AN ALTERNATIVE, OFF-CAMPUS COURSE WORK ON THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN1
Constitutional Law II
Atty. Mark Lawrence C. Badayos
INSTRUCTIONS
Following the Module Syllabus, go over this course with your groupmates and supply
answers as specifically instructed hereunder. You are to use this Course Work as a guide in
coming up with your Knowledge Portfolio. This design will only be effective if you read
through your materials in looking for answers. While you are to work in groups, it is highly
encouraged for each one to completely cover the materials assigned in the Module Syllabus.
Your outputs will also undergo plagiarism check. I shall also conduct recitations during our
scheduled synchronous session. If your Knowledge Portfolios do not reflect your
performance in the recitations, they will be totally discarded. This is the only way I
can make sure that you diligently and religiously worked on this course.
INTRODUCTION
1. The power of eminent domain is the right of a government to take and appropriate
private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done
only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor.2
2. This power, otherwise known as the power of expropriation, is entrenched in Section
9, Article III; Section 18, Article XII; and Sections 4 and 9, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution,
to wit:
Section 9, Article III. Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
Section 18, Article XII. The State may, in the interest of national welfare or
defense, establish and operate vital industries and, upon payment of just
compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private
enterprises to be operated by the Government.
Section 4, Article XIII. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform
program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are
landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of
other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the
State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural
1
This course was impelled by the suspension of physical classes as part of the efforts in containing
the spread of the Coronavirus disease (COVID-19).
2
U.S. v. Toribio, G.R. No. L-5060, 26 January 1910; Masikip v. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 136349, 23
January 2006.
1
lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the
Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or
equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary landsharing.
Section 9, Article XIII. The State shall, by law, and for the common good,
undertake, in cooperation with the public sector, a continuing program of
urban land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost
decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in
urban centers and resettlements areas. It shall also promote adequate
employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such
program the State shall respect the rights of small property owners.
3. This course shall have four (4) parts, to wit:
Part I
Part II
Part III
Part IV
Definition/Scope
Exercising Power/Authority
Requisites for a Valid Exercise
Right to Repurchase or Reacquire the Property
PART I: DEFINITION/SCOPE
4. In a plethora of cases, the Court took the opportunity to distinguish the State’s power
of eminent domain from its police power. One of these cases is Dipidio Earth-Savers MultiPurpose Association v. Gozun3, wherein the Court was asked to rule on the question
regarding the distinction between taking under the power of eminent domain vis-à-vis
regulation under police power.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
3
What particular law was assailed by petitioners? Why did they seek to
challenge this law?
What particular Department of Environmental and Natural Resources (DENR)
issuance was assailed by petitioners? Why did they seek to challenge this
DENR issuance?
How did the Court characterize the power of eminent domain vis-à-vis police
power? How are they similar? How are they different?
What is compensable taking? When is there a need for compensation? When
is there no need for compensation?
Does the power of eminent domain always result in the appropriation of title
to or possession of property?
G.R. No. 157882, 30 March 2006.
2
vi.
vii.
In this case, the Court’s ruling cited the case of Republic v. Castellvi4. In the
latter case, what are the five (5) requisites of taking in eminent domain?
What was the Court’s ruling regarding the provisions regarding “entry” and
“easement rights” under the law assailed by petitioners in this case?
5. As already established above, the State’s power of eminent domain is entrenched in
the Constitution, specifically in—inter alia—Section 9, Article III, to wit:
Section 9, Article III. Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
6. In Republic v. Tagle5, the Court discussed the nature of Section 9, Article III of the
1987 Constitution.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Does the power of eminent domain have to be granted by law before the State
can exercise it?
What is the nature of Section 9, Article III? Is it a constitutional grant of the
power of eminent domain, or a mere limitation on the State’s power of eminent
domain?
Will an ejectment suit prevail over the State’s power of eminent domain?
In expropriation, is mere physical possession of the property enough in and by
itself to constitute a taking of title?
7. In Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative (CANORECO) v. Court of Appeals6 and
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development
Corporation7, the Court took the opportunity to discuss the power of eminent domain visà-vis easement of right of way.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
Is an easement of right of way within the scope of the power of eminent
domain, or is it within the scope of police power? Why?
In CANORECO v. Court of Appeals, what was the Court’s ruling as regards
public utilities? Can public utilities exercise the power of eminent domain?
If public utilities were to exercise the power of eminent domain, does title
transfer to them?
Can a writ of demolition issued by a court prevail over an easement of right of
way?
In NAPOCOR v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Court, how much
just compensation is needed for an easement of right of way over a parcel of
land to be traversed by high-powered transmission lines?
4
G.R. No. L-20620, 15 August 1974.
5
G.R. No. 129079, 2 December 1998.
6
G.R. No. 109338, 20 November 2000.
7
G.R. No. 150936, 18 August 2004.
3
vi.
vii.
viii.
In the above case, how did the Court define market value? How did the Court
define just compensation?
Did the trial court, in setting the just compensation at P550 per square meter,
act capriciously or arbitrarily?
Can the exercise of the power of eminent domain only result in a mere burden
upon the owner of the condemned property?
PART II: EXERCISING POWER/AUTHORITY
8. As a general rule, it is Congress who exercises the power of eminent domain.8
9. As a matter of exception, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated by
Congress to the President, administrative bodies, local government units, and private
enterprises performing public services.9
10. For local government units, this grant of eminent domain can be found in Section 19
of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code, to wit:
Section 19. Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor
and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That,
the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer was
not accepted: Provided, further, That, the local government unit may
immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least
fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the
current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally,
That, the amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be
determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the
time of the taking of the property.
11. The cases of Masikip v. City of Pasig10 and Republic v. Court of Appeals11 are
particularly instructive on the local government units’ exercise of the delegated power of
eminent domain under the Local Government Code.
8
Masikip v. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 136349, 23 January 2006.
9
Id.
10
G.R. No. 136349, 23 January 2006.
11
G.R. No. 146587, 2 July 2002.
4
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.
x.
Does a local government unit have an inherent power of eminent domain? Is a
local government unit’s power of eminent domain absolute and carte blanche?
Is the grant of the power of eminent domain upon local government units
equal to the pervasive and plenary power vested upon the legislative branch
of the government?
In Masikip v. City of Pasig, the Court acknowledged that the exercise of
eminent domain is subject to judicial review. The Court, in this light,
enumerated the three areas of concern to which such judicial review is limited.
What are these areas of concern?
In the above case, how did the Court define “genuine necessity” vis-à-vis a local
government unit’s exercise of the power of eminent domain?
Must the ascertainment of such necessity precede or accompany the taking of
the land, or is it permissible that such ascertainment follows the taking of the
land?
In said case, was the City of Pasig able to establish the requisite of genuine
necessity to expropriate the property of petitioner? Why?
What is the court’s duty if an expropriating authority is unable to establish the
requisite of genuine necessity?
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, how did the Court characterize the nature of
expropriation proceedings? Are these proceedings adversarial?
Through what way can local governments wield the power of eminent
domain? Is this power boundless?
According to the Court in the above case, what is the remedy of an unpaid
landowner in an expropriation proceeding? Is the unpaid landowner entitled
to recovery of possession or only to the fair market value of the property?
12. Statutory construction has also been the subject of discussion in cases concerning the
exercise of the power of eminent domain. Two such cases are Jesus is Lord Christian School
Foundation v. Municipality of Pasig12 and San Roque Realty and Development Corp. v.
Republic13.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
What is the rule of construction in an eminent domain case? Is the case to be
strictly construed against the expropriating power or against the owner of the
expropriated property?
In Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation v. Municipality of Pasig,
what, according to the Court, is the reason underpinning this rule of
construction in eminent domain cases?
In said case, what provision in the Local Government Code was found by the
Court to have been violated by the respondent?
In San Roque Realty and Development Corp. v. Republic, what is the effect
if the Republic, as expropriator, makes full payment of just compensation?
12
G.R. No. 152230, 9 August 2005.
13
G.R. No. 163130, 7 September 2007.
5
v.
vi.
Can the State be barred by estoppel or laches because of the mistakes of its
officials or agents? Why?
Assuming arguendo that the State cannot be barred by estoppel or laches
because of the mistakes of its officials or agents, is there any exception to this
rule? What is this exception?
13. A non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic may also exercise the
power of eminent domain. This is part of the kernel of the Court’s discussion in Iron and
Steel Authority (ISA) v. Court of Appeals.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
What was the establishing law of ISA? Was ISA allowed by its establishing law
to exercise the power of eminent domain?
In this case, ISA—a non-incorporated agency of the Republic—eventually
ceased to be a juridical person. What, according to the Court, is the effect when
the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires?
Was the Republic allowed to substitute ISA in the expropriation proceedings?
As a rule, the power of eminent domain is vested primarily in the legislature.
In this light, was any legislative action required before the Republic could
substitute ISA in the expropriation proceedings? Why?
PART III: REQUISITES FOR A VALID EXERCISE
14. While, indeed, the power of eminent domain is an inherent power of the State, this
does not mean that it can be exercised without any bounds. Justice Marvic Leonen’s
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Southern Luzon Drug Corp. v. Department of Social
Welfare and Development14 is particularly instructive on the matter and expressly
enumerates the requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain, to wit:
“The requisites for the exercise of eminent domain are: (1) there must be a
genuine necessity for its exercise; (2) what is taken must be private
property; (3) there is taking in the constitutional sense; (4) the taking is for
public use; and (5) there must be payment of just compensation.”
15. In addition to the five (5) requisites enumerated by Justice Leonen’s Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion above, it is also important to note that due process of law is an equally
important requisite that may as well be considered as the sixth requisite. Thus, in Belen v.
Court of Appeals15, the Court ruled:
“The Court found that both the decrees [expropriating the Tambunting Estate],
being "violative of the petitioners' (owners') right to due process of law,"
failed "the test of constitutionality," and that, additionally, they were tainted
by another infirmity as regards "the determination of just compensation."
14
G.R. No. 199669, 25 April 2017.
15
G.R. No. 76182, 11 March 1991.
6
NECESSITY
16. The justiciability of the question of necessity was the crux of the discussion in
Municipality of Meycauayan v. Intermediate Appellate Court 16 and Republic v. La
Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas17.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
In Municipality of Meycauayan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, who was
the expropriating authority?
Is the issue of necessity a justiciable question if the expropriating authority is
the Legislature?
Did the Court find the existence of necessity in the above case?
In Republic v. La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas, who was the
expropriating authority?
Is the issue of necessity a justiciable question if the expropriating authority is
a delegate?
Did the Court find the existence of necessity in the above case?
17. In Bardillon v. Barangay Masili of Calamba, Laguna18, the Court ruled on the
question regarding to which court must issues of the necessity of expropriation be
addressed.
i.
ii.
iii.
In this case, to which court must one address—during the course of the
proceedings—the issue of the necessity of the expropriation?
What must the property owner do should he wish to object to the necessity of
the expropriation?
In the first question above, what is the court’s power and duty vis-à-vis the
issue of the necessity of the expropriation?
18. In Lagcao v. Judge Labra19, the Court furthered the discussion as regards the
impetus for the requisite of genuine necessity in the exercise of eminent domain.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
According to the Court, what must be the character of the necessity required
in the exercise of eminent domain? Why is this so?
Does the government have the power to capriciously or arbitrarily choose
which private property to expropriate?
What was the assailed ordinance in this case? Why was it assailed?
Ultimately, what was the Court’s ruling regarding the validity of the assailed
ordinance?
16
G.R. No. 72126, 29 January 1988.
17
G.R. No. L-12792, 28 February 1961.
18
G.R. No. 146886, 30 April 2003.
19
G.R. No. 155746, 13 October 2004.
7
PRIVATE PROPERTY
19. The requisite that private property must be taken—as opposed to public property—
has been the core of much discussion before the Court. This discussion can be found in the
cases of City of Manila v. Chinese Community20 and Republic v. PLDT21.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.
x.
xi.
xii.
In City of Manila v. Chinese Community, what was the property that was
sought to be expropriated by the City of Manila?
Is the City of Manila authorized to expropriate private lands for public use?
Where can this authority be found?
Was the City of Manila allowed to expropriate the subject property? Assuming
arguendo that it was not allowed to do so, what was the Court’s reasoning
therefor?
If the law neither designates which private property to be taken nor how much
may be taken, what must the courts do?
What, according to the Court, are the two conditions imposed upon the
authority conceded to the City of Manila? What is the corollary effect if both or
either of the two is not satisfied by the City of Manila?
Is the question of whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of eminent
domain is public or private a question of law or a question of fact?
What is the effect if private property is taken for any use which is not required
by the necessities or convenience of the public?
Explain this part of the Court’s ruling: “The exercise of the right of eminent
domain—whether directly by the State or by its authorized agent—is necessarily
in derogation of private rights.”
Is there a difference between public cemeteries and private cemeteries? If
there is, what is the relevance of this difference vis-à-vis the power of eminent
domain?
In Republic v. PLDT, what was the property sought to be expropriated?
Can services—e.g. the telephone services of PLDT—be properly subjected to
the power of eminent domain?
Assuming that, as an effect of the exercise of eminent domain, the property is
only subjected to a burden for public use and benefit, is payment of just
compensation still required?
20
G.R. No. L-14355, 31 October 1919.
21
G.R. No. L-18841, 27 January 1969.
8
TAKING IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL SENSE
20. In Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila22 and NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez23, the Court
reiterated the established rule that the exercise of the power of eminent domain does not
always result in the taking or appropriation of title to the expropriated property.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.
In Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila, what was the property expropriated?
How did the Court view the easement in this case? Did it view it as a mere
easement that does not call for any indemnification, or as an act of
expropriation that calls for indemnification? Why?
According to the Court, vis-à-vis the [Old] Civil Code, what must the courts do
in the event that the requisite in Article 349 of said Code24 is not complied
with?
What is the remedy if a corporation, board, or person unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right to which said person is entitled?
What did the Court say about Ayuntamientos? Did the latter have the authority
to impose new easements upon private properties?
In NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, who was the expropriator? Was the expropriator
authorized by law to exercise the power of eminent domain?
What did the Court say about the right-of-way easement? Was this an exercise
of eminent domain? Why?
In said case, how did the Court define just compensation? What are the criteria
to be taken into consideration in fixing just compensation?
If in the exercise of eminent domain, title does not transfer to the expropriator,
can this still nevertheless be considered an exercise of eminent domain?
21. The case of Republic v. Castellvi25 is particularly instructive when it comes to the
requisites for a valid taking.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
What are the five (5) requisites for a valid taking, as enunciated by the Court
in this case?
Which of the requisites were satisfied by the expropriator? Why?
Which of the requisites were not satisfied by the expropriator? Why?
What did the Court say about the Republic’s contention that the lease partook
of a “year-to-year” basis and was tantamount to a permanent right to occupy?
Was the Republic correct?
Can the power of eminent domain be properly carried out by leasing the
property sought to be expropriated?
22
G.R. No. L-3144, 19 November 1907.
23
G.R. No. 60077, 18 January 1991.
24
This provision is now Article 435 under the New Civil Code.
25
G.R. No. L-20620, 15 August 1974.
9
vi.
According to the Court, when should the taking of the Castellvi property have
been reckoned? Was it to be reckoned upon the Republic’s first occupation of
the property, or upon the filing of the complaint?
22. The cases of Amigable v. Cuenca26 and Velarma v. Court of Appeals27 talk about
the remedies available to the owner of the expropriated property.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
In Amigable v. Cuenca, what is the effect if no annotation in favor of the
government appears on the back of the certificate of title and no deed of
conveyance has been executed in favor of the government?
In the ordinary course of things, what is the registered owner’s remedy in the
above case? Does this remedy prescribe? Why?
In this case, what, according to the Court, was the more convenient and
feasible remedy available to the registered owner? Why?
Is the registered owner entitled to damages? What are the forms of damages
available to the registered owner?
According to the Court in this case, what is the basis or reckoning point for the
determination of due compensation?
In Velarma v. Court of Appeals, what is the effect on the ownership of the
property owner if the transfer is not yet consummated or the expropriation
proceedings have not yet been instituted by the government?
Does the private respondent in this case [property owner] have a cause of
action against the petitioner [the illegal settler]?
Before which court should the ejectment suit have been filed?
PUBLIC USE
23. The cases of Reyes v. National Housing Authority (NHA)28, Estate of Salud
Jimenez v. PEZA29, Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes30, and Filstream International Inc.
v. Court of Appeals31 are instructive on the concept of public use in expropriation
proceedings.
i.
ii.
iii.
In Reyes v. NHA, how did the Court define public use?
Is public use confined to actual use by the public? If not, what is the new
meaning or scope of public use?
What is the rationale for the “new approach” to the definition of public use?
26
G.R. No. L-26400, 29 February 1972.
27
G.R. No. 113615, 25 January 1996.
28
G.R. No. 147511, 20 January 2003.
29
G.R. No. 137285, 16 January 2001.
30
G.R. No. L-60549, 26 October 1983.
31
G.R. No. 125218, 23 January 1998.
10
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.
x.
xi.
xii.
Is expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development
within the purview of public use? Was NHA’s low-cost housing project on the
expropriated lots compliant with the public use requirement?
In Estate of Salud Jimenez v. PEZA, what is the effect if the expropriation
order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken? Can the authority to
expropriate and its public use still be questioned?
In said case, how did the Court define the flexibility of the definition of public
use vis-à-vis the power of eminent domain? Is public use an evolving concept
or a fixated one?
In Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, does public use also contemplate uses
which are not directly available to the public but which ultimately redound to
the public’s advantage or benefit?
Is the restrictive view of public use appropriate for the Philippines? Why?
Is the promotion of tourism within the purview of public use? Why?
In Filstream International Inc. v. Court of Appeals, does the State’s right to
expropriate private property so long as it is for public use take precedence
over the interest of property owners? If so, is this considered a carte blanche
rule that is not subject to any limitation?
Does the fact that the land sought to be expropriated is less than half a hectare
mean that there is no public use in the expropriation? Why?
Suppose that only a few can benefit from the expropriation of the property;
does this ipso facto mean that there is no public use?
24. The case of Manosca v. Court of Appeals32 involved the power of eminent domain
and a particular Christian religion—Iglesia ni Cristo. Here, the Court was asked to rule on the
validity and propriety of the expropriation of the birthplace of Felix Manalo, the religion’s
founder.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
32
According to the Court, what is the only direct constitutional qualification to
or limitation on the exercise of the power of eminent domain? What is the
purpose of this qualification or limitation?
What is the significant factor to be taken into consideration in the exercise of
the power of eminent domain vis-à-vis public use? Is it the principal objective
of the exercise of the power, or the consequences that spring forth from such
exercise?
Does the fact that members of Iglesia ni Cristo will ultimately benefit more
from the expropriation than the rest of the public necessarily diminish the
requisite of public use? Why?
Is public use defined in the Constitution? If it’s not so defined in the
Constitution, how then must public use be considered or defined?
G.R. No. 106440, 29 January 1996.
11
25. The cases of Moday v. Court of Appeals33, Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M.
Realty Corporation34, and Lagcao v. Judge Labra35 tackle the concept of public use vis-àvis the power of expropriation exercised by a local government unit.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.
In Moday v. Court of Appeals, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del
Sur disapproved Bunawan Municipal Resolution No. 43-89. How did the Court
rule on this matter? Did the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur act
with authority? Why?
Is Bunawan Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 valid and binding? Can it be used
as lawful authority to condemn private property for public use?
Is the Municipality of Bunawan empowered by law to exercise the power of
eminent domain? If so, where can this express grant be found?
In Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, the local chief
executive of Parañaque sought to exercise the power of eminent domain. What
was the basis for the local chief executive’s exercise of the power of eminent
domain?
What did the Court say about the validity of the basis upon which the local
chief executive of Parañaque sought to exercise the power of eminent domain?
Was this a valid basis? Was there compliance with the law?
Suppose that the exercise of the power of eminent domain is noncompliant
with the law; would this constitute res judicata that effectively bars the State
or any of its authorized agents forever? Why?
In Lagcao v. Judge Labra, what did the Court say about condemnation of
private lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion? Does this come within the
purview of condemnation for public use?
What is the effect on the property owners if an expropriator condemns private
lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion?
What was the ordinance that was assailed in this case? Was the ordinance
found to have been compliant with law? Why?
JUST COMPENSATION
26. Just compensation has been defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken. It is the fair market value of the property.36
33
G.R. No. 107916, 20 February 1997.
34
G.R. No. 127820, 20 July 1998.
35
G.R. No. 155746, 13 October 2004.
36
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Orilla, G.R. No. 157206, 27 June 2008.
12
27. In extension, the market value of the property has been defined as that sum of money
which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled
to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor.37
28. The cases of NAPOCOR v. Spouses Chiong38, Eslaban v. De Enorio39, and
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation40 are
particularly instructive on the concept of just compensation in expropriation proceedings.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
In NAPOCOR v. Spouses Chiong, the property expropriated was not the entire
property but merely a certain part thereof. In this case, is the property owner
restricted to the payment of the market value of the portion actually taken? If
the answer is in the negative, what did the Court say regarding the matter?
What did the Court say regarding consequential benefits? Must they be
deducted from the total compensation to be paid?
Assuming arguendo that consequential benefits must be deducted from the
total compensation to be paid, what is the rule vis-à-vis consequential
damages?
In Eslaban v. De Enorio, what did the Court say regarding the payment of just
compensation? Will it suffice that the right amount is paid regardless of the
time when the payment is made?
What is the effect if the payment of just compensation is not prompt?
In this case, what did the Court say about the payment of just compensation
vis-à-vis the Land Registration Act? What is the rule if the easement is not preexisting and is sought to be imposed only after the land has been registered
under said Act?
In CIR v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation, what did the Court say about the
tax credit pursuant to Republic Act No. 7432? Is this considered as a valid form
of just compensation or not? Why so?
Is there any difference between Republic Act No. 7432 and the Tax Code as
regards tax credit? Explain.
29. In a plethora of cases, the Court has ruled that the ascertainment of what constitutes
just compensation is essentially a judicial prerogative. This pronouncement by the Court—
albeit settled in jurisprudence—has nevertheless been the crux of many cases before the
37
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No.
78742, 14 July 1989.
38
G.R. No. 152436, 20 June 2003.
39
G.R. No. 146062, 28 June 2001.
40
G.R. No. 148512, 26 June 2006.
13
Court. These cases include EPZA v. Dulay41, Panes v. Visayas College of Agriculture
(ViSCA)42, and Belen v. Court of Appeals43.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.
In EPZA v. Dulay, what was the assailed decree? Was this decree
constitutional or unconstitutional?
Is an assessor’s assessment or the declared valuation by the owner a valid and
constitutional basis for the ascertainment of just compensation? Why?
At best, what—according to the Court—were the purpose and effect of the
valuation in the assailed decree? Could the valuation substitute the court’s
judgment as regards what amount should be awarded?
Are tax values absolute substitutes for just compensation, or are they—at
best—mere guides in determining just compensation?
As already established above, the determination of just compensation in
eminent domain cases is essentially a judicial function. Does this mean that the
executive and legislative departments are absolutely barred from
participating in such determination?
What is the furthest extent of the determinations made by the executive and
legislative departments?
In Panes v. ViSCA, what were the two assailed decrees? Were these decrees
constitutional or unconstitutional?
Assuming that the Court declared the decrees above as unconstitutional, what
was the Court’s reason therefor?
In Belen v. Court of Appeals, another decree was assailed. What was this
decree? Was this decree constitutional or unconstitutional? Why did the Court
rule this way?
30. Another requirement in the determination of just compensation is the appointment
of commissioners. This requirement is verbalized in Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court,
to wit:
Section 5, Rule 67. Ascertainment of compensation. – Upon the rendition of
the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3)
competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and
report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.
The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first session
of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within
which their report shall be submitted to the court. x x x
41
G.R. No. L-59603, 29 April 1987.
42
G.R. Nos. 56219-20, 27 November 1996.
43
G.R. No. 76182, 11 March 1991.
14
31. The cases of Manila Electric Co. v. Pineda44, Republic (MECS) v. Intermediate
Appellate Court45, NAPOCOR v. De la Cruz46, and Spouses Edmond Lee and Helen Huang
v. Land Bank of the Philippines47 contain rich discussions as regards the appointment of
commissioners for the determination of just compensation in expropriation cases.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.
In Manila Electric Co. v. Pineda, what was the Court’s ruling on the
indispensability of a trial before the commissioners?
What is the very purpose of a trial before the commissioners?
Is trial with the aid of commissioners a substantial right? Can it be dispensed
with in a capricious manner?
In Republic (MECS) v. Intermediate Appellate Court, how did the Court rule
regarding the binding force of the commissioners’ findings on the court? Is the
court ultimately bound by the commissioners’ findings?
In NAPOCOR v. De la Cruz, can the court substitute its own estimate of the
property’s value?
In the above case, is the court’s authority to substitute its own estimate a carte
blanche authority? If the answer is in the negative, what then—if any—are the
valid reasons or grounds that can justify such substitution?
In Spouses Edmond Lee and Helen Huang v. Land Bank of the Philippines,
what did the Court say regarding the trial by commissioners in agrarian
reform cases? Is this trial mandatory, or is it merely discretionary?
Assuming that the trial by commissioners in agrarian reform cases is merely
discretionary, what is the legal basis therefor?
Does Rule 67 of the Rules of Court have a compulsory or binding effect on the
Special Agrarian Courts (SACs)?
32. As a general rule, compensation in expropriation cases is to be paid in money and no
other. Thus, in Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform48, the
Court ruled in this wise:
“It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the
payment of just compensation is money and no other. And so,
conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that
medium.”
44
G.R. No. L-59791, 13 February 1992.
45
G.R. No. 71176, 21 May 1990.
46
G.R. No. 156093, 2 February 2007.
47
G.R. No. 170422, 7 March 2008.
48
G.R. No. 78742, 14 July 1989.
15
33. The exceptions to the general rule above have been richly discussed by the Court in
the cases of Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform49 and Sta.
Rosa Realty & Development Corp v. Court of Appeals50.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
In Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, what
did the Court say about the alternative forms of payment in agrarian reform
cases? Can payment be validly made in forms other than cash?
How did the Court characterize or describe the exercise of the power of
eminent domain under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program?
Explain this kind of expropriation.
Was the payment of just compensation in a form other than cash found by the
Court to be unduly oppressive upon the landowner? Why?
In Sta. Rosa Realty & Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, what are the
two modes of acquisition of private land under Republic Act No. 6657? Briefly
describe each and explain their differences, if any.
Under R.A. No. 6657, what must DAR do if its offer of just compensation is
rejected?
In the above case, was there compliance with R.A. No. 6657 when the payment
of just compensation was made by virtue of a trust account? Why so?
34. The reckoning point of a property’s market value for the determination of just
compensation in expropriation cases has also been the subject of much discussion in the
Court. This can be found in the cases of NAPOCOR v. Court of Appeals51, Eslaban v. De
Onorio52, NAPOCOR v. Henson53, Republic v. Ker & Co.54, and City of Cebu v. Spouses
Dedamo55.
i.
ii.
iii.
In NAPOCOR v. Court of Appeals, what is the reckoning point of the market
value of the property in the determination of just compensation, as a general
rule?
In said case, what—as a matter of exception—is the reckoning point if the
filing of the complaint occurs after the actual taking of the property, and the
owner would be given undue incremental advantages springing forth from the
use to which the government devotes the property expropriated?
In Eslaban v. De Onorio, what is the reckoning point where the expropriating
authority takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit?
49
G.R. No. 78742, 14 July 1989.
50
G.R. No. 112526, 12 October 2001.
51
G.R. No. 113194, 11 March 1996.
52
G.R. No. 146062, 28 June 2001.
53
G.R. No. 129998, 29 December 1998.
54
G.R. No. 136171, 2 July 2002.
55
G.R. No. 142971, 7 May 2002.
16
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.
x.
xi.
In this case, the Court enunciated that “the value of the property must be
determined either as of the date of the taking or the filing of the complaint,
whichever comes first.” Explain this part of the Court’s ruling.
In NAPOCOR v. Henson, what, according to the Court, is the principal criterion
in determining just compensation?
Was the trial court judge correct and justified in using the price of the lots in
an adjacent developed subdivision in the computation of just compensation?
In Republic v. Ker & Co., what did the Court say about a tax declaration vis-àvis the determination or computation of just compensation? Can a tax
declaration be treated as a sole and independent basis in determining the
market value of a property?
Can statements made in tax documents exclude or prevail over the court’s
determination of just compensation?
What is the effect on the commissioners’ valuation of just compensation, if any,
if the tax declaration of the property indicates a much lower assessed or
market value? Does it ipso facto render the commissioners’ valuation
excessive or unreasonable?
In City of Cebu v. Spouses Dedamo, what is the reckoning point if the power
of eminent domain is exercised by a local government unit? What is the legal
basis for this reckoning point?
Can the Rules of Court prevail over R.A. No. 7160 or the Local Government
Code? Why so?
35. The property owner’s entitlement to interest has also been addressed by the Court in
several cases. Two of these cases are Nepomuceno v. City of Surigao56 and Wycoco v.
Judge Caspillo57.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
In Nepomuceno v. City of Surigao, what is the rule if the value of the property
is fixed by the court? What, if any, is the interest rate? Until when does this
interest run?
In Wycoco v. Judge Caspillo, what did the Court say regarding the imposition
of an interest of 12% per annum on the just compensation due the landowner?
Is this a valid imposition?
Assuming that the interest of 12% per annum on the just compensation due
the landowner is valid, what—according to the Court—is the nature of this
interest? Does this render the obligation on the part of the government a
forbearance?
Can interest in the form of damages be imposed or applied when there is
prompt and valid payment of just compensation?
In the above case, the trust account was replaced with cash or Land Bank of
the Philippines bonds. Did this have the effect of curing the lack of
compensation? Why?
56
G.R. No. 146091, 7 May 2002.
57
G.R. No. 146733, 13 January 2004.
17
vi.
vii.
According to the Court, what was the interest rate on the just compensation to
which Wycoco was entitled?
When did the above interest begin to run? Until when did this interest run?
36. Questions as regards the right of the landowner in the event that just compensation
is not paid have also been addressed by the Court in a plethora of cases. Among these cases
are Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals58 and Republic of the Philippines v.
Vicente Lim59.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, what is the general rule
if just compensation is not paid in an expropriation proceeding? Is the private
landowner entitled to recover possession of the expropriated property?
If the private landowner is not entitled to recover possession of the
expropriated property, what then is the proper remedy, as a general rule?
In Republic of the Philippines v. Vicente Lim, the Court acknowledged that
the rule above does not always find application. In this case, why was the
Republic ordered to pay just compensation twice?
In the above case, the Republic never paid the owners after 57 years have
elapsed since the expropriation case was terminated. How did the Court
construe the Republic’s failure to pay just compensation?
In the foregoing question, was recovery of possession available as a remedy?
What is the rule as regards the owner’s remedy in the event that the
government fails to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the
finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings?
37. As discussed above, the defendant—in the determination of just compensation—
must be given an opportunity to be heard. In this light, the Court in Belen v. Court of
Appeals60 declared Presidential Decree Nos. 1670 and 1669 unconstitutional on the ground
that they violated the due process clause. Thus, the Court ruled in this wise:
“The decrees do not by themselves, provide for any form of hearing or
procedure by which the petitioners can question the propriety of the
expropriation of their properties or the reasonableness of the just
compensation.”
PART IV: RIGHT TO REPURCHASE OR REACQUIRE THE PROPERTY
38. In expropriation proceedings, the property owner’s right to repurchase or reacquire
the property is anchored on some factors to be taken into account. This discussion is found
58
G.R. No. 146587, 2 July 2002.
59
G.R. No. 161656, 29 June 2005.
60
G.R. No. 76182, 11 March 1991.
18
in the cases of Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA)61 v. Court of
Appeals and Republic v. Court of Appeals62.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
In MCIAA v. Court of Appeals, what is the rule if the title acquired by the
expropriator comes with the condition that, if the purpose ceases or is
abandoned, the property shall return to the former owner? Can the former
owner reacquire the property expropriated?
On the other hand, what is the rule if the decree of expropriation gives a title
in fee simple to the expropriator? Can the former owner reacquire the
property expropriated?
What is the rule if the land has been acquired for public use in fee simple and
unconditionally? Does the former owner have a right of retention over the
property? Can the former owner reacquire the property in the event that the
public use is abandoned or devoted to another use?
In the above case, what was the nature of the title granted to the Republic?
Was there any condition that entitled Chiongbian to repurchase the property
in the event that the purpose for the expropriation is ended or abandoned?
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, what did the Court say as regards the right
of the expropriating authority vis-à-vis that of an unpaid seller in an ordinary
sale? Are they the same or not?
Is the remedy of rescission available in expropriation cases? Why?
What is the nature of an expropriation proceeding? Is it a proceeding in rem
proceeding or a proceeding in personam?
61
G.R. No. 139495, 27 November 2000.
62
G.R. No. 146587, 2 July 2002.
19