TOP S ECR-ETI~-+>->¥~-w.
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MICHAEL F. HERTZ
Acting Assistant Attorney General
DOUGLAS N. LETTER
Terrorism Litigation Counsel
JOSEPH H. HUNT
Director, Federal Programs Branch
VINCENT M. GARVEY
Deputy Branch Director
ANTHONY J. COPPOLINO
Special Litigation Counsel
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
20 MassachusettsAvenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20001
Phone: (202) 5 14-4782
Fax: (202) 616-8460
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Attorneys for the United Scates and
Government Defendants Sued in their
Official Capacities
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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CAROLYN JEWEL, et al.
P laintiffs,
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v.
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY eta/.
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) No. 08-cv-4873~VRW
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) CLASSIFIED DECLARATION
) OF DEBORAH A. BONANNI,
) NA TlONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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EX PARTE, IN CAMERA
SUBMISSION
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Defendants.
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Date: June 25, 2009
Time: 2:30p.m.
Courtroom 6, l tb Floor
Chief Judge Vaughn R. Walker
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Derived From· NSAICSSM 1-5
Datod: 2009040
Declassify On: 2034040
Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni. Na1ional Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel. e/ nl.
1'.
Nntio11al SP.curity Agency, et a/. (No.~~~} ~ _
W.P£ ECR-El~//TSPN8 1~~
(U) Table of Contents
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l.
(U) Introduction
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II.
(U) Summary
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Ill.
(U) Classification of Declaration
IV.
(U) Background Information
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A.
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B.
C.
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II
(U) The National Security Agency
(U) September 11 , 2001 and the al Qaeda Threat.
(U) Summary ofNSA Activities After 9/11 to Meet al Qaeda Threat
V.
(U) NSA Information Protected by Privilege Assertions
VI.
(U) Description aflnfonnation Subject to Privilege and the Harm of Disclosure
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A.
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(U) Information That May Tend to Confirm or Deny Whether or Not the Plaioti
Have Been Subject to the AJleged NSA Activities
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(U) Information Related to NSA Activities, Sources, and Methods Implicated by
Plaintiffs ' Allegations
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1.
B.
(U) Plaintiffs' Allegations of a Communications Dragnet
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(a) (U) Information Related to Terrorist Surveillance Program
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(b) (U) Plaintiffs' Allegations Concerning the Collection of
Communication Records
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2.
fF&ISIIIOCfNF) lnfonnation Concerning Current FISA Authorized
Activities and Specific FISC Orders.
3.
(U) Plaintiffs' Allegations that AT&T Provided Assistance to the NSA
with the Alleged Activities
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Risks of Allowing Litigation to Proceed
VII.
(U)
VIII.
(U) Swnmary and Conclusion
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Classified In Camero, £.x Parte Declaration of Dcboroh A. Bonanni, Nctional Security Agency
carolyn Jewe(. er of. v. Nartonaf Secunl)> AgMcy. el ol. (
W)
TOP SECRET/IT8.PNS+-
·roP8ECR ET/lT8~~
CLASSIFIED DE CLARATJON OF DEBORAH A. BONANNI
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
(U)
I, Deborah A. Bonanni, do hereby state and declare as follows:
I. (U) Introduction
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I.
(U) I am the Chief of Staff for the National Security Agency (NSA), an
intel ligence agency within the Department of Defense. I have held this position since February
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2006. As the Chief of Staff, under our internal regulations, and in the absence of the Deputy
Director and the Director, I am responsible for directing the NSA, overseeing the operaHons
undertaken to carry out its mission and, by specific charge of the President and the Director of
National Intelligence, protecting NSA activities and intelligence sources and methods. I have
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been designated an originaJ TOP SECRET classification authority under Executive Order No.
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12958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19825 (1995), as amended on March 25,2003, and Department of Defense
Directive No. 5200.1 -R. Information Security Program Regulation, 32 C.F .R. § l59a.l2 (2000).
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2.
(U) The purpose of this declaration is to support an assertion of the military and
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state secrets privilege (hereafter "state secrets privilege") by the Director ofNationallntelligence
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("DNI") as the head of the intelligence comml.l.Ility, as well as the DNI's assertion of a statutory
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privilege llllder the National Security Act, to protect infonnation related to NSA activities
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described herein below. Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, the Director of the National
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Security Agency, has been sued in his official and individual capacity in the above captioned cas
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and has recused himself from the decision ofwhether to assert the statutory privilege in his
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officjaJ capacity. As the Deputy Director is currently out of the office on temporary duty, by
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operation of our intemal regulations and by specific delegatjon of the Director, 1 am authorized t
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review the materials associated with this litigation, prepare whatever declarations I detennine are
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appropriate, and determine whether to assert the NSA 's statutory privilege. Through this
Cla..;s iflerl/n CnmeM. E.x Parll! Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jl!wel. et a/. v. Nallona/ SectJrlty Agency, ~~ ~'·. ~~ ~ ~W)
+OP SE(;RGTI! F~R~
declaration, 1 hereby invoke and assert the NSA 's statutory privilege set forth in Section 6 of the
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National Security Agency Act of 1959, Public Law No. 86-36 (codified as a note to 50 U.S.C.
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§ 402) ("NSA Act"), to protect the infonnation related to NSA activities described herein below.
The statements made herein are based on my personal knowledge ofNSA activities and
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operations, and on infonnation made available to me as the ChiefofStaffofthe NSA.
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II. (U) Summary
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3.
(U) In the course of my official duties, l have been advised of this litigation and I
have reviewed the allegations in the Complaint in this case. In sum, plaintiffs allege that, after
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the 9/11 attacks, the NSA received presidential authorization to engage io surveillance activities
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far broader than the publ icly acknowledged "Terrorist Surveillance Program'' ("TSP"), which
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involved the interception of specific international communications involving persons reasonably
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believed to be associated with a! Qaeda and affiliated terrorist organizations. Plaintiffs allege
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that the NSA , with the assistance of telecommunication comp anies including AT&T, has
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indiscriminately intercepted the content and obtained the communications records of millions of
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ordin ary Americans as part of an alleged presidentially-authorized "Program" after 9/11. See
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Complaint at~ 2-13; 39-97. l cannot disclose on the public record the nature of ar~y NSA
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information implicated by the p)aintiffs' allegations. However, as described further below, the
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disclosure of information related to the NSA 's activities, sources and methods implicated by the
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plaintiffs' allegations reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the
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national security of the United States and, for this reason, are encompassed by the DNI's state
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secrets and statutory privilege asSertions,
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privilege, and should be protected from disclosure io this case. In addition, it js my judgment
as well as by my assertion of U1e NSA statutory
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that sensit ive state secrets are so central to the subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to
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proceed in the case risks the disclosure of the classi fied privileged national securi ty information
Cla5sified In Camero. Ex Parle Declaration of .Deborah A Bonanni, National So:rurity Agency
· RW)
TOP &~ET/ffSfWS+.
tGRCONINGFGR-N
Carolyn Jewel. et a/. v. National Security Agency, et a/. (No.-
'J'OP SE€-ORC-eNfN.G.f:@R:.N
described herein and exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States.
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(TSI!FSPHSI/IOCINF) The allegations in th.is lawsuit put at issue the disclosure
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of info.nnation concerning several highly classified and critically important NSA intelligence
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activities that commenced after th~ 9/J I terrorist attacks, but which are now conducted pursuant
to authority of the Foreign lntelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), including ongoing activities
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conducted under orders approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC").
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Plaintiffs' allegation that the NSA undertakes indiscriminate surveillance of the content 1 of
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millions of communications sent or received by people inside the United States---under the now
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defunct-TSP or otherwise---is false, as discussed below. The NSA's collection of the content of
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communications under the TSP was directed at international communications in which a
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participant was reasonably believed to be associated with al Qaeda or an affiliated organization
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and did not constitute the kind of dragnet collection of the content of millions of Americans'
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telephone or Internet communications that the plaintiffs allege. Although the existence of the
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TSP has been acknowledged, the details of that program remain highly classified, along with
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details of related content surveillance activities undertaken after the TSP pursuant to orders of
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the FISC. This information could not be disclosed to address or disprove or otherwise litigate
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the plaintiffs' allegation of a content dragnet without causing exceptional harm to NSA 's sources
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and methods of gathering intelligence---including methods currently used to detect and prevent
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further terrorist attacks under the authority of the FISA.
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5.
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(TS/rfSIV/SII/OCINFt Jn addition, as the Court should also be aware from prior
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classified declarations submirted by the NSA in related proceedings, the NSA has collected,
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pursuant to presidentiaJ authorization and currently under subsequent FISC orders, non-content
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(fS/1811/0CfNF) The term "content" is used herein to refer to the substance, meaning,
or purport of a communication, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), as opposed to the type of
addressing or routing info.nnation referred throughout this declaration as "meta data."
Cla~ificd
In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni. No.tional Securiry Agency
Carolyn Jewel. e1 al. Y. Naliomll SecurUy Agency. et at. (No.~RW)
TOP SECRE~-/BRGGN+NGffiR..N
information (i.e., meta data) about telephone
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highly sophisticated analytical tools that can uncover the cootacts
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members or agents o
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As noted above and detailed
below, the content surveillance subject to presidential authorization after 9/ll was not the
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content dragnet surveillance that plaintiffs allege, and the co1lection of .non-content information,
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while significant in scope remains a highly classified matter currently under FISA authorization.
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For the NSA to attempt to explain, clarify, disprove, or otherwise litigate plaintiffs' allegations
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regarding a communications dragnet would require the NSA to confirm the existence of, or
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disclose facts concerning, intelligence sources and methods for the co11ection of non-content
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information related to communications, as well as current NSA operations under FISC Orders--disclosures that would cause exceptional harm to national security.
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telecommunications carriers, in particular AT&T, assisted the NSA in alleged intelligence
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activities cannot be confirmed or denied without risking exceptionally grave harm to national
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security. Because the NSA has not undertaken the alleged dragnet collection of communications
content, no carrier has assisted in that alleged activity.
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Cln.ssilicd In Camera, Ex Parte Oeolaralion of Dcbomh A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jew€1, el al. v. National Security Aseney, eta/. (N
VRW)
+OP SEGRET,. ·.,~~l:-0¥-llRrl--
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would cause exceptionaJly grave damage to the
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national security.
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statutory privilege assertions, and my own statutory privilege assertion, seek to protect against
the disclosure of the highly classified intelligence sources and methods put at issue in this case
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and vital to the national security of the United States, including: (1) any information that would
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tend to con finn or deny whether particular individuals, including the named plaintiffs, have been
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subject to the alleged NSA intelligence activities; {2) information concerning NSA intelligence
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sources and methods, including facts demonstrating that the content collection under the TSP
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was limited to specific al Qaeda and associated terrorist-related international communications
[7
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and was not a content surveillance dragnet as plaintiffs allege; (3) facts that would tend to
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confirm or deny the existence of the NSA's bulk meta data coUection and use, and any
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information about those activities; and (4) the fact that
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TI1e fact that there has been public speculation
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about alleged NSA activities does not diminish the need to protect intelligence sources and
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methods from further expoS'Ure. Official confirmation and disclosure of the classified privileged
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national security information described herein would cause exceptionally grave damage to the
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national security. for these reasons, as set forth further below, 1 request that the Court uphold
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the state secrets and statutory privilege assertions that the DNI and I now make, and protect the
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information describtXJ in this declaration from disclosure.
Classified Jn Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A Bona~~oi, National Security Agency
Caroly11Jewel, eta!. v. NationaiSecuriryAgency, eta/. (No.
q::efLS-Eb-t+l~.l-1-h-t'-fft.rt-
-YRW)
::r..gp &EC'RET/f f S P / / S I - Y N e m
III. {U) Classification of Declaration
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-tSf/81:1/NFt This declaration is classified TOP SECRET/ITSP//SI-ECI
CON/NOFORN pursuant to the standards in Executive Order No. I 2958, as amended
by Executive Order No. 13292. Under Executive Order No. 12958, information is classified
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"TOP SECRET" if unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to
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cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security ofthe United States; "SECRET" if
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unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to cause serious
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damage to national security; and "CONFIDENTIAL" if unauthorized disclosure of the
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information reasonably could be expected to cause identifiable damage to national security. At
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the beginning of each paragraph of this declaration, the letter or letters in parentheses
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designate(s) the degree of classification of the information the paragraph contains. When used
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for this purpose, the letters ''U," "C," "S," and "TS" indicate respectively that the information is
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either UNCLASSIFIED, or is classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRE~.
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9.
(SN81HNF} Additionally, this declaration also contains Sensitive Compartmented
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Infonnation (SCI), which is "information that not only is classified for natjonal security reasons
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as Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential, but aJso is subject to special access and handling
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requirements because it involves or derives from particularly sensitive intelligence sources and
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methods." 28 C.F.R. § 17.18(a). Because of the exceptional sensitivity and vulnerability of such
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infonnation, these safeguards and access requirements exceed the access standards that are
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Clas.llif..,.J In Camera, Ex Parte Dccluration of Dclx>rah A BQnanni, National Security Agency
Corol)m JI!WCI, eta/. v. Nal•onal ~urity Aseney, cl a!. (No...,RW}
+OP £bGR6TiffSPUSI
/ORCO~VNGFORN
TOP SECRETNTSP//SI ,lQRCON/NOFORN
normally required for infonnation of the sam~tion level. Specifically, this declaration
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references communications intelligence (COMfNT), also referred to as special intelligence (Sl),
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which is a subcategory of SCI. COM TNT or SI identifies SCI that was derived from ex.pJoiting
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cryptographic systems or other protected sources by applying methods or techniques, or from
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intercepted foreign communications.
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l 0.
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related to or derived from the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), a controlled access signals
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intelligence program under presidential authorization in response to the attacks of September 11,
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2001. Although TSP was publicly acknowledged by then-President Bush in December 2005,
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details about the program remain highly classified and strictly compartmented. Jnfonnation
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pertaining to this program is denoted with the special marking "TSP" and requires more
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restrictive handling.
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It.
-{SHSIHNF) In addition to the fact that classified infonnation contained herein
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may not be revealed to any person without authorization pursuant"to Executive Order 12958, as
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amended, this declaration contains information that may not be released to foreign governments,
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foreign nationals, or non-U.S. citizens without pennission of the originator and in accordance
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Classified in Camera, Ex Pane Declaration of Oebo~ A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel. et al. v. NatioTUtl Security Agency, ~~ at. (No.. . . .RW)
+OP 8EGRET//T&P//SJ
/GRCONlNOFORN
TOP--8ECRET/A'SPI/SI /ORGON/Jl.JOFOR-N
with DNI policy. This jnformation is labeled "NOFORN." The "ORCON" designator means
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that the originator of the iofonnation controls to whom jt is released.
IV. {U) Background Information
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A.
(U) The NationaJ Security Agency
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(U) The NSA was established by Presidential Directive in 1952 as a separately
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organized agency within the Department of Defense. The NSA's foreign intelligence mission
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includes the responsibility to collect, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate signals
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intelligence (SIGINT) information, of which communications intell igence ("~OMINT") is a
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significant subset, for (a) national foreign intelligence purposes, (b) counterintelligence purposes
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and (c) the support ofmilitary operations. See Executive Order 12333, § 1.7(c), as amended.
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13.
ffSNSI) Signals intelligence (SIGINT) cons1sts of three subcategories:
(1) communications intelligence (CO MINT)~ (2) electronic intelligence (ELINT); and (3) foreign
instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT). Communications intelligence (COMTNT) is
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defined as "all procedures and methods used in the interception of communications and the
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obtaining of infonnation from such communications by other than the intended recipients." 18
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U.S.C. § 798. COMINT includes information derived from the interception of foreign and
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international communications, such as voice, facsimi le, and computer-to-computer information
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conveyed via a number of means
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Electronic intelligence (ELINT) is technical intelligence information derived from
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foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiations except atomic detonation or radioactive
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sources-in essence, radar systems affiliated with military weapons platforms (e.g., anti-ship) and
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civilian systems (e.g., shipboard and air traffic control radars). Foreign instrumentation signals
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(U) Section 1.7(c) ofE.O. J 2333, as amended, specifically authorizes the NSA to
"Collect (including through clandestine means), process, analyze, produce, and disseminate
signals intelligence information for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes to
support national and departmental missions."
Classilicd In Camera, Ex P(lrte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni. National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel. er ol. v Narionn/ Securiry Agency. eta/. (N
VRW)
intelligence (FlSfNT) is derived from non-U.S. aerospace surfaces and subsurface systems whic
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may have either military or civilian applications.
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(SHSI/fN ~
The NSA 's SJGINT responsihilities jnclude establishing and
operating an effective unified organization to conduct SIGINT activities set forth in Executive
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Order No. 123 33, § l.l2(b), as amended. In performing its S1GTNT mission, NSA has
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developed a sophisticated worldwide SIGINT collection network that acquires, among other
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things , foreign and international electroni c communications and related information. The
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technological infrastructure that supports the NSA ' s foreign intelligence information collection
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network has taken years to develop at a cost of bitlions of dollars and untold human effort. It
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relies on sophisticated collection and processing technology.
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(U) There are two primary reasons for gathering and analyzing foreign
intelligence information. The first, and most important, is to gain infonnation required to direct
U.S. resources as necessary to counter external tlueats and in support of military operations. The
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second reason is to obtain information necessary to the formulation ofU.S. foreign policy.
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Foreign intelligence information provided by the NSA is thus relevant to a wide range of
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important issues, including military order of battle; threat warnings and readiness; arms
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proliferation; international terrorism; counter-intelligence; and foreign aspects of international
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narcoti<.:S trafficking.
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16.
1SNSIIINF} The NSA 's ability to produce foreign intelligence information
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depends on its access to foreign and international electronic communications. Foreign
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intelligence produced by COMINT activities is an extremely important part of the overall forei
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inteJligence information available to the United States and is often unobtainable by other means.
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Public disclosure of either the capability to collect specific commtmications or the substance of
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the information derived from such collection itself can easily alert targets to the vulnerabi lity of
Classified In Camera. £x Parte Dech~rntion ofDebornh A. Bonanni. National Security Agency
Carolyn Jew<:/. ef at. v. Na11onal Securl(v Agency eta/. (No ~RW)
+GP-&EG~TI/TSP//8-1- -teR-GQN+NOFOR N
I)
TOP
SECR&~.'ORGONfll.IOFORN
their communications. Disclosure of even a single communication holds the potential of
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revealing intell\gence collection techniques that are applied against targets around the world.
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Once alected, targets can frustrate CO MINT collection by using different or new encryption
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techniques, by disseminating disinformation, or by utilizing a different communications link.
Such evasion techniques may inhibit access to the target's communications and therefore deny
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the United States access to information crucial to the defense of the United States both at home
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and abroad. COMINT is provided special statutory protection under 18 U.S.C. § 798, which
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makes it a crime to knowingly disclose to an unauthori?.ed person classified information
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"concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign
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government."
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B.
(U) September 11, 2001 and the al Qaeda Threat.
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(U) On September 11, 200l , the a1 Qaeda terrorist network launched a set of
coordjnated attacks along the East Coast of the United States. Four commercial jetliners, each
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carefully selected to be fully loaded with fuel for a transcontinental flight, were hijacked by al
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Qacda operatives. Those operatives targeted the Nation's financial center in New York with two
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of the jetliners, which they deliberately flew into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center.
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AI Qaeda targeted the headquarters of the Nation's Armed Forces, the Pentagon, with the third
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jetliner. AI Qaeda operatives were apparently headed toward Washington, D.C. with the fourth
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jetliner when passengers struggled with the hijackers and the plane crashed in Shanksville,
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Pennsylvania. The intended target of this fourth jetliner was most evidently the White House or
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the Capitol, strongly suggesting that al Qaeda's jntended mission was to strike a decapitation
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blow to the Government of the United States- to kill the President, the Vice President, or
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Members of Congress. The attacks of September 1I resulted in approximately 3,000 deaths-
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the highest single-day death toll from hostile foreign attacks in the Nation's history. In addition,
CIO$Si fic:d In Cameru, Ex Porte De<:laration of Dliborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Cffrnlyn Jewel, ~I a/. "· Nalional Securily Agency,
1:1
a/. (N
·YRW)
these attacks shut down air travel in the United States, disrupted the Nation' s financial markets
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and government operations, and caused billions of dollars of damage to the economy.
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18.
(U) On St:ptember 14, 200 I, a national emergency was declared ''by reason of the
terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center, New York, New York, and the Pentagon, and the
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continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States." Presidential
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Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48199 (Sept. 14, 2001). The United States also
immediately began plans for a mil itary response directed at al Qaeda's training grounds and
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havens in Afghanistan. On September 14, 200 I, both Houses of Congress passed a Joint
Resolut ion authorizing the President of the United States "to use all necessary and appropriate
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force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines plarmed, authorized,
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committed, or aided the tenorist attacks'' of September 11. Authorization for Use of Military
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Force, Pub. L. No. I 07-40 § 21 (a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (Sept. 18, 200 I) ("Cong. Auth.").
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Congress also ex.pressty acknowledged that the attacks rendered it "necessary and appropriate"
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for the United States to exercise jts right "to protect United States citizens both at bome and
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abroad," and acknowledged in particular that "the President has authority under the Constitution
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to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States." !d.
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pmbl.
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19.
(U) Also after the 9/11 attacks, a Military Order was issued stating that the attacks
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of September II "created a state of anned conflict," see Military Order by the President § 1(a),
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66 Fed. Reg. 57833, 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001), and that al Qaeda terrorists "possess both the
2S
capability and the intention to undertake further terrorist attacks against the United States that, if
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not detected and prevented, will cause mass deaths, mass injuries, and massive destruction of
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pt'operty, and may place at risk the continuity of the operations of the United States
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Govenunent," and concluding that "an extraordinary emergency exists for national defense
CIMI'Iifivd In Camera.
ex rarre [)(:x;lanuion of Debornh A. Bonanni. National Security Agency
Care~lyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, ct ~~. ~~·~ R~ ___ . •
TOP SCGRBT/ffS -NQ.JiGl~N
purposes." Military Order,§ l(c), (g), 66
. Reg. at 57833-34. Indeed, shortly after the
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attacks, on October 2, 200 l, NATO took the unprecedented step of invoking Article 5 of the
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North At lantic Treaty, which provides that an "anned attack against one or more of [the parties]
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shall be considered an attack against them all." North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63
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Stat. 2241,2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243,246.
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20.
(U) As a result of the unprecedented attacks of September II, 2001, the United
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States found itself immediately propelled into a worldwide war against a network of terrorist
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groups, centered on and affiliated with al Qaeda, that possesses the evolving capability and
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intention of inflicting further catastrophic attacks on the United States. That war is continuing
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today, at home as well as abroad. Moreover, the war against a\ Qaeda and its allies is a different
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kind of war, against a very different enemy, than any other war or enemy the Nation has
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previously faced. AI Qaeda and its supporters operate not as a traditional nation-state but as a
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diffuse, decentralized global network of individuals, cells, and loosely associated, often dis
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groups, that act sometimes in concert, sometimes independentl y, and sometimes in the United
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States, but always in secret-and their mission is to destroy lives and to disrupt a way of life
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through terrorist acts. AJ Qaeda works in the shadows; secrecy is essential to a1 Qaeda's success
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in plotting and executing its terrorist attacks.
21
21.
~The
Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Admiral Dennis
22
C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, details the particular facets of the continuing aJ Qaeda
23
24
threat and, thus, the exigent need for the NSA intelligence activities described here. The NSA
25
26
27
28
Global telecommunications networks, especially the Internet, have
Classtfioo /11 Comero . fix Parte Dedal1ltion nf Debornh A. Boo aMi. National Security Agency
Carolyu Jewel. et al. v. National Secunty t1 gency. eta/. (No~ ~!'] _
~<;;EC RET/(f'SP//SI ~8N/NOF OKN
developed in recent years into a loosely interconnected system-a network of networks-that is
2
ideally suited for the secret communications needs of loosely affiliated terrorist cells. HWldreds
3
of Internet service providers, or "ISPs," and other providers of communications services offer a
4
wide variety of global communications options, often free of charge.
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Classified /n Camera, Ex Pa,te Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni. National Security Agency
Carotyu Jewel. er at. v Nactonflf Secvrify Agency. eta(.
TOP SECRE1,
-VRW)
23.
2
3
4
fFSIISJHOCfNF) Our efforts against al Qaeda and its affiliates therefore present
critical challenges for the Nation's communications intelligence capabilities. First, in this new
kind of war, more than in any other we have ever faced, communications intelligence is essential
5
to our ability to identify the enemy and to detect and disrupt its plans for further attacks on the
6
7
United States. Communications intelligence often is the only means we have to learn the
identities of particular individuals who are involved in terrorist activities and the existence of
9
10
particular terrorist threats. Second, at the same time that communications intelligence is more
important than ever, the decentralized,
non~hierarchica l
nature of the enemy and their
ll
12
sophistication in exploiting the agility of modern telecommunications make successful
13
communjcations intelligence more difficult than ever. It is against this backdrop that the risks
14
presented by this litigation should be assessed, in particular the risks of disclosing particular
15
NSA sources and methods implicated by the claims.
16
C.
(U) Summary ofNSA Activities After 9/11 to Meet al Qaeda ThreaL
17
18
24.
(=F8N811/0CINF) After the September 11 attacks, the NSA received presidential
19
authorization and direction to detect and prevent further terrorist attacks within the United States
20
by intercepting the content of telephone and Internet communications for wh ich there were
2l
reasonable grounds to believe that (1) such communications originated or tenninated outside the
22
United States and (2) a party to such communication was a member or agent of al Qaeda or an
23
24
affiliated terrorist organization. The existence of this activity was disclosed by then-President
25
Bush in December 2005 (and subsequently referred to as the "Terrorist Surveillance Program'' or
26
"TSP"). 7
27
28
7
{lJ) On January 17, 2007, the Attorney General made public the general facts that new
orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court had been issued that authorized the
Government to target for collection international communications into or out of the United States
Cla.ssifitd In Camera. Ex Parle Declaration of Ot:borah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, e1 af. v. National Securily Agency, e1 al. (N
W)
25.
+9fi-&ECR6l=N1-&P.fi~OFORN
{~In mo~and classified terms, the NSA has
2
utilized a number of critically important intel1igence sources and methods to meet the threat of
3
another mass casualty terrorist attack on the United States-methods that were designed to work
4
in tandem and continue to this day under authority of the FISC. As noted above, one such
5
method involved the program publicly acknowledged by then-President Bush as the TSP, fn
6
7
which the NSA intercepted the content of telephone and Internet communications pursuant to
8
presidential authorization.8 As described further below, under the TSP, NSA did not engage in
9
plaintiffs' alleged dragnet surveillance of communication content, but intercepted the content of
10
particular communications where reasonable grounds ex.isted to believe one party involved a
member of agent oral Qaeda or affiliated terrorist organization based on particular "selectors"
12
13
(phone numbers or Internet addresses) associated with that target. In addition to collecting the
14
content of particular communications, the NSA has also collected non-content communication
15
information known as "meta data ." Specifically, after the 9/ll attacks, the NSA collected bulk
16
meta data related to telephony communications for the purpose of conducting targeted analysis to
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
where there is probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a member or agent of al
Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization; that, as a result of these orders, lillY electroruc
swveillance that had been occurring as part of the TSP was then being conducted subject to the
approval of the FISA Court; and that, under these circumstances, the TSP was not reauthorized.
8
(TSfffSPHSIIfOCINF) The first presidential authorization of the TSP was on October
4, 200 I, and the TSP was reauthorized approximately every 30-60 days throughout the existence
of the program. The documents authorizing the TSP also contained the authorizations fo(' the
meta data activities described herein. The authorizations, moreover, evolved over time, and
during certain periods authorized other activities (this declaration is not intended to and
25
26
27
28
Classified Jn Camera. £x Parte Declarotion of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
VRW)
Carolyn Jewel, et af. v. Notional Security Agency, et of. (
Telephony meta data is infonnation derived from call detail
2
records that reflect non-content information such as, but not limited to, the date, time, and
3
duration of telephone calls, as well as the phone numbers used to place and receive the calls. In
4
9
addition, since the 9/11 attacks, the NSA has collected bulk meta data related to Internet
5
communications. Internet meta data is header/router/addressing information, such as the '<to,"
6
7
8
9
10
''from," "cc," and "bcc"lines, as opposed to the body or "re" lines, of a standard email.
26.
(TSllSINOCINF} Each of the foregoing activities continues in some form under
authority of the FISA and, thus, the NSA utilizes the same intelligence sources and methods
today to detect and prevent further terrorist attacks that it did after the 9/J 1 attacks. First, as
II
12
noted above, on January 10, 2007, the FISC issued two orders authorizing the Government to
13
conduct certain electronic surveillance that had been occuning under the TSP. The FISC Orders
14
were implemented on January 17, 2007 and, thereafter, any electronic surveillance that had been
IS
16
occurring as part of the TSP became subject to the approval of the FISC and the TSP was not
reauthorized. 10
\7
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
ffSH81HOC/NF) As also described further(~ 64-67 infra), the FISC has extended
these orders with some modifications, and the Foreign Telephone and Email Order later expired
in August 2007 and was supplanted by authority enacted by Congress first under the Protect
10
Cla:l\1ilicd In Camera, & f'arte D~IM~tcon of Dcbordh A.. Bonunni, NtUionul Security Agency
~wulyn Jcwd, el a/. v. Nallonal Securiry Agency, el a/. (No~RW)
TOP SECRETNTSPI/SI
/ORCOWNOFORN
the co llection of telephony meta data,
27.
2
since May 2006 certain telecommunication providers have been required by an order of the FISC
3
to produce to the NSA on a daily basis all telephony meta data that they create ("FISC Telephon
4
Business Records Order"). The FJSC Telephone Business Records Order has been reauthorized
5
approximately every 90 days since it was first issued. Although this collection is broad in scope,
6
7
the NSA was authorized by the FISC to query the archived telephony data with identified
8
telephone numbers for which there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
9
the number is associated with
10
ercafter referred to
as a "RAS" determination).11 Historically, only a tiny fraction of telephony meta data records
II
12
collected by the NSA has actually been presented to a trained professional for analysis. As
discussed further below (see~~ 49-57 infra), while the vast majority of records are thus never
14
15
viewed by a human at the NSA, it is still necessary to collect the meta data in bulk in order to
utilize sophisticated and vital analytical tools for tracking the contacts
16
for protecting the national security of the United States.
17
Ill
19
20
21
22
24
25
26
27
28
America Act and then the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 to authorize foreign intelligence
surveillance of targets located overseas without indivjduaJ court orders.
11
(TS/fSIHOClNF) As set forth further below (mJ 6 1-63 infra), NSA's compliance with
this limitation in the FlSC Order has been subject to further proceedings in the FISC that
commenced with a compliance report by the government on January 15, 2009, which indicated
that the NSA had also been querying incoming telephony meta data with selectors for
counterterrorism targets subj ect to NSA surveillance under Executive Order 12333, as to which
the NSA had not made a "RAS" detennination. On Marc.h 2, 2009, the FISC renewed the Order
authorizing the bulk provision to NSA of business records containing telephony meta data from
telecommunications carrie~ut subjected that activity to new limitations,
including that the NSA may query the meta data only after a motion is granted on a case-by-case
basis (unless otherwise necessary to protect against imminent threat to human life). The FISC
also required the Government to report to the FISC on its review of revisions to the meta data
collection and analysis process, and that report shall include affidavits describing the value of the
collection of telephony meta authorized by the FISC Telephone Business Records Order.
Classified In Camera. E:x fane Declaration of Deborah A. Bonl1Jl11i, N11tiooa1 St:Gurity Agency
Carolyn kwe~ et al. Y. National Security Agency, et ai. (No. . .RW)
TOP SEGRET//TSPt/81
/ORCON/NOFORN
y 2004, the collection of Internet meta
28.
2
data jn bulk has been conducted pursuant to an order of the FISC authorizing the use of a pen
3
register and trap and trace device ("FISC Pen Register Order'' or "PRTI Order"). See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3127 (defining "pen register" and ''irap and trace device"). Pursuant to the FISC Pen Register
5
Order, which has been reauthorized approximately every 90 days since it was first issued, the
6
7
NSA is authorized to col1ect, in bulk, meta data associated with electronic communications
8
9
10
11
12
Although the NSA collects email meta data in bulk
13
14
15
it has been authorized by the FISC to query the archived meta data only using email
addresses for which there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the emai
16
address is associated with
imilar restrictions were
17
18
in place under the presidential authorization). As with buJk telephony meta data collection, bulk
19
Internet meta data collection is necessary to allow the NSA to use critical and unique analytical
20
capabi Ii ties to track the contacts (even retrospectively)
21
known
terrorists. Like telephony meta data activities, Internet meta data collection and analysis are vital
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Classified In Camero. Ex Po1le Declaration ~fDeborah A. Bononni, National Security Asency
Carolyn Jewel. e1 al. v. Nalfonol Security Agency. e1 ol.
RW)
:rep SECRE=f/n ~~
tools for protecting the United States from
2
accordingly, information pertaining to
those activities is highly classified. 13
3
V. (U) Information Protected by Privileg~
4
29.
(U) In general and unclassified terms, the following categories of information are
5
subject to the DNI's assertion of the state secrets privilege and statutory privilege under the
6
7
National Security Act, as well as my assertion of the NSA statutory privilege:
8
A.
Information that may tend to confirm or deny whether the
plaintiffs have been subject to any alleged NSA intelligence
activity that may be at issue in this matter; and ·
B.
Any information concerning NSA intelligence activities,
9
10
sources, or methods that may relate to or be necessary to
adjudicate plaintiffs' allegations, including allegations that
the NSA, with the assistance of telecommunications
carriers such as AT&T, indiscriminately intercepts the
content of communications and also collects the
communication records of millions of Americans as part of
an alleged presidentially authorized "Program" after 9/11.
See. e.g., Complaint at m12~ l3; 39-97.
II
12
13
14
IS
16
The scope of this assertion includes but is not limited to:
17
(i) Information concerning the scope and operation
18
of the now inoperative •'Terrorist Surveillance Progcam"
C'TSP") regarding the interception of the content of certain
one-end international communications reasonably believed
to involve a member or agent of al-Qaeda or an affiliated
terrorist organization, and any other information related to
demonstrating that the NSA does not other:wise engage in
the content surveillance dragnet that the plaintiffs allege;
and
19
20
21
22
23
(ii) Infonnation concerning whether or not the NSA
obtained from telecommurucations companies such as
24
25
26
13
27
28
(TSiffSfWSJHOCINF) As the NSA has previously advised the Court in related
proceedings, and describes further below (see note 22..J!!Jj;E), the bulk collection of Internet meta
data pursuant to presidential authorization ceased in 2004. See In Camera, Ex Parte
Classified Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander at, 31 n.8, MDL No. 06- J 791-VRW
(N.D. Cal.) (relating to all actions against the MCI and Verizon. Defendants) (submitted Apr. 20,
2007).
Classified Jn Comei'"O. E.r Pam Declaration of O<:borah A. Bonanni, National Securily Aseney
Cu1olyn )1!\l'f!l. at nl v. Narionol Se~curil)> Agency, er a/. (No.
RW}
TOP SBCRET/,
AT&T communication
records as alleged in
the Complaint; see, e.g., Complaint~~ 10; 82-97; and
2
(iii) Information that may tend to confirm or deny
whether AT&T (and to the extent relevant or necessary,
any other telecommunications carrier}, has provided
assistance to the NSA in connection with any aJieged
activity.
3
4
5
6
7
VI. (U) Description of Information Subject to Privilege and
A.
th~
Harm of Disclosure
8
(U) Information That May Tend to C onfirm or Deny Whether the Plaintiffs Have
Been S ubj ect to Any Alleged NSA Activities.
9
30.
10
(U) The first major category of information as to which I am supporting the DNI'
assertion of privilege, and asserting the NSA' s own statutory privilege, concerns information as
II
12
to whether particular individuals, including the named plaintiffs in this lawsuit, have been
13
subject to aJ Jeged NSA intelligence activities. As set forth below, disclosure of such infonnation
14
would cause exceptionally grave hann to the national security.
15
16
31 .
(TS!ffSPJ.C~ I/IOC/NF)
The five named plaintiffs in this cas~Tash Hepting,
17
18
Gregory Hicks, Carolyn Jewel} Erik Knutzen and Joice Walton have alleged that, pursuant to a
19
presidentiall y authorized program after the 9/ll attacks, the NSA, with the assistance of AT&T,
20
has acquired and continues to acquire the content of phone calls, ernails, instant messages, text
21
messages, web and other communications, both international and domestic, of millions of
22
.23
ordinary Aroericans---"practically every American who uses the phone system or the Internet"---
24
including the plaintiffs, as well as private telephone and Internet transaction records of millions
25
of AT&T customers, again including information concerning the plaintiffs' telephone and
26
Internet communications. See, e.g., Complaint, 7, 9, 10; see also ,1139-97. As set forth
27
herein, the NSA does not engage in "dragnet" surveil lance of the content of communications as
28
pJainti ffs allege,
Classified In Camera. E.x Partt Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Secwity Agency
CarOlyn Jewel. eta/. v. Nmionat Security Agency. et al.
RW)
TO P 8ECREl/n
IGR~
2
2
4
s
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
I ll
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Q~t!6l11
Camera. E.x Por-10 Declllrntion ofDebOT9h
A.
Bonanni. Nationo) Security Agency
Caro(vn Jewel. e1 at. v. NattoMl Security Agency. e1 a/. (No
RW}
2
2
3
4
5
(i
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
14
15
16
34.
(U) As a matter of course, the NSA cannot publicly con finn or deny whether any
17
18
19
individual is subject to surveillance activities because to do so would tend to reveal actuaJ
targets. For example, if the NSA were to confirm in this case and others tha1 specific individuals
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
preVlo
pnor
telephony meta data records was presented to an
, Ex Parte Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith
analyst for review, see
B. Alexander in Shubert, el al. v. Hush, et al .. (Case No. 07-cv-693) (dated May 25, 2007) 1 27,
and the scope of that disparity remains generally the same.
Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Deda:-ation of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jew~!. el o/. v. Nat!onal Securiry Agency. el a/. (No.~ ~] _
TOP SECRETifTS PHSr-~6NJNOFORN-
are not targets of surveillance, but later refuse to comment (as it would have to) in a case
2
involving ao actual target, an actual or potentiaJ adversary of the United States could easily
3
deduce by comparing such responses that the person in the latter case is a target. There can be
4
great harm in revealing targets of foreign intelligence surveillance. If an individual knows or
5
suspects he is a target of U.S. intelligence activities, he would naturally tend to alter his behavior
6
7
to take new precautions against surveillance. 1n addition, revealing who is not a target would
8
indicate who has avoided surveillance and reveal the limitations ofNSA's capabilities.
9
information could lead an actual or potential adversary, secure in the knowledge that he is not
10
Such
under surveillance, to convey information; alternatively, such a person may be unwittingly
II
12
utilized or even forced to convey information through a secure channel to a hostile foreign
\3
adven;ary. In short, revealing which channels are free from surveillance and which are not
14
would also reveal sensitive intelligence methods and thereby could help any adversary evade
15
detection and capitalize on limitations in NSA 's capabilities. 1l!
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
~
28
I
Classifi~d /rr
Camera. Ex far1e [k.c1arntion of Deborah A. 13onanm. National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel. ct a/. v. National Securuy Agency.
c1 a/.
-VRW)
2
8
B.
(U) Jnfo.-mation Related to NSA Activities, Sources, or Methods Implicated by the
Plaintiffs' AJlegations and the Harm to National Security oflts Disclosure.
9
10
1.
(U) Plaintiffs' Allegations of a Co mmunicatioos Dragnet.
11
36.
(U) I am also supporting the DNJ's assertion of privilege and asserting the NSA 's
12
statutory privilege over any other facts concerning NSA intelligence activities, sources, or
13
methods that may relate to or be necessary to litigate the plaintiffs' claims and allegations,
14
IS
including that (i) the NSA is indiscriminately intercepting the content of communications of
16
millions of ordinary Americans, see, e.g., Complaint~ 7, 9, 10, and (ii) that the NSA is
17
collecting the private telephone and Internet transaction records of millions of AT&T customers,
18
19
again including infonnatioo concerning the plaintiffs' telephone and Intemct communications.
See e.g., Complaint mJ 7, 9, 10, 13, 82~97. As described above, the scope of the government's
20
21
privilege assertion includes but is not limited to : (I) facts concerning the operation of the now
22
inoperative Terrorist Surveillance Program and any other NSA activities needed to demonstrate
23
that the TSP was limited to the interception of the content of o n~end international
24
communications reasonably believed to involve a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated
25
26
terrorist organization and that the NSA does not otherwise conduct the content surveillance
27
dragnet that the plaintiffs allege; and (2) infonnation concerning whether or not the NSA obtains
2&
transactional communication records from telecommunications companies such as AT&T as
Clnssifu~d In Ct.mcra, Ex Porte. D.:clamtion of Debora.h A. Bonanni, Natioual St:>eurhy A0oncy
Carolyn Jewel. et at.
u.
Nacionol Security Asency, et at.
W)
2
TOP Sf:CRE'fn"f3f /13J-! ! ! I !'ORC0tq/NQFORN
plaintiff'S allege. As set forth below, the disclosure o such in formation would cause
2
exceptionally grave hann to national security.
3
4
(a) (U) Information Related to the Terrorist Surveillance Program.
37.
(U) After the ex istence of the TSP was officially acknowledged in December
5
2005, tbe Government stated that the NSA's coJlecLion of the content of communications under
7
the TSP was directed at international communications in which a participant was reasonably
8
believed to be associated withal Qaeda or an affili ated organization. Plaintiffs' allegation that
9
the NSA has undertaken indiscriminate surveillance of the content of millions of
10
communications sent or received by people inside the United States after 9111 under the TSP is
II
12
therefore false, again as the Government has previously stated.19 But to the extent the NSA must
13
demonstrate that content swveillance under the TSP was so limited, and was not plaintiffs'
14
alleged content dragnet, or demonstrate that the· NSA has not otherwise engaged in the alleged
15
content dragnet, highly classified NSA intelligence sources and methods about the operation of
16
the TSP and NSA intelligence activities would be subject to disclosure or the risk of disclosure.
!7
18
The disclosure of whether and to what ex.tent the NSA utilizes certain intelligence sources and
19
methods would reveal to foreign adversaries the NSA's capabilities, or lack thereof, enabli.n g
20
them to either evade particular channels of communications that are being monitored, or exploit
21
channels of communications that are not subject to NSA activities---in either case risk-ing
22
exceptionally grave harm to national security.
23
24
25
26
27
38.
(U) The privileged information that must be protected from disclosure includes
the followi ng classified details co.ncem)ng content surveillance under the now inoperative TSP .
39.
(TSHTSPHSIHOCINF) First, interception of the content of communications
under lhe TSP was triggered by a r8Jlge of information, including sensitive foreign intelligence,
28
19
See, e.g., Public Declaration ofNSA Director Alexander in the Shubert action (07 -cv-
693-YRW) at~ 16.
Classtfiod In Camero, E.x Parte Dc<:laration of Dcbor<ih A. Bonnt~ni, National Security Agency
Carolyn JtW61. t!l ol. v. Nolionol ~<."1,,..;'>' Agency, e/ al. (No.~ RW)
TOP ScCR:ET/fl'Sf'l/91·
IOHCONINOFOR-N-
2
obtained or derived from various sources indicating that a particular phone number or email
2
address is reasonably believed by the U.S. intelligence Community to be associated with a
3
member or agent of aJ Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization. Professional intelligence
4
officers at the NSA undertook a careful but expeditious analysis of that information, and
5
considered a number of possible factors, in determining whether it would be appropriate to target
6
7
a telephone number or email address under the TSP. Those factors included whether the target
8
phone number or email address was: (1) reasonably believed by the U.S. Intelligence
9
Community, based on other authorized collection activities or other law enforcement or
10
intelligence sources, to be used by a member or agent of a1 Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist
II
12
I3
14
IS
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
C{as_qified In Crmw•o. £x P!frfe Occlaratioo of Debo~ A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
c.;nrolyn Jewel. e( of. v. Naliorraf Security Agl!ncy. e1 of. ~~o.~RW)
m:J2....~*-!-I·FF&P..f.i~~GFGR-N
40.
2
grounds to believe that the target is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist
3
organization, the NSA took steps to focus the interception on the specific a! Qaeda-related target
"
and on communications of that target that were to or from a foreign country. In this respect , the
5
NSA's collection efforts were
the NSA had
6
7
reasonable grounds to believe carry th:e "one-end" foreign communicat1ons of members or agents
8
of al Qaeda or affiliated terrorist organizations.
9
41.
10
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
2J
24
25
26
27
28
C la•sifoed In Camern, £.-.Park Oeclt~rntion ofOclx>rnh A. BoMnni, National Security Ag<!ncy
CMofyn Jf!we/. era f. v. Narwlllll Security Agency. er at. (No
73-VRW)
2
3
4
5
43.
fFSfffSPHSIHOCINF) The NSA took specific steps in the actual TSP
6
7
interception process to minimize the risk that the communications of non-targets were
8
intercepted. With respect to telephone commtmications, specific telephone numbers identified
9
through the analysis outlined above were
10
that the only communications
ll
12
13
14
15
intercepted were those to or from the targeted number of an individual who was reasonably
believed to be a member or agent of a\ Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization.
44.
(TS/rTSPNSlNOC/NF) For the interception of the content of Internet
communications under the TSP, the NSA used identifying information obtained through its
16
analy::;is of the target, such as email addresses
target for collection the
17
18
19
communications of individuals reasonably believed to be members or agents of al Qaeda or an
affiliated terrorist organization.
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
CI<IS5ified In Camera. Ex Parle Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, el a/. v. Nalional Security Agency. eJ al. (No. - : R W )
TOP SECREl'fiT&PHSI
'/ORCONINOFORt>J
2
3
4
h "key words" other than the targeted selectors
5
themselves. Rather, the NSA targeted for collection only email addresses
6
ated with suspected members or agents of aJ Qaeda or affiliated terrorist
7
mentioned ln
8
organizations, or communications in which such
9
addition, due to technical limitations of the hardware and software, incidental collection of non-
10
target communications has occurred, and in such circumstances the NSA applies its
II
]2
minimization procedures to ensure that communications of non-targets are not disseminated. To
the extent such facts would be necessary to dispel plaintiffs' erroneous content dragnet
14
IS
allegatjons, they could not be disclosed without reveaJing highly sensitive intelligence methods.
45.
(TSfFfSPHSIHOCINF) In addition to procedures designed to ensure that the TSP
16
was limited to the international communications of al Qaeda members and affiliates, the NSA
17
18
also took additional steps to ensure that the privacy rights of U.S. persons were protected. •
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Clnss1ficd In Came~o. F..r Pan11 Oecl!muion of Deborah A. Bonanni, NatiOnal Securiry Agency
Ca rofyfl Jewel. ei of. v. .'VatiOfla( Secunry Age11cy. ec at. (No.~RW)
TOP SECRETNTSPffSI-
/ORCON/NOfORN ..
3
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
\l
12
13
14
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16
17
18
foregoing information about the targeted scope of content collection under the TSP could not be
19
disclosed, in order to address and rebut plaintiffs' allegation that the NSA, with the assistance of
20
AT&T, engaged in the alleged content dragnet, without revealing specific NSA sources and
2l
methods and thereby causing exceptionally grave damage to the national security.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
22
(UI'FOUO) In addition, in implementing the TSP, the NSA applied the existing Legal
Compliance and Minimization Procedures applicable to U.S. persons to the extent not
inconsistent with the presidential authorization. See United States Signals Intelligeoce Directive
(USS ID) l8. These procedures require that the NSA refrain from intentionally acquiring the
communications ofU.S. persons who are not the targets of its surveillance activities, that it
destroy upon recognition any communications solely between or among persons in the U.S. that
it inadvertently acquires, and that it refrai.n from identifying U.S. persons in its intelligence
reports w1less a senior NSA official determines that the recipient of the report requires such
information in order to perform a lawful function assigned to it and the identity of the U.S.
person is necessary to understand the foreign intelligence or to assess its significance.
Classif1ed In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bononoi, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel. e1 a/. v, National Security Agency. eta/. (No .•
TOP 8ECR FfJ.q SPI/SI
VRW)
90RCON/NOFORN
3
47.
2
NSA intelligence activities would be needed to address or prove that the NSA does not conduct
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
IO
ln short, there is no other ''dragnet" program authorized by the President after 9/11
II
12
under which the NSA intercepts the content of virtually all domestic and international
!3
communications as the plaintiffs allege. Again, however, information about NSA content
14
surveillance activities beyond the TSP could not be disclosed in order to address and rebut
IS
]6
plaintiffs' allegation without revealing specific NSA sources and methods and thereby causing
exceptionally grave damage to national security.23
17
(b) (U) Plaintiffs' Allegations Concerning the Collection of Communication
Records.
18
19
48. (U) As noted above, plaintiffs also allege that the NSA is collecting the private
20
21
22
telephone and Internet transaction records of millions of AT&T customers, again including
information concerrung the plaintiffs' telephone and Internet communications. See. e.g.,
23
23
24
25
26
27
28
(f&ITSPHSIHOCINF) To the extent relevant to this case, additional facts about the
operational details of the TSP and subsequent FlSA authorized content surveillance activities
also could not be disclosed without exceptional harm to national security, including for example
infonnation that would demonstrate the operational swiftness and effectiveness ofutilizi
·unction with the meta data activities. As noted
content surveillance in
TSP, in conjunction with meta
collection and analysis described herein, allowed the NSA to obtain rapidly not only the content
of a particular communication, but connections between that target and others who may fonn a
web of al Qaeda conspirators.
Classified In Camera, & Pane Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
CCJrolyn J~el, el a/. v. National Secunty Agency. et a/.
W)
1'0P SECRFf,'·"''Q-D-1~
Complaint mJ7, 9, 10, 13, 82-97. ConfirmatiOn or denial of any information concerning whether
2
the NSA collects communication records would also disclose information about whether or not
3
the NSA utilizes particular intelligence sources and methods and, thus, the NSA's capabilities or
4
lack thereof, and would cause exceptionally grave hann to national security.
5
49.
7
(TSNS(J/OCfNF) ln addition to implicating the NSA's content collection
activities authorized after the 9/ll attacks, the plaintiffs' allegations also put directly at issue the
R
NSA 's bulk collection of non-content communication meta data. As explained above, the NSA
9
has not engaged in the alleged dragnet of communication content, and,
as now explained below,
10
to address plaintiffs' allegations concerning the bulk collection of non-content information
II
would require disclosure ofNSA sources and methods that would cause exceptional harm to
12
national security. As also explained herein, these meta data collection activities are now subject
14
15
to the orders and supervision of the FISC.
50.
16
2004 pursuant to the FISC Pen Register Order, the NSA co11ectcd bulk meta data associated with
17
18
electronic communications
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Classified /n Camera, Ex Partr: Dedaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Securily Agency
U.rolyn Jewel. et a/. v. Natianol Sea1rity Agency. eJ at.
RW)
TOP SEE'RETiff"SP
TOP SEER ET/.'-P'rt¥J~
-pursuant to the FISC Telephone Records
~1-ttH.P..''~~·G FORN-
, certain telecommunication companies
2
provide the NSA with bulk telephony meta data in the fonn of call detail records derived from
3
information kept by those companies in the ordinary course ofbusiness. See V'IJ25, 27, supra.
4
51.
ff&HSIHOCINF} The bulk meta data collection activities that have been
5
undertaken by the NSA since 9/ll are vital tools for protecting the United States from another
6
7
catastrophic terrorist attack. Djsclosure of these meta data activities, sources, or methods would
8
cause exceptionally grave hann to national security. It is not possible to target collection solely
9
on known terrorist telephone identifiers and effectively discover the existence, location, and
10
plans of terrorist adversaries.
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National S~rity Agency
Carolyn Jewel. ct at. v. NallOnol Security Agency. et a/. (No. 08-cv-4873- V RW)
TOP SECRET/ffSPI/SJ ~ORCON/NOFORN
3
to keep track of such operatives is through meta data collection and analysis.
4
5
t'fSttSfi Technical Details of Analytic Capabilities
6
7
52.
ffSHSIHOC/NfJ In particular, the bulk collection of Internet and telephony
8
9
10
ll
12
Contact-chaining allows the NSA to identify telephone numbers and email addresses
13
that have been in contact with kno
14
contacts can be targeted for immediate query and analysis as
15
and addresses; in tum, those
and addresses are identified. When the NSA performs a contact-chaining query on a terrorist-
16
associated telephone identifier
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
25
26
27
2R
Classified In Camera. £.x Par~ Occlaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
C<1rolyt1 Jewel. e1 ol. v. NaJional Security Agency. et aL (No. 08
-VRW)
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
55.
ff'Sf~Because it is impossible to detennine in advance
which particular piece of meta data will turn out to identify a terrorist, collecting meta data in
bulk is vital for the success of contact-chaining
NSA analysts know that
t
28
terrorists' telephone calls are located somewhere in the billions of data bits; what they cannot
Classified In Carrn:ra. £x Porte Decl3.01tion of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Securily Agency
Carol.vn Jewel. et al. v. NaUonal Secunry Age~~cy. eta/.
W}
3
know ahead of time is exactly where. The ability to accumulate meta data substantially (nr.r'P.A '~"'-~1
2
NSA 's ability to detect and identify these targets. One particular advantage ofbulk meta data
3
collection is that it provides a historical perspective on past contact activity that cannot be
4
captured in the present or prospectively. Such historical links may be vital to identifying new
5
targets, because the meta data may contain links that are absolutely unique, pointing to potential
7
targets that otherwise would be missed.
8
9
10
II
These sources and methods enable the NSA to segregate some of that very
12
13
small amount of otherwise undetectable but highly valuable infotlllation from the overwhelm1ng
14
amount of other infonnation that has no intelligence value whatsoever-in colloquial tenns, to
15
find at least some of the needles hidden in the haystack. If employed on a sufficient volume of
16
\7
18
19
20
21
22
56.
ffS//-81/INF) The foregoing discussion is not hypothetical. ~noted previously,
23
24
since inception of the first FrSC Telephone Business Records Order, NSA has provided 275
25
reports to the FBI. These reports have provided a total of 2,549 telephone identifiers as being in
26
contact w1th identifiers associated with
27
28
Classified In Camera. £x Pane Declt11111ion of Deborah A. Bonanni. National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel. et al. v. Nauonal Security Agency. et a/.
W)
3
TOP SECRETbTSf'HSI -
'/ORCON/NOfORN-
2
)
4
57.
(TS#Sli/OC.tNFt Accordingly, adjudication of plaintiffs' allegations concerning
5
the collection of non-content meta data and records about communication transactions would ris
b
co ntacts of
7
or require disclosure of critical NSA sources and methods for
8
terrorist communications as well as the existence of current NSA activities under FISC Orders.
9
Despite media speculation about these activities, official confirmation and disclosure of the
10
NSA 's bulk collection and targeted analysis of telephony meta data would confum to aU of our
II
12
foreign adversaries
existence of these critical intelligence
13
capabilities and thereby severely undermine NSA 's ability to gather infonnation concerning
14
terrorist connections and cause exceptional harm to oational security.
15
2.
(TS.l/SIJ/OCJNF) Information Concerning Current FISA Authorized
Acdvities and Specific FISC Orden.
58.
(TSIJTSPt/SIIIOC/INF) I am also supporting the DNI's state secrets privilege
16
17
18
assertion, and asserting NSA's statutory privilege, over infonnation concerning the various
19
orders of the Foreign intelligence Surveillance Court mentioned throughout this declaration that
20
21
authorize NSA intelligence collection activities, as well as NSA surveillance activities conducted
22
pursuant to the Protect America Act ("PAA'') and current activities authorized by the FISA
23
Amendments Act of 2008. As noted herein, the three NSA intelligence activities initiated after
24
the September 11 attacks to detect and prevent a further al Qaeda attack-(i) content collection
2S
26
of targeted al Qaeda and associated terrorist-related communications under what later was called
27
the TSP; (ii) internet meta data bulk collection; and (iii) telephony meta data bulk collection-
28
have been subj ect to various orders of the FISC (as well as FISA statutory authority) and are no
Classtf•cd Jn Cam~ro. Ex Porte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel. ~~ a/. v. NotiOIUJ/ Security Agency. et a/. (No.
W)
TOP
SECRC:F!!T-sPHS~BROON.£NefeR-N-
longer being conducted under presidential authorization. The bulk collection of non-content
2
transactional data for internet communications was first authorized by the FISC in the July 2004
3
FISC Pen Register Order, and the bulk collection of non-content telephony meta data was first
4
authorized by the FISC in May 2006. The existence and operational details of these orders, and
5
of subsequent FISC orders reauthorizing these activities, remain highly classified and disclosure
6
7
of this informatjon would cause exceptional hann to national security.25 In addition, while the
8
Govenunent has acknowledged tbe general existence of the January 10, 2007 FISC Orders
9
authorizing electronic survelllance similar to that undertaken i.n the TSP, the content of those
10
orders, and facts concerning the NSA sources and methods they authorize, cannot be disclosed
II
12
without likewise causing exceptional harm to national security. Subsequent content surveillance
13
sources and methods utilized by the NSA under the PAA and, currently, under the FISA
14
Amendments Act of2008 likewise cannot be disclosed. I summarize below the proceedings that
15
have occurred under authority of the FISA or the FISC.
16
59.
fFSHSIJIOCf!NP) (a) Internet Meta Data: Pursuan t to the FISC Pen Register
17
18
l9
Order, which has been reauthorized approximately every 90 days after it was first issued, NSA is
authorized to collect in bulk
meta data associated with
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
s ~ For this reason, the FISC Telephone Business Records Order and
FISC Pen Register Orders prohibit any person from disclosing to any other person that the NSA
has sought or obtained the telephony meta data, other than to (a) those persons to whom
disclosure is necessary to comply with the Order; (b) an attorney to obtain legal advice or
assistance with respect to the production of meta data in response to the Order; or (c) other
persons as permitted by the Director of the FBl or the Director's designee. The FISC Orders
further provide that any person to whom disclosure is made pursuant to (a), (b), or (c) shall be
subject to the nondisclosure requirements applicable to a person to whom the Order is directed in
the same manner as such person.
2
Classifoed Jn Comcra. Ex Partl! Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, eta/. v. Nat1ona/ Security Agency. eta/. (No.
RW)
4
2
3
4
5
The NSA is authorized to query the archived
6
7
meta data collected pursuant to the FISC Pen Register Order using email addresses for which
8
there were facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the email
9
address was associated wi
10
Order was most recently reauthorized on -
2009, and requires continued assistance by
II
providers through
12
13
60.
(TSHSINOCNNF) (b) Telephony Meta Data: Beginrtiog in May 2006, the NSA 's
14
bulk collection of telephony meta data, previously subject to presjdential authorization, was
15
authorized by the FISC Telephone Business Records Order. Like the FISC Pen Register Order,
16
the FISC Telephone Business Records Order was reauthorized approximately every 90 days.
17
18
Based on the finding that reasonable grounds existed that the production was relevant to efforts
19
to protect against international terrorism, the Order required
20
produce to the NSA ..call detail records" or "telephony metadata" pursuant to 50 U .S.C. §
21
to
186l[c] (authorizing the production ofbusiness records for, inter alia, an investigation to protect
22
against international terrorism). Telephony meta data was compiled from call detail data
2)
24
maintained by the providers in the ordinary course of business that reflected non-content
25
infonnation such as the date, time, and duration of telephone calls, as well as the phone numbers
26
used to place and receive the calls. The NSA was authorized by the FISC to query the archived
27
telephony meta data solely with identified telephone numbers for which there were facts giving
28
Classified In Com era. £.t Parle Declaration of Deborah A. Booanrti, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. NatiOnal Securicy A.gency. el a/.
RW)
41
TOP 3ECRE'ffff~:ONINOf0R~
rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the number was associated with
a "RAS" determinati on). The FISC Telephone Business
2
3
4
Records Order was most recently reauthorized on March 2, 2009, but subject to new specific
limitations, which l summarize next.
s
61.
(TSIISIHOCHNF) As noted above (note 11 supra), on January 15, 2009, the
6
7
Department of Juslice ("DOJ") submitted a compliance incident report related to the Business
8
Records Order to the FISC, based on infonnation provided to DOJ by the NSA, which indicated
9
that the NSA 's prior reports to the FISC concerning implementation of the FISC Telephone
10
Business Records Order had not accuratel y reported the eJCtent to which NSA had been querying
II
12
the telephony meta data acquired from carriers. In sum, this compliance incident related to a
13
process whereby currently tasked telephony selectors (i.e. phone numbers) reasonably believed
14
to be associated with authorized counter terrorism foreign intelligence targets associated wi
15
Executive Order 12333 were reviewed against
16
the incoming telephony metadata to detennine if that number had been in contact with a number
17
18
19
in the United States. This process occurred prior to a formal determination by NSA that
reasonable articulable suspicion existed that the selector was associated with
20
21
was not consistent with NSA 's prior descriptions of the
process for querying telephony meta data.
22
62.
ff-Sf/81-i/OC//NF) By Order dated March 2, 2009, the FISC has directed that the
23
24
NSA may continue to acquire cal l detail records of telephony meta data in accordance with the
25
FISC Telephone Business Record Orders, but is prohibited from accessing data acquired eJCcept
26
in a limited manner. In particular, the Government may request through a motion that the FISC
27
authorize querying of the telephony meta data for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence on a
'28
case-by-case basis (unless otherwise necessary to protect against imminent threat to human life,
Classified In Camera, £x Pane Dedaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel. el a/. v. National Securify Agency. e1 a/.
S73· V RW)
subject to report to the FISC the next business ay). In addition, the FISC imposed other
2
obligations on the Government, including to report on its ongoing review of the matter and to fit
3
affidavits de.<;cribing the continuing value of the telephony meta data collection to the national
4
security of the United States and to certify that the infonnation sought is relevant to an
authorized investigation.
6
7
63.
on this and other compliance issues to ensure that this vital intelligence too) works appropriately
9
10
and effectively. For purposes of this litigation, and the privilege assertions now made by the
DNI and by the NSA, the intelligence sources and methods described herein remain highly
11
12
13
14
15
compromise vital NSA sources and methods and result in exceptionally grave harm to national
security.
16
64.
(FS/ffSPHSIHOCHNF) (c) Content Collection: On January 10,2007, the FISC
17
I&
19
issued orders authorizing the Government to conduct certain electronic surveillance that had
been occurring under the TSP. Those Orders
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
where the Government determined that there was probable
27
28
and (2) the communication is to or from a foreign country (i.e.,
CI3SSlfied In Camera, Ex Part.e Declllration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, ct a/. v. Nalional Security Age:;_~y,;,._e~ ~~·. ~~? ~~~)
'"fOP SECRF~RCONfN9fe.R-N
4
a on~end foreign communication to or from
2
surveillance that was occurring as part of the TSP became subject to the approval of the FISA
3
Court and the TSP was not reauthorized. 27
4
65.
EfSNSlll0€1/NF1 The Foreign Telephone and Email Order remained in effect
until the Protect America Act (..PAA") was enacted in August 2007. Under the PAA, the FISA'
6
7
definition of"electronic surveillance" was clarified to exclude "surveillance directed at a person
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.'' 50 U.S.C. § 1805A. The PAA
9
10
authorized the DNl and the Attorney General to jointly "authorize the acquisition of
foreign intelligence information concerning persons reasonably believed to be outside the
11
12
United States" for up to one year, id. § 1805B(a), and to issue directives to communications
13
service providers requiring them to "immediately provide the Government with all information,
14
facilities, and assistance necessary to accomplish the acquisition" of necessary intelligence
15
infom1ation, id. § 1805B(e). Such directives were ·
16
content surveillance of overseas targets unde(' the PAA
17
66.
18
tfSI/SII/OCINF7 Beginning i~ 2008, expiring directives that had been
19
issued under the PAA for content surveillance of overseas targets (including surveillance of
20
speci
overseas) were replaced by new directives for such surveillance
21
22
2l
24
25
26
27
28
Classified fn Camera. f.x Pa11e Dt::clilration of Debornh A. Bonunn~ National S~urily Agency
Carolyn Je'wel, Cl al. v. Nalifm(l/ s~curlty Agency, <U al. (No.
W)
secwity.
2
3
69.
indiscriminate dragnet of the content of domestic and international communications as the
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
expected to cause exceptionally grave harm to national security.
70.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Clas_~ified
In Cumera. £.x Parle Dedararion of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Cnrolyr. l<!wcl, e1 al.
v.
NaliotTa/ Secunly Agency, et al. (No.~~~!']
TeP
__.. _.~ _
SECRETI/TSf'l/&1·-~0R N-
2
J
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
ll
12
13
14
15
16
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18
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20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Classi(ic:d In Camera,
ex farce Dcclarution of Deborah A.. Bonanni, National Securil'}l Agency
Carnlyn Jc:wel, ,., al. v. Nativnal Security Agency, ~(a(..
W)
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
lO
ll
12
13
14
IS
16
17
18
19
20
21
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24
25
26
27
28
Classified In Camera, fir Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Booanni, National Security Agency
Caro/y,. Jewel, eta/. v. National Security Agency. el a/.
RW)
73.
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
"
12
13
14
LS
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20
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27
28
Classificcl/n Cumera. £s. f'arte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni. Narional Security Agency
CArolyn Jcwd, cf a/. v. National Security (lgency. el al. (No. . .VRW)
TOP SECRF.T/tFSPI.'S I
90R CO~-
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
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13
14
IS
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19
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22
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24
25
26
27
28
Classified In Camero, Ex Pane Dcclarotion of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carol.vn Jewel. e1 of v. Noz,onol Security Agency, ct a/ (No.~VRW)
TOP
StCREl7ffSi¥fSi~FeRN
2
3
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
14
IS
16
I?
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19
20
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25
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27
28
Classified lrr Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Deboroh A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn kwttl, ftl a/. v. Nafiona{ Securuy Agency. era/. (No. 08-cv-41!73-VRW)
--=FGP--SEE'R:E1-h'l"SPHSt~N-/NOfORN-
5
2
4
5
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7
8
9
10
II
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13
14
IS
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Classified In Camero.. Ex Parle Ooclaralion of Oeborah A. Bonanni, Na1ion111 Security Agency
Caro(m kwcol. ec al. 1t Natconu{ Security Agency. e1 at. (No.~RW)
ffifl-"sE€R-f7FfFf&PHS-~GONtN OF0R-N-
5
2
3
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5
6
7
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9
10
II
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l3
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Class;lied ln Camera, Ex Pane ~lurotion of Ddxlrah A. Bonanni. National Security Agency
CorolynJ~~I. etal. v. NolionalSecurityAgency, et ol. (No.•
YRW)
-=tQP SECRETttTSPh'Sl-
/IORfONfNOFORN-
2
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II
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1.5
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Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, Natiooal Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel. et a/. v. NaJfonal Security ARency. et of. <_No.~~W)
TeP-S-F.C-RET/ffSPH~RCONfNOFORN
2
3
4
5
VII. (U) Risks of AJJowing Litigation to Proceed
6
7
80.
8
facts, and issues raised by this case, it is my judgment that sensitive state secrets are so central to
9
the subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to proceed wiU substantially risk the
10
disclosure of the privileged state secrets described above. Although plaintiffs' alleged content
II
12
surveillance dragnet does not occur, proving why that is
13
directly implicate highly classified
14
intelligence information and activities. Similarly, attempting to address plaintiffs' allegations
15
with respect to the bulk collection of non-content information and records containing
16
transactional metn data about communications would also compromise currently operative NSA
17
18
19
sources and methods that are essential to protecting national security, including for detecting and
preventing a terrorist attack.
20
21
22
my judgment, any effort to probe the outer-bounds of such classified information would pose
23
24
2S
26
27
28
35
fFSfff&PflSIJ/OO'NF) In its prior classified declarations in this action, the NSA has
set forth specific examples of how the intelligence sources and methods utilized by the NSA
after the 9/1 1 attacks, including content surveillance under the TSP and pursuant to subsequent
FlSA authority, as well as non-content meta data collection and analysis, have led to the
development by the NSA of actionable intelligence and important counter-terrorism efforts. See.
e.g., Classifted In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of LTG Keith B. Alexander in Shubert, et al. v.
Bush, et al., (Case No. 07-cv-693) (dated May 25, 2007) at 35-43, ~ 58-61. To the extent that
such information would be relevant to any litigation in this action, however, they could not be
disclosed without revealing specific NSA intelligence infonnation, sources, and methods, and
subject to the government's privilege assertion.
Classified In Camero, £:.):Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Sc:curity Agency
Carolyn Jewel, e1 a/. v NaJ/onal Securiry Agency. eta/.
RW)
TOP SECRFf/,' :~~H·
inherent and significant risks of the disclosure of that information, including critically sensitive
Indeed, any
2
information about NSA sources, methods, operations,
3
effort merely to allude to those facts in a non-classified fashion could be revealing of classified
4
details that should not be disclosed. Even seemingly rn.lnor or innocuous facts, in the context of
5
this case or other non-classified infonnation, can tend to reveal, particularly to sophisticated
6
7
8
9
10
foreign adversaries, a much bigger picture of U.S. intelligence gathering sources and methods.
81.
fFSHSih'NF1 The United States has an overwhelming interest in detecting and
thwarting further mass casualty attacks by al Qaeda. The United States has already suffered one
attack that killed thousands, disrupted the Nation's financial center for days, and successfully
tI
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struck at the command and control center for the Nation's military. AI Qaeda continues to
13
possess the ability and clear, stated intent to carry out a massive attack in the United States that
14
could result in a significant loss of life, as well as have a devastating impact on the U.S.
15
economy. According to the most recent intelligence analysis, attacking the U.S. Homeland
16
remains one of al Qaeda's top operational priorit ies, see Classified In Camera Ex Parte
17
18
Declaration of Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, and a1 Qaeda will
19
keep trying for high-impact attacks as long as its central couunand structure is functioning and
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affiliated groups are capable of furthering its intere.'>ts.
21
82.
fFSHSI/fNF:) AI Qaeda seeks to use our own communications infrastructure
22
against us as they secretly attempt to infiltrate agents into the United States, waiting to attack at a
23
24
time of their choosing. One of the greatest challenges the United States confronts in the ongoing
25
effort to prevent another catastrophic terrorist attack against the Homeland is the critical need to
26
gather intelligence quickly and effectively. Time is of the essence in preventing terrorist attacks,
27
and the government faces sigJJ ificant obstacles in finding and tracking agents of al Qaeda as they
28
manipulate modem technology in an attempt to communicate wh.ile remaining undetected. The
Classified in Camero, Ex Parte i)Qclaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Coroly11 Jewot. el ol. v. Nalionnl Sec.,·ity Agency, ct a!.. (No.~R W)
'ffiP SECR£i-fA:&p~-GRGONINOFO RN
.s
1'0f' SECJtE17't f3 Ptt31--
'tORCONfNOFORN
NSA sources, methods, and activities described herein are vital tools in this effort.
VUI. (U) Conclusion
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3
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83.
(U) ln sum, I support the DNl's assertion of the state secrets privilege and
statutory privilege to prevent the disclosure of the jnformation described herein and detailed
5
herein. I aJso assert a statutory privilege under Section 6 of the National Security Act with
6
7
respect to the information described herein which concerns the functions of the NSA. Moreover,
because proceedings in thi s case risk disclosure of privileged and classified intelli gence-related
9
information, 1respectfully request that the Court not only protect that information from
10
disclosure but also dismiss this case to prevent exceptional hann to the national security of the
II
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United Scates.
J declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
13
)4
IS
16
DATE
:3~J_M9
~
DEBORAH A. BONANNI
Chief of Staff
National Security Agency
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20
21
22
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24
25
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Classif1ed In Camera, f.x Parte Declaration ofDebomh A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel. et at. v. National Security Agency. eta/. (No.
5