Introduction
Since the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) was published, the Department of
Defense (DoD) established a transition to All-Domain Operations as a top goal driven by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare the US for future warfare.1 While the Joint Warfare construct,
that DoD uses today, coordinates between all the different domains, they are not integrated.
There are clear seams between each domain controlling the preponderance of force, which
creates time consuming deconfliction and coordination efforts when attempting to bring one
domain’s capabilities to another. All- Domain Operations (ADO) seeks to dissolve those seams
and provide commanders with clearer vision and the ability to complete kill chains in the most
effective and expeditious way possible. An evolution to All-Domain Operations will provide a
significant advantage over all competitors for the foreseeable future, but no country knows how
to implement it effectively.2 Each Service is developing its own domain specific organizational
and technological solution, such as the Army's Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept or the
Air Force's Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS), however there is still no mechanism
to provide domain integration.3 Technological advancements that create efficiencies and increase
effectiveness at the service level will increase overall capability, but these efforts will not bridge
1
“Implementing the National Defense Strategy: A Year of Successes the HONORABLE MARK T. ESPER Secretary of
Defense.” 2020. https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jul/17/2002459291/-1/-1/1/NDS-FIRST-YEARACCOMPLISHMENTS-FINAL.pdf.
2
Clark, Colin. 2020. “Gen. Hyten on the New American Way of War: All-Domain Operations.” Breaking Defense.
Above the Law. February 18, 2020. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/gen-hyten-on-the-new-american-wayof-war-all-domain-operations/.
3
Niewood, Eliahu, Greg Grant, and Tyler Lewis. n.d. “A NEW BATTLE COMMAND ARCHITECTURE for MULTIDOMAIN OPERATIONS Countering Peer Adversary Power Projection.”
https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/Joint-All-Domain-Command-Control.pdf. Pg. 3
the seams between domains. An adaption of the current organizational structure, and
development of an All-Domain Operations Command and Control (C2) construct, will enable
full integration by shifting operational focus and control from domains to warfighting functions.
Environment
Since the conclusion of the cold war, the global environment has changed
significantly. The re-emergence of Great Power Competition (GPC) and the exponential
advancements in technology have caused a change in how war is fought and has increased the
speed and complexity of the battlespace.4 Consequently, decisions will need to be made in
seconds or minutes instead of hours or days and encompass multiple geographic regions. This is
a shift compared with the current multiday process to analyze the operating environment and
issue commands across components. Adversaries currently excel at closing the “Kill Chain”
consisting of finding, fixing, track, targeting, engaging, and Assessing (F2T2EA). This is due to
the great emphasis placed on long-range fires, communications, networking, sensors, and cyber
assets. The network command and control capabilities allow a strategic asset such as the Chinese
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile to engage an operational or tactical level asset quickly, and
tactical level warfighters to employ strategic level cyber capabilities, as seen with the Russian
forces in the 2014 annexation of Crimea.5 Being able to combat this will rely on increasing the
speed and the distribution of our own F2T2EA network across all military domains and
4
“From the Chairman: The Character of War and Strategic Landscape Have Changed.” 2018. National Defense
University Press. April 12, 2018. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1491632/fromthe-chairman-the-character-of-war-and-strategic-landscape-have-changed/.
5
“Canadian Military Journal Vol. 17, No. 3.” 2013. Forces.gc.ca. 2013.
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/Vol17/no3/page17-eng.asp.
throughout the levels of war. The speed and flexibility of threats to the force will require
engagement from across domains with a comparable speed of decision making and execution.
Situations will arise in which Firing platforms, Positive Identification (PID), and weapons
release authority would traditionally reside in different domains. The C2 must integrate the
domains where these kill chain actions occur to adequately combat the threat.
Along with this environmental shift, the United States military advantage and status as a
hyper-power, dominating all states in all domains, has eroded over the past two decades. Global
competitors noticed the effective projection of power shown in the decisive victory in operation
desert storm. Because of this, enemies of the US have spent significant resources to adapt force
structures, capabilities, and modernization programs. The result is Anti-Access Area Denial
(A2AD) and Next-Generation cyber capabilities to counter the US ability to project power. The
US focus on counter-terrorism in the 2000s has caused these enemy capabilities to be left
unchecked, only recently becoming an area of concern and resulting in the recognition for future
warfare to need All-Domain Operations concepts.
Organizational Shift
A commander engaging an adversary needs to swiftly assess and determine the most
effective capability within the area of operations. Will a land-based precision missile or a
disabling cyber-attack be the best use of force and resources to achieve the mission objective? To
reach this level of vision on the battlefield, C2 should be organized around joint warfighting
functions such as logistics, intelligence, or fires instead of the domain or services. More
importantly, to have the necessary speed, the C2 structure needs to include tasking authority for
all assets that operate within the functions assigned and prioritized by a commander regardless of
the domain or Service origin.
Shifting to All-domain operations, the C2 construct will require advancement from
Service and domain-specific operational centers to functionally aligned, globally distributed AllDomain Operation Centers (ADOC) specific to missions, geographical theaters, and levels of
war. ADOCs could be implemented at the appropriate level of war to exploit a shared all domain,
all service situational understanding that will change the disjointed situational awareness in the
current domain isolated architectures. ADOCs would still be subject to the appropriate levels of
war as they relate towards objectives, but be inclusive of all services and sub-aligned according
to joint functions. For example, an operational level ADOC will still encompass nested
objectives comprised of multiple tactical goals but would include distributed subordinate
commanders for Intelligence, Fires, Logistics, ETC.
The methodology will become an all domains-best shooter type construct not contingent
on assets provided by supported services but rather on asset ability and effectiveness.6 Each
functional commander may not have forces from all domains due to limited resources, but each
would likely have forces from multiple domains to achieve their assigned mission. By focusing
of functions-based organization, the seams between different elements are based on missions or
objectives instead of domains. While this is a major adjustment, servicemembers officers across
the joint force are familiar with the idea of fighting functions, as they are discussed in
Professional military education and currently utilized at strategic levels. It will also reduce the
number of processes and steps by remove the iterative approach used to integrate domainspecific planning and engagement sequences today.
6
Osborn, Kris. 2020. “Multi-Domain Operations: A ‘next Step’ in U.S. Military Combat Strategy.” The National
Interest. September 2, 2020. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/multi-domain-operations-next-step-usmilitary-combat-strategy-168204.
Commanders will have more options for engaging the adversary by considering tradeoffs to attacking targets via long-range precision fires vs. using cyber capabilities. An ADOC
commander would be provided opportunities from the subordinate function commanders on each
capability's positive and negative aspects toward an objective. The ability to view the full range
of contextual data and options would establish a shared, clear understanding of the situation
based on mission or functional needs and capabilities, improving the speed, scale, and
effectiveness of decision making.
In terms of DOTMLPF, we are talking about parts Doctrine, Organizational, and
Leadership aspects of the All-Domain Operations solution that will need to be effected outside of
title 10 service responsibilities. The specific services and their programs, such as MDO &
AMBS, are currently working to deliver the remaining DOTMLPF aspects. Still, these will not
fully integrate into an ADO concept without the Organizational and Doctrine. As mentioned
previously, the Kill Chain has expanded beyond the domains which currently hold the
preponderance of force and so the solution will reside in the organization of the combat
commands. However, the technological elements that are the enablers and drivers of the DoD
ADO idea will carry some concerns.
Challenges
Because ADO will be enabled by a vast amount of robotics and Artificial Intelligence,
ethics and trust will concern the ADOC commanders. Commanders are not likely to make the
best decisions if they cannot trust or accept the risk that machines bring. The core of the debate
always comes down to the reliability of the systems, whether they are reliable enough to replace
humans for certain aspects of control in the kill chain. The adoption of a concept of Human
command and Machine control will be a new aspect of C2. The message to commanders needs to
relate AI and machine control as similar to today's environment. Commanders today trust their
subordinate units, capabilities, and personnel because they have been sufficiently trained to
execute specific missions to certain standards when given guidance and direction. AI and
machines will not be different. These capabilities are only fielded after being sufficiently tested
and fielded to perform under a strict set of specifications and coded to execute within allowed
command parameters. Society is already seeing this with ride-share apps, amazon, google maps,
and investment apps. Each of these receives inputs and determines the best route, cheapest
distribution, or least volatile markets to achieve the command end state. Commanders will still
command, and there will still be accountability for mishaps, same as in today's environment.
Still, Machines will slowly start to control the methods to achieve command end states.
The structures and battle rhythms of the current services and domains will also
need to be synchronized in an ADOC concept. Each existing domain has developed its battle
rhythm and structure conducive to the domain and geographic location. However, this construct
has been adapted to work in our current joint environment and is inefficient coordinating across
domain seams. ADO will involve a network of interconnected capabilities and a data flow that
will permeate across geographic boundaries. The ADOC concept will also require close and
succinct interservice support structures and personnel to mesh at all command levels. Because of
this, the ADOC structure will have to develop a single battle rhythm to result in the most
efficient processes.
The ADO construct will also need to be employed agnostically in relation to
specific domains or capabilities. Personnel working in ADOCs should be trained, and ADO
qualified, to ensure understanding of the different domain capabilities and eliminate service
biases that may preference specific domain capabilities over others. Operators and personnel
within JDOCs will likely need increased technical skillsets to interact with the technology and
have above-average knowledge of the function-based C2 structure. The amount of personnel will
likely decrease as AI assumes a large portion of data analysis7. Still, the personnel will be
integral to inserting human morals into the machine outputs and inputting command parameters
and priorities. Because of this, it is crucial to ensure that the appropriate personnel are selected
and trained for these assignments and that Commanders are aware of their integral role in the
technology-heavy architecture.
Emphasis on deliberate planning over dynamic planning is a staple seen across the
service and domain operation centers.8 This is likely a product of the nature of conflicts over the
past 20 years where enemy capabilities were vastly inferior and thus did not produce many
dynamic threats. The deliberate planning cycle of an Air Operations Center, for example, is
72hours and adequate to plan operations on targets that could easily be found, fixed, and fired
upon. In a near-peer competition, however, deliberate targets will become the exception rather
than the norm. Near peer advisories will employ highly mobile air and maritime assets, deceptive
long-range ground capabilities, and disruptive cyber threats. While deliberate targeting will still
be essential to the planning process, conflicts will likely develop into a proliferation of dynamic
7
Lingel, Sherrill, Jeff Hagen, Eric Hastings, Mary Lee, Matthew Sargent, Matthew Walsh, Ang Li, David Zhang, and
Blancett. n.d. “Joint All-Domain Command and Control for Modern Warfare an Analytic Framework for Identifying
and Developing Artificial Intelligence Applications.” Accessed May 5, 2021.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR4400/RR4408z1/RAND_RR4408z1.pdf. Pg. 44
8
Lingel, Sherrill, Jeff Hagen, Eric Hastings, Mary Lee, Matthew Sargent, Matthew Walsh, Ang Li, David Zhang, and
Blancett. n.d. “Joint All-Domain Command and Control for Modern Warfare an Analytic Framework for Identifying
and Developing Artificial Intelligence Applications.” Accessed May 5, 2021.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR4400/RR4408z1/RAND_RR4408z1.pdf. Pg. 4
events.9 The employment, and physical speed in the case of hypersonic weapons, that dynamic
threats possess, will require targeting solutions gathered from the interconnected web of sensors
in the All-Domain environment and the engagement from multiple if not all domains. An ADOC
concept would provide effective integration of capabilities that would complete a kill chain not
bound or hindered by the need to coordinate across domain command structures.
Centralized Command and Decentralized Control
The current Joint environment is dependent on the Service or domain-specific operations
centers for communication, planning, capability coordination, and execution of Joint operations.
Yet each center represents a critical vulnerability in an environment where adversaries attack at
longer kinetic ranges and from new domains such as space and cyber. The destruction, disabling,
or denial of any one of our domain operation centers will severely limit joint functionality. For
example, the 613 AOC at Hickam Air Force Base on Oahu and the 603 AOC at Ramstein Air
Base in Germany would support US Indo-Pacific Command and the US. European Command,
respectively, in fights against China or Russia. Both organizations place their systems and
personnel in unhardened above-ground centralized facilities and place theater-specific qualified
personnel and liaisons in one location.10
9
“The Strategic Shift and Dynamic Targeting: Meeting the Challenge - Second Line of Defense.” 2020. Second Line
of Defense. May 28, 2020. https://sldinfo.com/2020/05/the-strategic-shift-and-dynamic-targeting-meeting-thechallenge/.
10
Lingel, Sherrill, Jeff Hagen, Eric Hastings, Mary Lee, Matthew Sargent, Matthew Walsh, Ang Li, David Zhang, and
Blancett. n.d. “Joint All-Domain Command and Control for Modern Warfare an Analytic Framework for Identifying
and Developing Artificial Intelligence Applications.”
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR4400/RR4408z1/RAND_RR4408z1.pdf. Pg. 7
The ADOC construct may seem like we are creating an even more significant,
more consolidated vulnerability. However, this is just the opposite. The difference lies within the
technology. The joint construct today is dependent on Domain Operations Centers to collect
data, analyze it, and inform command decisions. All this happens in a vulnerable central location.
The vulnerability is not necessarily that there is a central operations center, but more so that all
the data collection, analysis, command decisions, and information transfer happen in the same
place. With the evolution of Information Warfare, data and analysis are no longer just a part of
decision making but are combat capabilities and domains. These capabilities begin needing
inclusion in decentralized execution rather than centralized direction, keeping with the two
principal prerequisites of successful command and control11. The ADOC idea decentralizes these
information and analysis nodes from the commander, yet retains the capability to receive
information and analysis for command decisions. This corrects the current vulnerability and puts
the C2 construct back within the realm of a sound and functioning command organization.
Another disadvantage to centralized control is the vulnerability to physical attack, and the
decision-making with ADOCs that incorporate an entire spectrum of warfare will be prime
targets. As stated, before with the decentralization of data and analysis, the difference will lie in
the technology. In the current Joint environment, eliminating a domain operations center would
essentially cut off that domain from the Joint force commander. It would take some time to
recreate an alternative C2 construct to re-connect the data analysis and command to the Joint
Force command. With the ADOC information decentralized, the network, sensors, computing
would remain intact. A contingency plan to essentially re-insert decision-makers into the
11
Milan N. Vego, “Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice”, Originally published 2007, U.S. Naval War
College, VIII-8
hierarchy would be a much simpler solution than the current alternative. With proper command
guidance and mission command authorities, the additional capability to decentralize subordinate
functional commanders or subordinate ADOC commanders would ensure the sustained
continuance of the command structure in an attack on an ADOC.
Lastly, this construct will still execute mission command through the relevant levels of
war. Theater strategic ADOC commanders will prioritize theater and functional objectives from
which commanders will be delegated authority to command and control forces within their lane
and echelon regardless of Service. Separate operational level ADOCs will execute command
authority over their specified geographic area of operation or mission. However, they would still
be designated a supported/supporting role of another geographic or functional objective by the
theater level ADOC commander
Alternative Solution
There are some thoughts that the current Joint construct will be sufficient to generate
force advantages, once the Services have implemented their capability and technology
upgrades.12 However, simply implementing increased data capabilities, system interoperability
will not enable All-Domain operations. Defense policy analyst Andrew Krepinevich said that "A
military revolution occurs when the application of new technologies into a significant number of
military systems combines with innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptation in
12
Priebe, Miranda, Douglas C. Ligor, Bruce McClintock, Michael Spirtas, Karen Schwindt, Caitlin Lee, Ashley L.
Rhoades, Derek Eaton, Quentin E. Hodgson, and Bryan Rooney, Multiple Dilemmas: Challenges and Options for AllDomain Command and Control. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA381-1.html. Pg. 84
a way that fundamentally alters the character and conduct of conflict." 13 In keeping with this
theory, the All-Domain Operations environment that the US DoD seeks will not come to fruition
without adapting the C2 structure to accompany the introduction of new technologies. The
integration of AI, advanced networks, and big data in concert into the current Joint architecture
will undoubtedly improve our effectiveness and speed. But this will still leave seams between
domains that must be bridged to combat the growing threats effectively. This would leave a
bottleneck at the strategic theater level of war, where we primarily see joint communication and
control.
Within the past five years, each Service or domain has had network programs to
link capabilities within their distinctive domains, and many are still ongoing. The Navy has
Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA), Army has the Integrated Tactical
Network (ITN), Airforce has the Air Force Network (AFNet) and the Combat Information
Transport System (CITS). Each one working to connect service capabilities to domain
architecture to achieve objectives according to their schemes of maneuvers. However, the
emerging character of conflict involving Information, Space, and long-range fires capabilities
have all but eliminated the boundaries of war. This, coupled with distributed operations and the
stated need to create a multiple dilemma environment for our adversaries, means that the US
must look to blur the traditional seams and stove-piped domain constructs.14 The proposed
ADOC construct is a way to do so. Implementing an ADOC at the needed level of war will
13
Krepinevich, Andrew F. "Cavalry to computer; the pattern of military revolutions." The
National Interest n37 (Fall 1994 n37): 30(13). General Reference Center Gold. Thomson
Gale. University of Florida. 19 Nov. 2006
14
Defense One Staff. 2021. “Defense One Radio, Ep. 89: JADC2, Explained.” Defense One. Defense One. March 31,
2021. https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/03/defense-one-radio-ep-89-jadc2-explained/173051/.
shorten the inter-domain coordination time and maintain an operational tempo that facilitates a
relative advantage against our enemies.
Conclusion
With the current innovation path, our status quo C2 construct will be overloaded by data
volume and inefficiencies, eventually becoming ineffective in a fast-paced conflict. New
Constructs embrace and adopt new technologies such as the ADOC to maintain an operational
advantage in the future. The Joint staff and services have begun initiatives to interconnect
domains and create ADO; Strategic Global Integration project Convergence (Army), Project
Overmatch (Navy/Marines), and Advanced Battle Management System (Airforce) encompasses
this overall effort. But at the center of all of them is how the ADO will establish Command and
Control. While this proposal is one way to do so, any new ideas must look at working in new
ways to clearly and successfully bring Service and domain capabilities together. They must
define how all domains can coordinate effectively to execute the required C2. Those definitions
must include the roles and authorities for commanders at all levels of war and how any different
constructs will interact when performing mission sets. And lastly, they need to describe what
program, platforms, and capabilities will be developed by each Service, how these will integrate
and complement C2 organization in the battlespace. New concepts will be tested and advanced
through experiments that will determine what C2 mechanisms and organizations are best suited
to rapidly employing capabilities across domain seams and facilitating dynamic and adaptive
operations.