INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS AND GROUP PROCESSES
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Yet Another Dark Side of Chivalry: Benevolent Sexism Undermines and
Hostile Sexism Motivates Collective Action for Social Change
Julia C. Becker
Stephen C. Wright
Philipps University Marburg
Simon Fraser University
The current research tests a model for understanding how benevolent sexism undermines, whereas hostile
sexism promotes, social change. Study 1 (N ⫽ 99) and Study 2 (N ⫽ 92) demonstrate that exposing
women to benevolent sexism decreases their engagement in collective action, whereas exposure to hostile
sexism increases it. Both effects were mediated by gender-specific system justification and perceived
advantages of being a woman. In Study 2, positive and negative affect also mediated these relationships.
Results from Studies 3 and 4 (N ⫽ 68 and N ⫽ 37) support the causal chain described in the mediational
models tested in Studies 1 and 2. Manipulations that increased gender-specific system justification (Study
3) and perceived advantages of being a woman (Study 4) reduced intentions to participate in collective
action.
Keywords: collective action, benevolent sexism, hostile sexism, system justification, social change
society around the globe. For instance, in a global comparison,
women were paid on average 16% less than men (International
Trade Union Confederation, 2008). They are underrepresented in
political decision making bodies (Inter-Parliamentary Union,
2008) and in leadership positions (for an overview, see Barreto,
Ryan, & Schmitt, 2009). Many women experience direct gender
discrimination (e.g., Swim, Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001) as
well as more subtle gender-related barriers such as stereotype
threat (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999).
Certainly, direct action by women has played a critical role in
reducing gender inequality. However, when considering the level
of continued disparity, one might be surprised by the relative lack
of continued collective action. One explanation for this may be that
while openly practiced dominance by men over women (hostile
sexism) can result (and has resulted) in collective action, more
subtle ideological forms of sexism that ostensibly provide advantages for women (benevolent sexism) can win the voluntary acceptance of women and inhibit collective action for social change.
The present series of studies directly tests the hypotheses that, at
least in Western societies, the “pacifying nature” of benevolent
sexism can undermine women’s engagement in collective action,
whereas the “oppressive nature” of hostile sexism can promote
women’s direct action to reduce systematic gender inequality
(Glick & Fiske, 1996; Jackman, 1994).
Early theorists posited that hostile regimes engender resentment
and resistance among the disadvantaged group, leading to intergroup conflict and collective attempts to change the status quo
(e.g., Marx & Engels, 1848/2007). However, given that many
oppressive social relations survive for long periods with little
evidence of strong political resistance (e.g., Jackman, 1994), it has
been suggested that dominant groups can achieve legitimacy and
thus sustain unequal intergroup relations through subtle ideological means (e.g., Gramsci, 1971; Machiavelli, 1517/1940). The
creation of legitimizing ideologies that win the consent of the vast
majority of the population leads members of low-status groups to
voluntarily accept rather than act against group-based inequality.
Thus, these legitimizing ideologies support the status quo by
earning consensual collective endorsement (Gramsci, 1971; Jost &
Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Marx & Engels, 1848/2007;
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
Gender relations provide a clear example of this. Although the
situation for women has improved dramatically in some nations,
there is strong evidence that the distribution of resource power
between women and men remains unequal in virtually every
This article was published Online First February 28, 2011.
Julia C. Becker, Department of Psychology, Philipps University Marburg, Marburg, Germany; Stephen C. Wright, Psychology Department,
Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada.
We thank John Jost and Shelly Zhou for helpful comments on an earlier
version of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Julia C.
Becker, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Psychology, Social
Psychology, Gutenbergstra␤e 18, 35032 Marburg, Germany. E-mail:
beckerj2@staff.uni-marburg.de
Hostile and Benevolent Sexism
Hostile and benevolent sexism represent two complementary
ideological belief systems that work together to stabilize the current gender hegemony (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Hostile sexism is
grounded in the belief that men are more competent than women
and thus are deserving of higher status and more power. This is
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2011, Vol. 101, No. 1, 62–77
© 2011 American Psychological Association 0022-3514/11/$12.00
DOI: 10.1037/a0022615
62
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ANOTHER DARK SIDE OF CHIVALRY
accompanied by a corresponding fear that women leverage sexuality or feminist ideology to extract power from men. Consistent
with this antipathetic characterization of women, hostile sexism is
associated with power values such as control or dominance
(Feather, 2004), social dominance orientation (e.g., Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007), and endorsement of unfavorable stereotypes
of women (Glick et al., 2000).
In contrast, benevolent sexism is an affectionate or chivalrous
expression of male dominance. Although patronizing, it characterizes women in a way that can be perceived as flattering (Jackman,
1994). Benevolent sexism includes three subcomponents: protective paternalism (e.g., the belief that women should be protected
and taken care of by men), complementary gender differentiation
(e.g., the belief that women are the “better” sex and have special
qualities, such as a superior moral sensibility, that few men possess), and heterosexual intimacy (e.g., the belief that women fulfill
men’s romantic needs). Although these three representations of
women appear subjectively positive, exposure to the patronizing
behaviors that result from them can undermine women’s cognitive
performance (Dardenne, Dumont, & Bollier, 2007; Vescio,
Gervais, Snyder, & Hoover, 2005). Moreover, the “positive” view
implied by benevolent sexism may be offered only to women who
behave in line with sexist prescriptions and is denied to nonconforming women such as feminists (Becker, 2010; Glick, Diebold,
Bailey-Werner, & Zhu, 1997). It is important that by portraying
women as wonderful but childlike, incompetent, needing men to
protect them, and therefore best suited for low-status roles, benevolent sexism justifies gender inequality (Glick & Fiske, 1996; Jost
& Kay, 2005).
Personal and Group Benefits Through
Benevolent Sexism
Glick and Fiske (2001) described hostile and benevolent sexism
as an “interlocking set of beliefs that reflects a system of rewards
(benevolent sexism) and punishment (hostile sexism)” (p. 117) and
as “complementary tools of control, the stick and the carrot, that
motivate women to accept a sexist system” (p. 139). In line with
this characterization of benevolent sexism as potentially rewarding
(as the “carrot”), researchers have found that benevolent sexism is
often not described by men or women as an expression of gender
discrimination (e.g., Barreto & Ellemers, 2005; Swim, Mallett,
Russo-Devosa, & Stangor, 2005). In contrast, it can be seen as
“subjectively favorable” (Glick & Fiske, 2001, p. 116) and flattering to women (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005). Indeed, although
women consistently reject hostile sexism more strongly than men,
they often show stronger endorsement of benevolent sexism compared with men (e.g., Glick et al., 2000). Women also endorse
benevolent sexism more strongly when it is directed at themselves
than when the target is a negatively stereotyped subtype of women
(Becker, 2010). Women not only like the profile of a benevolent
sexist man more than that of a hostile sexist man (Kilianski &
Rudman, 1998), they evaluate the profile of a benevolent sexist
man as more likeable and sexually attractive than a profile describing the man as completely nonsexist (Bohner, Ahlborn, &
Steiner, 2010). Further, benevolent sexist justifications can lead
women to accept sexist restrictions. For example, in a study by
Moya, Glick, Expósito, De Lemus, and Hart (2007), each female
participant was told that her male partner objected to her doing a
63
counseling practicum that involved working with rapists. The
justifications that the male partner provided for his objection were
varied. Results indicated that even women who did not endorse
benevolent sexist beliefs responded more positively (e.g., indicating that they felt flattered and protected) when they received a
benevolent sexist justification, compared with no justification.
Benevolent sexism may not only confer personal benefits in the
form of chivalry but also appear to have benefits for women as a
social group. Jost and Kay (2005) have shown that benevolent
sexism works in concert with hostile sexism to serve system
justification motives because it draws a picture of each gender
group as possessing a set of strengths and advantages that balances
out the groups’ weaknesses and disadvantages. Thus, benevolent
sexism serves a kind of palliative function, allowing women to feel
more positively about a group situation that would otherwise lead
only to negative cognitions and emotions. Women therefore accept
beliefs that justify existing gender inequality, at least in part, to
make the best of an unfavorable situation (Jost & Hunyady, 2002;
Napier, Thorisdottir, & Jost, 2010; Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen,
2007).
In conclusion, despite the clearly patronizing nature of benevolent sexist beliefs, they also can be interpreted as expressing
positive affect toward women, can be seen by both women and
men as providing personal and group benefits for women, and thus
can motivate women to be complicit in the maintenance of the
current gender status quo.
Predicting Collective Action
Most social psychological theories of collective action (e.g.,
Tajfel & Turner, 1979) describe two forms of action that members
of disadvantaged groups can take in response to their subordinate
social position—individual/social mobility or collective action.
Individual or social mobility refers to actions designed to improve
one’s own personal position or treatment and involves actually
moving out of or psychologically distancing oneself from the
disadvantaged ingroup. In contrast, collective action involves behaviors on behalf of the ingroup that are directed at improving the
conditions of the entire group (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam,
1990). It is important to note that collective action does not depend
on the number of participants but on the intended beneficiary of
the action. Thus, it can be engaged in by a single individual as long
it is intended to serve group rather than individual interests
(Wright, 2001, 2010). Because individual action leaves unchallenged the group-based inequality and collective action seeks to
improve the relative status of the disadvantaged group as a whole,
collective action is consistently described as the more effective
way to reduce inequality and to establish social justice (e.g.,
Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 1997; Wright, 2001; Wright et al.,
1990).
Why Would Benevolent and Hostile Sexism Have
Different Consequences for Women’s Engagement in
Collective Action?
Despite other differences, virtually all current social psychological models of collective action (e.g., Van Zomeren, Postmes, &
Spears, 2008; Wright, 2001, 2010) describe recognition of undeserved or illegitimate group-based disadvantage and the resulting
BECKER AND WRIGHT
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64
feelings of injustice and group-based anger as key catalysts for
collective action. Accordingly, research has demonstrated that
creating a perception of increasing group-based advantage, offering hope that one can individually escape the disadvantages faced
by the rest of the group, or offering a representation of the
advantaged group as supportive and caring can all undermine
engagement in collective action (e.g., Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, &
Pratto, 2009; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). Benevolent sexism appears to offer all three of these. It provides a positive representation of women, bestowing clear advantages in gender-relevant
domains and skills. It describes a caring and supportive relationship with men and may even be seen to offer women a way of
getting along individually by pairing themselves with a high-status
man who functions like an economic elevator (e.g., Ellemers,
2001; Glick & Fiske, 2001).
In addition, the stereotypic representations of women offered by
hostile and benevolent sexism should result in different degrees of
self-stereotyping. Research on self-categorization and selfstereotyping has demonstrated that individuals integrate group
stereotypes into their self-concepts and consequently behave according to these stereotypes (e.g., Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher,
& Wetherell, 1987). Moreover, Biernat, Vescio, and Green (1996)
demonstrated that individuals engage in selective self-stereotyping
by embracing positive, but not negative, group attributes as descriptive of themselves. Given the openly negative content of
hostile sexism, women should be less likely to embrace these as
self-stereotypes. Instead, because these representations threaten
both their individual and group status, they should be angrily
rejected (see Van Zomeren et al., 2008; Wright, 2001) and thus
should increase women’s endorsement of and engagement in collective action (e.g., Glick & Fiske, 2001; Jackman, 1994).
Conversely, given its subjectively positive and even flattering
tone, exposure to benevolent sexism may be experienced as conferring individual and group advantages and may lead women to
incorporate these representations as self-stereotypes and thus to
endorse characterizations of their group that contribute to their
lack of power.
Thus, we predict that, ironically, exposure to hostile sexism will
promote efforts to reduce gender-based inequality, whereas exposure to benevolent sexism will work effectively and invisibly to
undermine engagement in actions intended to increase gender
equality.
increased system justification should in turn inhibit collective
action, because one should be unlikely to act against a system that
one perceives as just (e.g., Wright, 2010). Thus, system justification should mediate the relationship between exposure to benevolent sexism and collective action.
In addition, our work considers the interplay of group-level and
individual-level variables in predicting collective action. That is,
we propose that exposure to benevolent sexism not only increases
system justification (a group-level variable) but also strengthens
perception that one receives personal advantages from being a
woman, and these perceptions of personal advantages should also
reduce collective action. Finally, it has been argued that exposure
to benevolent sexism can be rewarding (e.g., Jackman, 1994) and
thus should elicit positive emotions that are incompatible with
collective action participation (e.g., happiness and satisfaction).
Therefore, positive emotions should serve as a third mediator of
the effect of exposure to benevolent sexism on collective action. In
sum, we integrate and extend previous research (Glick & Fiske,
1996; Jackman, 1994; Jost & Kay, 2005) by predicting that system
justification, perceived advantages of being a woman, and positive
affect will combine to mediate the negative relation between
exposure to benevolent sexism and collective action on behalf of
women (see Figure 1).
Conversely, we argue that exposure to hostile sexism’s clearly
negative and antagonistic representation of women should increase
the perception that the system is unfair, reduce the perceived
personal advantages of being a woman, and inspire negative affect
(e.g., resentment and anger). In turn, these should inspire increased
collective action (see Figure 2).
We conducted four studies. Studies 1 and 2 provide experimental tests of the mediation models illustrated in Figure 1 and 2.
Women were assigned to one of four conditions— exposure to
benevolent sexism, exposure to hostile sexism, or one of two
control groups—and later responded to measures of genderspecific system justification, perceived advantages of being a
woman, positive/negative affect, and collective action intentions
(Study 1) and actual engagement in collective action (Study 2).
Studies 3 and 4 provide experimental tests of the causal impact of
two proposed mediators— gender-specific system justification and
perceived advantages of being a woman— on collective action
The Current Research
Gender-specific
system justification
The broad aim of the current research is to investigate differential effects of exposure to benevolent and hostile sexism on
engagement in collective action. Although the current research
focuses primarily on the undermining effects of exposure to benevolent sexism, it also offers a novel attempt to examine whether
exposure to hostile sexism can promote collective action. Our
research builds on prior work that has demonstrated the differential
effects of exposure to benevolent and hostile sexism on attitudinal
variables (e.g., Jost & Kay, 2005) by testing its behavioral implications for women’s engagement for social change.
We also propose a multiple mediation model to explain the
effects of exposure to benevolent and hostile sexism on collective
action. Jost and Kay (2005) have demonstrated that exposure to
benevolent sexism increases system justification. We argue that
+
_
+
Benevolent sexism
Perceived advantages
of being a woman
_
Collective action
_
+
Positive affect
Figure 1. Expected mediation model for the relation between exposure to
benevolent sexism and collective action.
ANOTHER DARK SIDE OF CHIVALRY
Gender-specific
system justification
_
_
_
Hostile sexism
Perceived advantages
of being a woman
+
_
Collective action
+
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Negative affect
Figure 2. Expected mediation model for the relation between exposure to
hostile sexism and collective action.
intentions. When used as follow-ups to the original mediational
test, Studies 3 and 4 provide the strongest evidence that genderspecific system justification and perceived advantages of being a
woman mediate the association between exposure to benevolent or
hostile sexism and collective action (cf. Spencer, Zanna, & Fong,
2005).
Study 1
Method
Participants. Women in this Web-based experiment were
recruited in a school for prospective schoolteachers (N ⫽ 99).
They agreed to participate in this study by entering their names and
e-mail addresses on a list. Participation was entirely voluntary.
Participants’ ages ranged from 23 to 47 years (M ⫽ 28.76 years,
SD ⫽ 5.62). Most (96%) self-identified as Germans, 4% as other.
Design and procedure. Research has demonstrated that the
activation of stereotypes can be sufficient to influence judgments
and behavior even when these stereotypes are not personally
endorsed (e.g., Wheeler & Petty, 2001). Moreover, Jost and Kay
(2005) demonstrated that stereotype activation through incidental
exposure can be as effective as an opportunity for personal endorsement in increasing system justification. Thus, stereotypic
content (benevolent or hostile sexism) and nonstereotypic content
(control conditions) were activated by having participants simply
read six stereotypical (benevolent or hostile sexist) or nonstereotypical statements. Specifically, after completing demographic
variables, participants were randomly assigned to one of four
conditions and were exposed to six sentences containing either (a)
benevolent sexism, (b) hostile sexism, (c) gender-neutral contents,
or (d) gender-unrelated contents. In the gender-neutral condition,
participants were exposed to six sentences that were favorable
toward women but nonstereotypical. This control allowed us to test
whether the activation of any favorable view of women as a group
would be sufficient to reduce interest in collective action or
whether the effect depends specifically on activating benevolent
sexist stereotypes (see Jost & Kay, 2005, p. 503). In the genderunrelated condition, participants were exposed to six sentences that
had nothing to do with gender. We expected no differences in
65
engagement in collective action between these two control conditions.
After this experimental manipulation, participants completed
measures of the proposed mediators (gender-specific system justification, perceived advantages of being a woman, positive and
negative affect). Next, they completed a measure of collective
action intentions. Finally, they completed the recognition task in
which they indicated which six of 24 sentences they had read
before. Participants were then thanked and debriefed.
To cover the purpose of the study, participants were told that
they were participating in a memory study, that they would be
presented with six sentences to read at the beginning of the study,
and that their task would be to recognize these six sentences when
they were presented in a group of 24 sentences at the end of the
study. In between, they would answer some questions that were
either highly related, partly related, or not related at all to the six
sentences.
Experimental manipulation. In the benevolent, hostile, and
gender-neutral conditions, participants read that “recent research
has demonstrated that most men support the following six statements”; in the gender-unrelated condition, the term men was
replaced with the term people.
Exposure to benevolent sexism. We included two items representing each of the three subcomponents of benevolent sexism.
These items were selected from a German translation of the
benevolent sexism scale (Eckes & Six-Materna, 1999; e.g., “Men
are incomplete without women”) and a new benevolent sexism
scale designed by Schuessler (2009; e.g., “Secretly, most women
yearn for a man whose arms they can find protection and security
in”; “Women have a way of caring that men are not capable of in
the same way”).1
Exposure to hostile sexism. We included six items representing hostile sexism selected from a German translation of the
hostile sexism scale (Eckes & Six-Materna, 1999; e.g., “Women
are too easily offended”) and a new hostile sexism scale designed
by Schuessler (2009; e.g., “When women have to work together,
they often get into cat fights”).
Gender-neutral control condition. We pretested a list of 23
gender-neutral items used by Hoffman and Hurst (1990) and by
Schneider-Düker and Kohler (1988) to find six attributes that
continue to be considered gender-neutral in contemporary German
society. The pretest sample (N ⫽ 41) was similar to the sample
used in the primary study. We selected the six attributes that did
not differ significantly from the neutral midpoint of a 5-point scale
(1 ⫽ typical female, 2 ⫽ rather female, 3 ⫽ neutral, 4 ⫽ rather
male, 5 ⫽ typical male): realistic, inventive, generous, healthy,
law-abiding, and systematic. These were then used in sentences
with wording similar to the benevolent sexism items (e.g.,
“Women are healthier than men”; “As compared to men, women
are more systematic”).
1
The Benevolent Sexism Scale (␣ ⫽ .88) and the Hostile Sexism Scale
(␣ ⫽ .90) designed by Schuessler (2009) are specifically adapted to the
German context. The correlation between Schuessler’s Benevolent Sexism
Scale and a direct German translation of the original Benevolent Sexism
Scale was r ⫽ .59, p ⬍ .001. The correlation between Schuessler’s
Hostile Sexism Scale and a direct German translation of the original
Hostile Sexism Scale is r ⫽ .47, p ⬍ .001.
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66
BECKER AND WRIGHT
Gender-unrelated control condition. These six items were
not related to gender and were originally created in German (e.g.,
“Tea is healthier than coffee”; “Biking is better for the environment than driving a car”).
Mediators and dependent variable. Unless otherwise indicated, all items were answered on a 7-point rating scale (1 ⫽
disagree strongly to 7 ⫽ agree strongly). The mediators were
measured in the following order: perceived advantages of being a
woman, affect, gender-specific system justification.
Gender-specific system justification was assessed using four
items from the gender-specific System Justification Scale (Jost &
Kay, 2005; e.g., “In general, relations between men and women are
fair”). Four items from the original scale were not included,
because they had low reliability in a pilot study with German
participants. Instead, we added two new items to improve reliability: “The division of societal power between women and men is
fair” and “The division of societal power between women and men
is just.” These six items were averaged (␣ ⫽ .85).
Perceived advantages of being a woman was measured using six
items created for this study in German. Four used a 7-point scale
(ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree). English translations of example items include “For me personally, being
a woman has many advantages” and “I benefit from being a
woman.” Two items called for direct comparison between men and
women on a scale ranging from definitely women to definitely men
(e.g., “In general, who has more advantages in our society?”).
These six items were averaged (␣ ⫽ .86).
Positive and negative affect were assessed by asking participants how strongly they felt the following four emotions (originally in German): happy, satisfied, angry, and furious. Participants
responded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from not at all to very
much. Responses to angry and furious were highly correlated (r ⫽
.79, p ⬍ .001), as were responses to happy and satisfied (r ⫽ .81,
p ⬍ .001). Thus, the two pairs of items were averaged to create
composite “negative affect” and “positive affect” scores.
Collective action intention was assessed using 10 items, created
for this study in German (e.g., “I would participate in a rally
demanding equal salaries for women and men”; “I would forward
an online petition to establish a law demanding minimum quotas
for women in leading positions”; “I would act against sexism in
general”). These 10 items were averaged (␣ ⫽ .91).
Manipulation check. At the end of the study, the 24 sentences used across all four experimental conditions were presented
to all participants, and they were asked to select the sentences they
had seen at the beginning of the study. We examined participants’
ability to detect the correct six sentences and used this as a
manipulation check. Selection of a sentence was coded with 1 and
nonselection of a sentence was coded with 0. We summed the six
sentences for each experimental condition to create four memory
scores (one each for benevolent sexist, hostile sexist, genderneutral, and gender-unrelated); each ranged from 0 (no sentences
selected) to 6 (all sentences selected).
Results
Manipulation check. To determine whether participants recalled the sentences they had previously been exposed to, we
performed four planned contrasts comparing (a) the benevolent
sexism memory score of participants in the benevolent sexism
condition with the benevolent sexism score of participants in all
three other conditions, (b) the hostile sexism memory score of
participants in the hostile sexism condition with the hostile sexism
memory score of participants in all three other conditions, (c) the
gender-neutral memory score of participants in the gender-neutral
condition with those in all three other conditions, and (d) the
gender-unrelated memory score of participants in the genderunrelated condition with those in all three other conditions.
Results revealed that participants exposed to benevolent sexism
were more likely to select benevolent sentences (M ⫽ 5.62) than
participants in the other three conditions (average M ⫽ 0.09), F(1,
94) ⫽ 2,276.14, p ⬍ .001, ␩2 ⫽ .96. Participants exposed to hostile
sexism were more likely to select hostile sentences (M ⫽ 5.82)
than participants in the other conditions (average M ⫽ 0.02), F(1,
94) ⫽ 12,504.67, p ⬍ .001, ␩2 ⫽ .99. Participants in the genderneutral condition were more likely to select gender-neutral sentences (M ⫽ 5.36) than participants in the other conditions (average M ⫽ 0.04), F(1, 94) ⫽ 1,278.73, p ⬍ .001, ␩2 ⫽ .93.
Participants in the gender-unrelated condition were more likely to
select gender-unrelated sentences (M ⫽ 5.92) than participants in
the other conditions (average M ⫽ 0.00), F(1, 94) ⫽ 32,417.89,
p ⬍ .001, ␩2 ⫽ 1.0. All other differences between groups were not
significant. Therefore, we concluded that participants carefully
read and effectively memorized the manipulations.
Preliminary analyses. To test our prediction that exposure to
gender-neutral statements would produce levels of collective action equivalent to exposure to gender-unrelated statements (i.e.,
that the two control conditions would not differ), we performed a
t test comparing the two conditions. Results showed that the
gender-neutral (M ⫽ 3.41, SD ⫽ 1.43) and gender-unrelated
conditions (M ⫽ 3.48, SD ⫽ 1.24) produce equivalent levels of
collective action intention, t(47) ⫽ – 0.18, p ⫽ .86. Therefore, the
two control conditions were combined into one pooled control
condition for all further analyses.
Testing the multiple mediation models. We tested the two
primary hypotheses by computing two multiple mediation models
using multiple regression analyses (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The
first examined the effect of exposure to benevolent sexism on
collective action intentions and the underlying mediational processes. For this analysis, the benevolent sexism condition was
compared with the pooled control condition (dummy coded: benevolent sexism ⫽ 1, control ⫽ 0). The second model examined
the effect of exposure to hostile sexism on collective action intentions and the underlying mediational processes. Here, the hostile
sexism condition was compared with the pooled control condition
(dummy coded: hostile sexism ⫽ 1, control ⫽ 0).
These analyses allow the total effect of the predictor variable on
the outcome variable to be decomposed into specific indirect
effects and the direct effect. The indirect effects are the causal
effects of the predictor variable on the outcome variable that can
be accounted for by the mediating variables. The direct effect is the
causal effect of the predictor variable on the criterion controlling
for all mediators. If the total indirect effect is significant, mediation is established as the direct effect is significantly smaller than
the total effect (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). In addition, the unique
specific indirect effect of each mediator can be tested controlling
for all other mediators, and it is possible to determine whether one
mediator accounts for more of the mediated effect than the others.
To test these indirect effects, we used bootstrapping (as recom-
mended by Preacher & Hayes, 2008, and Shrout & Bolger, 2002).
Bootstrapping is a nonparametric resampling procedure. Confidence intervals (CIs) for the indirect effect are estimated by
repeated sampling from the data set. The distribution of these
repeated estimates serves as approximation of the sampling distribution of the indirect effect of interest (Preacher & Hayes, 2008)
yielding in unbiased estimates of the standard error (Shrout &
Bolger, 2002). We present 95% CIs (bias corrected and accelerated). The bootstrap estimates are based on 5,000 bootstrap samples, using the SPSS version of the Preacher and Hayes (2009)
macro.
Test of the multiple mediation model for exposure to benevolent sexism. First, we tested the main hypothesis that exposure
to benevolent sexism would decrease the intention to engage in
collective action compared with the pooled control condition. As
predicted, the total effect was significant (B ⫽ –1.13, SE ⫽ 0.33,
p ⬍ .001), indicating that women exposed to benevolent sexism
reported significantly less intention to engage in collective action
than participants in the pooled control condition (for mean differences, see Figure 3).
Second, we examined whether this causal effect was mediated
by gender-specific system justification, perceived advantages of
being a woman, and positive affect (see Figure 4). An initial
regression with exposure to benevolent sexism as the predictor and
the three proposed mediators as outcome variables revealed that,
compared with the pooled control condition, exposure to benevolent sexism resulted in significantly higher gender-specific system
justification (B ⫽ 1.39, SE ⫽ 0.33, p ⬍ .001), greater perceived
advantages of being a woman (B ⫽ 1.29, SE ⫽ 0.27, p ⬍ .001),
and higher reported positive affect (B ⫽ 0.90, SE ⫽ 0.41, p ⬍ .05).
Exposure to benevolent sexism did not significantly influence
negative affect (B ⫽ 0.09, SE ⫽ 0.30, p ⫽ .74).
Next, we tested the predicted mediation in a multiple mediation
model. As predicted, the total indirect effect of exposure to benevolent sexism on collective action intentions was significant
(B ⫽ –1.13, SE ⫽ 0.26, p ⬍ .001) and the direct effect was reduced
to nonsignificant when the mediators were included (B ⫽ – 0.001,
SE ⫽ 0.30, p ⫽ .99), suggesting an overall mediation effect. The
bootstrapping procedure described earlier revealed that both
gender-specific system justification (B ⫽ – 0.55, SE ⫽ 0.22, p ⫽
5
Collective Action Intention
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ANOTHER DARK SIDE OF CHIVALRY
4.43
4
3.45
3
2.31
2
Experimental Condition
Benevolent sexism
Hostile sexism
"Pooled" Control
Figure 3. Effect of experimental conditions on collective action intentions, Study 1. All means are significantly different from one another (p ⬍
.05).
67
Gender-specific
system justification
1.39*** (.33)
Perceived advantages
of being a woman
1.43*** (.32)
Benevolent sexism
-.42** (.12)
-.36** (.12)
Collective action
intentions
-.001 (.30) (-1.13***(.33))
.90* (.41)
.01 (.08)
Positive affect
Figure 4. Multiple mediation model for the relation between exposure to
benevolent sexism and collective action intentions, Study 1, N ⫽ 99.
Statistics for each path are unstandardized estimates with standard errors in
parentheses. The unstandardized estimate in parentheses is the effect of
benevolent sexism on collective action without the mediators included.
ⴱ
p ⬍ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01. ⴱⴱⴱ p ⬍ .001.
.01) and perceived advantages of being a woman (B ⫽ – 0.55,
SE ⫽ 0.23, p ⫽ .02) significantly mediate the exposure to benevolent sexism/collective action relationship, and the 95% CIs for
each of these effects did not include zero ([–1.17, – 0.17] and
[–1.18, – 0.11], respectively). In contrast, neither positive affect
(B ⫽ 0.00, SE ⫽ 0.07, p ⫽ .96) nor negative affect (B ⫽ – 0.03,
SE ⫽ 0.08, p ⫽ .74) significantly mediated the relation between
exposure to benevolent sexism and collective action, and zero was
contained in the 95% CIs ([– 0.18, 0.18] and [– 0.25, 0.12], respectively).
In a last step, we compared the indirect effects of the two
significant mediators— gender-specific system justification and
perceived advantages of being a woman. The contrast effect was
not significant (B ⫽ – 0.00, SE ⫽ 0.36, p ⫽ .99) and zero was
contained in the 95% CI [– 0.77, 0.86], indicating no significant
difference in the strength of mediation by these two variables.
Test of the multiple mediation model for exposure to hostile
sexism. Again, we began by testing the main hypothesis that
exposure to hostile sexism would decrease collective action intentions. As predicted, the total effect of exposure to hostile sexism
was significant (B ⫽ 0.99, SE ⫽ 0.37, p ⬍ .001), indicating that
women exposed to hostile sexism reported significantly more
intention to engage in collective action than participants in the
pooled control condition (for mean differences, see Figure 3).
Moreover, compared with the control conditions, exposure to
hostile sexism resulted in significantly less gender-specific system
justification (B ⫽ – 0.74, SE ⫽ 0.24, p ⬍ .01), less perceived
advantages of being a woman (B ⫽ –1.07, SE ⫽ 0.32, p ⬍ .001),
less positive affect (B ⫽ –1.17, SE ⫽ 0.38, p ⬍ .01), and increased
negative affect (B ⫽ 1.29, SE ⫽ 0.35, p ⬍ .001).
Next, we tested the predicted mediation using a multiple mediation model (see Figure 5). As predicted, the total indirect effect of
exposure to hostile sexism on collective action intentions was
significant (B ⫽ 1.09, SE ⫽ 0.30, p ⬍ .001) and the direct effect
was reduced to nonsignificant when controlling for the mediators
(B ⫽ – 0.10, SE ⫽ 0.30, p ⫽ .74). The bootstrapping procedure
revealed that the indirect effects of gender-specific system justifi-
BECKER AND WRIGHT
68
Gender-specific
system justification
-.74** (.24)
Perceived advantages
of being a woman
-1.07*** (.32)
-.37* (.16)
-.51*** (.12)
Collective action
intentions
Hostile sexism
-.10 (.30) (.99**(.37))
1.29***(.35)
.15 (.10)
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Negative affect
Figure 5. Multiple mediation model for the relation between exposure to
hostile sexism and collective action intentions, Study 1, N ⫽ 99. Statistics
for each path are unstandardized estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The unstandardized estimate in parentheses is the effect of hostile
sexism on collective action without the mediators included. ⴱ p ⬍ .05.
ⴱⴱ
p ⬍ .01. ⴱⴱⴱ p ⬍ .001.
cation (B ⫽ 0.27, SE ⫽ 0.15, p ⫽ .06) and perceived advantages
of being a woman (B ⫽ 0.55, SE ⫽ 0.20, p ⫽ .01) were significant
and their 95% CIs did not include zero ([0.01, 0.66] and [0.17,
1.18], respectively). Thus, as predicted, both variables mediated
the relation between exposure to hostile sexism and collective
action. The mediational effects of negative affect (B ⫽ 0.19, SE ⫽
0.14, p ⫽ .17; 95% CI [– 0.10, 0.36]) and positive affect (B ⫽ 0.08,
SE ⫽ 0.10, p ⫽ .46; 95% CI [– 0.06, 0.62]) were not significant.
Finally, we compared the indirect effects of the two significant
mediators— gender-specific system justification and perceived advantages of being a woman. The contrast effect was not significant
(B ⫽ – 0.27, SE ⫽ 0.24, p ⫽ .27) and zero was contained in the
95% CI [–1.04, 0.25], indicating no significant difference in the
strength of mediation by these two variables.
Discussion
This study provides the first experimental evidence that exposure to benevolent sexism decreases intentions to engage in
collective action, whereas exposure to hostile sexism increases
collective action intentions. There was also strong evidence that
these effects were mediated by gender-specific system justification
and perceived advantages of being a woman. Women exposed to
benevolent sexism were more likely to perceive the gender system
as just and to see advantages of being a woman, which in turn was
associated with less interest in collective action to change the
current gender relations. In contrast, women exposed to hostile
sexism described the gender system as less just and saw fewer
advantages of being a woman, which in turn was associated with
increased interest in collective action. Furthermore, these results
demonstrated that the negative impact of exposure to benevolent
sexism on collective action intentions cannot be explained by the
fact that these statements appear to provide a favorable representation of women. As predicted, women who were exposed to
favorable but nonstereotypical beliefs about women (genderneutral control condition) did not differ from women in the genderunrelated control condition in terms of their interest in collective
action. Similarly, it appears that increased gender-specific system
justification and perceived advantages of being a woman also
result specifically from exposure to favorable beliefs that match
commonly held stereotypes of women.
Exposure to benevolent sexism also leads to more positive
affect, whereas exposure to hostile sexism leads to more negative
affect. However, there was no evidence for the predicted mediational role of positive and negative affect. It is possible that this
was due to the anonymous context of Web-based studies, which
might inspire less emotional involvement than real face-to-face
settings. Therefore, in our second study the role of affect was again
investigated, this time in a face-to-face setting. In addition, the
dependent measure in Study 1 was the intention to engage in
collective action. Attitude– behavior research has shown that behavioral intentions are not perfect predictors of actual behavior
(e.g., Kraus, 1995). Thus, a stronger test of our hypotheses would
involve a measure of actual engagement in collective action.
Furthermore, it has been shown that women’s own endorsement
of benevolent sexist beliefs can be an important moderator (e.g.,
Moya et al., 2007). Thus, it is possible that exposure to benevolent
sexism may be particularly effective for women who already
endorse this ideology, compared with those who do not. Women
who do not endorse benevolent sexism might be more skeptical
and more likely to recognize these representations of women as
discriminatory. Therefore, they should not reduce their collective
action intentions. Further, it is possible that exposure to hostile
sexism may increase collective action primarily among women
who do not endorse hostile sexist beliefs. Women who endorse
hostile sexist beliefs would be unlikely to increase their intention
for collective action when they are exposed to these beliefs. Thus,
Study 2 also examined whether women’s own endorsement of the
relevant ideologies moderates the effect of the exposure to sexism
on engagement in collective action.
Finally, exposure to benevolent sexism may inhibit, whereas
exposure to hostile sexism may promote, processes that affect
engagement in collective action on behalf of any ingroup (not just
women). To test this, we included a gender-unrelated collective
action measure.
Study 2
In Study 2, we aimed to replicate and extend the findings of
Study 1 and included four modifications. First, rather than measuring collective action intentions, we used two actual collective
actions as dependent variables. Participants were given the opportunity to take flyers to distribute and to sign a petition. We used
these two collective actions because we assumed the commitment
needed to sign a petition would be lower than that needed to
distribute flyers. Signing a petition involves relatively minor costs
(e.g., participants might think the male recipient of the petition
would recognize them as feminist), whereas taking flyers implies
a time commitment to distribute them, the possibility of public
arguments, and the possibility of being identified as feminist.
Second, we created an interpersonal interaction in the lab in
which an experimenter introduced the collective action measure.
Of course, having the experimenter introduce the collective action
measure could create demand characteristics that encourage collective action for reasons of social desirability. In an attempt to
investigate this possibility, we included a measure of selfmonitoring (Snyder, 1974). Self-monitoring includes two compo-
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ANOTHER DARK SIDE OF CHIVALRY
nents: acquisitive and protective self-monitoring. The acquisitive
self-monitor modifies her or his behavior in social situations to be
rewarded for behaving “correctly.” The protective self-monitor
adapts her or his behavior to avoid disapproval. Thus, both types
of self-monitors behave similarly but are guided by different
motives (Wolfe, Lennox, & Cutler, 1986).
Third, women’s own endorsement of benevolent and hostile
sexism was measured to determine whether the effects of exposure
to benevolent and hostile sexism were moderated by women’s
initial endorsement of these beliefs. Finally, we included an additional collective action measure that was not on behalf of the
ingroup of women. This allowed us to examine whether exposure
to benevolent sexism decreases (and exposure to hostile sexism
increases) engagement in collective action on behalf of any ingroup or whether these effects are confined to gender-related
collective action. We hypothesize that exposure to benevolent
sexism should exclusively decrease engagement in gender-related
collective action and that exposure to hostile sexism should only
increase engagement in gender-related collective action.
Method
Participants. Participants in this laboratory experiment were
female psychology students (N ⫽ 92), who received course credit
for their participation. Participants’ ages ranged from 19 to 27
years (M ⫽ 20.41 years, SD ⫽ 1.70). Most (95%) self-identified as
Germans, 5% as other.
Procedure.
Endorsement of benevolent and hostile sexist
beliefs and self-monitoring were measured in a mass-testing session that was ostensibly unrelated to the laboratory study. Four to
5 weeks later, participants came individually to a laboratory with
two rooms. After being welcomed by a female experimenter,
participants were taken into one of the rooms. As in Study 1,
participants were told they would participate in a memory study;
their task was to read and remember six sentences so that they
could later recognize these sentences in a larger group of 24
sentences. Moreover, they were told that the purpose of the study
was to examine the influence of contextual factors on memory. As
an example of context effects on memory, participants were told
that researchers have found that when people learn a list of words
while underwater, their ability to correctly remember these words
is better underwater than on shore (Godden & Baddeley, 1975).
Participants were told that the current study aimed to replicate this
finding using different rooms and to test whether the content
learned in one room could be recognized better in that room than
in another room. Participants were then asked to draw a button
from a box. If they drew the red button, they would change rooms
for the recognition task. If they drew the blue button, they would
stay in the current room. All participants drew a red button and
thus changed rooms.
After this introduction, the participants received an envelope
containing one of the four experimental manipulations. All envelopes were identical in appearance and were arranged so that the
experimenter was blind to experimental condition. Participants
were asked to open the envelope, spend 3 min reading and memorizing the six sentences on the sheet, and then put the sheet back
in the envelope. The experimenter left the room, returned after 3
min, and collected the closed envelope. Participants were told that
a delay was necessary between the reading of the six sentences and
69
the recognition task. They were told they would spend the first part
of this time in the current room before moving to the other room.
During the elapsed time, the participant was asked to help
another professor at the university who was developing a new
scale for an unrelated study. In fact, these scales were the proposed
mediators. To reinforce the notion that this task was unrelated to
the main study, the participant was asked to put the completed
questionnaire in a locked box standing in one corner of the room.
After the participant completed this ostensibly unrelated questionnaire, the experimenter invited the participant to follow her to the
other room.
The experimenter then explained that the participant would have
to wait another 5 min before completing the memory test and that
while waiting the participant could engage in two possible activities. First, she offered the participant two petitions to sign and
identified flyers that they could take and later distribute. She
explained that the petitions and flyers were designed by the student
council, which was currently running two campaigns: one aimed at
creating equality for women at the university, and the other aimed
at increasing students’ autonomy in determining the courses they
could take and their schedules. The participants were told that the
two petitions (one to hire more female professors, the other for
more study autonomy) would later be delivered to the head of the
department.2 Participants were also told that if they were willing to
distribute flyers, they should write down how many they wanted to
distribute and take this number from the pile of flyers arranged on
a nearby table.
Second, the experimenter explained that if the participant was
not interested in the petitions and flyers, she could read magazines.
Three back issues of the popular German magazines Der Spiegel
and Stern were provided. The experimenter then left the room. She
returned in 5 min, delivered the memory task, and then waited
outside the room until the participant had finished. Finally, the
experimenter enquired about any suspicion and thanked the participant. Participants were fully debriefed after the study was
finished. Nobody indicated suspicion that the three collective
action measures were part of the study.
Mass-testing pretest measures. Unless otherwise indicated,
all items were answered using 7-point rating scales (1 ⫽ disagree
strongly to 7 ⫽ agree strongly).
Benevolent sexist beliefs were measured using nine items from
the German translation of the benevolent sexism scale (Eckes &
Six-Materna, 1999; ␣ ⫽ .83; e.g., “Women should be cherished
and protected by men”).
Hostile sexist beliefs were measured using eight items from the
German translation of the hostile sexism scale (Eckes & SixMaterna, 1999; ␣ ⫽ .83; e.g., “Feminists are making unreasonable
demands of men”).
Self-monitoring was measured with six items from the Ability to
Modify Self-Presentation scale (e.g., “In social situations, I have
the ability to alter my behavior if I feel that something else is
called for”), six items from the Cross Situational Variability scale
(e.g., “Different situations can make me behave like very different
people”), and six items from the Attention to Social Comparison
Information scale (e.g., “The slightest look of disapproval in the
eyes of a person with whom I am interacting is enough to make me
2
Students knew that the head of the department was male.
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70
BECKER AND WRIGHT
change my approach”), using the German translation by Laux and
Renner (2002). Results of a factor analysis (principal axis analysis)
with promax rotation including all 18 items indicated a two-factor
solution (using the scree-test criteria; eigenvalues: 5.54, 3.12, 1.34,
1.11, 1.00 . . .). The first factor included all items from the Cross
Situational Variability and Attention to Social Comparison scales
and the second factor included all items from the Ability to Modify
Self-Presentation scale. Using the terminology of Laux and Renner
(2002), we averaged the Ability to Modify Self-Presentation items,
creating a composite measure of self-monitoring (␣ ⫽ .76) and the
items from the other two scales, creating a composite measure of
concern for appropriateness (␣ ⫽ .88).
Measures used in the main study. We used the same measures of gender-specific system justification, perceived advantages
of being a woman, and positive and negative affect and order of
measures as in Study 1.
Collective action was measured using two gender-related measures and one gender-unrelated measure of collective action.
Gender-related collective action Measure I: Number of flyers.
Students were given the opportunity to take flyers to distribute.
The flyer, titled “Plea for More Gender Equality for Women,”
contained demands for gender equality in terms of the unequal pay
of women compared with men, the underrepresentation of female
professors, and the demand for an antidiscrimination guideline at
the university. To encourage students to take flyers and to set
anchors, each participant received a list that already included three
entries by fictitious students living in Marburg. These fictitious
students took 50, 100, and 30 flyers. Participants recorded the
number of flyers they wanted to take and distribute.
Gender-related collective action Measure II: Women’s petition. Participants were given the opportunity to sign a petition
directed to the head of the department that demanded the hiring of
more female professors. To sign this petition, students had to write
their name, address, and signature. Participants received a petition
with three signatures of fictitious students living in Marburg on the
top. Only one was the same as on the flyer list.
Gender-unrelated collective action measure: Study autonomy
petition. Participants were given the opportunity to sign a petition, also directed at the head of the department, demanding that
students be given more choices so that they have more autonomy
in determining their study content and schedules. Signing this
petition required entering the same information as was requested
on the gender-related petition. Again, each participant received a
petition that already included three signatures. One name was the
same as on the flyer list and gender-related petition, and two were
different. This was designed to illustrate that it was fine to sign
both petitions and to take flyers or to engage in only one or two of
these actions.
Manipulation check. We used the same manipulation check
as in Study 1.
Results
We first report the results of the manipulation check, followed
by the results for gender-related collective action Measure I (number of flyers), gender-related collective action Measure II (women’s petition), and gender-unrelated collective action measure
(study autonomy petition).
Manipulation check. We examined participants’ ability to
detect their six target sentences, using the same procedure as in
Study 1. Participants showed near perfect recognition of the six
items, and all statistical tests of accuracy were highly significant
(all Fs ⬎ 10,397.23, ps ⬍ .001, ␩2 ⫽ 1). It was clear that all
participants read carefully and effectively memorized the sentences. One participant in the gender-neutral condition confused a
benevolent sexism statement with a gender-neutral statement, and
one participant in the hostile sexism condition failed to recognize
one sentence.
Gender-related collective action Measure I: Number of flyers.
Preliminary analysis. A t test revealed that women assigned
to the gender-neutral control condition (M ⫽ 36.92, SD ⫽ 47.14)
did not differ from women assigned to the gender-unrelated control condition (M ⫽ 36.36, SD ⫽ 40.42) in the number of flyers
they took, t(46) ⫽ 0.40, p ⫽ .97. Thus, as in Study 1, the two
control conditions were combined for the following analyses.
Test of the multiple mediation model for exposure to benevolent
sexism. We used the same procedure as in Study 1. As predicted,
the total effect of exposure to benevolent sexism on collective
action was significant (B ⫽ –29.17, SE ⫽ 10.09, p ⬍ .01),
indicating that women exposed to benevolent sexism took a
smaller number of flyers than those in the pooled control condition
(see Figure 6).
Moreover, exposure to benevolent sexism resulted in significantly higher gender-specific system justification (B ⫽ 0.66, SE ⫽
0.24, p ⬍ .01), greater perceived advantages of being a woman
(B ⫽ 0.62, SE ⫽ 0.17, p ⬍ .01), and higher positive affect (B ⫽
1.01, SE ⫽ 0.29, p ⬍ .01). Exposure to benevolent sexism had no
significant impact on negative affect (B ⫽ – 0.24, SE ⫽ 0.24,
p ⫽ .33).
Next, we tested the predicted mediational model. As predicted,
the total indirect effect of exposure to benevolent sexism on
number of flyers taken was significant (B ⫽ –29.89, SE ⫽ 8.09,
p ⬍ .001), and the direct effect of exposure to benevolent sexism
on number of flyers taken decreased to nonsignificant when the
mediators were included (B ⫽ – 0.72, SE ⫽ 8.42, p ⫽ .93; see
Figure 7), suggesting an overall mediation effect. The bootstrapping procedure used to examine specific indirect effects revealed
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
83.3
64.58
62
60
66.7
52
36.67
30
7.5
Number of Flyers Taken
Benevolent sexism
% Signed Women's (gender- % Signed Study Autonomy
related) Petition
(gender-unrelated) Petition
Hostile sexism
"Pooled" Control
Figure 6. Means for each of three experimental conditions on three
dependent variables, Study 2. All means within the first two dependent
variables (number of flyers taken and % signed women’s petition) are
significantly different from one another (p ⬍ .05). Means within the third
dependent variable (% signed study autonomy petition) are not significantly different from one another.
ANOTHER DARK SIDE OF CHIVALRY
Gender-specific
system justification
.66** (.24)
Perceived advantages
of being a woman
.62** (.17)
Benevolent sexism
-12.46** (4.20)
-20.09** (6.01)
-.72 (8.42) (-29.17**(10.09))
Collective action:
Number of flyers
-6.59+ (3.40)
1.01**(.29)
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Positive affect
Figure 7. Multiple mediation model for the relation between exposure to
benevolent sexism and the gender-related collective action Measure I:
Number of flyers, Study 2, N ⫽ 92. Statistics for each path are unstandardized estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The unstandardized
estimate in parentheses is the effect of benevolent sexism on collective
action without the mediators included. †p ⬍ .10. ⴱ p ⬍ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01.
ⴱⴱⴱ
p ⬍ .001.
that gender-specific system justification (B ⫽ – 8.25, SE ⫽ 3.98,
p ⫽ .04), perceived advantages of being a woman (B ⫽ –12.39,
SE ⫽ 4.86, p ⫽ .01), and positive affect (B ⫽ – 6.65, SE ⫽ 3.81,
p ⫽ .08) significantly mediate the exposure to benevolent sexism/
collective action relationship and the 95% CIs for these effects did
not include zero ([–20.62, –1.90], [–25.88, –3.74], and [–17.57,
– 0.19], respectively). Negative affect was not a significant mediator (B ⫽ –2.60, SE ⫽ 2.77, p ⫽ .35; 95% CI [– 8.57, 1.35]).
Finally, we compared the size of the indirect effects of the three
significant mediators. Results indicated no significant difference
between gender-specific system justification and perceived advantages of being a woman (B ⫽ 4.14, SE ⫽ 6.24, p ⫽ .51; 95% CI
[– 8.42, 16.53]) or positive affect (B ⫽ –1.61, SE ⫽ 5.49, p ⫽ .77;
95% CI [–16.59, 10.86]), and no significant differences between
perceived advantages of being a woman and positive affect (B ⫽
–5.74, SE ⫽ 6.44, p ⫽ .37; 95% CI [–22.72, 8.15]). Thus, all three
variables appear to be equally strong mediators.
Test of the multiple mediation model for exposure to hostile
sexism. We first tested the effect of exposure to hostile sexism
on the number of flyers taken. As predicted, the total effect was
significant (B ⫽ 27.92, SE ⫽ 12.17, p ⫽ .02), indicating that
women exposed to hostile sexism took a greater number of flyers
than those in the pooled control condition (see Figure 6).
Moreover, exposure to hostile sexism resulted in lower genderspecific system justification (B ⫽ – 0.63, SE ⫽ 0.26, p ⬍ .01),
lower perceived advantages of being a woman (B ⫽ – 0.51, SE ⫽
0.18, p ⬍ .01), and higher reported negative affect (B ⫽ 0.67,
SE ⫽ 0.25, p ⬍ .01). Exposure to hostile sexism had no significant
impact on positive affect (B ⫽ – 0.35, SE ⫽ 0.31, p ⫽ .26).
Next, we tested the predicted mediational model. As predicted,
the total indirect effect of exposure to hostile sexism on number of
flyers taken was significant (B ⫽ 30.69, SE ⫽ 10.14, p ⬍ .01), and
the direct effect of exposure to hostile sexism on number of flyers
decreased to nonsignificant when the mediators were included
(B ⫽ –2.78, SE ⫽ 8.33, p ⫽ .74; see Figure 8). The bootstrapping
procedure used to examine specific indirect effects revealed that
71
gender-specific system justification (B ⫽ 11.92, SE ⫽ 5.56, p ⫽
.03) and perceived advantages of being a woman (B ⫽ 10.15, SE ⫽
4.44, p ⫽ .02) significantly mediated the exposure to hostile
sexism/collective action relationship. The effect of negative affect
(B ⫽ 5.56, SE ⫽ 3.38, p ⫽ .10) approached conventional significance. The CIs of all three mediators did not include zero ([2.57,
27.39], [2.25, 21.79], and [0.51, 14.87], respectively). Positive
affect was not a significant mediator (B ⫽ 3.07, SE ⫽ 2.91, p ⫽
.29; 95% CI [–1.49, 11.99]).
Finally, we compared the size of indirect effects of the three
significant mediators. Results indicated no significant differences
between the effects for gender-specific system justification and
perceived advantages of being a woman (B ⫽ 1.77, SE ⫽ 6.50,
p ⫽ .79; 95% CI [–10.35, 17.35]) or negative affect (B ⫽ 6.36,
SE ⫽ 6.19, p ⫽ .30; 95% CI [– 4.17, 23.83]), and no significant
difference between the effects of perceived advantages of being a
woman and negative affect (B ⫽ 4.59, SE ⫽ 5.35, p ⫽ .39; 95%
CI [–5.12, 16.50]). Thus, all three variables appear to be equally
strong mediators.
Test of potential moderators. In a last step, a hierarchical
regression analysis was used to test whether the effects of exposure
to benevolent and hostile sexism were moderated by participants’
own endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs, hostile sexist beliefs, self-monitoring, or concern for appropriateness. In Step 1,
exposure to benevolent sexism (Dummy 1: benevolent sexism
condition ⫽ 1, all other conditions ⫽ 0) and exposure to hostile
sexism (Dummy 2: hostile sexism condition ⫽ 1, all other conditions ⫽ 0) were entered together with centered scores of women’s
endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs, hostile sexist beliefs,
self-monitoring, and concern for appropriateness. Step 2 included
six two-way interactions. Three involved Dummy 1 (exposure to
benevolent sexism) and women’s endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs, self-monitoring, and concern for appropriateness, and
three involved Dummy 2 (exposure to hostile sexism) and women’s endorsement of hostile sexist beliefs, self-monitoring, and
concern for appropriateness.
At Step 1, the analysis revealed the significant main effect of
exposure to benevolent sexism (B ⫽ –22.99, SE ⫽ 12.00, p ⫽ .06)
Gender-specific
system justification
-.63** (.26)
Perceived advantages
of being a woman
-.51** (.18)
Hostile sexism
-18.89** (4.24)
-19.97*** (5.63)
-2.78 (8.33) (27.92*(12.17))
.67**(.25)
Collective action:
Number of flyers
8.34* (4.16)
Negative affect
Figure 8. Multiple mediation model for the relation between exposure to
hostile sexism and the gender-related collective action Measure I: Number
of flyers, Study 2, N ⫽ 92. Statistics for each path are unstandardized
estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The unstandardized estimate
in parentheses is the effect of hostile sexism on collective action without
the mediators included. ⴱ p ⬍ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01. ⴱⴱⴱ p ⬍ .001.
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72
BECKER AND WRIGHT
and of exposure to hostile sexism (B ⫽ 28.96, SE ⫽ 11.66, p ⫽
.02), replicating the effect shown in previous analyses. Beyond
these two main effects, the only additional variable predicting
collective action was endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs
(B ⫽ –15.47, SE ⫽ 5.55, p ⬍ .01). Higher endorsement of
benevolent sexist beliefs was associated with taking a smaller
number of flyers. At Step 2, none of the two-way interactions were
significant. Thus, it appears that the main effects of exposure to
benevolent and hostile sexism were not moderated by women’s
endorsement of sexist ideology, their level of self-monitoring, or
their concern for appropriateness.
Gender-related collective action Measure II: Women’s
petition.
Effects of the experimental conditions on collective action.
Logistic regression analyses were calculated to test the main
hypothesis that women exposed to benevolent sexism would be
less likely, whereas women exposed to hostile sexism would be
more likely, to sign the women’s petition, compared with women
in the two control conditions.
Three dummy variables were used to compare the effects of
exposure to benevolent sexism (Dummy 1), exposure to hostile
sexism (Dummy 2) and the gender-neutral condition (Dummy 3)
to the gender-unrelated control condition. An overall significant
effect emerged, ␹2(3) ⫽ 13.79, p ⬍ .01. Again, the gender-neutral
control (65.4% signed the petition) did not differ from the genderunrelated control (59.1% signed the petition; B ⫽ 0.27, SE ⫽ 0.60,
p ⫽ .65); thus, the two control conditions were combined into a
pooled control condition for the further analyses.
As predicted, women exposed to benevolent sexism were less
likely to sign the gender-related petition than women assigned to
the control conditions (B ⫽ –1.36, SE ⫽ 0.57, p ⫽ .02; see Figure
6). Moreover, the difference between those women who were
exposed to hostile sexism and those assigned to the control conditions approached conventional levels of statistical significance
(B ⫽ 1.10, SE ⫽ 0.62, p ⫽ .08).3
Test of potential moderators. In a last step, a hierarchical
logistic regression analysis was used to test whether the effects of
exposure to benevolent and hostile sexism were moderated by
endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs, endorsement of hostile
sexist beliefs, self-monitoring, and concern for appropriateness,
using the same procedure as presented earlier. Again, beyond the
two significant main effects of exposure to benevolent sexism
(B ⫽ –1.4, SE ⫽ 0.62, p ⫽ .02) and exposure to hostile sexism
(B ⫽ 1.4, SE ⫽ 0.67, p ⫽ .03), the only additional variable
predicting collective action that approached conventional significance was participants’ endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs
(B ⫽ – 0.54, SE ⫽ 0.33, p ⫽ .09). Higher endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs was associated with lower likelihood of signing
the gender-related petition. None of the two-way interactions were
significant, indicating that the effects of exposure to benevolent
and hostile sexism were not moderated by any of the four individual difference variables.
Gender-unrelated collective action measure: Study autonomy
petition.
Effects of the experimental conditions on collective action.
The logistic regression analysis with signing the study autonomy
petition as the outcome produced no significant overall effect,
␹2(2) ⫽ 1.47, p ⫽ .48. Women exposed to benevolent sexism (B ⫽
0.32, SE ⫽ 0.54, p ⫽ .55) and hostile sexism (B ⫽ 0.61, SE ⫽
0.52, p ⫽ .24) did not differ from the pooled control groups (see
Figure 6). Thus, as predicted, neither experimental manipulation
had an impact on signing the study autonomy petition.
Discussion
Study 2 replicated and extended the finding of Study 1 with the
use of two measures of actual collective action behavior and
provided additional support for the opposite effects of exposure to
benevolent and hostile sexism for actions designed to produce
social change. Exposure to benevolent sexism inhibited women’s
tendencies to sign a gender-related petition and to take flyers
designed to raise awareness about gender inequality, whereas
exposure to hostile sexism promoted both of these actions. Moreover, the expected mediation models were fully supported. Exposure to benevolent sexism increased the perception that the gender
system is fair, increased the perceived advantages of being a
woman, and increased positive affect, which in turn reduced the
number of flyers participants took and the likelihood of signing a
petition on behalf of women. In contrast, exposure to hostile
sexism decreased the perception that the gender system is fair,
decreased the perceived advantages of being a woman, and increased negative affect. These processes increased the tendency to
engage in gender-related collective action. Thus, compared to
Study 1, Study 2 provides clear evidence of the mediating role of
positive and negative affect. Interestingly, these processes were
not influenced by women’s own general endorsement of the sexist
beliefs they were confronted with, nor was there evidence that they
were influenced by social desirability concerns (self-monitoring
and concern for appropriateness).
Moreover, we did not find effects on our control collective
action measure, illustrating that exposure to benevolent sexism
does not inhibit, and exposure to hostile sexism does not promote,
general engagement in collective action on behalf of any ingroup.
Instead, these effects are confined to collective action on behalf of
women. Thus, the inclusion of a control collective action unrelated
to gender represents an important and unique contribution of this
study.
However, Spencer et al. (2005) have stressed that correlational
mediation analyses are overused. They proposed that a more
powerful way to demonstrate the causal chain proposed by mediational models is to include follow-up studies in which the proposed mediators are manipulated to demonstrate their causal impact on the outcome variables. This provides more compelling
evidence because the mediating psychological process is examined
as both an effect of the independent variable and as a cause of the
dependent variable. So far, in two studies we have demonstrated
that the intervening variables of gender-specific system justification and perceived advantages of being a woman are consistently
affected by exposure to sexist ideologies. The next step is to
provide evidence that they are causes of collective action tendencies. Therefore, we conducted two further experiments to test the
effects of gender-specific system justification (Study 3) and perceived advantages of being a woman (Study 4) on collective action
intentions.
3
A multiple mediation analysis produced essentially the same findings
as for the dependent variable taking flyers. Details of this analysis can be
obtained from Julia C. Becker.
ANOTHER DARK SIDE OF CHIVALRY
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Study 3
The aim of this study was to provide experimental evidence for
the proposed causal impact of gender-specific system justification
on intention to engage in collective action. The primary challenge
in doing this was to effectively manipulate gender-specific system
justification. This was accomplished indirectly using bogus information about the attitudes of members of the participant’s ingroup,
namely, students at their university (for another example of successful bogus consensus manipulation see, Stangor, Sechrist, &
Jost, 2001). Information about ingroup norms can influence group
members’ opinions because when one’s collective identity is salient, self-stereotyping leads the individual to perceive group characteristics as personal characteristics (Biernat et al., 1996; Turner
et al., 1987).
Method
Participants. Participants in this Web-based experiment were
female psychology students (N ⫽ 68). They agreed to participate
by entering their names and e-mail addresses on a list and received
course credit for their participation. Participants’ ages ranged from
19 to 26 years (M ⫽ 20.63 years, SD ⫽ 1.61). All self-identified
as Germans.
Procedure and measures. Participants were randomly assigned either to a gender-specific system justification high (GSJ
high) condition or a gender-specific system justification low (GSJ
low) condition. All participants read a short text titled “Marburg
Students’ Opinions About Gender Fairness,” in which genderspecific system justification was manipulated by information indicating either that most students justify the gender system (GSJhigh condition) or that most students do not justify the gender
system (GSJ-low condition). The text was based on items designed
by Jost and Kay (2005). Participants in the GSJ-high condition
read the percentages mentioned first, whereas participants in the
GSJ-low condition read the percentages in parentheses.
87% (13%) of the students hold the view that the division of societal
resources between women and men is fair and just. The same number
agree that both men and women have a fair shot at wealth and
happiness. 92% (8%) report that the division of labor in families
generally operates as it should and our society is set up so that men
and women usually get what they deserve. However, 11% (89%) of
students hold the opinion that gender roles need to be radically
restructured.
Manipulation check. After reading this information, participants answered a single item tapping gender-specific system justification: “In general, relations between men and women are fair
in Germany.” This item was answered twice. First, participants
estimated the percentage of Marburg students who would agree
with the statement, selecting one of 11 options, ranging from 0%
to 100%. Second, they indicated their own agreement with the
statement on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (do not agree at all)
to 7 (fully agree). Finally, they completed the 10-item collective
action intention measure used in Study 1 (␣ ⫽ .89). They were
then thanked and debriefed.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation check. A t test comparing participants in the
two conditions on the estimated gender-specific system justifica-
73
tion among students yielded a significant effect, t(66) ⫽ –11.98,
p ⬍ .001. Those in the GSJ-high condition reported that more
students would agree with the system justification item (M ⫽ 85%,
SD ⫽ 13) than did those in the GSJ-low condition (M ⫽ 36%,
SD ⫽ 19). Similarly, the t test comparing participants own endorsement of gender-specific system justification statements also
yielded a significant effect, t(66) ⫽ –2.94, p ⬍ .01, indicating that
participants in the GSJ-high condition (M ⫽ 4.23, SD ⫽ 1.59)
agreed more strongly with the statements than did those assigned
to the GSJ-low condition (M ⫽ 3.18, SD ⫽ 1.35).
Effects of the experimental conditions on collective action.
A t test comparing the two conditions on the collective action
measure yielded the predicted effect, t(66) ⫽ 3.16, p ⬍ .01,
showing that women assigned to the GSJ-low condition (M ⫽
4.03, SD ⫽ 1.20) reported significantly greater intention to participate in collective action than did women assigned to the GSJhigh condition (M ⫽ 3.10, SD ⫽ 1.21). Thus, increasing genderspecific system justification resulted in less endorsement of
collective action compared with a situation in which participants’
system justification was decreased. Results of this study provide
experimental evidence of the causal role of gender-specific system
justification in altering collective action intentions and therefore
support its mediating role in the relationship between exposure to
benevolent and hostile sexism and collective action shown in
Study 1 and 2.
Study 4
The design of Study 4 was identical to Study 3, except that
perceived advantages of being a woman were manipulated instead
of gender-specific system justification. The purpose of this study
was to provide an experimental investigation of the predicted
causal influence of perceived advantages of being a woman on
intention to engage in collective action. Perceived advantages of
being a woman were manipulated with a focus of attention manipulation in which women were asked to focus on and write about
either the benefits or the costs of being a woman.
Method
Participants. Participants in this Web-based experiment were
female nonpsychology students (N ⫽ 37). They agreed to participate by entering their names and e-mail addresses on a list and
received course credit for their participation. Participants’ ages
ranged from 19 to 27 years (M ⫽ 22 years, SD ⫽ 2.10). All
self-identified as Germans.
Procedure and measures. Participants were randomly assigned to the perceived advantages or the perceived disadvantages
condition. Those in the perceived advantages condition read: “Being a woman has advantages and disadvantages. Please focus only
on the advantages that you have from being a woman and write
down what comes to mind.” Participants in the perceived disadvantages condition read the same text but were asked to focus only
on disadvantages. After writing (dis-)advantages, they answered a
manipulation check item (“Being a woman has many advantages”)
on a 7-point scale (1 ⫽ strongly disagree, 7 ⫽ strongly agree).
Finally, they completed the collective action measure used in
Studies 1 and 3 (␣ ⫽ .86) and were thanked and debriefed.
BECKER AND WRIGHT
74
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Results and Discussion
Advantages and disadvantages.
First, we investigated
whether women in the perceived advantages condition in fact
reported advantages and women in the perceived disadvantages
condition reported disadvantages of being a woman. One participant in the perceived advantages condition was excluded because
she wrote, “I don’t have advantages”; one participant in the perceived disadvantages condition was excluded because she wrote,
“There are no disadvantages.” All other participants wrote at least
two (dis-)advantages. The most common advantages listed were
related to benevolent sexism (e.g., being more emotional, more
understanding, being helped more quickly, being invited to dinners
and drinks, men behave charmingly); others referred to workrelated issues (e.g., having less career pressure, no military service) or multitasking. The most common disadvantages listed
involved discrimination in work life (e.g., being paid less than
men, poor career outlook, glass ceiling), sexism in general and role
expectation (e.g., being primarily responsible for child care and
household, being more restricted and controlled), sexual harassment, or physical disadvantages (e.g., being physically less
strong).
Manipulation check. A t test comparing the two conditions
on the perceived advantages of being a woman item yielded a
significant effect, t(35) ⫽ –2.82, p ⬍ .01. As expected, women in
the perceived advantages condition (M ⫽ 4.27, SD ⫽ 1.44) indicated more advantages of being a woman than women in the
perceived disadvantages condition (M ⫽ 2.82, SD ⫽ 1.59).
Effects of the experimental conditions on collective action.
A t test comparing the two conditions on the collective action
measure yielded the predicted effect, t(34) ⫽ 3.54, p ⬍ .01.
Women assigned to the perceived advantages condition reported
significantly less intention to participate in collective action (M ⫽
2.95, SD ⫽ 1.50) than those assigned to the perceived disadvantages condition (M ⫽ 4.54, SD ⫽ 1.22). Thus, thinking about
advantages of being a woman decreases collective action intentions, whereas thinking about disadvantages of being a woman
increases intentions to take actions to change the gender system.
These results provide experimental evidence of the causal role of
perceived advantages of being a woman in altering collective
action intentions, and therefore support its mediating role in the
relationship between exposure to benevolent and hostile sexism
and collective action.
General Discussion
Discrimination against women is still widespread all over the
world (e.g., Glick et al., 2000), yet most women do not challenge
ongoing gender inequality. To investigate this paradox, we conducted four studies examining the impact of sexist ideologies on
women’s participation in collective action and present a model for
understanding how exposure to benevolent sexism can undermine,
whereas exposure to hostile sexism can promote, social change.
The studies reported here provide consistent support for our theoretical argument that this process is mediated by gender-specific
system justification and perceived advantages of being a woman.
More specifically, the first two experiments showed that women
exposed to benevolent sexism were less willing to engage in
collective action, because exposure to benevolent sexism increased
gender-specific system justification and perceptions that there are
personal advantages of being a woman. Exposure to hostile sexism, however, resulted in increased willingness to engage in collective action, because it decreased the perception that the gender
system is just and decreased perceptions of the personal advantages gained by being a woman. In addition, results of Study 2
revealed that women faced with benevolent sexism felt more
positive emotions, and this also predicted less engagement in
collective action, whereas women confronted with hostile sexism
felt more negative emotions, which predicted greater collective
action participation.
Taken together, the four studies provide experimental evidence
of the chain of causality (Spencer et al., 2005). Studies 1 and 2
show that collective action and the two process variables (genderspecific system justification and perceived advantages of being a
woman) were impacted by experimental manipulations of exposure to benevolent or hostile sexism. Then, experimental manipulations of gender-specific system justification (Study 3) and perceived advantages of being a woman (Study 4) show that these can
both cause changes in collective action intentions.
This work fills a critical gap in the literature by demonstrating
how the ostensibly positive stereotypes contained in benevolent
sexism can effectively undermine women’s resistance to gender
inequality. Jost and Kay (2005) showed that exposure to benevolent sexism appears to compensate for economic inequality between men and women and allows women to justify the system
that maintains this inequality. Similarly, Jackman (1994) has described how positive stereotypes and chivalrous paternalistic behavior provide the velvet glove whereby dominant groups use
“sweet persuasion” rather than hostile force to maintain their
position of power. The current research takes a major next step
forward by providing direct experimental evidence in support of
these claims about the behavioral implications of this kind of
system justification. Thus, the present work complements previous
work by demonstrating that ideology can be the catalyst for change
as well as a source of support for the status quo (Wakslak et al.,
2007).
Implications for Inhibition of Social Change
The present research illustrates that women adopt belief systems
that serve as justifications for existing gender inequality at least in
part to make the best of an unfavorable situation rather than
challenging it. Noticing that men endorse benevolent sexist beliefs
(such as “women are morally superior” or “women excel as
caregivers”) can flatter women into active cooperation with a
patriarchal system (Jackman, 1994) by enhancing an illusion of
having individual and group benefits of being a woman. Thus,
benevolent sexism creates a more positive social identity for
women and offers a means by which women as individuals can
manage within a sexist system (Glick & Fiske, 2001).
This research strengthens the case that the negative societal
impact of benevolent sexism is not only found in the paternalistic
and thus unequal treatment meted out by men who endorse these
beliefs. Benevolent sexism plays a direct role in undermining
women’s motivation to engage in direct action to improve their
lower status. As a result, gender injustice not only remains but is
made more hegemonic and even harder to challenge by winning
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ANOTHER DARK SIDE OF CHIVALRY
the voluntary acceptance and consent of women (e.g., Gramsci,
1971; Jost & Hunyady, 2002).
Our model, including gender-specific system justification,
perceived advantages of being a woman, and emotions as joint
and equal mediators of the effects of exposure to benevolent
sexism on collective action, does not deny the possibility of
alternative models. For example, it is conceivable that at least
some of these mediators might be arranged in a sequential
chain. On the basis of work by Jost and Hunyady (2002), Napier
et al. (2010) and Wakslak et al. (2007), we might predict that
exposure to benevolent sexism increases system justification,
which serves a palliative function by increasing positive and
decreasing negative affect, which in turn inhibits collective
action. Alternatively, exposure to benevolent sexism might
influence positive and negative affect, which then increases
system justification and reduces collective action. We tested
these two alternative models with the data in Study 1 and 2.
However, because the mediating effects for positive and negative affect were not consistent and strong in our data, neither of
these sequential models fit the data as well as the models we
have presented. Nonetheless, future research would do well to
examine more fully these kinds of sequential causal models.
Implications for Promotion of Social Change
Interestingly, and perhaps ironically, by focusing on collective
action participation, these findings point to a more positive view of
hostile sexism. Although hostile sexism can be used by men as the
basis for denying women equal access to positions of power and
for the general subjugation of women, it may also inspire women
to act, and the action it inspires may be precisely the means by
which real social change can occur. This implies that women care
about social justice and are bothered if their group is treated
unfairly.
Furthermore, by blending affection with dominance, men can
strategically leverage benevolent sexism as a means of reducing
women’s collective resistance against gender inequality (see
also Moya et al., 2007). Thus, it seems clear that identifying
dominance as part of benevolent sexist affection is an important
first step to increasing resistance (Stangor et al., 2003). We
have shown that when women identify sexist behavior as discriminatory (i.e., hostile sexism), they are more willing to
engage in collective action to change the gender status quo.
Although most research has found that benevolent sexism is not
identified as discriminatory (e.g., Barreto & Ellemers, 2005;
Swim et al., 2005), Vescio et al. (2005) provided an example of
a more optimistic possibility. They showed that when the condescending nature of patronizing behavior is made explicit and
clearly apparent (by praising women but assigning them to a
devalued position), women respond with anger. Thus, women
may accept the condescending aspects of benevolent sexism as
long as they appear to promise certain benefits. As a logical
consequence, interventions to increase women’s knowledge of
the long-term personal and group costs of benevolent sexism
might be very effective. Future research is needed to determine
whether this would also inspire increased collective action (for
initial research, see Becker & Swim, in press). Moreover, it
should be noted that our findings might apply primarily to
societies with a general orientation toward a normative rejec-
75
tion of hostile sexist beliefs. Other research is needed to examine women’s responses to hostile sexism in countries with
higher levels of gender inequality (e.g., Napier et al., 2010).
Implications for Paternalistic Relationships Beyond
Gender
These findings may also have implications for relationships
beyond gender (see Jackman, 1994). Paternalism toward those
lower in socio-economic status, some ethnic minorities, people
with disabilities, and other stigmatized groups may have the same
pacifying effects on participation in collective action and thus
serve to slow the pace of social change to benefit these groups as
well.
Also, our general approach of considering the implications of
intergroup attitudes for participation in collective action is in line
with ideas presented by Wright and Lubensky (2009), who argue
that the literatures on prejudice and collective action have seldom
been considered simultaneously and this has led to an incomplete
understanding of the societal implications of prejudice and its
reduction. They provided initial evidence that although positive
cross-group contact can reduce prejudice among both dominant
and subordinate groups, it can have detrimental effects for subordinated groups because it reduces interest in collective action (see
also Saguy et al., 2009). Although Wright and Lubensky (2009)
have made a different specific point than the one made in the
current line of research, they recognize that work on prejudice (i.e.,
racism, sexism, etc.) would benefit from considering its implications not only for intergroup attitudes and the discriminatory
actions initiated by the advantaged group but also for collective
action by the disadvantaged group. Thus, we conclude with the
words of Jackman (1994), who called on researchers to “redirect
our attention to the many ways that dominant groups subvert
conflict by befriending or at least emotionally disarming those
whom they subordinate” (p. 2).
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Received July 10, 2009
Revision received November 23, 2010
Accepted November 30, 2010 䡲
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