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DAR vs Woodland
GR No. 188174, June 29, 2015
FACTS: Woodland is the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 10.0680 hectares located at Davao City. On
2003, DAR issued a Notice of Coverage placing the 5.0680 hectares under the coverage of CARL for having exceeded the retention
limit. The title was cancelled and new title covering 5.0680 hectares was issued under Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, CLOAs
were issued in favor of 5 farmer beneficiaries. Woodland filed with the RTC a complaint for declaratory relief, annulment of the notice
of coverage un RA 6657. It argued that pursuant to Section 5 of the law, the agency had a period of ten (10) years to implement the
CARP from the time of its effectivity on 15 June 1988. It further argued that the CARL's amendatory law, R.A. 8532, did not extend the
DAR's authority to acquire agrarian lands for distribution. It theorized that the budget augmentations legislated in R.A. 8532 pertained
only to the funding requirements of the other facets of the CARP implementation and excluded the acquisition of private agricultural
lands. RTC ruled in favor of Woodland. DAR filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the DAR can still issue Notices of Coverage after 15 June 1998.
HELD: Yes. The agrarian reform program, being one of the immutable hallmarks of the 1987 Constitution, must be faithfully
implemented to meet the ends of social justice. The Court cannot subscribe to WoodlandÊs stance that the DARÊs authority to issue
notices of coverage and acquisition ceased after the 10-year implementation period mentioned in Section 5 of the CARL. Such a view
runs afoul of the constitutional mandate firmly lodged in Article XIII, Section 4, which seeks the just distribution of all agricultural lands
to qualified farmers and farmworkers to free them from oppressive tenancy agreements.
The success of the CARP depends heavily on the adept implementation by the DAR. The agencyÊs primordial procedural tool for
realizing the lawÊs objectives is the issuance of Notices of Coverage and Acquisition.
Association of small land owners vs Secretary of Agrarian reform
Gr No. 78742, July 14, 1989
FACTS: The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution scheme provided for
in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of rice lands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares.
They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants
under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian
reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may be forced to distribute their land under eminent domain or police power.
HELD: There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the
application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended
for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene
materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike
the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that
the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the
regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the
power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of
the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial
rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power
of eminent domain
Luz Farms vs Hon. Sec. of the Dept. of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 86889
Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in livestock and poultry business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the
enforcement of CARP. Luz Farms petitions CARP to be declared unconstitutional together with a writ of preliminary injunction or
restraining the order.
Issue: Constitutionality of CARP, insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry, swine in its coverage.
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural,"
clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage
of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
Stanfilco vs Dole Philippines
Gr No. 154048
On January 29, 1998, SEARBEMCO, as seller, and respondent DOLE Philippines, Inc. (Stanfilco Division) (DOLE), as buyer,
entered into a Banana Production and Purchase Agreement(BPPA). The BPPA provided that SEARBEMCO shall sell exclusively to DOLE,
and the latter shall buy from the former, all Cavendish bananas of required specifications to be planted on the land owned by
Issue: Whether or not the petition is within the exclusive jurisdiction of Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)?
Section 3(d) of RA No. 6657 is clear in defining an agrarian dispute: any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including dispute concerning farm-workers
associations or representations of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms
and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether
the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
The parties in the present case have no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian relationship that could bring their controversy within
the ambit of agrarian reform laws and within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. In fact, SEARBEMCO has no allegation whatsoever in its
motion to dismiss regarding any tenancy relationship between it and DOLE that gave the present dispute the character of an agrarian
We have always held that tenancy relations cannot be presumed. The elements of tenancy must first be proved by substantial evidence
which can be shown through records, documents, and written agreements between the parties. A principal factor, too, to consider in
determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is the intent of the parties.
G.R. No. 171107
September 5, 2012
FACTS: In 1950, Pedro hired respondent Minople Macaraeg (Minople) to work on the lot 657. Pedro divided Lot 657 among his four
children, including Lucila. Eventually, Lucila’s undivided share became Lot No. 1222, the subject landholding.
After almost 30 years, Lucila’s representative, petitioner Anita C. Vianzon (Anita), executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of her
daughter, Redenita Vianzon (Redenita), conveying a 2.5- hectare portion of the subject land. Soon thereafter, Anita filed two
applications to purchase the subject property – one in 1990 and the other on August 7, 1996. Minople, however, also filed his own
application to purchase the same land. These conflicting claims were brought before the Department of Agrarian Reform.
The DAR Secretary found that it was Minople who was the "actual possessor/ cultivator of the lot in consideration." Aggrieved, Anita
appealed to the OP. On August 18, 2004, the OP issued a resolution declaring Lucila as "the legitimate and lawful purchaser/
beneficiary of the landholding in question."
Not in conformity, Minople elevated the matter to the CA. In upholding Minople’s right to the subject land, the CA anchored its
Decision on Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6657 or CARL. According to the CA, Minople had been working on the contested lot since
1950, as a tenant and performing all aspects of farming and sharing in the harvest of the land, in conformity with DAR’s A.O. No. 3,
Series of 1990, pursuant to the CARL.
Undaunted, Anita is now before this Court via this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Minople has a rightful claim over the said land as a tenant.
HELD: Yes. The beacon that will serve as our guide in settling the present controversy is found in the Constitution, more particularly
Articles II and XIII:
Article II
SEC.21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.
Article XIII
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farm workers, who
are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till x x x
Picking up from there, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6657, or the CARL of 1988. Section 22 of this law enumerates those who should
benefit from the CARL.
SEC. 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. – The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to landless residents of the
same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the following order of priority:
(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;
(b) regular farmworkers;
(c) seasonal farmworkers;
(d) other farmworkers;
(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
(f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and
(g) others directly working on the land.
x x x.
Pursuant to this, the DAR issued A.O. No. 3 lays down the qualifications of a beneficiary in landed estates in this wise: he or she should
be (1) landless; (2) Filipino citizen; (3) actual occupant/tiller who is at least 15 years of age or head of the family at the time of filing of
application; and (4) has the willingness, ability and aptitude to cultivate and make the land productive.
The significance of the allocatee/awardee being the actual tiller is made even clearer in the "Operating Procedures" of A.O. No. 3 itself,
where the MARO is required to make a determination as to who the actual tiller is, for it is to him that the land should be awarded. In
fact, item 2.1.3, states that if it is found that the allocatee or awardee employs others to till the land, the MARO should cancel the
Order of Award (OA) or Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) and issue a new one in favor of the "qualified actual cultivator/occupant."
Given all the laws in place together with the undisputed fact that Minople worked on the subject landholding for more than half a
century, the inescapable conclusion is that Minople as the actual tiller of the land is entitled to the land mandated by our Constitution
and R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 78517 February 27, 1989
Reyeses acquired two parcels of land in Zamboanga del Sur through
Their predecessors-in-interest who were originally granted homestead patents. They desired to cultivate these lands personally, but
Alita et.al. refused to vacate, relying on the provisions of the agrarian reform law back then PD 27. Thus, the Reyeses filed a complaint
against the Minister of Agrarian Reform, the DAR Regional Director, and Alita et. al. for the declaration of PD 27 and appurtenant
regulations as inapplicable to homestead lands. The CA declared that PD27 is inapplicable to homestead' that the Reyeses will
cultivate their farmholding as owners thereof' and ejectment of the so-called tenants Alita et. al.)
ISSUE: Should agrarian reform under PD 27 be applicable to homestead lands?
HELD: NO. The contention that PD 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them
ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation CANNOT BE INVOKE to defeat the very purpose of the public Land Act
(CA 141)
The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where
he may build a modest house for himself and family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life’s other
needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They
have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks after the
Welfare of the people’s happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right.
Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the
disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture,
subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
NOTA BENE: Section 6 of CARL provides that the original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original
homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
Paris v Alfeche
Facts: Petitioner is the registered owner of two parcels of land situated at Paitan, Quezon, Bukidnon. The said parcels are fully
tenanted by private respondents herein who are recipients of Emancipation Patents in their names pursuant to Operation Land
Transfer under P.D. 27. Petitioner alleged that she owns one of the subject property as original homestead grantee who still owned
the same when Republic Act No. 6657 was approved, thus she is entitled to retain the area to the exclusion of her tenants. The
Adjudicator a quo rendered a decision in favour of the petitioner but that decision was reversed by DARAB. On appeal to the CA, the
appellate court rejected the claim of the petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the original homesteads issued under the public land act are automatically exempted from the operation of
land reform
Held: Homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain the original homesteads, only for "as long as they
continue to cultivate" them. That parcels of land are covered by homestead patents will not automatically exempt them from the
operation of land reform. It is the fact of continued cultivation by the original grantees or their direct compulsory heirs that shall
exempt their lands from land reform coverage.
In Paris v. Alfeche, 416 Phil 473 (2001), the Court held that the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 are also applicable to the agrarian reform
process of lands placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228, which has not been completed upon the effectivity of R.A.
No. 6657. Citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 1248 (1999), the Court in Paris held that P.D. No. 27 and
E.O. No. 228 have suppletory effect to R.A. No. 6657, to wit:
We cannot see why Sec. 18 of RA [No.] 6657 should not apply to rice and corn lands under PD [No.] 27. Section 75 of RA [No.] 6657
clearly states that the provisions of PD [No.] 27 and EO [No.] 228 shall only have a suppletory effect. Section 7 of the Act also
provides –
Sec. 7. Priorities.—The DAR, in coordination with the PARC shall plan and program the acquisition and distribution of all agricultural
lands through a period of (10) years from the effectivity of this Act. Lands shall be acquired and distributed as follows:
Phase One: Rice and Corn lands under P.D. 27; all idle or abandoned lands; all private lands voluntarily offered by the owners of
agrarian reform; x x x and all other lands owned by the government devoted to or suitable for agriculture, which shall be acquired
and distributed immediately upon the effectivity of this Act, with the implementation to be completed within a period of not more
than four (4) years (emphasis supplied).
ASPERILLA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 204964,
October 15, 2014
J. Leonen
FACTS : Respondent Lutgarda Torres del Rosario sought to exempt her lots, numbered 854 and 855, -both located in Angeles City,
Pampanga- from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Exemption was granted by the then
secretary of Agrarian Reform. However, the farmers in the said lots led by Remigio Espirito opposed, saying that under the Housing
and Land Regulatory Board Resolution, and Angeles City Council Resolution, the lots were classified as agricultural, meaning they are
well under the coverage of the CARP. Espiritu’s motion was considered by a new secretary agrarian reform, so del Rosario appealed
to the Office of the President. But, her appeal was dissmissed by the Deputy Executive Secretary of Legal Affairs Manuel B. Gaite.
Now, respondent del Rosario assails the decision of Gaite, saying the same was void because the latter was already appointed to the
Securities and Exchange Commission two months before the decision was rendered.
ISSUE: a. WON Gaite, in violation of Art. VII section 13, is not considered as a valid executive department officer
b. WON Gaite’s decision is valid.
a. No. Gaite is rather a de facto officer of the President after his appointment to the Securities and Exchange Commission, any
decision he renders during this time is presumed to be valid, binding, and effective.
b. Yes. Respondent has not presented evidence showing that the decision was rendered beyond the power of authority. There is a
presumption of regularity of official acts, unless rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity. Del Rosario failed to rebut the
Petition of Espiritu is granted.
G.R. No. 163026 : August 29, 2012
FACTS: Respondents are the occupants/tillers of a rice land situated at Upig, San Ildefonso, Bulacan designated as Lot No. 546, with
an aggregate area of 274,180 square meters. In April 1977, respondents filed their respective applications to purchase Lot No. 546
with the DAR-Bulacan Provincial Office. Since the 1940’s, respondents recognized Arcadio Castro, Sr. as their landlord who claimed
to be the original tenant of the land. However, records of the DAR Region III Office showed that the registered claimant of Lot No.
546 is one “Arcadio Cruz.”
The processing of respondents’ applications was stalled due to the opposition of Arcadio Castro, Sr. who submitted photocopies of
certain official receipts and the Affidavit executed by his sister-in-law, Jacobe Galvez. In the said affidavit, Jacobe Galvez attested
that upon the instruction of her brother-in-law, she paid on September 27, 1944 the “cost and rental” of Lot No. 546 in the amount
of P5,091.80. Additional payments were supposedly made in 1961 in the amounts of P1,181.77 and P530.52. Jacobe Galvez further
explained that while the receipts were issued in her name, her payments were made for and in behalf of her brother-in-law who
actually owns the land and is the one receiving rentals or share in the harvest from the tenants. Thus, Castro claimed that he has
vested rights over the said lot.
When the matter was elevated to the Regional Director, the latter ruled that there is no evidence to show that registrant “Arcadio
Cruz” and claimant Arcadio Castro, Sr. is one and the same person, and no legal action was taken to correct the discrepancy in name
as to vest unto the claimant legal personality to be the proper party-in-interest. On appeal to the DAR Secretary, the latter affirmed
the Regional Director’s ruling. Both the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals also found that the heirs of Castro failed to
establish their claim.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Castro, Sr. has acquired vested right over Lot 546?
HELD: The Court denies the petition.
CIVIL LAW: vested right
A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and
which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term “vested right” expresses the concept of
present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just
and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny. To be
vested, a right must have become a title—legal or equitable—to the present or future enjoyment of property.
A party claiming a right granted or created by law must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his
evidence and not on the weakness of that of his opponent.
LABOR LAW: agrarian reform; social justice
Finally, the Court holds that no reversible error was committed by the CA when it ruled that the order of DAR Regional Director
giving due course to the application of respondents is consistent with the agrarian reform policy under the 1987 Constitution.
Whereas C.A. No. 539 enacted in 1940 authorized the Government to acquire private lands and to subdivide the same into home
lots or small farms for resale to bona fide tenants, occupants or private individuals who will work the lands themselves, the social
mandate under the 1987 Constitution is even more encompassing as it commands “the Congress to give the highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, x xx”
To achieve such goal, “the State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farm workers, who are landless, to own directly and collectively the land they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to receive a
just share of the fruits thereof.” Moreover, C.A. No. 539 being a social legislation, this Court has previously declared that “in the
construction of laws that find its origin in the social justice mandate of the Constitution,” the constant policy is “ to assure that its
beneficient effects be enjoyed by those who have less in life.”
Petition is DENIED.
Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al., G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with
MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda
Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred
in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by
application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to
choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences
and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in
the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.”
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.
(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?
(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
(3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA
6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP?
(4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC
approved HLI’s SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda
Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be
allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?
[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the option
granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court
thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]
1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.
[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the
minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or
the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have
produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts
and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed
that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because
not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also
given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]
2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.
[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it
was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has
been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that
in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there
was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]
3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the
4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP.
[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of
agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural
land.Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting
to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly
covered by RA 6657.
However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive – considering that there are
roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may
necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to
give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In
order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters
involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the
DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.
On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been
validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita
Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded
from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale
of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]
4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.
[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLI’s
SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be
precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval
of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory
acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s revocation of the
SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that
none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the
instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any
means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian
court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is
admittedly a judicial function.]
5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the
qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.
[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10 years from
the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the
EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started.
Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP
coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then
all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons
not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]
6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be
[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI,
inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in
HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296%
unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means
the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI
stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares
divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the
295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]
FACTS: Respondent Remedios Loyola (Loyola) owns a 240-square meter parcel of land located in Barangay Milagrosa, Carmona,
Cavite, awarded by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
This lot is covered by Certificate of Land Ownership (CLOA) No. 20210 issued in favor of Loyola on 27 December 1990 and duly
registered on 14 March 1991 under Transfer of Certificate of Title (TCT)/CLOA No. 998.
On 27 June 1995, petitioner Julian S.Lebrudo (Lebrudo), now deceased and represented by his son, petitioner Reynaldo L.Lebrudo,
filed with the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Trece Martires City, Cavite, an action for the
cancellation of the TCT/CLOA in the name of Loyola and the issuance of another for the one-half portion of the lot inLebrudosfavor.
Loyola promised to give Lebrudo the one-half portion of the lot. Thereafter, TCT/CLOA No. 998 was issued in favor of Loyola. In
exchange for Lebrudos assistance in redeeming and obtaining a title to the lot, Loyola then allegedly executed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated 28 December 1989, waiving and transferring her rights over the one-half portion of the lot in favor of Lebrudo. To
reiterate her commitment, Loyola allegedly executed two more Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 1 December 1992 and 3 December
1992, committing herself to remove her house constructed on the corresponding one-half portion to be allotted to Lebrudo.
Thereafter, Lebrudo asked Loyola to comply with her promise. However, Loyola refused. Lebrudo eventually filed an action with the
PARAD, which granted his petition. The DARAB reversed, which was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not Lebrudo is entitled to the one-half portion of the lot covered by RA 6657 on the basis of the waiver and
transfer of rights embodied in the two Sinumpaang Salaysay allegedly executed by Loyola in his favor.
Held: No, the petition lacks merit for the following reasons:
The law expressly prohibits any sale, transfer or conveyance by farmer-beneficiaries of their land reform rights within 10 years
from the grant by the DAR. The law provides for four exceptions:
(1) through hereditary succession;
(2) to the government;
(3) to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP); or
(4) to other qualified beneficiaries.
In short, during the prohibitory 10-year period, any sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights is void, except as allowed by
law, in order to prevent a circumvention of agrarian reform laws, and Lebrudo does not fall under any of the exceptions.
Petitioner is not a qualified beneficiary who is entitled to the lot under the CARP because he is not landless, and he is not the
actual occupant or tiller of the lot at the time of the filing of the application. DAR Administrative Order No. 3, series of 1990,
enumerated the qualifications of a beneficiary:
(1) Landless;
(2) Filipino citizen;
(3) Actual occupant/tiller who is at least 15 years of age or head of the family at the time of filing application; and
(4) Has the willingness, ability and aptitude to cultivate and make the land productive.
Thus, the Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the Decision rendered and affirmed the Resolution of the CA.
THE CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. BALBINA ESTRADA Y SARMIENTO, minor and only heiress of Concepcion Sarmiento,
deceased, and ARISTON ESTRADA, personally, and as administrator, defendants-appellants.
City Attorney Adams for plaintiff-appellant.
Ariston Estrada for defendants-appellants.
[G.R. No. 7749
September 9, 1913]
A complaint was filed setting forth the necessary allegations, answer joined, and commissioners were appointed, who, after viewing
the premises and receiving evidence, and being unable to agree, submitted two reports to the court.
The evidence was very contradictory since the evidence of the City of Manila showed that the value of the land did not exceed P10
per square meter, while the defendant Estrada contended that the true market value of the land in question was P25 per square meter
based on its price on the market, or should be worth on the market at this time.
For the determination of the market value of land, which was that sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy
and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefore.
The court holds it just and equitable to take as a compromise between the two conflicting majority and minority opinions of the three
commissioners the average of the two prices they have fixed per square meter for the land in question, P20 and P10, respectively,
fixing upon P15 per square meter.
Motions for a new trial having been made by both parties and denied by the court, both parties appealed from that part of the decision
fixing the value of the land at P15 per square meter. The record was therefore elevated to the SC for a review of the evidence and
assigned errors of the parties.
ISSUE: Whether the determination of just compensation for the land taken is based on the market value?
The court ruled that P10 per square meter shall be the valuation of the land shown by a great preponderance of the evidence. It has
been referred to the testimony of the two real estate agents, upon a sale of similarly situated land made only thirty days previous to
the date of the hearing; and the assessment of the property for taxation, at P6 per square meter. This was the evidence upon which
the dissenting commissioner predicated his appraisement of the land, arriving at the same figure as did this Supreme Court of P10 per
square meter. There is a considerable difference between this valuation and P25 per square meter, as fixed by Estrada, or of the price
fixed by the majority report of the commissioners of P20 per square meter. It is to be noted that no witnesses other than Estrada were
called who could confirm the higher valuation or even testify to an intermediate price.
"Compensation" means an equivalent for the value of the land (property) taken. Anything beyond that is more and anything short of
that is less than compensation. To compensate is to render something which is equal to that taken or received. The word "just" is used
to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation;" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property taken
shall be real, substantial, full, ample. "Just compensation," therefore, as used in section 246 of the Code of Civil Procedure, means a
fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained."
G.R. No. 164876 January 23, 2006 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. LEONILA P. CELADA, Respondent.
Facts: Respondent Leonila P. Celada owns 22.3167 hectares of agricultural land situated in Calatrava, Carmen, Bohol, of which
14.1939 hectares was identified in 1998 by the DAR as suitable for compulsory acquisition under CARP. The matter was then
indorsed to petitioner LBP for field investigation and land valuation. LBP valued respondent’s land at P2.1105517 per square
meter for an aggregate value of P299,569.61 but it was rejected. Nonetheless, LBP deposited the said sum in cash and bonds in the
name of respondent. Pursuant to Section 16(d) of RA No. 6657, the matter was referred to the DARAB, Region VII-Cebu City, for
summary administrative hearing on determination of just compensation. While the DARAB case was pending, respondent filed, a
petition for judicial determination of just compensation against LBP, the DAR and the MARO of Carmen, Bohol, before the Regional
Trial Court of Tagbilaran City contending that the current market value of her land is at least P150,000.00 per hectare based on: (1)
the land in question has been mortgaged to the defunct Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bohol), Inc., for P1,220,000.00 on July 23, 1998
since it was appraised at P15.00 per square meter; and (2) Agricultural lands in said barangay are priced ranging from P140,000.00 to
P150,000.00 per hectare and current land transactions reveal said price range. LBP filed its Answer7 raising non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. The RTC rendered decision denying the Affirmative Defense of Land Bank and fixes the compensation of
the land of petitioner at P2.50 per square meter or a total of P354,847.50. LBP elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which,
however, dismissed the appeal outright based on: (a) lack of affidavit of service; (b) failure of counsel to indicate his Roll of
Attorneys’number; and (c) failure to attach material portions of the records. The lack of affidavit of service is not deemed fatal
where the petition filed below is accompanied by the original registry receipts showing that the petition and its annexes were served
upon the parties.16 On the other hand, the failure of counsel to indicate his Roll of Attorneys’number would not affect
respondent’s substantive rights, such that petitioner’s counsel could have been directed to comply with the latter requirement
rather than dismiss the petition on purely technical grounds. As for petitioner’s failure to attach material portions of the records,
the appellate court a certain leeway to require parties to submit additional documents as may be necessary in the interest of
substantial justice. While a remand of the case to the appellate court would seem to be in order, we deem it proper to resolve the
case on the merits if only to write finis to the present controversy. LBP filed the instant petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling: We do not agree with petitioner’s submission that the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over respondent’s petition for
determination of just compensation despite the pendency of the administrative proceedings before the DARAB. In Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the landowner filed an action for determination of just compensation without waiting for the
completion of the DARAB’s re-evaluation of the land. The Court nonetheless held therein that the SAC acquired jurisdiction over
the action for the following reason: It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has ‘original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners.’ This ‘original and exclusive’
jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials original jurisdiction in compensation
cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decision. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly
appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert
the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore would be void. Thus, direct
resort to the SAC by private respondent is valid. It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an
exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State. The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent
domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies.24
Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of respondent’s petition for determination of just compensation. In the same vein,
there is no merit to petitioner’s contention that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies when she directly filed the
petition for determination of just compensation with the SAC even before the DARAB case could be resolved. The issue is now moot
considering that the valuation made by petitioner had long been affirmed by the DARAB in its order dated April 12, 2000. As held in
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable when the issue is
rendered moot and academic, as in the instant case. We agree with petitioner that the SAC erred in setting aside petitioner’s
valuation of respondent’s land on the sole basis of the higher valuation given for neighboring properties. The SAC based its valuation
solely on the observation that there was a "patent disparity" between the price given to respondent and the other landowners. We
note that it did not apply the DAR valuation formula since according to the SAC, it is Section 17 of RA No. 6657 that "should be the
principal basis of computation as it is the law governing the matter". The SAC was at no liberty to disregard the formula which was
devised to implement the said provision. It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the
law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect.32 Administrative issuances partake
of the nature of a statute33 and have in their favor a presumption of legality.34 As such, courts cannot ignore administrative issuances
especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in issue. Unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no
option but to apply the same. Under the circumstances, we find the explanation and computation of petitioner to be sufficient and in
accordance with applicable laws. Petitioner’s valuation must thus be upheld. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
G.R. No. 171941, August 2, 2017
Pursuant to the CARL, the DAR compulsorily acquired lands owned by Luz Lim and Purita Lim Caochan. The Land Bank computed the
value of the property. Lim however rejected Land Bank‘s valuation. A summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the
PARAD to determine the valuation of the property. Dissatisfied with the PARAD‘s decision, Lim and Cabochan filed a petition for
determination of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court.
The RTC adopted the valuation submitted by the appointed commissioner. Both parties moved for reconsideration. The RTC then
reconsidered its earlier decision and increased the valuation. CA affirmed.
Land Bank, not satisfied, filed a petition for review on certiorari for fixing the valuation of Lim‘s property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in adopting the calculations of the LBP instead of the Administrative Order of DAR
RULING: The SC reversed the decision of the RTC.
In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and
income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be
considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the
property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, these
shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
Diamond Farms vs Diamond Farm Workers Multi-Purpose Coop
July 18, 2012
Facts of the case
The Petitioner and CARP
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the commercial farming of bananas. A portion of the land it owns was placed under CARP
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program) coverage. Thus, its certificates of title over portions of the land under CARP were cancelled,
and new TCT’s were issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Subsequently, beneficiaries were identified, most of whom
were members of respondent cooperative. Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) were issued for them.
Petitioner’s Complaint
Petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful occupation against respondents, alleging that it was the lawful owner of two parcels of land
within the portions covered by the CLOA and that the said CLOAs had yet to attain finality owing to appeals filed by petitioner. Thus,
while the beneficiaries had yet to be designated with finality, respondents refused to do work for petitioner, and forcibly entered the
land subject to the dispute and occupied the same.
Respondents Counterclaim
Respondents argued that indeed, petitioner had the TCT’s of the parcel of land subject to the dispute, but these were put under the
name of the Republic upon subjecting it to CARP. Thus, despite the award of CLOAs to respondents, petitioner continued to manage
the land while paying wages them. Respondents thus demanded that their rights under the CLOAs be established, and that the
petitioner pay them their production share.
The Lower Courts’ Ruling
The CA affirmed the DAR Adjudication Board ordering the petitioner to turn over the possession of the land to the respondents.
WON respondents are guilty of unlawful occupation. NO.
Respondents are not guilty of unlawful occupation
The action taken by respondents to guard the land was reasonable and necessary to protect their legitimate possession and prevent
what petitioner attempted to do.
- Respondents were simply protecting their right, after the petitioner’s attempt to thwart the CARP’s implementation. What
the petitioner did was install workers which it conspired with on land already identified as falling under CARP and having
CARP-designated beneficiaries. This served as an attempted roadblock to installing the legitimate beneficiaries on the land.
Petitioners already lost ownership over the land
Petitioner itself acknowledged that there was a deposit of the initial valuation of the land. It even manifested that the Republic’s TCT’s
were neither attacked nor assailed in this case. Thus, upon petitioner’s own reasoning, it already lost possession and ownership over
the land when the condition (payment of just compensation) was fulfilled, which was not disputed in this case.
Petitioner must turn over possession to respondents
Under Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 2 of the CARL, the agrarian reform program is founded on the right
of farmers and regular farm workers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till. The policy on agrarian reform
is that control over the agricultural land must always be in the hands of the farmers.
- Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated, etc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, et al
The court ruled that the Constitution and the CARL intended the farmers, individually or collectively, to have control over
agricultural lands, otherwise all rhetoric about agrarian reform will be for naught.
Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform
225 SCRA 278 (1993)
Petitioner Natalia Realty, Inc. is the owner of a 125.0078-ha land set aside by Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 (1979) as townsite
area for the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Estate Developers and Investors Corporation (EDIC), the developer of the area, was
granted preliminary approval and locational clearances by the then Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) for the
establishment of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision therein. In November 1990, a Notice of Coverage was issued by DAR on the
undeveloped portion of the landholding. The developer filed its objections and filed this case imputing grave abuse of discretion to
respondent DAR for including the undeveloped portions of its landholding within the coverage of CARP.
Are lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, and approved by HLURB and its precursor agencies prior to
15 June 1988, covered by RA 6657?
Sec. 4 of RA 6657 states that the CARL covers "regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
and agricultural lands" and as per the transcripts of the Constitutional Commission, "agricultural lands" covered by agrarian reform
refers only to those which are "arable and suitable lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands." The land
subject of the controversy has been set aside for the Lungsod Silangan Reservation by Proclamation No. 1637 prior to the effectivity
of RA 6657 and in effect converted these lands into residential use. Since the Natalia lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988,
DAR is bound by such conversion, and thus it was an error to include these within the coverage of CARL.
DAR represented by Secretary Jose Mari Ponce vs. Delia Sutton, et. al.
G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005
Sutton and her siblings inherited a parcel of land in Masbate devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. Pursuant to the agrarian
reform program at the time, they made a voluntary offer to sell their holding to DAR to avail of the incentives in 1987.
In 1988, a new law, CARL, took effect, which included farms used for raising livestock under its coverage. In light of the Luz Farms
ruling, the Suttons filed a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their land was outside the coverage of CARL. The DAR ignored
their request.
In 1993 the DAR issued AO 9-1993, which provides that only lands used for raising livestock, poultry and swine are outside the
coverage of CARL. And in 1995, the DAR ordered a part of the Suttons’ landholdings to be segregated and placed under Compulsory
ISSUE: Whether or not DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 which prescribes a maximum retention for owners of lands
devoted to livestock raising is constitutional?
HELD: The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum
retention limit for their ownership is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution.
The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the
definition of “agriculture” or “agricultural activity.”
The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural activity. DAR
has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It
has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O. The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as
unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution.
Milestone Farm vs Office of the President [GR No. 182332, February 23, 2011]
FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in raising of cattle, pigs and other livestocks. In 1988, CARL took effect. In 1990, SC held in
a case that agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and/or swine raising are excluded from CARP.
In 1993, the DAR issued DAR AO No. 9 setting forth rules and regulations to govern the exclusion of agricultural lands used for
livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CARPcoverage. Because of his AO, portion of the land of the petitioner was declared to be
not excluded from the coverage of CARP.
ISSUE: Whether or not Milestone’s property should be exempted from the coverage of CARP
When CA made its decision, DAR AO No. 9 was not yet declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Thus, it could not be said
that the CA erred or gravely abused its discretion in respecting the mandate of DAR A.O. No. 9, which was then subsisting and in full
force and effect.
As correctly held by respondent OP, the CA correctly held that the subject property is not exempt from the coverage of the CARP, as
substantial pieces of evidence show that the said property is not exclusively devoted to livestock, swine, and/or poultry raising.
G.R. No. 158228 March 23, 2004
Lot No. 2509 and Lot No. 817-D which were donated by the late Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS (formerly Bureau of
Consequently, titles thereto were transferred in the name of respondent DECS .Respondent DECS leased the lands to Anglo
Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from 1984-1994. The contract of lease was subsequently
renewed for another 10agricultural crop years or until 2005. On June 10, 1993, Eugenio Alpar and several others, claiming to be
permanent and regular farm workers of the subject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage
with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Escalante. After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piñosa, sent a "Notice of
Coverage" to respondent DECS, stating that the subject lands are now covered by CARP and inviting its representatives for a
conference with the farmer beneficiaries. The recommendation for coverage was approved by DAR Regional Director Dominador B.
Andres approved the r, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Respondent DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed the Order of the Regional Director.
Respondent DECS filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which set aside the decision of the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform. Hence, the instant petition for review.
Whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998 (CARL).
No. While respondent DECS sought exemption from CARP coverage on the ground that all the income derived from its contract of
lease with Anglo Agricultural Corporation were actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes, such as for the
repairs and renovations of schools in the nearby locality, the
court is inclined with the petitioner’s argument that the lands subject hereof are not exempt from the CARP coverage because the
same are not actually, directly and exclusively used as school sites or campuses, as they are in fact leased to Anglo Agricultural
Corporation. Further, to be exempt from the coverage, it is the land per se, not the income derived therefrom, that must be actually,
directly and exclusively used for educational purposes. Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are
exempted from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption specifying those “lands actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations
operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, …, shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.”
Clearly, a reading of the paragraph shows that, in order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must be "
actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary;" and 2) the purpose is "for school sites and campuses, including
experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes."
Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 103125. 17 May 1993
Facts: The Province of Camarines Sur questioned the decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed the lower court’s order to grant
and issue a writ of possession against the agricultural land of private respondents Ernesto and Efren, both surnamed San Joaquin, for
the establishment of a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and housing projects. Petitioner contended that
it has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of the Local Government Code and that the
expropriations are for a public use; thus, there is no need for the approval of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
Issue: Is the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units subject to the prior approval of the Secretary of Agrarian
Held: NO. Section 9 of the Local Government Code does not intimate in the least that local government units must first secure the
approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can
institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which
expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian
Reform. To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands
needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with
the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would
then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
G.R. No. 127198, [May 16, 2005]
Private respondents Jose R. Caguiat, represented by Attorneys-in-fact Jose T. Bartolome and Victorio Mangalindan, filed a petition
before the trial court for the determination of just compensation for their agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were
acquired by the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The petition named as respondents the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank).
After trial, the court rendered the decision in favor of petitioners, and ordered the respondents “to pay these lands owned by
petitioners and which are the subject of acquisition by the State under its land reform program, the amount of P30.00 per square
meter, as the just compensation due for payment xxx”
In its motion for reconsideration, Land Bank argues, among others, that the trial court erred in declaring that PD 27 and Executive
Order No. 228 (EO 228) are mere guidelines in the determination of just compensation, and in relying on private respondents' evidence
of the valuation of the properties at the time of possession in 1993 and not on Land Bank's evidence of the value thereof as of the
time of acquisition in 1972.
The Court gave due course to the instant petition for review given the substantive issues raised by Land Bank in its motion for
Whether Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657), rather than P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228, is the law that should apply in the determination of
just compensation for the subject agricultural land.
Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private
respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of RA 6657 before the completion of this process, the just compensation
should be determined and the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO
228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling in Parisv. Alfeche.
Section 17 of RA 6657 which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the determination of just compensation,
reads as follows:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. — In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of
the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner,
the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as
well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall
be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering
the DAR's failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined
in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full
and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.
G.R. No. 170220. November 20, 2006
Lubrica vs. Land Bank of the Philippines
Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee of Federico C. Suntay over certain parcels of agricultural land located at Sta.
Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 3,682.0285 hectares. In 1972, a portion of the said property with an
area of 311.7682 hectares, was placed under the land reform program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27(1972) and
Executive Order No. 228 (1987).
The land was thereafter subdivided and distributed to farmer beneficiaries. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and
the LBP fixed the value of the land at P5,056,833.54 which amount was deposited in cash and bonds in favor of Lubrica.
On the other hand, petitioners Nenita Suntay-Tañedo and Emilio A.M. Suntay III inherited from Federico Suntay a parcel of
agricultural land located at Balansay, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1 with an area of
45.0760 hectares and Lot 2 containing an area of 165.1571 hectares or a total of 210.2331 hectares. Lot 2 was placed under
the coverage of P.D. No. 27 but only 128.7161 hectares was considered by LBP and valued the same at P1,512,575.05
Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties, hence the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform conducted summary
administrative proceedings for determination of just compensation. On January 29, 2003, the PARAD fixed the preliminary
just compensation at P51,800,286.43 for the 311.7682 hectares and 21,608,215.28 for the 128.7161 hectares
Not satisfied with the valuation, LBP filed on February 17, 2003, two separate petitions for judicial determination of just
compensation before the Regional Trial Court.
Whether the determination of just compensation should be based from the value of the expropriated properties at the
time of payment or in 1972 when PD27 took effect
The expropriation of landholdings covered by R.A. No. 6657 take place, not on the effectivity of the Act on June 15, 1988,
but on the payment of just compensation. The Court reittertaed that the expropriation of the landholding did not take
place on the effectivity of P.D. No. 27 on October 21, 1972 but seizure would take effect on the payment of just
compensation judicially determined. Likewise, under prevailing jurisprudence, the Court reaffirmed that expropriation
of landholdings covered by R.A. No. 6657 take place, not on the effectivity of the Act on June 15, 1988, but on the
payment of just compensation
G.R. No. 159674 June 30, 2006
Private respondent Hacienda Maria Inc. requested that 527.8308 hectares of itslandholdings be placed under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensationtherefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the landholdings
so that thesame may be covered under Agrarian Reform Program. In 1982, a final survey over the entirearea was conducted and
approved. From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding TCTs and EPscovering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners,
among other persons. InDecember 1997, HMI filed with RARAD petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverageunder
Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former landholdings. HMI claimedthat said area was not devoted to either rice
or corn, that the area was untenanted, and that nocompensation was paid therefor. RARAD rendered a decision declaring as void the
TCTs andEPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was not devoted to rice and corn, andneither was there any established
tenancy relations between HMI and petitioners. Petitionersappealed to the DARAB which affirmed the RARAD Decision. On appeal to
the CA, the samewas dismissed. Petitioners contended that the EPs became indefeasible after the expiration of one year from their
Issue: Whether or not EPs have become indefeasible one year after their issuance.
After complying with the procedure in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree where the DAR is required to issue the corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have
complied with Presidential Decree No. 27, the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their Eps acquire the same protection accorded to
other TCTs. The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the
issuance of the order for theissuance of the patent. Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral
proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person.