Construction of Boysun GPP
ALARP Demonstration Study Report
ALARP DEMONSTRATION STUDY REPORT
BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-FF-REP-10006-E-C
C
10.11.2021
Issued for Review
Prashant Mali
Lasha Nodia
Leonid Asaftei
B
17.08.2021
Issued for Review
Prashant Mali
Lasha Nodia
Leonid Asaftei
REV.
Date
Revision Purpose
Originated
Checked
Approved
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Construction of Boysun GPP
ALARP Demonstration Study Report
REVISION LOG SHEET
Revision
B
C
Date
17.08.2021
10.11.2021
Audit objective
Issued for Review
Issued for Review
Originated
Prashant Mali
Prashant Mali
Checked
Lasha Nodia
Lasha Nodia
Approved
Leonid Asaftei
Leonid Asaftei
HOLDS
Hold #
Hold Description
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Construction of Boysun GPP
ALARP Demonstration Study Report
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABBREVIATIONS USED.................................................................................................................................... 6
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................................... 7
1.
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................... 8
2.
SCOPE & OBJECTIVE ............................................................................................................................ 9
3.
4.
2.1
Scope ......................................................................................................................................... 9
2.2
Objective.................................................................................................................................... 9
GENERAL INFORMATION .................................................................................................................... 11
3.1
Project location ....................................................................................................................... 11
3.2
Project Information ................................................................................................................. 13
3.3
General Project Description ................................................................................................... 13
ALARP PROCESS ................................................................................................................................ 16
4.1
4.2
4.3
5.
6.
7.
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 16
4.1.1.
Risk Reduction .......................................................................................................... 16
4.1.2.
ALARP ....................................................................................................................... 17
Approach - Demonstrating ALARP........................................................................................ 18
4.3.1.
Good Engineering Practice ...................................................................................... 18
4.3.2.
Effective Hazard Management Strategy .................................................................. 19
Cost Benefit Analysis ............................................................................................................. 21
RISK ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ........................................................................................................... 22
5.1
Individual Risk Acceptance Criteria ...................................................................................... 22
5.2
Societal Risk Acceptance Criteria ......................................................................................... 22
OVREVIEW OF PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS (PHA) STUDIES...................................................... 24
6.1
HAZID/ENVID Study ................................................................................................................ 24
6.2
HAZOP Study .......................................................................................................................... 24
6.3
FERA Study ............................................................................................................................. 25
6.4
QRA Study ............................................................................................................................... 25
MAJOR HAZARDS FROM PHA STUDIES ........................................................................................... 26
7.1
High Risk Scenarios from HAZID/ENVID .............................................................................. 26
7.2
High Risk Scenarios from HAZOP Study .............................................................................. 26
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8.
7.3
FERA ........................................................................................................................................ 29
7.4
QRA .......................................................................................................................................... 31
location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) Results .................................................... 31
7.4.2.
Societal Risk Results................................................................................................ 32
ALARP DEMONSTRATION................................................................................................................... 33
8.1
9.
7.4.1.
Overview of ALARP Demonstration from QRA Study.......................................................... 33
8.1.1.
location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) Results (Including Modification Factor)34
8.1.2.
Societal Risk Results (Including Modification Factor)........................................... 36
8.2
HAZID Study Recommendations ........................................................................................... 37
8.3
HAZOP Study Recommendations ......................................................................................... 37
8.4
FERA Study Recommendations ............................................................................................ 37
8.5
QRA Study Recommendations .............................................................................................. 38
8.6
Review of PHA Recommendations ........................................................................................ 39
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................................... 43
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Risk Acceptance Criteria
Table 2: High Risk Hazards from HAZID Study
Table 3: High Risk Hazards from HAZOP Study – Unit 213 (Representative Case)
Table 4: Impact of Fire & Explosion on Buildings from FERA Study Report
Table 5 – Location Specific Individual Risk Value
Table 6 – Top Ten Risk Integral Table
Table 7: Probability of Failure on Demand for Independent Protection Layer
Table 8 – Location Specific Individual Risk Value
Table 9- High Risk Contributors for Risk Ranking Locations at ALARP
Table 10 – Effect Level Risk Contributors for Risk Ranking Locations
Table 11: Review of PHA Recommendations
22
26
26
29
31
33
33
34
34
35
40
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Risk reduction Hierarchy
Figure 2: ALARP (General Representation)
Figure 3 – Individual Risk Criteria
Figure 4 – Societal Risk Criteria (FN Curve)
Figure 5 – Multilevel Individual Risk Contour for Boysun Gas Processing Plant (BGPP)
Figure 6- F (Frequency) & N (Number of fatalities) Curve for Boysun Gas Processing Plant
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17
22
23
31
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Figure 7 – Multilevel Individual Risk Contour for Boysun Gas Processing Plant (BGPP)
Figure 8- F (Frequency) & N (Number of fatalities) Curve for Boysun Gas Processing Plant
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ABBREVIATIONS USED
Abbreviation
AGR
Concept
Acid Gas Removal
AGRU
Acid Gas Removal Unit
ALARP
As Low as reasonably Practicable
BDV
Blow Down Valve
BGPP
Boysun Gas Processing Plant
CFD
Computational Fluid Dynamics
EEN
Enter Engineering (Client - EPC Contractor)
ENVID
Environmental Hazard Identification
EPC
Engineering, Procurement and Construction
ESD
Emergency Shutdown
FEED
Front-End Engineering Development
FERA
Fire & Explosion Risk Assessment
GPP
Gas Processing Plant
HAZID
Hazard Identification
HAZOP
billion standard cubic meters per annum
HSE
Health Safety Environment
IDLH
Immediately dangerous to Life & Health
IRPA
Individual Risk Per Annum
LSIR
Location Specific Individual Risk
MOC
Management of Change
PFD
Process Flow Diagram
PPE
Personnel Protective Equipment
PSM
Process Safety management
PSV
Pressure Safety Valve
QRA
Quantitative Risk Assessment
SCE
Safety Critical Element
SGCOC
Surhan Gas Chemical Operating Company FC LLC (COMPANY)
SOP
Standard operating procedure
SRU
Sulfur Recovery Unit
U&O
Utility Facilities & Offsites
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REFERENCES
Sr.
No.
1
2
Doc. Title
Doc. Number
Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment Study - Boysun Gas
Processing Plant
Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of Boysun Gas
Processing Plant (BGPP), Surkhandarya, Uzbekistan.
J-7011-S-RT-1802-Rev 01
J-7011-S-RT-1801-Rev 01
3
License HAZOP Study
1736_LICENSE_HAZOP_Rev A
4
Open Art HAZOP Study
1736_OPENART_HAZOP_Rev A
5
Utility Art HAZOP Study
1736_UTILITY_HAZOP_Rev A
6
HAZID/ENVID Report
BGPP-WOOD-F-200-000-0-HS-REP-00001-E
7
Basic Engineering Design Guidelines
BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-AL-BOD-00001-E-R3
8
Active Fire Protection Philosophy
9
Passive Fire Protection Philosophy
BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-HS-PHI-00002-E-R1
10
Fire And Gas Detection Philosophy
BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-HS-PHI-00003-E-R2
11
Process Safety Design Philosophy
BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-HS-PHI-00004-E-R1
12
Escape, Evacuation Philosophy
BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-HS-PHI-00005-E-R1
13
Instrument Automation Philosophy
BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-IN-PHI-00001-E-R1
14
Emergency Isolation and Depressurization Philosophy
BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-PR-PHI-00001-E-R2
15
Drainage Philosophy
BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-PR-PHI-00002-E-R1
16
Overpressure Protection Philosophy
BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-PR-PHI-00003-E-R3
17
Systems And Equipment Isolation Philosophy
BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-PR-PHI-00007-E-R1
18
Safeguarding And ESD Philosophy
BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-PR-PHI-00020-E-R1
BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-HS-PHI-00001-E-R1 - AFP
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1. INTRODUCTION
The project envisages the construction of a new Gas Processing Plant (hereinafter named GPP) to partly
produce a treated gas suitable for domestic use or export, produced at gas field “Mustaqilligning 25 yilligi” located
in the Surkhandarya region of the Republic of Uzbekistan.
The gas field will process 5 BCMA of raw natural gas with high content of CO2 and H2S, processed in a Gas
Processing Plant (hereinafter named GPP) to partly produce a treated gas suitable for domestic use or export.
GPP will be fed by Raw Natural Gas, connected from gas field to GPP inlet battery limits through seven (7)
dedicated gas pipelines (one from each of the cluster pads) connected to an inlet manifold. GPP shall consist in
two (2) parallel trains, each train designed for 2.5 BCMA and basically consisting of the following main units:
•
Inlet Gas Separation Unit
•
Acid Gas Removal Unit (AGRU) (licensed by Shell)
•
Dehydration Unit
•
Sulphur Recovery Unit (SRU) (licensed by Shell)
In addition to these, there are other main units common to both trains:
•
Sulphur Solidification Unit
•
Sour Water (Chemical Oxidation) Unit (licensed by Shell)
•
Utility Facilities & Offsites (U&O)
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2. SCOPE & OBJECTIVE
Scope
2.1
The Scope for ALARP Demonstration study is limited to Surhan Gas Chemical Operating Company (SGCOC) Boysun Gas Processing Plant (BGPP), Uzbekistan. Following units are included in BGPP.
Unit Code
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
241
242
243
251
253
261
263
264
265
266
280
290
291
292
410
460
470
710
715
Description
Inlet Manifold
Test Separator
Inlet Separator Unit
Sulfinol M
Sulfinol X
SRU
Dehydration Unit
Sulphur Granulation Unit
Chem Oxydation
Formation Water Treatment
Steam and BFW Generation
Steam Condensate Polishing
Heating Water System
Service Ins Air
Nitrogen System
Raw Water Distribution
Fire Water System
Cooling Water
Potable Water
Demin Water Treatment
Fuel gas
Flare system
Sweet flare
Acid flare
Sulphur Storage System
Waste water treatment
Chemical Storage
Normal Power Supply
Emergency Diesel Generator
Objective
2.2
The objective of the study is to confirm that risk reduction to ALARP levels at the BGPP facilities are demonstrated
using the following hierarchy of techniques, depending on the nature and complexity of the risk:
1.
Engineering judgement
2.
Qualitative risk assessment (HAZID/HAZOP)
3.
Quantitative risk assessment (FERA/QRA)
4.
Analysis of ALARP proposals
5.
Cost-benefit analysis
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All risks and particularly those associated with the major hazards of fire, explosion and loss of containment, shall
be demonstrated to be ALARP and reported accordingly.
The project design philosophy has ensured throughout that risks to plant personnel, third parties and the
environment are not increased so that they exceed the Project Risk Acceptance Criteria and are demonstrated to
be as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).
The approach proposed to effectively achieve this objective is summarised as:
•
Prevention of incidents stemming from accidental loss of containment and;
•
Efficient control of any such incident, should one nevertheless occur.
These objectives has been assured by using a risk based approach to the design of the facilities, applying the
appropriate Codes and Standards and quality assurance procedures, all reinforced by Safety Reviews undertaken
at key stages in the design process.
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3. GENERAL INFORMATION
3.1
Project location
The working area is located 100 km Northwest of Termez in the Boysun district of Surkhandarya region, 7.7 km
Southeast of the village of Kofrun.
Legend
Clusters
Project export gas pipeline DIN 800 mm.
Project water pipeline
Project collectors from well pad
Project water pipeline
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ALARP Demonstration Study Report
Legend
Project water pipeline
Project FOCL
Notes: From the starting point of parallel
laying of water conduit and FOCL line to the
GPP, laying of project utilities shall be
carried out in one corridor.
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3.2
Project Information
PROJECT INFORMATION
Project Name:
EPC Contractor:
COMPANY:
Boysun Gas Processing Plant (BGPP)
Enter Engineering Pte. Ltd. (EEN)
Surhan Gas Chemical Operating Company FC LLC (SGCOC)
DD Subcontractor
Uzliti Engineering LLC
Official name of the
production site:
Mustaqilligning 25 yilligi
Location of the production
site:
3.3
Boysun district of the Surkhandarya region in the Republic of Uzbekistan
Location type:
Greenfield
Project type:
DD (Detail Design)
General Project Description
Regarding the layout of the plant, the GPP is divided in three different main areas, interconnected between them:
•
GPP Main Area: containing most of the process and utility units, and the flares area. Water Treatment Area
(containing the raw water and wastewater treatment units) to be located within GPP main area.
•
Sulfur Handling Area: located SW and away about 100 m near to the main GPP area, connected by means
of one liquid Sulfur pipeline, and containing the units for Sulfur solidification and solid Sulfur storage,
handling and loading in truck or trains.
Raw Gas Field (Out of GPP SOW)
N
Raw Gas Pipelines (by others)
Raw Water
Sources (Out of
GPP SOW)
Raw Water Pipelines (Out of GPP SOW)
Sulfur Handling Area
GPP Main Area
Flare
Liquid Sulfur Pipelines
Location is on HOLD
(HOLD 01)
Surhan Gas Chemical Operating Company (SGCOC) plans to develop “Mustaqilligning 25 yilligi” (M25) gas field,
which is located in the Boysun District, Surkhandarya Region, in the Republic of Uzbekistan.
The overall project development includes drilling of production wells, construction of the gas gathering system (9
compressor stations), the Gas Processing Plant (GPP), associated utilities / pipelines and other supporting facilities,
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infrastructure, and common utility systems necessary for safe operation and maintenance of the complex. The
design total capacity of the M25 field for new GPP facilities is 5 billion standard cubic meters of reservoir fluid per
year (5 BCMA).
The overall GPP includes all processing units, utilities, offsite and infrastructure necessary to produce sales gas
(will be exported through one existing gas pipeline, and a new one will be built) and elemental (granules or blocks)
Sulfur.
•
Inlet Gas Separation Unit
Raw inlet gas is sent to three-phase separator to remove liquid water, with dissolved CO2 and H2S. Acid water
with dissolved H2S and CO2 shall be routed to sour water stripper (Formation Water Treatment System), while
raw gas shall be processed in Acid Gas Removal Unit. Although no hydrocarbon liquid is expected, it is taken
into consideration to be sent to Formation Water Treatment (Unit 219) in case of presence.
•
AGR Unit
The primary purpose of the Acid Gas Removal (AGR) unit is the removal of acid gases, H2S and CO2, to a
level compatible with the quality requirements of the treated gas for export.
•
Sulfur Components Absorber section (Sulfinol-M Unit)
In the first step, H2S and mercaptans are removed by means of a hybrid amine solvent (Sulfinol-M) that is
selective for H2S removal and is effective in mercaptan removal. The resulting CO2 concentration in the treated
gas of the Sulfinol-M absorber is 7-8 mol%.
The feed gas is supplied from the inlet separation unit and enters the feed gas knock-out drum, where remaining
liquid in the gas is separated. From this KO drum, the gas is sent to the absorber where it is contacted countercurrently with lean Sulfinol-M solvent. The treated gas then goes to the treated gas knock-out drum provided
with demister to prevent entrainment of Sulfinol-M components to the downstream Sulfinol-X Unit.
The solvent is brought into the main Sulfinol-M absorber by a charge pump. Semi-lean solvent coming from
the SCOT Absorber is brought into Sulfinol-M absorber. The rich Sulfinol- M solvent is flashed in a hydrocarbon
flash vessel. A slipstream of lean solvent treats this flash gas stream in the flash gas absorber to remove H2S,
and the flash gas is routed to the incinerator. The loaded solvent from both the main absorber and the flash
gas absorber is routed via a Lean/Rich heat exchanger to the regenerator.
•
CO2 and COS Absorber Section (Sulfinol-X Unit)
In the second step, CO2 and COS are removed by means of a hybrid amine solvent (Sulfinol-X) that is selective
for CO2 and COS removal.
Treated gas is supplied from Sulfinol-M unit and enters the Sulfinol-X main absorber where it is contacted
counter-currently with lean Sulfinol-X solvent. The treated gas then goes to the treated gas knock-out drum
provided with demister to prevent entrainment of Sulfinol-X components to the downstream Sulfur Recovery
Unit.
The solvent is brought into the main Sulfinol-X absorber by a charge pump. The rich Sulfinol- X solvent is
flashed in a hydrocarbon flash vessel. Flash gas is routed to the incinerator. The loaded solvent is routed via a
Lean/Rich heat exchanger to the regenerator.
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•
Dehydration Unit
Mercaptans are fully removed by Sulfinol-M Unit and Mercaptans concentration of the treated wet gas at the
exit of AGR unit.
•
Sulfur Recovery Unit
The Sulfur Recovery Unit (SRU) processes the main acid gas from the Acid Gas Removal, together with other
small flash gas containing off-gas streams coming from other units. The SRU consists of a Claus Units for each
line with low-pressure oxygen used as oxidant of Claus reaction.
•
Sulfur Solidification Unit
Sulfur Solidification Unit shall be one of vendor package items intended to convert the liquid Sulfur in solid
Sulfur.
•
Sour Water Treatment (Chemical Oxidation) Unit
H2S oxidation process will be used to treat the sour water from Quench Column by applying chemicals like
caustic, Sodium Bisulphite, Hypochlorite which are chemicals commonly applied for this treatment. This
straightforward approach will achieve the required specification of 5 ppm H2S in the water.
•
Formation Water Treatment Unit
Formation Water Treatment Unit treats part of the contaminated water condensate from Inlet Gas Separation
Unit, AGR and SRU (acid water from KO Drum), in order to avoid accumulation of H2S and other dissolved
gases (e.g., CO2) in the water. These dissolved gases, in particular the bulk of CO2, H2S contained in the sour
water are removed by means of LP stripping steam supplied to the stripping column, where acid injection is
applied to prevent scale formation. Water from stripper bottom is sent to WWT, Sour Gas is routed to acid flare
system for burning. Once the operation is stable, sour gas will be forwarded to U-215 Sulphur Recovery
System.
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4. ALARP PROCESS
4.1
Introduction
4.1.1. Risk Reduction
Risks to personnel or assets may be managed by either reducing the potential (frequency) of an event, or mitigating
the consequence of those potential accidents. The measures employed to achieve this can be classified into three
main categories:
•
Inherent Safety/Prevention – safety by effectively removing hazards or minimizing the potential for hazards
to be realized. For example, substituting a flammable solvent for an alternative low hazard fluid, or use of
fully rated equipment which would protect against a gas break through case from a selection of process
options or design basis that aim to achieve inherent upstream vessel of higher pressure.
•
Detection and Control – provision of measures to detect incidents and control their affects. Examples
include gas detection allowing isolation and blowdown of facilities to limit release sizes.
•
Mitigation - measures that minimize the final consequences when a hazard is realized, such as use of a
passive fire protection to limit the damage caused by an ignited release, or escape systems designed to
avoid casualties.
The above is a hierarchy and the preferred safeguard should always be to design for inherent safety or prevention
whenever practicable. Inherent Safety is described below.
Inherent Safety
At all relevant design stages, effort will be made to manage hazards by the application of Inherent Safety principles
rather than control and mitigation methods (after the event). The process being utilized can be illustrated as below;
Figure 1: Risk reduction Hierarchy
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Where and if possible (noting that there are some constraints to the following associated with a upgrade/revamp
project), the inherent safety features that will be considered by engineers during the design are:
•
Physical segregation/separation
•
Reducing inventories/storage quantities
•
Reduce design pressures, and pressure interfaces (hence potential overpressure scenarios)
•
Use of corrosion resistant materials.
•
Reducing leak sources by using welded pipework, as opposed to flanged connections.
The premise behind the application of these techniques is that preventing releases / accidents is preferential to
mitigating their effects after the initial loss of containment.
Subsequent risk reduction measures are important when inherent safety cannot be achieved, and they are
generally the requirements of regulation, codes and standards and shall be considered where necessary to reduce
risks.
The most effective controls are via Elimination, Substitution and then followed by Engineering controls (control and
mitigation). E. Eliminating hazards and ensuring inherent safety principles are applied is vital at the concept and
design stages. During the operational stage, the emphasis on further risk reduction measures is towards control,
mitigation and emergency response measures, as the fundamentals of the design cannot usually be changed
meaning that hazards cannot usually be eliminated or substituted.
As part of Project Development several safety studies have been performed that has assessed the risk of facility
(either qualitatively or quantitatively) by investigating hazard scenarios & risk reduction measures in place. The
studies also resulted in range of recommendations to further reduce the risk to ALARP.
4.1.2. ALARP
The ALARP (“as low as reasonably practicable”; see Figure below) principle is widely used in the oil and gas industry.
The use of the ALARP principle may be interpreted as, satisfying a requirement to keep the risk level “as low as
possible.” This involves weighing a risk against the trouble, time and money needed to control it. Thus, ALARP
describes the level to which it is expected to see workplace risks controlled.
Figure 2: ALARP (General Representation)
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The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) provides the following advice in terms of ALARP (Ref. - HSE Guidance,
‘ALARP at a Glance’):
‘In essence, making sure a risk has been reduced ALARP is about weighing the risk against the sacrifice needed
to further reduce it. The decision is weighted in favour of health and safety because the presumption is that the
duty-holder should implement the risk reduction measure. To avoid having to make this sacrifice, the duty-holder
must be able to show that it would be grossly disproportionate to the benefits of risk reduction that would be
achieved. Thus, the process is not one of balancing the costs and benefits of measures but, rather, of adopting
measures except where they are ruled out because they involve grossly disproportionate sacrifices.’
4.2
Approach - Demonstrating ALARP
For the BGPP facilities, assurance that the design conforms to the ALARP principles is achieved by the
combined application of:
•
Design according to good practice.
•
Application of an effective strategy for managing identified hazards with all reasonably practicable
improvements implemented.
First and foremost it is demonstrated that the design of the facility follows good design principles, complies with
statutory provisions, uses appropriate design codes and standards, and follows industry accepted practices with
equipment based on proven practices and technology.
Once good practice is established, application of an effective strategy for managing hazards is demonstrated. Here
risk reduction measures are balanced against cost (in money, time or complexity) of implementing such measures
with all reasonable practical improvements implemented unless they can clearly be shown to be “not reasonably
practicable”.
In making the demonstration it has been attempted to categorize design decisions and measures into those which
conform to what is considered to be “good practice” and those which arise from the hazard management process
and go beyond what is considered to be good practice. Actual measures involve aspects of both and the division
is necessarily subjective.
4.3.1. Good Engineering Practice
‘Good practice’ is defined in the HSE general ALARP guidance (‘ALARP Suite of Guidance’) as:
“those standards for controlling risk that HSE has judged and recognised as satisfying the law, when applied to a
particular relevant case, in an appropriate manner.”
Compliance with statutory provisions and use of appropriate design codes and standards and industry accepted
practices provides a robust design basis for the BGPP facilities.
The statutory requirements used in the design of the BGPP are presented in the Basic Engineering Design
Guidelines (Ref 7).
Industry recognized codes and standards to which the BGPP facility designed are detailed in individual discipline
philosophy documents and the Basic Engineering Design Guidelines:
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•
Active Fire Protection Philosophy (Ref. 8)
•
Passive Fire Protection Philosophy (Ref. 9)
•
Fire And Gas Detection Philosophy (Ref. 10)
•
Process Safety Design Philosophy (Ref. 11)
•
Escape, Evacuation Philosophy (Ref. 12)
•
Instrument Automation Philosophy (Ref. 13)
•
Emergency Isolation and Depressurization Philosophy (Ref. 14)
•
Drainage Philosophy (Ref. 15)
•
Overpressure Protection Philosophy (Ref. 16)
•
Systems and Equipment Isolation Philosophy (Ref. 17)
•
Safeguarding and ESD Philosophy (Ref. 18)
No exceptions to design codes have been identified that would impact risk to personnel.
4.3.2. Effective Hazard Management Strategy
Process Safety Design Philosophy (Ref. 11) gives the hazard management Procedure for new installations which
are part of the GPP Complex Project to be applied to licensed units (unless licensor special requirements dictate
otherwise), open-art units, utilities and offsites.
Section 5 gives the risk UK HSE risk acceptance criteria.
The QRA (Ref 2) has calculated that the risks to personnel are within the region “risks are tolerable if reduced to
as low as reasonably practicable”.
This means that the adoption of risk reduction measures beyond those associated with good design practice are
balanced against the cost (in money, time, or complexity) of implementing such measures with the emphasis to
implement improvements unless they can clearly be shown to be “not reasonably practicable”.
Once measures to reduce risk further are shown to be not reasonably practicable, the risks to personnel are
considered ALARP.
In this respect the risks to personnel are demonstrated as being “tolerable if ALARP” by the application of an
effective hazard management strategy where the levels of risk achieved by designing in accordance with good
practice are reduced further by implementation of reasonably practicable measures.
The core elements of the strategy, for effective hazard management is given below:
•
The identification of all hazards;
•
The assessment to determine Major Hazards
•
The evaluation of the risks from Major Hazards (qualitatively or quantitatively);
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•
The identification of potential measures for risk reduction for which the following hierarchy of preference
has been applied:
- Elimination and minimization of hazards by design (inherently safer design)
- Prevention (reduction of likelihood)
- Detection (transmission of information to control point)
- Control (limitation of scale, intensity and duration), and
- Mitigation of consequences (protection from effects).
•
The analysis of risk reduction measures and the associated benefits (including evaluation of reasonable
practicability involving cost benefit analysis when appropriate).
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Construction of Boysun GPP
ALARP Demonstration Study Report
Following hazard Identification/Risk Assessment studies are carried for BGPP facility.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
4.3
HAZID/ENVID (Ref. 6)
HAZOP (Ref. 3, 4 & 5)
FERA Study (Ref. 1)
QRA Study (Ref. 2)
Building Risk Assessment - BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-FF-STU-10004
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Assessment Study - BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-FF-REP-10005
Flare Radiation and Dispersion Analysis Study - BGPP-UZLE-D-200-290-0-FF-STU-10001
Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) Study - BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-FF-STU-10006
Material Handling Study - BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-SA-REP-10001
Noise Mapping Study - BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-FF-STU-10008
Vapor Cloud Explosion Study (CFD) - BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-FF-STU-10004
60% Model Review - BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-AL-REP-10002
90% Model Review - BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-AL-REP-10003
Review Report of Isolation of Equipment for Maintenance - BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-HS-REP-00001
Review Report Project Design Requirements - BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-AL-REP-10001
Cost Benefit Analysis
In addition to ensuring that risks do not exceed intolerability limits it is a Project goal that the risks are reduced to
ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable). Cost benefit analysis can be used to assess the viability and priority of
risk reduction measures.
Cost benefit analysis of the proposed risk reduction measures can be performed using established cost benefit
methodologies.
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ALARP Demonstration Study Report
5. RISK ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
5.1
Individual Risk Acceptance Criteria
In the UK-HSE criteria, the individual risk levels for the onsite populations can be classified as follows.
Table 1: Risk Acceptance Criteria
Acceptance
Fatality
Unacceptable
Broadly Acceptable
Tolerable
≥ 1 fatality in 1,000 years
≤ 1 fatality in 1 million years
1 fatality between 1,000 and 1 million years
This risk acceptance criterion is given in below image:
Figure 3 – Individual Risk Criteria
*Note: In Individual risk to workers means individual risk to onsite personnel and Individual risk to public means
individual risk to offsite people
5.2
Societal Risk Acceptance Criteria
The societal risk represents the frequency of having an accident with N or more people being killed simultaneously.
The people involved are assumed to have some means of protection. The societal risk is presented as an FN curve,
where N is the number of deaths and F the cumulative frequency of accidents with N or more deaths.
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ALARP Demonstration Study Report
Figure 4 – Societal Risk Criteria (FN Curve)
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ALARP Demonstration Study Report
6. OVREVIEW OF PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS (PHA) STUDIES
6.1
HAZID/ENVID Study
Two HAZID/ENVID review sessions were conducted as part of the Boysun Gas Processing Plant Project: first
session, held on 14th to 17th April 2020, covered some of the process units in project scope, while the second
session was carried out on 25th May to 29th May 2020 for analyzing the remaining plant sections.
The whole scope of the HAZID/ENVID sessions was divided into 21 Nodes: 6 (six) nodes analysed in the first session
and 15 nodes analysed in the second one.
HAZID/ENVID review was conducted based on procedure BGPP-WOOD-F-200-000-0-HS-PRO-00002-E, including
the project risk matrix and HAZID/ENVID check list.
The appointed HAZID/ENVID Team:
•
Identified any significant hazards associated with the implementation of the project design.
•
Analyzed, for each identified hazard, the possible causes highlighting the potential consequences.
•
Assessed the related qualitative level of risk (consequence severity for people and for environment as well
as the likelihood of the occurrence)
•
Identified the already defined control/mitigation measures.
Reference Report - HAZID/ENVID REPORT - Doc. No.: BGPP-WOOD-F-200-000-0-HS-REP-00001-E
6.2
HAZOP Study
Following are the details for HAZOP studies conducted.
1. License HAZOP workshop was conducted from 9th March to 27th March 2021 and covered following units.
• U213, U214 & U215
• total of Twenty (20) nodes were identified for these units.
2. Open Art HAZOP workshop was conducted from 9th March to 16th March 2021 and covered following units.
• U210, U212, U216, U217, U219.
• total of Twenty (20) nodes were identified for Open art units.
3. Utility HAZOP workshop was conducted for Ten (10) days from 22nd March to 1st April 2021 and covered
all units in Utility. The units are given below.
• U241, U242, U243, U251, U253, U261, U263, U264, U265, U266, U280, U290, U291, U292, U460,
U470, U710, U715.
• total of Forty (40) nodes were identified for Utility units.
For each selected node deviations were identified based on standard guidewords, the consequences of these
hazards were identified, and risk ranked based on risk matrix.
Reference Reports –
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•
•
•
6.3
License HAZOP Study - 1736_LICENSE_HAZOP_Rev A
Open Art HAZOP Study - 1736_OPENART_HAZOP_Rev A
Utility Art HAZOP Study - 1736_UTILITY_HAZOP_Rev A
FERA Study
The study presented Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment results carried out using DNV PHAST & SAFETI software
version 8.22, for each defined failure case of the Boysun Gas Processing Plant, in order to give an overview on the
extent of impact from potential major accident scenarios.
The types of events presented are:
• Jet fire
• Flash fire
• Pool fire
• Explosion
The assessment was based on the hazards that may occur during the operations of the project according to
information available. The scope of work is limited to the different components associated with the proposed facility.
The facilities of the Gas Processing Plant Boysun, Uzbekistan considered for the FERA study are units – 210, 211,
212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 241, 242, 243, 251, 253, 261, 263, 264, 265, 266, 280, 290, 291, 292, 410,
460, 470, 710, 715.
6.4
QRA Study
The QRA study addresses Risk Assessment of the various facilities available and Hazardous operations carried out
at the above mentioned facility of Boysun Gas Processing Plant (BGPP). Surhan Gas Chemical Operating Company
may consider implementation of the recommendations made in the report as per their individual merit.
As part of the QRA study, hazard scenarios were identified for the project facility and consequence analysis was
carried out using DNV PHAST software version 8.22. The risk analysis was carried out using DNV SAFETI software
version 8.22 to obtain risk results in the form of LSIR contours and F-N curve. These risk results were assessed
based on the HSE UK Risk Acceptance Criteria and the Individual Risk Per Annum for the employees was found to
broadly lie in the ALARP and the societal risk falls broadly in the ALARP region accounting the Proposed Safeguard
Measures. The Risk contour for the nearby villages is not reached, hence it is deduced that the risk for the nearby
village falls under the Acceptable region.
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7. MAJOR HAZARDS FROM PHA STUDIES
Hazards at BGPP were identified along with their existing risk in studies listed in section above. The HAZID/HAZOP
study gives the qualitative risk, while QRA & FERA gives the quantitative risk associated with hazard scenarios.
This section describes the existing risk at BGPP & identifies the hazards/scenarios whose assigned risk falls in
intolerable region.
7.1
High Risk Scenarios from HAZID/ENVID
HAZID/ENVID Report (Doc. No.: BGPP-WOOD-F-200-000-0-HS-REP-00001-E) is referred for high risk hazards in
BGPP. Below is the list of hazards with high risk (with assigned risk rank of 1 & 2) hazards from HAZID Study.
Table 2: High Risk Hazards from HAZID Study
GW
Specific
GW
Cause
Consequence
Safeguards
S
L
R
Environmental
Hazards and natural
phenomena
Erosion
Riverbank erosion:
not applicable for the
GGP but for pipeline
Movement of supports
and overstress of the line
-
D
3
2
Zero level in
deaerator
Damage of pumps and
loss BFW supply to
Steam generator (tubes
dry condition) and desuperheater. Emergency
plant shutdown.
D
3
2
Overfilling in
K.O. drum
Release of liquid to flare
and potential
overpressure
leading to consequent
release of flammable gas
(acid gas) (jet fire) /
Dispersion of H2S
D
3
2
Accidental
release of liquid
Sulphur (along
pipeline routing interference with
roads, collision with
vehicles)
Release of liquid Sulphur
to the atmosphere and
consequent Sulphur
solidification. Potential
Injury of public (hot fluid
and Sulphur fire)
E
3
1
Excess/zero
Level
Process
Process
-
Release of
inventory
Process
7.2
ESD system (opening
of deaerator bypass
low level) ESD
system (stop of
pumps - Low low
level) protecting
pumps damages
DCS for High / high
high level in KO Drum
Firefighting system
F&G Detection
FERA/QRA Study
Emergency response
plan Escape route
Leak detection
system FERA/QRA
Study Emergency
response plan
Escape ways
(pipeline are in open
area)
High Risk Scenarios from HAZOP Study
The HAZOP study reports presents HAZOP worksheets for all units at BGPP, HAZOP worksheet for unit 213 is
referred to identify the high risk hazards which are presented in table below as representative case. Likewise other
units have high risk hazard potential which can be referred from HAZOP study Reports.
Table 3: High Risk Hazards from HAZOP Study – Unit 213 (Representative Case)
Cause
1.1.2 Inadvertent Closure of
any Manual Isolation Valve
Consequence
Cat
S
L
R
1.1.2.1 Upstream pressurization leading
to over pressurization loss of
S
E
5
2
26 / 43
Safeguards
72 212-PSV-01003A/B is
available.
BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-FF-REP-10006-E-C
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Cause
Consequence
Cat
S
L
R
containment leading to fire/toxic release
and fatality, possible Environmental
hazard
Safeguards
73 212-PIT-01004 will initiate the
212- IS-01004 to open 212-BDV01001.
1.1.3 Malfunction Closure of
1.1.3.1 Flaring of raw Gas leading to
both 213-XV- 01010 & 213-XV- Loss of production, toxic release, and
01110 (Common cause failure) fatality
S
E
5
1.1.4 213-PIC-01102
malfunction Opening of 213PCV-01102
S
E
2
S
E
2
1
A
M
2
2
197 PDAH on 213-PDIT-01001
S
E
5
2
2 LAHH on 213-LIT-1003 will
trigger 213-S- 1001 to close the
S
S
E
E
3
3
1
1
3 213-CHV-01001 Provided.
4 213-CHV-01004 Provided.
1.1.5 Leakage in the system
due to corrosion.
1.1.6 Demister blockage
1.2.1 More flow from upstream
node (Unit 212 FCV-01003A)
1.3.1 No feed to Absorber
1.3.2 High level in Absorber
1.1.4.1 Flaring of raw Gas leading to
Loss of production toxic release and
fatality
1.1.5.1 Loss of containment leading to
fire/toxic release and fatality, possible
Environmental hazard
1.1.6.1 Less flow to absorber leading to
Loss of production.
1.2.1.1 High Level on KO Drum leading
to carry over to the Absorber, loss of
containment leading to fire/toxic release
and fatality, possible Environmental
hazard
1.3.1.1 Possible reverse Flow
1.3.2.1 Possible reverse Flow
195 PCV-01102
opens to flare
2
196 FAL on 213- FI-01017
1
1.4.1 Possible External Fire
1.4.1.1 Possible over pressurization
leading to Explosion and possible
fatality.
S
E
2
1
1.4.2 Blockage of demister
pads.
1.4.2.1 Possible over pressurization
leading to Explosion and possible
fatality.
S
E
2
1
1.5.1 213-PIC-01102
malfunction Opening of 213PCV-01102
1.5.1.1 Flaring of raw Gas leading to
Loss of production toxic release and
fatality
S
E
2
1
1.8.1 LIC-01001 Malfunction
closure of 213-LCV-01001
1.8.1.1 Possible carryover of Liquid,
loss of containment leading to fire/toxic
release and fatality, possible
Environmental hazard
S
1.8.2 Malfunction closure of
XV-01001
1.8.2.1 Possible carryover of Liquid,
loss of containment leading to fire/toxic
release and fatality, possible
Environmental hazard
S
E
4
1
1.8.3.1 Possible carryover of Liquid,
1.8.3 Inadvertent Closure of
loss of containment leading to fire/toxic
Manual Isolation Valve 213-BVrelease and fatality, possible
01022/23/24
Environmental hazard
S
D
3
2
1.9.1 LIC-01001 Malfunction
1.9.1.1 Over pressure in Down Stream
system and Sour Gas will enter in
27 / 43
E
4
1
196 FAL on 213- FI-01017
2 LAHH on 213-LIT-01003 will
trigger 213-S- 01001 to close the
inlet valves. 213- XV-01010/213XV- 01110
7 213-LIT-01001 will give high
level alarm for operator to work.
2 LAHH on 213-LIT-01003 will
trigger 213-S- 01001 to close the
inlet valves. 213- XV-01010/
213-XV- 01110
7 213-LIT-01001will give high
level alarm for operator to work.
2 LAHH on 213-LIT-01003 will
trigger 213-IS- 01001 to close
the inlet valves. 213- XV-01010/
213-XV- 01110
198 LALL on 213-LIT-01004 will
trigger 213-IS- 01001 to close
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Cause
Opening of 213-LCV-01001
Consequence
downstream and Loss of containment
may lead to possible fatality.
1.11.1.1 Piping corrosion. loss of
containment leading to fire/toxic release
1.11.1 Condensation in the
and fatality, possible Environmental
Piping.
hazard
2.1.2.1 Flaring of Gas leading to loss of
2.1.2 213-PCV-01103
production. loss of containment leading to
fails open.
fire/toxic release and fatality, possible
Environmental hazard
2.1.3.1 Pressurization of 213-01-VN2.1.3 Downstream valves
04/05 and 13-01-VE-01, loss of
closed 213-XVcontainment leading to fire/toxic release
01022
and fatality, possible Environmental
hazard
2.1.4.1 Less flow to the
Downstream Unit (Unit-214). Flaring of
2.1.4 Blockage of Demister of
Gas through PCV- 01102 leading to
213-01-VN- 05
Loss of Gas. Toxic release and
possible fatality
2.2.1 More flow from upstream
node
2.2.1.1 High pressure in the System
(Absorber), leading to potential Fire &
Explosion, Loss of Containment,
Exposure to Toxic Gas, Environmental
Hazard and Potential Fatality.
2.2.1 More flow from upstream
node
2.2.1.3 Solvent Carryover, leading to
potential Fire & Explosion, Loss of
Containment, Exposure to Toxic Gas,
Environmental Hazard and Potential
Fatality.
2.4.1.1 Overpressurization of the
2.4.1 Inadvertent closure of the
System leading to potential Fire &
213-XV- 01022 and manual
Explosion, Loss of Containment,
valves on 213-GP- 01002Exposure to Toxic Gas, Environmental
9501.
Hazard and Potential Fatality.
Cat
S
L
R
S
E
5
2
the inlet valves. 213- XV-01010/
213-XV- 01110
8 213-IS-01001
will trip 213-XV- 01001
S
E
5
2
5 Material is selected
accordingly
S
E
2
1
S
E
2
1
S
E
2
1
S
E
5
2
14 213-PCV-01103 is provided.
213-PDI-01003 is Provided.
S
E
4
1
17 Downstream KOD is
provided.
S
E
5
2
Safeguards
18 213-BDV-01011 will open on
confirm fire (IS-01-01008).
19 213-XV-01022 position status
is mentioned on DCS.
20 213-PCV-01103
is provided
21 212-PSV-01003A/B is sized
for Blocked Outlet.
22 213-PIT-01070A/B/C (2oo3)
will activate IS-01008 leading to
blow down of the Unit.
2.5.1 213-PCV-01103
wide open
2.5.1 213-PCV-01103
wide open
2.5.1.1 Flaring of Gas leading to Loss of
production. loss of containment leading
to fire/toxic release and fatality, possible
S
Environmental hazard
2.5.1.3 Solvent carryover due to surge in
Gas flow rate. loss of containment
S
leading to fire/toxic release and fatality,
28 / 43
E
4
1
E
4
1
23 213-PIT-01070
A/B/C low pressure
provided.
alarm
24 Downstream KOD 213-01VN-05 is provided.
BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-FF-REP-10006-E-C
Construction of Boysun GPP
ALARP Demonstration Study Report
Cause
Consequence
Cat
S
L
R
Safeguards
possible Environmental hazard
2.5.2 Opening of Blow Down
Valve 213-BDV-01011
2.5.2.1 Refer to 2.5.1.1
S
E
4
1
2.6.1 External Fire near 21301-VN-05
2.6.1.1 Possible over pressurization
leading to Explosion and possible
fatality.
S
E
5
2
2.6.2 External Fire near 21301-VE-01
2.6.2.1 Possible over pressurization
leading to Explosion and possible
fatality.
S
E
5
2
2.6.3 High temperature gas
flow from Unit-212.
2.6.3.1 Hydrocarbon condensation in
absorber leading to foaming, offspec gas A
and leading to loss of production.
H
3
2
2.9.1 213-BV-01060
closed.
2.9.1.1 Carryover of the hydrocarbons in
solvent line, possible fire hazard.
S
E
3
1
2.10.1 closure of 213- XV01003 / manual valve and/or
213-LCV- 01010 stuck closed
2.10.1.1 Liquid carryover to unit-214.
loss of containment leading to fire/toxic
release and fatality, possible
Environmental hazard
S
E
5
2.12.1 213-LCV-01010
wide open.
2.12.1.1 Gas blow by to flash vessel
213-01-VH-06, Loss of containment and
possible fatality.
Environmental Impact.
Possible Fire hazard.
S
E
5
2
33 213-PSV-01003A/B/C/D
35 213-IS-01004 will
closed on 213-XV- 01002
34 213-PCV-01008C
36 213-RO-01030
provided on liquid outlet line.
2.14.1 Heat tracing failure
2.14.1.1 Potential blockage in the piping
leading to over pressurization and
S
leakage resulting in flammable/ toxic gas
release.
E
5
2
38 PSV upstream lines are
routed such as slops towards the
source.
7.3
2
25 Open Close Indication of BDV
in DCS.
18 213-BDV-01011 will open on
confirm fire (IS-01-01008).
27 213-PSV-01002A/B/C/D are
provided.
27 213-PSV-01002A/B/C/D are
provided.
18 213-BDV-01011 will open on
confirm fire (IS-01-01008).
28 213-TDI-01002 with low
temperature alarm provided.
30 213-IS-01006 will
closed on 213-XV- 01003.
FERA
The impact of the fire & explosion scenarios on the building as identified from the FERA report is presented in table
below.
Is No.
Table 4: Impact of Fire & Explosion on Buildings from FERA Study Report
Description
Building/s impacted
211-IS-01
Raw gas from gas gathering header of cluster 4 to 211-XV 00001
Analyzer shelter (513-34)
211-IS-02
211-XV 00001 to 211-XV 00003 through 211-00-VT-01A
Analyzer shelter (513-34)
211-IS-03
211-XV 00003 to Inlet Separator system train 1 (212-01-HA-01) and Inlet
Separator system train 2 (212-02-HA-01) (Battery Limit)
Analyzer shelter (513-34)
211-IS-04
Raw gas from gas gathering header of cluster 3,5 to 211-XV 00006
Analyzer shelter (513-34)
211-IS-05
211-XV 00006 to 211-XV 00008 through 211-00-VT-01B
Analyzer shelter (513-34)
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Is No.
Description
Building/s impacted
211-IS-06
211-XV 00008 to Inlet Separator system train 1 (212-01-HA-01) and Inlet
Separator system train 2 (212-02-HA-01) (Battery Limit)
Analyzer shelter (513-34)
211-IS-07
Raw gas from gas gathering header of cluster 4,7 to 211-XV 00011
Analyzer shelter (513-34)
211-IS-08
211-XV 00011 to 211-XV 00013 through 211-00-VT-01C
Analyzer shelter (513-34)
211-IS-09
211-XV 00013 to Inlet Separator system train 1 (212-01-HA-01) and Inlet
Separator system train 2 (212-02-HA-01) (Battery Limit)
Analyzer shelter (513-34)
211-IS-10
Raw gas from gas gathering header of cluster 6 to 211-XV 00016
Analyzer shelter (513-34)
211-IS-11
211-XV 00018 to Inlet Separator system train 1 (212-01-HA-01) and Inlet
Separator system train 2 (212-02-HA-01) (Battery Limit)
Analyzer shelter (513-34)
211-IS-12
Sour water from 211-XV 00020 to Inlet separation system (Battery Limit)
through 211-00-CZ-01G/H
Analyzer shelter (513-34)
213-IS-01
Sour Gas (Battery Limit) from 212-01-HA-01 to 213-XV-01010
Analyzer shelter (513-34)
213-IS-02
213-XV-01010 to 213-XV-01001 / 01002 / 01003 / 01022 / 213-SDV-01021
/ 01023
Analyzer shelter (513-34)
214-IS-05
Acid gas from 214-PCV +01017A to Unit 215 - Incinerator
Main Substation-512-01
214-IS-06
From 214-00-TA-01 to 214-00-TA-01
GPP Process Substation 512-02
216-IS-01
Treated Gas from 214-01-VN-03(B.L) to 216-XV-01004 at the inlet of 21601-HA-01A/B
Regeneration gas compressor shelter
train-1 513-03
216-IS-02
From 216-XV-01004 at the inlet of 216-01-HA-01A/B / 216-XV-01033 to
216-XV-01041 at the Outlet of 216-01-VX-01
Regeneration gas compressor shelter
train-1 513-04
216-IS-08
From 216-XV-01042 at the Outlet of 216-01-VX-02 D to 216-XV-01033
Regeneration gas compressor shelter
train-1 513-05
710-IS-01
Raw gas from gas gathering header of cluster 4 to 211-XV 00001
Gas Engine generators building
715-IS-01
From truck connection for unloading for Unloading to Daily tank
Main Control Room 511-00, RIB Utilities
area 511-01, BFW Pumps Shelter 51307
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ALARP Demonstration Study Report
7.4
QRA
7.4.1. LOCATION SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL RISK (LSIR) RESULTS
LSIR is used to indicate the risk for individual who is positioned at a particular location for 24 hours per day, 365
days per year. The risk exposure is calculated for all relevant hazards and summed up to give the overall risks for
the installation. LSIR contour for BGPP facility is shown below:
Figure 5 – Multilevel Individual Risk Contour for Boysun Gas Processing Plant (BGPP)
From the LSIR contours, the inner contour cover up to the radius of 156.63 m from the centre of the Unit 210 located
near Unit 211 represents IRPA of 1E-02/Avg.Year which comes under the INTOLERABLE region. The contour
representing the IRPA of 1E-03/Avg. Year comes under the ALARP Region, this impact will cover up to the radius
of 175.08 m from the centre of the Unit 210 located near Unit 211. The yellow line represents the IRPA of 1E07/Avg. Year which comes under the ACCEPTABLE Region, this impact will cover up to the radius of 3558.3 m
from the centre of the Unit 210 located near Unit 211. The orange line represents the IRPA of 1E-08/Avg.Year which
comes under the ACCEPTABLE Region, this impact will cover up to the radius of 4537.18m from the centre of the
Unit 210 located near Unit 211. The blue line represents the IRPA of 1E-09/Avg.Year which comes under the
ACCEPTABLE Region, this impact will cover up to the radius of 4973.22 m from the centre of the Unit 210 located
near Unit 211. It is the frequency at which an individual or an individual within a group may be expected to sustain
a given level of harm (typically death) from the realization of specific hazards.
Table 5 – Location Specific Individual Risk Value
LSIR (/avg. year)
IRPA-Day Shift
(/avg. year)
IRPA-Night Shift
(/avg. year)
Risk level
Chemical warehouse for utilities
1.67E-03
8.37E-04
8.37E-04
ALARP
Administration building
4.42E-04
2.21E-04
2.21E-04
ALARP
Domestic building
7.15E-04
3.57E-04
3.57E-04
ALARP
Canteen
5.59E-04
2.80E-04
2.80E-04
ALARP
Warm-up / Sanitary building
1.79E-03
8.96E-04
8.96E-04
ALARP
Risk Ranking Locations
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Construction of Boysun GPP
ALARP Demonstration Study Report
LSIR (/avg. year)
IRPA-Day Shift
(/avg. year)
IRPA-Night Shift
(/avg. year)
Risk level
Main control room
1.39E-03
6.93E-04
6.93E-04
ALARP
Mechanical and repair shop
4.61E-04
2.30E-04
2.30E-04
ALARP
Laboratory
9.33E-04
4.67E-04
4.67E-04
ALARP
Security services facility
3.24E-04
1.62E-04
1.62E-04
ALARP
Security gatehouse for personnel, for cars and trucks
1.04E-03
5.22E-04
5.22E-04
ALARP
Risk Ranking Locations
IRPA = LSIR*Occupancy Factor
Occupancy Factor = 0.5 (It is calculated for 12 hrs/day).
7.4.2. Societal Risk Results
The second definition of risk involves the concept of the summation of risk from events involving many fatalities
within specific population groups. This definition is focused on the risk to society rather than to a specific individual.
We can identify specific groups of people who work on or live close to the installation; for example, communities
living or working close to the station.
Figure 6- F (Frequency) & N (Number of fatalities) Curve for Boysun Gas Processing Plant
In the F-N plot shown above, the red line represents the maximum risk criteria and green line represents the
minimum. The region between the yellow and the red line is called the ALARP region as shown in the above figures,
green line which is the actual risk falls in the UNACCEPTABLE region.
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Construction of Boysun GPP
ALARP Demonstration Study Report
Table 6 – Top Ten Risk Integral Table
Isolatable Section
Risk Integral [/Avg. Year]
213-IS-07-100 mm-IDLH
2.35E-01
213-IS-07100 mm-ERPG-2
2.10E-01
215-IS-05 - 100 mm-ERPG-2
6.27E-02
215-IS-05 - 100mm-IDLH
6.27E-02
213-IS-12-100 mm-Flammable
3.03E-02
213-IS-11-100 mm-Flammable
2.82E-02
213-IS-07-FBR-IDLH
2.08E-02
213-IS-07-FBR-ERPG-2
2.07E-02
212-IS-01-100mm-IDLH
1.25E-02
212-IS-01-100mm-ERPG 2
1.25E-02
8. ALARP DEMONSTRATION
It has been found that the societal risk at BGPP is in unacceptable region. This suggests the requirement to
demonstrate ALARP. To reduce a risk to lowest tolerable level practicable involves balancing reduction in risk to a
level, objectively assessed, where the trouble, difficulty and cost of further reduction measures becomes
unreasonably disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained.
8.1
Overview of ALARP Demonstration from QRA Study
For demonstrating the Unacceptable /ALARP the proposed safeguard measures like BDV, Fire and Gas Protection
System, Active Fire Protection System, Passive Fire Protection System can be considered, that is the credit has
been provided for the proposed safeguards in the failure frequency calculation as mentioned in table below.
Table 7: Probability of Failure on Demand for Independent Protection Layer
Independent Protective Layer
Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD)
Fire & Gas detection system
0.006
Blow down system
0.017
Automatic ESD system
0.017
Passive Fire Protection
0.01
QRA Study demonstrated that after accounting the above mentioned safeguards the risk is reduced from
unacceptable to ALARP region and it is presented below.
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Construction of Boysun GPP
ALARP Demonstration Study Report
8.1.1. location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) Results (Including Modification Factor)
Figure 7 – Multilevel Individual Risk Contour for Boysun Gas Processing Plant (BGPP)
Table 8 – Location Specific Individual Risk Value
7.04E-05
IRPA-Day
Shift (/avg.
year)
3.52E-05
IRPA-Night
Shift (/avg.
year)
3.52E-05
Administration building
8.26E-06
4.13E-06
4.13E-06
ALARP
Domestic building
1.85E-05
9.25E-06
9.25E-06
ALARP
Canteen
1.26E-05
6.29E-06
6.29E-06
ALARP
Warm-up / Sanitary building
7.18E-05
3.59E-05
3.59E-05
ALARP
Main control room
5.10E-05
2.55E-05
2.55E-05
ALARP
Mechanical and repair shop
7.57E-06
3.78E-06
3.78E-06
ALARP
Laboratory
2.80E-05
1.40E-05
1.40E-05
ALARP
Security services facility
3.88E-06
1.94E-06
1.94E-06
ALARP
Security gatehouse for personnel, for cars and trucks
3.41E-05
1.71E-05
1.71E-05
ALARP
Risk Ranking Locations
LSIR (/avg.
year)
Chemical warehouse for utilities
Risk level
ALARP
IRPA = LSIR*Occupancy Factor
Occupancy Factor = 0.5 (It is calculated for 12 hrs/day).
Table 9- High Risk Contributors for Risk Ranking Locations at ALARP
Sr. No
Risk Ranking Locations at ALARP
High Risk Contributors
1
Chemical warehouse for utilities
Toxic\Unit 470\IS 01\FBR
2
Administration building
Toxic\Unit 215\IDLH\215-IS-05 - FBR
3
Domestic building
Toxic\Unit 215\IDLH\215-IS-05 - FBR
4
Canteen
Toxic\Unit 215\IDLH\215-IS-05 - FBR
5
Warm-up / Sanitary building
Toxic\Unit 215\IDLH\215-IS-05 - FBR
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BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-FF-REP-10006-E-C
Construction of Boysun GPP
ALARP Demonstration Study Report
Sr. No
Risk Ranking Locations at ALARP
High Risk Contributors
6
Main control room
Toxic\Unit 215\IDLH\215-IS-05 - FBR
7
Mechanical and repair shop
Toxic\Unit 216\216-IS 03\25
8
Laboratory
Toxic\Unit 215\IDLH\215-IS-05 - FBR
9
Security services facility
Security gatehouse for personnel, for cars and trucks
Toxic\Unit 216\216-IS 03\25
10
Toxic\Unit 215\IDLH\215-IS-05 - 100
Table 10 – Effect Level Risk Contributors for Risk Ranking Locations
Sr.No
.
Risk Ranking Locations
Effect Level
Flash fire to LFL fraction effect level
1
2
3
4
5
Chemical warehouse for utilities
Administration building
Domestic building
Canteen
Warm-up / Sanitary building
Indoor toxic effect level
5.10679E-06
Jet fire radiation effect level - 4 kW/m2
6.80529E-07
Jet fire radiation effect level - 5 kW/m2
5.19048E-07
Jet fire radiation effect level - 8 kW/m2
2.21613E-07
Jet fire radiation effect level - 12.5
kW/m2
Jet fire radiation effect level - 32 kW/m2
Main control room
1.17563E-07
9.16832E-09
Jet fire radiation effect level - 37.5
kW/m2
Outdoor toxic effect level
2.87441E-05
Flash fire to LFL fraction effect level
1.61959E-10
Indoor toxic effect level
4.90535E-07
Outdoor toxic effect level
3.63704E-06
Flash fire to LFL fraction effect level
2.48266E-10
Indoor toxic effect level
1.13163E-06
Outdoor toxic effect level
8.12044E-06
Flash fire to LFL fraction effect level
2.15321E-10
Indoor toxic effect level
7.51003E-07
Outdoor toxic effect level
5.54131E-06
Flash fire to LFL fraction effect level
1.42617E-07
Indoor toxic effect level
4.99829E-06
Jet fire radiation effect level - 4 kW/m2
4.98312E-09
Jet fire radiation effect level - 5 kW/m2
3.323E-09
Jet fire radiation effect level - 8 kW/m2
1.14629E-09
Jet fire radiation effect level - 12.5
kW/m2
Jet fire radiation effect level - 32 kW/m2
Jet fire radiation effect level - 37.5
kW/m2
Outdoor toxic effect level
6
Risk Total [/Avg.
Year]
3.71512E-07
Flash fire to LFL fraction effect level
Indoor toxic effect level
35 / 43
7.5986E-09
9.96E-10
6.58001E-10
5.9107E-10
3.0665E-05
6.69815E-08
3.405E-06
BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-FF-REP-10006-E-C
Construction of Boysun GPP
ALARP Demonstration Study Report
Sr.No
.
7
8
9
10
Jet fire radiation effect level - 4 kW/m2
Risk Total [/Avg.
Year]
8.30433E-10
Jet fire radiation effect level - 5 kW/m2
5.58852E-10
Outdoor toxic effect level
2.20107E-05
Flash fire to LFL fraction effect level
1.41094E-10
Indoor toxic effect level
4.89863E-07
Outdoor toxic effect level
3.29484E-06
Flash fire to LFL fraction effect level
2.66545E-09
Risk Ranking Locations
Mechanical and repair shop
Laboratory
Security services facility
Security gatehouse for personnel, for cars and
trucks
Effect Level
Indoor toxic effect level
1.7597E-06
Outdoor toxic effect level
1.22305E-05
Flash fire to LFL fraction effect level
1.29449E-11
Indoor toxic effect level
2.76142E-07
Outdoor toxic effect level
1.66613E-06
Flash fire to LFL fraction effect level
3.56546E-07
Indoor toxic effect level
2.30999E-06
Jet fire radiation effect level - 4 kW/m2
2.17208E-08
Jet fire radiation effect level - 5 kW/m2
1.55692E-08
Outdoor toxic effect level
1.42036E-05
8.1.2. Societal Risk Results (Including Modification Factor)
Figure 8- F (Frequency) & N (Number of fatalities) Curve for Boysun Gas Processing Plant
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Construction of Boysun GPP
ALARP Demonstration Study Report
In the F-N plot shown above, the red line represents the maximum risk criteria and green line represents the
minimum. The region between the yellow and the red line is called the ALARP region as shown in the above figures,
green line which is the actual risk falls in the ALARP region.
The result of this QRA study shows that the individual risk comes under the ALARP region, and the Societal risk
comes under ALARP region.
8.2
HAZID Study Recommendations
Total of 72 recommendations resulted from the study, covering:
•
occupational health and safety issues, especially for the plant’s operation: need to develop operating
procedures for access to process areas and for personnel protection (PPE, manual loading operations)
• maintenance needs for blowers and reactor in SRU unit
• reference scenarios for pipeline design (routing, supports, etc.)
• sizing criteria for PSV
• need of further evaluation during HAZOP review
• environmental issues: noise study, permitting, waste disposal needs during commissioning and
construction phases.
Out of 72 recommendation 4 recommendations are generated for high risk hazards described in Section 7.1.
8.3
HAZOP Study Recommendations
The process hazard analysis (HAZOP study) carried out at detailed design stage of the project generated broad
range of recommendation to ensure good plant operability & reduced likelihood of loss of containment scenarios.
Total 796 recommendations are generated through HAZOP studies performed for the BGPP. Below table gives the
number of recommendations from HAZOP study.
HAZOP Study
Document Number
Units Covered
Open Art HAZOP Study
1736_OPENART_HAZOP_Rev A
U210, U212, U216, U217, U219
License HAZOP Study
1736_LICENSE_HAZOP_Rev A
Utility Art HAZOP Study
1736_UTILITY_HAZOP_Rev A
U213, U214, U215
U241, U242, U243, U251, U253, 261,
U263, U264, U265, U266, U280, 291,
U292, U460, U470, U710, U715
8.4
No. of
Recommendation
332
228
236
FERA Study Recommendations
FERA Study Recommendations are given below.
1. The 25 mm leak size flash fire scenario for the Isolatable sections 715-IS-01,212-IS-01,210-IS-01, 210-IS02,210-IS-03,210-IS-04,210-IS-05,210-IS-06,210-IS-07,210-IS-08 is found to affect the adjacent equipment or
facility, hence consider providing proper shielding at the appropriate places.
2. The 1E-06/year risk effect level contour for the Flash fire Scenario encompass the entire facility, hence it is
recommended to avoid any ignition sources and consider providing suitable fire rating for the Electrical /
Instrumentation components for use in hazardous areas during emergency conditions (i.e. when flammable gas
is present).
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3. The following Process Area building is subjected to Main Control Room - 511-00, RIB Utilities Area - 511-01,
GPP Process substation - 512-02, Main Substation – 512-01, Gas engine generators building - 513-01
Regeneration gas compressor shelter train 1, BFW pumps shelter- 513-07, Analyzer shelter (513-34), is
subjected to 8 kw/m2 jet fire radiation, hence ensure fire protection/firewall for these building is provided.
4. The following Process Area building Analyzer shelter (513-34), 512-02-GPP process substation, Regeneration
gas compressor shelter train 1, Main Control Room - 511-00, is subjected to 32 kw/m2 jet fire radiation, hence
ensure active and passive fire protection for these building/structures.
5. Ensure Providing Passive fire protection for the equipment, as mentioned in the above table no 8 / Figure No
16, its structures and Piperack since it is subjected to the Jet Fire Radiation between 8 kw/m 2 and 32 kw/m2.
6. The 1E-05 /year risk effect level contour for the overpressure level is not reached.
7. Though the risk /failure frequency for the diesel tank is moderate, based on the overpressure Impact Analysis
Table no 5,6, &7 the Main Control Room and Chemical Ware house may subjected to the Over pressure level
of 3 psi, 5 psi, 12 psi due to the 25 mm failure case of Diesel Tank, hence, if possible, consider providing blast
proof wall for the Main Control Room and Chemical Ware house.
8. The Pool fire radiation of 8 kw/m2 of 213 -00-TA-02 fire reaches the entire tank farm and its adjacent unit
equipment, hence ensure providing Fire detection and protection system for the all the tanks.
8.5
QRA Study Recommendations
The result of this QRA study shows that the individual risk comes under the ALARP region and the Societal risk
comes under ALARP region.
In order to bring down the risk from ALARP to Acceptable the following safety systems should be ensured to
prevent the uncontrolled flow and mitigate the consequence
•
•
•
•
•
Activate audible and visual alarms to alert personnel
Standard Operating Procedure
Emergency Response Plan
Escape and Evacuation Route with adequate windsock at strategic location.
Regular Inspection & Audits
Based on the result the toxic risk contributes major risk for the risk ranking location considered for the study and
the effect zone of H2S toxic gas covers most of the facility. Therefore, it is recommended to consider provision of
HVAC system with auto shut-off damper in all occupied buildings.
The personnel should carry appropriate escape sets in addition to personnel toxic monitors where a timely
evacuation cannot be made while they are working toxic effect zone.
General Recommendations
1. Vehicles are generally considered to be an ignition source. It is recommended that all the vehicles entering
the facility shall have a provision of spark arrestors installed on their exhaust silencers.
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Construction of Boysun GPP
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2. It is recommended that Warning and Safety Signage complying the requirement of ANSI Z535- 2011 and
OSHA standards shall be installed at all strategic locations of the facility identifying the hazards associated
with chemicals being manufactured/handled.
3. The workforce present in the areas having probability of exposure to hazardous chemicals within the facility
shall be trained to carry necessary PPEs to avoid occupational injury or emergency.
4. Fire Fighting equipment (e.g., fire water pumps, fire water storage, water curtains, fire extinguishers, etc.)
are available with the facility.
5. Eye wash and safety showers are installed at strategic locations of the plant
6. Facility team maintains a good working condition of plant through;
7. Good Housekeeping
8. Use of PPEs
9. Strategic Communication Protocol and System
10. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Standard Maintenance Procedures (SMPs)
11. Preventive and Predictive Maintenance Practices.
12. Electrical Safety
13. Colour Coding System
8.6
Review of PHA Recommendations
The risk at BGPP is largely contributed by toxic gas (H2S) hazard. Out of top ten risk contributors shown previous
section (Table 10), six are due to toxic gas scenarios (impact of IDLH concentration) followed by flammable risk.
The below table depicts the review of recommendations resulted from various safety studies and their importance
to ensure ALARP demonstration. For HAZOP/HAZID, it is assumed that low risk recommendations are being
implemented along with high risk recommendations, the action tracking procedure/close-out procedure shall ensure
that all recommendations are implemented and are approved. For FERA and QRA studies, all recommendations are
mentioned in below table and are analyzed with respect to their impact.
It is assumed that plant will have Preventive Maintenance practice implemented during Operation to ensure the
performance of all the safeguards to meet their desired output. Safety Critical Elements (SCEs) shall be identified,
and special/rigorous maintenance schedule shall be followed for maintenance of SCEs.
Management of Change (MOC) in accordance with PSM (Process Safety Management) practices shall be
implemented during operation phase of the plant as a part of PSM Implementation.
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BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-FF-REP-10006-E-C
Construction of Boysun GPP
ALARP Demonstration Study Report
Table 11: Review of PHA Recommendations
Time of
Implementation
Type of recommendation
Study
recommendation
Procedural
HAZID
-
72 recommendations are initiated, majorly these are related to process design
improvement.
HAZOP
-
796 recommendations are initiated, majorly these are related to process design
improvement.
FERA
1
2
3
4
5
The 25 mm leak size flash fire scenario for the Isolatable sections 715-IS-01,212IS-01,210-IS-01, 210-IS-02,210-IS-03,210-IS-04,210-IS-05,210-IS-06,210-IS07,210-IS-08 is found to affect the adjacent equipment or facility, hence consider
providing proper shielding at the appropriate places.
The 1E-06/year risk effect level contour for the Flash fire Scenario encompass
the entire facility, hence it is recommended to avoid any ignition sources and
consider providing suitable fire rating for the Electrical / Instrumentation
components for use in hazardous areas during emergency conditions (i.e. when
flammable gas is present).
The following Process Area building is subjected to Main Control Room - 511-00,
RIB Utilities Area - 511-01, GPP Process substation - 512-02, Main Substation –
512-01, Gas engine generators building - 513-01 Regeneration gas compressor
shelter train 1, BFW pumps shelter- 513-07, Analyzer shelter (513-34), is
subjected to 8 kw/m2 jet fire radiation, hence ensure fire protection/firewall for
these building is provided.
The following Process Area building Analyzer shelter (513-34), 512-02-GPP
process substation, Regeneration gas compressor shelter train 1, Main Control
Room - 511-00, is subjected to 32 kw/m2 jet fire radiation, hence ensure active
and passive fire protection for these building/structures.
Ensure Providing Passive fire protection for the equipment, as mentioned in the
above table no 8 / Figure No 16, its structures and Piperack since it is subjected
to the Jet Fire Radiation between 8 kw/m2 and 32 kw/m2.
40 / 43
Design
Improvement
Needs further
Assessment Design
(CFD/CBA)
Operation
Risk after
Implementation
ALARP
Yes /No
It is assumed that low risk recommendations are being implemented along with high risk
recommendations, the action tracking procedure/close-out procedure shall ensure that all
recommendations are implemented and are approved.
-
Y
N
Y
-
Y
-
Y
N
Y
-
Y
-
Y
N
(Note 1)
Y
-
Y
-
Y
N
(Note 1)
Y
-
Y
-
Y
N
(Note 1)
Y
-
Y
BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-FF-REP-10006-E-C
Construction of Boysun GPP
ALARP Demonstration Study Report
Time of
Implementation
Type of recommendation
Study
recommendation
6
7
QRA
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Though the risk /failure frequency for the diesel tank is moderate, based on the
overpressure Impact Analysis Table no 5,6, &7 the Main Control Room and
Chemical Ware house may subjected to the Over pressure level of 3 psi, 5 psi,
12 psi due to the 25 mm failure case of Diesel Tank, hence, if possible, consider
providing blast proof wall for the Main Control Room and Chemical Ware house.
The Pool fire radiation of 8 kw/m2 of 213 -00-TA-02 fire reaches the entire tank
farm and its adjacent unit equipment, hence ensure providing Fire detection and
protection system for the all the tanks.
Vehicles are generally considered to be an ignition source. It is recommended
that all the vehicles entering the facility shall have a provision of spark arrestors
installed on their exhaust silencers.
It is recommended that Warning and Safety Signage complying the requirement
of ANSI Z535- 2011 and OSHA standards shall be installed at all strategic
locations of the facility identifying the hazards associated with chemicals being
manufactured/handled.
The workforce present in the areas having probability of exposure to hazardous
chemicals within the facility shall be trained to carry necessary PPEs to avoid
occupational injury or emergency.
Fire Fighting equipment (e.g., fire water pumps, fire water storage, water
curtains, fire extinguishers, etc.) are available with the facility.
Eye wash and safety showers are installed at strategic locations of the plant
Facility team maintains a good working condition of plant through;
Good Housekeeping
Use of PPEs
Strategic Communication Protocol and System
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Standard Maintenance Procedures
(SMPs)
Preventive and Predictive Maintenance Practices.
Electrical Safety
Colour Coding System
41 / 43
Needs further
Assessment Design
(CFD/CBA)
Risk after
Implementation
ALARP
Yes /No
Procedural
Design
Improvement
-
Y
CFD (Note- 2)
Y
-
Y
-
Y
(Note 1 & 3)
Y
-
Y
Y
-
N
-
Y
Y
-
Y
N
Y
-
Y
Y
-
N
-
Y
Y
-
Y
N
Y
-
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
-
N
N
N
N
N
Y
-
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
-
N
-
Y
Y
Y
Y
-
Y
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
-
Y
Y
Y
BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-FF-REP-10006-E-C
Operation
Construction of Boysun GPP
ALARP Demonstration Study Report
Notes:
1. The Active Fire Protection Philosophy (Ref. 8) & Passive Fire Protection Philosophy (Ref. 9) is in place.
2. The requirement is assessed through Vapor Cloud explosion study (CFD) - BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-FF-STU-10005.
3. The Fire Detection System requirements are specified by the F & G detection philosophy (Ref. 10), the fire & gas detector layouts is prepared accordingly. Also,
F & G mapping study report (BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-FF-STU-10002) can ensure the requirement.
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Boysun Gas Processing Plant (BGPP)
ALARP Demonstration Study Report
9. CONCLUSION
Overall, all the recommendations mentioned above can be implemented, no recommendation requires change
in design, ongoing engineering phase of the project must ensure the implementation of these recommendations.
Need for CBA (Cost Benefit Analysis) may not arise as long as all the recommendations are implemented in
totality unless the decision of accepting any of the recommendation is not challenged by any of the stake-holder
or Company.
It has been demonstrated that the BGPP development presents risk to personnel which are ALARP.
It has been calculated (Ref 2) that the Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA) values for each worker group are
considerably less than the maximum tolerable limit (1.00E-03) but are greater than the broadly tolerable region
(1.00E-06) and lie within the “tolerable if ALARP” region.
ALARP has been achieved by:
• Providing a robust design basis for the facilities with the use of Good Engineering Practice by means
of compliance with statutory provisions and use of appropriate design codes and standards and
industry accepted practices.
• Applying an effective hazard management strategy of hazard identification, giving rise to
recommendations concerning the elimination, prevention, control, and mitigation of major hazard risk
which is integrated into meeting the applicable local & international standards.
• Implementing those demonstrated to be reasonably practicable (with support to decision making from
cost benefit analysis where appropriate). Where measures judged to involve sacrifice grossly
disproportionate to the risk benefits obtained, these measures shall be excluded.
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BGPP-UZLE-D-200-000-0-FF-REP-10006-E-C