Facts
Campos instituted SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 with the Securities,
Investigation and Clearing Department (SICD) of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, a petition against Makati Stock Exchange, Inc.,
and its directors. The petition sought, among others, the nullification
of a Resolution dated June 3, 1993 of the MKSE Board of Directors,
which allegedly deprived him of his right to participate equally in the
allocation of Initial Public Offerings (IPO) of corporations registered
with MKSE. The SICD issued a TRO and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
to enjoin MKSE from enforcing the Resolution. MKSE appealed the
case to the SEC en banc for its failure to state a cause of action. SECEB reversed all of SICD’s orders. Campos then filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the CA and it annulled SEC-EB’s decisions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 sufficiently states a cause of
action.
RULING:
No. The petition filed by Campos should be dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action. A cause of action is the act or omission by
which a party violates a right of another. A complaint states a cause of
action where it contains three essential elements of a cause of action,
namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation
of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in
violation of said legal right. If these elements are absent, the complaint
becomes vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action.
Petition in SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 asserts a right in favor of
respondent: Campos’s alleged right to subscribe to the IPOs of
corporations listed in the stock market at their offering prices; and
stipulates the correlative obligation of petitioners to respect
respondent’s right by continuing to allow respondent to subscribe to
the IPOs of corporations listed in the stock market at their offering
prices.
Although the Petition in SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 does allege a right
and an obligation, it utterly failed to lay down the source or basis of
respondent’s right and/or petitioners’ obligation. Campos merely
quoted in his Petition the MKSE Board Resolution granting him the
position of Chairman Emeritus of MKSE for life. However, there is
nothing in the said Petition from which the Court can deduce that
Campos was granted by law, contract, or any other legal source, the
right to subscribe to the IPOs of corporations listed in the stock
market at their offering prices.
ANG YU ASUNCION v. CA, GR No. 109125, 1994-12-02
Facts:
Specific Performance was filed by Ann Yu Asuncion
On July 29, 1987 a Second Amended Complaint for Specific Performance was filed by Ann
Yu Asuncion and Keh Tiong, et al., against Bobby Cu Unjieng, Rose Cu Unjieng and Jose
Tan before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Manila in Civil Case No. 87-41058,
alleging,... among others, that plaintiffs are tenants or lessees of residential and commercial
spaces owned by defendants described as Nos. 630-638 Ongpin Street, Binondo, Manila;
that they have occupied said spaces since 1935 and have been religiously paying the rental
and complying with... all the conditions of the lease contract; that on several occasions
before October 9, 1986, defendants informed plaintiffs that they are offering to sell the
premises and are giving them priority to acquire the same; that during the negotiations,
Bobby Cu Unjieng offered a price... of P6-million while plaintiffs made a counter offer of P5million; that plaintiffs thereafter asked the defendants to put their offer in writing to
which request defendants acceded; that in reply to defendants' letter, plaintiffs wrote
them on October 24, 1986 asking that they... specify the terms and conditions of the
offer to sell; that when plaintiffs did not receive any reply, they sent another letter
dated January 28, 1987 with the same request; that since defendants failed to specify the
terms and conditions of the offer to sell and because of... information received that
defendants were about to sell the property, plaintiffs were compelled to file the
complaint to compel defendants to sell the property to them.
plaintiffs are tenants or lessees of residential and commercial spaces owned by
defendants... defendants informed plaintiffs that they are offering to sell the premises
and are giving them priority to acquire the same
The trial court found that defendants' offer to sell was never accepted by the
plaintiffs for the reason that the parties did not agree upon the terms... and
conditions of the proposed sale, hence, there was no contract of sale at all...
lower court ruled that should the defendants subsequently offer their property for
sale at a price of P11-million or below, plaintiffs will have the right of first refusal.
The court a quo in the aforestated decision gave the plaintiffs-appellants the right of first
refusal only if the property is... sold for a purchase price of Eleven Million pesos or lower;...
find no reason not to grant the same right of first refusal to herein appellants in the event
that the subject property is sold for... a price in excess of Eleven Million pesos.
Cu Unjieng spouses executed a Deed of Sale (Annex D, Petition) transferring the property
in question to herein petitioner Buen Realty and Development Corporation... onsideration of
the sum of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (... hus, at any time prior to the perfection of the
contract, either negotiating party may stop the negotiation.' The offer, at this stage, may be
withdrawn; the withdrawal is effective... immediately after its manifestation, such as by its
mailing and not necessarily when the offeree learns of the withdrawal
Issues:
Buen Realty can be held bound by the writ of execution by virtue of the notice of lis
pendens, carried over on TCT No. 195816 issued in the name of Buen Realty, at the time of
the... latter's purchase of the property on 15 November 1991 from the Cu Unjiengs.
Ruling:
We affirm the decision of the appellate court.
An obligation is a j... uridical necessity to give, to do or not to do (Art. 1156, Civil Code). The
obligation is constituted upon the concurrence of the essential elements thereof, viz: (a) The
vinculum juris or juridical tie which is the efficient... cause established by the various
sources of obligations (law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts and quasi-delicts); (b) the
object which is the prestation or conduct, required to be observed (to give, to do or not to
do); and (c) the subject-persons... who, viewed from the demandability of the obligation, are
the active (obligee) and the passive (obligor) subjects.
Among the sources of an obligation is a contract (Art. 1157, Civil Code), which is a meeting
of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give
something or to render some service (Art. 1305, Civil Code). A contract undergoes
various... stages that include its negotiation or preparation, its perfection and, finally, its
consummation. Negotiation covers the period from the time the prospective contracting
parties indicate interest in the contract to the... time the contract is concluded (perfected).
The perfection of the contract takes place upon the concurrence of the essential elements
thereof. A contract which is consensual as to perfection is so established upon a mere
meeting of minds, i.e., the... concurrence of offer and acceptance, on the object and on the
cause thereof. A contract which requires, in addition to the above, the delivery of the object
of the agreement, as in a pledge or commodatum, is commonly referred to as a... real
contract. In a solemn contract, compliance with certain formalities prescribed by law, such
as in a donation of real property, is essential in order to make the act valid, the prescribed
form being thereby an essential element... thereof. The stage of consummation begins
when the parties perform their respective undertakings under the contract culminating in the
extinguishment thereof.
Until the contract is perfected, it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a
binding juridical relation. In sales, particularly, to which the topic for discussion about the
case at bench belongs, the contract is perfected when a person, called the... seller,
obligates himself, for a price certain, to deliver and to transfer ownership of a thing or right
to another, called the buyer, over which the latter agrees. Article 1458 of the Civil Code
provides:
"Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer
the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price
certain in money or its equivalent.
"A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional."
A negotiation is formally initiated by an offer. An imperfect promise (policitacion) is merely
an offer
Thus, at any time prior to the perfection of the contract, either negotiating party may stop
the negotiation.' The offer, at this stage, may be withdrawn; the withdrawal is effective...
immediately after its manifestation, such as by its mailing and not necessarily when the
offeree learns of the withdrawal (
Pelayo vs. Lauron
Facts
Arturo Pelayo, a physician-residing in Cebu, filed a complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana
Abella. the plaintiff was called to the house of the defendants, and that upon arrival he was
requested by them to render medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give
birth to a child. After consultation with the attending physician, Dr. Escano, it was found
necessary, on account of the difficult birth, to remove the fetus by means of forceps which
operation was performed by the plaintiff, service he was occupied until the following morning,
and that afterwards, on the same day, he visited the patient several times; that the just and
equitable value of the services rendered by him was P500, which the defendants refuse to
pay without alleging any good reason there for
DEFENDANTS:
In answer to the complaint counsel for the defendants denied all of the allegations therein
contained and alleged as a special defense, that their daughter-in-law had died in
consequence of the said childbirth, and that when she was alive she lived with her husband
independently and in a separate house without any relation whatever with them, and that, if on
the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants, her stay there was accidental
therefore, he prayed that the defendants be absolved of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff
judgment was entered by the court: whereby the defendants were absolved from the former
complaint, on account of the lack of sufficient evidence to establish a right of action against the
defendants,
it becomes necessary to decide who is bound to pay the bill, whether the father and mother-in-law of
the patient, or the husband of the latter.
According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasicontracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the code or in special
laws, etc., are the only demandable ones
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual obligations to
which spouses are bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.)
If every obligation consists in giving, doing, or not doing something (art. 1088), and spouses are
mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but that, when either of them by
reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other is under the unavoidable
obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician.
the party bound to furnish such support is therefore liable for all expenses,
In the face of the above legal precepts it is unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees due
to the plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants
during her childbirth is the husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in law, the
defendants herein. The fact that it was not the husband who called
is no bar to the fulfillment of the said obligation, as the defendants, in view of the imminent danger to
which the life of the patient was at that moment exposed, considered that medical assistance was
urgently needed, and the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife with the indispensable services of
a physician at such critical moments is specially established by the law, as has been seen, and
compliance therewith is unavoidable
plaintiff, who believes that he is entitled to recover his fees, must direct his action against the
husband who is under obligation to furnish medical assistance to his lawful wife in such an
emergency.
From the foregoing it, may readily be understood that it was improper to have brought an action against
the defendants simply because they were the parties who called the plaintiff
Therefore, in view of the considerations hereinbefore set forth, it is our opinion that the judgment
appealed from should be affirmed with the costs against the appellant.
Macasat vs. COA
pursuant to Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, 1 petitioner, Flavio K. Macasaet & Associates,
Inc., prays that the ruling of public respondent Commission on Audit (COA) denying its claim for
completion of payment of professional fees be overturned.
respondent Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) entered into a Contract for "Project Design and
Management Services for the development of the proposed Zamboanga Golf and Country Club,
Calarian, Zamboanga City" with petitioner company, but originally with Flavio K. Macasaet alone
Under the Contract, PTA obligated itself to pay petitioner a professional fee of seven (7%) of the
actual construction cost
"ARTICLE IV — PROFESSIONAL FEE "In consideration for the professional services to be performed
Designer under Article I of this Agreement, the Authority shall pay seven percent (7%) of the actual
construction cost."
"ARTICLE V — SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS "1. Upon the execution of the Agreement but not more than
fifteen (15) days, a minimum payment equivalent to 10 percent of the professional fee as provided in
Art. IV computed upon a reasonable estimated construction cost of the project.
after the project was completed, PTA paid Supra Construction Company, the main contractor, the
additional sum of P3,148,198.26 representing the escalation cost of the contract price due to the
increase in the price of construction materials
PTA: On 3 July 1985 PTA denied payment on the ground that "the subject price escalation referred to
increased cost of construction materials and did not entail additional work on the part of petitioner as to
entitle it to additional compensation under Article VI of the contract
COA: "to allow subject claim in the absence of a showing that extra or additional services had been
rendered by claimant would certainly result in overpayment to him
PETITIONER: petitioner anchors its claim to additional professional fees, not on any change in services
rendered, but on Article IV, and paragraph 5 of Article V, of the Contract
RULING
The use of the terms "actual construction cost", gradating into "final actual project cost" is not
without significance.
The real intendment of the parties, as shown by paragraph 5, Article V, of their Contract was to base
the ultimate balance of petitioner's professional fees not on "actual construction cost" alone but on
the final actual project cost; not on "construction cost" alone but on " project cost."
the Contract allowed for flexibility based on actuality and as a matter of equity for the contracting
parties. The final actual project cost" covers the totality of all costs as actually and finally determined,
and logically includes the escalation cost of the contract price.
The price escalation cost must be deemed included in the final actual project cost and petitioner held
entitled to the payment of its additional professional fees. Obligations arising from contract have the
force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith (Article 1159,
Civil Code).
WHEREFORE, the ruling of respondent Commission on Audit is hereby SET ASIDE
Locsin III vs Mekeni Food Corp
Facts
respondent Mekeni Food Corporation (Mekeni), offered petitioner Antonio Locsin II the position of
Regional Sales Manager. In addition to a compensation and benefit package, Mekeni offered petitioner a
car plan, under which one-half of the cost of the vehicle is to be paid by the company and the other half
to be deducted from petitioner's salary
Mekeni furnished petitioner with a used Honda Civic car valued at P280,000.00,
Petitioner paid for his 50% share through salary deductions of P5,000.00 each month.
Locsin resigned effective February 25, 2006. By then, a total of P112,500.00 had been deducted from
his monthly salary and applied as part of the employee's share in the car plan
In his resignation letter, petitioner made an offer to purchase his service vehicle by paying the
outstanding balance thereon. The parties negotiated, but could not agree on the terms of the proposed
purchase. Petitioner thus returned the vehicle to Mekeni on May 2, 2006
Petitioner made personal and written follow-ups regarding his unpaid salaries, commissions, benefits,
and offer to purchase his service vehicle.
Mekeni replied that the company car plan benefit applied only to employees who have been with the
company for five years; for this reason, the balance that petitioner should pay on his service vehicle
stood at P116,380.00 if he opts to purchase the same.
Petitioner filed against Mekeni and/or its President, Prudencio S. Garcia, a Complaint for the recovery
of monetary claims consisting of unpaid salaries, commissions, sick/vacation leave benefits, and
recovery of monthly salary deductions which were earmarked for his costsharing in the car plan.
The case was docketed in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
Labor Arbiter Cresencio G. Ramos
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered directing respondents
to turn-over to complainant the subject vehicle upon the said complainant's payment to them of the
sum of P100,435.84
Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby Granted. The assailed Decision dated October
30, 2007 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered ordering respondent-appellee
Mekeni Food Corporation to pay complainant-appellee the following:
1. Unpaid Salary in the amount of P12,511.45
2. Unpaid sick leave/vacation leave pay in the amount of P14,789.15;
3. Unpaid commission in the amount of P9,780.00; and
4. Reimbursement of complainant's payment under the car plan agreement in the amount of
P112,500.00; and
5. The equivalent share of the company as part of the complainant's benefit under the car plan 50/50
sharing amounting to P112,500.00. Respondent-Appellee Mekeni Food Corporation is hereby authorized
to deduct the sum of P4,736.50 representing complainantappellant's cash advance from his total
monetary award.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
with the CA assailing the NLRC's February 27, 2009 Decision, saying that the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in holding it liable to petitioner as it had no jurisdiction to resolve petitioner's
claims, which are civil in nature.
In the absence of evidence as to the stipulations of the car plan arrangement between Mekeni and
petitioner, the CA treated petitioner's monthly contributions in the total amount of P112,500.00 as
rentals
Therefore, Mekeni has no obligation to return these payments to Locsin
Ruling:
The only issue that must be resolved in this Petition, then, is whether petitioner is entitled to a refund of
all the amounts applied to the cost of the service vehicle under the car plan.
From the evidence on record, it is seen that the Mekeni car plan offered to petitioner was subject to no
other term or condition than that Mekeni shall cover one-half of its value, and petitioner shall in turn
pay the other half through deductions from his monthly salary. Mekeni has not shown, by documentary
evidence or otherwise, that there are other terms and conditions governing its car plan agreement with
petitioner. There is no evidence to suggest that if petitioner failed to completely cover one-half of the
cost of the vehicle, then all the deductions from his salary going to the cost of the vehicle will be
treated as rentals
Any benefit or privilege enjoyed by petitioner from using the service vehicle was merely incidental and
insignificant, because for the most part the vehicle was under Mekeni's control and supervision
In light of the foregoing, it is unfair to deny petitioner a refund of all his contributions to the car plan.
Under Article 22 of the Civil Code, "[e]very person who through an act of performance by another, or
any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without
just or legal ground, shall return the same to him."
Article 2142 27 of the same Code likewise clarifies that there are certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral
acts which give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract, to the end that no one shall be unjustly
enriched or benefited at the expense of another
In the absence of specific terms and conditions governing the car plan arrangement between the
petitioner and Mekeni, a quasi-contractual relation was created between them. Consequently, Mekeni
may not enrich itself by charging petitioner for the use of its vehicle which is otherwise absolutely
necessary to the full and effective promotion of its business
Conversely, petitioner cannot recover the monetary value of Mekeni's counterpart contribution to the
cost of the vehicle; that is not property or money that belongs to him
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED IN PART . The assailed January 27, 2010 Decision and April 23,
2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 109550 are MODIFIED, in that respondent
Mekeni Food Corporation is hereby ordered to REFUND
Dy vs. People
Facts
Petitioner was the former General Manager of MCCI
petitioner assisted MCCI in its business involving several properties. One such business pertained to the
construction of warehouses over a property (Numancia Property) that MCCI leased from the Philippine
National Bank (PNB)
petitioner proposed to William Mandy (Mandy), President of MCCI, the purchase of a property owned
by Pantranco.
As the transaction involved a large amount of money, Mandy agreed to obtain a loan from the
International China Bank of Commerce (ICBC).
Petitioner represented that she could facilitate the approval of the loan. True enough, ICBC granted a
loan to MCCI in the amount of P20,000,000.00, evidenced by a promissory note.
Mandy entrusted petitioner with the obligation to manage the payment of the loan
MCCI received a notice of foreclosure over the mortgaged property due to its default in paying the loan
obligation
MCCI, through Mandy, issued 13 Allied Bank checks and 12 AsiaTrust Bank checks in varying amounts
and in different dates covering the period from May 18, 1999 to April 4, 2000. 6 The total amount of the
checks, which were all payable to cash, was P21,706,281.00
Mandy delivered the checks to petitioner. Mandy claims that he delivered the checks with the
instruction that petitioner use the checks to pay the loan.
Petitioner, on the other hand, testified that she encashed the checks and returned the money to
Mandy.
ICBC eventually foreclosed the mortgaged property as MCCI continued to default in its obligation to pay.
Mandy claims that it was only at this point in time that he discovered that not a check was paid to ICBC.
MCCI, represented by Mandy, filed a Complaint-Affidavit for Estafa
(RTC Decision) acquitting petitioner
The trial court further made a finding that Mandy and petitioner entered into a contract of loan. 13
Thus, it held that the prosecution failed to establish an important element of the crime of estafa —
misappropriation or conversion. However, while the RTC Manila acquitted petitioner, it ordered her to
pay the amount of the checks.
CA: AFFIRMED
ISSUES: The central issue is the propriety of making a finding of civil liability in a criminal case for estafa
when the accused is acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the crime
charged.
Ruling:
It is in recognition of this dual nature of a criminal act that our Revised Penal Code provides that every
person criminally liable is also civilly liable. This is the concept of civil liability ex delicto.
Rules of procedure for criminal and civil actions involving the same act or omission
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Our Rules of Court prescribes a kind of fusion such that, subject to certain defined qualifications,
when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising
from the offense is deemed instituted as well
However, there is an important difference between civil and criminal proceedings that require a
fine distinction as to how these twin actions shall proceed. These two proceedings involve two
different standards of proof
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been
found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for
such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the
civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second
instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. he is not exempt
from civil liability which CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil
Code, where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission."
Hence, a civil action filed for the purpose of enforcing civil liabilityex delicto, even if
mandatorily instituted with the corresponding criminal action, survives an acquittal when it is
based on the presence of reasonable doubt.
In these instances, while the evidence presented does not establish the fact of the crime with
moral certainty, the civil action still prevails for as long as the greater weight of evidence tilts
in favor of a finding of liability. This means that while the mind of the court cannot rest easy in
penalizing the accused for the commission of a crime, it nevertheless finds that he or she
committed or omitted to perform acts which serve as a separate source of obligation. There is
no sufficient proof that the act or omission is criminal beyond reasonable doubt, but there is a
preponderance of evidence to show that the act or omission caused injury which demands
compensation.
Civil Liability Ex Delicto in Estafa Cases
Manantan held that when there is no delict, "civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the
civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of." In Dy's case, the civil liability arises out of contract — a different source of
obligation apart from an act or omission punished by law — and must be claimed in a separate civil
action.
Violation of Due Process
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This provides another compelling reason why the civil liability arising from the loan should be
instituted in a separate civil case.
The Due Process Clause of the Constitution dictates that a civil liability arising from a contract
must be litigated in a separate civil action.
In a situation where a court (in a fused action for the enforcement of criminal and civil liability)
may validly order an accused-respondent to pay an obligation arising from a contract, a person's
right to be notified of the complaint, and the right to have the complaint dismissed if there is no
cause of action, are completely defeated. In this event, the accused-respondent is completely
unaware of the nature of the liability claimed against him or her at the onset of the case
CONCLUSION
The lower courts erred when they ordered petitioner to pay her civil obligation arising from a
contract of loan in the same criminal case where she was acquitted on the ground that there was no
crime. Any contractual obligation she may have must be litigated in a separate civil action involving
the contract of loan. We clarify that in cases where the accused is acquitted on the ground that
there is no crime, the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case cannot prosper precisely
because there is no delict from which any civil obligation may be sourced
Philippines Petroleum Corporation vs. Duque
The instant petition arose from an Information for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City against herein respondents
accused being then the authorized signatories of FITNESS CONSULTANTS, INC. did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out, draw and issue to PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP.,
to apply on account or for value the check described below:
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, said accused did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check
upon its presentment which check when presented for payment within reasonable time from date
thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED" and
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the said accused failed to pay said payee the face amount
of said check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice.
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petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC) is a lessee of a building known as Shell
House
PSPC subleased a 500-meter portion of the 2nd Floor of the Shell Building to the The Fitness
Center (TFC) . 4 Thereafter, TFC encountered problems in its business operations. Thus, with
the conformity of PSPC, TFC assigned to Fitness Consultants, Inc. (FCI) all its rights and
obligations under the contract of sublease executed by PSPC in its favor
Subsequently, FCI failed to pay its rentals to PSPC.
FCI subsequently issued a check, with respondents as signatories, which would supposedly
cover FCI's obligations to PSPC. However, the check was dishonored, thus, leading to the filing
of a criminal complaint against respondents for their alleged violation of BP 22.
METC:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the Court renders judgment finding accused Carlo Duque and Teresa
Duque GUILTY of the offense of Violation of B.P. 22 and hereby sentences them to pay a FINE of
P105,516.55 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
RTC:
Acquit. However, the Court maintains the court a quo's finding in ordering the accused to pay the
complainant Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSC) the amount of One Hundred Five Thousand
Five Hundred Sixteen Pesos and Fifty Five Centavos (Php105,516.55) as civil indemnity with interest
of 12% per annum
Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration 8 of the RTC Decision contending that they
could not be held civilly liable because their acquittal was due to the failure of the prosecution to
establish the elements of the offense charged. I
n addition, they assert that they, being corporate officers, may not be held personally and civilly
liable for the debts of the corporation they represent, considering that they had been acquitted of
criminal liability.
the RTC found merit in respondents' Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The RTC ruled, in
essence, that respondents may not be held civilly liable for the value of the subject check because
they have not been convicted of the offense with which they had been charged. In addition, the
RTC found that the check was drawn against the current account of FCI and the obligations sought
to be paid were corporate debts and, as such, FCI, not respondents, should be held civilly liable.
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The RTC likewise held that the veil of corporate fiction was not used as cloak for fraud as there
was no evidence that respondents agreed to be personally liable for the corporation's
obligations
PSPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration
. The RTC ruled that respondents' acquittal, the same having been based on the prosecution's
failure to prove all the elements of the offense charged, did not include the extinguishment of
their civil liability
The CA basically held that, upon acquittal, the civil liability of a corporate officer in a BP 22
case is extinguished with the criminal liability, without prejudice to an independent civil action
which may be pursued against the corporation.
RULING:
The only issue in the present case is whether or not respondents, as corporate officers, may still be
held civilly liable despite their acquittal from the criminal charge of violation of BP 22.
The Court rules in the negative, as this matter has already been settled by jurisprudence. In the case
of Gosiaco v. Ching, 15 this Court enunciated the rule that a corporate officer who issues a
bouncing corporate check can only be held civilly liable when he is convicted
once acquitted of the offense of violating BP 22, a corporate officer is discharged from any civil
liability arising from the issuance of the worthless check in the name of the corporation he
represents.
This is without regard as to whether his acquittal was based on reasonable doubt or that there
was a pronouncement by the trial court that the act or omission from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist
nothing in the records at hand would show that respondents made themselves personally nor
solidarily liable for the corporate obligations
respondents signed the subject check in their capacity as corporate officers and that the check was
drawn in the name of FCI as payment for the obligation of the corporation and not for the personal
indebtedness of respondents
Thus, the general rule that a corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate check can be held
civilly liable when convicted. respondents' civil liability was extinguished with their criminal
liability
CCBPI vs Menez
Research [s]cientist Ernani Guingona Meñez [Meñez] was a frequent customer of Rosante Bar and
Restaurant ordered two (2) bottles of beer. Thereafter, he ordered pizza and a bottle of "Sprite."
drank from the straw the contents of the Sprite [b]ottle. He noticed that the taste of the softdrink
was not one of Sprite but of a different substance repulsive to taste. The substance smelled of
kerosene
Upon returning to the table, he picked up the bottle of Sprite and brought it to the place where the
waitresses were and angrily told them that he was served kerosene.
All of the waitresses confirmed that the bottle smelled of kerosene and not of Sprite.
had to be confined in the hospital for three (3) days.
As a result of the incident, [Meñez] filed a complaint against [CCBPI and Rosante] and prayed for the
following damages
Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) as actual damages; (b) Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) as
moral damages; (c) Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as exemplary damages; (d) One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000[.00]) as attorney's fees; (e) Cost of Suit.
RTC:
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The [RTC]
found the evidence for [Meñez] to be ridden with gaps
It declared that there was failure of [Meñez] to categorically establish the chain of custody of the
"Sprite" bottle which was the very core of the evidence in his complaint for damages. The Court
noted that from the time of the incident, thirtysix (36) hours have lapsed before the "Sprite" bottle
was submitted for laboratory examination. During such time, the "Sprite" bottle changed hands
several times.
The RTC further noted that since kerosene had a characteristic smell, and considering that the
"Sprite" bottle allegedly contained pure kerosene, it was quite surprising why the employees of
[Rosante] did not notice its distinct smell.
CA: the CA granted the appeal and reversed the Decision of the RTC
Defendant-Appellee Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. is ORDERED to pay the following with six
[per cent] (6%) interest per annum reckoned from May 5, 1995:
RULING:
The CA correctly ruled that prior resort to BFD is not necessary for a suit for damages under Article
2187 of the Civil Code to prosper. Article 2187 unambiguously provides
ART. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall
be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no
contractual relation exists between them and the consumers.
Quasi-delict being the source of obligation upon which Meñez bases his cause of action for
damages against CCBPI, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable.
Such is not a condition precedent required in a complaint for damages with respect to obligations
arising from quasi-delicts
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal
offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction,
abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary
detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8)
Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles
21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
1. Unfortunately, Meñez has not presented competent, credible and preponderant evidence to
prove that he suffered physical injuries when he allegedly ingested kerosene from the "Sprite"
bottle in question
Consequently, in the absence of sufficient evidence on physical injuries that Meñez sustained, he
is not entitled to moral damages.
2. As to exemplary or corrective damages, these may be granted in quasi-delicts if the defendant
acted with gross negligence pursuant to Article 2231 21 of the Civil Cod
Meñez has failed to establish that CCBPI acted with gross negligence
Meñez is not entitled to exemplary damages absent the required evidence. The only evidence
presented by Meñez is the opened "Sprite" bottle containing pure kerosene.
3. The CA Decision did not even provide the basis for the award of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and
cost of suit
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated April 22, 2013
and Resolution dated October 11, 2013 in CAG.R. CV No. 02361 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
dismissal of the complaint for insufficiency of evidence by the Regional Trial Court,
De Llana vs. Biong
Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car with sister and a certain Calimlim
Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light turned red. A few
seconds after the car halted, a dump truck containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the car's
rear end, violently pushing the car forward
Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other visible physical injuries.
traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000 identified the truck driver as Joel Primero. It stated
that Joel was recklessly imprudent in driving the truck.
Joel later revealed that his employer was respondent Rebecca Biong
n the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side
of her neck and shoulde
Her injury became more severe. Her health deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer
move her left arm
The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the
practice of her profession since June 2000 despite the surgery.
Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded from Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but
Rebecca refused to pay
DR. LLana: She alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular accident and
claimed P150,000.00 for her medical expenses (as of the filing of the complaint) and an average
monthly income of P30,000.00 since June 2000. She further prayed for actual, moral, and exemplary
damages as well as attorney's fees
Rebecca: Dra. dela Llana had no cause of action against her as no reasonable relation existed
between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana's injury. She pointed out that Dra. dela Llana's
illness became manifest one month and one week from the date of the vehicular accident. As a
counterclaim, she demanded the payment of attorney's fees and costs of the suit
RTC: The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana's
whiplash injury to be Joel's reckless driving.
It pointed out that the massive damage the car suffered only meant that the truck was overspeeding
It pointed out that the massive damage the car suffered only meant that the truck was overspeeding
CA: A reversed the RTC ruling. It held that Dra. dela Llana failed to establish a reasonable connection
between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence
A reversed the RTC ruling. It held that Dra. dela Llana failed to establish a reasonable connection
between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence
ISSUE: The sole issue for our consideration in this case is whether Joel's reckless driving is the
proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana's whiplash injury.
RULING:
Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict."
Under this provision, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are: (1) damages to
the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose
acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between
such negligence and the damages.
Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary facts by which the
factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be established,
A. The pictures of the damaged car only demonstrate the impact of the collision
B. The medical certificate cannot be considered because it was not admitted in evidence
We also point out in this respect that the medical certificate nonetheless did not explain the
chain of causation in fact between Joel's reckless driving and Dra. dela Llana's whiplash injury.
C. that Joel's negligence caused her whiplash injury has no probative value
- Dra. dela Llana, lone ordinary witness
- In the present case, Dra. dela Llana's medical opinion cannot be given probative value for
the reason that she was not presented as an expert witness
In the present case, Dra. dela Llana's medical opinion cannot be given probative value for
the reason that she was not presented as an expert witness
Dra. dela Llana did not present any testimonial or documentary evidence that directly
shows the causal relation between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana's injury
In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her case by preponderance of
evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated February 11, 2008 and
Resolution dated March 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and the
petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Spouses Abrogar vs. Cosmos
[T]o promote the sales of "Pop Cola", defendant Cosmos, jointly with Intergames, organized
an endurance running contest
Plaintiffs' son Rommel applied with the defendants to be allowed to participate in the
contest and after complying with defendants' requirements, his application was accepted
and he was given an official number
As it turned out, the plaintiffs' (sic) further alleged, the defendants failed to provide
adequate safety and precautionary measures and to exercise the diligence required of
them by the nature of their undertaking, in that they failed to insulate and protect the
participants of the marathon from the vehicular and other dangers along the marathon
route.
Rommel was bumped by a jeepney that was then running along the route of the marathon
on Don Mariano Marcos Avenue (DMMA for brevity), and in spite of medical treatment
given to him at the Ospital ng Bagong Lipunan, he died later that same day due to severe
head injuries.
petitioners sued the respondents in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City) to
recover various damages for the untimely death of Rommel


Cosmos: only financial assistance
Intergames: asserted that Rommel's death had been an accident exclusively caused by the
negligence of the jeepney driver
that there could be no cause of action against it because the acceptance and approval of
Rommel's application to join the marathon had been conditioned on his waiver of all rights
and causes of action arising from his participation in the marathon; 12 that it exercised due
diligence in the conduct of the race that the circumstances called for and was appropriate,
RTC: Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc. and Intergames, Inc., ordering both defendants, jointly
and severally, to pay and deliver to the plaintiffs the amounts
The RTC observed that the safeguards allegedly instituted by Intergames in conducting the
marathon had fallen short of the yardstick to satisfy the requirements of due diligence as
called for by and appropriate under the circumstances; failure to exercise due diligence;
that the liability of the respondents towards the participants and third persons was solidary,
because Cosmos, the sponsor of the event, had been the principal mover of the event, and, as
such, had derived benefits from the marathon that in turn had carried responsibilities towards
the participants and the public;
CA: The CA reduced the issues to four, namely:
1. Whether or not appellant Intergames was negligent in its conduct of the "1st Pop Cola Junior
Marathon" held on June 15, 1980 and if so, whether its negligence was the proximate cause of
the death of Rommel Abrogar.
2. Whether or not appellant Cosmos can be held jointly and solidarily liable with appellant
Intergames for the death of Rommel Abrogar, assuming that appellant Intergames is found to
have been negligent in the conduct of the Pop Cola marathon and such negligence was the
proximate cause of the death of Rommel Abrogar.
3. Whether or not the appellants Abrogar are entitled to be compensated for the "loss of
earning capacity" of their son Rommel.
4. Whether or not the appellants Abrogar are entitled to the actual, moral, and exemplary
damages granted to them by the Trial Court.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct to human affairs, would do, or doing
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
ACCORDING TO CA
In the case at bar, the trial court erred in finding that the appellant Intergames failed to satisfy
the requirements of due diligence in the conduct of the race.
The Civil Code provides that if the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be
observed in the performance of an obligation that which is expected of a good father of the
family shall only be required
Hence, appellant Intergames is only expected to observe ordinary diligence and not
extraordinary diligence.
BASICALLY DITO, TINANGGAP NA RAW NI VICTIM YUNG RISK, NAG OCCULAR NA RAW, TAPOS
ENOUGH NA YUNG MGA TAONG INAVAILNG INTERGAMES, BEST ROUTE NA RAW YON NO
CHOICE NA KAYA WALA NA MAGAGAWA ANG INTERGAMES
From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that the role of the appellant Cosmos was limited to
providing financial assistance in the form of sponsorship.
In this case, appellant Cosmos was not negligent in entering into a contract with the appellant
Intergames considering that the record of the latter was clean and that it has conducted at least
thirty (30) road races.
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS , the judgment appealed from must be, as it
hereby is, REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another entered DISMISSING the complaint a quo.
The appellants shall bear their respective costs
RULING
NEGATIVE
the safety and precautionary measures undertaken by Intergames were short of the diligence
demanded by the circumstances of persons, time and place under consideration. Hence,
Intergames as the organizer was guilty of negligence.
The race organized by Intergames was a junior marathon participated in by young persons
aged 14 to 18 years.
We consider the "safeguards" employed and adopted by Intergames not adequate to meet
the requirement of due diligence
Intergames had a choice on where to stage the marathon, considering its admission of the
sole responsibility for the conduct of the event, including the choice of location.
Intergames had full awareness of the higher risks involved in staging the race alongside
running vehicles, and had the option to hold the race in a route where such risks could be
minimized, if not eliminated. B
In this regard, it can be pointed out that the number of deployed personnel, albeit sufficient to
stage the marathon, did not per se ensure the safe conduct of the race without proof that such
deployed volunteers had been properly coordinated and instructed on their tasks.
It did not instruct the volunteers on how to minimize, if not avert, the risks of danger in
manning the race, despite such being precisely why their assistance had been obtained in the
first place.
Intergames had no right to assume that the volunteers had already been aware of what
exactly they would be doing during the race
II. The negligence of Intergames as the organizer was the proximate cause of the death of
Rommel
In order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally or some person for whose acts
it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
We hold that the negligence of Intergames was the proximate cause despite the intervening
negligence of the jeepney driver.
Proximate cause is "that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new
cause, produces an event, and without which the event would not have occurred."
If the party guilty of the first act of negligence might have anticipated the intervening cause,
the connection is not broken;
An examination of the records in accordance with the foregoing concepts supports the
conclusions that the negligence of Intergames was the proximate cause of the death of
Rommel; and that the negligence of the jeepney driver was not an efficient intervening cause.
First of all, Intergames' negligence in not conducting the race in a road blocked off from
vehicular traffic, and in not properly coordinating the volunteer personnel manning the
marathon route effectively set the stage for the injury complained of.
Secondly, injury to the participants arising from an unfortunate vehicular accident on the
route was an event known to and foreseeable by Intergames, which could then have been
avoided if only Intergames had acted with due diligence by undertaking the race on a blockedoff road, and if only Intergames had enforced and adopted more efficient supervision of the
race through its volunteers.
And, thirdly, the negligence of the jeepney driver, albeit an intervening cause, was not
efficient enough to break the chain of connection between the negligence of Intergames and
the injurious consequence suffered by Rommel
it was the duty of Intergames to guard Rommel against the foreseen risk, but it failed to do so.
III. The doctrine of assumption of risk had no application to Rommel
The doctrine of assumption of risk means that one who voluntarily exposes himself to an
obvious, known and appreciated danger assumes the risk of injury that may result therefrom
a defense in negligence cases, therefore, the doctrine requires the concurrence of three
elements, namely: (1) the plaintiff must know that the risk is present; (2) he must further
understand its nature; and (3) his choice to incur it must be free and voluntary. 7
to the effect that a person does not comprehend the risk involved in a known situation
because of his youth, 84 or lack of information or experience,85 and thus will not be taken to
consent to assume the risk.
IV Cosmos is not liable for the negligence of Intergames as the organizer