter’s national law.
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial
difference between a Filipino who initiated foreign
divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a
divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws,
both are considered as Filipinos who have the same
rights and obligations in an alien land. The
circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not
for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to
their foreigner spouses who are no longer their
wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between
them based merely on the superficial difference of
whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is
utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to
one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
8
ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 118904
April 20, 1998
FACTS
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the
parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes, Lourdes
and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the
above named children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all
situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the
legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Sometime
after the marriage, he demanded from the defendants to
partition the land into three equal shares and to give him
the (1/3) individual share of his late father, but the
defendants refused.
Arturio Trinidad filed, an action for partition of four
parcels of land. Defendants denied that plaintiff was the
son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants
contended that Inocentes was single when he died in
1941, before plaintiff’s birth. Defendants also denied that
plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that the parcels
of land described in the complaint had been in their
possession since the death of their father in 1940 and
that they had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of
the land.
Arturio presented witnesses to prove his position. Jovita
Gerardo testified that Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad
Molato are the parents of Arturio; that Felix and Lourdes
as the uncle and aunt of Arturio; and also identified
pictures where the respondents were with Arturio and his
family.(At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died]
without issue and he was survived by his only sister,
Lourdes Trinidad.) Another witness, ISABEL MEREN, 72
years old and a widow testified that she knows Inocentes
Trinidad as the father of Arturio Trinidad; that she knew
Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as the parents
of Arturio and that she was present when they were
married in New Washington, Aklan, by a protestant
pastor by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. She further
testified that upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes took
Arturio and cared for him. ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself,
was presented as witness. As proof that he is the son of
Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed a
certificate of baptism, and a certificate of loss issued by
the LCR that his birth certificate was burned during
World War 2. He also testified that he lived with Felix
and Lourdes and provided for his needs.
court rendered a twenty-page decision in favor of Arturio.
The CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner presented sufficient
evidence of his parent’s marriage and his filation.
RULING
The partition of the late Patricios real properties requires
preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner or coheir of the decedent’s estate. His right as a co-owner
would, in turn, depend on whether he was born during
the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between
his mother (Felicidad) and his putative father
(Inocentes).
When the question of whether a marriage has been
contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of
marriage, the following would constitute competent
evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony,
the couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband
and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the
baptismal certificates of children born during such union,
and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent
documents.
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records
of births, deaths and marriages were lost, burned or
destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said
municipality. Although the marriage contract is
considered the primary evidence of the marital union,
petitioner’s failure to present it is not proof that no
marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence
may take its place. In place of a marriage contract, two
witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren
and Jovita Gerardo. It further gives rise to the disputable
presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage. Petitioner also presented his
baptismal certificate in which Inocentes and Felicidad
were named as the child’s father and mother, and family
pictures.
The totality of petitioner’s positive evidence clearly
preponderates over private respondent’s self- serving
negations.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the
assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The trial courts decision is REINSTATED.
On the other hand, defendants presented Pedro Briones
who testified that Inocentes was not married when he
died in 1940s. Lourdes Trinidad also testified that she
was not aware that his brother married anybody and
denied that Arturio lived with them. Beatriz Sayon also
testified that Inocentes died in 1941, and that Felicidad
Molato had never been married to Inocentes. The trial
9
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versusCIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
G.R. No. 154380, FIRST DIVISION, October 5, 2005
QUISUMBING,J.
Cipriano. However, the naturalized alien wife
subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Clearly, the two elements of Article 26,
Paragraph 2 are present in this case. Thus, Cipriano, the
“divorces” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties
at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this
case, when Cipriano's wife was naturalized as an
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between her and Cipriano. However,
the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid
divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the two
elements of Article 26, Paragraph 2 are present in this
case. Thus, Cipriano, the “divorces” Filipino spouse,
should be allowed to remarry.
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III (Respondent) married Lady Myros
Villanueva on May 24, 2981. Their marriage was blessed
with two children. In 1986, respondent’s wife left for the
United States bringing along their son. A few years later,
respondent discovered that his wife has been
naturalized as an American Citizen. Sometime in 2000,
respondent learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain
Innocent Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a
petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed
and thus, the Court granted his petition. The Republic
sought reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent can remarry under Article 26
of the Family Code (YES)
RULING:
In ruling this case, it is important to consider the
legislative intent of this provision. If the Court is to give
meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to
the alien spouse who,after obtaining a divorce is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant
case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The two
elements of Article 26, Paragraph 2 are: (1) there is a
valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (2) a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship
of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry. In this case, when Cipriano's wife was
naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and
10
G.R. No. 210766 January 8, 2018
MARIA CONCEPCION N. SINGSON a.k.a.
CONCEPCION N. SINGSON vs. BENJAMIN L.
SINGSON
jewelry; and that these are conjugal assets because they
came from petitioner's salaries and his (respondent's)
own inheritance money.
DEL CASTILLO, J.
Trial thereafter ensued. Petitioner's witnesses included
herself, her son, Jose Angelo Singson (Jose), and Dr.
Sta. Ana-Ponio.
FACTS:
On February 27, 2007, Maria Concepcion N. Singson
a.k.a. Concepcion N. Singson (petitioner) filed a Petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36
of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code).
This was docketed as Civil Case No. 07-0070.
In its Decision of November 12, 2010, the RTC granted
the Petition and declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent void ab initio on the ground of
the latter’s psychological incapacity.
It was alleged therein that on July 6, 1974, petitioner and
Benjamin L. Singson (respondent) were married before
the Rev. Fr. Alfonso L. Casteig at St. Francis Church,
Mandaluyong, Rizal; that said marriage produced four
children, all of whom are now of legal age; that when
they started living together, petitioner noticed that
respondent was "dishonest, unreasonably extravagant at
the expense of the family's welfare, extremely vain
physically and spiritually," and a compulsive gambler;
that respondent was immature, and was w1ab1e to
perform his paternal duties; that respondent was also
irresponsible, an easy-going man, and guilty of infidelity;
that respondent's abnormal behavior made him
completely unable to render any help, support, or
assistance to her; and that because she could expect no
help or assistance at all from respondent she was
compelled to work doubly hard to support her family as
the sole breadwinner.
Petitioner also averred that at the time she filed this
Petition, respondent was confined at Metro Psych
Facility, a rehabilitation institution in Pasig City; and that
respondent's attending psychiatrist, Dr. Benita Sta. AnaPonio (Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio), made the following
diagnosis on respondent: xx
Finally, petitioner claimed that she and respondent did
not enter into any ante-nuptial agreement to govern their
property relations as husband and wife and that they had
no conjugal assets or debts.
Traversing petitioner's allegations, respondent claimed
that "psychological incapacity" must be characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, which are
not present in the instant case because petitioner's
allegations are not supported by facts. Xx
Respondent furthermore claimed that he and petitioner
had conjugal assets and debts; that the land where their
family home is built came from his earnings, hence the
family home is their conjugal property; that he and
petitioner also have a house and lot in Tagaytay City, as
well as bank accounts that are in petitioner's name only;
and he and petitioner also have investments in shares of
stocks, cars, household appliances, furniture, and
In its Decision of August 29, 2013, the CA overturned
the RTC.
Hence, this Petition wherein notably the petitioner insists
that this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that
personality disorders are generally incurable and
permanent, and must continuously be treated medically;
that in this case the Clinical Summary; had pointed out
that respondent's understanding of his gambling problem
is only at the surface level; and that in point of fact Dr.
Sta. Ana-Ponio had affirmed that personality disorders
are incurable.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
(2) Whether or not the testimonies of Dr. Sta. AnaPonio and son Jose are meritorious.
(3) Whether or not Court can take judicial notice of
the fact that personality disorders are generally
incurable
and
permanent,
and
must
continuously be treated medically.
HELD:
(1) NO.
We agree with the CA that the evidence on record does
not establish that respondent's psychological incapacity
was grave and serious as defined by jurisprudential
parameters since "[respondent] had a job; provided
money for the family from the sale of his property;
provided the land where the family home was built on;
and lived in the family home with petitioner-appellee and
their children."
Upon the other hand, petitioner herself testified that
respondent had a job as the latter "was working at a
certain point." This is consistent with the information in
Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Clinical Summary and testimony,
which were both included in petitioner's formal offer of
evidence, respecting the parties' relationship history that
petitioner and respondent met at the bank where
petitioner was applying for a job and where respondent
was employed as a credit investigator prior to their
courtship and their marriage.
11
It is significant to note moreover that petitioner also
submitted as part of her evidence a notarized summary
dated February 18, 2010 which enumerated expenses
paid for by the proceeds of respondent's share in the
sale of his parents' home in Magallanes, Makati City
which amounted to around ₱2.9 million. Although
petitioner was insinuating that this amount was
insufficient to cover the family expenses from 1999 to
2008, we note that she admitted under oath that the
items for their family budget, such as their children's
education, the payments for association dues, and for
electric bills came from this money.
(2) NO.
As heretofore mentioned, the medical basis or evidence
adverted to by the RTC did not specifically identify the
root cause of respondent's alleged psychological
incapacity.
Equally bereft of merit is petitioner's claim that
respondent's alleged psychological incapacity could be
attributed to the latter's family or childhood, which are
circumstances prior to the parties' marriage; no evidence
has been adduced to substantiate this fact. Nor is there
basis for upholding petitioner's contention that
respondent's family was "distraught" and that
respondent's conduct was "dysfunctional"; again, there is
no evidence to attest to this. These are very serious
charges which must be substantiated by clear evidence
which, unfortunately, petitioner did not at all adduce.
Indeed, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not make a specific
finding that this was the origin of respondent's alleged
inability to appreciate marital obligations.
Needless to say, petitioner cannot lean upon her son
Jose's testimony that his father's psychological
incapacity existed before or at the time of marriage. It
has been held that the parties' child is not a very reliable
witness in an Article 36 case as "he could not have been
there when the spouses were married and could not
have been expected to know what was happening
between his parents until long after his birth."
(3) NO.
To be sure, this Court cannot take judicial notice of
petitioner's assertion that "personality disorders are
generally incurable" as this is not a matter that courts
are mandated to take judicial notice under Section 1,
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The August 29,
2013 Decision and January 6, 2014 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96662 are
AFFIRMED.
12
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,
vs. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 173540, 22 January 22 2014.
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
This case involves a contest between two women both
claiming to have been validly married to the same man,
now deceased. Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted
on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de
Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that Tecla is the
lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido
(Eustaquio). Tecla alleged that her marriage to
Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in
Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of
the said town. While the a marriage certificate was
recorded with the local civil registrar, the records of the
LCR were destroyed during World War II. Tecla and
Eustaquio begot four children, but Eustaquio left his
family in 1954. In 1979, Tecla learned that Eustaquio got
married to another woman by the name of Peregrina,
which marriage she claims must be declared null and
void for being bigamous. In support of her claim, Tecla
presented eyewitnesses to the ceremony, the birth
certificate of their children and certificates to the fact that
the marriage certificate/records were destroyed.
Peregrina, on the other hand averred that she is the
legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22
September 1989, their marriage having been celebrated
on 30 March 1979 and showed the marriage contract
between her and Eustaquio.
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than
the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of
the marriage between his parents. It is an error on the
part of the RTC to rule that without the marriage
certificate, no other proof can be accepted.
The execution of a document may be proven by the
parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses
who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or
even by those to whom the parties have previously
narrated the execution thereof. In this case, due
execution was established by the eyewitness
testimonies and of Tecla herself as a party to the event.
The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony of the
officiating priest. Since the due execution and the loss of
the marriage contract were clearly shown by the
evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial
and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of
marriage. The starting point then, is the presumption of
marriage. Every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of
any counter-presumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not
what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would
be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.
RTC ruled in favor of Peregrina. It relied on Tecla’s
failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio.
Without such certificate, RTC considered as useless the
certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon
over the lack of records.
The CA, on appeal, ruled in favor of Tecla. It held there
was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla
and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband
and wife and begot four children. Such presumption,
supported by documentary evidence consisting of the
same Certifications disregarded by the RTC, and
testimonial evidence created sufficient proof of the fact
of marriage. The CA found that its appreciation of the
evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with
Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Between Tecla and Peregrina, who was the legal wife of
Eustaquio?
RULING:
TECLA While a marriage certificate is considered the
primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as
the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of
13
G.R. No. L-28248 March 12, 1975
LEONORA PERIDO, joined by husband MANUEL
PIROTE, INOCENCIA PERIDO, ALBENIO PERIDO,
PAULINO PERIDO, LETIA PERIDO, joined by
husband BIENVENIDO BALYAO, LETICIA PERIDO,
joined by husband FELIX VILLARUZ, EUFEMIA
PERIDO,
CONSOLACION
PERIDO,
ALFREDO
PERIDO, GEORGE PERIDO, AMPARO PERIDO,
WILFREDO
PERIDO,
MARGARITA
PERIDO,
ROLANDO
SALDE
and
EDUARDO
SALDE,
petitioners, vs. MARIA PERIDO, SOFRONIO PERIDO,
JUAN A. PERIDO, GONZALO PERIDO, PACITA
PERIDO, MAGDALENA PERIDO, ALICIA PERIDO,
JOSEFINA PERIDO, FE PERIDO, TERESA PERIDO
and LUZ PERIDO, respondents.
FACTS:
Lucio Perido married twice during his lifetime. His first
wife was Benita Talorong,. After Benita died Lucio
married Marcelina Baliguat. The children and
grandchildren of the first and second marriages of Lucio
Perido executed a document denominated as"
Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition," The
heirs from the first marriage opposed the declaration of
the CA that Lucio’s children in the 2nd marriage are his
legitimate children.
The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five
children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat. The
petitioners insist that said children were illegitimate on
the theory that the first three were born out of wedlock
even before the death of Lucio Perido's first wife, while
the last two were also born out of wedlock and were not
recognized by their parents before or after their
marriage. In support of their contention they allege that
Benita Talorong died in1905, after the first three children
were born, as testified to by petitioner Margarita Perido
and corroborated by petitioner Leonora Perido; that as
late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a widower, as shown
on the face of the certificates of title issued to him in said
year; and Lucio Perido married his second wife,
Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as allegedly
established through the testimony of petitioner Leonora
Perido.
weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that
persons living together husband and wife are married to
each other. This presumption, especially where
legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this case, may
be overcome only by cogent proof on the part of those
who allege the illegitimacy. In the case of Adong vs.
Cheong Seng Gee this Court explained the rationale
behind this presumption, thus: "The basis of human
society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but
it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently,
every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married. The reason is that such is the common
order of society, and if the parties were not what they
thus hold themselves out as being, they would he living
in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure
is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage." (Sec.334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio —Always presume marriage. "In view of the
foregoing the Court of Appeals did note in concluding
that the five children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat were born during their marriage and, therefore,
legitimate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lucio is actually married with his 2 nd wife.
RULING:
Petition cannot be sustained. This finding conclusive
upon us and beyond our power of review. Under the
circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal impediment to
marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first
child in 1900.With respect to the civil status of Lucio
Perido as stated in the certificates of title issued to him
in1923, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the
statement was not conclusive to show that he was not
actually married to Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore, it is
14
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO,
petitioner, v. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001
family court. However, appearance is not sufficient;
compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence
must be demonstrated.
FACTS:
Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to
Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal,
on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and
wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent
became an Australian citizen and was married again to
petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on January 12,
1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a
marriage license, respondent was declared as “single”
and “Filipino.”
2nd issue:
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent
lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting
marriage at the time he married her. On his Answer,
Rederick contended that his first marriage was validly
dissolved; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
Grace.
Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that
reads:
“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this
decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has
died) commits the offence of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce
decree obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal
capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence,
the Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial court,
which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce
ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity to remarry
despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a
quo for the purpose of receiving evidence. The Court
mentioned that they cannot grant petitioner’s prayer to
declare her marriage to respondent null and void
because of the question on latter’s legal capacity to
marry.
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s
wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity
was pending , respondent was able to secure a divorce
decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because
the “marriage had irretrievably broken down.”
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of
Rederick and Grace Recio dissolved on the ground that
the Australian divorce had ended the marriage of the
couple thus there was no more marital union to nullify or
annul.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and
Editha Samson was proven.
2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally
capacitated to marry petitioner
RULING:
1st issue:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of
the divorce decree of respondent’s marriage to Samson
is insufficient. Before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Furthermore, the
divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian
15
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, -versusLIBERTY D. ALBIOS, respondent.
G.R. No. 198780, THIRD DIVISION, October 16, 2013
MENDOZA, J.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an
essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same
Code provides that the absence of any essential
requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio. Under
said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely
given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing
officer.
A “freely given” consent requires that the contracting
parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated
nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent
under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as
fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent
must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties
must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature
of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences
of their act. Their understanding should not be affected
by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. Based on
the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and
Fringer. Here, their freely given consent is best
evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. There was a
clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage to
fully comply with the requirements of an application for
citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding
of the legal tie that would be created between them,
since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to
accomplish their goal.
FACTS
Liberty D. Albios, a Filipina, paid Daniel Lee Fringer, an
American, $2,000.00 for the latter to marry Liberty for
purposes of immigration. In 2004, Liberty and Daniel
were married out of jest. Immediately after the marriage,
they separated and never lived as husband and wife.
However, Liberty’s immigration application was denied.
In 2006, Liberty filed a Petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage with Daniel on the ground that they never
really had any intention of entering into a married state
or complying with any of their essential marital
obligations.
According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished
from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the
validity of marriage. The OSG also argues that the
present case does not fall within the concept of a
marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally consented
to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American
citizenship would be rendered futile.
Later, both the RTC and CA declared the marriage void
ab initio, explaining that when marriage was entered into
for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal
and family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception.
ISSUE
Whether or not a marriage, contracted for the sole
purpose of acquiring American citizenship and in
consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground
of lack of consent. (NO)
RULING
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an
essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same
Code provides that the absence of any essential
requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio. Under
said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely
given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing
officer.
A “freely given” consent requires that the contracting
parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated
nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent
under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as
fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent
must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties
must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature
of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences
of their act. Their understanding should not be affected
by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. Based on
the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and
Fringer. Here, their freely given consent is best
evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. There was a
clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage to
fully comply with the requirements of an application for
citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding
of the legal tie that would be created between them,
since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to
accomplish their goal.
Marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title, provided that they comply with
all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though
the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the
only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not
precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
16
Catalan vs. CA
G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent
Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan.
Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of
America and allegedly became naturalized citizens
thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and
Orlando divorced in April 1988. Two months after the
divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married
respondent
Merope
in
Calasiao,
Pangasinan.
Contending that said marriage was bigamous since
Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio
Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City
against Orlando and Merope. Respondents filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of
action as petitioner was allegedly not a real party-ininterest, but it was denied. Trial on the merits ensued.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which
took effect on March 15, 2003, now specifically provides:
a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has legal personality to file the
petition for nullity of marriage between Orlando and
Merope
RULING:
Petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the
nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the
absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law
allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court
for reception of additional evidence is necessary to
determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a
divorce decree and whether the foreign law which
granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the
same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage,
then the trial court should declare respondents’ marriage
as bigamous and void ab initio. On the contrary, if it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which
allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must
dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage
on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan
lacks legal personality to file the same. The case was
remanded to the trial court for its proper disposition.
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force
at the time the respondents were married, or even in the
Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however,
only a party who can demonstrate “proper interest” can
file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage,
like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party in interestand must be
based on a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog,
the Court held that the children have the personality to
file the petition to declare the nullity of the marriage of
their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects
their successional rights. Significantly, Section 2(a) of
17
ROBERTO DOMINGO, Petitioner, -versus- COURT
OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R.
AVERA, Respondents
G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993
and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be
declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties
acquired at the time of their void marriage and such
properties be placed under the proper management and
administration of the attorney-in-fact.
ROMERO, J.
ISSUE
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void
marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the
same should be filed only for purposes of
remarriage.(YES)
The Family Code settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter of whether the petition for
judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground
for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free
from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void.
FACTS
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A.
Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto
Domingo. The petition alleged among others that: they
were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth
Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract
Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No.
4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he
had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on
April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing;
she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in
1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy;
from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been
working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the
Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month
annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer
since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed
and completely dependent upon her for support and
subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she
purchased real and personal properties with a total
amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under
the possession and administration of Roberto; sometime
in June 1989, while on her one- month vacation, she
discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman;
she further discovered that he had been disposing of
some of her properties without her knowledge or
consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter
appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorneyin- fact to take care of her properties; he failed and
refused to turn over the possession and administration of
said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is
not authorized to administer and possess the same on
account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition
prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from
exercising any act of administration and ownership over
said properties; their marriage be declared null and void
RULING
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and
private respondent celebrated while the former's
previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still
subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the
beginning. Petitioner himself does not dispute the
absolute nullity of their marriage.
The Family Code settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter of whether the petition for
judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground
for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free
from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute
nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal
and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of
the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who
marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
Just over a year ago, the Court made the
pronouncement that there is a necessity for a declaration
of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before
contracting another in the recent case of Terre v. Terre.
The Court, in turning down the defense of respondent
Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct
consisting of contracting a second marriage and living
with another woman other than complainant while his
prior marriage with the latter remained subsisting, said
that "for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab
initio is essential."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law
states that the final judgment therein shall provide for
"the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of
the common children, and the delivery of their
18
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings."
Private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of
property will simply be one of the necessary
consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion
that in order for their properties to be separated, an
ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose
is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the
effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of
which is the separation of property according to the
regime of property relations governing them. It stands to
reason that the lower court before whom the issue of
nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed
with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions
regarding the couple's properties.
19
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, Petitioner, -versusSUSAN YEE CARIÑO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a
final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity.
Presumed validity of Nicdao’s marriage w/ the deceased
cannot stand as there is no marriage license, burden of
proof of validity was w/ her. It does not follow however,
that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” would now
be awarded to Yee.
FACTS:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño,
he contracted two marriages, the first was with petitioner
Susan Nicdao Cariño, with whom he had two offsprings,
and the second was with respondent Susan Yee Cariño,
with whom he had no children in their almost ten year
cohabitation.
SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due
to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He
passed away under the care of Susan Yee who spent for
his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and
respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and
financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from
various government agencies.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to
the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of,
the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She,
however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the
previous marriage and that she became aware of it only
at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner
who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To
bolster her action for collection of sum of money,
respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased is void ab initio because the same
was solemnized without the required marriage license. In
support thereof, respondent presented the marriage
certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which
bears no marriage license number and a certification
from the Local Civil Registrar that there is no record of
such marriage license. The trial court ruled in favor of
respondent, Susan Yee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be
invoked to settle claims to death benefits. (NO)
RULING:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a
final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity.
Presumed validity of Nicdao’s marriage w/ the deceased
cannot stand as there is no marriage license, burden of
proof of validity was w/ her. It does not follow however,
that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” would now
be awarded to Yee. As stated earlier, for purposes of
remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration
of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before
a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the
second marriage would also be void. Considering then
that the marriage of Yee and the deceased is a
bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the
subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be
valid, the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and
the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs as
they were both legally capacitated. The difference bet
147 and 148 is that wages and salaries earned by either
party during the cohabitation period will be split equally
between them even if only one party contributed in 147,
whereas in 148 wages and salaries earned by each
party belong to him or her exclusively. So under Art 147,
Susan Nicdao is entitled to half of the remunerations and
the other half belong to the legal heirs of Santiago, who
are in this case, the children of Susan Nicdao
20
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, -versus- COURT OF
APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
GR No. 119190, 16 January 1997,
TORRES, JR., J.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family
Code is "To procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant nonfulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at
bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent
to psychological incapacity.
FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao-Tsoi married on May 22,
1988 at the Manila Cathedral Intramuros Manila. After
the celebration thereof and wedding reception, the
newlyweds proceeded to the house of husbanddefendant’s mother. Contrary to her expectations,
instead of consummating their marriage, husbanddefendant just went to bed, slept on one side, then
turned his back and went to sleep. The newlyweds failed
to consummate their marriage even on the succeeding
nights. The couple slept together in the same room and
on the same bed for almost ten (10) months but there
was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. She
claims that she did not even see her husband’s private
parts nor did he see hers.
On January 20, 1989, they submitted themselves for
medical examinations to Dr. Eufamio Macalalag,
urologist at the Chinese General Hospital. The results of
said physical examination showed that she is healthy,
normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband’s
examination was kept confidential. Medications were
only prescribed for her husband but the same was also
kept confidential. No treatment was given to her, but for
her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but
he failed to do so.
Frustrated, the wife filed a case in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City in order to annul their marriage.
Husband-defendant does not want his marriage annulled
since he loves her wife very much, he has no defect on
his part, and there is still chance of reconciliation.
However, husband-defendant claims that if their
marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological
incapacity, the fault lies with his wife. The husbanddefendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22,
1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there
was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for
this, according to the defendant, was that every time he
wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she
always avoided him and whenever he caresses her
private parts, she always removed his hands. The
defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex
with him only once but he did not continue because she
was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped. In
another physical examination by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr.,
which was submitted in a Medical Report, results
showed that there is no evidence of impotency of
husband-defendant
The trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage
void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed such
decision and denied the subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the refusal of a couple to have
sexual intercourse with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not there is a necessity to determine
who between the couple are psychologically
incapacitated.
RULING:
1. Yes, the refusal of a couple to have sexual intercourse
with each other constitutes psychological incapacity. The
Court provides that one of the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code is “To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation
of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end
of marriage.” Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation
will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In this case, the Court ruled that the senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the
above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
The Court further quoted, “If a spouse, although
physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or
her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse
with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.”
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor
is actually the “spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order” (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is
useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man
is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to
say “I could not have cared less.”
2. No, there is no necessity to determine who between
the couple are psychologically incapacitated. In this
case, neither the trial court nor the respondent court
made a finding on who between petitioner and private
21
respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the
other, however, the fact remains that there has never
been coitus between them. The Court held that since the
action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either
party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the
question of who refuses to have sex with the other
becomes immaterial.
Herein Petitioner alleged that it was his wife who refused
to have coitus with him, that the same may not be
psychological but merely a physical disorder. The Court
found such defenses unmeritorious. The Court held that
there was nothing in the record to show that he had tried
to find out or discover what the problem with his wife
could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor’s
Medical Report that there is no evidence of his
impotency and he is capable of erection. Since it is
petitioner’s claim that the reason is not psychological but
perhaps physical disorder on the part of private
respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove
such a claim.
As stated by the respondent court:
“…if it were true that it is the wife who was
suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant
did not go to court and seek the declaration of
nullity weakens his claim. This case was
instituted by the wife whose normal expectations
of her marriage were frustrated by her
husband’s inadequacy. Considering the innate
modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to
believe that she would expose her private life to
public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against
her husband if it were not necessary to put her
life in order and put to rest her marital status.”
Hence, in view of the foregoing, the petition is denied.
22
Tongol v. Tongol
G.R. No. 157610, 19 October 2007
FACTS:
Orlando G. Tongol and Filipinas M. Tongol were married
on August 27, 1967. Out of their union, they begot four
children, namely: Crisanto, Olivia, Frederick, and Ma.
Cecilia. On May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a
petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of
gains, which was granted in a Judgment issued by the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 143 on April 24, 1995.
On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of
Makati City a verified petition for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that the latter
is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her
essential marital obligations. Orlando alleged that
Filipinas was unable to perform her duty as a wife
because of Filipinas unbearable attitude that will lead to
their constant quarrel. In her answer with CounterPetition, Filipinas admitted that efforts at reconciliation
have been fruitless and that their marriage is a failure.
However, she claims that their marriage failed because it
is Orlando`s insufficiency to fulfill his obligation as
married man. Both parties underwent a psychological
exam which proved that the respondent Filipinas Tongol
has a psychological insufficiency.
Evidence for Orlando consisted of his own testimony,
that of his sister, Angelina Tongol, and of Annaliza
Guevara, an employee in the pharmaceutical company
owned by the spouses Tongol. Orlando also presented
Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist who conducted a
psychological examination of both parties. Orlando
submitted documents evidencing their marriage, the birth
of their four children, the RTC decision granting the
petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of
gains, and the written evaluation of Dr. Villegas
regarding the spouses’ psychological examination. On
the other hand, record shows that evidence for Filipinas
only consisted of her own testimony.
On June 30, 1999, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 149,
rendered a Decision dismissing the petition on appeal,
the CA affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the RTC. Hence,
herein petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented in
the present case is enough to sustain a finding that
herein respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her essential marital obligations.
discharged by the parties to the marriage.” What has
been established in the instant case is that, by reason of
her feelings of inadequacy and rejection, respondent not
only encounters a lot of difficulty but even refuses to
assume some of her obligations towards her husband,
such as respect, help and support for him. However, this
Court has ruled that psychological incapacity must be
more than just a “difficulty,” a “refusal” or”neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations.
Dr. Villegas also failed to fully and satisfactorily explain if
the personality disorder of respondent is grave enough
to bring about her disability to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. There is no evidence that such
incapacity is incurable. Neither in her written evaluation
nor in her testimony did Dr. Villegas categorically and
conclusively characterizes respondent’s inadequate
personality disorder as permanent or incurable.
The psychological incapacity considered under Article 36
of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses. The fourth guideline in
Molina requires that the psychological incapacity as
understood under Article 36 of the Family Code must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. In the
present case, the testimonies of petitioner and
respondent as well as the other witnesses regarding the
spouses’ differences and misunderstanding basically
revolve around and are limited to their disagreement
regarding the management of their business. A mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. In addition, it is true that the marital
obligations of a husband and wife enumerated under the
Family Code include the mutual responsibility of the
spouses to manage the household and provide support
for the family, which means that compliance with this
obligation necessarily entails the management of the
income and expenses of the household. While
disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect
the other aspects of one’s marriage as to make the
wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a sufficient ground to
declare a marriage null and void.
Marital obligation includes not only a spouse’s obligation
to the other spouse but also one’s obligation toward their
children. In the present case, no evidence was
presented to show that respondent had been remiss in
performing her obligations toward their children as
enumerated in Article 220 of the Family Code.
RULING:
The Court cannot see how respondent’s personality
disorder would render her unaware of the essential
marital obligations, or to borrow the terms used in
Santos Case, “to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
23
Barcelona v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 130087, 24 September 2003
FACTS:
Respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally
married union begot five children. On 29 March 1995,
private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon filed a Petition for
Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M.
Barcelona. Petition further alleged that petitioner Diana
was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the
celebration of their marriage to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up
to the present time. The petition allegedthe noncomplied marital obligations. During their marriage, they
had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing.
Respondent, coming from a rich family, wasa
disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the
house. She would go to her sister‘s house or would play
tennis the whole day. When the family had crisis due to
several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the
sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to herself and
eventually refused to speak to her husband.
On November 1977, the respondent, who was five
months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the pretext
of re-evaluatingher feelings with petitioner, requested the
latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. In his
desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the
respondent‘s pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to
leave their conjugal dwelling. The respondent at the time
of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with theessential obligation of
marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and until
the present time. Such incapacity wasconclusively found
in the psychological examination conducted on the
relationship between the petitioner and therespondent
Diana claims that petitioner falls short of the guidelines
stated in Molina case and there is no cause for action.
such incapacity becomes manifest only after
solemnization.
its
The Supreme Court held that psychological incapacity
should refer to a mental incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such
as those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code
and must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability.
The elements of Psychological incapacity are:
(a) Grave – It must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and
(c) Incurable and Permanent – It must be incurable or,
even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.
ISSUE:
Whether of not petitioner stated a cause of action
against Diana.
RULING:
YES, since petition stated legal right of Tadeo,
correlative obligation of Diana, and her act or omission
as seen infacts FAILURE TO STATE ROOT CAUSE
AND GRAVE NATURE OF ILLNESS. Sec 2 of rules of
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage – petition
does not need to show root cause sinceonly experts can
determine it b the physical manifestations of physical
incapacity.PETITION IS DENIED, THERE IS CAUSE OF
ACTION.
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration,
was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
24
Republic v. Court of Appeals Molina
G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997
FACTS:
Spouses Roridel and Reynaldo Molina were married on
April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church in Manila; that
a son, Andre O. Molina was born.After a year of
marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends
on whom he squandered his money; that he depended
on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting
in frequent quarrels between them.
Sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of
his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the
sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the
couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which
their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987,
Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live
with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later,
Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then
abandoned them.
Reynaldo had shown that he was psychologically
incapable of complying with essential marital obligations
and was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome
individual who thought of himself as a king to be served;
and that it would be to the couples best interest to have
their marriage declared null and void in order to free
them from what appeared to be an incompatible
marriage from the start.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
RULING:
No, the marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo
subsists and remains valid. The Court of Appeals erred
in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee
intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil
laws on personal and family rights, and holding
psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and
behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative
of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her
personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as
his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of
the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the
union to self-destruct because it defeats the very
objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the
marriage.
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there
is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect
spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a
“difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing
of
“irreconcilable
differences”
and
“conflicting
personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most
liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of
proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The
incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the
celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be
clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such
illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital
obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the
Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles
220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and
their children; (7) interpretation made by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church,
and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the SolicitorGeneral to appeal as counsels for the State.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed
and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the
marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina
subsists and remains valid.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of
Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing
at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is
25
VERONICO
TENEBRO,
petitioner,
v.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004.
FACTS:
Tenebro married Ancajas (complainant) on April 10,
1990. On 1991, Tenebro informed Ancajas that he was
previously married to a certain Villareyes on November
10, 1986. Invoking this previous marriage, Tenebro left
Ancajas stating that he wanted to cohabit with Villareyes.
Subsequently, on January 25,1993, Tenebro again
contracted another marriage with Villegas. When
Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she then filed a
criminal complaint for bigamy against Tenebro.
During trial, Tenebro denied that he and Villareyes were
validly married to each other claiming that no marriage
ceremony took place to solemnize their union. He
alleged that he only signed a marriage contract merely to
enable her to get the allotment from his office in
connection with his work as a seaman. He further avers
that there was no record of his marriage with Villareyes.
On November 10, 1997, the RTC found Tenebro guilty
for the crime of bigamy. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC. In his petition for review to the SC,
Tenebro presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1)
denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes,
and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his
marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity, retroacts to the date on which the second
marriage was celebrated. Hence, petitioner argues that
all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are
absent, and prays for his acquittal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tenebro can use psychological
incapacity as ground for absolution of bigamy case
against him.
RULING:
No, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does
not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As
such, an individual who contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding
the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
rendered in the proper proceedings”. A plain reading of
the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was
celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of
the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already
been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent
reason for distinguishing between a subsequent
marriage that is null and void purely because it is a
second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent
marriage that is null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal
liability for bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal laws
protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of
the sacrosanct character of this special contract between
spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard
of the permanent character of the special bond between
spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.
Would the absolute nullity of either first or second
marriage prior to its judicial declaration as being void,
constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for
bigamy? Yes. Except for a void marriage on account of
psychological incapacity—void marriages are inexistent
from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is
required to establish their nullity. The complete nullity of
a previously contracted marriage being void ab initio and
legally inexistent can outrightly be a defense in an
indictment for bigamy. Strong reservation on the ruling
that bigamy is still committed though marriage is ab initio
null and void (if marriage is contracted before th judicial
declaration of its nullity). Canon law-reconcile grounds
for nullity of marriage. Reasons why except those due to
psychological incapacity:
a) Breaches neither the essential nor the formal
requisites of marriage
b) Other grounds are capable of relatively easy
demonstration,
psychological
incapacity
however, being a mental state may not be so
readily evident
c) It remains valid and binding until declared
judicially as void
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes “any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
26
Republic v. Quintero-Hamano
428 SCRA 735; May 20, 2004
Topic: Void Marriages; Psychological Incapacity
Nature of the Case: Petition for declaration of nullity on
the ground of psychological incapacity
FACTS:
On January 14, 1988, respondent Lolita QuinteroHamano and Toshio were married in Cavite. Unknown to
respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to
assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity
became manifest only after the marriage. One month
after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and
promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the
holidays with his family. After sending money to
respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving
financial support. She wrote him several times but he
never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent
learned from her friends that Toshio visited the
Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their
child.
On June 17, 1996, respondent filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband
Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
The prosecutor filed a report finding that no collusion
existed between the parties. The trial court granted
respondent’s motion to present her evidence ex parte.
She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family.
She thereafter offered documentary evidence to support
her testimony.
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of
Toshio’s psychological incapacity, the trial court held
that: It is clear from the records of the case that Toshio
failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner
and father to his daughter. He remained irresponsible
and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his
family. Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a
clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for
his wife and child, which characterizes a very immature
person. Certainly, such behavior could be traced to
Toshio’s mental incapacity and disability of entering into
marital life.
The Sol gen appealed to the CA but the same was
denied.
Lolita exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
CA concluded that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his
family, and to “observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support” pursuant to Article
68 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The CA emphasized that this case could not be equated
with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina and
Santos vs. Court of Appeals. In those cases, the
spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a “mixed
marriage,” the husband being a Japanese national.
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of
his family and his insensitivity to them did not
automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His
behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the
personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable
expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe
and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio,
in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
ISSUE:
WON respondent was able to prove the psychological
incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital
obligations
RULING:
No
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short
of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated
to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was
never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness. After respondent testified on how
Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was
presented showing that his behavior was caused by a
psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no
need for an actual medical examination, it would have
greatly helped respondent’s case had she presented
evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness.
This could have been done through an expert witness.
This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground
for legal separation. There was no showing that the case
at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the
context of legal separation. We cannot presume
psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio
abandoned his family immediately after the celebration
of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough
to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must
be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof
of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person,
an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting
and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
According to the appellate court, the requirements in
Molina and Santos do not apply here because the
present case involves a “mixed marriage,” the husband
being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving
psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between
27
an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be
lenient in the application of the rules merely because the
spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated
happens to be a foreign national. The medical and
clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were
formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in
general. Hence, the norms used for determining
psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.
28
Marcos v. Marcos
343 SCRA 755, October 19, 2000
FACTS:
Brenda and Wilson first met sometime in 1980 when
both of them were assigned at the Malacañang Palace,
she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a
Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. They
later on became sweethearts and got married and had 5
children. After the EDSA revolution, both of them sought
a discharge from the military service. He engaged to
different business ventures but failed. She always urged
him to look for work so that their children would see him,
instead of her, as the head of the family and a good
provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful
employment, they would often quarrel and as a
consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even
force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He
would also inflict physical harm on their children for a
slight mistake and was so severe in the way he
chastised them.
was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six
years. It was during this period that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged
psychological illness was traced only to said period and
not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important,
there is no evidence showing that his condition is
incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed
as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the
dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to
show that the alleged psychological incapacity is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines
outlined in Molina.
Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he
would leave their house. In 1992, they were already
living separately. She did not want him to stay in their
house anymore so when she saw him in their house, she
was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned
violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her
mother who came to her aid. She sought for nullity of
their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The Brenda submitted herself to psychologist Natividad
A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation. The court
a quo found Wilson to be psychologically incapacitated
to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his
failure to find work to support his family and his violent
attitude towards Brenda and their children. RTC granted
the petition. CA reversed. Hence, this case.
ISSUE:
Whether personal medical or psychological examination
of the respondent by a physician is a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the
nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of
evidence presented. There is no requirement, however
that the respondent should be examined by a physician
or a psychologist as a condition since qua non for such
declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced
that respondent failed to provide material support to the
family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part.
There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were
already present at the inception of the marriage or that
they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent
can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and
29
G.R. No. 201061
July 3, 2013
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN
BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
TOPIC: Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage
(Article 148)
DOCTRINE:
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of
marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property,
or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions, in accord
with Article 148.
FACTS:
Benjamin and Sally developed a romantic relationship in
1979. Sally’s father was against the relationship. Sally
brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City
where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally,
knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the
marriage contract would not be registered. Sally filed
criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public
documents against Benjamin, using their simulated
marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a
petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on
the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and
that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.
Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the
properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with
Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as
administrator of the properties during the pendency of
the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley
as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties
became the subject of the partition before the trial court.
Aside from the seven properties enumerated by
Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in
her answer.
The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded
with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office because it could not be registered due to
Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena. The trial
court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was not bigamous.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally are void for not having a marriage license
2. Whether Art. 148 should govern Benjamin and
Sally’s property relations
3. Whether bigamy was committed by the
petitioner
HELD:
1. YES.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and,
at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the
Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license,
except those covered by Article 34 where no license is
necessary, “shall be void from the beginning.” In this
case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
solemnized without a license. It was duly established
that no marriage license was issued to them and that
Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the
marriage license numbers issued by the local civil
registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982.
The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35which
made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent.
Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts
under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are
absolutely simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and void
from the beginning.” Thus, the Court of Appeals did not
err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio
and non-existent.
2. YES.
The property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed
by Article 148 of the Family Code which states: Art. 148.
In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common
in proportion to their respective contributions. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The
same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits
of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or
her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in
such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is
not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of
the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply
even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of
marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property,
or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly
excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which
were given by Benjamin’s father to his children as
advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition
before the trial court even admitted that “Benjamin’s late
father himself conveyed a number of properties to his
children and their respective spouses which included
Sally x x x.”
30
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that
the decision of the CA is more in accord with the
evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT
No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and
Sally as spouses. The properties under TCT Nos. 61720
and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin with the
descriptive title “married to Sally.” The property covered
by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the
name of Sally with the descriptive title “married to
Benjamin” while the properties under TCT Nos. N193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally
as a single individual. We have ruled that the words
“married to” preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.
Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of
actual contribution from either or both spouses, there
can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family
Code.
3. NO.
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous
under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that
the first or former marriage shall not be null and void.
The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be
assumed as the one that is valid, there being no
evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of
invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage
contract. However, if the second marriage was void not
because of the existence of the first marriage but for
other causes such as lack of license, the crime of
bigamy was not committed. For bigamy to exist, the
second or subsequent marriage must have all the
essential requisites for validity except for the existence
of a prior marriage. In this case, there was really no
subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a
purported marriage contract without a marriage license.
The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local
civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short,
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist.
They lived together and represented themselves as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
31
G.R. No. 127358
March 31, 2005
ALTERNATIVE ISSUE AND RULING
NOEL
BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH
BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
x-------------------x
G.R. No. 127449
March 31, 2005
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS
and
ISABEL
LUCIA
SINGH
BUENAVENTURA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground that both he and his
wife were psychologically incapacitated.
The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered
into between petitioner and respondent null and violation
ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal
partnership property; ordered petitioner a regular support
in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly,
subject to modification as the necessity arises, and
awarded the care and custody of the minor to his
mother. Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the
appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondent’s motion
issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like
to P20, 000.
The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and
affirmed in to the RTC decision. Petitioner motion for
reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid
marriage.
HELD:
Since the present case does not involve the annulment
of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of article 50 in
relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code,
providing for the dissolution of the absolute community
or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do
not apply. Rather the general rule applies, which is in
case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property
regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and
distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the
court a quo were found, both by the RTC and the CA, to
have been acquired during the union of the parties, the
same would be covered by the coownership. No fruits of
a separate property of one of the parties appear to have
been included or involved in said distribution.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not, based on the findings of the
lower
court,
the
marriage
between
Buenaventura and Singh may be declared null
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code,
due to the psychological incapacity of the
petitioner.
2. Whether or not the award of moral damages to
the aggrieved spouse is proper in such cases.
RULING:
1. Yes. The Court of Appeals and the trial court
considered the acts of the petitioner after the
marriage as proof of his psychological
incapacity, and therefore a product of his
incapacity or inability to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. Psychological
incapacity has been defined, as no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
2. Based on the above definition of psychological
incapacity, by declaring the petitioner as
psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of
awarding moral damages on the same set of
facts was negated. The award of moral
damages should be predicated, not on the mere
act of entering into the marriage, but on specific
evidence that it was done deliberately and with
malice by a party who had knowledge of his or
her disability and yet wilfully concealed the
same.
32
G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO
TUAZON, JR. being the Judge of the RTC, Branch
139, Makati City, respondents
FACTS
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix
were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate
Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.
After twenty-four years of marriage and four children,
petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code before Branch 87 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City.
Petitioner’s wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was
petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived
with a certain woman named Milagros Salting.
Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal
Code against petitioner and his paramour before the City
Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated
September 16, 1997, found probable cause and ordered
the filing of an Information against them. The case, was
filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 61.
Petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant
for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings
Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the
criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the
civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed
a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal
case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the
foregoing motion. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
of the said Order of denial was likewise denied.
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the
proceedings in the concubinage case, petitioner went to
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 on
certiorari, questioning the Orders issued by Judge
Cervantes and praying for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. The Regional Trial Court of Makati
denied the petition for certiorari.
No. The pendency of a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question to a
prosecution for concubinage.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question
is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential
elements:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of
petitioner’s marriage is not a prejudicial question to the
concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the
suspension of the latter pending the final determination
of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil
case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid
civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.
In the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to
the judgment of the competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and
purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not
his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in
affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of
marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a
criminal case for concubinage.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the pendency of a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage poses a prejudicial question to a
prosecution for concubinage filed by the wife?
RULING:
33
G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
QUISUMBING, J.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract
bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs
no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without
more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly
valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable
for bigamy unless he $rst secures a judicial declaration
of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the
house of one Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Bohol
for four years. Their communication was broken after
school year 1977-1978. In 1984, Lucio received a letter
from Lucia from Singapore. After an exchange of letters,
the two became sweethearts. Lucia later returned to the
Philippines but left again for Canada to work there.
Nonetheless, the sweethearts maintained a constant
communication. Lucia, later came back to the
Philippines. The two agreed to get married, thus, they
were married at Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at
Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. Lucia reported back to her work
in Canada leaving Lucio behind. Barely a year, August
19, 1991, Lucia filed with Ontario Court a petition for
divorce which was granted and took effect in February of
1992. On October that year Lucia married Maria
Lumbago also in Tagbilaran City. September 21, 1993,
Lucio filed a complaint for nullity of marriage in Regional
Trial Court of Bohol on the ground that there was no
marriage ceremony actually took place. He was later
charge with Bigamy filed by City Prosecutor of the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court laid down the elements of
Bigamy.
1. the offender has been legally married;
2. the first marriage has not been legally dissolved,
or in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse has not been judicially declared
presumptively dead;
3. he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
4. The subsequent marriage would have been valid
had it not been for the existence of the first.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the
accused must have been legally married. Yet, the trial
court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing
officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of
the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of
a solemnizing officer. The Supreme Court held that, the
mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no
judicial declaration of nullity. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity
of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were
never married “from the beginning.” The contract of
marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this
argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes,
petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he
contracted the marriage with Maria. The existence and
the validity of the first marriage being an essential
element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a
conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where
there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner,
must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal
case invoking prejudicial question. The civil case is a
prejudicial question to bigamy. The Court granted
unfortunately denied by the motion for reconsideration of
the prosecution.
The Regional Trial Court of Bohol held Lucio guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
He filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. While the
case was pending in Court of Appeals, the trial court
granted the petition for nullty of marriage since no
marriage ceremony took place. No appeal was taken
from this decision, thus, became final and executory. But
the Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit.
Hence, the petition was elevated to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so,
whether his defense of good faith is valid.
34
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versusGREGORIO NOLASCO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 94053, THIRD DIVISION, March 17, 1993
Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also
claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too
had no news of Janet Monica.
FELICIANO, J.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had
lived with and later married Janet Monica Parker despite
his lack of knowledge as to her family background. He
insisted that his wife continued to refuse to give him
such information even after they were married. He also
testified that he did not report the matter of Janet
Monica's disappearance to the Philippine government
authorities.
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the
Civil Code, which it superseded, the following crucial
differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required
for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four
(4) years; however, there is need for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse
present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code
imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article
83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be
no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee
is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so
by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under
Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code,
upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief"
that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
FACTS:
Respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Antique a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker,
invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition
prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively
dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared
null and void. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco
did not possess a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead.
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a
seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a
British subject, in a bar in England during one of his
ship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards,
Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on
his ship for six (6) months until they returned to
respondent's hometown after his seaman's contract
expired. Respondent married Janet Monica Parker in a
Catholic rite.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the
marriage celebration, he obtained another employment
contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents.
Sometime later, while working overseas, respondent
received a letter from his mother informing him that
Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter
informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique.
Respondent claimed he then immediately asked
permission to leave his ship to return home.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for
her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved
fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to
his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton,
Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that
his wife is already dead. (NO)
RULING:
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the
Civil Code, which it superseded, the following crucial
differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required
for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four
(4) years; however, there is need for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse
present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code
imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article
83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be
no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee
is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so
by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under
Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code,
upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief"
that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to
conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence
as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the
investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his
attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts
is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or wellfounded belief that she was already dead. When he
arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet
Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local
authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another
seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of
many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he
confused London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on
his supposed efforts to locate his wife in England.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet
Monica declined to give any information as to her
personal background even after she had married
respondent too convenient an excuse to justify his failure
to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the
35
alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which
respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent
said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified
circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to
respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from
their friends of her whereabouts, considering that
respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony.
Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimony
merely tended to show that the missing spouse had
chosen not to communicate with their common
acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the
well-founded belief required by law that his absent wife
was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a
court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively
dead.
36
G.R. No. 184621
December 10, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR, Respondent.
FACTS:
The respondent and Jerry were married on September
20, 1997. They lived together as husband and wife in
their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City,
South Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the couple
had a violent quarrel. Thereafter, Jerry left their conjugal
dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent
ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen,
communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or about
his whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the
time of Jerry's disappearance, the respondent filed
before the RTC a petition for her husband's declaration
of presumptive death. She claimed that she had a wellfounded belief that Jerry was already dead. Despite
inquiries from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her
sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and friends, but
to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also
allegedly made it a point to check the patients directory
whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest
efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting
her to file the petition in court.
The RTC issued an order granting the respondents
petition and declaring Jerry presumptively dead.
The CA through a petition for certiorari filed by the
petitioner, Republic of the Philippines affirmed in toto the
latters order, thus:
The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition
before this Court . It maintains that although judgments
of trial courts in summary judicial proceedings, including
presumptive death cases, are deemed immediately final
and executory (hence, not appeal able under Article 247
of the Family Code), this rule does not mean that they
are not subject to review on certiorari.
Likewise, petitioner posited that the respondent did not
have a well-founded belief to justify the declaration of
her husbands presumptive death. It claims that the
respondent failed to conduct the requisite diligent search
for her missing husband pursuant to the strict standard
under Article 41 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
W/N the petition for the declaration of presumptive death
should be granted
RULING:
NO. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death
can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive years and the
present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior
spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family
Code, there are four (4) essential requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for
four consecutive years, or two consecutive years
if the disappearance occurred where there is
danger of death under the circumstances laid
down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded
belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee
Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the
old provision of the Civil Code which it superseded,
imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded
belief” that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be
granted.
In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief"
was anchored on her alleged "earnest efforts" to locate
Jerry, which consisted of the following:
(1) She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from
her in-laws, neighbors and friends; and
(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that
she looked through the patients’ directory, hoping to find
Jerry.
These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent
standard" and degree of diligence required by
jurisprudence for the following reasons:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing
husband. It can be inferred from the records that her
hospital visits and her consequent checking of the
patients’ directory therein were unintentional. She did not
purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband
as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily
directed to look for him. This Court thus considers these
attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her
husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police
nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him.
While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the
nature of the situation in which the present spouse is
placed, under present conditions, we find it proper and
prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been
missing, to seek the aid of the authorities or, at the very
least, report his/her absence to the police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives
or their neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her
efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom
she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named. As
37
held in Nolasco, the present spouse’s bare assertion that
he inquired from his friends about his absent spouse’s
whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the friends
from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the
testimony nor presented as witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to
support the respondent’s claim that she conducted a
diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence
proving that she had a well-founded belief other than her
bare claims that she inquired from her friends and inlaws about her husband’s whereabouts. In sum, the
Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged
in a "passive search" where she relied on
uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and
friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search because
her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded
belief that her husband was already dead.
38
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, Petitioner, -versusISAGANI D. BOBIS, Respondent
G.R. No. 138509, FIRST DIVISION, July 31, 2000
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the
time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a
prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this
is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to
determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage.
Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a
license is a matter of defense because there is still no
judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second
marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that
bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its
elements concur two of which are a previous marriage
and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid
had it not been for the existence at the material time of
the first marriage.
FACTS
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first
marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said
marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated,
the same respondent contracted a second marriage with
petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996
and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally
Hernandez. Based on petitioners complaint-affidavit.
Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action
for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first
marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a
marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy
invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first
marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case.
ISSUE
Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a
prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy. (NO)
RULING
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct
and separate from the crime but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused. It must appear not only that the civil case
involves facts upon which the criminal action is based,
but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the
civil action would necessarily be determinative of the
criminal case. Consequently, the defense must involve
an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue
raised in the criminal action and its resolution
determinative of whether or not the latter action may
proceed. Its two essential elements are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the
guilt or innocence of the accused but simply tests the
sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order
to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A
party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to
have hypothetically admitted that all the essential
elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the
information, considering that the prosecution has not yet
presented a single evidence on the indictment or may
not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the
allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial
question is in effect a question on the merits of the
criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the
time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a
prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this
is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to
determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage.
Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a
license is a matter of defense because there is still no
judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second
marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that
bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its
elements concur two of which are a previous marriage
and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid
had it not been for the existence at the material time of
the first marriage.
In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and
thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent
his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and
eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist
has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code,
contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy
charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void
and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack
of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party
may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of
a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter
contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a
declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that
the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render
nugatory the provisions on bigamy.
39
G.R. No. 165545
March 24, 2006
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner, vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent.
Where a person has entered into two successive
marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the validity of
the second marriage, and the burden is on the party
attacking the validity of the second marriage to prove
that the first marriage had not been dissolved.
FACTS:
In 1955 Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz married in
Barcelona, Sorsogon. Fifteen plus years later, Clemente
filed an action to declare the presumptive death of Alice,
she being an absentee. The petition was granted in
1970.
In 1983, Clemente married Jarque. The two live together
until Clemente’s death in 1998. Jarque then sought to
claim her husband’s SSS benefits and the same were
granted her. On the other hand, a certain Cecilia BailonYap who claimed that she is the daughter of Bailon to a
certain Elisa Jayona petitioned before the SSS that they
be given the reimbursement for the funeral spending for
it was actually them who shouldered the burial expenses
of Clemente.
They further claim that Clemente contracted three
marriages; one with Alice, another with Elisa and the
other with Jarque. Cecilia also averred that Alice is alive
and kicking and Alice subsequently emerged; Cecilia
claimed that Clemente obtained the declaration of Alice’s
presumptive death in bad faith for he was aware of the
whereabouts of Alice or if not he could have easily
located her in her parent’s place. She was in Sorsogon
all along in her parents’ place. She went there upon
learning that Clemente had been having extra-marital
affairs.
SSS then ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had
been granted her and to return the same to Cecilia since
she shouldered the burial expenses and that the benefits
should go to Alice because her reappearance had
terminated Clemente’s marriage with Harque. Further,
SSS ruled that the RTC’s decision in declaring Alice to
be presumptively death is erroneous. Teresita appealed
the decision of the SSS before the Social Security
Comission and the SSC affirmed SSS. The CA however
ruled the contrary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent
spouse declared presumptively dead automatically
terminates the subsequent marriage.
HELD:
There is no previous marriage to restore for it is
terminated upon Clemente’s death. Likewise there is no
subsequent marriage to terminate for the same is
terminated upon Clemente’s death. SSS is correct in
ruling that it is inutile for Alice to pursue the recording of
her reappearance before the local civil registrar through
an affidavit or a court action. But it is not correct for the
SSS to rule upon the declaration made by the RTC.
The SSC or the SSS has no judicial power to review the
decision of the RTC. SSS is indeed empowered to
determine as to who should be the rightful beneficiary of
the benefits obtained by a deceased member in case of
disputes but such power does not include the appellate
power to review a court decision or declaration. In the
case at bar, the RTC ruling is binding and Jarque’s
marriage to Clemente is still valid because no affidavit
was filed by Alice to make known her reappearance
legally. Alice reappeared only after Clemente’s death
and in this case she can no longer file such an affidavit;
in this case the bad faith [or good faith] of Clemente can
no longer be raised – the marriage herein is considered
voidable and must be attacked directly not collaterally –
it is however impossible for a direct attack since there is
no longer a marriage to be attacked for the same has
been terminated upon Clemente’s death.
ALTERNATIVE RULING
HELD:
The second marriage contracted by a person with an
absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the
competent court that can nullify the second marriage
pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and upon the
reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for
annulment may be filed.
The two marriages involved herein having been
solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of
the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at
the time of their celebration.
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being
voidable, it is terminated by final judgment of annulment
in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears
or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a
subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42
thereof provides the subsequent marriage shall be
automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit
of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it
void ab initio.
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to
terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or
by court action, such absentee‘s mere reappearance,
even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent
marriage, will not terminate such marriage. Since the
second marriage has been contracted because of a
40
presumption that the former spouse is dead, such
presumption continues inspite of the spouse‘s physical
reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still
be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent
marriage is terminated as provided by law.
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in
accordance with law, Bailon‘s and Teresita‘s marriage
prior to the former‘s death in 1998, Teresita is rightfully
the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
41
G.R. No. 186400
October 20, 2010
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner, vs. DANILO T.
BOLOS, Respondent.
not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was
solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its
effectivity.
DOCTRINE
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; The Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, which the Court promulgated on 15
March 2003, extends only to those marriages entered
into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took
effect on 3 August 1988.
ISSUE:
Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” is applicable to the
case at bench.
FACTS:
Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Respondent
Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family
Code. After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the
petition for annulment. A copy of said decision was
received by respondent Danilo and he thereafter timely
filed the Notice of Appeal.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as
contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court
promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope.
Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s
failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or
new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Thereafter, the RTC
issued the order declaring its decision declaring the
marriage null and void as final and executory and
granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by
Cynthia. Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a
petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the
orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared
psychologically capacitated to render the essential
marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared
guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their
children.
The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside
the assailed orders of the RTC declaring the nullity of
marriage as final and executory. The appellate court
stated that the requirement of a motion for
reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the
marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized
on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took
effect.
HELD:
No, it does not.
“Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern
petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages
under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to
those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The
rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered
by the Family Code and those solemnized under the
Civil Code.8 The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to
petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase “under the
Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the
word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.”
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting
aside the RTC decision which denied due course to
respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also
applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity
of the Family Code. According to petitioner, the phrase
“under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers
to the word “petitions” rather than to the word
“marriages.” Such that petitions filed after the effectivity
of the Family Code are governed by the A.M. No. even if
the marriage was solemnized before the same. Danilo,
in his Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is
42
G.R. No. 166357
January 14, 2015
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner, vs. MA. ELENA
FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
FACTS:
Tyrone Kalaw and Malyn Fernandez got married in
1976. After the birth of their 4th child, Tyrone had an
affair with Jocelyn Quejano. In May 1985, Malyn left the
conjugal home and her four children with Tyrone.
Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, and they
had three more children. In 1990, Tyrone went to the
United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. On
July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation
from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code. He alleged that Malyn was psychologically
incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential
marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their
marriage.
He alleged that:
1) She leaves the children without proper care and
attention as she played mahjong all day and all night;
2) She leaves the house to party with male friends and
returned in the early hours of the following day; and
3) She committed adultery on June 9, 1985 in Hyatt
Hotel with one Benjie whom he saw half-naked in the
hotel room.
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr.
Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard
Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyn’s
psychological incapacity. Dr. Gates explained that Malyn
suffers from Narcissistic Personalityu Disorder and that it
“may have been evident even prior to her marriage”
because it is rooted in her family background and
upbringing. Fr. Healy concluded that Malyn was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital
duties. He explained that her psychological incapacity is
rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her family. This
role allegedly inflated Malyn’s ego to the point that her
needs became priority, while her kids’ and husband’s
needs became secondary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
HELD:
YES. The Court in granting the Motion for
Reconsideration held that Fernandez was indeed
psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed the
previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case.
Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert
opinions were just given much respect in this case.
The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of
Republic v. CA have turned out to be rigid, such that
their application to every instance practically condemned
the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain
rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be
so strictly and too literally read and applied given the
clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted
version of “less specificity” obviously to enable “some
resiliency in its application.” Instead, every court should
approach the issue of nullity “not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but
according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity that
no case would be on “all fours” with the next one in the
field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the
nullity of marriage; hence, every “trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate
court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court.
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological
incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the
courts, which are concededly not endowed with
expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity
rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves
to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed,
the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent
and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.
Personal examination by party not required; totality
of evidence must be considered
We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional
mandate for the State to protect marriage as an
inviolable social institution only relates to a valid
marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage
that is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage
has no legal existence.
There is no requirement for one to be declared
psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined
by a physician, because what is important is the
presence of evidence that adequately establishes the
party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological
incapacity,
then
actual
medical
examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.”
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition
could possibly result from an assumed state of facts
existed in the record, the expert opinion should be
admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in
interpreting such other evidence on the causation.
Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE
43
Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity
should be considered as conjectural or speculative and
without any probative value only in the absence of other
evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings
under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay
that would justify their exclusion as evidence.
Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as
to psychological and emotional temperaments
The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court
deserved credence because it was in the better position
to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses
while they were testifying. The position and role of the
trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing
the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed
but should be accorded due importance and respect.
The fact that the respondent brought her children with
her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her
neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her
tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her
willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling
on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very
grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for
parenting to the gratification of her own personal and
escapist desires.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her
children’s moral and mental development. This disregard
violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect
her children.
The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to
give to such expert opinions a merely generalized
consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their
value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the
nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts
sufficiently and competently described the psychological
incapacity of the respondent within the standards of
Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the
conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses
because they were largely drawn from the case records
and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after
the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the
petitioner’s factual premises.
The Court also held that the courts must accord weight
to expert testimony on the psychological and mental
state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the
nullity of marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of
the Family Code the courts, “despite having the primary
task and burden of decision-making, must not discount
but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the
expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.”
Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes
neglect of parental duties
The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing
should not have delimited our determination of the
presence or absence of psychological incapacity.
Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to
fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of
parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had
she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities,
she would have known that bringing along her children
of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would
expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices
that would erode their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the longterm effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong
playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly on
her very young children.
44
G.R. No. 189538
February 10, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.
In allowing the correction of the subject certi$cate of
marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial
court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as
there was no marriage to speak of.
FACTS:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office
(NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one
of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend
of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that
she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a
Korean National. She denied having contracted said
marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged
husband; She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of
Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in
the wife portion thereof.
During trial, She completely denied having known the
supposed husband, but she revealed that she
recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she
had met them while she was working as a receptionist in
Tadel's Pension House. She believed that her name was
used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel
agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in
order for her to obtain a passport. A document examiner
testified that the signature appearing in the marriage
contract was forged. The RTC decided in favor of the
petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar.
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the
assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no
clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2)
granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife
portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect,
declaring the marriage void ab initio.
Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had
jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for correction of
entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary
proceeding required. Considering that respondents
identity was used by an unknown person to contract
marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible
for respondent to institute an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void
marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
May the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract
which, in effect, nullifies the marriage, be undertaken in
a Rule 108 proceeding?
HELD:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings may either be summary or
adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure
to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the
civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is
deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is
adversary.
Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia 225 Phil.
408 the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected
through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true
facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error
availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial
proceeding."An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding
is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings
where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and
where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings
and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy
[is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a
special proceeding is not always summary. The
procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary
proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition;
it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who
may claim interest which would be affected by the
cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil
registrar and any person in interest to file their
opposition, if any; and it states that although the court
may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after
hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or
issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the
procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is
the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect
substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil
register.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an
entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these
safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited
grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support
pendente lite of the spouses and children, the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of
the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997
(Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in
45
the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil
registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen
cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi
Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National
Statistics Office G.R.No. 196049, June 26, 2013.
While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to
determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court where all the parties
had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations
of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the
evidence of the parties had already been admitted and
examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the
nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to
speak of, but the correction of the record of such
marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence.
Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the
subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife
portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare
the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
DENIED.
46
FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner, vs. CONCHITA
DELIZO, respondent.
G.R. No. L-15853, EN BANC, July 27, 1960,
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
FACTS
The dismissed complaint, which was filed on September
6, 1955, was based on the ground of fraud, it being
alleged, among other things, that defendant Conchita
Delizo, herein respondent, at the date of her marriage to
plaintiff, herein petitioner Fernando Aquino, on
December 27, 1954, concealed from the latter that fact
that she was pregnant by another man, and sometime in
April, 1955, or about four months after their marriage,
gave birth to a child. In her answer, defendant claimed
that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock
between her and the plaintiff.
If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump",
he could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking,
whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their
marriage more so because she must have attempted to
conceal the true state of affairs. Even physicians and
surgeons, with the aid of the woman herself who shows
and gives her subjective and objective symptoms, can
only claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% at five
months. and 50% at six months. (XI Cyclopedia of
Medicine, Surgery, etc. Pregnancy, p. 10).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the concealment of the wife at the time of
marriage that she is pregnant by a man other than her
husband constitutes fraud. (YES).
RULING:
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of
the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes
fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. (Art. 85,
par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In the case of
Buccat vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19)
cited in the decision sought to be reviewed, which was
also an action for the annulment of marriage on the
ground of fraud, plaintiff's claim that he did not even
suspect the pregnancy of the defendant was held to be
unbelievable, it having been proven that the latter was
already in an advanced stage of pregnancy (7th month)
at the time of their marriage. That pronouncement,
however, cannot apply to the case at bar.
Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more
than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to
plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that
her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since
she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff.
According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month
of pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is
still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement
is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is
hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only
to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is
only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement
of the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the
umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more
general and apparent. (See Lull, Clinical Obstetrics, p.
122)
47
G.R. No. L-1967
May 28, 1951
Probate of the will of the late Faustino Neri San
Jose. PAZ NERI SAN JOSE, petitioner. MATILDE
MENCIANO, in her behalf and in behalf of the minors
CARLO MAGNO NERI and FAUSTINO NERI, Jr.,
plaintiffs-appellees, vs. PAZ NERI SAN JOSE and
RODOLFO PELAEZ, defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
Matilde Menciano filed a motion for declaration of heirs,
alleging that she is the widow of the deceased Faustino
Neri San Jose, to whom she was married on September
28, 1944. Before the marriage they lived together as
husband and wife, there having been no impediment to
their marriage. As a result of their cohabitation the child
Carlo Magno Neri was born, baptized and was
legitimized by the subsequent matrimony of his parents.
The second child Faustino Neri, Jr., was born on April
24, 1945 is a legitimate child.
Paz Neri San Jose, then executrix of the estate of the
deceased Faustino Neri San Jose, and Rodolfo Pelaez,
designated universal heir in the will of the deceased filed
a motion to question the declaration of heirs.
assailed only by strong, clear, and convincing oral
testimony.
Faustino’s meticulous signature cannot be signed by one
who is not of sound mind and of fair physical condition.
He may have been sick at that time, but not to such a
degree as to render him unconscious of what he was
doing.
Impotency is the physical inability to have sexual
intercourse. The presumption is in favor of potency. The
fact that the deceased was able to produce the
specimen as what was instructed by his doctor shows
that he was potent. The necessary conclusion is that the
child Faustino Neri, Jr., is conclusively presumed to be
the legitimate son of the deceased Faustino Neri with
Matilde Menciano in lawful wedlock.
The trial court, after a careful and exhaustive review of
the evidence, correctly reached the conclusion that
allegation of illegally disposing money and jewelry has
not been substantiated.
They alleged that marriage between said deceased and
Matilde Menciano was in violation of the legal provisions
and requisites, because he was deprived of free will due
to his age and sickness. Accordingly, Matilde Menciano
took advantage of his condition, by intrigue, deceit and
threat of abandoning him, forced Neri to marry her. The
deceased was impotent and congenitally sterile, the
same as his brothers and sister Conchita, who had no
children therefore it would have been impossible for him
to have fathered the children
Defendants also filed a counterclaim for the sum of
P286, 000 in cash, and for jewels and certain properties,
which, as alleged, were retained and illegally disposed of
by Matilde Menciano.
ISSUE:
1. Was the marriage between the deceased
Faustino Neri San Jose and Matilde Menciano
valid?
2. Are, the children Faustino Neri, Jr. and Carlo
Magno Neri the legitimate children of the
deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and Matilde
Menciano?
3. Did Matilde Menciano have illegally disposed of
the cash, jewels, and certain properties above
mentioned?
HELD:
The marriage of Matilde and Faustino was evidenced by
a valid Marriage License and Marriage Certificate both of
which were signed by the parties and properly recorded
at the Office of the Civil Registrar. Being official and
public documents, their validity can be successfully
48
MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner v. RODOLFO S.
ANCHETA, respondent
G.R. No. 145370.
March 4, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo
Ancheta were married on March 5, 1959 and had eight
children. After 33 years of marriage the petitioner left the
respondent and their children. Their conjugal properties
were later separated through a court-sanctioned
compromise agreement where the petitioner got among
others a resort in Cavite. When the husband wanted to
marry again, he filed before the Regional Trial Court a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity
on June 5, 1995. Although he knew that the petitioner
was already residing at the resort in Cavite, he alleged in
his petition that the petitioner was residing at Las Piñas,
Metro Manila, such that summons never reached her.
Nevertheless substituted service was rendered to their
son at his residence in Cavite. Petitioner was then
declared in default for failing to answer the said petition.
Just over a month after it was filed, the trial court granted
the petition and declared the marriage of the parties void
ab initio.
presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the
proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.”
Here, the trial court immediately received the evidence
of the respondent ex-parte and rendered judgment
against the petitioner “without a whimper of protest from
the public prosecutor who even did not challenge the
motion to declare petitioner in default.”
The Supreme Court reiterates: “The task of protecting
marriage as an inviolable social institution requires
vigilant and zealous participation and not mere proforma compliance. The protection of marriage as a
sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true
and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as
well.”
Petition is GRANTED.
Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial court’s
order declaring as void ab initio her marriage with
respondent Rodolfo, citing extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction over her person, among others. She alleged
that the respondent lied on her real address in his
petition so she never received summons on the case,
hence depriving her of her right to be heard. The Court
of Appeals dismissed her petition so she now comes to
the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was
valid.
HELD:
NO. The trial court and the public prosecutor defied
Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 18, Section 6 of
the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). A grant of annulment of
marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the
danger of collusion, says the Court. “Hence, in all cases
for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal
separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered
to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of
preventing any collusion between the parties and to take
care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.”
“If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint,
the court cannot declare him or her in default but
instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to
determine if collusion exists between the parties. The
prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the
application for legal separation or annulment through the
49
Ocampo v. Florenciano
G.R. No. L-13553, 23 February 1960
FACTS:
Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married
in 1938. They begot several children who are not living
with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several
occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by
maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having
found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to
study beauty culture where she stayed for one year.
Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out
with several other men other than Arcalas. In 1952,
when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and
since then they had lived separately. In June 1955,
plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit
relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention
of filing a petition for legal separation to which defendant
manifested conformity provided she is not charged with
adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a
petition for legal separation in 1955.
ISSUE:
Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes
the confession of judgment disallowed by the Family
Code.
RULING:
Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that
she committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of
adultery other than such confession, is not the
confession of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the
Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of
judgment, a confession done in court or through a
pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery
independent of the defendant’s statement agreeing to
the legal separation, the decree of separation should be
granted since it would not be based on the confession
but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What
the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on
defendant’s confession. The petition should be granted
based on the second adultery, which has not yet
prescribed.
50
Margie Macias Corpus, complainant vs. Judge
Wilfredo G. Ochotorena, RTC- Branch 11,
Sandiganbayan, Zamboanga Del Norte, respondent
(A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861)
1. What is the appearance of the State in annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation?
2. Is Judge Ochotorena is guilty of gross ignorance of
the law?
July 30, 2004
Tinga, J.
FACTS:
On February 6, 2001, Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (Mr.
Macias) filed declaration of nullity of marriage against
her wife Mrs. Margie Macias. The case was raffled to
Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena’s court. On the same day
the Complaint was filed, Judge Ochotorena, the
respondent, immediately issued Summons to Mrs.
Macias. However, the Summons was not served on Mrs.
Macias for the reason that her whereabouts were
allegedly unknown. Consequently, Mr. Macias filed a
motion to serve summons by publication.
On March 7, 2001, respondent granted the motion in his
Order with the directive that Mrs. Macias should file her
answer within 30 days after notice. Thereafter, Mr.
Macias caused the publication of the Summons in the
local weekly newspaper, Tingog Peninsula, based in
Dipolog City in its March 11-17, 2001 issue.
Mrs. Macias claims she learned of the aforesaid
publication of Summons during the first week of April
2001. Without delay, on April 10, 2001 or within the 30day period to file an answer, she filed a Motion to
Dismiss, which she set for hearing on April 20, 2001.
However, instead of first acting upon the motion, the
respondent judge set the hearing on the merits of the
subject case on April 19, 2001, or one day before.
On April 19, 2001, respondent judge denied the Motion
to Dismiss and re-set the hearing on the merits then
after the respondent judge terminated the proceedings
and declared the case submitted for decision. Various
motions and manifestations, one after the other but
interrelated, were filed by the counsel of Mrs. Macias
opposing the hearing on the merits of the case before
the respondent judge but denied and ignored and
hearing proceeded without resolving the other motions
and manifestations. Without waiting for the OCAs
Indorsement, the respondent judge submitted his
Comment/Answer. Finally, respondent judge insists that
his Decision is valid and prays for the dismissal of the
instant Complaint for lack of merit.
What happened in the case is a classic example of
railroading or procedural short-cut. Instead of resolving
the Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge completely
ignored it and proceeded with the trial on the merits of
the case by receiving Mr. Macias evidence ex-parte.
RULINGS:
1. Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
states: "If the defending party in an action for annulment
or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a
collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no
collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it
that the evidence submitted is not fabricated."
Thus, the report of the Public Prosecutor is a condition
sine qua non for further proceedings to go on in the
case.
In the case, the respondent judge ignored this
procedural rule.
The record shows that Public
Prosecutor Arturo M. Paculanag had filed a Certification
dated May 04, 2001 with the respondent judge's court,
stating, among others, that he appeared in behalf of the
Solicitor General during the ex-parte presentation of
plaintiff's evidence, even cross-examining the plaintiff
and his witness, the psychiatrist Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos,
and that he had no objection to the granting of the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, such
Certification does not suffice to comply with the
mandatory requirement that the court should order the
investigating public prosecutor whether a collusion exists
between the parties. The directive must be made by the
court before trial could proceed, not after the trial on the
merits of the case had already been had. Notably, said
Certification was filed after the respondent judge had
ordered the termination of the case.
2. Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent
judge violated Mrs. Macias right to due process when he
completely ignored the pertinent rules. A judge is called
upon to exhibit more than just a modicum of
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is his
duty to keep always abreast with law and jurisprudence.
When the law or procedure is so elementary, for him not
to know it or to act as if he does not know it constitutes
gross ignorance.
Under Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of the law is
considered a serious offense, for which a penalty of
either dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
benefits, suspension from office for more than three (3)
months but not exceeding six (6) months or a fine of
more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20, 000.00) but
not exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) may
be imposed.
ISSUES:
51
Respondent compulsorily retired from the service on
June 04, 2001, thus, dismissal or suspension from the
service is no longer possible. Nonetheless, a penalty of
fine may still be imposed upon him considering that
under the Resolution of the First Division in A.M. No.
10597-Ret. dated October 22, 2001, the Court retained
the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) from
his retirement benefits to answer for whatever
administrative sanction the Court may impose upon him
with regard to this case. Considering that this is the first
time the respondent judge will be meted a penalty, the
Court finds a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) appropriate.
52
Sin v. Sin
G.R. No. 137590, 26 March 2001
exposure of an invalid one as well.The records are bereft
of evidence that the State participated in the prosecution
of the case thus; the case is remanded for proper trial.
FACTS:
This is a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage due
to psychological incapacity.
Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a
Portuguese citizen in January 1987. Florence filed in
September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties
presented their respective documentary and testimonial
evidence. In June 1995, trial court dismissed Florence’s
petition and throughout its trial, the State did not
participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed
with the trial court a manifestation dated November 1994
stating that he found no collusion between the parties,
he did not actively participated therein. Other than
having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more
was heard of him.
ISSUE:
Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even
with the absence of the participation of the State in the
proceedings.
RULING:
No. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to
the petition.
Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed”.
A declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code requires the application of procedural and
substantive guidelines. While compliance with these
requirements mostly devolves upon the petitioner, the
State is likewise mandated to actively intervene in the
procedure. Should there be non-compliance by the State
with its statutory duty, there is a need to remand the
case to the lower court for proper trial.
In this case, it can be argued that since the lower court
dismissed the petition, the evil sought to be prevented
(i.e., dissolution of the marriage) did not come about,
hence, the lack of participation of the State was not
preserved. The task of protecting marriage as an
inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous
participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The
protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires
not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the
53
EMILIO R. TUASON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON,
respondents.
G.R. No. 116607
April 10, 1996
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondent Maria Victoria Tuason was married
to petitioner Emilio Tuason on June 3, 1972 and had two
children. However, at the time of the marriage, Emilio
manifested psychological incapacity to comply with his
Related imagemarital obligations and resulted to violent
fights between husband and wife. Due to the series of
physical abuse against the respondent, the petitioner’s
use of prohibited drugs, cohabiting with three women,
leaving the conjugal home and giving minimal child
support, abuse of conjugal property use and incurring of
bank debts without the respondent’s consent, she filed a
petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of their
marriage in 1989 before the RTC Makati on the ground
of psychological incapacity and prayed for powers of
administration to save conjugal properties from further
dissipation.
Emilio filed his Opposition to private respondent’s
petition for appointment as administratix of the conjugal
properties of gains on April 18, 1990. The trial court
scheduled the reception of petitioner’s evidence on May
11, 1990. A counsel for petitioner moved for a
postponement on the ground that the principal counsel
was out of the country and due to return on the first
week of June, thus granted the motion and reset the
hearing to June 8, 1990.
However, on June 8, 1990, petitioner failed to appear.
On oral motion of private respondent, the court declared
petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence
and deemed the case submitted for decision on the
basis of the evidence presented.
On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment
declaring the nullity of private respondent’s marriage to
petitioner and awarding custody of the children to private
respondent.
Counsel for petitioner received a copy of this decision on
August 24, 1990. No appeal was taken from the
decision.
On September 24, 1990, private respondent filed a
“Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains
and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties”
and was opposed by the petitioner on October 17, 1990.
Also on the same day, October 17, 1990, petitioner,
through new counsel, filed with the trial court a petition
for relief from judgment of the June 29, 1990 decision.
The trial court denied the petition on August 8, 1991
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on July
1994. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in the absence of petitioner in the
hearing, the court should have ordered a prosecuting
officer to intervene.
RULING:
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable
remedy; it is allowed only in exceptional cases where
there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a
party has another remedy available to him, which may
be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an
adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not
prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal,
he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will
not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the
effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at
law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the
petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal
which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.
Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious
defense. He cites the Family Code which provides that in
actions for annulment of marriage or legal separation,
the prosecuting officer should intervene for the state
because the law looks with disfavor upon the haphazard
declaration of annulment of marriages by default. He
contends that when he failed to appear at the scheduled
hearings, the trial court should have ordered the
prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and inquire
as to the reason for his non-appearance.
Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecution attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based
upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict
application of Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code. For
one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial
court for failure to answer. Petitioner filed his answer to
the complaint and contested the cause of action alleged
by private respondent. He actively participated in the
proceedings below by filing several pleadings and crossexamining the witnesses of private respondent. It is
crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was
characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by
collusion.
54
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in
annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings
is to determine whether collusion exists between the
parties and to take care that the evidence is not
suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner’s vehement
opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the
conclusion that collusion existed between the parties.
There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence
was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties.
Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the
non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack
of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to
the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.
55
Gamboa-Hirsch Vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 174485, July 11, 2007
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks
to set aside the decision of the CA which granted private
respondent Franklin joint custody with petitioner Agnes
of their minor daughter Simone.
Spouses Franklin and Agnes started to have marital
problems as Agnes wanted to stay in Makati City, while
Franklin insisted that they stay in Boracay Island. When
Agnes came to their conjugal home in Boracay, and
asked for money and for Franklin’s permission for her to
bring their daughter to Makati City for a brief vacation
she has an intention not to come back to Boracay.
Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before
the CA for Agnes to produce Simone in court; CA issued
a Resolution which ordered that a writ of habeas corpus
be issued ordering that Simone be brought before said
court. CA granted Franklin joint custody with Agnes of
their minor child. Agnes filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it granted joint custody in utter disregard
of the provisions of the Family Code, as to minors seven
(7) years of age and below.
RULING:
The court held that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion when it granted joint custody of the minor child
to both parents. The so-called "tender-age presumption"
under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome
only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness.
The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her
children in one or more of the following instances:
neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of
the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable
disease. Here, the mother was not shown to be
unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor
child. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced
to wrench the child from the mother’s custody. Sole
custody over Simone Noelle Hirsch is hereby
AWARDED to the mother, petitioner Agnes GamboaHirsch.
56
G.R. NO. 154994 : June 28, 2005
JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO, Petitioner,
CRISANTO
RAFAELITO
GUALBERTO
Respondent.
v.
V,
Doctrines – A person’s sexual preference or moral
alone does not prove incompetency of a person to fulfill
parental obligations.
A writ of habeas corpus may be issued only when the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto.
The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is more
cautiously regarded, since the latter requires the
performance of a particular act that tends to go beyond
the maintenance of the status quo.
FACTS
Respondent Crisanto Gualberto filed on 12 March 2002
in the RTC of Parañaque City a petition for nullification of
his marriage to his wife Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto as
well as (ancillary) pendente lite custody of their minor
child Rafaello. He alleged that she took Rafaello with her
from their conjugal home in Parañaque City in early
February 2002. Rafaello, barely 4 years old, was also
enrolled in Infant Toddlers Discovery Center in BF
Homes, Parañaque City. During the trial, Crisanto
testified that Joycelyn took their child to her stepparents’
home in Caminawit, San Jose, Mindoro Occidental, and
that he failed to see his child despite his efforts to search
for them (Joycelyn and Rafaello). Another witness, Mr.
Renato Santos, testified during the trial that he was
commissioned by Crisanto to conduct surveillance on
Joycelyn and he came up with a conclusion that
Joycelyn was having relationship with a Noreen Gay
Cuidadano in Cebu City.
(1) W/N Crisanto Gualberto can have custody of
pendente lite custody of their minor child Rafaello?
(2) W/N the remedies of writ of habeas corpus and the
preliminary mandatory injunction will be issued in favor
of Crisanto Gualberto?
RULING
1. NO. The Supreme Court ruled in Joycelyn’s favor that
Rafaello’s custody remains with her. The Court reasoned
out that held that sexual preference or moral alone does
not prove a person’s neglect or incompetency to fulfill
parental obligations and the husband must clearly
establish that the wife’s moral lapses have had an
adverse effect on the child’s welfare or have distracted
her from exercising proper parental care. The Court
stated that it must be also demonstrated that a woman’s
relationship with another woman (lesbian) was not
conducive to the child’s development.
2. NO. The Court also stated that since it ruled that
Rafaello’s custody remains with Joycelyn, Crisanto’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus and the preliminary
mandatory injunction prayed will have no legal and
factual basis. The Court stated that the issuance of writ
of habeas corpus does not apply to the present case, as
a writ of habeas corpus may be issued only when the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto. Also, since Crisanto failed to
prove a clear and unmistakable right to have Rafaello’s
custody, the Court held that the ancillary remedy of
preliminary mandatory injunction cannot be granted. The
Court held that unlike an ordinary preliminary injunction,
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is more
cautiously regarded, since the latter requires the
performance of a particular act that tends to go beyond
the maintenance of the status quo.
On 3 April 2002, RTC Parañaque Judge Helen Ricafort
granted Crisanto’s prayer for custody pendente lite of
Rafaello. The Court of Appeals ruled in Crisanto’s favor
and awarded him pendente lite custody of the child.
Joycelyn appealed the verdict of the Court of Appeals
and the RTC, arguing that her child Rafaello cannot be
separated from her, because Article 213 of the Family
Code provides that when the parents are (legally)
separated and the child is less than seven (7) years old,
the child cannot separated from the mother (Joycelyn)
unless there are compelling reasons found by the court
where custody can be awarded to child’s
father/husband. Meanwhile, based on the same
provision of the Family Code, Crisanto argues that
Joycelyn’s acts, especially her relationship with a
lesbian, provides compelling reasons to award him
custody of Rafaello.
Issues
57
G.R. No. L-23482
ALFONSO LACSON, petitioner, vs. CARMEN SAN
JOSE-LACSON and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent are a married couple with our
children. Respondent left the conjugal home and filed a
complaint against petitioner in the JDRC for custody of
all their children as well as support for them and herself.
However, both parties were able to reach an amicable
settlement. After, they filed a joint petition with the CFI
for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and a
judicial separation of property. The CFI issued an order
rendering judgement approving and incorporating in toto
their compromise agreement. After, the petitioner
delivered all 4 children to the respondent and remitted
money for their support.
case at bar, the spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of
their separation of property and the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership. It does not appeal that they have
creditors who will be prejudiced by the said
arrangements. It is likewise undisputed that the couple
have been separated in fact for at least five years - the
wife's residence being in Manila, and the husband's in
the conjugal home in Bacolod City. Therefore, inasmuch
as a lengthy separation has supervened between them,
the propriety of severing their financial and proprietary
interests is manifest. However, in so approving the
regime of separation of property of the spouses and the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership, this Court does
not thereby accord recognition to nor legalize the de
facto separation of the spouses.
Later, the respondent spouse filed three motions in the
JDRC, the first a motion wherein she alleged that she
entered into and signed the Joint Petition as the only
means by which she could have immediate custody of
the minor children who are all below the age of 7, and
thereafter prayed that she be considered relieved of the
agreement pertaining to the custody and visitation of her
minor children and that since all the children are now in
her custody, the said custody in her favor be confirmed
pendente lite.
The petitioner opposed the motion. The JDRC dismissed
the case. The second, a motion for reconsideration of
the compromise judgment which the CFI denied. Both
appeals were certified by the CA to the SC since the
issues revolve around a question of law. The third, a
certiorari proceeding before the CA, respondent averring
that the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion and
acted in excess of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate
execution of the compromise judgment in its order, thus
in effect depriving her of the right to appeal. The CA
granted this petition. Thus this consolidated petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the compromise agreement entered into by the
parties and the judgment of the CFI grounded on the
said agreement, are conformable to law.
RULING:
It is. The compromise agreement and the judgment of
the CFI grounded on the said agreement are valid with
respect to the separation of property of the spouses and
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership. The law
allows separation of property of the spouses and the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership provided judicial
sanction is secured beforehand. Thus the new Civil
Code provides, “In the absence of an express
declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation
of property between spouses during the marriage shall
not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.” In the
58
JOSE R. PAÑGANIBAN, complainant, vs. ELIAS
BORROMEO, respondent.
FACTS
These proceedings looking to the disbarment of the
respondent attorney are before us on the
representations of the Solicitor-General that the
respondent appear and show cause, if any he has, why
he should not be proceeded against for professional
malpractice. The respondent admits that, in his capacity
as notary public he legalized the document which is the
basis of the complaint against him, and that the
document contains provisions contrary to law, morals
and good customs, but by way of defense disclaims any
previous knowledge of the illegal character of the
document.
On November 25, 1931, Alejandro Pabro and Juana
Mappala husband and wife, subscribed a contract before
the notary public Elias Borromeo, who was at that time a
regularly admitted member of the Philippine Bar. The
contract in question had been prepared by the municipal
secretary of Naguilian, Isabela. Attorney Borromeo
cooperated in the execution of the document and had, at
lease, some knowledge of its contents, although he may
not have been fully informed because of a difference in
dialect. The contract in substance purported to formulate
an agreement between the husband and the wife which
permitted the husband to take unto himself a concubine
and the wife to live in adulterous relationship with
another man, without opposition from either one of them.
We hold the contract to contain provisions contrary to
law, morals and public order, and as a consequence not
judicially recognizable.
2. Passing to the second question, we think there can be
no question as to the right of the court to discipline an
attorney who, in his capacity as notary public, has been
guilty of misconduct. To the office of notary public there
is not attached such importance under present
conditions as under the Spanish administration. Even so,
the notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness
and faithfulness. It is for the notary to inform himself of
the facts to which he intends to certify, and to take part
in no illegal enterprise. The notary public is usually a
person who has been admitted to the practice of law,
and such, in the commingling of his duties as notary and
lawyer, must be held responsible for both. We are led to
hold that a member of the bar who performs an act as a
notary public of a disgraceful or immoral character may
be held to account by the court even to the extent of
disbarment.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the contract sanctioned an illicit and
immoral purpose (YES)
2. Whether a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct
as a notary public.
RULING
1. The contract of the spouses, it will be recalled, was
executed at a time when the Spanish Penal Code, as
modified by Act No. 1773 was in force. Conceding,
however, that the more liberal provisions of the Revised
Penal Code should be given application, it is herein
provided that the consent or pardon given by the
offended party constitutes a bar to prosecution for
adultery or concubinage. In this instance, if the spouses
should retain their present frame of mind, no prosecution
of either one by the other could be expected.
Nevertheless, we think it far from the purpose of the
Legislature to legalize adultery and concubinage. They
still remain crimes, with the qualification that prosecution
cannot be instituted if the offended party consent to the
act or pardon the offender. This is a matter of future
contingency and is not matter for legalization in wanton
disregard of good morals.
59
PEOPLE v GUINUCUD and ROSARIO TAGAYUN
G.R. No. L-38672 October 27, 1933
and the honor of his family to be flagrantly sullied by the
notorious adultery of his wife.
FACTS:
On April 1930, the husband, Ramon Palattao,
abandoned and deserted his wife, Rosario Tagayun, and
their child. Rosario lived with her mother. Thereafter, at
the request of the mother of Rosario, the barrio
lieutenant, took Rosario and her child to Ramon's house
but she was refused admission by the said Ramon.
Thereafter, on July 3, 1930, Ramon, induced his wife, to
sign the document which appears in the record as
Exhibit 1 as follows:
2. In this case, the very thing happened which he might
have foreseen and probably did foresee when he
abandoned his wife and deceived her into believing that
she was free when she signed the said agreement a
year and a half before the offense was committed. His
consent to the offense before it was committed was void
but his tolerance of and acquiescence in the offense
after it was committed demonstrate that it is a
hypocritical pretense for him now to appear in court as
the "offended party" and bar his right to prosecute his
wife.
1. They will live separately.
2. The mutually agree to give privilege to love or marry
other people.
3. They are bound to support their child jointly.
Ramon then admitted on cross-examination that, for
more than a year before he filed the complaint in this
case, he knew that his wife Rosario and her coaccused
Alfonso were living together in the same house. During
all that time he took no action whatever to vindicate the
honor or his name, because he felt bound by the alleged
agreement to give his consent to Rosario's conduct or
because he expected her to reciprocate. He was
"assuming a mere pose when he signed the complaint
as the 'offended spouse," and his conduct as shown by
the evidence in this case warrants the inference that he
consented to, and acquiesced in, the adulterous
relations existing between the accused, and he is,
therefore, not authorized by law to institute this criminal
proceeding.
ISSUE:
1. WON the said contract implies that the husband
has consented to his wife’s affair.
2. WON the contract will bar criminal proceedings.
HELD:
1. YES. The contract has implied that Ramon has
consented with the affair.
Exhibit 1, is void in law, it is nevertheless competent
evidence to explain the husband's inaction after he knew
of his wife's living with the coaccused and to show that
he acquiesced in her conduct. The expression "if he
shall have consented" in article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code, which bars the "offended" husband from
instituting a prosecution, has no reference to any
consent or agreement prior to the commission of the
offense but relates to an express or implied
acquiescence subsequent to the offense. This consent
or acquiescence need not be express but may be
inferred from the conduct or the long continued inaction
of the husband after learning of the offense. The
husband who is truly "offended", within the meaning of
the statute, will not sit passively by and allow his name
60
Partosa-Jo v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 82606, 18 December 1992
FACTS
Jose Jo is a Chinese national, and Prima Partosa is his
legal wife. Jose Jo admitted that he had cohabited with
three other women and fathered 15 children. The two
agreed that Prima would temporarily leave their conjugal
home in Dumaguete City to stay with her parents during
the initial period of her pregnancy and for Jose to visit
and support her. They never agreed to separate
permanently. In 1942, Prima went back to Dumaguete,
but she was not accepted by her husband.
In 1980, Prima filed a petition for judicial separation of
conjugal property as well as for support. The trial court
judge rendered the decision granting Prima a monthly
support of Php500, Php40,000 for the construction of a
house where she may live separately, Php19,200 by
way of support in-arrears, and Php3,000 for attorney’s
fees. However, the complaint for judicial separation of
conjugal property was dismissed for lack of a cause for
action and on the ground that separation by agreement
was not covered by Article 178 of the Civil Code.
Art. 178. The separation in fact between husband and
wife without judicial approval, shall not affect the
conjugal partnership, except that:
(3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just
cause for at least one year, she may petition the court
for a receivership, or administration by her of the
conjugal partnership property or separation of property.
For abandonment to exist there must be an absolute
cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the
intention of perpetual separation. The fact that Jo did not
accept her demonstrates that he had no intention of
resuming their conjugal relationship. From 1968 until
1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to Prima.
Hence, the physical separation of the parties, coupled
with the refusal by the private respondent to give support
to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a
ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal
property.
Jose contended that the decision of the trial court could
no longer be reviewed by the Court of Appeals because
it has long since become final and executory. Prima, on
the other hand, argued that a disposition of that case
was made in the penultimate paragraph of the decision.
It reads:
“It is, therefore, hereby ordered that all properties in
question are considered properties of Jose Jo, the
defendant in this case, subject to separation of property
under Article 178, third paragraph of the Civil Code,
which is subject of separate proceedings as enunciated
herein.”
Prima believed this to be the dispositive portion of the
case.
ISSUE:
WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to
warrant judicial separation of conjugal property.
RULING:
The petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner
and that the court ordered the conjugal property of the
spouses be divided between them, share and share
alike. The division will be implemented after the
determination of all the properties pertaining to the said
conjugal partnership including those that may have been
illegally registered in the name of the persons. SC is in
the position that respondent court should have made the
necessary modification instead of dismissing the case
filed.
61
Estrella de la Cruz vs. Severino de la Cruz
No. L-19565
30 January 1968
Castro, J.
FACTS:
On 01 February 1938, Estrella and Severino married in
Bacolod City. During their union, six (6) children were
born, and seven (7) parcels of land from Bacolod
Cadastre and three (3) parcels of land from Silay
Cadastre were acquired. These lands were assessed at
P45,429 and P43,580, respectively. The hacienda in
Silay had a net profit of P3,309.49 in 1957. Aside from
these properties, the spouses also owned a number of
varied businesses and subdivisions.
On 22 July 1958, Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint
alleging that her husband had not only abandoned her,
but also mismanaged their conjugal partnership
properties. According to Estrella, since 1955, Severino
had not lived in their conjugal home, but instead had
lived in his office and thereafter had been living in Manila
with his concubine, Nenita Hernandez.
This was
supported by notes and letters written by Nenita which
Estrella found hidden in the pocket of her husband’s polo
shirt and then in his iron safe thereafter.
When
confronted, Severino denied of abandoning his wife and
children. He reasoned that he was only living in his
office to teach a lesson to his quarrelsome and
extremely jealous wife. He further averred that he never
failed to give his family financial support as evidenced by
the allowance drawings of the wife in the amounts
ranging from P1000 to P1500 from the office, which was
corroborated by Marcos Ganaban, the assistant general
manager of Philippine Textboard Factory.
moral desertion.Therefore, physical separation alone is
not the full meaning of the term “abandonment”, if the
husband, despite his voluntary departure from the
society of his spouse, neither neglects the management
of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to
his wife.
In the case at bar, the Court believed that the defendant
did not intend to leave his wife and children permanently.
Thus, the SC held that lower court erred in holding that
mere refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of
the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the
progress of the business constitutes abuse of
administration. In order for abuse to exist, there must be
a willful and utter disregard of the interest of the
partnership evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts
or omissions prejudicial to the latter.
Furthermore, Estrella insists that her husband refused
and failed to inform her of the status of their various
business concerns.
She further claims that such
actuations are tantamount to an abuse of administrative
powers over the conjugal partnership properties.
However, no evidence from the plaintiff was presented.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been abandonment on the part
of the husband and whether or not there has been an
abused of his authority as administrator of the conjugal
partnership.
RULING:
No. The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of
his marital obligations and support of the family.
To be legally declared as to have abandoned the
conjugal home, one must have willfully and with intention
of not coming back and perpetual separation. The law
provides that there must be real abandonment and not
mere separation. The abandonment must not only be
physical estrangement but also amount to financial and
62
BENJAMIN BUGAYONG vs. LEONILA GINEZ
G.R. No. L-10033
FACTS:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States
Navy, was married to defendant Leonila Ginez.
Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with
their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. After
some time, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sisterin-law and informed her husband by letter that she had
gone to reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan.
the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten
months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity
amounting to adultery.It has been held in a long line of
decisions of the various supreme courts of the different
states of the U. S. that 'a single voluntary act of sexual
intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery of the
offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation,
especially as against the husband'. In the lights of the
facts testified to by the plaintiff-husband, of the legal
provisions above quoted, and of the various decisions
above-cited, the inevitable conclusion is that there is
condonation.
Afterwards, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters
from some anonymous writers informing him of alleged
acts of infidelity of his wife. Benjamin Bugayong then
went to Asingan, Pangasinan and sought for his wife.
Both husband and wife then proceeded to the house of
Pedro Bugayong, a cousin of Benjamin, where they
stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and
wife. Then they returned to the plaintiff's house and
again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On
the third day, Benjamin tried to verify from his wife the
truth of the information he received that she had
committed adultery but, instead of answering his query,
she merely packed up and left, which he took as a
confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. After
that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to
locate her.
Benjamin then filed a complaint for legal separation
against his wife, who timely filed an answer vehemently
denying the averments of the complaint and stating than
she was condoned by her husband.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was condonation in this case.
RULING:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense
constituting a ground for legal separation. A detailed
examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband,
clearly shows that there was a condonation on the part
of the husband for the supposed "acts of infidelity
amounting to adultery" committed by defendant-wife.
Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities
amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant,
a reconciliation was effected between her and the
plaintiff.
The act of the latter in persuading her to come along
with him, and the fact that she went with him and
consented to be brought to the house of his cousin
Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as
husband and wife for one day and one night, and the
further fact that in the second night they again slept
together in their house likewise as husband and wife —
all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of
this court than that a reconciliation between them was
effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by
63
PEOPLE V. ZAPATA AND BONDOC
G.R. NO. L-3047
FACTS:
A complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc
against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife, and Dalmacio
Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having
repeated sexual intercourse during the period from the
year 1946 to 1947. The complaint was filed on March 14,
1947 whereby Dalmacio Bondoc knows his codefendant
to be a married woman. The defendant wife entered the
plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four months
which penalty she served. In the same court, on
September 17, 1948, the offended husband filed another
complaint for adulterous acts committed by his wife and
her paramour from March 1947 to September 1948.
Each of the defendants filed a motion to quash the
complaint of the ground that they would be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial
court upheld the contention of the defendants and
quashed the second complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second complaint can be quashed for
double jeopardy.
RULING:
A second complaint charging the commission of
adulterous acts not included in the first complaint does
not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of
the constitution is that, if the second complaint places
the defendants twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense, the adultery committed by the male
defendant charged in the second complaint, should he
be absolved from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon
the evidence that he did not know that his codefendant
was a married woman, would remain or go unpunished.
The defense set up by him against the first charge upon
which he was acquitted would no longer be available,
because at the time of the commission of the crime
charged in the second complaint, he already knew that
this defendant was a married woman and he continued
to have carnal knowledge of her.
Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous wife,
such pardon would not exempt the wife and her
paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts
committed after the pardon was granted because the
pardon refers to previous and not to subsequent
adulterous acts.
The order appealed from, which quashed the second
complaint for adultery, is hereby reversed and set aside,
and trial court directed to proceed with the trial of the
defendants in accordance with law, with costs against
the appellees.
64
MATUBIS V. PRAXEDES
G.R. No. L-11766
FACTS:
Plaintiff and defendant were legally married. For failure
to agree on how they should live as husband and wife,
they agreed to live separately from each other. After,
they entered into an agreement to the effect that they
relinquished their right over the other as legal husband
and wife. When defendant began cohabitating with
another woman, they bore a child. They deported
themselves as husband and wife and were generally
reputed as such in the community.
Alleging abandonment and concubinage, plaintiff filed
with the CFI a complaint for Legal Separation and
change of surname against her the defendant. After the
trial, without the defendant adducing any evidence, the
court a quo rendered judgment holding that the acts of
defendant constituted concubinage, it, however,
dismissed the complaint. Thus this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was condonation on the part of the
plaintiff allowing such act of the defendant.
RULING:
Yes there was, the decision appealed from is affirmed.
Article 102 of the new Civil Code provides that an action
for legal separation cannot be filed except within one
year from and after the date on which the plaintiff
became cognizant of the cause send within five years
from and after the date when such cause occurred. The
complaint was filed outside the periods provided for by
the above Article. By the very admission of plaintiff, she
came to know the ground (concubinage) for the legal
separation in January, 1955. She instituted the complaint
only on April 24, 1956. It is to be noted that appellant did
not even press this matter in her brief.
Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are
necessarily the import of paragraph 6 (b) of the
agreement. The condonation and consent here are not
only implied but expressed. The law (Art. 100 Civil
Code), specifically provides that legal separation may be
claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has
been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented in
writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court’s
sympathy.
65
Pacete v. Carriaga
G.R. No. L-53880, 17 March 1994
period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward
getting the parties to reconcile.
FACTS:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979,
for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her
erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la
Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her
and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She
averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete
on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that
Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with
Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such
marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between
her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently
preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of
the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a
provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides
that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or
for legal separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation
fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to investigate whether or not collusion between
the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to
intervene for the State in order to see to it that the
evidence submitted is not fabricated.”
The defendants were each served with summons. They
filed an extension within which to file an answer, which
the court partly granted. Due to unwanted
misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the
defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the
court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare
the defendants in default, which the court forthwith
granted. The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during
the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980.
After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the
plaintiff on March 17, 1980.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file
their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in
rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed
the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be
null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.
RULING:
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal
separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment. In case of nonappearance of the defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion
between parties exists. If there is collusion, the
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order
to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not
fabricated.”
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of
the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings
for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages,
under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more
than a mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family
Code, further mandates that an action for legal
separation must “in no case be tried before six months
shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,”
obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off”
66
ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ de ARROYO GR No. L-17014
FACTS:
Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo were
married in 1910 and have lived together as man and wife
until July 4, 1920 when the wife went away from their
common home with the intention of living separate from
her husband. Mariano’s efforts to induce her to resume
marital relations were all in vain.
cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to
return. The plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint,
without special pronouncement as to costs of either
instance.
Thereafter, Mariano initiated an action to compel her to
return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a
dutiful wife. Dolores averred by way of defense and
cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave
because of the cruel treatment of her husband. She in
turn prayed that a decree of separation be declared and
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership as well as
permanent separate maintenance.
The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence
before him, reached the conclusion that the husband
was more to blame than his wife and that his continued
ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her
abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent
breaking off of marital relations with him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts can compel one of the
spouses to cohabit with each other
RULING:
NO. It is not within the province of the courts of this
country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of
course where the property rights of one of the pair are
invalid, an action for restitution of such rights can be
maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the
doctrine that an order, enforceable by process of
contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of
the purely personal rights of consortium. At best such an
order can be effective for no other purpose than to
compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the
experience of these countries where the court of justice
have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married
people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable.
We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo
in this case is entitled to the unconditional and absolute
order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile,
which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint;
though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial
declaration that his wife has presented herself without
sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return.
Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in
respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill,
it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has
absented herself from the marital home without sufficient
67
TENCHAVEZ V. ESCANO
G.R. No. L-19671
FACTS:
Pastor Tenchavez, 32, married Vicenta Escano, 27, on
Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu City. As of June 1948, the newlyweds were already estranged. On June 24, 1950,
Escano left for the US. On August 22, 1950, she filed a
verified complaint for divorce against the plaintiff in the
State of Nevada on the ground of "extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character."
On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was issued by
the Nevada Court. On September 13, 1954, Escano
married an American Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She
now lives with him in California and by him, has begotten
children. She acquired American citizenship on August
8, 1958. On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint
for legal separation and damages against VE and her
parents in the CFI-Cebu.
Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and
Mina Escaño are undeserving of an award for damages
because they are guilty of contributory negligence in
failing to take up proper and timely measures to
dissuade their daughter Vicenta from leaving her
husband Tenchavez obtaining a foreign divorce and
marrying another man (Moran). This theory cannot be
considered: first, because this was not raised in the court
below; second, there is no evidence to support it; third, it
contradicts plaintiff's previous theory of alienation of
affections in that contributory negligence involves an
omission to perform an act while alienation of affection
involves the performance of a positive act.
detriment of those members of our society whose means
do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain
absolute divorce outside the Philippines.Therefore, a
foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and
decreed after the effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction.
2. Yes. The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her
divorce, for grounds not countenanced by our law, which
was hers at the time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury
upon plaintiff's feelings in a manner "contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy" (Civil Code, Art. 21) for
which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral
damages. It is also argued that, by the award of moral
damages, an additional effect of legal separation has
been added to Article 106.
It was plain in the decision that the damages attached to
her wrongful acts under the codal article (Article 2176)
expressly cited. But economic sanctions are not held in
our law to be incompatible with the respect accorded to
individual liberty in civil cases. Thus, a consort who
unjustifiably deserts the conjugal abode can be denied
support (Art. 178, Civil Code of the Phil.). And where the
wealth of the deserting spouse renders this remedy
illusory, there is no cogent reason why the court may not
award damage as it may in cases of breach of other
obligations to do intuitu personae even if in private
relations physical coercion be barred under the old
maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and factum".
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not at the the time Escano was still a
Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was
issued.
2. Whether or not the award of moral damages
against Escaño may be given to Tenchavez on
the grounds of her refusal to perform her wifely
duties, her denial of consortium, and desertion
of her husband.
RULING:
1. Yes. At the time the divorce decree was issued,
Escano like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She
was then subject to Philippine law under Art. 15 of the
New Civil Code (NCC). Philippine law, under the NCC
then now in force, does not admit absolute divorce but
only provides for legal separation. For Philippine courts
to recognize foreign divorce decrees between Filipino
citizens would be a patent violation of the declared policy
of the State, especially in view of the third paragraph of
Art. 17, NCC.
Moreover, recognition would give rise to scandalous
discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the
68
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 187495
April 21, 2014
FACTS:
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and
have four children.
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a ComplaintAffidavit, alleging that her husband, the accusedappellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998
at their residence in Cagayan de Oro City, and that on
December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her
shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.
As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal
intimacy did not really cause marital problems between
her and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both
frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of
course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm.
However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He
would immediately remove her panties and, sans any
foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged
method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so
she would resist his sexual ambush but he would
threaten her into submission.
One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a
daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not lie
thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested
separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior
prompted him to ask angrily: “Why are you lying on the
cot?”, and to instantaneously order: “You transfer here to
our bed.”
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she
had headache and abdominal pain due to her
forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease
him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the
cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on
the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell,
took her pillow and transferred to the bed.
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not
before long, expressed his desire to copulate with her by
tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by
warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not
feeling well.
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual
yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding on to
her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore
on the sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her
legs.
The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster,41
stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on
them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her
hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was
carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest
by desperately shouting: “Don ‘t do that to me because
I’m not feeling well.” Accused raised the defense of
denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the rape
charges as her revenge because he took over the
control and management of their businesses, and to
cover up her extra-marital affairs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be a marital rape.
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not
have property rights over their wives’ bodies. Sexual
intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not
consensual, is rape.
Violation of equal protection clause
The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases
differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the
elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for
their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause.
The Court found that there is no rational basis for
distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital
rape. The various rationales which have been asserted
in defense of the exemption are either based upon
archaic notions about the consent and property rights
incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand
even the slightest scrutiny.
The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the
New York statute to be unconstitutional.
Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with
absolute immunity from prosecution for the rape of his
wife. The privilege was personal and pertained to him
alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will
be liable when he aids or abets another person in raping
her.
Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the crime
without regard to the rapist’s legal relationship with his
victim.
Implied consent theory untenable
The Court also ruled against the application of implied
consent theory which was raised by the accused. The
accused argued that consent to copulation is presumed
between cohabiting husband and wife unless the
contrary is proved.
According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that
rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within
marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her
consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon
her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW
69
and its accompanying Declaration, defines
penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
and
70
Goitia v. Campos-Rueda
G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916
TRENT, J.:
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose
Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on January
7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino
Manila. They stayed together for a month before
petitioner returned to her parent’s home. Goitia filed a
complaint against respondent for support outside the
conjugal home.
It was alleged that respondent
demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts
on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such
acts and demanded her husband other than the legal
and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing,
respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting
injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated
that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her
except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a
judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from
respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.
is not an impeachment of that public policy by which
marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its
nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker
one; and except in so far only as such separation is
tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and
morals may be considered, it does NOT in any respect
whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose
place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to
support her outside the conjugal home.
RULING:
Yes. Campos Rueda was held liable to support his wife.
The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to
support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by
paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his
own home at his option. However, this option given by
law is NOT absolute.
This obligation is founded not so much on the express or
implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the
natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the
enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state
itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by
his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek
protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate
maintenance is not due and payable either as damages
or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of
the term, but rather a judgment calling for the
performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of
the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a
view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the
wife; as where the husband makes so base demands
upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her.
In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the
conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and
physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim
support from the husband for separate maintenance
even outside the conjugal home. The pro tanto
separation resulting from a decree for separate support
71
PELAYO VS. LAURON 12 Phil. 453
G.R. No. L-4089 January 12, 1909
FACTS:
Arturo Pelayo, a physician, plaintiff was called to render
medical assistance to the defendant’s daughter-in-law,
who was about to give birth. After the consultation of Dr.
Escaño, it was deemed that the operation was going to
be difficult for child birth, but regardless, Dr. Pelayo
proceeded with the job of operating on the subject and
also removed the after birth. The operation went on until
morning and on the same day, visited several times and
billed the defendants the just amount of P500 for the
services rendered to which defendants refused to pay.
Counsel for the defendants denied all of the allegation
and alleged as a special defense, that their daughter-inlaw had died in consequence of the said childbirth, that
when she was alive she lived with her husband
independently and in a separate house without any
relation whatever with them, and that, if on the day when
she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants,
her stay there was accidental and due to fortuitous
circumstances. Therefore, he prayed that the defendants
be absolved of the complaint with costs against the
plaintiff.
services that he rendered was the husband of the
patient.
Within the meaning of the law, the father and mother-inlaw are strangers with respect to the obligation that
devolves upon the husband to provide support, among
which is the furnishing of medical assistance to his wife
at the time of her confinement; and, on the other hand, it
does not appear that a contract existed between the
defendants and the plaintiff physician, for which reason it
is obvious that the former can not be compelled to pay
fees which they are under no liability to pay because it
does not appear that they consented to bind themselves.
ISSUE:
Are Marelo and Juana obliged to pay petitioner for the
medical assistance rendered to their daughter-in-law?
HELD:
No. According to article 1089 of the Civil Code,
obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasicontracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in
which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. Obligations
arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly
determined in the code or in special laws, etc., are the
only demandable ones. Obligations arising from
contracts have legal force between the contracting
parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their
stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and 1091.)
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness
was comprised among the mutual obligations to which
the spouses were bound by way of mutual support.
(Arts. 142 and 143.) If every obligation consists in giving,
doing or not doing something (Art. 1088), and spouses
were mutually bound to support each other, there can be
no question but that, when either of them by reason of
illness should be in need of medical assistance, the
other was under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the
necessary services of a physician in order that health
may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the
sickness by which life is jeopardized. The party bound to
furnish such support was therefore liable for all
expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his
professional services. Consequently, the person bound
to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional
72
GANDIONGCO VS PENARANDA
GR No. 72984
FACTS
Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a
complaint against herein petitioner, Froilan Gandionco
for legal separation on the ground of concubinage as a
civil case. Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of
concubinage against her husband. She likewise filed an
application for the provisional remedy of support pendent
elite which was approved and ordered by the respondent
judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal
separation and the incidents consequent thereto such as
the support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case
for concubinage filed against him. He contends that the
civil action for legal separation is inextricably tied with
the criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal
separation will have to be suspended and await the
conviction or acquittal of the criminal case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can
proceed pending the resolution of the criminal case for
concubinage. (NO)
RULING:
Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the
petitioner were incorrect. A civil action for legal
separation on the ground of concubinage may proceed
ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for
concubinage, because said civil action is not one to
enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, even if
both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are
related to the same offense. Such civil action is one
intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the
legal consequences thereof including the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of the
children, support and disqualifications from inheriting
from the innocent spouse. Decree of legal separation
may be issued upon proof by preponderance of
evidence, where no criminal proceeding or conviction is
necessary.
Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy,
can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and
granted at the discretion of the judge. If in case, the
petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite
ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to
modify or reduce the same.
73
G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998
HERBERT CANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and
MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were
married and begot three children namely: Keith,
Charmaine and Joseph Anthony. When Anna Marie
learned that her husband was having extramarital affair
with Wilma Soco, a family friend, she filed a petition for
legal separation with alimony pende lite. The lower court
rendered a decision granting the joint manifestation of
the Cang spouses providing that they agreed to “live
separately and apart from bed and board.”
With regard to the absence of the consent of the
petitioner to the adoption, it is clear in the provisions of
law that the written consent of the natural parent is
indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption.
However, the court may acquire jurisdiction over the
case even without the written consent of the parents or
one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption
alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from
compliance therewith. Since the alleged
abandonment of the children by the petitioner was not
given sufficient evidence, the petition for adoption of the
Cang children by the spouse respondents Ronald and
Maria Clara Clavano was DENIED.
Petitioner left for the United States where he sought a
divorce from Anna Marie before State of Nevada. The
said court then issued a decree of divorce and granted
sole custody of three children to Anna Marie, reserving
“rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places” to
petitioner.
Meanwhile, private respondents Ronald Clavano and
Maria Clara Clavano, respectfully the brother and sisterin-law of Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings for
adoption of the three Cang children before the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu. The petition bears the signature of
then 14- year-old Keith signifying consent to his
adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of
consent alleging that petitioner had evaded his legal
obligation to support his children; that her brother and
sister had been helping her in sustaining the children;
that she will be going to the United States to attend to a
family business; and that petitioners had long forfeited
his parental rights.
Petitioner, upon learning the petition for adoption,
returned to the Philippines and filed on opposition to the
petition for the adoption of his children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as
to warrant dispensation of his consent to the adoption of
his children.
RULING:
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the
act of abandonment imports “any conduct of the parent
which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental
duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” It
means “neglect or refusal to perform the natural and
legal obligations of care and support which parents owe
their children.” In the case at bar, records disclose that
petitioner’s conduct did not manifest a settled to purpose
to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims over his children as to constitute abandonment.
Physical estrangement alone, without financial and
moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonement.
74
LAPUZ SY vs. EUFEMIO
G.R. No. L-30977
FACTS
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition
for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging
that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934;
that they had lived together as husband and wife
continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned
her; that they had no child; and that she discovered her
husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go
Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about March
1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal
separation, which, among others, would order that the
defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his
share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio however counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his
marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his
prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to
Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo
Hiok. On May 31, 1969, petitioner died in a vehicular
accident. Respondent moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the death abated the action for legal
separation.
the action itself. For this reason the courts are almost
unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a
divorce proceeding, before final decree, abates the
action.
However, it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute
community of property), the loss of right by the offending
spouse to any share of the profits earned by the
partnership or community, or his disqualification to
inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as
the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the
offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all
rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil
Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the
spouses; and by their nature and intent, such claims and
disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or
transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim
that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies,
under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to
warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of
the deceased party.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final
decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action
RULING:
An action for legal separation which involves nothing
more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses
is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines
recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the
innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal
separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the
spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the
proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal
separation already rendered. Being personal in
character, it follows that the death of one party to the
action causes the death of the action itself “... When one
of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce,
because the marriage is dissolved. The heirs cannot
even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes
place during the course of the suit (Article 244, Section
3).” The action is absolutely dead
Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under
the sanction of law, and an action for divorce is a
proceeding brought for the purpose of effecting a
dissolution of that relation. The action is one of a
personal nature. In the absence of a statute to the
contrary, the death of one of the parties to such action
abates the action, for the reason that death has settled
the question of separation beyond all controversy and
deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons
of the parties to the action and of the subject-matter of
75
Ty v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 127406, 27 November 2000
FACTS:
Edgardo M. Reyes married Anna Maria Regina
Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in
Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27,
1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their
marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid
marriage license.The church wedding on August 27,
1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of
consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his
marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia
P. Ty on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the
judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they
also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil
Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160, praying
that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void.
He alleged that they had no marriage license when they
got married. He also averred that at the time he married
petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated
that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity
of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The
decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was
rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage
to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
ISSUE:
Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage of
Reyes is required before a subsequent marriage can be
entered into validly.
RULING:
Private respondents first and second marriages
contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are governed
by the provisions of the Civil Code. Pertinent to the
present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides
that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse
shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so
contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until
declared null and void by a competent court.
As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains no
express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on that
time provides the following:
People v. Mendozaand People v. Aragon, this Court held
that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved the same
factual milieu. Accused contracted a second marriage
during the subsistence of his first marriage. After the
death of his first wife, accused contracted a third
marriage during the subsistence of the second marriage.
The second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy. The
Court acquitted accused on the ground that the second
marriage is void, having been contracted during the
existence of the first marriage. There is no need for a
judicial declaration that said second marriage is void.
Since the second marriage is void, and the first one
terminated by the death ofhis wife, there are no two
subsisting valid marriages. In Odayat v. Amante (1977),
the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza precedents.
We exonerated a clerk of court of the charge of
immorality on the ground that his marriage to
FilomenaAbella in October of 1948 was void, since she
was already previously married to one Eliseo Portales in
February of the same year. The Court held that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of
void marriages.
On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, the court
applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The Court held
that since the second marriage took place and all the
children there under were born before the effectivity of
the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence at that time. The first marriage
of private respondent being void for lack of license and
consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its
nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In
this case, therefore, we conclude that private
respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid.
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee
being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been
absent for less than seven years, is generally considered
as dead and before any person believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
76
Bonifacia Mateo, et al. v. Gervasio Lagua, et al.
G.R. No. L-26270, October 30, 1969
FACTS
Cipriano Lagua and his wife Alejandra Dumlao, in a
public instrument, donated the two parcels of land to
their son Alejandro Lagua, in consideration of the latter’s
marriage to Bonifacia Mateo. The couple took
possession of the properties, but the Certificates of Title
remained in the donor’s name. Cipriano Lagua later
executed a deed of sale of the same two parcels of land
in favor of his younger son, Gervasio. A TCT were
issued to Gervasio. Bonifacia Mateo and her daughter,
Anatalia, sought the annulment of the deed of sale in
favor of Gervasio Lagua and for recovery of possession
of the properties which was granted by the court. The
decision became final, and Bonifacia Mateo, and her
daughter, Anatalia Lagua, were installed in possession
of the land.
the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation may be
reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that
the value of the donated property exceeds that of the
disposable free portion plus the donee’s share as
legitime in the properties of the donor. In the present
case, it can hardly be said that, with the evidence then
before the court, it was in any position to rule on the
inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to
order its reduction and reconveyance of the deducted
portion to the respondents.
Gervasio Lagua and Cipriano Lagua, filed a complaint
for annulment of the donation of the two lots, insofar as
one-half portion thereof was concerned claiming that in
donating the two lots, said plaintiff not only neglected
leaving something for his own support but also
prejudiced the legitime of his forced heir, plaintiff
Gervasio Lagua. While the cases were pending, plaintiff
Cipriano Lagua died. The Court of Appeals held that the
donation to Alejandro Lagua of the 2 lots prejudiced the
legitime of Cipriano’s other heir, Gervasio Lagua. The
donation was thus declared inofficious, and defendantsappellees were ordered to reconvey to plaintiff Gervasio
Lagua a portion of 494.15 square meters to be taken
from any convenient part of the lots.
ISSUE:
Is the court of appeals ruling on the inofficiousness of
the donation proper?
RULING
No. ART. 908 of the civil code provides that to determine
the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of
the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts, and
charges, which shall not include those imposed in the
will. To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be
added the value of all donations by the testator that are
subject to collation, at the time he made them. In other
words, before any conclusion about the legal share due
to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary
that certain steps be taken first.
The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by
deducting a payable obligations and charges from the
value of the property owned by the deceased at the time
of his death; then, all donations subject to collation
would be added to it. With the partible estate thus
determined, the legitimes of the compulsory heir or heirs
can be established; and only thereafter can it be
ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced
77
G.R. No. L-12707
August 10, 1918
HARDING VS COMMERCIAL UNION
FACTS:
In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance
for a Studebaker she received as a gift from her
husband. She was assisted by Smith, Bell, and Co.
which was the duly authorized representative (insurance
agent) of Commercial Union Assurance Company in the
Philippines. The car’s value was estimated with the help
of an experienced mechanic (Mr. Server) of the Luneta
Garage. The car was bought by Mr. Harding for
P2,800.00. The mechanic, considering some repairs
done, estimated the value to be at P3,000.00. This
estimated value was the value disclosed by Mrs. Harding
to Smith, Bell, and Co. She also disclosed that the value
was an estimate made by Luneta Garage (which also
acts as an agent for Smith, Bell, and Co).
In March 1916, a fire destroyed the Studebaker. Mrs.
Harding filed an insurance claim but Commercial Union
denied it as it insisted that the representations and
averments made as to the cost of the car were false; and
that said statement was a warranty. Commercial Union
also stated that the car does not belong to Mrs. Harding
because such a gift [from her husband] is void under the
Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mrs. Harding is entitled to the insurance
claim.
RULING:
Yes. Commercial Union is not the proper party to attack
the validity of the gift made by Mr. Harding to his wife.
The statement made by Mrs. Harding as to the cost of
the car is not a warranty. The evidence does not prove
that the statement is false. In fact, the evidence shows
that the cost of the car is more than the price of the
insurance. The car was bought for P2,800.00 and then
thereafter, Luneta Garage made some repairs and body
paints which amounted to P900.00. Mr. Server attested
that the car is as good as new at the time the insurance
was effected.
Commercial Union, upon the information given by Mrs.
Harding, and after an inspection of the automobile by its
examiner, having agreed that it was worth P3,000, is
bound by this valuation in the absence of fraud on the
part of the insured. All statements of value are, of
necessity, to a large extent matters of opinion, and it
would be outrageous to hold that the validity of all valued
policies must depend upon the absolute correctness of
such estimated value.
78
Rosanna Tan-Andal vs Mario Victor Andal
G.R. No. 196359 – Civil Law – Persons and Family
Relations – Marriage; Annulment of Marriage –
Psychological Incapacity – Abandonment of certain
portions of the Molina Guidelines – Expert witness not
needed in proving psychological incapacity
FACTS:
In 1995, Rosanna Tan and Mario Victor Andal married
each other. They were blessed with one child. However,
even before their marriage, Rosanna already observed
Mario to be extremely irritable and moody. Earlier in their
marriage, Rosanna also observed Mario to be
emotionally immature, irresponsible, irritable, and
psychologically imbalanced. Rosanna later learned that
Mario was a drug addict. Due to his erratic behavior,
Rosanna caused Mario to be confined in a drug rehab
center twice. Mario’s irresponsibility even caused the
closure of their family business. Mario also exposed their
daughter to his drug use. In December 2000, fed up with
Mario, Rosanna chose to live separately from him. In
August 2003, Rosanna filed a petition to have her
marriage with Mario be declared void on the ground that
Mario was psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations.
To prove her case, she presented a psychologist (Dr.
Fonso Garcia) who, after interviewing Rosanna,
Rosanna’s daughter, and Rosanna’s sister, concluded
that Mario was psychologically incapacitated to perform
essential marital obligations. Dr. Garcia did not interview
Mario as the latter, despite invitation, refused an
interview. In her assessment, Dr. Garcia found Mario to
be suffering from Narcissistic Antisocial Personality
Disorder.
In May 2007, the trial court voided the marriage between
Rosanna and Mario as it ruled that Rosanna was able to
prove her case. The Court of Appeals however reversed
the trial court on the ground that the findings of Dr.
Garcia was unscientific and unreliable because she
diagnosed Mario without interviewing him.
On appeal, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to
revisit the Molina Guidelines and the other nullity cases
decided by the Supreme Court after Molina.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Rosanna and
Mario is void.
HELD:
Yes. Dr. Garcia’s expert testimony is given due weight.
HOWEVER, the Supreme Court declared, among
others, that in psychological incapacity cases, expert
testimony is NOT a requirement.
Below is the Supreme Court’s new set of guidelines in
determining the existence of psychological incapacity:
1. The burden of proof in proving psychological
incapacity is still on the plaintiff. The Supreme Court
however clarified that the quantum of proof required in
nullity cases is clear and convincing evidence which is
more than preponderant evidence (ordinary civil cases)
but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt (criminal
cases). This is because marriage is presumed valid and
in this jurisdiction, a presumption can only be rebutted
with clear and convincing evidence.
2. Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity
nor a personality disorder that must be proven through
expert testimony. There must be proof, however, of the
durable or enduring aspects of a person’s personality,
called “personality structure,” which manifests itself
through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines
the family. The spouse’s personality structure must
make it impossible for him or her to understand and,
more important, to comply with his or her essential
marital obligations. Proof of these aspects of personality
need not be given by an expert. Ordinary witnesses who
have been present in the life of the spouses before the
latter contracted marriage may testify on behaviors that
they have consistently observed from the supposedly
incapacitated spouse.
3. Incurable, not in the medical, but in the legal sense;
incurable as to the partner. Psychological incapacity is
so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific
partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple’s
respective personality structures are so incompatible
and antagonistic that the only result of the union would
be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the
marriage.
4. As to gravity, it must be shown that the incapacity is
caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause. It is not
necessary that it must be shown that the psychological
incapacity is a serious or dangerous illness BUT that
“mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts” are excluded. The
psychological incapacity cannot be mere “refusal,
neglect, or difficulty, much less ill will.”
5. Juridical antecedence. The incapacity must be proven
to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
6. Essential marital obligations are not limited to those
between spouses. Hence, those covered by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.
7. The decisions of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines has
persuasive effect on nullity cases pending before secular
courts. Canonical decisions are, to reiterate, merely
79
persuasive and not binding on secular courts. Canonical
decisions are to only serve as evidence of the nullity of
the secular marriage, but ultimately, the elements of
declaration of nullity under Article 36 must still be
weighed by the judge.
SUMMARY:
Psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of
dysfunctionality that show a lack of understanding and
concomitant compliance with one’s essential marital
obligations due to psychic causes. It is not a medical
illness that has to be medically or clinically identified;
hence, expert opinion is not required. As an explicit
requirement of the law, the psychological incapacity
must be shown to have been existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, and is caused by a durable
aspect of one’s personality structure, one that was
formed before the parties married. Furthermore, it must
be shown caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause.
To prove psychological incapacity, a party must present
clear and convincing evidence of its existence.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that in voiding illequipped marriages, courts are not really violating the
inviolability of marriage as a social institution which is
enshrined in no less than the Constitution. Courts should
not hesitate to declare such marriages void solely for the
sake of their permanence when, paradoxically, doing so
destroyed the sanctity afforded to marriage. In declaring
ill-equipped marriages as void ab initio, the courts really
assiduously defend and promote the sanctity of marriage
as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our
society is thereby made all the more strong.
80