Zoe Drayson:
The Philosophy of phenomenal consciousness
Philosophy of Mind – Prof. Dr. phil. Sven Walter – Wednesday 8 am
Jakob Lohkamp
CQ1:
On p. 277, Drayson says: “Science deals in data that are public in the sense of being
shareable and measurable by others; the privacy of conscious experiences seems to prevent them
fulfilling these criteria.” Why is that?
Science is making great advancements in the research of consciousness, f.e. we now know how our
eyes together with attention form our conscious perception of the world (Drayson 2015, p. 274ff.).
Furthermore, we know how pain works on a neurological level, and are able to measure
consciousness in other animals by conducting behavioural studies, where animals explore the
mirror-image of themselves, enacting in self-reflective thought. These examples share one common
trait, that for science we need observable, third person data that is replicable and . But, according to
Drayson (2015, p. 275ff.) there is another aspect of consciousness in addition to its causalfunctional role, namely its phenomenal properties, which science fails to capture. Phenomenal
aspects are characterized by experiential qualities, they do not enter our everyday lives, nor can they
become the object of our introspection. What she refers to, also known as qualia, is partly explained
in Thomas Nagel´s famous bat example, which in a nutshell states that we can not imagine what it
feels like to be a bat, as being a bat has a quality to itself that only a bat can experience (Nagel,
1974).
How do we know what we are talking about when referring to linguistic term X? We do not know
it. We assume the other person will understand us from the basis of shared experience, but we can
never be sure about it (Drayson 2015, p. 277). Qualia are subjective, inherently private and we need
special access to them i.e. being a bat. According to Drayson (2015, p. 277 ff.) it is the subjectivity
and privacy that we can not measure scientifically, leaving us unable to know for certain what it is
like to experience the world through the mind of someone else.
DQ2:
On pp. 278–279, Drayson says: “Furthermore, it’s hard to see how the third-person
scientific evidence could ‘trump’ my first person knowledge of my experience: what sort of evidence
could a doctor use to persuade you that you’re in pain, when you are awake and conscious but not
consciously experiencing pain?” Suppose this is plausible. Even then, does it hold for all mental
states? Can’t we be mistaken about our own mental states in the sense that, say, a psychotherapist
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might convince us that what we took to be an instance of, say, jealousy is in fact an instance of
narcissism?
I do believe that we can be wrong about our own mental states, which does not mean that I can be
easily convinced of being in pain as in Drayson´s example. We certainly have introspection and are
able to identify mental states we experience, especially mental states with high impact such as being
in pain, fear or affection. In another exemplary mental state, depression, I believe one does not
necessarily know that they are depressed. But as scientists learned more about the pathology of the
disease, it was found that depression is often linked with hormonal imbalance in the brain, so it can
be measured by medical staff, as well as behavioural descriptions. Furthermore, you may find
yourselves looking back and acknowledging the mental state you have been through, again
diminishing the chance of accurate introspection. Perhaps, in such a special case, only the change of
mental states allows this kind of retrospection, . I believe, the more we learn about psychology and
our functioning, we can see scientifically established, converging patterns in behaviour, and
therefore mental states. As in the case of narcissism, I believe we can derive core traits of a person
with this diagnosis, by checking for several pathological markers. Jealousy, as stated in DQ2, could
be one of them. Still, it is unclear how well the definition will fit one´s character, as humans are
rather complex. But psychologists and neurologists may be able to give an educated guess.
Probably, the person affected will deny such a diagnosis, as it is linked with societal classifications,
rendering one a good or bad member of society, as I would argue is the case for a lot of mental
states.
Lastly, if Qualia can not be measured, nor compared, how can we know that we do not share a
great amount of it? We may never be able to fully understand one another but populations share an
immense amount of experiences and knowledge about the world, which allows for subjective as
well as inter-subjective exchange. It is this common ground that we rely on every day when using
language and interacting with each other, as it would be impossible without it. Personally, I would
not be easily convinced by a doctor to be in pain, but perhaps I will be convinced after all.
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References
Drayson, Zoe (2015). The philosophy of phenomenal consciousness: An introduction. In S. Miller (Ed.), The
Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness: Toward a science and theory, pp. 273–292. DOI:
10.1075/aicr.92.11dra
Nagel, Thomas. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450. DOI: 10.2307/2183914
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