City of Manila v. Chinese Community
GR 14355 (1D), 31 October 1919
FACTS:
Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands be
expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement namely,
the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming that such expropriation
was necessary.
Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity
existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a
cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered
with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be
converted into a street for public purposes. In fact, they even offered the
adjacent road to be used, for free, so not to expropriate cemetery and
disturb the dead.
The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation
of the particular strip of land in question.
Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that
it (petitioner) has the authority to expropriate any land it may desire; that
the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of
the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can
inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions
concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of
the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the
land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor
of the defendant for its value.
ISSUE:
W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of
the expropriation?
HELD:
The courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the
expropriation.
The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine
necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The ascertainment
of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the
land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 166 Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre,
73 Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)
The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be
confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the
legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within
the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be
questioned by the courts, but that general authority of municipalities or
entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular
instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to
exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions
accompanying the authority.
The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation
to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the
legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is
exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the
general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into.
The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether
the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is purely
legislative and not judicial, arises generally in the wisdom and propriety of the
legislature in authorizing the exercise of the right of eminent domain instead
of in the question of the right to exercise it in a particular case
By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of restricting the
exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case
and for the purposes designated by the law.//
MODAY V. CA
Percival Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur.
In 1989, the of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan Del Sur passed a
resolution authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Inititate the Petition for
Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot along the National Highway
owned by Precival Moday for the site of Bunawan Farmers center and Other
Government Sports Facilities. The mayor approved the resolution and was
then transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved with the
ruling that the expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots
owned by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed
through with the expropriation nonetheless.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by
virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
HELD:
A municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal
resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan
exercised is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty.
It is government’s right to appropriate private property for public use or
purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of
eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public
entities and public utilities.
For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the
taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The only
ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution,
ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is
“beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the
same.” The provincial (board's) disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or
order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution,
ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by law.
If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative function of the
municipal council or president
In this case, the SP merely stated that there are other available lands for
the purpose sought and did not even bother to declare the SB resolution as
invalid.
The Municipality of Bunawan’s power to exercise the right of eminent
domain is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337. The Sangguniang
Panlalawigan’s disapproval of the questioned resolution does not render the
same null and void. Under Section 153 of B.P. 337, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan was granted the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid
on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of Sangguniang Bayan or the
Mayor to issue.
Hence, the expropriation case is valid.
MASIKIP V. CITY OF PASIG
FACTS:
Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land
located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila. The City of Pasig
notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion
of her property to be used for the “sports development and recreational
activities” of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to
Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of
Pasig.
Petitioner replied stating that the intended expropriation of her property is
unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive.
Respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner’s
property is “to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents”
and subsequently filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation.
Thereafter petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint by reason that
(1) THERE IS NO GENUINE NECESSITY FOR THE TAKING OF THE PROPERTY
SOUGHT TO BE EXPROPRIATED; and (2) PLAINTIFF HAS ARBITRARILY AND
CAPRICIOUSLY CHOSEN THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE EXPROPRIATED.
Issue:
Whether the expropriation of private property for the benefit of a small
community notwithstanding that there is such a recreational facility only a
short distance away, is considered to be for public use?
Held:
The expropriation of private property for the benefit of a small
community is not considered to be for public use.
((The power of eminent domain of the local government units was laid
down in Sec. 19 of the local government code which it provides that: “A local
government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or
welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws: Provided, however, That, the power of eminent domain may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That, the local
government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the
filing of expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper
court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property
based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated:
Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for expropriated property shall
be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time
of the taking of the property."))
The right to take private property for public property necessarily
originates from the necessity and the taking must limited to such necessity.
In this case, the respondent has failed to establish that there is a genuine
necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property. The records show that the basis
for the passage of the ordinance authorizing the expropriation indicates that
the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners
Association, a private, non-profit organization, and not the residents of
Caniogan. It can be gleaner that the members of the said association are
desirous of having their own private playground and recreational facility.
The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The
necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists and
alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the
area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City,
including those of Caniogan.
In this case, the court ruled that respondent City of Pasig has failed to
establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property.
LAGCAO V. JUDGE LABRA
Facts:
The Province of Cebu donated several lots to the City of Cebu. This
include lot 1029 which was purchase by the petitioner on installment basis.
But then, in late 1965, the lots, including Lot 1029, reverted to the Province of
Cebu. Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 which
prompted the petitioner to sue the province for specific performance and
damages in the then Court of First Instance. CFI ruled in favor of petitioners.
After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only
to discover that it was already occupied by squatters. Thus, petitioners
instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The MTCC, Branch 1,
Cebu City, rendered a decision ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On
appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCC’s decision and issued a writ of execution
and order of demolition.
However, when the demolition order was about to be implemented,
Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters to the MTCC, requesting the
deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City was still looking for a
relocation site for the squatters thus, suspending said demolition.
Unfortunately for Petitioners, during the suspension period, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City passed Ordinance No. 1772 which
included Lot 1029 among the identified sites for socialized housing. Thereafter,
Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted by the SP of Cebu City authorizing the mayor
of Cebu City to initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of Lot
1029 which was registered in the name of petitioners. The intended acquisition
was to be used for the benefit of the homeless after its subdivision and sale to
the actual occupants thereof.
In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is
unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their property for the
purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the concept of
public use contemplated in the Constitution. They allege that it will benefit
only a handful of people.
Issue 1:
Whether or not the local government units have the inherent power of
eminent domain.
Held:
Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain.
Local governments can exercise such power only when expressly
authorized by the Legislature. As provided in the Local Government Code of
1991, Congress conferred upon local government units the power to
expropriate. However, there are two legal provisions which limit the
exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.
Thus, the exercise by local governments of the power of eminent
domain is not absolute. In fact, Section 19 of RA 7160 explicitly states that
such exercise must comply with the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws. Strict limitations on the exercise of the such power by local
government units is required, especially with respect to (1) the order of
priority in acquiring land for socialized housing and (2) the resort to
expropriation proceedings as a means to acquiring it.
In this case, Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes
of socialized housing.
The City of Cebu failed to comply with the substantive requirements of
a valid ordinance. Likewise, it failed to establish that the other modes of
acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first exhausted.
Thus, the Court finds Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm
for being violative of the petitioners’ right to due process. Therefore, the
petition was granted.
Issue 2:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 1843 is a valid exercise of eminent domain
under RA 7279?
Ruling:
Ordinance No. 1843 is not a valid exercise of eminent domain under RA
7279
The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine
necessity and that necessity must be of public character. Government may not
capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be
expropriated.
In this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners’ property was
singled out for expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled
the particular choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the
choice of petitioners’ property as the site of a socialized housing project. There
are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws; and (2) private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
Thus, the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent
domain is not absolute. In fact, Section 19 of RA 7160 itself explicitly states
that such exercise must comply with the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws. Strict limitations on the exercise of the power of eminent
domain by local government units, especially with respect to (1) the order of
priority in acquiring land for socialized housing and (2) the resort to
expropriation proceedings as a means to acquiring it. Private lands rank last in
the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein,
expropriation proceedings may be resorted to only after the other modes of
acquisition are exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is mandatory
because these are the only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of private
property against what may be a tyrannical violation of due process when their
property is forcibly taken from them allegedly for public use. The Local
Government Unit failed to follow section 9 and 10 of RA 7279.
JILCF v. MUNICIPALITY OF PASIG G.R. NO. 152230 August 09, 2005
FACTS:
The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a
municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid,
Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly made of light materials, were located.
The road had to be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code,
so that fire trucks could pass through in case of conflagration. Likewise, the
residents in the area needed the road for water and electrical outlets. So it
sought to expropriate the co-owned properties of 3 Ching Cuanco’s (JILCF’s
predecessor in interest).
Thereafter, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance
authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation for the said property
in which it stated that the property owners were notified of the municipality’s
intent to purchase the property for public use as an access road but they
rejected the offer.
The municipality then filed a complaint against the Ching Cuancos for
the expropriation of the property however the property was already sold to
herein plaintiff, Jesus is Lord Christian Foundation in which they constructed a
cemented road with a width of three meters.
When apprised about the complaint, JILCSFI filed a motion for leave to
intervene as defendant-in-intervention, which was granted by the court. It
averred that the plaintiff’s exercise of eminent domain was only for a particular
class and not for the benefit of the poor and the landless. It also alleged that
the property sought to be expropriated is not the best portion for the road and
the least burdensome to it. Also, it averred that it has been denied the use and
enjoyment of its property because the road was constructed in the middle
portion and that the plaintiff was not the real party-in-interest. //
Issue:
Whether or not the Municipality of Pasig can validly exercise the power of
eminent domain.
Held:
The Municipality of Pasig cannot validly exercise the power of eminent
domain.
The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate
right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial
sovereignty for a public purpose.
The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the
owner and against the condemner. When the power is granted, the extent to
which it may be exercised is limited to the express terms or clear implication
of the statute in which the grant is contained.
For the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain, it must comply
with the following requisites:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local
chief executive to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceeding over a particular private property
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or
welfare, or for the benefit of the poor or landless.
3. There is a payment of just compensation
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated.
In the present case, the respondent failed to prove that before it filed
its complaint, it made a written and definite and valid offer to acquire the
property for public use as an access road. The only evidence adduced by the
respondent to prove its compliance is the photocopy of the letter purportedly
bearing the signature of Engr. Reyes to only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo
Cuangco.
Moreover, the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing
the road particularly in the petitioner’s property. Also, the petitioner was
deprived of its right to due process for the reason that it was not notified of
any ocular inspection of property.
Thus, the petition was granted.
San Roque v. Republic
Facts:
Subject parcels of land, together with seventeen (17) others, were the
subject of an expropriation proceeding.However, the title of the
subject parcel of land was not transferred to the government.
Eventually, the land was subdivided and T.C.T. No. 11946 was
cancelled and new titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of
Cebu. In which the Two parcels of the land were acquired by
defendant-appellee.
Plaintiff-appellant filed the present case alleging that it is the owner
of the subject parcels of land.
In its Answer, defendant-appellee claimed that it was a buyer in
good faith. It also claimed that there was no valid expropriation
because it was initiated by the executive branch without legislative
approval. It also alleged that the expropriation was never
consummated because the government did not actually enter the
land nor were the owners paid any compensation.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in holding the (a)validity of the expropriation
proceedings; (b) respondent had a better right to the subject
properties and (c) respondent is not guilty of laches
Ruling:
The CA erred in holding the validity of expropriation.
No piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an
unwilling owner until compensation is paid.
Without FULL PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION, there can be no transfer
of title from the landowner to the expropriator. Thus, the Republic's failure
to pay just compensation precluded the perfection of its title over the lot
sought to be expropriated. In fact, the unpaid owner has the right to recover
the property if within 5 years from the decision of the expropriation court,
the expropriator fails to effect payment of just compensation.
Eminent domain cases are strictly construed against the
expropriator and the payment of just compensation for private
property taken for public use is an indispensable requisite for the
exercise of said power.
The Republic manifestly failed to present clear and convincing
evidence of full payment of just compensation. Furthermore, the
initial deposit claimed to be paid by the Republic would not
adequately recompense all owners of the lots expropriated. More
importantly, if the Republic had actually made full payment of just
compensation, in the ordinary course of things, it would have led to
the cancellation of title, or the annotation of the lien in favor of the
government on the certificate of title covering questioned lot.
The registration with the Registry of Deeds of the Republic's interest
arising from the exercise of it's power or eminent domain is in
consonance with the Land Registration Act. There is no showing that
the Republic complied with the registration requirement.
From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent upon the Republic
to cause the registration of the subject properties in its name or record
the decree of expropriation on the title. Yet, not only did the Republic
fail to register the subject properties in its name, it failed to do so for
56 years.//