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MODULE 2:
CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS (Art. 414)
TAKE NOTE: Things cannot be considered as property
when not capable of appropriation. However, under
certain conditions a person’s body may be a subject
to a contract like being a model.
(But onerous contract involving a human’s body is
contrary to public morals).
ARTICLE 414:
All things which are or may be the object of
May Rights be considered as Property?
appropriation are considered either:
(1) Immovable or real property; or
(2) Movable or personal property
Yes, as it is sometimes used to denote a to which
legal relations between persons can exist.
Thing vs. Property
Property as a right – Under Article 414, Property is the
thing that is the object of rights and not the “title” or
“right” itself.
Thing – any object that exists and satisfies some
human needs. Includes those already owned and
those to capable to be appropriated.
Property – ALREADY appropriated and in the
possession of man. – if not susceptible of
appropriation then it is not property.
The concept of thing is broader than the concept of
property because while property refers only to those
objects which are or may be the object of
appropriation, thing refers also to those which are
not or may not be the object of appropriation. IN
OTHER WORDS, thing is the genus while property is
the species.
Requisites or Characteristics of Property
Utility – the capacity to satisfy human needs. (FOOD,
SHELTER, CLOTHING, KNOWLEDGE, etc.)
Individuality – the quality of existing apart from any
other thing. Things which cannot exist by themselves
independently can only become property when
separated from its whole. (HUMAN BODY)
Appropriability – capability of being possessed.
(a) Common Things – not capable of
appropriation like sunlight, air and the
ocean.
Nonetheless,
capable
of
appropriation under certain conditions,
like air  oxygen, sunlight  electricity,
becoming property in law.
(b) A thing – may have no owner as it is not
yet appropriated like WILD animals,
treasures.
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Property can be an object (res) of rights. The
existence of a right presupposes the existence of an
object over which such right can be exercised. All
these rights, as meeting points between our needs
and the things which are destined to satisfy them,
must have a thing that would serve as their object.
These objects can either be acts of another person
or things.
Real rights vs. personal rights
Real Right – the power belonging to a person over a
specific thing, without a passive subject individually
determined against whom such right may be
exercised.
Personal Right – is the power of one person to
demand of another, as a definite passive subject,
the fulfillment of prestation to give, to do or not to
do.
REAL RIGHTS
A real right is
exercised over a
thing.
A real right has a
specific object or
refers to a specific
property.
A real right is
extinguished by the
destruction of the
object.
PERSONAL RIGHTS
A personal right is exercised
against another person, the
debtor.
A personal right affects all
present and future property
of the debtor.
Personal
rights
survive
destruction of the object.
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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Classification of Property: Real Property and
personal property (Article 414, NCC)
In GENERAL:
1. Immovable (real) and movable (personal)
property.
2. Tangible
(corporeal)
and
Intangible
(incorporeal) property; Like in money, the
value presented is intangible but the paper is
tangible.
3. Consumable and Non-consumable property
4. Fungible and Non-fungible property.
5. Property of public dominion and property of
private
ownership
Basis of classification – Based on the nature of the
thing itself, based on its mobility or immobility.
Importance of the classification
The classification of things into movables or
immovables is the most important in the law of
property. This is due to the fact that the condition of
property as movables or immovables affects all
property, such as acquisition, use, and loss, and
particularly such important aspects thereof as
prescription, registration, possession, etc., which are
governed by different provisions of law.
In private international law – immovables are
governed by the law of the country and movables
are governed by personal law of the owner.
In Criminal Law – Usurpation of property can only
affect real property. Robbery and Theft can be
committed against personal property.
In Contracts - only real property can be the subject
matter of real mortgage and antichresis, personal
property can be the subject matter of simple loan or
mutuum, voluntary deposit, pledge, and chattel
mortgage.
Mixed property or semi-movables
There are things that are strictly neither movables nor
immovables but partake of the nature of both. They
are thus called mixed, or the semi-movables.
Movables (machines, paintings) but rendered
immobilized by destination or through attachment to
immovables;
Immovables but are treated as movables because
they can be transplanted (plants) or dismantled or
moved (light materials) to another place without
impairing their substance.
Animals in animal houses which are classified as
immovables though transferable from place to
place or they can move by themselves.
In common law, a leasehold is regarded as
partaking partly of the nature of land and partly of
chattels and is, therefore, called a chattel real.
Real property comprises all rights over land with such
additions and exceptions as the law has seen fit to
establish. All other proprietary rights, whether, in rem
or in personam, pertain to the law of personal
property.
CASES
Laurel vs. Abrogar (G.R. No. 155076, January 13,
2009)
Laurel was charged with theft for allegedly taking
and PLDT’s international long-distance calls.
The business of providing telecommunication or
telephone service are personal property which can
be the object of theft under Art. 308 of the RPC.
Since PLDT does not own the said telephone calls,
then it could not validly claim that such telephone
calls were taken without its consent. What
constitutes Theft is the use of the PLDT's
communications facilities without PLDT's consent.
The theft lies in the unlawful taking of the telephone
services & businesses.
Generally, transactions involving real property must
be recorded in the Registry of Property to affect third
persons. (see Arts. 708-711.) This is not required with
respect to personal property except in the case of
chattel mortgage. (Art. 2140.)
Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co. (G.R. No. L11658, February 15, 1918)
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Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
CAF purchased from Strong Machinery Co. rice–
cleaning machines which CAF installed in one of its
buildings. As security for the purchase price, CAF
executed a chattel mortgage on the machines and
the building on which they had been installed. When
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CEF failed to pay, the registered mortgage was
foreclosed and Strong Machinery Co. purchased the
building. This sale was annotated in the Chattel
Mortgage Registry. Later, Strong Machinery Co. also
purchased from Agricola the lot on which the
building was constructed. The sale wasn't registered
in the Registry of Property BUT Strong Machinery Co.
took possession of the building and the lot. However,
the same building had been previously purchased
by Leung Yee, a creditor of Agricola, at a sheriff's
sale despite his knowledge of the prior sale in favor
of Strong Machinery Co. The sale to Leung Yee was
registered in the Registry of Property.
Chattel Mortgage refers to the mortgage of Personal
Property executed in the manner and form
prescribed in the statute.
Since the building is REAL PROPERTY, its sale as
annotated in the Chattel Mortgage Registry cannot
be given the legal effect of registration in the
Registry of Real Property. The mere fact that the
parties decided to deal with the building as personal
property does not change its character as real
property.
Since Leung Yee purchased the property despite
knowledge of the previous purchase of the same by
Strong Machinery Co., it follows that Leung Yee was
not a purchaser in good faith.
“One who purchases real estate with knowledge of
a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim
that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as
against the true owner of the land or of an interest
therein. The same rule must be applied to one who
has knowledge of facts which should have put him
upon such inquiry and investigation as might be
necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the
title of his vendor.”
Following the rule on possessory rights provided in
Art. 1473, Strong Machinery Co. has a better right to
the property since it first purchased the same ahead
of Leung Yee, the latter not being a purchaser in
good faith.
Prudential Bank vs. Panis (G.R. 50008, August 31,
1988)
Spouses Magcale secured a loan from Prudential
Bank. To secure payment, they executed a real
estate mortgage over a residential building. The
mortgage included also the right to occupy the lot
and the information about the sales patent applied
for by the spouses for the lot to which the building
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stood. After securing the first loan, the spouses
secured another from the same bank. To secure
payment, another real estate mortgage was
executed over the same properties. The Secretary of
Agriculture then issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent
over the land which was later on mortgaged to the
bank. The spouses then failed to pay for the loan and
the REM was extrajudicially foreclosed and sold in
public auction despite opposition from the spouses.
The respondent court held that the REM was null and
void.
May a valid REM be constituted on the building
erected on the belonging to another?
A real estate mortgage can be constituted on the
building erected on the land belonging to another.
The inclusion of building distinct and separate from
the land in the Civil Code can only mean that the
building itself is an immovable property. While it is
true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes in
the absence of stipulation of the improvements
thereon, buildings, still a building in itself may be
mortgaged by itself apart from the land on which it
is built. Such a mortgage would still be considered as
a REM for the building would still be considered as
immovable property even if dealt with separately
and apart from the land. The original mortgage on
the building and right to occupancy of the land was
executed before the issuance of the sales patent
and before the government was divested of title to
the land. Under the foregoing, it is evident that the
mortgage executed by private respondent on his
own building was a valid mortgage. As to the
second mortgage, it was done after the sales patent
was issued and thus prohibits pertinent provisions of
the Public Land Act.
EXTRA NOTES:
In this case, the pivotal issue is whether or not a valid
REM can be constituted on the building erected on
the land belonging to another. Ans: YES
It has been held that the inclusion of building
separate and distinct from the land, in said provision
of law can only mean that a building by is an
immovable property.
Thus, while it is true that a mortgage of land
necessarily includes, in the absence of stipulation of
the improvements thereon, buildings, still a building
by itself may be mortgaged apart from the land on
which it has been built. Such a mortgage would still
be a REM for the building would still be considered
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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immovable property even if dealt with separately
and apart from the land.
and creditors who had sufficient notice of such
stipulation.
People’s Bank and Trust Co. vs. Dahican Lumber Co.
(L-17500, May 16, 1967)
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that DALCO
purchased the after-acquired properties to be
placed on, and be used in the development of its
lumber concession and agreed that THE SAME SHALL
BECOME IMMEDIATELY SUBJECT TO THE LIEN
CONSTITUTED BY THE QUESTIONED MORTGAGES.
Atlantic sold and assigned all its rights in a lumber
concession to DALCO. The full amount was not yet
paid by DALCO to Atlantic. To develop the
concession, DALCO obtained various loans from
People’s Bank and Trust Co. The loan was secured by
a REM over five parcels of land, including the
buildings and improvements thereon.
On the same date, DALCO executed a second
mortgage on the same properties in favor of AG and
P to secure payment of the unpaid balance of the
purchase price. Both deeds contained an identical
provision extending the mortgage lien to properties
to be SUBSEQUENTLY acquired by DALCO.
After which, DALCO then purchased various
machineries, equipment, spare parts and supplies
(collectively
referred
to
as
after-acquired
properties).
Pursuant to the provisions of the mortgage deeds,
the Bank requested DALCO to submit complete lists
of said properties but the latter failed to do so.
DALCO then passed a resolution to rescind the
alleged sales of AFTER-ACQUIRED properties by
Connel Bros. The bank thereafter, demanded for the
cancellation of such agreements.
When DALCO refused to do so, the Bank
commenced foreclosure proceedings, including the
AFTER-ACQUIRED properties. DALCO and CONNEL
contended that the mortgages were null and void
as regards to the AFTER ACQUIRED properties
because they were not registered in accordance wit
the Chattel Mortgage Law.
THE COURT EXPLAINED, that after aquired properties
were purchased in connection with and for the use
in the development of its lumber cession and must
have been deemed to be IMMOBALIZED.
Being such, it did not have to be registered a second
time as chattel mortgages in order to bind the after
acquired properties and affect third persons.
“Machinery placed on property by a tenant does
not become immobilized, yet, when the tenant
places it there pursuant to a contract that it shall
belong to the owner, it then becomes immobilized
as to that tenant and even as against his assignees
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Board of Assessment Appeals, Q.C. vs. Meralco (G.R.
No. L-15334, January 31, 1964)
Meralco’s electric power is generated by its hydroelectric plant located at Botocan Falls, Laguna and
is transmitted to the City of Manila by means of
electric transmission wires, running from the province
of Laguna to the said City. These electric transmission
wires which carry high voltage current, are fastened
to insulators attached on steel towers. Meralco has
constructed 40 of these steel towers within Quezon
City, on land belonging to it.
The QC City Assessor declared the MERALCO's steel
towers subject to real property tax. After the denial
of MERALCO's petition to cancel these declarations,
an appeal was taken to the QC Board of Assessment
Appeals, which required respondent to pay real
property tax on the said steel towers for the years
1952 to 1956. MERALCO paid the amount under
protest, and filed a petition for review in the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA) which rendered a decision
ordering the cancellation of the said tax
declarations and the refunding to MERALCO by the
QC City Treasurer.
The steel towers of an electric company do not
constitute real property for the purposes of real
property tax. Steel towers are not immovable
property under paragraph 1, 3 and 5 of Article 415
(NCC) because they do not constitute buildings or
constructions adhered to the soil. As per description,
given by the lower court, they are removable and
merely attached to a square metal frame by means
of bolts, which when unscrewed could easily be
dismantled and moved from place to place.
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
ARTICLE 415:
The following are immovable property:
(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all
kinds adhered to the soil;
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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(2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are
Definition of Immovable Property
attached to the land or form an integral part of an
immovable;
(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a
fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be
separated
therefrom
without
breaking
the
material or deterioration of the object;
(4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects for
use or ornamentation, placed in buildings or on
lands by the owner of the immovable in such a
manner that it reveals the intention to attach them
permanently to the tenements;
(5)
Machinery,
receptacles,
instruments
or
implements intended by the owner of the
tenement for an industry or works which may be
carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and
which tend directly to meet the needs of the said
industry or works;
(6) Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish
ponds or breeding places of similar nature, in case
Those in the aforementioned Provision of the New
Civil Code.
Classification of Real Properties
Immovables by nature – those which cannot be
moved from place to place, such as those
mentioned in No. 1 (with respect to land and roads)
and No. 8 in Art. 415 of the NCC.
Immovables by Incorporation – those which are
attached to an immovable in such a manner as to
form an integral part thereof, such as those
mentioned in Nos. 1 (except land and roads), 2, 3,
and 4 of Art. 415.
Immovables by destination – those which are
placed in an immovable for the use, exploitation or
perfection of such immovable, such as those
mentioned in Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9 of Art. 415
Immovables by analogy – or those which are
considered immovables by operation of law, such as
those mentioned in No. 10 of Art. 415
Kinds of Real Properties
their owner has placed them or preserves them
with the intention to have them permanently
attached to the land, and forming a permanent
part of it; the animals in these places are included;
(7) Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land;
(8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the
matter thereof forms part of the bed, and waters
either running or stagnant;
(9) Docks and structures which, though floating,
are intended by their nature and object to remain
at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast;
(10) Contracts for public works, and servitudes and
other real rights over immovable property.
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Buildings – to be considered real property, a building
must be more or less permanent in character.
Buildings that are merely superimposed over the
land and which are meant for immediate sale of
demolition are not immovable properties.
Constructions – Adherence of construction under
par. 1 may either be mediate or immediate. Even if
the construction is merely resting on a pillar for
instance, the thing is still real property. Steel posts of
electric companies that are merely bolted on
platforms on the side of streets are not considered
real property under par. 1 of Art. 415. A warehouse
made of strong materials may also qualify as
“construction”
Roads - Roads, whether public or private, are
immovable. They are considered integral parts of the
land. Examples of constructions are railroads. A wall
or fence is to be regarded as a construction by
incorporation; it is immovable as long as there is an
intent to attach it permanently although it is merely
made to rest on the land.
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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Trees – Trees are real properties if they are adhered
to the soil. While an uprooted tree is generally
considered a movable property when it constitutes
the natural product of the land, it does not lose its
character as an immovable if it is still integral part of
the forest.
Statues, reliefs, painting, etc. – The property involved
must be a statue, relief, painting or other objects for
use or ornamentation; the object must be placed in
a building or land; The object must be placed there
by the owner of the building or land; and the object
must be placed there in a manner that reveals the
intention to attach them permanently to the building
or land.
Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements –
Machinery, receptacle, instrument or implement are
placed in a building or a piece of land; The same
must have been placed there by the owner of the
building or the piece of land; The owner must have
been intended by the owner for an industry or work;
The industry or work must be carried on in the same
building or piece of land where the machinery and
the like were placed and the Machinery,
receptacle, instrument or implement must tend to
meet directly the needs of the industry or work.
Additional notes on machinery:
Machinery may be installed by the agent of the
owner BUT NOT by the tenant, usufructuary or any
other person having only temporary right unless such
person acted as an agent of the owner.
Exception: Tenant can be considered an agent if the
contract of lease provides that any machine
installed by the tenant on the leased premises shall
belong to the owner upon the expiration of the lease
without compensation.
Both Electric lines and communications cables, in
the strictest sense, are not directly adhered to the soil
but pass through posts, relays or landing stations, but
both may be classified under the term “machinery”
as real property under Art. 415 for the simple reason
that such pieces of equipment serve the owner’s
business or tend to meet the needs of his industry or
works that are on real estate.
Even objects in or on a body of water may be
classified as such, as “waters” is classified as an
immovable under Art. 415 (8).
Docks – Docks although they are floating are
expressly recognized as immovables. Even the
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garden, trees, living quarters of workers and
machineries in the platform are considered real
properties.
Real Rights – Real rights must be over real properties.
While there can be real rights over movables, the
same real rights are not real properties. A duly
registered Real Estate Mortgage is an encumbrance
that is a real right.
Estoppel – Parties to the contract are estopped from
claiming that an immovable like a building is real if
they treated the same in the contract as personal.
Like a house which is to be treated real, was
subjected to chattel mortgage.
Limitation: The agreement to treat real property as
personal does not bind innocent third persons.
The bank that is a mortgagee in a registered real
estate mortgage executed after the execution of a
previous chattel mortgage over the same property
which is a building is not bound by the chattel
mortgage; the bank is third person.
CASES
Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing and Finance,
Inc., G.R. No. 137705. August 22, 2000)
Petitioners contend that the machines that were
subject of the Writ of Seizure were placed in the
factory built on their own land. Indisputably, they
were essential and principal elements of their
chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each
of them was movable or personal property on its
own, all of them have become immobilized by
destination because they are essential and principal
elements in the industry. Petitioners argue that said
machines are real property pursuant to Art. 415 (5) of
the NCC and are not, therefore, the proper subjects
of a Writ of Seizure. However, the Lease Agreement
entered into by the petitioners provides that the
machines in question are to be considered as
personal property. Are the subject machines real
property as argued by the Petitioners?
Clearly, the petitioners are estopped from denying
the characterization of the subject machines as
personal property. Under the circumstances, they
are personal properties which are proper subjects to
the Writ of Seizure.
It should be stressed, however, that the Court’s
holding – that the machines should be deemed
personal property pursuant to the Lease Agreement
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– is good only insofar as the contracting parties are
concerned. Hence, while the parties are bound by
the Lease Agreement, third persons acting in good
faith are not affected by its stipulation characterizing
the subject machinery as personal.
In this case, David obtained a loan from Kim upon
the security of a chattel mortgage on a house
situated Tondo, Manila. When David defaulted, Uy
Kim foreclosed the mortgage and the house was
sold to Uy Kim.
Piansay vs. David (G.R. No. L-19468, October 30,
1964)
Thereafter, Uy Kim sold the house to Salvador
Piansay. In the meantime, Marcos Mangubat filed
an action for collection of loan against David. After
obtaining a judgment against David, the house was
levied upon at the instance of Mangubat. Piansay
assailed the right of Mangubat to levy upon
execution the house in question alleging that the
same belongs to him, he having bought it from Uy
Kim, who, in turn, acquired it at the auction sale held
in connection with the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the Chattel Mortgage constituted in her favor by
David. In ruling in favor of Mangubat, the court held
“regardless of the validity of a contract constituting
a chattel mortgage on a house, as between the
parties to said contract, the same cannot and does
not bind third persons, who are not privies to the
aforementioned contract or their privies. As a
consequence, the sale of the house in the
proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of said
chattel mortgage, is null and void insofar as
Mangubat is concerned, and did not confer upon
Mrs. Uy Kim, as buyer in said sale, any dominical right
in and to said house, so that she could not have
transmitted to her assignee, Piansay any such right
as against defendant Mangubat.
David and Mangubat – filed a case to nullify the
foreclosure of a chattel mortgage of a house
executed by David in favor of Plaintiff Uy which was
subsequently sold by the Uy to Piansay. They argued
that the chattel mortgage and its subsequent sale is
invalid because a house is not a personal property
but a real property.
Is the chattel mortgage and its subsequent sale valid
even if the Subject house is real property?
In this case, while it is true that said document was
correspondingly registered in the Chattel Mortgage
Register of Rizal, this Act produced no effect
whatsoever for where the interest conveyed is in the
nature of real property, the registration of the
document in the registry of chattels is merely a futile
act. Thus, the registration of the chattel mortgage of
a building of strong materials produced no effect as
far as the building is concerned At any rate,
regardless of the validity of a contract constituting a
chattel mortgage on a house, as between the
parties to said, the same cannot and does not bind
third persons, who are not parties to the
aforementioned contract or their privies a
consequence, the sale of the house in question in
the proceedings for the extra-judicial foreclosure of
said chattel mortgage, is null and void insofar as
defendant Mangubat is concerned, and did not
confer upon Mrs. Uy Kim, as buyer in said sale, any
dominical right in and to said house (De la Riva vs.
Ah Yee, 60 Phil. 800), so that she could not have
transmitted to her assignee, plaintiff Piansay, any
such right as against defendant Mangubat. In short,
plaintiffs have no cause of action against the
defendants herein.
A mortgage creditor who purchases real properties
at an extra-judicial foreclosure sale thereof by virtue
of a chattel mortgage constituted in his favor, which
mortgage has been declared null and void with
respect to said real properties acquires no right
thereto by virtue of said sale.
Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Board of Assessment
Appeals (G.R. No. L-50466 May 31, 1982)
Caltex filed a case to nullify the decision of
Respondent that its machineries and equipment
installed on gasoline stations located on leased
lands are real properties which are subject to realty
tax. They Argued and invoked the rule that
machinery which is movable in its nature only
becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the
owner of the property or plant but not when so
placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person
having only a temporary right, unless such person
acted as the agent of the owner
The Supreme Court ruled that the machineries and
equipment of Caltex are real properties which are
subject to realty tax.
DIGEST VERSION 2:
In this case, we hold that the said equipment and
machinery, as appurtenances to the gas station
building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is
subject to realty tax) and which fixtures are
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necessary to the operation of the gas station, for
without them the gas station would be useless, and
which have been attached or affixed permanently
to the gas station site or embedded therein, are
taxable improvements and machinery within the
meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real
Property Tax Code.
The rule invoked by Petitioner is an interpretation of
paragraph 5 of Article 415 of the Civil Code
regarding machinery that becomes real property by
destination. In the Davao Saw Mills case the question
was whether the machinery mounted on
foundations of cement and installed by the lessee on
leased land should be regarded as real property for
purposes of execution of a judgment against the
lessee. The sheriff treated the machinery as personal
property. This Court sustained the sheriff's action.
(Compare with Machinery & Engineering Supplies,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 96 Phil. 70, where in a
replevin case machinery was treated as realty).
Here, the question is whether the gas station
equipment and machinery permanently affixed by
Caltex to its gas station and pavement (which are
indubitably taxable realty) should be subject to the
realty tax. This question is different from the issue
raised in the Davao Saw Mill case.
Philippine Refining Co., Inc. vs. Aboitiz & Co. (G.R. No.
L-41506, March 25, 1935)
Philippine Refining Co filed a case for the foreclosure
of the chattel mortgage of vessels of Aboitiz and Co
for the latter was judicially declared insolvent
Aboitiz argued that the chattel mortgages of vessels
cannot be foreclosed for such are defective since
there was no affidavit of good faith appended to
the mortgage and recorded therewith.
is not only necessary for a chattel mortgage of a
vessel to be noted in the registry of the register of
deeds, but it is essential that a record of documents
affecting the title to a vessel be entered in the
record of the Collector of Customs at the port of
entry.
The Chattel Mortgage Law in its section 5, in
describing what shall be deemed sufficient to
constitute a good chattel mortgage, includes the
requirement of an affidavit of good faith appended
to the mortgage and recorded therewith. The
absence of the affidavit vitiates a mortgage as
against creditors and subsequent encumbrancers.
As a consequence, a chattel mortgage of a vessel
wherein the affidavit of good faith required by the
Chattel Mortgage Law is lacking, is unenforceable
against third persons.
MOVABLE PROPERTY
ARTICLE 416:
The following things are deemed to be personal
property:
(1) Those movables susceptible of appropriation
which are not included in the preceding article;
(2) Real property which by any special provision
of law is considered as personalty;
(3) Forces of nature which are brought under
control by science; and
(4) In general, all things which can be transported
from place to place without impairment of the real
property to which they are fixed.
Can the chattel mortgages of vessels be foreclosed?
No as they are considered Personal property under
the civil law.
Similarly, under the common law, vessels are
personal property although occasionally referred to
as a peculiar kind of personal property. Since the
term "personal property" includes vessels, they are
subject to mortgage agreeably to the provisions of
the Chattel Mortgage Law. Indeed, it has heretofore
been accepted without discussion that a mortgage
on a vessel is in nature a chattel mortgage. The only
difference between a chattel mortgage of a vessel
and a chattel mortgage of other personalty is that it
8|USC Law in the time of COVID-19
ARTICLE 417:
The following are also considered as personal
property:
(1) Obligations and actions which have for their
object movables or demandable sums; and
(2) Shares of stock of agricultural, commercial and
industrial entities, although they may have real
estate.
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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Test to Determine If Property is Immovable:
Test by Exclusion which is contemplated under par 1
of Article 416 – to determine if the property is
included in enumeration in Art. 415. If the property is
included in Article 415, the property is real and if the
property is not one of those enumerated under
Article 415 then the property is personal or movable.
Test by Description under which a property is
considered personal if, by its nature, it can be
moved from place to place and can eb removed
from the real property without impairment of the real
property. However, the Test by Exclusion is the
SUPERIOR test.
Par 2 of Art. 416 provides for those real property
considered as personal by special provision of Law.
Growing Crops are considered immovable under Art
415 (2) but are personalty under the Chattel
Mortgagee Law and thus, making it an object of
chattel mortgage.
Electricity, the same as gas, is a valuable article of
merchandise, bought and sold like other personal
property and is capable of appropriation by another
Obligations and Actions are really personal rights,
they having a definite passive subject. The word
“property’’ in law, has acquired a meaning which
goes beyond material objects and comprehends
also rights.
generally like other chattel mortgages as to its
requisites and validity.
Vessels are subject to mortgage agreeably to the
provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law.
Sibal vs. Valdez (G.R. No. L-26278, August 4, 1927)
Sibal filed a case to exercise his right of redemption
of his sugar canes which was sold in public auction
of Valdez.
Valdez argued that the sugar cane in question had
the nature of personal property and was not,
therefore, subject to redemption. Further, he argued
that by reason of the preliminary injunction he was
unable to gather the sugar cane, sugar-cane shoots
(puntas de cana dulce) palay in said parcels of land,
representing a loss to him of P8,375.20 and that, in
addition thereto, he suffered damages amounting
to P3,458.56
Is the Sugar Cane a personal property (therefore not
subject to redemption)?
The sugar cane is a personal property and was not,
therefore, subject to redemption. Plaintiff is also
ordered to pay Defendant P8,900.80. The appeal is
dismissed.
Philippine Refining Co., Inc. vs. Aboitiz & Co., supra
The first question raised by the appeal is, whether the
sugar cane in question is personal or real property. It
is contended that sugar cane comes under the
classification of real property as "ungathered
products" in paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil
Code. Said paragraph 2 of article 334 enumerates
as real property the following: Trees, plants, and
ungathered products, WHILE they are annexed to the
land or form an integral part of any immovable
property." That article, however, has received in
recent years an interpretation by the Tribunal
Supremo de España, which holds that, under certain
conditions, growing crops may be considered as
personal property.
Vessels are considered personal property under the
civil law and the common law.
Manresa admits that growing crops are sometimes
considered and treated as personal property.
The only difference between a chattel mortgage of
a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personality
is that it is not now necessary for a chattel mortgage
of a vessel to be noted in the registry of the register
of deeds, but it is essential that a record of
documents affecting the title to a vessel be entered
in the record of the Collector of Customs at the port
of entry. Otherwise a mortgage on a vessel is
Growing crops raised by yearly labor and cultivation
are considered personal property
9|USC Law in the time of COVID-19
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
Shares of stocks are personal property, and,
therefore, can be the subject matter of a chattel
mortgage. So are the certificates themselves
evidencing the ownership of the shares.
The interest in a business must not be confused with
interest in the real property of a business entity which
interest is also real property.
CASES
For the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law,
"ungathered products" have the nature of personal
property.
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Laurel vs. Abrogar, supra.1
Since the passage of the Revised Penal Code on
December 8, 1930, the term "personal property" has
had a generally accepted definition in civil law. In
Article 335 of the Civil Code of Spain, "personal
property" is defined as "anything susceptible of
appropriation and not included in the foregoing
chapter (not real property)." Thus, the term "personal
property" in the Revised Penal Code should be
interpreted in the context of the Civil Code provisions
in accordance with the rule on statutory
construction that where words have been long used
in a technical sense and have been judicially
construed to have a certain meaning, and have
been adopted by the legislature as having a certain
meaning prior to a particular statute, in which they
are used, the words used in such statute should be
construed according to the sense in which they
have been previously used. In fact, this Court used
the Civil Code definition of "personal property" in
interpreting the theft provision of the penal code in
United States v. Carlos.
In this case, the act of conducting ISR operations by
illegally connecting various equipment or apparatus
to private respondent PLDT’s telephone system,
through which petitioner is able to resell or re-route
international long-distance calls using respondent
PLDT’s facilities constitutes all three acts of
subtraction mentioned above.
As can be clearly gleaned from the above
disquisitions, petitioner’s acts constitute theft of
respondent PLDT’s business and service, committed
by means of the unlawful use of the latter’s facilities.
In this regard, the Amended Information
inaccurately describes the offense by making it
appear that what petitioner took were the
international long-distance telephone calls, rather
than respondent PLDT’s business.
Consumable/Non-consumables, Fungibles/Nonfungibles
ARTICLE 418:
Movable property is either consumable or nonconsumable. To the first class belong those
movables which cannot be used in a manner
appropriate to their nature without their being
consumed; to the second class belong all the
others.
ARTICLE 418:
Movable property is either consumable or nonconsumable. To the first class belong those
movables which cannot be used in a manner
appropriate to their nature without their being
consumed; to the second class belong all the
others.
A thing is fungible if it can be substituted by another
thing of the same kind, quantity and quality, and
non-fungible if not replaceable in such equivalents.
Consumables are those that cannot be used in a
manner appropriate to their nature without their
being consumed.
Non-consumables belong all the others.
Rice is consumable because it cannot be used
according to its nature without being consumed. A
statue is non-consumable because it can be used
according to its nature without being consumed.
Fungible Things:
The terms “Consumable” and “Fungible” are
sometimes
used
interchangeably.
However,
“Fungibles” are those properties that can be
replaced by another property of the same kind,
quantity and quality. One unit of property is
1
In the case of Laurel v. Abrogar, the Supreme Court ruled that business of
providing telecommunication or telephone service is likewise personal
property which can be the object of theft under Art. 308 of the RPC. In this
case, it was held that the act of conducting International Simple Resale
operations by illegally connecting various equipment or apparatus to PLDT’s
telephone system, through which a person or entity is able to resell or re-route
10 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
international long distance calls using PLDT’s facilities but without passing
through the toll center of PLDT’s international gateway facility, is theft. The
only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the
RPC is that it be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of asportation
– defined as carrying away.
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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equivalent to or is deemed to be the equivalent of
and replaceable with another unit of the same kind,
quantity and quality. The fungibility of property is a
question of intent of parties.
The term “Non-fungibles” is just the opposite of
fungibles.
A sack of rice of a particular kind and quality is
fungible because it is equivalent to and can be
replaced by another sack of rice of the same kind
and quality. Rice is by its nature consumable but if
the parties intend a loan of rice, for display or
exhibition, it is in that sense nonfungible because the
identical rice need be returned. If the rice is loaned
for consumption, it is not only consumable but also
fungible. The obligation to deliver the picture that is
hanging in a specific room involves non-fungible
thing.
PROPERTY IN RELATION TO THE PERSON TO WHOM IT
BELONGS
This article talks about public dominion and not
public ownership.
1. Public dominion does not import the idea of
ownership. Property of public dominion is not owned
by the State but simply under its jurisdiction and
administration for everyone’s enjoyment.
2. Purpose is intended for the common and public
welfare and so it cannot be subject of appropriation
3. Relations of the State to this property arises from
the fact that the State is the juridical representative
of the social group.
Property of Public Dominion
Property of public dominion is not owned by the
State but simply under its jurisdiction and
administration for the collective enjoyment of all the
people of the State of which it is the territorial
sovereign.
Classification of Property according to Ownership
ARTICLE 419:
Property is either of public dominion or of private
ownership.
1. Public Dominion – Owned by the state and
intended for public use. (not for the use of the
state as a juridical person)
2. Private ownership – Owned by the state in its
private capacity and private persons either
individually or collectively. (FOREIGNERS are
not allowed to become owners of lands
except if the acquisition is through hereditary
succession).
Presumption - If it cannot be determined if the
property is of private ownership or of public
dominion, the property is presumed to be of public
dominion.
The Regalian Doctrine - under which all lands of the
public domain pertain to the State and the latter is
the foundation of any asserted right to ownership in
land. Accordingly, the State presumably owns all
lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
the private ownership.
DOMINION V. OWNERSHIP
11 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
Article 420:
The following things are property of public
dominion:
1-Those intended for public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
2-Those which belong to the State, without being
for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national
wealth.
Kinds
For public Use (examples: Roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads)
For public service (examples: government offices) –
Now for public use but intended for some specific
public service
For the Development of the National Wealth
(examples: Forest land, minerals)
Even if the government collects toll fees, the road is
still “intended for public use’’ if anyone can use the
road under the same terms and conditions as the
rest of the public.
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Those of similar character
Public streams, river channels, river beds, creeks and
esteros.
1. Accretions to the shores of the sea by action of the
water
2. Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay)
above them
3. Lands that disappeared into the sea by natural
erosion due to the ebb and flow of the tide
4. Canals constructed on private lands
5. Foreshore lands when the sea moved toward and
estate and the tide invaded it
6. Lot on which stairways were built for the use of
people as passageway to the highway
TAKE NOTE: The mere reclamation of certain
foreshore land and submerged areas by a
government agency does not convert these
inalienable natural resources of the state into
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
There must be a law or presidential proclamation
officially classifying these Art. 420 41 reclaimed lands
as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or
concession.
Characteristics
Property of public dominion is outside the commerce
of man and hence it:
1. Cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise
be the subject matter of contracts;
2. Cannot be acquired by prescription against
the state;
3. Is not subject to attachment or execution;
4. Exempt from real estate tax and are exempt
from sale at public auction;
5. Cannot be burdened by any voluntary
easement.
A property of public dominion cannot be registered
under the land registration law and be subject of a
Torrens Title.
CASES:
Harty vs. Municipality of Victoria (G. R. No. 5013,
March 11, 1909)
land of Defendant known as the public plaza. He
argued that it had acquired said parcel of land
more than sixty years previously, and had
continued to possess the same ever since up to
1901, in which year the defendant Municipality of
Victoria unlawfully and forcibly seized the said
property, claiming to be entitled thereto and
retaining it to the present day.
Municipality of Victoria argued that the Plaza
described in No. 4 of the complaint was founded
when the sitio denominated as Canarum, a barrio
of town of Tarlac, was converted into a civil town
in 1855; that the parish of Tarlac was established
many years after the civil town, and that
therefore, it neither had then, nor has now any title
to the PLAZA claimed, and that the complaint
injured the defendant (Municipality), and for this
reason the latter prayed that the judgment be
entered absolving the defendant of the
complaint with costs and damages against the
plaintiff.
ISSUE: Is Harty the Real Owner of the Public Plaza?
RULING:
In this case, the very beginning, the large tract of
land that surrounds the church and the parish
house was known as a public plaza, destined to
the use of all the residents of the recently founded
town; public performances and religious
processions were held thereon without hindrance
either on the part of the local authorities or of the
curate of said town.
Even though all the remaining space of land
which now forms the great plaza of the town of
Victoria had been owned by the said Tañedo, it
must be presumed that he waived his right thereto
for the benefit of the townspeople, since from the
creation or establishment of the town, down to the
present day, all the residents, including the curate
of said town, have enjoyed the free use of said
plaza; it has not been satisfactorily shown that the
municipality or the principales of the town of
Victoria had donated the whole of said land to
the curate of Victoria or to the Catholic Church,
as alleged, nor could it have been so donated, it
being a public plaza destined to public use and
was not of private ownership, or patrimony of the
town of Victoria, or of the Province of Tarlac. It
should be noted that, among other things, plazas
destined to the public use are not subject to
prescription.
Harty, as Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
filed a case claiming that ownership of a parcel of
12 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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Manila International Airport Authority vs. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006)
divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or
voting shares.
MIAA filed an original petition for prohibition and
injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order. The petition sought to
restrain the Respondent City of Parañaque from
imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and
auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and
Buildings.
No one can dispute that properties of public
dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil
Code, like "roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State," are owned by
the State. The term "ports" includes seaports and
airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings
constitute a "port" constructed by the State. Under
Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport
Lands and Buildings are properties of public
dominion and thus owned by the State or the
Republic of the Philippines.
They further argued that, that it cannot claim
ownership over these properties since the real
owner of the Airport Lands and Buildings is the
Republic of the Philippines. The MIAA Charter
mandates MIAA to devote the Airport Lands and
Buildings for the benefit of the general public.
Since the Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted
to public use and public service, the ownership of
these properties remains with the State. The Airport
Lands and Buildings are thus inalienable and are
not subject to real estate tax by local
governments.
They also argued that Section 21 of the MIAA
Charter specifically exempts MIAA from the
payment of real estate tax. MIAA insists that it is
also exempt from real estate tax under Section 234
of the Local Government Code because the
Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the
Republic. To justify the exemption, MIAA invokes
the principle that the government cannot tax
itself. MIAA points out that the reason for tax
exemption of public property is that its taxation
would not inure to any public advantage, since in
such a case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor.
City of Paranaque argued and cited Mactan
International Airport v. Marcos where we held that
the Local Government Code has withdrawn the
exemption from real estate tax granted to
international airports. Respondents further argue
that since MIAA has already paid some of the real
estate tax assessments, it is now estopped from
claiming that the Airport Lands and Buildings are
exempt from real estate tax.
Are the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA
exempt from real estate tax under existing laws?
Yes. In this case, there is no dispute that a
government-owned or controlled corporation is
not exempt from real estate tax. However, MIAA is
not
a
government-owned
or
controlled
corporation. A government-owned or controlled
corporation must be "organized as a stock or nonstock corporation." MIAA is not organized as a
stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock
corporation because it has no capital stock
13 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to
public use because they are used by the public
for international and domestic travel and
transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects
terminal fees and other charges from the public
does not remove the character of the Airport
Lands and Buildings as properties for public use.
Properties of public dominion, being for public use,
are not subject to levy, encumbrance or
disposition through public or private sale. Any
encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale
of any property of public dominion is void for
being contrary to public policy. Essential public
services will stop if properties of public dominion
are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and
auction sale.
EXTRA NOTES ON MIAA case:
The collection of toll and other fees does not
convert the property of public dominion into
patrimonial properties. Example: Airport lands and
buildings are properties of public dominion and
the collection of terminal fees for their use does
not make them private properties.
Bishop of Calbayog vs. Director of Lands (G.R. No.
L-23481 June 29, 1972)
Bishop of Calbayog filed a case for the registration
of Lots 1, 2, and 3. The first two lots situated in the
poblacion of Catarman, Samar, and the third in
barrio Cawayan. They argued that they are in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession, since the Spanish Regime of such lots.
The Director of Lands argued and filed an
opposition to the application with respect to the
three lots, 1953, and the Municipality of Catarman
with respect to Lot 2 during the survey thereof.
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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Are the Applicants entitled to registration on Lots?
In this case, the conclusion that may be drawn
from the evidence on record is that Lot 2, called
the "town plaza" by oppositor, is a public plaza
and that Nalazon St., traversing Lot I and Lot 2, is a
public thoroughfare and should therefore be
excluded from the application for registration filed
by the Church.
Admittedly Nalazon St. was originally merely a trail
used by the parishioners in going to and from the
church. But since 1910, when it was opened and
improved as a public thoroughfare by the
municipality, it had been continuously used as
such by the townspeople of Catarman without
objection from the Church authorities.
With respect to Lot 2, there is no evidence that
either the Church or the municipality exercised
clear acts of ownership or of exclusive possession
over this lot. It is true that there were witnesses who
testified that around the turn of the century there
were camarins inside this lot used as stables for the
horses and cows owned by a Fr. Troquillo. But
these witnesses likewise testified that this lot had
been used also as a playground as well as a
school garden by the students of the public school
located on the adjoining municipal lot. This lot still
serves as a public playground up to the present.
The municipality also makes use of this lot during
town fiestas by constructing temporary sheds
which are rented to itinerant vendors.
The municipality, as has been heretofore noted,
was declared in default with respect to Lot 1, and
the default was never lifted.
Thus, Applicant is entitled to registration only to
Lots 1 and 3. Lot 2, being a public plaza, and
Nalazon St., traversing Lot 1 and Lot 2, being a
public thoroughfare, are not subject to
registration.
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Director of Lands
(G.R. No. 150824, February 4, 2008)
Land Bank of the Philippines argued that the
mortgage of the land should remain valid
because it is a mortgagee in good faith and that
it also invoked the non-impairment of contract
clause. They further argued that TCT No. T-57348 is
a Torrens title which has no written indications of
defect or vice affecting the ownership of Lourdes
Farms, Inc. Hence, it posits that it was not and
could not have been required to explore or go
14 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
beyond what the title indicates or to search for
defects not indicated in it.
The herein respondents Director of Lands filed a
case for the cancellation of title/patent and
reversion of the land covered by OCT No. P-2823
into the mass of public domain. The complaint, as
amended, was filed against Bugayong and other
present owners of the land, such as Lourdes Farms,
Inc. and the latter's mortgagee, petitioner LBP.
Lastly, they Argued that at the time Sales Patent
No. 4576 was issued to Bugayong, the land it
covered was still within the forest zone; it was
released as alienable and disposable land only on
March 25, 1981.
Is the mortgage of the land to Land Bank valid?
Forest lands cannot be owned by private persons.
It is not registerable whether the title is a Spanish
title or a Torrens title. It is well settled that a
certificate of title is void when it covers property of
public domain classified as forest or timber or
mineral land. Any title issued covering nondisposable lots even in the hands of an alleged
innocent purchaser for value shall be cancelled.
In this case, the mortgagor, Lourdes Farms, Inc.
from which LBP supposedly obtained its alleged
interest has never been the owner of the
mortgaged land. Acquisition of the subject land
by Lourdes Farms, Inc. is legally impossible as the
land was released as alienable and disposable
only on March 25, 1981. Even at present, no one
could have possessed the same under a claim of
ownership for the period of thirty (30) years
required under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended. Hence, LBP acquired
no rights over the land.
The constitutional guarantee of non-impairment
of contracts may not likewise be used by LBP to
validate its interest over the land as mortgagee.
The State's restraint upon the right to have an
interest or ownership over forest lands does not
violate the constitutional guarantee of nonimpairment of contracts. Said restraint is a valid
exercise of the police power of the State.
Alienation of Public Agricultural Lands
REGALIAN DOCTRINE
GR: All natural resources belong to the state and are
not subject to alienation with the exception of public
agricultural lands.
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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The State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land. Unless public land is shown to
have been reclassified and alienated by the State to
a private person, it remains part of the inalienable
public domain.
XPN: Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified and alienated by the State to a private
person.
1. Before public agricultural lands are made
available for disposition (under the Public Land Act
[C.A. No. 141] as amended.), they are property of
public dominion for the development of the national
wealth.
After being made so available, they become
patrimonial or private property of the State; and
when acquired by private individuals, they become
private property.
2. In the hands of a government agency tasked and
authorized to dispose of alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, these lands are still
public, not private lands. Only when qualified parties
(i.e., individuals; see Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. 2.)
acquire these lands will they become private lands.
PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
421. All other property of the State, which is not of
the character stated in the preceding article, is
patrimonial property.
Characteristics:
1. May be acquired by private individuals or juridical
persons through prescription
2. May be the object of an ordinary contract.
CONVERSION OF PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMAIN TO
PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
422. Property of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
Property of the National government
Not self-executory. There must be a formal
declaration by the executive or legislative dept that
the property is no longer needed for public use.
All lands of the public domain belong to the State
and lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State.
Occupation in the concept of owner, no matter
how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title.
Property of political subdivisions
In case of provinces, cities, etc. the conversion must
be authorized by law.
Cases in point:
PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY, definition.
Ignacio v. Director of Lands
The property of the State owned by it in its private or
proprietary capacity (not for public use, service or
development of national wealth).
FACTS
Ignacio filed for the registration of a parcel of land
(mangrove). He later amended his application
that he owned the subject lot by right of
accretion. The subject lot adjoins a parcel owned
by Ignacio which he had acquired from the
Government by virtue of a free patent title in 1936.
The subject lot was formed by accretion and
alluvial deposits caused by the action of the
Manila Bay which borders it on the southwest.
The State has the same rights as private individuals
where they can dispose of the property in
accordance to laws regulations.
Rationale: It exists for the State to support the
attainment of its economic ends, giving it the means
to exist.
4. Cemeteries
Ignacio claims that he had been occupying the
subject lot since 1935, planting it with api-api trees,
and that his possession thereof had been
continuous, adverse and public for a period of
twenty years until said possession was disturbed by
Valeriano. Moreover, granting that the subject lot
was part of the public domain, the same is no
longer necessary for any public use or purpose,
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Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
Examples:
1. Incomes or rents of the State
2. Property acquired in execution and tax sales
3. Property donated to the government
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and therefore, became disposable and available
for private ownership.
Issue: W/N the subject lot forms part of the public
domain
All other property possessed by any of them is
patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code,
without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
Ruling: Yes, the subject lot is part of the public
domain. Since it is part of the public domain, it is
not subject to prescription.
CLASSIFICATIONS
Until a formal declaration on the part of the
Government, through the executive department
or the Legislature, to the effect that the land in
question is no longer needed for coast guard
service, for public use or for special industries, they
continue to be part of the public domain, not
available for private appropriation or ownership.
Since the subject lot is part of the public domain,
it is not subject to ordinary prescription. The
occupation or material possession of any land
formed upon the shore by accretion, is illegal
without previous permission from the proper
authorities (Government).
2. Patrimonial property – others not enumerated as
property for public use, including those used for
public service.
In this case, there was no formal declaration on
the part of the Government, through the
executive department or the Legislature, that the
subject lot no longer formed part of the public
domain. Thus, although Ignacio was in possession
of the lot for over twenty years and introduced
improvements thereto, the possession is illegal.
Property that forms part of the public domain is
outside of the sphere of commerce and is
intended for public uses and for the benefit of
those who live nearby.
3. Calapan Lumber v. Community Sawmill
Under the Revised Administrative Code, the
provincial board was held without power to grant
exclusive use of an unfinished provincial road for
twenty years to a lumber company in consideration
of the latter completing the construction thereof,
much less declare it private property.
PROPERTIES OF POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS
423. The property of provinces, cities and
municipalities is divided into property for public
use and patrimonial property.
Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces,
cities, and municipalities, consist of the provincial
roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares,
fountains, public waters, promenades, and public
works for public service paid for by said provinces,
cities, or municipalities.
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1. For public use – provincial roads, city streets,
fountains, public waters, etc.
Note:
Articles 423 and 424 speak of property for public use,
indicating that property for public service are
patrimonial. On the other hand, property of the State
intended for public service, without being for public
use, are property of public dominion.
Political subdivisions cannot register as their own any
part of the public domain, unless it is first shown that
a grant thereof has been made or possession has
been enjoyed during the period necessary to
establish a presumption of ownership.
PROPERTY OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
425. Property of private ownership, besides the
patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities
and municipalities consists of all property
belonging to private persons, either individually or
collectively.
They refer to all property belonging to private
persons either individually or collectively and those
belonging to the State and any of its political
subdivisions which are patrimonial in nature.
Collective ownership includes co-ownership and
ownership by corporations, partnerships, and other
juridical entities which are allowed under the law to
acquire and possess property of all kinds.
1.A possessory information inscribed in the Registry of
Property showing possession by their occupants and
their
predecessors
since
time
immemorial
demonstrates prima facie that the possessors of the
land to which it refers are the owners thereof.
2. The fact that a road has been kept in repair by a
private enterprise and the government has not
contributed to the cost of its construction or
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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maintenance, tends strongly to
contention that it is a private way
support
the
TRANSCRIPT of ATTY’s DISCUSSION (Property in
Relation to PERSONS to Whom it belongs)
So, based on your readings, there are so many ways
of classifying property. Another way of classifying
property is in relation to the person with whom it
belongs. So, your Article 419 tells us that property
maybe of PUBLIC DOMINION, or of private
ownership.
When we say public dominion, this refers to
properties that are owned by the state in its
sovereign capacity. It is used for PUBLIC PURPOSES.
When we say it is of private character, or properties
of private ownership, it can actually refer to 2 kinds.
(A) Those owned by the state but on its private
capacity (or what we call patrimonial properties.
(B) Or those owned by private individuals, either
individually or collectively.
WHAT IS THE RULE ON LAND OWNERSHIP?
The rule is that, the property is presumed to be State
Property in the absence of any showing to the
contrary. This is the general rule. If you claiming
ownership over a particular parcel of land then you
must show proof that it is yours. If there is no proof
then the general rule is that, it belongs to the state. It
is property of public dominion.
ARTICLE 420 gives us the different types of properties
of public dominion.
FIRST, those intended for public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others
of similar character.
NOW, when you examine this type or property of
public dominion, clearly it is intended for public use.
SECOND, those which belong to the State, without
being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
So basically, there are 3 types of properties of public
dominion.
(A) for public use, (b) for public service, (c) for the
development of national wealth.
Now, supposing, there is a public road, and it
collects toll fees, will that convert such road to one
of private ownership, because it is collecting fees?
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No. Just because it is collecting fees it does not make
it private property. The same as with our airports. We
pay terminal fees, your sea ports, you pay terminal
fees, but it does not change its character as it is still
a property of public dominion.
Now, can private individuals own property of public
dominion?
The answer is No. Because a property of public
dominion is outside the commerce of men. Can you
acquire it through acquisitive prescription?
Can you say that “I was not aware that this is a
property of public dominion as in fact this belongs to
my Grandfather, and I did not know that this is a
forest land, and we have been living in this property
for 30 years”. Can you acquire a property of public
dominion like a forest land thru acquisitive
prescription?
No. It cannot be acquired through acquisitive
prescription.
What is another characteristic of a property of public
dominion? It cannot also be encumbered. It being
outside the commerce of men it cannot be
encumbered. In other words, if a city or the state will
borrow money, they cannot offer your airport, they
cannot offer public roads as security for the loan
because they cannot be encumbered.
And, they cannot also be burdened of easements.
We will also be learning about easements towards
the end of the schedule.
And of course, they cannot be registered under the
Land Registration Law.
What if, for example there was a mistake? It was
mistakenly registered, like forest land being
mistakenly registered under PD 1529? Can the state
get it back?
Yes, through reversion. Because again, if the
property is of public dominion, it will belong to the
state. It cannot be owned privately.
Read the case of Harty vs. Municipality – there the
issue was, who is the owner of this subject parcel of
land that surrounds the parish church of this
particular town. Is it owned by the state? Or is it
owned by the church?
Here the SC said that the church was unable to
prove that the land belonged to them. What did we
say about land ownership? The presumption is, it
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belongs to the state. If you cannot show proof, and
there being no clear proof that it belonged to the
church, then it has been used for time immemorial
as a public plaza (a plaza is a property for public use)
then clearly, it belongs to the state.
In the case of MIAA, please read this also, there are
so many important principles there. Here, the
question was, can MIAA be taxed by the local
government? Because the local government was
taxing it, was levying real property taxes.
The SC said that again, an airport is a property of
public dominion and owned by the state. It is for
public use. When you look at article 420, it says in
there, “ports”. The term ports clearly include airports,
-- seaports and airports. Just because you are
collecting fees, it does not make it into private
property, it is still a property of public dominion, and
you cannot tax the state. The property cannot be
encumbered – and outside the commerce man. If
you tax a property belonging to the state, it is like the
state getting money from one pocket and
transferring it to another. It’s useless. You do not tax
a property owned by the state, unless there is a clear
law allowing it, but there is no such law. PLEASE READ
MIAA. There is a discussion there that it is also not a
GOCC because a GOCC may be taxed, but MIAA
is not a GOCC, but rather, a government
instrumentality with corporate powers to perform
governmental functions. So, it being a property of
public dominion, it cannot be taxed, and cannot be
encumbered. This is the case of MIAA.
So, read also the Bishop of Calbayog vs. Director of
Lands case. Make sure to complete the assignment.
Again, in your modules.
Now, the case of land bank of the Philippines versus
director of Lands. So, you have Lourdes farms –
borrowed money from LBP or land bank, and
secured this loan with a parcel of land. Now, it was
found that the subject parcel of land was in fact a
forest land. So the question now is, can LBP being the
mortgagee and foreclosing the property because
Lourdes farms was not able to pay the loan, can LBP
say that it was a mortgagee in good faith and
therefore, must be able to still own that property,
which turned out to be a forest land?
The SC said no. They cannot acquire a property of
public dominion. Therefore, the property must be
reverted back to the State. Again, please read the
case.
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What is Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Naguit all
about? This is actually a case that also now deals
with PD 1529. So, you have Naguit, filing a petition for
original registration of a parcel of land, as to be
discussed in your LTD because it deals with section
14 par 1 of PD 1529 in connection with ownership of
lands under property. So, you have NAGUIT, claiming
ownership and wants to register it Under PD 1529.
But, SOLGEN opposed the registration saying that,
the land is not alienable and disposable. Meaning,
the land is not agricultural. Section 14 of PD 1529
requires that, the land must be alienable and
disposable for it to be registered under PD 1529.
Section 14 par 1 of pd 1529 says that for you to
register a parcel of land, the property in question
must be alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and the applicants by themselves or
through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious
possession and occupation and that such possession
is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier.
Now, as I mentioned, SOLGEN opposed this. The
SOLGEN said that this land is not alienable and
disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
So now comes the question as to how do we
interpret Sec 14, Par 1? Do we need to say under
such section that the land being alienable and
disposable, must it be alienable and disposable
since June 12, 1945 or earlier or does the requirement
on it reckoning from June 12, 1945 or earlier – does it
refer only to possession?
The supreme court said that it should only refer to
possession and not that it is alienable or disposable
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The SC said that the
requirement that it is alienable or disposable land of
the public domain, that is a requirement still, granting
that such land is alienable and disposable at the
time of filing of the petition.
So, for so long as the land is already alienable and
disposable at the time of filing of the petition and
that is fine. But of course, you have to prove, that the
possession date back since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
So, you have to prove possession.
The SC said that in this case NAGUIT was able to
prove possession of the property since 1945, and it
was established by the existence of 50 – 60 yr old
trees at the time NAGUIT purchased the property, as
well as Tax Declarations also of NAGUIT’s
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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predecessor in interest Urbano, and the TAX
DECLERATION dated as far back as 1945.
THERE MUST BE AN EXECUTIVE DECLARATION or
possibly LEGISLATIVE DECLARATION.
So, there was a good indicia of possession, and so all
the requirements are present AT THE TIME OF THE
FILING OF THE PETITION, IT WAS ALREADY ALIENABLE
AND DISPOSABLE, yes it might not have been
alienable or disposable since June 12, 1945 but that
is not required by the law. What is required since
June 12, 1945 or earlier is proof of possession, to
which NAGUIT was able to prove in this case.
Please Read Ignacio vs. Director of Lands (G.R. No.
L-12958, May 30, 1960)
Now, I mentioned earlier that, the state also has
another type of property, apart from property of
public dominion. You have patrimonial property. This
is article 421. All other property of the State, which is
not of the character stated in the preceding article,
is patrimonial property.
So we have here, the provincial board of oriental
Mindoro, granting Calapan lumber to undertake a
completion of a public road – because the province
have no funds anymore so they granted a private (a
lumber) company to finish it and they granted a
concession to Calapan Lumber the ownership of the
road but there was a condition that it must be
donated back to the province. Later on, the
province withdrew the resolution.
What are examples of patrimonial property?
You have incomes or rents of the state, vacant lands
without known owner or possessor. Property
escheated to the state, property acquired in
execution and tax sales, property donated to the
government, waterworks, water houses, markets,
cemeteries and friar lands.
Now, earlier, I asked, can you acquire a property of
public dominion through acquisitive prescription?
We said No, you cannot. How about patrimonial
property? Can we acquire patrimonial property
through acquisitive prescription?
The answer is Yes. Because this time, the property is
owned by the state in its private capacity. It is not for
public use, not for public purposes (for service
rather), and not for the development of national
wealth.
Can a property of public dominion be converted
into patrimonial property? The answer is also Yes.
That is article 422 which says, Property of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or
for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State.
Now the question is, is this self-executing? Most
authors say that no, this is not self-executing. This
means that, there must still be a formal declaration
of the executive or the legislative declaring that this
property, previously a property of public dominion
(because it is for public use, public service, or
development of national wealth), the state is
already withdrawing it from public use, public
service, or the development of national wealth.
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Make sure to read all the cases that I have assigned
– it will make you understand the principles clearly.
Drop your questions in the think tank.
Let me discuss a little bit the case of Calapan Lumber
Co. vs. Community Sawmill.
Now, the main issue here is, can you convert a public
road into a private road just because a private entity
is now spending for it? The answer is No. The only time
that you can convert a property of public dominion
into a private road is only when there is an executive
or legislative declaration that you are withdrawing it
from public use, public service or for the
development of national wealth.
Just because someone else is paying for it, even a
private individual or entity, does not convert it into a
private property.
Now, for 423, so you have the state, and the state is
divided into different units. You have provinces, cities
and municipalities. Can they also own property? Yes.
This is 423. The property of provinces, cities, and
municipalities (just like the state in general) is also
divided into property for public use and patrimonial
property. So, it is the same.
Article 424 - Property for public use, in the provinces,
cities, and municipalities, consist of the provincial
roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares,
fountains, public waters, promenades, and public
works for public service paid for by said provinces,
cities, or municipalities.
All others that do not fall under those, will also now
become patrimonial property of those local
government units.
Article 425 - Property of private ownership, besides
the patrimonial property of the State, provinces,
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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cities, and municipalities, consists of all property
belonging to private persons, either individually or
collectively.
So, this is what I said earlier. That your property may
be classified depending on ownership. It can be
property of public dominion or property of private
ownership. Property of public dominion, those
owned by the state in its sovereign capacity, and
private ownership, can be subclassified into
patrimonial property owned by the state in its private
capacity, and the other classification are those
private properties owned by private individuals,
whether singly or collectively.
MODULE 3:
OWNERSHIP
Ownership in General
Ownership is the right to enjoy, dispose, and recover
a thing without further limitations than those
established by law or the will of the owner. In one
case, it was defined as the independent and general
power of a person over a thing for purposes
recognized by law and within the limits established
thereby.
Kinds of Ownership
1. Beneficial Ownership is which recognized by
law and capable of being enforced in court,
as distinct from legal ownership and control.
Beneficial Ownership used in 2 ways.
Beneficial Use – right to enjoy but the title is with
another person.
(a) to indicate the interest of a beneficiary in
trust property
(b) to refer to power of a shareholder of a
corporation to buy or sell, the shares though
the shareholder is not registered in the
corporation’s books as the owner.
2. Legal Ownership and Control
3. Naked Ownership - the enjoyment of all the
benefits and privileges of ownership, as
against the bare title to property
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RIGHTS OF AN OWNER
Article 428:
The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a
thing, without other limitations than those
established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the
holder and possessor of the thing in order to
recover it.
1. Right to Possess – Right to hold a thing or
enjoy a right. May be exercised in one’s own
name or in that of another. (ownership is
different from possession. The right to possess
does not always include the right to use).
2. Rights to Use and Enjoy - This right necessarily
includes the right to transform and “the right
to exclude any person from the enjoyment
and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he
may use such force as may be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of his property.
3. Right to receive the fruits and accessories The ownership of property gives the right by
accession to everything which is produced
thereby, or which is incorporated or
attached thereto, either naturally or
artificially. Thus, accession includes the right
to the fruits and the right to the accessories
of a thing.
4. Right to consume - means the right of the
owner to consume a thing by its use, the use
that extinguishes, that consumes things
which are consumable.
5. Right to Dispose or Alienate - An owner may
dispose of or alienate his property either
totally, as in sale and donation, or partially,
without transferring ownership, encumber as
in lease, pledge, and mortgage. In the
second case, the owner creates an
encumbrance on his property that restricts
the use or transfer of the same.
6. Right to recover possession and or ownership
- The owner has a right of action against the
holder and possessor of the thing (or right) in
order to recover it. The true owner must resort
to judicial process for the recovery of the
property.
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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CASES
Perez v. Evite (G.R. No. L-16003
[G.R. No. L-39350. October 29, 1975.]
CENONA OLEGO v. Judge ALFREDO REBUENO
FACTS:
Facts:
The Court of First Instance of Batangas rendered a
judgment dismissing the complaint of the plaintiffs
(action to quiet title) and declaring defendants
owners of the land in question which judgement
was affirmed by the CA.
Thereafter the defendants ordered its execution to
which the plaintiffs averred saying that the
decision merely declared the defendants owners
of the property and did not order the delivery
therefore putting them at variance with the
decision which is null and void.
In support of this, the plaintiffs relied on two cases
which stated that ownership is different from
possession. A person may be declared owner, but
he may not be entitled to possession; that a
declaration of ownership does not mean a
direction to surrender it to him.
Issue:
WON it is proper for defendants to vacate the
property.
RULING:
Where the ownership of a property was decided in
a judgment, the delivery of possession should be
considered included in the decision where the
defeated party’s claim to the possession is based
on his claim of ownership or such party has not
shown any right to possess the property
independently of his claim of ownership which
was rejected. Indeed, it would be defeating the
ends of justice to require a successful litigant
adjudged to be the owner of a property to
institute another action for the purpose of
obtaining possession of the property. It would
foster unnecessary and expensive litigations and
result in multiplicity of suits, which our judicial
system abhors.
Pedro D. Servano sued Cenona Olego, for a
declaration as to the legality of his title to a
residential lot, alleging that he acquired by
purchase the said lot, which he had possessed en
concepto de dueño, but his possession was
disturbed by Cenona who claimed to be the
owner of the lot.
Olego, on the other hand, claimed that she was
the "absolute owner and lawful possessor of the
land." After several postponements, the parties
submitted a compromise whereby Olego
admitted Servano’s ownership of the lot and "that
judgment be rendered declaring" him the owner
thereof.
The decision approving the compromise
agreement did not order Olego to vacate the lot,
although it followed the usual pattern of
judgments in such cases: ordering the parties to
comply with the terms of the compromise.
No further proceedings was had in the case for
more than ten years after the alleged
compromise settlement was concluded, until
Servano sued Olego for contempt on the ground
that the latter prevented the former from having
the peaceful use and enjoyment of the land, and
that she branded the decision as "fake" and "not
worthy of respect."
Olego moved to dismiss the contempt charge on
the grounds (a) that the amicable settlement was
obtained through fraud and misrepresentation,
(b) that the execution of the judgment was barred
by statute of limitations, and (c) that the Court had
lost jurisdiction over the case.
Issue:
Does Cenona Olego’s acknowledgment of
Servano’s ownership include the obligation to
deliver the possession of the land to him?
RULING:
The general rule is that the adjudication of
ownership does not include the possession of the
property (Talens v. Garcia, 87 Phil. 173; Jabon v.
Alo, 91 Phil. 750).
The exception is that the adjudication of
ownership would include the delivery of
possession if the defeated party has not shown
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any right to possess the land independently of his
claim of ownership which was rejected (Perez and
Alcantara v. Evite and Manigbas, 111 Phil. 564).
But then in such a case a writ of execution would
be required if the defeated party does not
surrender the possession of the property. The
owner should enforce his right to possess the land
(as an incident of his ownership) by asking for a
writ of execution within five years from the finality
of the decision. Thereafter, he could enforce his
right by action within the next five years (Sec. 6,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court; Art. 1144, Civil Code).
Atty. Servano did not enforce his right to possess
the land within the ten-year period. To enforce the
judgment in his favor by means of a contempt
proceeding after the expiration of the ten-year
period would be a circumvention of the statute of
limitations. What the law prohibits directly should
not be allowed to be done indirectly.
Considering that the judgment against Cenona
Olego is no longer enforceable and taking into
account her imputation that the compromise, on
which the said judgment was based, was vitiated
by fraud and mistake, the said judgment cannot
possibly affect her possession of the disputed land.
Nor can it destroy the legal presumption in her
favor that as possessor of the land in the concept
of owner she has a just title thereto (Art. 541, Civil
Code).
Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 138842
FACTS:
Maximinoo Nazareno Sr. and Aurea Poblete were
husband and wife. Upon their death, they were
survived by their children, Natividad, Romeo,Jose,
Pacifico and Maximinoo Jr.
In the course of the proceedings, Romeo
discovered that his parents executed several
deeds of sale conveying a number of real
properties in favor of his sister, Natividad. This
involved 6 lots in QC one of which is a lot occupied
by Romeo and his wife. This lot was later sold by
Natividad to Maximino Jr.
Romeo filed on behalf of the estate of Maximino
Sr., a case for annulment of sale with damages
against Natividad and Maximino Jr. on the ground
that both sales were void for lack of consideration.
Trial Court rendered judgement declaring the
nullity of the deed of sale. CA modified RTC,
ordered lots cancelled and restored to the estate
of Maximino Sr.
ISSUE: WoN the CA was correct in ordering the lots
cancelled and in restoring them to the estate of
Maximino Sr.
RULING:
YES. It appears that it was the practice in the
Nazareno family to make simulated transfers of
ownership of real properties to their children in
order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes.
Facts & circumstances indicate badges of a
simulated sale w/c make the sale void & of no
effect. Therefore, Natividad never acquired
ownership over the property because the Deed of
Sale in her favor is also void for being without
consideration and title to Lot 3 cannot be issued in
her name.
An exception, however, exists where the actual
possessor has shown a valid right over the property
enforceable even against the owner thereof.
(Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, 121 SCAD 678, 326
SCRA 338 [2000].)--> mao ni sa book ba but wa jud
koy nabasahan inani na principle sa case itself.
Ngano niii hahaha
Maximinoo Jr. and Natividad are petitioners in this
case, while Romeo and his wife are respondents.
Deceased spouses Nazareno acquired properties
in Quezon City and in Cavite . It is the ownership
of some of these properties that is in question in this
case.
It appears that after the death of Maximino Sr..
Romeo filed an intestate and was appointed
administrator of his father’s estate.
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Flancia vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 146997
Legal principle: An owner does not only have the
right to enjoy the thing but also the right to dispose
of it.
Facts: Oakland Development Resources obtained
a loan from Genato. As security for the loan,
Oakland executed a mortgage over the house
and lot that Spouses Flancia had purchased from
them.
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Spouses Flancia allege that they purchased the
disputed house and lot from Oakland. Shortly
after, Spouses Flancia received notice that all the
property formerly owned by Oakland, including
their house and lot, was being foreclosed. They
now allege that the mortgage over their house
and lot was null and void because Art. 2085 of the
Civil Code requires that the mortgagor (Oakland)
must be the absolute owner of the mortgaged
property. In this case, since they were now the
rightful owners of the property, it can no longer be
subject to a mortgage.
Genato alleges that the Contract to Sell between
the Spouses Flancia and Oakland was not a
mutual promise to buy and sell. In a Contract to
Sell, ownership is retained by the seller, regardless
of delivery and is not to pass until full payment of
the price.
Issue: W/N the registered mortgage constituted
over the property was valid
Ruling: Yes, the registered mortgage in favor of
Genato over the disputed property was valid.
Thus, Genato has the right to foreclose the
property.
In a contract of sale, the vendor loses ownership
over the property and cannot recover it unless
and until the contract is resolved or rescinded. In
a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor
until full payment of the price.
Ownership is the independent and general power
of a person over a thing for purposes recognized
by law and within the limits established thereby.
According to Art. 428 of the Civil Code, this means
that the owner has the right to enjoy and dispose
of a thing, without other limitations than those
established by law.
property were expressly withheld by Oakland. All
that was granted to the Spouses Flancia by the
"occupancy permit" was the right to possess it.
Thus, when the disputed property was mortgaged
to Genato, Oakland still retained absolute
ownership over the property by virtue of the
contract to sell.
In this case, because Oakland retained all the
foregoing rights as owner of the property, it was
entitled absolutely to mortgage it to Genato.
Vda. De Bautista vs. Marcos, ET AL.
(G.R. No. L-17072
FACTS:
On May 17, 1954, defendant here [Marcos]
obtained a loan in the amount of 2k from Marcelo
Vda. De Bautista. To secure, conveyed to the
latter by way of mortgage a 2-hectare portion of
an unregistered parcel of land in Tarlac.
Next, on July 1956, mortgagor Marcos filed, in
behalf of the heirs of her deceased mother
Cainglet, an application for the issuance of a free
patent over the land in question.
Free patent then was issued to them on January
25, 1957. The land was registered in their names
under OCT on Feb. 22, 1957.
The debt remained unpaid up to 1959.
Foreclosure was filed on March 4, 1959.
Issue:
w/n the mortgage is valid.
An owner does not only have the right to enjoy the
thing but also the right to dispose of it (jus
disponendi). The right to enjoy necessarily includes
the right to use and enjoy (jus utendi) and the right
to consume the thing by its use (jus abutendi). The
right to dispose is the power of the owner to
alienate, encumber, transform and even destroy
the thing owned.
Ruling:
As it is an essential requisite for the validity of a
mortgage that the mortgagor be the absolute
owner of the thing mortgaged (Art. 2085, N.C.C.),
and it appearing that the mortgage was
constituted before the issuance of the patent to
the mortgagor, the mortgage in question is void
and ineffective.
The contract between Spouses Flancia and
Oakland was a Contract to Sell. The intention of
Oakland to not to transfer ownership to Spouses
Flancia until full payment of the purchase price
was very clear. Acts of ownership over the
The defendant was not yet the owner of the land
during the mortgage, making the land part of the
public domain. In addition, the issuance of the
free patent does not validate or cure defect of
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the deed of mortgage under the doctrine of
estoppels.
Even if the mortgage was executed after the
issuance of the patent, and was foreclosed within
the 5-year prohibitive period under the Public
Land law, the mortgage will still be invalid not
because the mortgagor is not the owner but
because of the prohibition under the said law. The
law provides that a land cannot be alienated or
disposed of within 5 years after the issuance of the
free patent for the property to remain with the
grantee and his family.
Doctrine of SELF – HELP
The right of the owner to use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual
or threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of his property.
Take note: Self-defense in RPC also extends to a
man’s
rights
including
right
to
property.
Article 419:
The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the
right to exclude any person from the enjoyment
and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use
such force as may be reasonably necessary to
repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
Requisites:
(1) There must be actual or threatened physical
invasion or usurpation.
(2) Reasonable force is exercised.
(3) The force is exercised by the owner or lawful
possessor.
(4) There is no delay in the exercise. (at the time
of an actual or threatened dispossession)
CASE
German Management & Services vs. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 76216
TCT. On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose
executed a special power of attorney authorizing
petitioner German Management Services to
develop their property covered by TCT No. 50023
into a residential subdivision.
They then found out that the part of the property
was occupied by private respondents and twenty
other persons whom they advised to vacate the
premises. The petitioners refused and continued
developing the property.
The respondents then filed an action for forcible
entry against petitioner, alleging that they are
mountainside farmers of Rizal and members of
CCFA, and have occupied their farm holdings for
12 – 15 years prior to PD 27.
They also contended that the petitioners in this
case forcibly removed and destroyed the barbed
wire fence enclosing their farm holdings without
notice and bulldozing the rice, corn, fruit bearing
trees and other crops of private respondents by
means of force.
ISSUE:
WoN the doctrine of self-help is appreciable in this
case/
RULING:
The doctrine of self-help, which the petitioners
were using to justify their actions, are not
applicable in the case because it can only be
exercised at the time of actual or threatened
dispossession which is absent in the case at bar (in
fact they are the ones who are threatening to
remove the respondents with the use of force.)
Article 536 basically tells us that the owner or a
person who has a better right over the land must
resort to judicial means to recover the property
from another person who possesses the land.
ENCLOSING and FENCING
Article 430:
Every owner may enclose or fence his land or
tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead
hedges, or by any other means without detriment
to servitudes constituted thereon.
FACTS:
Spouses Jose, residents from the USA are owners of
a land in Inarawan, Rizal which is covered by a
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The owner can exclude others by erecting fences in
the boundaries subject to limitations like those
brought about by easement.
Jurisprudence: The owner of a fishpond is always
under obligation to respect the statutory easement
of waters charged upon his property and had no
right to close the passage and outlet of the waters
flowing from the land and the lake.
SURFACE RIGHTS of LAND OWNERS
The owner of a land is entitled to exercise his right to
the surface, the space above it and the sub-surface.
Art. 437:
The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its
surface and of everything under it, and he can
construct thereon any works or make any
plantations and excavations which he may deem
proper, without detriment to servitudes and
subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot
complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial
navigation.
Extent
The landowner’s right extends to such height or
depth where it is possible for them to obtain some
benefit or employment, and it is extinguished
beyond such limit as there would be no more interest
protected by law.
Limitations
(1) Reasonable
requirements
of
aerial
navigation;
(2) Limitations imposed under the Regalian
Doctrine and mining laws.
It was held in Republic vs. CA L-43938, that registered
landowners may even be ousted of ownership and
possession o their properties in the event the latter
are reclassified as mineral lands because real
properties are characteristically indivisible. For the
loss sustained by such owners, they are entitled to
just compensation under the Mining Laws or in
Appropriate expropriation proceedings.
Republic vs. CA L-43938
FACTS:
These cases arose from the application for
registration of a parcel of land filed on February
11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and
25 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin
and Eduardo. The land was divided into 9 lots and
according to the application of registration of the
parcel of land, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la
Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya
Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964.
The application was separately opposed by
Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big
Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and
all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry
Development, as to lots 1-9.
In support of the application, both Balbalio and
Alberto testified that they had acquired the
subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio
claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father
shortly after the Liberation.
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June
Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it
on September 22, 1934, by the successors-ininterest of James Kelly, who located the claim in
September 1909 and recorded it on October 14,
1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had
been in actual, continuous and exclusive
possession of the land in concept of owner, as
evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits
of annual assessment, its geological mappings,
geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its
payment of taxes on the land.
Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of
Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia
mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds
on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January
2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of
Baguio. These claims were purchased from these
locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has
since then been in open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced
by its annual assessment work on the claims, such
as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual
taxes thereon.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also
interposed its objection, arguing that the land
sought to be registered was covered by the
Central
Cordillera
Forest
Reserve
under
Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929.
Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not
subject to alienation under the Constitutions of
1935 and 1973.
Trial Court: The trial court denied the application,
holding that the applicants had failed to prove
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their claim of possession and ownership of the land
sought to be registered.
they had the right to transfer the same, as they
did, to Benguet and Atok.
CA: Reversed the trial court. Affirmed the surface
rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the
same time reserving the sub-surface rights of
Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
The Court feels that the rights over the land are
indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification
must be categorical; the land must be either
completely mineral or completely agricultural. In
the instant case, as already observed, the land
which was originally classified as forest land
ceased to be so and became mineral — and
completely mineral — once the mining claims
were perfected. As long as mining operations
were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it
did not cease to be so and become agricultural,
even if only partly so, because it was enclosed
with a fence and was cultivated by those who
were unlawfully occupying the surface.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine
which, as its name implies, is intended for the
benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule
simply reserves to the State all minerals that may
be found in public and even private land devoted
to “agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential
or (for) any purpose other than mining.” Thus, if a
person is the owner of agricultural land in which
minerals are discovered, his ownership of such
land does not give him the right to extract or utilize
the said minerals without the permission of the
State to which such minerals belong.
Basis of CA Ruling: The Court of Appeals justified
this by saying there is “no conflict of interest”
between the owners of the surface rights and the
owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather
doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the
owner of piece of land has rights not only to its
surface but also to everything underneath and the
airspace above it up to a reasonable height.
Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as
mineral underneath and agricultural on the
surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is
also difficult to understand, especially in its
practical application.
Issue: Whether respondent court’s decision, i.e.
“the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land
while at the same time reserving the sub-surface
rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining
claim,” is correct.
Held: No. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok
have exclusive rights to the property in question by
virtue of their respective mining claims which they
validly acquired before the 1935 Constitution
prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public
domain except agricultural lands, subject to
vested rights existing at the time of its adoption.
The land was not and could not have been
transferred to the private respondents by virtue of
acquisitive prescription. The use of the land could
not be shared simultaneously by them and the
mining companies for agricultural and mineral
purposes. It is true that the subject property was
considered forest land and included in the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair
the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at
that time. Such rights were not affected either by
the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution
against the alienation of all lands of the public
domain except those agricultural in nature for this
was made subject to existing rights. The perfection
of the mining claim converted the property to
mineral land and under the laws then in force
removed it from the public domain. By such act,
the locators acquired exclusive rights over the
land, against even the government, without need
of any further act such as the purchase of the land
or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land
had become the private property of the locators,
26 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court
is in supposing that the rights over the land could
be used for both mining and non-mining purposes
simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that
once minerals are discovered in the land,
whatever the use to which it is being devoted at
the time, such use may be discontinued by the
State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in
the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land
is thus converted to mineral land and may not be
used by any private party, including the registered
owner thereof, for any other purpose that will
impede the mining operations to be undertaken
therein. For the loss sustained by such owner, he is
of course entitled to just compensation under the
Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation
proceedings.
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D. RECOVERY OF POSSESSION AND/OR OWNERSHIP
1. ACTIONS AVAILABLE TO OWNER
Note: The form of actions available to the owner to
judicially recover his property depends on whether
the property is real or personal, and whether the
purpose of the action is merely to recover possession
or ownership, or both.
RECOVERY OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
A. Replevin
action or provisional remedy where the
complainant prays for the recovery of
possession of the personal property (also
applicable to immovable property by
destination e.g. machineries, eqpt).
both a form of principal remedy (i.e., to
regain possession) and of a provisional
remedy that would allow the plaintiff to
retain the thing wrongfully detained by
another pendent lite
The right to recover movable property (Rule
60, ROC)
Requirements (sec. 2 of Rule 60, ROC):
 state in an affidavit that he is the
owner of the property claimed,
particularly describing it, or that
he is entitled to the possession
thereof and that it is “wrongfully
detained by the adverse party.’’
 The applicant for the writ of
replevin has the burden of
proving his ownership and/or right
of possession over the property in
question.
Important: Wrongful detention by the
defendant of the property sought in the
action must be satisfactorily established.
Not applicable to:
A. Movables distrained or taken for a tax
assessment or a fine pursuant to the law
B. Those under a writ of execution or
preliminary attachment
C. Those under custodia legis
Prescription period:
27 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
4 or 8 years from the time the possession
thereof is lost, in accordance with Article
1132.
Arabesque Industrial Phils v. CA
G.R. No. 101431
FACTS:
Arabesque Industrial Philippines, Inc. (AIPI),
bought at public auction the tugboat MT Rover of
respondent PNOC Dockyard and Engineering
Corp. (PDEC). Despite notice by PDEC that it was
imposing lay day charges if the boat was not
removed from its premises by 9 May 1989, AIPI did
not remove the boat; instead, it engaged PDEC to
repair it. The bill for the repair rose to P1,681,896.30.
Petitioner AIPI paid only P329,115.00 leaving a
balance of P1,352,781.30. After evaluating the
repair work, AIPI expressed willingness to pay only
an additional of P494,593.60.
On 7 September 1990, AIPI received from Atty.
Rosendo Chaves, a notary public, a notice for the
sale of the boat at public auction pursuant to Arts.
2241 (5), 2243 and 2212 of the Civil Code. Under
Art. 2241, credits for the marking, repairs,
safekeeping or preservation of personal property,
on the movable-made, repaired, kept or
possessed constitutes fifth in the order of
preference (par. 5), such credit being considered
under Art. 2245 as a mortgage or lien within the
purview of the legal provisions governing
insolvency. From the time of judicial demand, the
interest due on such credit shall earn legal interest
according to Art. 2212 although the obligation
may be silent on this point.ch
Subsequently, AIPI sued PDEC and Notary Public
Rosendo Chaves for the nullification of the public
auction sale contending that Arts. 2241 and 2243
of the Civil Code cited by PDEC were not
applicable as AIPI was not yet judicially declared
insolvent, AIPI praying for immediate injunction of
the auction sale and for PDEC to accept
P494,593.60 as reasonable and complete
payment of its services.
Upon AIPI’s posting a bond of P1 Million, and
considering the answer of PDEC admitting the
ownership of the boat by AIPI, the court granted
the replevin and ordered the return of the boat to
AIPI. Thereafter, the sheriffs enforcing the writ of
replevin took possession of the boat and delivered
the same to AIPI.
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Then, the Court of Appeals set aside the writ of
replevin and directed the return of the boat to
PDEC on the ground that the chattel was not
wrongfully detained but possessed in the exercise
of PDEC of a mechanic’s lien for its unpaid repair
bills.
AIPI now questions the decision of the Court of
Appeals. It argues that respondent appellate
court should not have set aside the writ of replevin
because they (AIPI) are the owner of the boat and
that the right of an owner is superior to that of a
mere lien holder. AIPI contends that lay day fees
are incurred by it for continuous possession of the
boat by PDEC, and that AIPI should not be made
to suffer for PDEC’s refusal to release the boat.
ISSUES:
whether the writ of replevin was properly issued by
the court a quo
RULING:
Court of Appeals correctly set aside the writ of
replevin. Such writ cannot be properly directed
against a lawful possessor of a chattel, and the
matter of ownership as well as incurring of
additional lay day fees by the continued
detention of the boat by PDEC is therefore
inconsequential. The requirement of posting a
counterbond to reacquire possession of the
chattel subject of the writ, does not apply in the
case at bar because that presupposes a previous
valid writ. In this case, however, the chattel was
ordered returned to PDEC because the writ was
improperly issued. Definitely, it was not issued on
the basis of the non-posting of a counterbond.
Chua vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 79021
FACTS:
Judge Lauro V. Francisco RTC Cebu branch 13,
after examining 2Lt. Dennis P. Canoy and two (2)
other witnesses, issued a search warrant directing
the immediate search of the premises of R.R.
Construction located at M.J. Cuenco Avenue,
Cebu City, and the seizure of an Isuzu dump truck
with plate number GAP-175. At twelve noon of the
same date, respondent Canoy seized the
aforesaid vehicle and took custody thereof.
28 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
RTC cebu branch 8: ACTION FOR Replevin/Sum of
Money for the recovery of possession of the same
Isuzu dump truck was filed by petitioner against
respondent Canoy and one "John Doe"
Petitioner questioned the validity of the search
warrant and the subsequent seizure of the subject
vehicle on the strength of the aforesaid search
warrant.
Writ of REPLEVIN – ISSUED by Judge Canares of RTC
Branch 8
Canoy filed a motion for the dismissal of the
complaint and for the quashal of the writ of
replevin – DENIED.
Meanwhile, a Carnapping case pending
preliminary investigation before the Fiscal’s office
was provisionally dismissed upon motion of Romeo
Chua with the following reservation: "without
prejudice to its reopening once the issue of
ownership is resolved"
CA reversed RTC decision, ordered the dismissal of
the Replevin action and directed that possession
of the subject vehicle be restored to Canoy
SC – certiorari.
ISSUE: WON RTC erred when it ordered the transfer
of possession of the property seized to petitioner
when the latter filed the action for replevin
HELD: YES.
1.
It is a basic tenet of civil procedure that
replevin will not lie for property in custodia legis. A
thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has
been and is subjected to the official custody of a
judicial executive officer in pursuance of his
execution of a legal writ. The reason posited for
this principle is that if it was otherwise, there would
be interference with the possession before the
function of the law had been performed as to the
process under which the property was taken. Thus,
a defendant in an execution or attachment
cannot replevy goods in the possession of an
officer under a valid process, although after the
levy is discharged, an action to recover possession
will lie.
2.
Construing the Pagkalinawan case
together with the Vlasons case, we rule that where
personal property is seized under a search warrant
and there is reason to believe that the seizure will
not anymore be followed by the filing of a criminal
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and there are conflicting claims over the seized
property, the proper remedy is the filing of an
action for replevin, or an interpleader filed by the
Government in the proper court, not necessarily
the same one which issued the search warrant;
however, where there is still a probability that the
seizure will be followed by the filing of a criminal
action, as in the case at bar where the case for
carnapping was "dismissed provisionally, without
prejudice to its reopening once the issue of
ownership is resolved in favor of complainant"
(emphasis supplied), or the criminal information
has actually been commenced, or filed, and
actually prosecuted, and there are conflicting
claims over the property seized, the proper
remedy is to question the validity of the search
warrant in the same court which issued it and not
in any other branch of the said court.
Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu Branch VIII
erred when it ordered the transfer of possession of
the property seized to petitioner when the latter
filed the action for replevin. It should have
dismissed the case since by virtue of the
"provisional dismissal" of the carnapping case
there is still a probability that a criminal case would
be filed, hence a conflict in jurisdiction could still
arise.
Here, the possession is illegal from the beginning and
the only issue is who has the prior possession de
facto.
In the theory of forcible entry, the issue is who has
actual and physical possession, regardless of legal
possession.
Example:
The party is claiming ownership by his registered title
of the property and the other party is claiming
ownership by his possession of the property (title is
not registered; no certificate of title). The court will
usually decide favorably on the party who is the
registered owner (only provisional in nature—res
judicata is not applicable). Then the aggrieved part
can still file an action for accion reinvidicatoria,
because the aggrieved party is relying on “being the
owner” as his basis for the possession.
Nature of the action
Summary in nature because they involve a
disturbance of social order which must be abated as
promptly as possible without any undue reliance on
technical and procedural rules which only cause
delay.
Where to File
RECOVERY OF REAL PROPERTY
A. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER
Proper Municipal Trial Court or Metropolitan Trial
Court
Prescriptive Period
Denominated as accion interdictal and are two
forms of an ejectment suit which may be instituted
by “a person deprived of the possession of any land
or building by:
1. When through FIT (force, intimidation, threat)
– 1 year from dispossession
2. When through SS (Stealth, strategy) – 1 year
from Discovery
1. force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth, or landlord, vendor, vendee,
2. or other person against whom the possession
of any land or building is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration or termination of the right
to hold possession, by virtue of any contract,
expressed or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such
landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person.’’
An action for forcible entry is a quieting process. The
restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the
summary nature of such process. Indeed, the oneyear period within which to bring the action is
generally counted from the date of actual entry into
the property.
FORCIBLE ENTRY
Summary action to recover material or physical
possession of real property when a person originally
in possession was deprived thereof by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth (FISTS).
29 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
After one year even the owner of the property
cannot resort to either of these remedies. The
rationale of the proceedings is to provide for an
expeditious means of protecting actual possession
or the right to possession of the property involved
without delay in the determination thereof.
Judgment must be executed immediately when it is
in favor of the plaintiff in order to prevent further
damages arising from loss of possession.
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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Issues involved
mere physical or material possession (possession de
facto) — not juridical or civil possession (possession
de jure) which arises from ownership as one of its
attributes nor ownership — of which a person has
been deprived or against whom it has been withheld
by any of the means or circumstances mentioned.
FORCIBLE ENTRY
UNLAWFUL
DETAINER
When
&
Who can
institute
to recover material or
physical possession of
real property when a
person originally in
possession
was
deprived thereof by
force,
intimidation,
threat, strategy, or
stealth (FISTS).
Distinction
Possession is illegal
from the beginning
Nature
action
SUMMARY
to recover
material or
physical
possession
of
real
property
when
a
person
against
whom the
possession
of
any
land
is
unlawfully
withheld
after
the
expiration
of the right
to
hold
possession
, by virtue
of
any
contract,
express or
implied.
Possession
is
legal
from
the
start
but
became
illegal
thereon
SUMMARY
UNLAWFUL DETAINER
Summary action to recover material or physical
possession of real property when a person against
whom the possession of any land is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or
implied.
The possession is legal from the start but becomes
illegal later on.
Example:
Contract of lease (lessee-lessor). The entry of the
lessee is valid from the start pursuant to the lease
contract. It will become illegal after the expiration of
the lease AND the lessee refuses to vacate the
property even if there is a demand to vacate.
Nature of the action
Summary in nature because they involve a
disturbance of social order which must be abated as
promptly as possible without any undue reliance on
technical and procedural rules which only cause
delay.
Where to File
Proper Municipal Trial Court or Metropolitan Trial
Court
Prescriptiv
e Period
1
YR
from
dispossession/discover
y
Issues
involved
mere physical or material possession
Prescriptive Period
1 year from the time possession became unlawful or
date of last demand to vacate
Issues involved
mere physical or material possession (possession de
facto) — not juridical or civil possession (possession
de jure) which arises from ownership as one of its
attributes nor ownership — of which a person has
been deprived or against whom it has been withheld
by any of the means or circumstances mentioned.
30 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
of
1 YR from
the
time
possession
became
unlawful or
date
of
last
demand
to vacate
NOTE:
In both, the only issue is physical or material
possession.
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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Neither claim of juridical possession nor even
ownership can prevent a court from taking
cognizance of the case-- ownership is not an issue,
however, it may be decided provisionally to
determine issues on priority of possession.
Peralta-Labrador v. Bugarin
GR No. 165177 | August 25, 2005
Legal principle: An action for forcible entry is a
quieting process and the one-year time bar for
filing a suit is in pursuance of the summary nature
of the action.
Facts: Peralta-Labrador was the owner of a parcel
of land that she had purchased from Spouses
Pronto in 1976. She was issued a tax Declaration
and has since been paying taxes on the lot. When
the DPWH constructed a road which traversed
Peralta-Labrador’s lot, this resulted in the
separation of 108 sq. m. from her total lot owned.
Sometime in 1994, Bugarin forcibly took possession
of the 108 sq. m. lot and refused to vacate it.
Peralta-Labrador filed a case for Recovery of
Possession and Ownership over the disputed
parcel of land in 1996.
Bugarin contends that the 108 sq. m. lot was
included in his OCT and that he has been in
continuous possession and occupation since 1955.
He also pleads that the case be dismissed due to
prescription.
The MTC ruled in favor of Bugarin on the basis of
his OCT and due to Peralta-Labrador’s failure to
prove physical ownership and possession. Both the
RTC and the CA affirmed the MTC’s decision.
Issue: W/N the MTC had jurisdiction over PeraltaLabrador’s complaint
Ruling: No, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the
case because the complaint was filed two years
after forcible entry. The complaint should have
been filed with the RTC.
Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Civil
procedure provide that when a person has been
deprived of the possession of any land or building
by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth,
they may institute proceedings at the proper
Municipal Trial Court within one (1) year after such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession.
An action for forcible entry is a quieting process
and the one year time bar for filing a suit is in
31 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
pursuance of the summary nature of the action.
Proceedings in the MTCs have been nullified when
it improperly assumed jurisdiction of a case in
which the unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession had exceeded one year.
The one-year period within which to bring an
action for forcible entry is generally counted from
the date of actual entry to the land. However,
when entry is made through stealth, then the oneyear period is counted from the time the plaintiff
learned about it. After the lapse of the one-year
period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land
may file either an accion publiciana, which is a
plenary action to recover the right of possession;
or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to
recover ownership as well as possession.
When Bagarin took possession forcibly in 1994,
Peralta-Labrador only instituted the complaint in
1996, two years after the forcible entry. Thus, the
cause of action for forcible entry has prescribed
and the MTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the
case. Peralta-Labrador’s complaint should have
been filed with the proper RTC. Jurisdiction over
the subject matter cannot be waived by the
parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence or
even express consent.
Nunez vs. SLTEAS
G.R. No. 180542
FACTS:
The spouses Ong Tiko and Emerenciana
Sylianteng executed a deed of assignment over
their parcel of land in favor of SLTEAS Phoenix
Solutions, Inc. (SLTEAS) in 1999. SLTEAS left the
parcel of land idle and unguarded for some time
due to important business concerns.
In 2003, an ocular inspection conducted by SLTEAS
revealed that Nuñez and 21 other individuals were
already occupying the parcel of land and were
refusing to vacate despite of verbal demands
made by SLTEAS.
SLTEAS filed a complaint for forcible entry by
means of strategy and stealth, against Nuñez who
alleged to have a subsisting lease agreement over
the parcel of land with Maria Sylianteng.
Nunez argued that the property occupied by him
is owned by one Maria Ysabel Potenciano Padilla
Sylianteng, with whom he had concluded a
subsisting lease agreement over the same, and
that, in addition to respondent’s lack of cause of
action against him, the MeTC had no jurisdiction
over the case for lack of prior demand to vacate
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and referral of the controversy to the barangay
authorities for a possible amicable settlement.
ISSUE: w/n the case of forcible entry should
prosper
RULING:
Yes.
The rule is no different in actions for forcible entry
where the following requisites are essential for the
MeTC’s acquisition of jurisdiction over the case,
viz.: (a) the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical
possession of the property; (b) they must assert
that they were deprived of possession either by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and,
(c) the action must be filed within one (1) year
from the time the owners or legal possessors
learned of their deprivation of the physical
possession of the property.
As it is not essential that the complaint should
expressly employ the language of the law, it is
considered a sufficient compliance of the
requirement where the facts are set up showing
that dispossession took place under said
conditions. The one-year period within which to
bring an action for forcible entry is generally
counted from the date of actual entry on the
land, except that when the entry is through
stealth, the one-year period is counted from the
time the plaintiff learned thereof.
In this case, as the registered owner of the subject
parcel, respondent distinctly alleged that, by its
representatives and thru its predecessors-ininterest, it had been in possession of the subject
parcel and had exercised over the same all
attributes of ownership, including the payment of
realty taxes and other expenses; that an ocular
inspection conducted in October 2003 revealed
that petitioner and his co-defendants have
succeeded in occupying the property by means
of stealth and strategy; and, that its subsequent
demands to vacate had been unheeded by said
interlopers.
POSSESSION:
Then as now, petitioner argues that, aside from the
admission in the complaint that the subject parcel
was left idle and unguarded, respondent’s claim
of prior possession is clearly negated by the fact
that he had been in occupancy thereof since
1999. While prior physical possession is, admittedly,
an indispensable requirement in forcible entry
cases, the dearth of merit in petitioner’s position is,
however, evident from the principle that
32 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
possession can be acquired not only by material
occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is
subject to the action of one's will or by the proper
acts and legal formalities established for acquiring
such right.
Because possession can also be acquired by
juridical acts to which the law gives the force of
acts of possession, e.g., donations, succession,
execution and registration of public instruments,
inscription of possessory information titles and the
like, it has been held that one need not have
actual or physical occupation of every square
inch of the property at all times to be considered
in possession.
Additionally, Petitioner is, finally, out on a limb in
faulting the Court of Appeals with failure to apply
the first paragraph of Article 1676 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines in relation to the lease he claims
to have concluded with one Maria Ysabel
Potenciano Padilla Sylianteng. In the absence of
proof of his lessor’s title or respondent’s prior
knowledge of said contract of lease, petitioner’s
harping over the same provision simply amounts to
an implied admission that the premises occupied
by him lie within the metes and bounds of the
subject parcel. Even then, the resolution of said
issue is clearly inappropriate since ejectment
cases are summary actions intended to provide
an expeditious manner for protecting possession
or right to possession without involvement of title.
Moreover, if a defendant’s mere assertion of
ownership in an ejectment case will not oust the
MeTC of its summary jurisdiction, we fail to see why
it should be any different in this case where
petitioner merely alleged his lessor’s supposed title
over the subject parcel.
Dela Cruz vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 139442
FACTS:
The Reyes family owned the lot located at Lacson
Street Manila. Cruz was one of their lessees and
paid rent over a portion of the lot for well over 40
years. Sometime in 1989, a fire struck the premises
and destroyed Cruz’s dwelling. After the fire, Cruz
and some tenants returned to the said lot and
rebuilt their houses, simultaneously, the Reyes
Family made several verbal demands on the
remaining lessees and Cruz, to vacate the lot but
they did not comply. Cruz was served a written
demand to vacate said lot but refused to leave.
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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The disputed lot was sold by the Reyeses to Tan Te.
Despite the sale, Cruz did not give up the lot. The
petitioner (cruz) was sent a written demand to
relinquish the premises which she ignored
prompting Tan Te to initiate proceedings at the
barangay level.
On September 8, 1997, respondent Tan Te filed an
ejectment complaint with damages before the
Manila MeTC, entitled Melba Tan Te v. Lourdes
Dela Cruz and docketed as Civil Case No. 156730CV. The complaint averred that: (1) the previous
owners, the Reyeses were in possession and
control of the contested lot; (2) on November 26,
1996, the lot was sold to Tan Te; (3) prior to the sale,
Dela Cruz forcibly entered the property with
strategy and/or stealth; (4) the petitioner
unlawfully deprived the respondent of physical
possession of the property and continues to do so;
and, (5) the respondent sent several written
demands to petitioner to vacate the premises but
refused to do so.
On October 24, 1997, petitioner filed her answer
and alleged that: (1) the MeTC had no jurisdiction
over the case because it falls within the jurisdiction
of the RTC as more than one year had elapsed
from petitioner's forcible entry; (2) she was a rentpaying tenant protected by PD 20; 2 (3) her lease
constituted a legal encumbrance upon the
property; and (4) the lot was subject of
expropriation.
Whether or not the ejectment case will prosper???
It is an unlawful detainer case not forcible entery.
Thus exclusive, original jurisdiction over ejectment
proceedings (accion interdictal) is lodged with
the first level courts. This is clarified in Section 1,
Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that
embraces an action for forcible entry
(detentacion), where one is deprived of physical
possession of any land or building by means of
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.
In actions for forcible entry, three (3) requisites
have to be met for the municipal trial court to
acquire jurisdiction. First, the plaintiffs must allege
their prior physical possession of the property.
Second, they must also assert that they were
deprived of possession either by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. Third, the
action must be filed within one (1) year from the
time the owners or legal possessors learned of their
deprivation of physical possession of the land or
building.
33 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
The other kind of ejectment proceeding is
unlawful detainer (desahucio), where one
unlawfully withholds possession of the subject
property after the expiration or termination of the
right to possess.
Here, the issue of rightful possession is the one
decisive; for in such action, the defendant is the
party in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause
of action is the termination of the defendant’s right
to continue in possession. The essential requisites
of unlawful detainer are: (1) the fact of lease by
virtue of a contract express or implied; (2) the
expiration or termination of the possessor’s right to
hold possession; (3) withholding by the lessee of
the possession of the land or building after
expiration or termination of the right to possession;
(4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental
or comply with the terms of the lease and vacate
the premises; and (5) the action must be filed
within one (1) year from date of last demand
received by the defendant
Two (2) kinds of action to recover possession of
real property which fall under the jurisdiction of the
RTC are: (1) the plenary action for the recovery of
the real right of possession (accion publiciana)
when the dispossession has lasted for more than
one year or when the action was filed more than
one (1) year from date of the last demand
received by the lessee or defendant; and (2) an
action for the recovery of ownership (accion
reivindicatoria) which includes the recovery of
possession.
Ocampo vs. Dionisio
G.R. No. 191101
FACTS:
Dionisio filed a complaint for forcible entry against
Mario and Felix Ocampo. Dionisio sought to
recover the possession of a portion of his property
situated in Dalig, Cardona, Rizal, alleging that
Mario and Felix built a piggery thereon without his
consent.
·
In his answer, Mario denied Dionisio’s allegation,
claiming that the disputed parcel of land is owned
by his wife Carmelita, who inherited the same from
her father. Mario further claimed that they have
been in possession of the said parcel of land since
1969.
·
The MTC dismissed the complaint, finding that
Dionisio failed to establish his prior possession of
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the disputed parcel of land. Dionisio died.
Consequently, his heirs filed a complaint for
recovery of possession against the spouses Mario
and Carmelita. The respondents sought to recover
the same portion of land subject of the forcible
entry case.
·
The heirs averred that the subject property
was acquired by Dionisio in 1945 when he
purchased the same from a certain Capistrano.
That Dionisio thereafter took possession of the
subject property and was able to obtain a free
patent covering the subject property. An OCT was
subsequently issued in the name of Dionisio in
1987.
·
The MTC dismissed the complaint on the
ground of res judicata in the light of the finality of
the decision in the forcible entry case.
he RTC reversed, declaring the heirs entitled to
possession for being the lawful owners of the lands
and ordering the spouses to vacate as well as to
pay the heirs P10,000.
·
The RTC opined that the forcible entry case
only involves the question of who has a better right
to the possession of the subject property while the
recovery of possession case not only involves the
right to the possession of the subject property, but
the ownership thereof as well. The RTC stressed
that a judgment rendered in a forcible entry case
will not bar an action for recovery of possession
based on title or ownership since there is no
identity of cause of action as between the two
cases.
·
Further, the RTC held that the heirs were able
to establish that the subject property is indeed
part of the parcel of land covered by the OCT
registered in the name of Dionisio.
·
The CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not the finality of the decision in
the forcible entry case constitutes res judicata,
which would warrant the dismissal of the
respondents’ complaint for recovery of possession
– No.
Held: The doctrine of res judicata is laid down
under Section 47, Rule 39[1] comprehends two
distinct concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by former
judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment.
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between
the first case where judgment was rendered and
the second case sought to be barred, there is
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action. In this instance, the judgment in the first
34 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
case constitutes an absolute bar to the second
action.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and
second cases, but no identity of causes of action,
the first judgment is conclusive only as to those
matters actually and directly controverted and
determined and not as to matters merely involved
therein. This is the concept of res judicata known
as "conclusiveness of judgment."
For res judicata under the first concept, bar by
prior judgment, to apply, the following requisites
must concur: (a) finality of the former judgment;
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must
be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must
be, between the first and second actions, identity
of parties, subject matter and causes of action.
The first 3 requisites are present in this case. The
decision in the forcible entry case rendered by the
MTC, a court which has jurisdiction over the
subject property and the parties, had long
become final. The said decision is an adjudication
on the merits. However, the fourth requisite is not
present. Although there is identity of parties and
subject matter as between the forcible entry case
and recovery of possession case, there is no
identity of causes of action.
The forcible entry case only involves the issue of
possession over the subject property while the
recovery of possession case puts in issue the
ownership of the subject property and the
concomitant right to possess the same as an
attribute of ownership.
In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the
only issue is possession in fact, or physical
possession of real property, independently of any
claim of ownership that either party may put forth
in his pleading. If plaintiff can prove prior physical
possession in himself, he may recover such
possession even from the owner, but, on the other
hand, if he cannot prove such prior physical
possession, he has no right of action for forcible
entry and detainer even if he should be the owner
of the property.
Thus, the MTC’s determination is only limited to the
issue of who has "actual prior possession" of the
property regardless of ownership of the same.
On the other hand, the recovery of possession
case is actually an accion reinvindicatoria or a suit
to recover possession of a parcel of land as an
element of ownership. A perusal of the complaint
filed by the respondents in the recovery of
possession case shows that the heirs, as
successors-in-interest of Dionisio, are asserting
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ownership of the subject property and are seeking
the recovery of possession thereof.
A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will
not bar an action between the same parties
respecting title or ownership because between a
case for forcible entry and an accion
reinvindicatoria, there is no identity of causes of
action. Such determination does not bind the title
or affect the ownership of the land; neither is it
conclusive of the facts therein found in a case
between the same parties upon a different cause
of action involving possession.
The decision in the forcible entry case is
conclusive only as to the MTC’s determination that
the petitioners are not liable for forcible entry since
the respondents failed to prove their prior physical
possession; it is not conclusive as to the ownership
of the subject property. Besides, Section 18, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that a
"judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry
or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the
possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or
affect the ownership of the land."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 187944
CARMENCITA SUAREZ v. MR. AND MRS. FELIX E.
EMBOY
FACTS:
A 222–square meter parcel of land is covered by
TCT issued in the name of Carmencita.
Respondents’ house stands in the subject lot. The
respondents claim that their mother had
occupied the subject lot during her lifetime and
they had thereafter stayed in the subject lot for
decades after inheriting it.
Respondents received from Carmencita’s counsel
a demand letter to vacate the subject lot. They
were informed that Carmencita had already
purchased the subject lot from the former’s
relatives. They refused to comply insisting that their
mother’s inheritance pertained to the lot in
question.
Subsequently, Carmencita filed against the
respondents a complaint for unlawful detainer.
She alleged that she bought the subject lot from
35 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
the registered owners, Heirs of Vicente, who
allowed the respondents to occupy the same by
mere tolerance. As their successor–in–interest, she
claimed her entitlement to possession of the
subject lot and the right to demand from the
respondents to vacate the same.
The MTCC upheld Carmencita’s claims in its
decision rendered.
The respondents were
ordered to vacate the subject lot and remove at
their expense all the improvements they had built
thereon. RTC affirmed in its entirety the MTCC
ruling.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Carmencita’s complaint against
the respondents had sufficiently alleged and
proven a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
HELD:
Carmencita had not amply alleged and proven
that all the requisites for unlawful detainer are
present in the case at bar.
In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following
key jurisdictional facts must be alleged and
sufficiently established:
(1) initially, possession of property by the
defendant was by contract with or by tolerance
of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal
upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in
possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on
defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned
above is markedly absent. Carmencita failed to
clearly allege and prove how and when the
respondents entered the subject lot and
constructed a house upon it. Carmencita was
likewise conspicuously silent about the details on
who specifically permitted the respondents to
occupy the lot, and how and when such
tolerance came about. Instead, Carmencita
cavalierly formulated a legal conclusion, sans
factual substantiation, that (a) the respondents’
initial occupation of the subject lot was lawful by
virtue of tolerance by the registered owners, and
(b) the respondents became deforciants
unlawfully withholding the subject lot’s possession
after Carmencita, as purchaser and new
registered owner, had demanded for the former
to vacate the property. It is worth noting that the
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absence of the first requisite assumes even more
importance in the light of the respondents’ claim
that for decades, they have been occupying the
subject lot as owners thereof.
This Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction
to effect the ejectment of an occupant on the
land, it is necessary that the complaint must
sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to
bring the party clearly within the class of cases for
which the statutes provide a remedy, without
resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are
summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts
must appear on the face of the complaint. When
the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it
does not state how entry was effected or how and
when dispossession started, the remedy should
either be an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria.
detainers, but an accion publiciana. The objective
of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover
possession only, not ownership.
Note: Important nga madetermine ang right
action sa person who wants to eject a possession
bec lahi2 ug jurisdiction for that: if forcible entry or
unlawful detainer gani= municipal trial court or
metropolitan trial court, if accion publiciana or
reivindicatoria = RTC
Nature of the action
B. ACCION
PUBLICIANA
REINVIDICATORIA
AND
ACCION
Accion Publiciana/Plenaria de posesion
ordinary civil proceeding to recover the better right
of possession of realty independently of title.
The issue is possession
independently of the title.
de
jure
of
realty
This is also used to refer to an ejectment suit filed after
the expiration of one year from the occurrence of
the cause of action or year from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty.
Note:
An action for recovery of possession is distinct and
different from an action for recovery of title or
ownership. A judgment rendered in the first is
conclusive only on the question of possession, and
not that of ownership. It does not in any way bind the
title or affect the ownership of the property involved.
IN OTHER WORDS: if at the time of the filing of the
complaint more than one year had elapsed since
defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or
defendant’s possession had become illegal, the
action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal
36 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
XPNS when Accion Publiciana cannot be resorted to:
1. Forcible entry
2. Unlawful detainer
Where to file
a. Assessed value P20,000 and below- MTC
b. Assessed value is more than 20,000- RTC
Prescriptive Period
10 years otherwise the real right of possession is lost
Issues involved
Juridical or civil possession (possession de jure)
plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding before
the RTC
as distinguished from accion interdictal – the issue in
interdictal is limited to the question of possession in
fact while accion publiciana revolves on the issue of
determination of the better right of possession or
possession in law.
As distinguished from accion reivindictoria – in
accion publiciana, the basis of recovery of
possession is the plaintiff’s real right of possession or
jus possessionis – which is the right to the possession
of the real estate independent of ownership. On the
other hand, in accion reivindicatoria, however, the
basis of the action for recovery of possession is
ownership itself.
Accion Reinvindicatoria
seeks the recovery of possession based on
ownership (which, of course, includes the jus utendi
and the jus fruendi), also brought in the regional trial
court in an ordinary civil proceeding.
IN OTHER WORDS: is a suit which has for its object the
recovery of possession over the real property as
owner. It is an action whereby plaintiff alleges
ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery
of its full possession. Different from that of publiciana
where plaintiff merely alleges proof of better right to
possess without claim of title. The plaintiff in this
accion sets up title in him and prays that he be
declared the owner and be given possession
thereof.
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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Where to file
RTC where the real property is situated
Prescriptive Period
FACTS:
10 years - if the other party seeks to obtain ownership
by ordinary prescription; requires good faith and just
title.
30 years – if the other party seeks to obtain
ownership by extraordinary prescription, does not
require good faith nor just title.
Issues involved
Ownership which ordinarily includes possession
(although a person may be declared owner but he
may not be entitled to possession because the
possessor has some rights which must be respected
e.g. lessee in a contract of lease)
Nature of the action
Action to recover ownership in an ordinary civil
proceeding.
Accion
interdictal
Involves
merely
possession de
facto without
claim of title
one of a possessory action. It does not seek the
recovery of possession or ownership. (Bokingo v.
Court of Appeals, 489 SCRA 521 [2006].)
Accion
publiciana
Involves
merely
possession de
jure/
better
right
of
possession or
possession
in
law.
Accion
reinvidicatoria
Involves
ownership
hence
evidence
of
title may be
introduced
May
be
resorted when
complainant
fails to aver
facts
constitutive of
forcible
entry/unlawful
detainer
Cases
Bokingo vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 161739,
May 4, 2006)LEGAL PRINCIPLE:
A complaint which is principally an action to
enjoin the defendant and his representatives from
committing acts that would tend to prevent the
survey of the subject land cannot be said to be
37 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
Alfredo Bokingo filed an application for titling of a
parcel of land before the DENR. When the
plaintiffs knew of Bokingo’s application, the
plaintiffs filed a protest against Bokingo’s
application. The Provincial Environmentand
Natural Resources (PENR) resolved the protest in
favor of plaintiffs and issued a certification stating
that the order has become final and executory
and ordered an execution for such.
In connection therewith, the respondents were
authorized by the City Environment and Natural
Resources OCcer (CENRO) to conduct a survey
on the subject land. However, petitioner Bokingo,
through his representatives, unjustly prevented the
conduct of the said survey. Hence, they filed a
complaint for injunction in order that the
respondents' right to survey the subject land would
not be defeated.
Bokingo filed with the court a quo a motion to
dismiss alleging that since it could be gleaned
from the complaint that the issue between the
parties involved the possession of the land, the
assessed value of the land is crucial to determine
the court’s jurisdiction. Since the assessed value of
the land was only 14,410 (based on the tac
declarations) the RTC has no jurisdiction over such
as it properly belonged to MTC.
The court a quo the denied his motion to dismiss
and held that it had jurisdiction over the subject
matter which decision was affirmed by the CA
hence the instant petition seeking for the reversal
of the CA’s decision.
ISSUE: WoN the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
RULING:
Yes. It is to be noted that the complaint for
Injunction filed by the respondents where the
principal relief sought is to enjoin permanently the
illegal acts of the defendants therein, including
petitioner Bokingo, of preventing the survey of the
land is the subject matter of the case and not one
of possession of the land.
In this connection, it is well to note the action is one
where the subject of litigation may not be
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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estimated in terms of money, it is cognizable
exclusively by Regional Trial Courts
Contrary to the view posited by petitioner
Bokingo, the cause of action of the respondents'
complaint is not, as yet, to recover the possession
of the subject land.
There are three kinds of actions to judicially
recover possession of real property and these are
distinguished in this wise:
What really distinguishes an action for unlawful
detainer from a possessory action (accion
publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory action
(accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to
the question of possession de facto. An unlawful
detainer suit (accion interdictal) together with
forcible entry are the two forms of an ejectment
suit that may be filed to recover possession of real
property. Aside from the summary action of
ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary
action to recover the right of possession and
accion reinvindicatoria or the action to recover
ownership which includes recovery of possession,
make up the three kinds of actions to judicially
recover possession.
Significantly, the respondents' is principally an
action to enjoin petitioner Bokingo and his
representatives from committing acts that would
tend to prevent the survey of the subject land. It
cannot be said therefore that it is one of a
possessory action. As such, the subject matter of
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation and
properly cognizable exclusively by the court a
quo, a Regional Trial Court under Section 19 (1) of
BP Blg. 129.
Hilario v. Salvador
GR No. 160384, April 29, 2005
Legal principle: In accion publiciana and
reinvindicatoria, the assessed value of the real
property is a jurisdictional element to determine
the court that can take cognizance of the action.
Facts: Hilario filed for accion reivindicatoria in the
RTC against Salvador in 1996, alleging that the
latter constructed a house on his property and
refused to leave despite their demands.
Salvador asserts his right over the property, having
received prior consent from Hilario’s grandmother.
He moved to dismiss the case on the ground of the
38 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
lack of jurisdiction of the RTC. Under BP 129, as
amended by RA 7691, it is an essential requisite to
state the assessed value of the disputed property
in the complaint and to describe the subject lot in
question, in order to determine which court has
jurisdiction. Hilario failed to do both. Salvador
alleges that based on the 1991 tax declaration
presented by Hilario, since the assessed value of
the property did not exceed P20,000, it falls within
the jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.
Hilario asserts that the case falls within the RTC
because it is a case for accion reivindicatoria,
which is an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Thus, regardless of the assessed value
of the property, exclusive jurisdiction falls within the
RTC. Moreover, Hillario alleges that even if
pecuniary estimation is not needed, the case still
falls with the RTC because the market value of the
property is P3.5M.
The RTC ruled in favor of Hilario. However, this
decision was overturned by the CA, asserting that
the RTC had no jurisdiction to hear the case.
Issue: W/N the RTC had jurisdiction over the case
Ruling: No, since the assessed value of the
property was below P20,000, the MTC, not the RTC,
had jurisdiction over the case.
An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its
object the recovery of possession over the real
property as owner. It involves recovery of
ownership and possession based on the said
ownership. On the other hand, an accion
publiciana is one for the recovery of possession of
the right to possess. It is also referred to as an
ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year
after the occurrence of the cause of action or
from the unlawful withholding of possession of the
realty.
For an accion reinvindicatoria or an accion
publiciana suit to proper, the assessed value of the
property should be alleged in the complaint.
When the complaint was filed on September 3,
1996, RA 7691 was already in effect. The law
provides that exclusive jurisdiction in civil actions,
which involve title or possession of property, falls in
the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC when the assessed
value of the property DOES NOT EXCEED P20,000
(or P50,000 in Metro Manila). When the assessed
value EXCEEDS P20,000 (or P50,000 in Metro
Manila), the RTC shall exercise jurisdiction.
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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Thus, the jurisdiction of the court over an action
involving title to or possession of land is now
determined by the assessed value of the said
property and not the market value thereof. The
assessed value of real property is the fair market
value of the real property multiplied by the
assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable
value.
construct a house on the southern portion of the
land and to stay there temporarily.
The fair market value is the price at which a
property may be sold by a seller, who is not
compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is
not compelled to buy. An assessed value can
have reference only to the tax rolls in the
municipality where the property is located, and is
contained in the tax declaration.
The
respondents
Answered
with
Counterclaims. They did not dispute that Ignacio
was able to secure the title over the entire lot.
However, they asserted that on April 17, 1973,
Ignacio and herein petitioner sold to their mother
Anastacia the southern portion of the Lot shown
by “Kasulatan sa Bilihan”. There, Ignacio’s
signature was found.
They also alleged that the accion publican has
already prescribed, because it is only available
for 10 yrs.
They said that if you look at the complaint, it
was alleged that they took possession as early as
1968 but the case was filed only in 1995.
Hilario’s claim failed because the assessed value
puts the property within the jurisdiction of the MTC.
Based on the evidence presented by Hilario,
which was a 1991 tax declaration, the assessed
value was set at P5,950. Their loose remark that the
property was worth P3.5 M was made without any
evidence. Thus, the court can only base its
decision on the 1991 tax declaration. Being less
than P20,000, the case falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.
It is important to note that the nature of the action
and which court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the same is determined by the (1)
material allegations of the complaint, (2) the type
of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and (3) the law
in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of
whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of
the claims asserted therein. The caption of the
complaint is not determinative of the nature of the
action. Nor does the jurisdiction of the court
depend upon the answer of the defendant or
agreement of the parties or to the waiver or
acquiescence of the parties.
Urieta vs. Aguilar (G.R. No. 164402, July 05, 2010)
Facts:
On Aug 3, 1995, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Recover of Possession and Damages before the
RTC.
Said:
On May 1977, her husband [Ignacio] was
issued an OCT for a land.
Prior, or on 1968, Ignacio allowed the sister of
petitioner, mother of respondent Alfaro, to
39 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
1994, Ignacio died and his heirs decided to
partition the lot. They did not vacate and heed
the demand.
A case of accion publiciana was then filed.
It was then denied by the petitioner that there
was a signing of the Kasulatan sa BIlihan.
As to the issue of prescription, she asserted that
respondents' occupation of subject property
cannot ripen into ownership considering that the
same is by mere tolerance of the owner.
Also, the Kasulatan was not registered with the
proper registry of Deeds.
Issue: [feel nako mao ni ang issue in connection
with sa atong topic: “Was there a prescription for
accion publiciana?”
[Whether or not petitioner can recover the
land]
Held: [Guys butngan nlng nako sa ruling ha nga
wla ni prescribe cause ngano ni rule man if ni
prescribe? Mao gyud akong gi libgan kay wala
ni gi touch sa SC sa case….]
Yes, the petitioner can recover the land.
What is accion publiciana?
Also known as accion plenaria de posesion,
accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding
to determine the better right of possession of
realty independently of title. It refers to an
ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one
year from the accrual of the cause of action or
from the unlawful withholding of possession of the
realty.
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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The objective of the plaintiffs in accion
publiciana is to recover possession only, not
ownership. However, where the parties raise the
issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the
issue to determine who between the parties has
the right to possess the property. This
adjudication, however, is not a final and binding
determination of the issue of ownership; it is only
for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession, where the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The
adjudication of the issue of ownership, being
provisional, is not a bar to an action between the
same parties involving title to the property. The
adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the
issue of ownership.
And yes, torrens title na tanan og remedial law.
But for me ang issue was whether ni prescribe
naba, so ang answer is No.
Wala ni prescribe cause sige ko examine sa
case then 1994 man last ni demand dba then
1995 gi file, so within the 10 year period.
Bongato vs. Malvar (G.R. No. 141614. August 14,
2002)
Facts: Private respondents spouses Severo and
Trinidad Malvar filed a complaint for forcible entry
against petitioner Teresita Bongato, alleging that
petitioner Bongato unlawfully entered a parcel of
land covered by TCT No. RT-16200 belonging to
the said spouses and erected thereon a house of
light materials.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction which the Metropolitan Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) denied holding that the
motion is prohibited under the Rule on Summary
Procedure. The MTCC rendered a decision
ordering petitioner to vacate the land in question,
and to pay rentals, attorney's fees, and the costs
of the suit. The decision was affirmed by the
Regional Trial Court. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals held that the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) had jurisdiction over the case, and
that it did not err in rejecting petitioner's Motion to
Dismiss. The appellate court reasoned that the
MTCC had passed upon the issue of ownership of
the property merely to determine possession — an
action that did not oust the latter of its jurisdiction.
Unsatisfied with the appellate court's Decision,
petitioner lodged the present petition.
40 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
Issue: "Whether or not the Court of Appeals
gravely abused its discretion in not finding that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction since the Complaint
was filed beyond the one-year period from date
of alleged entry
Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the petition.
According to the Court, it is wise to be reminded
that forcible entry is a quieting process, and that
the restrictive time bar is prescribed to
complement the summary nature of such process.
Indeed, the one-year period within which to bring
an action for forcible entry is generally counted
from the date of actual entry to the land.
However, when entry is made through stealth,
then the one-year period is counted from the time
the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the
one-year period, the party dispossessed of a
parcel of land may file either an accion
publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover
the right of possession; or an accion
reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover
ownership as well as possession. On the basis of
the foregoing facts, it is clear that the cause of
action for forcible entry filed by respondents had
already prescribed when they filed the Complaint
for ejectment on July 10, 1992. Hence, even if
Severo Malvar may be the owner of the land,
possession thereof cannot be wrested through a
summary action for ejectment of petitioner, who
had been occupying it for more than one (1) year.
Respondents should have presented their suit
before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an
accion reivindicatoria, not before the MTCC in
summary proceedings for forcible entry. Their
cause of action for forcible entry had already
been prescribed, and the MTCC had no more
jurisdiction to hear and decide it
Encarnacion vs. Amigo (G.R. No. 169793,
September 15, 2006) (dispossession started from
1995 so when filed on 2006, the action already
prescribed)
Principle: The proper remedy to be filed when the
period from the actual ownership and
dispossession of property to the filing for the
complaint has lapsed 1 year is accion publiciana
Encarnacion acquired two lots.
o
originally owned by Valient (1st
owner).
o Valiente sold to Malagpitan (2nd
owner).
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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-
-
-
-
ISSUE
-
o Malagpitan sold to Magpantay (3rd
owner). Magpantay exceuted an
affidavit
in
favor
of
Encarnacion(her son-in-law for the
said lands
Petitioner Amigo allegedly entered the
premises and took possession of a portion
of the property in 1985 without permission
and continued even after the TCTs were
issued to petitioner
February 1, 2001. Petitioner, through his
lawyer, sent a demand letter to
respondent. March 2, 2001, Petiioner filed
a complaint for ejectment in the MTC
which the MTC granted.
It was brought to the RTC on appeal
where it ruled that the MTC had a lack of
jurisdiction,
having
no
appellate
jurisdiction.
It was brought to the CA where it was
remanded to the RTC, ruling that the
remedy sought (unlawful detainer) was not
proper. It should have been accion
publiciana.
W/N the CA erred in holding that the
proper action is accion publiciana and not
unlawful detainer as filed by the petitioner
RULING (No error, the appropriate action is Accion
publiciana)
From the allegation, Encarnacion had
become the owner of the property on April
11, 1995.
The letter for ejectment was received by
the respondent on Feb 12, 2001.
Encarnacion filed the complaint for
ejectment on March 2, 2001.
Since the defendant occupied the
portions of the lot in 1985, it can be said
that the deprived possession of the portion
thereof started on 1995 when he claimed
possession of the land.
The lapse between 1995 (the start of
dispossession) and 2001 (the filing of the
complaint for ejectment is 6 years. Thus the action
for unlawful detainer has prescribed and the
appropriate remedy is accion publiciana
Manlapaz vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 39430.
December 3, 1990)
Facts:
Private respondents filed an ejectment case in
the MTC against herein petitioners as defendants
alleging that herein petitioners, thru force,
intimidation and threats and with the use of guns,
forcibly ousted the private respondents from Lots
32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41, Block 21 of Bahay
Pare, Pampanga, which private respondents
had been occupying and cultivating peacefully,
notoriously and continually for more than ten (10)
years.
Petitioners resisted the ejectment case alleging
lack of jurisdiction and denied all other material
allegations in the complaint.
Thereafter, the parties entered into a stipulation
of facts wherein they agreed that:chanrobes
virtual 1aw library
1. The lots under litigation are Lots 32, 36, 37, 38,
39, 40 and 41 of Block 21 of the Bahay Pare
Estate, Candaba, Pampanga;
2. The said lots belong to the Land Authority;
3. Both parties had filed their respective
applications to purchase said lots from the
Government;
4. On May 20, 1968, the Land Authority rendered
its decision dismissing the applications of
petitioners;
5. On appeal to the Office of the President, the
decision of the Land Authority was reversed and
the awards in favor of private respondents were
cancelled;
6. Private respondents seasonably petitioned for
judicial review and for annulment of said
decision of the Office of the President before the
Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as
Civil Case No. 79371;
7. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 79371,
the Land Authority issued Orders of Award to
petitioners on September 21, 1970;
8. The ejectment case was filed by private
respondents during the pendency of said Civil
Case No. 79371 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila;
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9. Private respondents have been regularly
harvesting an average one hundred (100)
cavans per hectare from the land in dispute; and
10. On September 1, 1971, private respondents
discovered petitioners’ intrusion over subject
property;
On February 27, 1974, the Municipal Court of
Candaba rendered judgment in favor of private
respondents, ordering petitioners to vacate the
lots and restore possession thereof to private
respondents, and to pay as rentals twenty-five
(25) cavans per hectare for each year from May,
1971 until they shall have vacated the
controverted lots.
Petitioners appealed the MTC’s decision. During
the pendency of said appeal, a motion for
execution pending appeal was filed by private
respondents for failure of petitioners to file a
supersedeas bond. The Court of First Instance of
Candaba, Pampanga issued an order granting
the same.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals to which the CA dismissed.
Petitioners now come forward to question the
lack of jurisdiction by the MTC over the case.
Issue:
An action for recovery of possession is totally
distinct and different from an action for recovery
of title or ownership. In fact, a judgment rendered
in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive
only on the question of possession and not that of
ownership. It does not in any way bind the title or
affect the ownership of the land or building.
Therefore, where a person supposes himself to be
the owner of a piece of land and desires to
indicate his ownership against the party actually
in possession, it is incumbent upon him to institute
an action to this end in a court of competent
jurisdiction; and he cannot be permitted, by
invading the property and excluding the actual
possessor to place upon the latter the burden of
instituting an action to try the property right. In no
case may possession be acquired through force
or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who
objects thereto. He who believes that he has an
action or a right to deprive another of the
holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the
competent court, if the holder should refuse to
deliver the thing. When a person is in possession
of the land and has maintained that possession
for years, he cannot be forcibly dispossessed
thereof, even by the owner.
Pending final adjudication of ownership, the
municipal court has jurisdiction to determine in
the meantime the right of possession over the
land.
Does the MTC have jurisdiction over the case
questioning the ownership of the lots?
Held:
Yes. Firmly settled is the rule that a municipal
court has jurisdiction over forcible entry or
unlawful detainer cases even if the ownership of
the property is in dispute.
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 132424,
May 2, 2006)
In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the
main issue is one of priority of possession. The
legal right thereto is not essential to the
possessor’s cause of action, for no one may take
law into his own hands and forcibly eject another
or deprive him of his possession by stealth, even
if his title thereto were questionable or actually
disputed in another case. If the plaintiff can
prove prior physical possession in himself, he may
recover such possession even from the owner,
but on the other hand, if he cannot prove such
prior physical possession, he has no right of
action for forcible entry and detainer even if he
should be the owner of the property.
FACTS:
Petitioners Bonifacio and Venida filed an unlawful
detainer case against Valdez. They claimed a
case for unlawful detainer by alleging that
respondents unlawfully withheld from them the
possession of the property in question, and that
after respondents were asked to vacate, they
refused. They further contend that the summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy
available to the owner if another occupies the
land at the owner’s tolerance or permission
without any contract between the two as the
occupant is bound by an implied promise to
vacate the land upon demand by the owner.
42 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
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In their answer, respondents contended that the
complaint failed to state that petitioners had prior
physical possession of the property or that they
were the lessors of the former. In the alternative,
private respondents claimed ownership over the
land on the ground that they had been in open,
continuous, and adverse possession of the lot.
MTC favored petitioners and affirmed by RTC.
However, CA reversed and set aside the decisions.
It held that the complaint lacked key jurisdictional
allegations to support an action for ejectment. It
lacked an allegation of prior material possession
which is mandatory in forcible entry, neither does
there appear to be a case of unlawful detainer,
since respondents failed to show that they had
given the petitioners the right to occupy the
premises.
ISSUES
A. WON the allegations of the complaint
clearly made out a case for unlawful
detainer.
B. WON on the allegations of the
complaint, the municipal trial court has
original jurisdiction
RULING:
The petition is not meritorious. The Complaint and
the other pleadings do not recite any averment of
fact that would substantiate the claim of
petitioner that it permitted or tolerated the
occupation of the property by Respondent Cruz.
The complaint contains only bare allegations that
1) respondent immediately occupied the
subject property after its sale to her, an action
merely tolerated by petitioner. This just
supports the view that respondent’s
occupation of the property was unlawful at its
inception; and
2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the
premises was by mere tolerance present a
right from the start, an essential requirement in
unlawful detainer cases
Nothing has been said on how respondents’ entry
was effected or how and when dispossession
started. Admittedly, no express contract existed
between the parties. Jurisdictional facts must
appear on the face of the complaint. When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible
entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not
state how entry was affected or how and when
dispossession started, the remedy should either be
an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria
in the proper regional trial court. Since the
complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional
43 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer,
the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over
the case.
C. ACTION TO RECOVER IS BASED ON
OWNERSHIP
Case:
Caro vs. Sucaldito (G.R. No. 157536. May 16, 2005)
LEGAL PRINCIPLE: Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest,
or one “who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit.”
(caro does not have a cause of action but only a
rival patentee) – no interest involved in the
property
FACTS: Gregorio Caro bought a parcel of land
from Ruperto Gepilano as evidenced by a Deed
of Sale. Thereafter, Gregorio Caro sold a portion of
the said lot to his son Melchor Caro, and now
identified as Lot No. 4512 of the Cadastral survey
of Nueva Valencia.
Father and son executed a Deed of Definite Sale
covering Lot No. 4512. Thereafter, Melchor Caro
applied for a free patent before the Bureau of
Lands covering the said area of the property
which he bought from his father. The application
was, however, opposed by Deogracias de la Cruz.
The Regional Director rendered a Decision
canceling the said application. Caro filed a
notice of appeal before the Regional Land Office
however, the appeal was dismissed on the ground
of failure to file an appeal memorandum within
the reglementary period therefor.
On August 29, 1982, Susana R. Sucaldito, as the
buyer of Lot No. 4512, filed an Application for a
Free Patent covering the said lot, and was issued
Free Patent No. 597599. Consequently, the
Register of Deeds of Iloilo City issued Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) in her favor. Sucaldito
then filed a Petition for Writ of Possession before
the RTC of Iloilo City, which was granted.
Thereafter, Caro filed a Complaint against
Sucaldito for “Annulment of Title, Decision, Free
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Patent and/or Recovery of Ownership and/or
Possession with Damages” before the RTC of Iloilo
City. He later filed an amended complaint,
alleging that he was the owner of the subject lot,
and had been in possession of the same “since
1953 and/or even prior thereto in the concept of
owner, adversely, openly, continuously and
notoriously.” He further alleged that the said lot
had been declared for tax purposes in his name
and that of his predecessors-in-interest, and that
the corresponding land taxes had been paid
therefor and lamented that despite the
overwhelming evidence proving his ownership
and possession of the said property, the Bureau of
Lands did not award it to him.
Caro further alleged that since the issuance of the
free patent over the subject lot in favor of
Sucaldito was wrongful and fraudulent, she had
no right whatsoever over the subject lot. Hence,
as a “trustee of a constructive trust,” she was
obliged to return the same to him as the lawful
owner.
RULING OF TRIAL COURT: Caro had no personality
to file the action for the annulment of the free
patent issued in favor of Sucaldito, which could
only be brought by the Solicitor General. It held
that “an applicant for a free patent who is not the
owner of a parcel of land cannot bring an action
in court to recover the land, for the court may not
usurp the authority of the Director of Lands and the
Secretary of Agriculture to dispose lands of the
public
domain
through
administrative
proceedings under the Public Land Act,” or
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. The
trial court further stressed that the remedy of a
rival-applicant for a free patent over the same
land was through administrative channels, not
judicial, because even if the oppositor succeeds
in annulling the title of the applicant, the former
does not thereby become the owner of the land in
dispute.
Aggrieved by the trial court’s ruling, Caro elevated
the case to the CA
CA’S DECISION: The CA dismissed the petition. The
appellate court agreed with the ruling of the RTC
that the petitioner had no personality to file the
action under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, considering further that he was a mere
applicant for a free patent. Citing several cases,
the appellate court ruled that the findings of fact
made by administrative agencies which are
supported by substantial evidence must be
respected, particularly where the question
44 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring special knowledge and
experience.
ISSUE: WON he has the legal personality to file the
action for annulment of patent based on
constructive trust.
HELD: The Court agrees with the ruling of the RTC
and the CA, and holds that the petitioner has no
personality to file a suit for reconveyance of the
subject property. The Court notes that the
petitioner’s complaint before the RTC prays for the
annulment of the free patent issued in the
respondent’s favor. Considering that the ultimate
relief sought is for the respondent to “return” the
subject property to him, it is in reality an action for
reconveyance.
In De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, the Court held
that “[t]he essence of an action for reconveyance
is that the decree of registration is respected as
incontrovertible but what is sought instead is the
transfer of the property which has been wrongfully
or erroneously registered in another person’s
name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better
right.”
Indeed, in an action for reconveyance filed by a
private individual, the property does not go back
to the State. Reversion, on the other hand, is an
action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert
the land back to the government under the
Regalian doctrine.
Considering that the land subject of the action
originated from a grant by the government, its
cancellation is a matter between the grantor and
the grantee. Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest,
or one “who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit.”
Corollarily, legal standing has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case, such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the challenged act. Interest
means a material interest in an issue that is
affected by the questioned act or instrument, as
distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the
question involved.
Clearly then, a suit filed by one who is not a partyin-interest must be dismissed. In this case, the
petitioner, not being the owner of the disputed
property but a mere applicant for a free patent,
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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cannot thus be considered as a party-in-interest
with personality to file an action for
reconveyance. To reiterate, the petitioner is not
the proper party to file an action for reconveyance
that would result in the reversion of the land to the
government. The petitioner has no personality to
“recover” the property as he has not shown that
he is the rightful owner thereof.
PEZA vs. Fernandez (G.R. No. 138971. June 6, 2001)
Legal principle: Registration of real property is
considered a constructive notice to all persons
and thus, the four-year prescriptive period for filing
the action based on fraud shall be counted
therefrom on date of issuance of the certificate of
title over the property. The period is 10 years if the
action is based on implied or constructive trust but
the action is imprescriptible when the plaintiff or
the person enforcing the trust is in possession of the
property. In any case, for an action for
reconveyance, to prosper, the property should
not have passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value.
Facts: The subject lot, covered by an OCT was
registered to Rapaya and 15 other co-owners.
Igot-Soroño and 2 others who [falsely] claimed to
be Rapaya et al’s only surviving heirs executed an
Extrajudicial partition of the lot and were issued a
TCT on July 8, 1982. Igot-Soroño et al sold the lot to
the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA)
through a compromise agreement granted by the
RTC in August 11, 1982. Thus, the lot was transferred
to EPZA and a TCT was issued in their favor on
October 12, 1982.
The other Heirs of Rapaya et al, realising they were
excluded from the exrajudicial settlement, filed a
case on July 29, 1996 to nullify the sale between
Igot-Soroño et al and EPZA and sought to redeem
the lot.
EPZA moved to have the case dismissed on the
ground of prescription. This was because the twoyear period within which an unduly excluded heir
may seek a new settlement of the estate had
already lapsed by the time the case was filed in
court. The said heirs had already received
constructive notice of the sale and transfer
through the registration of the extra-judicial
partition with the Registry of Deeds.
45 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
Issue/s:
1. W/N the claim over the property has
prescribed
2. W/N the property can still be reconveyed
to the defrauded Heirs of Rapaya
Ruling:
1. Yes, the lot can no longer be reconveyed
back to the defrauded Heirs of Rapaya
because the claim has prescribed and the
remedy of reconveyance cannot be
availed once the property has passed to
an innocent purchaser for value.
Under Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, persons
unduly deprived of their lawful participation in a
settlement may assert their claim only within the
two-year period after the settlement and
distribution of the estate. This prescription period
does not apply, however, to those who had no
part in or had no notice of the settlement. Section
4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, is not meant to be
a statute of limitations. Moreover, by no reason or
logic can one contend that an extrajudicial
partition, being merely an ex parte proceeding,
would affect third persons who had no knowledge
thereof. Be that as it may, it cannot be denied,
either, that by its registration in the manner
provided by law, a transaction maybe known
actually or constructively.
While an extrajudicial partition is an ex parte
proceeding, after its registration under the Torrens
system and the annotation on the new certificate
of title of the contingent liability of the estate for a
period of two years as prescribed in Rule 74,
Section 4, of the Rules of Court, by operation of law
a constructive notice is deemed made to all the
world, so that upon the expiration of said period all
third persons should be barred [from going] after
the particular property, except where title thereto
still remains in the names of the alleged heirs who
executed the partition tainted with fraud, or their
transferees who may not qualify as ‘innocent
purchasers for value’. If the liability of the
registered property should extend indefinitely
beyond that period, then such constructive notice
which binds the whole world by virtue of
registration would be meaningless and illusory.
The only exception to the above-mentioned
prescription is when the title remains in the hands
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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of the heirs who have fraudulently caused the
partition of the subject property or in those of their
transferees who cannot be considered innocent
purchasers for value.
In this case, the other Heirs of Rapaya are deemed
to have been constructively notified of the
extrajudicial settlement by reason of its
registration and annotation in the certificate of title
over the subject lot. From the time of registration,
the date when Igot-Soroño et al executed an
extrajudicial partition of the lot, they had two (2)
years or until July 8, 1984, within which to file their
objections or to demand the appropriate
settlement of the estate. Moreover, since the title
to the property was no longer with Igot-Soroño et
al but with EPZA, who was an innocent purchaser
for value, the other Heirs of Rapaya can no longer
reconvey the lot.
1. No, the property cannot be reconveyed
because the action for reconveyance
resulting from fraud prescribes in four years.
While persons who have been deprived of
property through fraud have the right to
reconveyance, this right is subject to limitations.
An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud
prescribes four years from the discovery of the
fraud; such discovery is deemed to have taken
place upon the issuance of the certificate of title
over the property. Registration of real property is
considered a constructive notice to all persons
and, thus, the four-year period shall be counted
therefrom. Clearly then, the Heirs of Rapaya’s
action for reconveyance based on fraud has
already prescribed, considering that title to said
property had been issued by the RTC way back on
August 11, 1982, while the reivindicatory suit was
instituted only on July 29, 1996.
Even an action for reconveyance based on an
implied or a constructive trust would have already
prescribed just the same, because such action
prescribes (10) years from the alleged fraudulent
or date of issuance of the certificate of title over
the property. The imprescriptibility of an action for
reconveyance based on implied or constructive
trust applies only when the plaintiff or the person
enforcing the trust is in possession of the property.
In effect, the action for reconveyance is an action
to quiet the property title, which does not
prescribe. Undisputedly, the Heirs of Rapaya are
not in possession of the disputed property. In fact,
46 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
they do not even claim to be in possession of it,
even if to do so would enable them to justify the
imprescriptibility of their action.
Finally,
it
must
be
remembered
that
reconveyance is a remedy of those whose
property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in the name of another. Such recourse,
however, cannot be availed of once the property
has passed to an innocent purchaser for value. For
an action for reconveyance to prosper, the
property has passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value.
Gasataya vs. Mabasa (G.R. No. 148147, February
16, 2007
Facts: Respondent Editha Mabasa’s father,
Buenaventura, was granted a homestead patent
on 3 different lots. Buenaventura Mabasa then
mortgaged these lots to Development Bank of the
Philippines to secure a loan. He was unable to pay
his indebtedness, so DBP foreclosed his properties
and sold these at a public auction. DBP then
emerged as the highest bidder.
When Buenaventura Mabasa died,
respondent’s siblings authorized her to negotiate
with DBP for the repurchase of the lots. DBP
allowed respondent to reacquire the foreclosed
properties through a deed of conditional sale.
THEN, respondent entered into an
Agreement with petitioner’s father, SABAS
GASATAYA, for the him to assume payment of the
obligation to DBP. They then agreed that SABAS
will take possession of the lots for 20 years and
develop them into a fishpond.
Upon representation and according to Sabas
Gasataya, that Respondents OBLIGATION TO DBP
had already been settled, they entered into
another agreement and it was then denominated
as “DEED OF SALE OF FISHPOND LANDS with RIGHT
TO REPURCHASE.”
HOWEVER, it was discovered 8 years later
that SABAS GASATAYA stopped paying DBP.
Because of this, DBP revoked the right to
repurchase.
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DBP then held a public auction and GASATAYA
participated. He won the bid and acquired title to
the lots.
Respondent then filed a complaint in the
RTC for reconveyance for title of lands against
petitioner and SABAS GASATAYA.
She claimed that the latter deliberately
reneged on his commitment to pay DBP to revoke
the right to repurchase and subject the properties
to auction so that he can bid.
The CA affirmed that a person cannot ask
for the reconveyance of titles on disputed lands if
she is not the owner thereof.
Issue: Whether or not Mabasa may recover the
property
Ruling:
Yes. Reconveyance is available not only to
the legal owner of a property but also to the
person with a better right than the person under
whose name said property was erroneously
registered.
While respondent is not the legal owner of
the disputed lots, she has a better right than
petitioner to the contested lots on the following
grounds: first, the deed of conditional sale
executed by DBP vested on her the right to
repurchase the lots and second, her right to
repurchase them would have subsisted had they
(the Gasatayas) not defrauded her.
Fraud overthrows the presumption that the
public sale was attended with regularity. The
public sale did not vest the petitioner with any
valid title to the properties since it was but the
consequence of his and his father’s fraudulent
schemes. The registration of the properties in
petitioner’s name did not obliterate the fact that
fraud preceded and facilitated such registration.
Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an
intentional deception practiced by means of
misrepresentation of material facts. It is fraud to
knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which
benefit is obtained, to the prejudice of another.
Consequently,
fraud
is
a
ground
for
reconveyance.
The Court takes significant note of the fact
that respondent’s father originally acquired the
subject
lots
through
homestead
grant.
Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act) aims to
47 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
confine and preserve to the homesteader and his
kin the homestead lots. We, therefore, agree with
the CA’s disquisition that courts should “lend a
stout shoulder to help keep a homestead in the
homesteader’s family” for the stern reality cannot
be belied that “homesteaders and their families
are generally in the lower stratum of life” and most
likely, when they alienate the homestead, it is “out
of dire necessity.”
D. OTHER ACTIONS FOR RECOVERY OF
POSSESSION
1. INJUNCTION
judicial process whereby a person is required to do
or refrain from doing a particular thing.
It is a writ framed according to the circumstances of
the case commanding an act which the court
regards as essential to justice, or restraining an act it
deems contrary to equity and good conscience.
Requirements:
a. there must exist a clear and positive right
over the property in question which should
be judicially protected through the writ; and
b. the acts against which the injunction is to be
directed are violative of said right.
As such, the subject matter of litigation is incapable
of pecuniary estimation and properly cognizable
exclusively by a regional trial court under Section
19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. (Bokingo v. Court
of Appeals, 489 SCRA 521 [2006].)
Sole object
To preserve the status quo until the issues of the case
be heard.
Rationale:
The status quo is the last actual peaceable
uncontested status which preceded the pending
controversy.
Remedy generally not available:
1. A person entitled to recover possession of
property from another who is in actual
possession thereof, is ordinarily not allowed to
avail himself of the remedy of preliminary
preventive or mandatory injunction but must
bring the necessary action for the recovery
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of possession. Injunction is not designed to
protect contingent on future rights.
2. Injunctive relief will not be granted to take
property out of the possession or control of
one party and place it in that of another
whose title has not been clearly established
or who did not have such possession or
control at the inception of the case. Its
proper function is simply to maintain the
status quo at the commencement of the
action.
3. Injunction cannot be a substitute for other
suits for recovery of possession, such as an
action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer
and accion publiciana. Hence, its denial will
not bar the institution of the more
appropriate remedy.
Reasons for the rule:
The doctrine proceeds on the familiar rule that the
writ of injunction is an equitable relief, and that the
determination of title is a legal remedy.
Before the issue of ownership is determined, justice
and equity demand that the parties be maintained
in their status quo so that no advantage may be
given to one to the prejudice of another.
Cases when the remedy may be allowed
be compensated by ages if the injunction
sought is not granted and there is no plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
CASE:
Bokingo vs. Court of Appeals, supraBokingo is one of the defendants in the complaint
for injunction and damages filed by Campos, heirs
of busa, heris of busa-panal, and the heirs
Concordia Busa. The complain was filed in the RTC
of Butuan City . Argued that the complaint filed by
the Respondents with the court a quo is a
possessory action. To determine which court, the
RTC or MTC, has primary jurisdiction, petitioner
Bokingo theorizes that it is necessary that the
assessed value of the land be alleged in the
initiatory complaint. Absent such allegation, the
court where the case was filed should allegedly
preliminarily determine the assessed value of the
subject property to determine whether or not it
has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
claim. In the present case, according to petitioner
Bokingo, the assessed value of the subject land is
only P14,410.00; hence, jurisdiction thereof
properly belongs to the MTC in accordance with
Section 19(2) or 33(3) of BP Blg. 129 as amended
by RA 7691 and not the RTC
1. Actions for Forcible entry- must file within 10
days from the filing of the complaint
The Heirs Filed a complaint against Petitioner for
injunction and damages
Rationale: to prevent the defendant from
committing further acts of dispossession.
In this case, the respondents’ complaint has not
sought to recover the possession or ownership of
the subject land. Rather, it is principally an action
to
enjoin
petitioner
Bokingo
and
his
representatives from committing acts that would
tend to prevent the survey of the subject land. It
cannot be said therefore that it is one of a
possessory action. The respondents, as plaintiffs in
the court a quo, to be entitled to the injunctive
relief sought, need to establish the following
requirements: (1) the existence of a right to be
protected; and (2) that the acts against which the
injunction is to be directed are violative of the said
right. As such, the subject matter of litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and properly
cognizable exclusively by the court a quo, a
Regional Trial Court under Section 19 (1) of BP Blg.
129, as amended by RA 7691
2. Ejectment cases- in cases where the higher
court is satisfied that the lessee’s appeal is
frivolous or dilatory or that the lessor’s appeal
is prima facie meritorious.
3. Possessor admittedly owner or in possession in
concept of owner- to restrain the acts of
trespass and illegal interference with his
possession.
4. Possessor clearly not entitled to the property
5. Extraordinary
caseswhere
urgency,
expediency,
and
necessity
require
immediate possession as where material and
irreparable injury will be done which cannot
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Significantly, the respondents' complaint has not
sought to recover the possession or ownership of
the subject land. Rather, it is principally an action
to
enjoin
petitioner
Bokingo
and
his
representatives from committing acts that would
tend to prevent the survey of the subject land. It
cannot be said therefore that it is one of a
possessory action. The respondents, as plaintiffs in
the court a quo, to be entitled to the injunctive
relief sought, need to establish the following
requirements: (1) the existence of a right to be
protected; and (2) that the acts against which the
injunction is to be directed are violative of the said
right.
Idolor vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 141853.
February 7, 2001)
TAKE NOTE THAT FORECLOSURE IS A SALE –
CERTIFCATE OF SALE
After the prescriptive period – 1 year, the bank will
have consolidated ownership between the buyer.
You will not have anymore right.
Principle: Failure to show interest or title in the
property will forfeit the issuance of a preliminary
injunction over a particular property or subject.
FACTS
-
-
-
-
On March 21, 1994 Idolor executed a Real
estate Mortgage in favor of De Guzman
with the right of foreclosure upon failure to
redeem the mortgage on or before Sept.
20, 1994.
Sept. 21, the wife of De Guzman filed a
complaint against Idolor which resulted in
a “Kasunduang Pag-aayos”, stating Idolor
had a 90 day grace period to settle
P520,000. Failure to settle account on or
before Dec. 21, 1996 would automatically
execute a deed of sale with the
agreement to repurchase without interest
within one year in favor of De Guzman for
the land owned by Idolor
Petitioner failed. Thus, De Guzman filed
an extra judicial foreclosure on March 21,
1997 pursuant to the agreement In March
21, 1994
May 23, 1997, the mortgaged property
was sold to De Guzman.
June 25, 1998 Idolor filed a complaint for
annulment of sherrif sale with a writ of
preliminary injunction alleging irregularity
and lack of notice of extrajudicial
proceedings.
49 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
-
ISSUE
-
-
-
RTC issued preliminary injunction BUT the
CA granted the preliminary injunction
Petitioner claims that her proprietary right
over the subject land was not lost as her
right of redemption of property has not
lapsed
W/N the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the CA was issued with grave
abuse of discretion.
W/N the petitioner has no more
proprietary right to the issuance of the writ
of injunction.
(unrelated to topic) W/N the kasundang
pag-aayos novated the old agreement.
RULING(NO, petitioner had no proprietary right;
NO, no Gadalej)
Ø Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed
to protect substantive rights and interest
Ø Requisites before issuance of prelim
injunction:
a. Right in esse or the existence of a right
to be protected
b. The act against which the injunction is
to be directed is a violation of such
right (Failure to show evidence merits a
denial of the remedy)
Ø The Supreme Court agrees that the
petitioner has no more proprietary right to
speak over the foreclosed property to
entitle the issuance of preliminary
injunction.
Ø The Property was sold in public auction on
May 23, 1997 and registered on June 23,
1997. The petitioner had one year to
redeem the property but she failed to
exercise her right on or before June 23,
1998. THUS, spouses de Guzman are now
entitled to conveyance and possession of
foreclose property
Ø Additionally, petitioner failed to show
sufficient interest or title in the property
sought to be protected (requisite 2 of
prelim injunction) as her right to
redemption expired.
Unrelated: (regarding the kasunduang pagaayos)
Ø There was no novation as both agreements
were not conflicting in all parts.
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FEDERATED REALTY CORPORATION v. Hon. COURT
OF APPEALS
Facts:
Petitioner FRC is the registered owner of a 543square meter lot in Apas, Lahug, Cebu City,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of
the Registry of Deeds of Cebu City. The lot adjoins
a military reservation, Camp Lapu-Lapu, where
the Command Headquarters of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines-Visayas Command
(AFP-VISCOMM) is situated.
The lot in question used to be a portion of Lot No.
933 containing an area of 37,126 square meters
and formed part of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate.
In 1932, Lot No. 933 was registered in the names
of Francisco Racaza, Pantaleon Cabrera and
Josefina Martinez per TCT No. RT 2533 (T-13).
Sometime in 1938, Lot No. 933 was one of 18 lots
subjected to expropriation proceedings by the
government for the purpose of establishing a
military reservation. Pursuant to the court’s order,
the Republic deposited P9,500.00 with the
Philippine National Bank as a precondition for
entry to the lots sought to be expropriated. The
Court rendered a Decision condemning Lot No.
933 along with the 17 other adjacent lots of the
Banilad Friar Lands Estate in favor of the Republic.
In 1947, the whole military reservation was
converted into a national airport by virtue of a
Presidential Proclamation and, by virtue thereof,
turned over to the National Airports Corporation.
This Court has had two occasions to rule on the
question of ownership involving two of the lots.
Valdehueza v. Republic, decided in 1966,
concerned Lot Nos. 932 and 939 of the Banilad
Friar Lands Estate, while Lot No. 932 was likewise
the subject of Republic v. Lim, decided earlier this
year. In both cases, the Court found that by the
very admission of the government, there was no
record of payment of compensation by the
government to the landowners. Thus, the Court
ruled in both cases that there was no transfer of
the lots involved in favor of the government. The
decisions, however, did not touch on the state of
ownership of Lot No. 933 which was not involved
in the cases.
Beginning in 1940, Lot No. 933 had been
subdivided.Part of it was segregated as Lot 933B under TCT No. 49999 in the name of Francisco
Racaza who sold the same to the Cebu Agro
Development Corporation (Cebu Agro) on 11
March 1974. Cebu Agro had Lot 933-B further
50 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
subdivided into three farm lots to expand its
rabbit farm. TCT No. 108002 was issued for Lot
933-B-1 by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on
05 April 1989 while TCT No. 108001 was issued for
Lot 933-B-2. On 08 April 1992, TCT No. 119740 was
issued for Lot 3, with an area of 543 square
meters, which is a portion of the consolidation of
Lots 933-B-1 and 933-B-2. All three titles were
registered in the names of Arturo Mercader, the
President-General Manger of Cebu Agro, and his
wife Evangeline Mercader, who religiously paid
the real property taxes for the three lots.
On 27 April 1992, FRC bought Lot 3 from the
Mercader spouses.
FRC hired workers to fence the said lot in
preparation for the construction of a commercial
building
thereon.
However,
the
fence
construction was halted when Captain Rogelio
Molina arrived with a jeepload of fully-armed
men from the AFP-VISCOMM, and ordered FRC's
workers to stop building the structure per
instructions of AFP-VISCOMM Commanding
General Romeo Zulueta. Intimidated, FRC's men
stopped working. When they resumed work the
following day, Captain Molina returned with his
armed men and again ordered them to stop the
construction.
FRC later filed a Complaint for Injunction against
Captain Molina and company. The complaint
was later amended to implead the Republic of
the Philippines (Republic) through the AFPVISCOMM and its Commanding General Romeo
Zulueta. FRC sought the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, to order the respondents to cease,
desist and refrain from threatening, intimidating
and harassing the workers constructing its fence
and to cease, desist and refrain from committing
acts of intrusion into and deprivation of subject
land, and to cease, desist and refrain from
harassing, disturbing and interfering with its
peaceful and lawful possession and enjoyment
thereof. FRC also prayed that after trial, (i) the
injunction be made permanent, (ii) respondents
adjudged without any legal right to or interest
whatsoever in the parcel of land in litigation, (iii)
respondents ordered to pay compensatory and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation. The trial court issued a
TRO.
Respondents admitted that Captain Rogelio
Molina ordered FRC's workers to desist from
fencing the land in dispute on the ground that
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said lot is government property. However, they
denied that he and his armed men threatened
and/or harassed the said workers.
The trial court found that the subject property is in
the possession of FRC and its predecessor-ininterest and ruled that FRC's assertion of
ownership is supported by a TCT which must be
upheld until nullified by a competent court in a
proper proceeding. In all probability, the
Republic would prevent the construction of FRC's
fence, if not provisionally prevented by court
order, thereby making injunction a proper relief,
the lower court noted.
The Republic appealed the trial court’s decision
in the CA and the latter granted the Republic’s
certiorari and set aside the RTC’s decision. The
appellate court ratiocinated that FRC does not
have a clear and unmistakable right over the
subject property on the ground that "the subject
lot not only adjoins military structures, but the
main entrance thereof carries the arch of the
AFP-VISCOMM identifying beyond peradventure
of doubt that one is entering the premises of the
AFP, a government entity." It likewise held that
the damage which FRC may suffer in enjoining it
from undertaking any improvements on the
subject property "pales in comparison with what
the [Republic] stands to suffer in the event of a
permanent injunction against it - the integrity of
its military premises."
Issue:
Whether or not injunction lies in favor of FRC to
prevent the Republic from interfering in the
exercise of its rights of ownership over the subject
property.
Held:
Yes.
To be entitled to injunctive relief, the following
must be shown: (1) the invasion of a right sought
to be protected is material and substantial; (2)
the right of complainant is clear and
unmistakable; and (3) there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage.
We first take up the second requisite. Without
ruling on the question of ownership over the
subject property, we shall delve into the
respective claims of ownership of the parties if
only to determine if FRC had sufficiently
51 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
established the existence of a right to be
protected by a writ of injunction.
Basically, FRC anchors its claim on the
indefeasibility of its registered title to the subject lot
which cannot be collaterally attacked by the
Republic in an injunction suit. It further alleges, and
as found by the trial court, that along with its
predecessors-in-interest it has been in open,
peaceful and continuous possession thereof since
time immemorial, tilling the same and paying all
the taxes due thereon.
On the other hand, the Republic has not
presented any title over the subject lot but instead
relies heavily on the Commonwealth and
Valdehueza cases in asserting ownership and
possession over the same, arguing that it was
expropriated by the government for military
purposes in 1940. It further alleges that its
possession of the subject lot is evidenced by the
existence of military structures on the adjoining lots
and that of the Camp Lapu-Lapu arch on the
main entrance of the property in question.
However, it has been held that a certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein. It becomes
the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land. It
is undisputed that FRC holds the title for the
property. Assuming that the Republic had
indeed paid the deposit or made full payment of
just compensation, in regular order this should
have led to the cancellation of title, or at least,
the annotation of the lien in favor of the
government on the certificate of title covering
the subject lot.
Anent the third requisite, the appellate court ruled
that in the event of a permanent injunction the
Republic stands to suffer greater injury compared
to FRC, as a private commercial building within a
camp will pose serious danger and damage to
military operations. Again, we disagree.
In seeking the affirmation of the writ of injunction
issued by the CA to enjoin the implementation of
the permanent injunction ordered by the trial
court against it, the Republic invokes national
security and the integrity of its military operations.
It argues that civilians cannot be allowed to lurk
within military premises.
However, we cannot overemphasize that until
FRC's title is annulled in a proper proceeding, the
Republic has no enforceable right over the
subject property. Neither military operational
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integrity nor national defense vests title to property
in favor of the government.
Furthermore, the only so-called military structure
allegedly found on Lot No. 933 is the arch of
Camp Lapu-Lapu. It is not even clear where
exactly on Lot No. 933 this arch stands. Neither
was it shown when the same was constructed.
Note that the lot in question is not the entire Lot
No. 933, but only a portion thereof.
The Republic's assertion that the defense of the
State will be in grave danger if we shall order the
reversion of Lot 932 to respondent is an
overstatement. First, Lot 932 had ceased to
operate as an airport. What remains in the site is
just the National Historical Institute's marking
stating that Lot 932 is the "former location of
Lahug Airport." And second, there are only
thirteen (13) structures located on Lot 932, eight
(8) of which are residence apartments of military
personnel. Only two (2) buildings are actually
used as training centers. Thus, practically
speaking, the reversion of Lot 932 to respondent
will only affect a handful of military personnel. It
will not result to "irreparable damage" or
"damage beyond pecuniary estimation," as what
the Republic vehemently claims.
Since the Republic has failed to prove its
indubitable right over the lot in question, we have
to rule that FRC possesses a clear and
unmistakable right over the subject lot that
necessitates the issuance of a writ of injunction to
prevent serious damage to its interests as
titleholder thereto. Meanwhile, FRC may institute
a separate proceeding to quiet its title wherein
the issue of ownership over the subject property
may finally be resolved.
2. WRIT OF POSSESSION
generally understood to be an order whereby a
sheriff is commanded to place a person in possession
of a real or personal property, such as when a
property is extrajudicially foreclosed.
Not just between the parties - Also those who have
been occupying the property before the decree
was granted.
SC : if the occupation of the subject property was
already after the decree, dli na pwede writ of
possession lang because the defendants must have
their day in court. You should file a case for forcible
entry. Writ of possession can lie against respondents
52 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
and defendants on the land registration case also
those who are occupying the property up until the
granting of the decree. IF YOU OCCUPY AFTER, DLI
NA WRIT OF POSSESION. THE OWNER MUST FILE A
CASE OF FORCIBLE ENTRY
WRIT of possession is an order to wards the sheriff.
That is not disobeyence to the court if you don’t
obeey sherrif. The sherrif must exhaust all means to
give the possession to the winning party but you
cannot be held in contempt of court.
The writ of demolition is a completement of a writ of
possession. If there are improvements there, and the
real owner cannot enjoy because of demolitions,
then it can be asked of (writ of demolition).
Cases when remedy is allowed:
1. Land registration proceeding- The judgment
confirming the title of the applicant and
ordering the registration in his name carries
with it the delivery of possession which is an
inherent element of ownership.
a. Against defeated party and adverse
occupant
b. Against
subsequent
transferee
or
possessor
c. May include writ of demolition
Purpose: to place the winning party in possession of
the property covered by such decree. Thereby,
there would be an avoidance of inconvenience
and the further delay to which a successful litigant
would be subjected if he were compelled “to
commence other actions in other courts for the
purpose of securing the fruits of his victory.
2. Real Estate Mortgage
Note:
It is a ministerial duty of the trial court to issue the writ
of possession in favor of the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale of mortgaged property after the
one-year period for redemption has expired and
ownership has been consolidated in the purchaser.
A writ of possession may be issued even before the
redemption period has expired on the ex parte
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application of the purchaser and approval of a
bond.
3. Chattel Mortgage
In the case of a chattel mortgage, an ordinary
action is necessary to recover possession of the
mortgaged chattel in case of the refusal of the
mortgagor to surrender it. (Luna v. Encarnacion, 91
Phil. 531 [1952].) The Chattel Mortgage Law does not
contain any provision similar to Section 6 of Act No.
3135.
4. Eminent Domain proceedings
Requisites before a writ of possession can be issued:
a. There must be a complaint for expropriation
sufficient in form and in substance;
b. A
provisional
determination
of
just
compensation for the properties sought to
be expropriated must be made by the trial
court on the basis of judicial (not legislative or
executive) discretion.
c. The deposit requirement under Section 2,
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court must be
complied with.
5. Ejectment
A lessee of land not owned by the lessor has no legal
right of possession. The buyer of the land who was
subrogated to the rights, interests and obligations of
the owner has every right to ask for a writ of
possession and request the court for a special order
of demolition of any existing structure found within his
property
CASES:
Vencilao vs. Vano (G.R. No. L-25660, Feb. 23, 1990)
FACTS:
There are three consolidated cases involved given
that there are the same parties and parcels of
land in question. In G.R. No. L-25660, the heirs of
the late Juan Reyes filed an application for
registration of the subject parcel of land, which
resulted in an OCT. After the heirs tried to take
possession of the property, a reconveyance of
property was filed against them by Vencila et al.,
asserting that:
53 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
a. They have acquired the land by purchase or
inheritance – and in OCEN possession for 30 years
b. The parcels of land that they own were by
mistake part of Juan Reyes’ estate
(Reconveyance is a remedy available to a person
whose property has been wrongfully registered
under the Torrens system in another's name)
The heirs of Juan Reyes moved to dismiss the case
of reconveyance stating that the other parties
had no cause of action and that they were barred
by prior judgement already.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss of
heirs of Juan Reyes, then set aside the same order,
and then reversed itself partially. Meaning, some
cases were dismissed, some were not since there
were several petitioners. The parties whose cases
were dismissed appealed to the SC.
The petitioners who appealed contended that
they were not claimants-oppositors nor defeated
oppositors in the said land registration case, as
their names don’t appear in the amended
application for registration. They argue that they
have occupied the parcels of land for more than
30 years which began long before the application
for registration and that even after registration,
they continued to possess the land.
ISSUE:
WON the writ of possession may be issued against
the petitioners who appealed considering that
they were not the defeated parties in the
registration case
RULING:
Yes. In a registration case, the judgment
confirming the title of the applicant and ordering
its registration in his name necessarily carried with
it the delivery of possession which is an inherent
element of the right of ownership. The issuance of
the writ of possession is, therefore, sanctioned by
existing laws in this jurisdiction and by the generally
accepted
principle
upon
which
the
administration of justice rests (Romasanta, et. al. v.
Platon). A writ of possession may be issued not
only against the person who has been defeated in
a registration case but also against anyone
unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or
any portion thereof during the land registration
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proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree
(Demorar v. Ibañez)
foreclosed property and to eject JETRI, its agents
and other persons claiming rights under it.
The petitioners’ contention that they have been in
possession of the said land for more than thirty (30)
years which began long before the filing of the
application for registration and continued in
possession after the hearing of the registration
case, worked against them. It was a virtual
admission of their lack of defense. Thus, the writs of
possession were properly issued against them.
Aggrieved by the aforequoted Order, petitioner
instituted an appeal before the Court of Appeals
which was dismissed by the appellate court.
On the issue of contempt, (not very relevant re
writ of possession but just to be sure; registrant
filed contempt against one of the occupants )
the court ruled that the occupants were not
guilty. Contempt only applies when after the
sheriff dispossess or eject the occupants, they
enter/attempt to enter the property. It was the
sheriff’s and not the petitioners’ fault that there
was delivery of possession was unsuccessful.
ISSUE: WoN petitioner can raise the validity of the
foreclosure sale as a ground to attack the
propriety of the issuance of the Writ of Possession.
Jetri Construction Corp. vs. BPI (G.R. No. 171687.
June 8, 2007)
Petitioner Jetri Construction Corporation applied
for a 20M Omnibus Line Credit Facility with Far
East Bank and Trust Company (predecessor-ininterest of respondent BPI). Upon approval of the
credit facility, petitioner Jetri Co was able to
borrow from the bank and mortgaged his land
covered by a TCT as well as the building erected
therein.
When Jetri Construction Corporation defaulted
in paying the loan, it entered into a Loan
Restructuring Agreement with the bank.
However, for failure to pay under the loan
restructuring agreement, the bank foreclosed
the REM on the property and held an auction
sale which was sold to the bank.
Upon the expiration of the redemption period
with petitioner failing to redeem the property,
ownership over the mortgaged property was
consolidated in favor of the bank and a new
certificate of title was issued in its name. Despite
demands, however, JETRI Co refused to vacate
the premises of the foreclosed property, thus,
herein respondent filed a Petition for the Issuance
of Writ of Possession of Real Property which was
issued by the RTC directing the sheriff to place
the bank in actual physical possession of the
54 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
In this case, Petitioner Jetri Construction
Corporation raises the validity of the foreclosure
sale as a ground to attack the propriety of the
issuance of the Writ of Possession.
RULING: NO.
This is erroneous. This Court, in numerous
decisions, has enunciated that any question
regarding the validity of the mortgage or its
foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing
the issuance of a writ of possession. Regardless of
whether or not there is a pending suit for
annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure
itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of
possession, without prejudice of course to the
eventual outcome of the said case. Any question
regarding the regularity and validity of the sale,
as well as the consequent cancellation of the
writ, is to be determined in a subsequent
proceeding.
More succinctly, the issuance of a writ of
possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a
ministerial act. After the consolidation of title in
the buyer's name for failure of the mortgagor to
redeem the property, the writ of possession
becomes a matter of right.
Therefore, the issue of nullity of the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale was of no moment. Said issue
cannot bar the issuance of a writ of possession
since, as stated above, any question regarding
the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure is
not a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a
writ of possession.
A.G. Development Corp vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 111662, October 23, 1997
Legal principle: The issuance of a writ of possession
to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is not
a judgment on the merits. Being merely a
ministerial function, the court neither exercises its
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official discretion or judgment. In other words, its
issuance is summary in nature; hence, it cannot be
considered a judgment on the merits which is
defined as one rendered after a determination of
which party is right as distinguished from a
judgment rendered upon some preliminary or
formal technical point.
Facts: AGDC and NHA entered in a MOA wherein
AGDC agreed to construct an apartment
building. AGDC executed in favor of NHA a
promissory note and a real estate mortgage over
the land as security. NHA made an initial payment
to AGDC to cover a portion of the contract price.
However, NHA rescinded the agreement and
demanded the immediate return of the initial
amount paid on the ground that AGDC was not
able to finish the project on time. When AGDC
refused, the real estate mortgage over the land
was foreclosed and the property was sold to NHA.
When the one-year period to redeem the
property expired, a TCT and subsequently, a writ
of possession was issued to the NHA by the RTC of
Quezon City.
In response, AGDC filed a case against the NHA
before the RTC of Makati for breach of contract,
nullity of promissory note and mortgage, and
reversion of possession and title. A. Francisco
Realty (AFRDC), claiming it was an innocent
purchaser for value of the property since it bought
the same from the NHA, filed a motion to dimiss
the case. They allege that the RTC of Makati had
no jurisdiction to entertain the AGDC’s complaint
and annul the NHA’s writ of possession because
they have coordinate jurisdiction with the RTC of
Quezon City.
The Makati RTC ruled in favor of AFRDC
Issue: W/N the issuance of the writ of possession by
the Quezon City RTC constitutes res judicata as a
bar to AGDC’s filing of the complaint with the
Makati RTC
Ruling: No, the issuance of a writ of possession
does not constitute res judicata to bar AGDC’s
complaint because the issuance of a writ of
possession is not a judgement on the merits.
Res judicata has four requisites: a) the former
judgment must be final; b) the court which
rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; c) the judgment must be on the
merits; and d) there must be between the first and
55 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
second actions, identity of parties, subject matter
and causes of action.
The issuance of a writ of possession is not a
judgment on the merits. A writ of possession is
generally understood to be an order whereby the
sheriff is commanded to place a person in
possession of a real or personal property, such as
when a property is extrajudicially foreclosed. In
this regard, the issuance of a writ of possession to
a purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure is
merely a ministerial function. As such, the Court
neither exercises its official discretion nor
judgment.
In other words, the issuance of the writ of
possession is summary in nature, hence the same
cannot be considered a judgment on the merits
which is defined as one rendered after a
determination of which party is right, as
distinguished from a judgment rendered upon
some preliminary or formal technical point.
Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata applies
only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and
not to the exercise of administrative powers or to
legislative, executive or ministerial determination.
Accordingly, cases disposed of on technical
grounds do not fall within the doctrine of res
judicata. Hence, the issuance of the writ of
possession by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City was not a judgment on the merits but simply
an incident in the transfer of title.
Maglente vs. Baltazar Padilla
FACTS:
Jan. 15, 1985, Philippine Realty Corporation
or PRC, owns a parcel of land in Manila. PRC then
entered into a contract of lease for 3 years with
one of the petitioners, Ursula Maglente.
In the contract, it was stated that, if PRC
were to sell the leased property, Maglente would
be given the first priority (right of refusal) to buy it.
Both parties agreed also for the prohibition
of subleasing.
However, after the execution of the
contract, Maglente subleased portions of the
property to respondents.
March 9, 1987, when the lease contract
was about to expire, PRC sent a written offer to sell
the leased property to Maglente.
In response, Maglente wasted to buy it.
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However, in 1989, PRC received a letter
from respondents who subleased the property
that they desire to buy the property.
PRC then filed a complaint for interpleader
in the RTC so that they could litigate among
themselves who had the right to purchase the
property.
After trials, PRC was ordered to execute a
deed of sale in favor of petitioners.
Petitioners then filed a motion for the
issuance of a write of possession but respondents
[who were occupying the property] objected on
the ground that the trial court’s decision on the
interpleader case merely resolved petitioner’s
right to purchase the leased property but did not
declare them as the owners entitled to possession.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not petitioners are [is] entitled to a writ
of possession
RULING:
Petitioner is not entitled to a writ of possession. The
appeal is dismissed
A writ of possession shall issue only in the following
instances:
(1) land registration proceedings;
(2) extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real
property;
(3) judicial foreclosure of property provided that
the mortgagor has possession and no third party
has intervened, and
(4) execution sales.
Here, petitioners seek the writ as a consequence
of the trial court’s decision ordering the execution
of a contract of sale/contract to sell in their favor.
The writ does not lie in such a case.
Here, the trial court’s decision in the interpleader
case (affirmed by both the CA and the SC) merely
resolved the question of who, between petitioners
and respondents, had the right to purchase PRC’s
property. The directive was only for PRC to
execute the necessary contract in favor of
petitioners as the winning parties, nothing else.
It was clear that, at that point, petitioners were not
yet the owners of the property. The execution of
the "deed of sale" in their favor was only
preliminary to their eventual acquisition of the
property. Likewise, although we stated in G.R. No.
111743, or in the other case, that the contract of
sale between petitioners and PRC had already
been perfected, we refrained from declaring
56 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
them the owners since, pending the execution of
the deed of sale or delivery of the property,
ownership had yet to transfer to them at that time.
Thus, petitioners' argument that the trial court's writ
of execution in the interpleader case carried with
it the corollary right to a writ of possession is
without merit. A writ of possession complements
the writ of execution only when the right of
possession or ownership has been validly
determined in a case directly relating to either.
The interpleader case obviously did not delve into
that issue.
Furthermore, the rule is that the enforcement of a
judgment may not vary or alter the tenor of the
judgment but must strictly conform to it. It should
be in harmony with the judgment that gives it life
and not exceed it. We thus cannot fault the trial
court for refusing to issue a writ of possession to
petitioners as its issuance would not be in
conformity with the trial court's judgment in the
interpleader case.
Finally, petitioners cannot recover possession of
the property via a mere motion. They must file the
appropriate action in court against respondents
to recover possession. While this remedy can
delay their recovery, this Court cannot permit an
abbreviated method without subverting the rules
and processes established for the orderly
administration of justice.
Real Action vs. Personal Action
By the nature of the actions arising from the juridical
relation. —Real right is directed against the whole
world, giving rise to real actions (action in rem)
against third persons, while personal right is binding
or enforceable only against a particular person, i.e.,
the debtor, giving rise to personal actions (actio in
personam) against such debtor.
All the three actions (interdictal, publiciana,
reinvindicatoria) though involving real property are
actions in personam and, therefore, the judgment
thereon bind only the same parties and their privies
or successors-in-interest in the same action arising
from the same cause, and not strangers. Thus, if a
person who is not a party to the action, is a possessor
in good faith of the property in question, the
judgment rendered in said case cannot be validly
executed against him. (Galaxy v. Uytiepo, 92 Phil.
344 [1952] as opposed to actions in rem or actions
against the whole world like the probate of a will or
a land registration proceeding.
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Obligations of an Owner (Arts. 431-432)
Art. 431. The owner of a thing cannot make use
thereof in such manner as to injure the rights of a
third person.
Obligation to respect the rights of others.
Based on Police Power -> Sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laidas : (use your own property in such a manner
as not to injure that of another)
Such restriction is deemed to exist even without an
expressed provision. This doesn’t apply where the
owner makes use of it in a lawful manner for then it
cannot be said that the manner of the use is such as
to injure the rights of a third person.
Art. 432. The owner of a thing has no right to
prohibit the interference of another with the same,
if the interference is necessary to avert an
imminent danger and the threatened damage,
compared to the damage arising to the owner
from the interference, is much greater. The owner
may demand from the person benefited
indemnity for the damage to him.
GR: As a rule, a person cannot interfere with the right
of ownership.
Exception: State of Necessity (recognized under the
Revised Penal Code) but does not exempt the
offender from civil liability. (Article 432 allows
interference with another’s property under certain
conditions)
It embodies the “least evil” rule – between 2 evils,
choosing the lesser evil is justified.
Requisites:
1. Interference necessary – Must be necessary
to avert imminent danger and the
threatened damage to the actor or a third
person.
path of a fire, or shooting to death a
neighbor’s pig found among the plants of a
person’s land.
-It is not required for a person in a state of
necessity to be free from negligence or
mistake. The measure is found in the situation.
The actor is given benefit of reasonable
doubt.
2. Damage to another much greater than
damage to property – The imminent danger
is greater than the damage to the owner
from the interference. After all, he may
demand from the person benefited
indemnity for the damage to him unless, of
course, the owner would have been liable
under the law for the damage if the danger
had not been prevented, in which case he
would not be entitled to recover indemnity
for the damage suffered by him.
Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of
ownership raises a disputable presumption of
ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial
process for the recovery of the property.
Presumption of Ownership (433 includes immovable
and movable)
Requisites:
1. There must be actual (physical or material)
possession of the property
2. The possession must be under claim of
ownership.
Purpose: To prevent disturbances of the public
peace, and to forbid any person righting himself by
his own hands and by violence, requiring that the
party who has obtained possession in this manner
shall restore it to the party from whom it has been so
obtained.
Nature: Judicial process contemplated
-includes all necessary acts and even
destruction to one’s property to avoid
danger. (In fire, an owner has no right to stop
firemen from breaking into his yard or even
demolishing his house to prevent fire)
-Disproportionate to the necessity of averting
the threatened danger or damage (unlawful)
Like demolishing a house which is not in the
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The term “judicial process” could mean no less than
an ejectment suit or reinvindicatory action, in which
the ownership claims of the contending parties may
be properly heard and adjudicated.
Ex parte petition is not a judicial process because it
is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one
party “sues another for the enforcement or
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protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of
a wrong.”
Unlike a judicial foreclosure of REM, any property
brought within the ambit of the Act is foreclosed by
the filing of a petition, not with any court of justice,
but with the office of the sheriff of the province
where the sale is to be made.
TAKE NOTE: A third person in possession of an
Extrajudicially foreclosed realty who has a better
right will have no chance to be hear on this kind of
proceeding. The 3rd person cannot be dispossessed
on a mere ex parte motion – it tantamounts to
ejectment (violation of due process).
Action to Recover
Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must
be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the
strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant’s claim.
Burden of proof lies on the party who substantially
asserts the affirmative of an issue, upon the principle
that the suitor who relies upon the existence of a fact
should be called upon to prove that fact by a
preponderance of evidence.
He must rely on the strength of his evidence and not
upon the weakness of the opposing party.
Requisites:
1. Identity of the Property - the person who
claims that he has a better right to the
property must prove not only his ownership of
the property claimed but also the identity of
the land he claims. (location, area and
boundaries)
(a) Doubt as to identity of land - In cases
of doubt as to the land’s identity, the
court may conduct an investigation
in the form of hearing or an ocular
inspection, or both, to enable it to
know positively the land in litigation.
(recourse to pleadings, extrinsic
evidence, oral or written)
(b) Sufficient identification of land - If a
party fails to identify sufficiently and
satisfactorily the land which he claims
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as his own, his action must necessarily
fail.
(c) Conflict
between
area
and
boundaries of land – THE BOUNDARY
WILL PREVAIL.
where it appears that the land is so
described by boundaries as to put its
identification beyond doubt, an
erroneous statement relative to the
area of the questioned parcel may
be disregarded because what really
defines a piece of ground is not the
area but the boundaries therein laid
down as enclosing the land and
indicating its limits.
Does not apply if the boundaries do
not identify the land beyond doubt. If
there is overlapping of boundaries,
the actual size gains importance.
(d) Precise location and extent of land it is not necessary for the plaintiff to
establish the precise location and
extent of the lands claimed or
occupied by the defendant, in order
to establish his right to a judgment for
possession, where he shows that the
defendant is unlawfully in possession
of any part of the tract of land his
ownership of which has already been
proved by him.
2. Strength of plaintiff’s title – Parties must litigate the
issue of identity and ownership.
(a) Presumption of Sufficient Title - The
possessor under claim of ownership has in his
favor the legal presumption that he holds the
possession by reason of a sufficient title, and
he cannot be forced to show it.
(b) Action founded on positive rights – The
action of the plaintiff must be founded on
positive rights and not merely on negative
ones, such as the lack or insufficiency of title
on the part of the defendant.
Mere possession of the thing claimed is
sufficient to insure respect for the present
possessor while no other person appears to
show and prove a better right.
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CASES:
Heirs of L. Vencilao Sr. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 123713
Facts:
A parcel of registered land located at Canduyao,
Calapo, San Isidro, Bohol mortgaged by Pedro
Luspo to the PNB was foreclosed and a portion of
which was later sold to the Gepalago Spouses. It
was donated by the spouses to their son in 1988.
On February 12, 1990, petitioners filed a complaint
for recovery thereof claiming ownership by virtue
of acquisitive prescription in favor of their
deceased father who had declared the property
for taxation purposes.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners holding that they had been in
possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years
and that the Gepalagos knew that the land had
long been possessed and enjoyed in the concept
of owners by petitioners.
The Court of Appeals, on appeal, reversed the trial
court and held that the vendee for value has the
right to rely on what appears on the certificate of
title and that a certificate of title is the best
evidence of ownership of registered land.
Issue: Whether or not the Petitioner can recover
title over the land
Ruling: Petitioner cannot recover title over the
land. The appeal is dismissed
The Supreme Court held that a title, once
registered, cannot be defeated even by adverse,
open and notorious possession.
In this case, it should be noted that the land in
dispute is a registered land placed under the
operation of the Torrens system way back in 1959,
or more than thirty (30) years before petitioners
instituted the present action in the court a quo,
and for which Original Certificate of Title No. 400
was issued. The rule is well-settled that prescription
does not run against registered land.
Neither can the tax declarations and tax receipts
presented by petitioners as evidence of ownership
prevail over respondents' certificate of title which,
to reiterate, is an incontrovertible proof of
ownership. It should be stressed that tax
declarations and receipts do not by themselves
conclusively prove title to the land. They only
constitute positive and strong indication that the
59 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
taxpayer concerned has made a claim either to
the title or to the possession of the property for
which taxes have been paid. Stated differently,
tax declarations and tax receipts are only prima
facie evidence of ownership or possession.
But assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioners
has indeed acquired the land they were claiming
by prescription, there likewise exists a serious d
oubt on the precise identity of the disputed
property. What petitioners claimed in their
complaint was a parcel of land located in
Cambansag, San Isidro, Bohol, with an area of
3,625 square meters. This clearly differs from the
piece of land registered in the name of
Gepalagos, which is Lot No. A-73 of the Subdivision
Plan (LRC) Psd-60558, LRC Rec. No. H-4251, and
located in Candungao Calapo, San Isidro, Bohol,
with an area of 5,970 square meters. Even the
commissioner's report failed to clarify the
difference in the area and location of the
property claimed. In order that an action to
recover ownership of real property may prosper,
the person who claims that he has a better right to
it must prove not only his ownership of the same
but also satisfactorily prove the identity thereof.
CA RULING AFFIRMED: Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court and declared the Gepalagos
owners of the disputed property —
Evidently,
defendant-appellants
spouses
Gepalago were purchasers in good faith and for
value. They acquired their share in the property
from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) which was
the registered owner. Even assuming they had
knowledge of the plaintiff-appellee' possession of
the said property at the time of the purchase, it
was PNB which was the registered owner of the
property. The title was transferred to the bank after
the foreclosure sale of the property mortgaged by
the previous registered owner, Pedro Luspo.
Thus, where the certificate of title is in the name of
the vendor when the land is sold, the vendee for
value has the right to rely on what appears on the
certificate of title. The rule that all persons dealing
with property covered by Torrens Certificate of
Title are not required to go beyond what appears
on the face of the title is well-settled.
Heirs of Anastacio Fabela vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 142546
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Legal principle: The plaintiff must rely on the
strength of the title. Failure to
overcome the preponderance of evidence with
regard to the ownership as well as the
identification of the title will not merit the remedy
Facts: On May 10, 1924, the Heirs of Fabela and
Neri entered into an agreement, Escritura de
Transaccion, which entrusted Neri with the
possession of the land for a period of 14 years
Upon the expiration of the period on May 10, 1938,
Neri would restore the possession of the property
to the Heirs of Fabela without need of redemption.
Around 1977 or 1978, the Bureau of Lands
conducted a survey on the land when a road was
constructed across the land dividing the disputed
property into two lots (Lot 868 and 870), both of
which Neri declared in his name.
Sometime in 1980, the Philippine Veterans
Industrial Development Corporation (PHIVIDEC)
negotiated with Neri for the purchase of one of
the lots but the sale was contested by the Heirs of
Fabela. However, Neri executed a waiver over a
portion of Lot 870 stating that that it was
erroneously included his name, thus, the Heirs of
Fabela received the proceeds.
However, despite demands, Neri still had not
returned Lot 868, pursuant to the Escritura de
Transaccion agreement in 1924. Thus, the Heirs of
Fabela filed for reconveyance of the said parcel
of land against Neri.
The RTC ruled in favour of the Heirs of Fabela but
the CA reversed its decision stating that the Heirs
had not successfully adduced the required
preponderance of evidence. Although the lands
were claimed by the Fabela, it Neri who had
registered the lots in his name. Thus, Neri’s waiver
of rights in 1980 only refers to Lot 870, not Lot 868.
Issue: W/N the Heirs of Fabela failed to adduce
preponderance of evidence
Ruling: Yes, the Heirs of Fabela’s failure to identify
the boundaries of the land with particularity
coupled with failure to pay land taxes does not
overthrow the presumption that Neri is the rightful
owner of Lot 868.
On the issue of boundaries: What really defines a
piece of land is not the area mentioned in its
description, but the boundaries therein laid down,
60 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. In this
case, the Heirs of Fabela base their claim of
ownership on the Escritura de Transaccion
agreement. However, the said agreement failed
to identify with particularity, the boundaries of the
land, particularly Lot 868.
On the issue of registration and payment of tax:
Although a tax declaration is not considered as
conclusive proof of ownership the same is
admissible in evidence to show the nature of the
possession of the claimant of the property for
which taxes have been paid. Where it is shown
that the plaintiff has never paid the land tax, while
the defendant has faithfully done so for many
years, there being no explanation offered, it was
held that such payment of taxes should be taken
into consideration in favor of defendant.
Being the exclusive possessors of the subject
property who have declared the same for tax
purposes through the years, defendantsappellants are entitled to such favorable
presumption of ownership which so far had not
been overturned by plaintiffs-appellees. In this
case, when the Bureau of Lands conducted the
survey, the registered claimant of Lot 868 was Neri,
who had declared the land for taxation purposes.
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff
to establish his case by preponderance of
evidence. If he claims a right granted or created
by law, he must prove his claim by competent
evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of that of
his opponent. When the record does not show
that the land which is the subject matter of the
action for recovery of ownership has been exactly
determined, such action cannot prosper,
inasmuch as the petitioners’ ownership rights in
the land claimed do not appear satisfactorily and
conclusively proven at the trial.
Evidence to Prove Ownership
Ownership may be shown by any evidence, written
or oral, admissible in law
1. Torrens Title
2. Title from Spanish government
3. Patent Duly registered
4. Deed of sale
5. Operating a business for nine years in defendant’s
own name representing himself to the public to be
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the owner and the plaintiff never made any protest
or objection.
6. Occupation of a building for a long time by a
party without paying rent
7. A letter in which defendant recognized the
ownership of the property by the plaintiff
8. Adverse and exclusive possession and ownership
of parcels of land for a long time attested not only
by witnesses but also by declaration of properties,
payment of taxes, and a deed of mortgage
executed by the possessor’s predecessors-in-interest
as owners of the property.
Quantum of proof needed
(1) Preponderance of evidence. —
This is the evidence adduced as a whole by one side
is superior to that of the other. Thus, this form of
evidence may be rebutted by stronger, contrary
evidence.
Equiponderance of evidence - there is nothing in the
evidence which shall incline it to one side or the
other, the court will find for the defendant.
Why? Under this principle, the plaintiff must rely on
the strength of his evidence and not on the
weakness of the defendant’s claim.
(2) Indicia of claim of ownership - One’s evidence
may or may not be sufficient to support a claim of
ownership or title over property.
Example: there mere leasing of property and
receiving rent therefor; tax declarations or tax
receipts -> in the absence of other proofs, are not
sufficient to support an action to recover.
Tax dec are only prima facie evidence of ownership
or possession but are NONETHELESS good indicia of
possession.
(3) Conclusiveness of certificates of title - An original
certificate of title indicates true and legal ownership
of a private land and should be accorded great
weight as against tax declarations and/or tax
receipts which are not conclusive evidence of
ownership nor proof of the area covered therein.
CASES:
Republic vs. Carrasco
G.R. No. 143491
Facts: Carrasco filed an application for registration
of title over a parcel of land, claiming ownership
of at least 30 years over the property. Among the
documents attached to the application were the
following:
• Individual plan and technical description of the
land
• Diazo polyester film (SEPIA) of the original survey
subdivision plan SGSNo. 04-000518-D of which the
subject land is a part
• Affidavit of Ownership dated August 22, 1996,
therein stating that he took possession of the land
in 1990 from his predecessor, Norberto Mingao,
who has occupied the land for the last 25 years
• Mingao’s Deed of Waiver dated December 16,
1991, thereunder waiving his claim over the land
in favor of the respondent
• Certification from the Land Registration Authority
as to the status of the land
• Tax Declaration No. 017-4224 for the year 1996 in
his name
• Official receipt dated September 13, 1996 of
realty tax payment
The Republic opposed Carrasco’s application,
insisting that (1) the land being applied for
registration is not alienable public agricultural
land; and (2) Carrasco is not qualified to register
the lot under Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1529. Both the RTC and CA ruled in favour of
Carrasco.
Issue: W/N Carrasco was able to sufficiently prove
his possession of the lot in the concept of an owner
Ruling: No, Carrasco was unable to sufficiently
prove possession in the concept of an owner due
to his failure to prove the either he or Mingao have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the property under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945.
If there is an earlier then the earlier title will prevail
over the later one.
Under Section 14, paragraph (1), of the Property
Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529), property may
be registered once it can be shown that (a) the
claimant, by himself or through his predecessorsin-interest, have been in open, continuous,
exclusive
and
notorious
possession
and
occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b)
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the land subject of the application is alienable
and disposable land of the public domain.
While the subject property is indeed part of the
part of the alienable and disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, having been classified
as such by the DENR, Carrasco failed to establish
his ownership of the land in question for the period
of possession required by law.
The person who seeks registration of title to a piece
of land must prove his claim by clear and
convincing evidence. In this case, Carrasco failed
to prove that Mingao, from whom he allegedly
derived his title, was the owner of the subject land
and hence can transmit rights over the same in his
favor.
Based on Mingao’s Affidavit of Ownership on June
1, 1998, Mingao had been in possession of the lot
since 1950. However, without more evidence, said
affidavit is not adequate to prove the fact of
possession beginning that date. Such an affidavit
cannot be given full credence when it simply
alleged that Mingao had occupied the land for
the last 25 years.
Moreover, Carrasco’s testimony
regarding
Mingao's possession and ownership, aside from
being self-serving, consists merely of general
statements with no specifics even as to when his
predecessor began occupying the land. Indeed,
such is hardly the well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence required in cases of this nature.
Carrasco must present proof of specific acts of
ownership to substantiate his claim and cannot
just offer general statements which are mere
conclusions of law than factual evidence of
possession.
Thus, Carrasco could not have acquired an
imperfect title to the land in question because he
has not proved possession openly, continuously
and adversely in the concept of an owner since
June 12, 1945, the period of possession required by
law. At best, he can only prove possession since
1990, the date which he admitted to have taken
possession of the subject parcel of land from
Mingao.
Ramos-Balalio vs. Ramos
G.R. No. 168464
Facts:
Felix Domingo applied for a sales patent over a
parcel of land. Susana Ramos opposed the
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application stating that she had been occupying
the lot since 1938. The Bureau of Land ruled in
favor of Susana, declaring that she and her
children have sufficiently established their right of
preference over the land and advised her to
apply for a homestead patent.
Subsequently, Susana sold the land to Zenaida
who, in turn, partitioned it among herself, her
brother Alexander, Rolando, and Eusebio.
However, not only was the partition unregistered
but the Deeds of Sale were executed to only to
Alexander and Rolando. When Zenaida
mortgaged her share, it came to her knowledge
that Rolando and Eusebio had usurped her share
and deprived the mortgagees of possession over
the land. After settling the mortgage, she filed a
case before RTC for the recovery of inheritance,
possession and damages with a petition for
preliminary mandatory injunction. RTC ruled in
favour of Ramos-Balali and ordered her brother
and Ramos to pay her.
The CA reversed the RTC decision, upon finding
that there was no homestead patent application.
Due to this lack of application, Susana’s better
right of possession never ripened into ownership
which she could have transmitted it to her heirs.
Thus, neither of the parties can claim any vested
right over the subject parcel of land which is still
part of the public domain. Issue: W/N Zenaida has
sufficiently proven ownership over the land
Ruling: Yes, Zenaida has sufficiently proven prior
possession of the lot in the concept of owner
through a verified application for land registration
with the Bureau of Lands, along with tax
declarations.
However,
while
preferential
possession is granted to Zenaida, the lack of the
homestead patent application means that
ownership cannot be enforced because none of
the parties have any vested right over property
which is still part of the public domain.
Zenaida proved prior possession of her portion of
the land because her possession antedates the
filing of the homestead application. She
produced evidence showing that she has filed a
verified application for the registration of the land
with the Bureau of Lands on August 10, 1971 which
is still pending. The documents remain
uncontested and the application has not been
assailed by any of the parties to the case. She
alleged that during the lifetime of her mother, she
and her maternal grandfather cultivated and
occupied the land.
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Moreover, Zenaida presented tax declarations
both in her name and her mother. Although tax
declarations or realty tax payments of property
are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession
in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in
his actual or at least constructive possession. They
constitute at least proof that the holder has a
claim of title over the property. Her voluntary
declaration of her property for taxation purposes
manifest not only her sincere and honest desire to
obtain title to the property and announces her
adverse claim against the State and all other
interested parties, but also the intention to
contribute needed revenues to the Government.
Ergo, her uncontested and verified application for
a homestead patent coupled with her open and
notorious occupation of the land proves her
preferential right to possess the land claimed,
which entitled her to be protected by law in such
possession.
Spouses Azana vs. Lumbo
G.R. No. 157593
Facts:
Lumbo’s parents purchased a parcel of land at a
public auction, evidenced by a final bill of sale.
This same property was inherited by Lumbo upon
the death of his parents. However, when it had
come to their knowledge that a deed of absolute
sale over the property was issued by Spouses
Gregorio to Spouses Azana, they filed an action
for quieting of title.
Spouses Azana claim that they had purchased the
property from Spouses Gregorio in good faith,
evidence by an absolute deed of sale. They claim
that Spouses Gregoria were indeed the prior
lawful owners, having purchased the property
from Bandiola, also evidenced by a Deed of Sale.
They also show tax declarations over the subject
lot.
The RTC ruled in favour of Spouses Azana, stating
that Lumbo had failed to establish that the
property was included in the final bill of sale. Due
to the equiponderance of evidence, all doubts
must be resolved in favour of Spouses Azana.
However, the CA reversed the decision and ruled
in favour of Lumbo.
Ruling: No, Spouses Azana’s claim of ownership
does not establish preponderance of evidence
because the evidence they presented was not
enough to overturn Lumbo’s final bill of sale.
First, Spouses Azana clearly failed to establish by
preponderance
of
evidence, the exact
perimeters of the property they are claiming for
ownership. Their tax declarations state that the lot
was bound in the east by a particular land mass.
However, it is highly unlikely that the portion of the
mother property would not have similar
boundaries as those of the latter on at least two
sides. The evidence they presented cast doubt on
the validity of their claim.
Second, the tax declarations presented are not
enough to prove ownership. While in the absence
of contrary evidence, tax declarations, being
official documents, enjoy a presumption of truth
as to their contents, they are not conclusive
evidence of ownership. A disclaimer is even
printed on their face that they are issued only in
connection with real property taxation [and]
should not be considered as title to the property.
At best, tax declarations are an indicia of
possession in the concept of an owner. Nondeclaration of a property for tax purposes does
not necessarily negate ownership.
Third, the Deeds of Sale, which stemmed from
Badiola are only prima facie evidence. They have
since been disputed because Bandiola could not
have owned the property. Thus, the subsequent
conveyance to Spouses Gregorio, and ultimately
to Spouses Azana, were null and void.
Clearly, Lumbo has been able to establish by
preponderance of evidence that they are the
rightful owners of the lot. When an owner of real
property is disturbed in any way in his rights over
the property by the unfounded claim of others, he
may bring an action for quieting of title. The
purpose of the action is to remove the cloud on
his title created by any instrument, record,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently
valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid
and prejudicial to his title. Thus, Lumbo, as the
owner of the property, is entitled to have the
aforementioned deeds of sale nullified to remove
any doubt regarding their ownership of the lot.
Issue: W/N Spouses Azana was able to establish
ownership over the property
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Fule vs. Legare
G.R. No. L-17951
Facts: Legare owned a parcel of land, where a
residential house was built, as evidenced by a TCT.
she lived there with her adopted son, John, and
her maid. Through a public deed, she mortgaged
the house in favour of Soriano as security for her
loan.
One evening, Legare, John, and the maid were
sitting in the drawing room when an unknown man
intruded, pressed a knife to Legare’s throat, and
told her to give him P10,000. Because Legare had
no money, the man left, threatening her to get the
money ready as he would be back in the morning.
Her son John made no attempt to help and
instead told his mother to sign certain papers,
which will enable her to receive assistance from
the US Veterans Adminstration. Legare was unable
to read or write and was only able to sign her
name, signed the documents.
Unfortunately, the document was a Deed of Sale
in favour of John Legare, supposedly executed on
April 7, 1953 and acknowledged by a notary
public. John approached a real estate broker
who helped him sell the house to Spouses Fule.
Spouses Fule also agreed to pay the balance of
the mortgage to Soriano.
Thus, a Deed of Sale between John Legare and
Spouses File was executed. Legare now filed an
action to cancel the title based on her son’s
fraudulent acts.
Issue: W/N Legare can recover her property
Ruling: No, even if the the deed of sale in favour
of John Legare was fraudulent, when the lot was
purchased by Spouses Fule from a licensed broker,
they are considered innocent purchasers for value
and are now the lawful owners.
Under Section 5 of Act 496, as amended, John's
possession of the certificate and its subsequent
transfer to Spouses Fule operated as a conclusive
authority from the registered owner to the register
of deeds to enter a new certificate. Although the
deed of sale in favor of John Legare was
fraudulent, the fact remains that he was able to
secure a registered title to the house and lot. It was
this title which he subsequently conveyed to
Spouses Fule.
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While a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and
conveys no title, there are instances when such a
fraudulent document may become the root of a
valid title. One such instance is where the
certificate of title was already transferred from the
name of the true owner to the forger, and while it
remained that way, the land was subsequently
sold to an innocent purchaser. For then, the
vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared
in the certificate.
The rights of the innocent purchaser for value must
be respected because under the Torrens system,
registration is the operative act that gives validity
to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.
Consequently, where there was nothing in the
certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in
the ownership of the property, or any
encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not
required to explore farther than what the Torrens
title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden
defect or inchoate right that may subsequently
defeat his right thereto. If the rule were otherwise,
the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate
of title which the Torrens system seeks to insure
would entirely be futile and nugatory.
When the Register of Deeds issued and registered
a certificate of title in the name of John Legare,
insofar as third parties were concerned, he had
acquired valid title to the house and lot. Therefore,
when he transferred this title to the Spouses Fule,
third persons, the entire transaction fell within the
purview of Article 1434 of the Civil Code. The
registration in John Legare's 1 name effectively
operated to convey the properties to him.
Rumarete vs. Hernandez
G.R. No. 168222
Legal principle: Payment of taxes alone, without
possession, could hardly be construed as an
exercise of ownership, where what stands out is
the overwhelming passivity of claimants of
allowing another to exercise acts of ownership
and to enjoy the fruits of the litigated lot for 22
years without any interference.
Facts: Spouses Rumarate filed an action for
reconveyance against the heirs of Hernandez.
Rumarate claims that the disputed lot was
possessed by his godfather, Santiago, who then
orally donated the lot to Rumarate in 1929, and
executed an affidavit of quit-claim, ratifying the
transfer of the lot to Rumarate in 1960. In 1929, the
Rumarate family had been possessing the land as
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owners and paid taxes since 1961. In 1970,
Rumarate learned that the Heirs of Hernandez
were able to acquire a title over the lot. However,
he did not immediately file a case against them
because he was advised to just remain on the
land and pay the corresponding taxes.
The Heirs of Hernandez claim that Santiago had
actually sold the lot to their parents on 1964. The
CFI decision recognised the lot as public land and
recognised Santiago as a claimant but the latter
was not issued a title because he failed to file an
answer. Spouses Hernandez later filed a motion for
the case to be re-opened, which resulted in the
issuance of an OCT in their name. After their
death, their heirs executed a deed of partition
and were issued a TCT over the lot. From 1996, the
Hernandez’s had been paying the taxes but were
not in actual possession of the property, only
intermittently visiting at times.
The RTC ruled in favour of Rumarate , stating that
possession of the land in the concept of owner
since 1929 makes them owners by acquisitive
prescription after the lapse of 10 years (the
prescriptive period for accion publiciana. Thus,
when Santiago sold the land to Spouses
Hernandez, Santiago actually hod no more title
over the property, and therefore, transmitted no
right of ownership to Hernandez.
Issue: W/N the lot should be awarded to
Rumarate, who had been occupying the lot since
1929 but had no certificate of title
Ruling: Yes, while Rumarate had no certificate of
title over the lot, his open, continuous, exclusive,
notorious possession and occupation in the
concept of an owner for more than 30 years
vested him and his heirs title over the said lot. While
Hernandez had a certificate of title, their lack of
possession, coupled with passivity in allowing
Rumarate to exercise acts of ownership over the
property is not indicative of their ownership.
The law applicable at the time Rumarate
completed his 30-year possession (from 1929 to
1959) in the concept of an owner was Sec. 48(b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land
Act, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,
effective June 22, 1957.
The said law provides that those who by
themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been, in continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession
and occupation
of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
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bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing
of the application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title.
It is important to note that possession is broader
than occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law adds the
word occupation, it seeks to delimit the allencompassing effect of constructive possession.
Taken together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious, the word occupation
serves to highlight the fact that for one to qualify
under the Public Land Act, his possession of the
land must not be mere fiction.
Thus, when the conditions are complied with, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law, a right to a government grant,
without necessity of a certificate of title being
issued, and the land ceases to be part of the
public domain. The registration would not confer
title, but simply recognize a title already vested.
Payment of taxes alone will not grant a right of
ownership to Hernandez. Only a positive and
categorical assertion of their supposed rights
against Rumarate would rule out the application
of laches. It means taking the offensive by
instituting legal means to wrest possession of the
property which, however, is absent in this case.
The payment of taxes alone, without possession
could hardly be construed as an exercise of
ownership. What stands out is their overwhelming
passivity by allowing Rumarate to exercise acts of
ownership and to enjoy the fruits of the litigated lot
for 22 years without any interference.
DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY BY COMPETENT
AUTHORITY (Art. 435-436)
Art. 435. No person shall be deprived of his
property except by competent authority and for
public use and always upon payment of just
compensation.
Should this requirement be not first complied with,
the courts shall protect and, in a proper case,
restore the owner in his possession. (349a)
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1. As an exercise of the power of Eminent Domain
Public use, judicial question.
The right or power of the State or of those to whom
the power has been lawfully delegated to take (or
expropriate) private property for public use upon
paying to the owner a just compensation to be
ascertained according to law.
The question of whether a particular use is a public
one is ultimately a judicial question. But where
Congress has specified the public purpose for which
the authority to expropriate is granted, the courts are
without jurisdiction to inquire into the necessity of
such purpose.
The expropriation of property for public use is
governed by special laws. (Art. 1488.) The Rules of
Court (Rule 69 thereof.) governs the procedure for
the exercise of eminent domain.
Requisites:
(1) The taking must be done by competent authority;
(2) It must be for public use;
(3) The owner must be paid just compensation; and
(4) The requirement of due process of law must be
observed.
Legal basis: Article 8, 1987 Constitution
ELEMENTS:
TAKING BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY.
o
By the State- it is inherent which need not be
granted by the Constitution.
Where is it lodged: Legislative may be validly
delegated
o
By Municipal Corporations, other gov’t
entities, and public service corps.
- The scope of such delegated power is
necessarily narrower than that of the
delegating authority and must be sought
in the terms of the delegation itself.
EXISTENCE OF PUBLIC USE
Public Use, concept.
may be identified with “public benefit,’’ “public
utility,’’ or “public advantage.’’ It should not be
understood as the equivalent of “use by the public.’’
That only a few actually benefit from the
expropriation of private property does not diminish its
public use as long as public benefit or advantage is
present although it may only be indirect, including in
particular urban land reform and housing.
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On the other hand, if the authority given is a general
one, courts have the power to inquire into the issue
of whether the particular expropriation is indeed for
public use or not.
Reasonable necessity sufficient.
In the exercise of the power of eminent domain,
absolute necessity is not required, but only a
reasonable necessity of the taking for the purpose in
view.
PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION
Just compensation, concept.
The equivalent for the value of the property at the
time of its taking.
Anything beyond that is more and anything short of
that is less than just compensation.
Measure of indemnity: Fair and full equivalent for the
loss sustained, not whatever gain would accrue to
the expropriating entity.
Estimating the MV:
all the capabilities of the property and all the uses to
which it may be applied or for which it is adapted
are to be considered and not merely its condition at
the time and the use to which it is applied by the
owner.
All the facts as to the condition of the property and
its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities
may be shown and considered in estimating its
value. (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 597
[1981].)
Prompt payment to property owner.
means not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid the owner of the property but
also the payment of the amount within a reasonable
time after its taking.
Determination of Just Compensation
Judicial Function.
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Note:
The executive department or the legislature may
make the initial determination but when a party
claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights
that private property may not be taken for public
use without just compensation, no statute, decree or
executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court’s finding.
OBSERVANCE OF DUE PROCESS
2 fold-aspect:
o
o
Procedural- method or manner by
which the law is enforced.
not be entitled to compensation, unless he can
show that such condemnation or seizure is
unjustified.
2. As an exercise of Police Power
Related to the use, enjoyment, not ownership or
property.
Any holder of property, however absolute and
unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied
condition that his manner of using it shall not be
injurious to the enjoyment of others having an equal
right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious
to the community.
Note: It is violative of due process to deny to
the owner the opportunity to prove that the
valuation in the tax documents is unfair or
wrong
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas: (use your own
property in such a manner as not to injure that of
another)
Substantive- requires that the law itself, not
merely the procedures by which the law is
enforced, is fair, reasonable or just.
Police power laws and regulations do not constitute
taking under the right of eminent domain or a
deprivation of property without due process of law.
Note: the taking of property for private use,
or without compensation or payment of just
compensation, or by a corporation which is
not a “competent authority,’’ offends
substantive due process.
Persons affected
compensation.
RESTORATION TO THE OWNER OF HIS PROPERTY
Taking of property not involved.
not
entitled
to
financial
Unlike in eminent domain, the person affected by
the exercise of police power is not entitled to
financial compensation, unless he can show that the
condemnation or seizure is unjustified.
Should the requirements for the exercise of eminent
domain be not first complied with, the courts shall
protect, and in a proper case, restore the owner in
his possession. (Art. 435, par. 2.)
Compensation: altruistic recognition that the just
restraint is for the public good.
1.Where there is estoppel or acquiescence on the
part of the owner.
Art. 438. Hidden treasure belongs to the owner of
the land, building, or other property on which it is
found.
if the owner of a land allows a public utility company
to occupy his land, without objection, he is
considered to have waived his right to the possession
thereof and may sue only for just compensation.
2.Where power exercised is without authority.
if any such person or corporation enters upon private
property in the absence of such authority, they are
there as mere trespassers and stand in no better
position than any other intruder.’’
Art. 436. When any property is condemned or
seized by competent authority in the interest of
health, safety or security, the owner thereof shall
67 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
K. HIDDEN TREASURE (Art. 438-439)
Nevertheless, when the discovery is made on the
property of another, or of the State or any of its subdivisions, and by chance, one-half thereof shall be
allowed to the finder. If the finder is a trespasser,
he shall not be entitled to any share of the
treasure.
If the things found be of interest to science or the
arts, the State may acquire them at their just price,
which shall be divided in conformity with the rule
stated. (351a)
Art. 439. By treasure is understood, for legal
purposes, any hidden and unknown deposit of
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money, jewelry, or other precious objects, the
lawful ownership of which does not appear. (352)
Concept of Hidden Treasure
A. Consist of money, jewels, or precious objects
(movables only e.g. prehistoric tomb
excluded except the movables found
therein).
B. Its existence is hidden and unknown, such
that their finding is a real discovery. (Owner
unknown, e.g. only if the thing has been
considered lost and the owner has already
abandoned it)
C. Its lawful ownership does not appear
Right to Hidden Treasure
1. Place where the treasure may be found.
2. Belongs to owner of the land, etc. if he is the
finder.
3. Finder entitled to one-half if he is not the
owner of land, etc.
4. Finding is by chance (not purposely sought)
o
or a paid laborer working for the owner of the
land, provided he has not been engaged
precisely to look for hidden treasure.
Who is a trespasser?
a stranger who has absolutely no right over the
property in which the treasure is found and has not
been given permission by the other to enter.
Such person is not entitled to any share of the
treasure he may discover since a person cannot be
allowed to benefit from his own unlawful act
especially if there is a prohibition against his entry.
Problem:
Suppose under a tip that hidden treasure is buried in
the land of X, Y leased the property and found
precious objects after conducting excavations
thereon. Is Y entitled to one-half share in the
treasure? Yes, for the following reasons:
(a) Y is not a trespasser;
(b) He is not guilty of any unlawful act;
(c) The treasure would not have been found had Y
not leased the property;
Note:
a. See however: Opinion of Jurado where
finding by chance may also include cases
“by a stroke of good fortune”.
b. If the owner has his permission to the finder to
make an investigation, the finder is still
entitled to (1/2)
c. The finder should be entitled to a share as a
recompense for his sincerity and labor and
on the principle of quasi-contract (1/2)
Important: A finder ordered by the landowner to
search is not entitled he is entitled only to
salary/wage.
(d) One-half is a just recompense for his effort and
assuming some risks; and
(e) There was an element of uncertainty in the
discovery.
SEC 3. Right of accession with respect to movable
property
KINDS OF ACCESSION (PERSONAL PROPERTY)
1. Conjunction
or
adjunction
(i.e.
engraftment,
attachment,
weaving,
painting, writing)
2. Commixtion or confusion
3. Specification
Who are strangers?
Anyone who has absolutely no right over the
immovable or the thing in which the treasure is found
but includes also:
o
o
Lessee (gets ½)
Usufructuary (gets ½)
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ADJUNCTION
466. Whenever two movable things belonging to
different owners are, without bad faith, united in
such a way that they form a single object, the owner
of the principal thing acquires the accessory,
indemnifying the former owner thereof for its value.
ADJUNCTION DEFINED
The union of two movable things belonging to
different owners in such a way that they form a
single object, but each one of the component
things preserves its value.
Characteristics
In order that adjunction may take place, it is
necessary that:
1.
There are two movables belonging to different
owners
2.
They are united in such a way that they form a
single object
3.
They are so inseparable that their separation
would impair their nature or result in
substantial injury to either component.
NOTE:
In determining the right of the parties in adjunction,
regard is had only to the things joined and not to the
persons. But where there is a mere change of form
or value which does not destroy the identity of the
component parts, the original owners may demand
their separation. (see Art. 469.)
Kinds of adjunction
1.
2.
Inclusion/Engraftment – when a diamond is set
on a gold ring
Soldering – when lead is united to an object
made of lead
i.
ii.
Ferruminacion – if both the accessory and
principal objects are of the same metal
Plumbatura – if they are of different metals
3.
Writing – when a person writes on another’s
paper
4.
Painting – when a person paints on another’s
canvas
5.
Weaving – when thread belonging to different
owners are used in making textile
OWNERSHIP OF
ADJUNCTION
NEW
OBJECT
FORMED
BY
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Union
took
place
WITHOUT BAD FAITH
the owner of the
principal thing acquires
the accessory, with the
obligation to indemnify
the former owner of the
accessory for its value
in its uncontroverted
state.
Union took place in
BAD FAITH
Article 470 applies.
Art. 467. The principal thing, as between two things
incorporated, is deemed to be that to which the
other has been united as an ornament, or for its
use or perfection. (376)
468. If It cannot be determined which of the two is
the principal one, the thing of the greater value
shall be so considered, and as between two
things of equal value, that of the greater volume.
In painting and sculpture, writings, printed matter,
engraving and lithographs, the board, metal,
stone, canvas, paper or parchment shall be
deemed the accessory thing.
TESTS TO DETERMINE PRINCIPAL IN THE ORDER OF
APPLICATION
A.
B.
C.
D.
That thing to which the other has been
united as an ornament or for its use or
perfection (rule of importance and
purpose)
The one of greater value, if they are of
unequal value
The one of greater volume, if equal value
That of greater merits taking into
consideration
all
pertinent
legal
provisions applicable as well as the
comparative merits, utility and volume of
their respective things.
Take note: In paintings, etc. what is painted is of
greater value or importance that the board, etc.
Hence, the painting is the principal.
2nd test:
Reasonable because as a GR: things of greater
value are more important than thigs of smaller
value.
3rd test:
Purely arbitrary (but based on the necessity of
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resolving the matter)
3.
WHERE ADJUNCTION INVOLVES THREE OR MORE
THINGS
Art 466 should be applied. The principal should be
determined and distinguished from the others.
Should there be two or more things that could be
considered principals with respect to the others, still
the court should determine by resort to reasonable
means which is the principal thing and which are
the accessory things. (3 Manresa 279.)
Art. 469. Whenever the things united can be
separated without injury, their respective owners
may demand their separation.
Nevertheless, in case the thing united for the use,
embellishment or perfection of the other, is much
more precious than the principal thing, the owner
of the former may demand its separation, even
though the thing to which it has been incorporated
may suffer some injury. (378)
TWO INSTANCES WHEN SEPARATION
ALLOWED:
1.
MAY BE
Separation without injury – when
separation can be done without injury,
their respective owners may demand
separation.
NOTE: Here, there has been no real
accession.
Article
469
apparently
contemplates adjunction by inclusion and
by soldering in which separation is possible
without injury to the things united
2.
Accessory much more precious – where
the thing (e.g. diamond) united for the
embellishment or perfection of the other,
is much more precious than the principal
thing (eg. gold ring), the owner of the
diamond may demand its separation
even though the principal thing may
suffer some injury.
Who shall
separation?
bear
the
expenses
Owner of principal acted in bad faith –
owner of the accessory may separate it
even if the principal be destroyed.
470. ADJUNCTION IN BAD FAITH
Art. 470. Whenever the owner of the accessory
thing has made the incorporation in bad faith, he
shall lose the thing incorporated and shall have
the obligation to indemnify the owner of the
principal thing for the damages he may have
suffered.
If the one who has acted in bad faith is the owner
of the principal thing, the owner of the accessory
thing shall have a right to choose between the
former paying him its value or that the thing
belonging to him be separated, even though for
this purpose it be necessary to destroy the
principal thing; and in both cases, furthermore,
there shall be indemnity for damages.
If either one of the owners has made the
incorporation with the knowledge and without
the objection of the other, their respective rights
shall be determined as though both acted in
good faith. (379a)
RULES ADJUNCTION IS DONE IN BAD FAITH
1.
Bad faith on the part of the accessory owner
A. He shall lose the thing incorporated
B. Liable for damages
2.
Bad faith on the part of the principal owner
Accessory owner is given the owner to:
A. Require principal owner to pay
the value of the accessory plus
damages
B. Have the accessory separated
even if destroys the principal, plus
damages
3.
Bad faith on the part of both = the
respective rights shall be determined as
though both acted in good faith. Article 453
should be applied.
for
When is there bad faith?
The owner who caused the incorporation
because he is the one considered at fault
although he acted in good faith
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When either one of the owners made the union with
the knowledge and without the objection of the
other (Art. 453, par. 2)
FORM OF INDEMNITY
Art. 471. Whenever the owner of the material
employed without his consent has a right to an
indemnity, he may demand that this consist in the
delivery of a thing equal in kind and value, and in
all other respects, to that employed, or else in the
price thereof, according to expert appraisal. (380)
The material employed may be the principal or the
accessory, the owner of such material has the right
to an indemnity because he acted in good faith,
while the other who made the incorporation without
his consent, acted in bad faith.
Innocent owner has the option to either:
A. Demand the delivery of a thing equal in kind
and value and in all other respects to that
employed
(e.g.
quantity,
quality,
appearance)
B. Demand payment of its price, including its
sentimental value as appraised by experts
Take note: This is without prejudice to the right given
to the accessory owner to demand its separation
from the principal thing.
Art. 472. If by the will of their owners two things of
the same or different kinds are mixed, or if the
mixture occurs by chance, and in the latter case
the things are not separable without injury, each
owner shall acquire a right proportional to the part
belonging to him, bearing in mind the value of the
things mixed or confused. (381)
Art. 473. If by the will of only one owner, but in
good faith, two things of the same or different kinds
are mixed or confused, the rights of the owners
shall be determined by the provisions of the
preceding article.
If the one who caused the mixture or confusion
acted in bad faith, he shall lose the thing
belonging to him thus mixed or confused, besides
being obliged to pay indemnity for the damages
caused to the owner of the thing with which his
own was mixed. (382)
Mixture
Articles 472 and 473 deal with mixture which takes
place when two or more things belonging to
different owners are mixed or combined with the
respective identities of the component parts
destroyed or lost.
As distinguished from adjudication, there is a greater
degree of inter-penetration, and in certain cases,
even decomposition of the things which have been
mixed.
Two kinds of mixture:
1. Commixtion – mixture of
belonging to different owners
solid
things
2. Confusion – mixture of liquid things belonging
to different owners
Note: May be voluntary of by chance.
RULES GOVERNING MIXTURE
1. Mixture by will of the owners – Their rights shall
first be governed by their stipulations. If there
is none, each owner acquires a right I the
mixture in proportion to the value of his
material as in co-ownership.
2. Mixture caused by an owner in good faith or
by chance – Share of each owner shall be
proportional to the value which belonged to
him.
Note: The rule is different in cases of
accession which give to the owner of the
principal, right over the accessory.
However, it is to be noted that strictly
speaking, there is NO accession in mixture
since there is neither a principal nor
accessory.
A. If things mixed are exactly the same kind and
quality: Divide the mixture equally between
the owners
B. If things mixed are of different kinds or quality:
Co-ownership arises
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Note: However, if the things mixed can be
separated without injury, their respective
owners may demand their separation.
The expenses incident to separation shall be
borne by all the owners in proportion to their
respective interests in the mixture.
Good faith does not necessarily exclude
negligence which gives right to damages.
(Art. 456.)
Cattle belonging to another were mixed by
defendant who apparently stole them, with his
own.
Facts: SVE, Inc. brought an action to recover
about 200 heads of cattle that were driven or
wandered from its pasture lands into the adjoining
ranch of L, defendant. L himself admitted such
commixtion although, he says, plaintiff had
already retrieved its animals. Which cattle
belonged to plaintiff and which belonged to him
could no longer be determined. The lower court
found for plaintiff.
Issue: Should L forfeit the cattle he originally had?
3. Mixture caused by an owner in bad faith
A. Owner in bad faith
belonging to him.
forfeits
the
thing
B. Liable to pay indemnity for damages
4. Mixture made with the knowledge and
without the objection of the other owner =
applying the provisions of Art. 470 (par. 3),
their respective rights shall be determined as
though both acted in good faith.
Illustrative cases:
Palay belonging to different owners was
deposited in a warehouse belonging to another
but palay found later was less than that
deposited.
Held: “The 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay
belonging to S, having been mixed with the 1,026
cavans and 9 kilos of palay belonging to T in B’s
warehouse; the sheriff having found only 924 and
31 1/2 kilos of palay in said warehouse at the time
of the attachment thereof; and there being no
means of separating from said 924 cavans and 31
1/2 kilos of palay belonging to S and those
belonging to T, the rule prescribed in Article 472 of
the Civil Code is applicable.
The proportion only of the 924 cavans of palay
which were attached and sold, shall be taken,
thereby giving S who deposited 778 cavans,
398.49 thereof, and T, who deposited 1,026
cavans, 525.51, or the value thereof at the rate of
P3.00 per cavan.’’ (Santos v. Bernabe, 54 Phil. 19
[1929].)
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Held: Yes. “There is no doubt that hundreds of
cattle belonging to plaintiff have been driven into
or wandered into defendant’s land. No actual
evidence exists that all these missing animals (823)
were taken by defendant or his men; but in view
of the proof that his men on two occasions drove
away more than 30 heads of cattle, it is not
erroneous to believe that the others must have
also been driven away on subsequent or prior
occasions, applying, by analogy, the principle
that one who stole a part of the stolen money
must have also taken the larger sum lost by the
offended party. The circumstances disclosed in
the record show that defendant acted in bad
faith.
Under Article 383 (now Article 473.), if the
commingling of two things is made in bad faith the
one responsible for it will lose his share.’’ (Siari
Valley Estate, Inc. v. Lucasan, 97 Phil. 987 [unrep.
1955].)
Art 474: One who in good faith employs the
material of another in whole or in part in order to
make a thing of a different kind, shall appropriate
the thing thus transformed as his own,
indemnifying the owner of the material for its
value.
If the material is more precious than the
transformed thing or is of more value, its owner
may, at his option, appropriate the new thing to
himself, after first paying indemnity for the value of
the work, or demand indemnity for the material.
If in the making of the thing bad faith intervened,
the owner of the material shall have the right to
appropriate the work to himself without paying
anything to the maker, or to demand of the latter
that he indemnify him for the value of the material
and the damages he may have suffered.
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However, the owner of the material cannot
appropriate the work in case the value of the
latter, for artistic or scientific reasons, is
considerably more than that of the material.
Specification - accession by specification takes
place whenever the work of a person is done on the
material of another, such material, in consequence
of the work itself, undergoing a transformation.
-imparting of a new form to the material
belonging to another
- or the making of the material of another into
a thing of a different kind.
(1) in Adjunction and mixture, there would be at
least two things, while in specification, there may
only be one thing whose form is changed;
(2) In the Adjunction and specification, the
component parts retain or preserve their nature,
while in the mixture, the things mixed may or may not
retain their respective original nature; and
(3) In the adjunction and in specification, the
principle that accessory follows the principal applies,
while in the mixture, co-ownership results.
Art. 475. In the preceding articles, sentimental
value shall be duly appreciated.
Rules
Appraisal of sentimental value.
(1) Person made use of material of another in good
faith – Worker becomes the owner of the new thing
but must indemnify the owner in good faith for the
material value.
Sentimental value (appreciated in the payment of
indemnity) attached to a thing is not always easy to
estimate because it depends upon a person’s
subjective evaluation. In the adjudication of moral
damages, the sentimental value of property, real or
personal, may be considered by the court.
Exception: (if material is more precious)
(a)Owner of material may – appropriate the
thing for himself but pay for the labor
RIGHT OF ACCESSION (Art. 440)
(b)demand indemnity for the material
Take Note: if the user of the material acted in GF but
owner of material in BF – the user may appropriate
the new thing without paying the owner of the
material
or require the owner to pay him the value of the
thing or the value of his work or labor, with a right to
indemnity for damages.
(2) Person made use of material of another in bad
faith. – has the option to either appropriate the work
to himself without paying the maker or to demand
the value of materials plus damages.
Exception: Not available if the value of work
is considerably more than that of the
material. (PREVENTS UNJUST ENRICHMENT at
the expense of maker) – Labor or work
considered as principal.
(3) Person made use of material of another with the
consent and without objection of the latter – both as
if acted in good faith.
Adjunction, mixture, and specification distinguished.
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Right of Accession
It is the right of the owner of a thing, real or personal, to
become the owner of everything which is produced
thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto,
either naturally or artificially.
ART 440 – The ownership of property gives the right by
accession to everything which is produced thereby, or
which is incorporated or attached thereto, either
naturally or artificially.
Atty Bathan:
Being the owner of a thing, you also have the right
to own whatever is incorporated or attached to that
thing. Whether the attachment be done naturally or
it be done artificially.
(READING ARTICLE 440)
Now, what is the difference between accession and
your accessory?
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ACCESSION vs. ACCESSORY
ACCESSION are the fruits of, or additions to, or
improvements upon, a thing (the principal).
-Building
-Planting
-Sowing
-Accession Natural (alluvion)
-Avulsion
-Change of course of rivers
-Formation of Islands
ACCESSORY are the things joined to, or included
with, the principal thing for the latter’s
embellishment, better use, or completion.
-key of a house
-frame of a picture
-bracelet of a watch
-machinery in a factory
-bow of a violin
-Based on convenience and necessity
Atty Bathan:
When you talk about accession discreta, you are
talking about or referring to the fruits of the thing. It
could be natural, industrial or civil fruits.
Natural Fruits – They are the spontaneous products of
the soil, and the young or other products of animals.
Industrial Fruits – There is a thing line between
Industrial and Natural. When you talk about
industrial, there is work involved. This may still refer to
young of animals, to fruits, but this time there is
industry involved, unlike your natural fruits.
Civil Fruits – You refer to rents, you refer to interests,
income.
What is accession continua?
This refers to the building of an improvement on a
property.
Atty Bathan:
ACCESSION CONTINUA
So, when you talk about accession in this chapter,
you are actually talking about the building, the
planting and the sowing or alluvion or accession
natural or avulsion or the change of course of rivers,
or the formation of islands.
With respet to real property
-Accession industrial (building, planting or
sowing);
-Accession Natural (alluvion, avulsion,
change of river course, and formation of islands);
So, these are the improvements upon the thing. So,
when you make buildings upon a parcel of land then
it makes it more useful.
With respect to personal property
-Conjunction of adjunction (which may
take place by inclusion or engraftment, soldadura
or attachment, tejido or weaving, pintura or
painting, and escritura or writing);
-Commixtion or confusion
-Specification.
While accessory, it is only for embellishment, or for
better use or completion. Like the key of a house,
frame of a photo.
Kinds of Accession
Accession Discreta
-Right of the owner to also own the fruits of the
thing.
-Based on the Principle of Justice.
-Natural Fruits
-Industrial Fruits
-Civil Fruits
Accession Continua
-Right of the owner of a thing to own the things
attached or incorporated to the thing.
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Atty Bathan:
Accession continua maybe classified further with
respect to real property, and also with respect to
personal property.
When you build a building on your parcel of land, it
shall be considered as accession industrial. If you
make planting or sowing, it is also industrial.
Accession Natural, or natural accession. (another
chapter)
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For accession continua with respect to personal
property, we will have another chapter on that.
RIGHT OF OWNER TO THE FRUITS (441, 442, 444)
Natural Fruits
-Spontaneous products of the soul, and
the young and other products of animals
-Only such as are manifest or born are
considered as natural or industrial fruits. With
respect to animals, it is sufficient that they are in
the womb of the mother, although unborn.
Industrial Fruits
-those produced by lands of any kind
through cultivation or labor
Civil Fruits
-rents of buildings, the price of leases of
lands and other property and the amount of
perpetual or life annuities or other similar income.
Atty Bathan:
When are they considered or deemed born (young
of animals)?
Young of animals, they are deemed to exist at the
beginning of the maximum ordinary period of
gestation. With respect to plants, which produce
only one crop and then they perish, they should be
deemed existing at the time the seedlings appear
from the ground. As to plants and trees which live for
years, and we have periodic fruits, the fruits are not
deemed existing until they actually appear on the
plants and trees.
Industrial fruits, that is what we mentioned. The only
thing separating between industrial and natural is
that, industrial involves labor that is incorporated
thereto. There is now work involved.
-pledge
-antichresis
Atty Bathan:
Okay, Now, what is the general rule when we talk
about the right of an owner to the fruits? The general
rule is, all of them belong to the owner of the thing.
The exceptions however, meaning you are the
owner of the principal thing, but you are not entitled
to the fruits. Possession in good faith of another,
when there is a usufruct, lease of rural lands and in
cases of pledge and antechresis.
OBLIGATION OF THE RECIPIENT OF THE FRUITS
Article 443. He who receives the fruits has the
obligation to pay the expenses made by a third
person in their production, gathering, and
preservation.
WILL OWNER BE EXCUSED TO PAY THE EXPENSES IF
THE PERSON PRODUCING, GATHERING AND
PRESERVING THE FRUITS DID SO IN BAD FAITH?
The owner cannot excuse himself from his
obligation by alleging bad faith on the part of the
possessor because Art 443 makes no distinction
and because the expenses made were necessary
for without which the owner would not have
received the fruits.
Atty Bathan:
Now, let us talk about the obligation of the recipient
of the fruits (443).
General Rule
-All fruits belong to the owner of a thing.
This means that, you are the owner of the property,
and you are enjoying the fruits, but somebody else
produced, gathered and preserved those fruits. In
the interest of justice, the law tells you that, while you
maybe the owner of the land, or may have the right
to the fruits of that land, but if you are not the one
who spent for the production and the gathering and
the preservation of those fruits, then the law says, you
must pay the expenses that was incurred by the 3rd
person.
Exceptions
-Possession in good faith by another
-usufruct
-lease of rural lands
(SECOND PARAGRAPH) in other words, somebody
else, a 3rd person, not the owner of the land. You own
the land and then here comes a third person who
planted on the land, took care of the harvest,
And then civil fruits, as we mentioned are rents of
buildings…
RIGHT OF OWNER TO THE FRUITS
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produced and gathered. But then we said, the fruits
must belong to the owner of the land, and he did so
in bad faith. Will the owner be excused from not
paying him because of doing so in bad faith?
Now, you look at 443, because it does not make any
distinction. The owner cannot excuse himself from
obligation by alleging bad faith on the part of the
possessor because 443 makes no distinction. This is
because, the expenses would have been spent for
by the owner anyway by gathering them, preserving
them, as they are called necessary expenses.
Whether or not a third person may have spent for it,
the owner would have spent for it just the same.
IF EXPENSES EXCEED THE FRUITS, SHOULD OWNER
STILL PAY THE EXCESS?
YES. The law makes no distinction.
Is there a way where the owner will be excused
from paying the expenses?
-Yes, if owner allows the possessor to
complete the harvesting and gathering of the
fruits for himself.
Art. 446. All works, sowing, and planting
are presumed made by the owner and at his
expense, unless the contrary is proved.
Accession follows the principal
For example, the owner is your client, and he tells
you, atty.,
can I not pay this? You know, I will be at a loss as the
fruits are only for 100k but the expenses are more
than that. YES, THERE IS A WAY. If the owner will allow
the possessor to complete the harvesting and
gathering of the fruits for himself. Then, he need not
pay. IN other words, the 3rd person who produced,
who preserved them, who gathered them, he will let
that 3rd person collect and harvest and gather and
keep the fruits for himself. And so, in that way, he
need not pay for the expenses.
RIGHT OF ACCESSION, WITH RESPECT TO
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
Atty Bathan:
Atty Bathan:
Should the owner still pay the excess? Meaning, the
owner now gathered the fruits, the fruits let us say,
now valued at 100k, but the expenses in producing
them, preserving or gathering them amounted to
150k. Will the owner still pay for those expenses when
the expenses are 150k and the fruits are only valued
at 100k?
Again, yes because the law does not make any
distinction. The law does not say that if the expenses
are more than the value of the fruits and the owner
will no longer pay the 3rd person no. And so, the
owner must still pay.
Is there a way where the owner may excuse himself?
445 and 446 gives you the general rule, as to who
owns anything that is built, planted or sown on the
land of another. So, if you own a land, and you see
a building there that is being constructed or you see
plantings on that parcel of land, the general rule is,
it will belong to you, the owner of the land.
446 in support of 445, also tells you that, all works,
sowing, and planting, they are presumed to be
made by the owner of the land and at his expense.
The exception is, if the contrary is proved that a 3 rd
person has spent on the construction of the work or
on the plantings or of the sowings.
Basically, the principle then is that, the accession
follows the principal. Meaning, who ever owns the
principal, is also the owner of accession, which is
found on the principal thing.
General Rule
Art. 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown
on the land of another and the improvements or
repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the
land, subject to the provisions of the following
articles.
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ART 447
LANDOWNER USES MATERIALS OF ANOTHER
Now, compare the situations based on whether the
Owner of the Material is in GF or in BF
ART 447. The owner of the land who makes
thereon, personally or through another, plantings,
constructions or works with the materials of
another, shall pay their value; and, if he acted in
bad faith, he shall also be obliged to the
reparation of damages. The owner of the
materials shall have the right to remove them only
in case he can do so without injury to the work
constructed,
or
without
the
plantings,
constructions or works being destroyed. However,
if the landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of
the materials may remove them in any event, with
a right to be indemnified for damages.
Article 447.
This gives you a situation where the land owner uses
the materials of another.
You have here A who owns the land. He makes
constructions on the land, makes a house on the
land using the materials of B.
In other words:
If you use the materials of another, whether
you be in good faith or in bad faith, you are
to pay for the value of those materials to the
owner of the materials.
No distinction.
GF or BF, GF – you thought they were yours,
actually not. If it belongs to another person,
you have to pay the materials. But if you
acted in BF, knowing its not yours, in addition,
you are obliged to pay for damages.
The owner or the materials, however, shall have the
right to remove them only in case he can do so
without injury to the work constructed, or without the
plantings, constructions or works being destroyed.
Remember: Owner of the Materials has the right to
remove the materials.
Subject however to the condition that it will not do
injury or damage to the work constructed, or without
the plantings, constructions or works being
destroyed. [See Art. 447 above.]
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Granting, that the Land owner who used the
materials USED IT IN GOOD FAITH.
Remember that as a general rule, whoever owns the
property, Principal, the things built on it will belong to
the owner of the property. The problem is when he
did so by using the materials of another.
If both are in good faith, [such as in a situation where
the owner of the land does not know that the
materials do not belong to him and also that the
owner of the materials did not now that someone
used his materials] the O.M. will now have the right
to remove. Of course, this right is inferior to the right
of the owner of the land as he can only remove his
materials if it does not cause damage or injury.
But, if the L.O used it in bad faith, the O.M. may
remove them in any event with the right to be
indemnified for damages. [See table above]
In 447, you have a LO using the materials of another
to build in this property.
In 448, it is when your builder, sower, or planter builds
on a property that is not his. What are the rules?
For us to remember this, I have prepared a Diagram:
Remember: w/n the L.O is in good faith [or if not in
GF but in BF] he should pay the value of the material.
Only diff is that if BF – nay damages.
What if this time, the owner of the materials, or OM
was in BF?
Example:
He knew that the owner of the land is using his
materials but he did not complain, nor he did not
notify the L.O. he did not even say stop, he just let
him be. If the LO is in good faith then the OM is liable
for any consequential damages, without right of
removal w/n injury would be caused.
Still, LO should still pay for the value of the materials,
based on principle against Unjust Enrichment.
If LO is in BF, and OM is BF too, follow the rule as when
both are in GF.
Because then, if both are in BF, both should be
treated as in GF
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For zooming in Purposes:
Another option of the land owner in GF is to oblige
the builder to pay the price of the land.
However, there are conditions for that.
-
LO, GF [meaning he does not know that somebody
else is building on this property].
Builder, GF [this is because he builds on a property,
he honestly believed, belonged to him.]
LO’s rights is superior.
Why?
We go back to the General Rule. The accession
follows the principal. The land owner now has the
right to either appropriate the building by paying
indemnity to the builder or to oblige the builder to
pay the price of the land [if sower, pay the proper
rent]. [See diagram above].
If the value of the land is considerably
greater than the value of the building, then,
you cannot force your builder to buy the
land. [this is because if he has made a cheap
structure, like 100k ra, then prop is 5m. it
would be very unfair for him to pay 5m for the
property when what he built was only 100k.
The landowner can no longer force the
builder to buy the land. They will however be
under the law, put under A FORCED LEASE.
The builder will now have to pay rent to the
land oner. They have to agree on the terms
of the lease. If they do not agree then the
court will decide for them .
As I mentioned earlier, the option is given to the land
owner. WHY?
Option given to Landowner
1. Appropriate here is technically, BUY the
building, you pay for the building that was
built on your property by the builder,
2. Or, you oblige the builder to pay the price of
the land. Sell the land.
When you say appropriate the building by
paying indemnity, HOW DO YOU MEASURE THE
INDEMNITY?
This is because, the accessory or the accession
follows the principal and not the other way around.
The law says, you look at 546 and 548. This
means:
In short, you pay the value of the improvement.
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Now, what constitutes good faith under Art. 448?
Good faith under Art. 448 consists in the honest belief
of the builder, sower, or planter that the land he is
building, sowing, or planting, on is his or that by some
title, he has the right to build thereon. There is also
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ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. When you
build on property, you honestly believe that the
property is yours. You really thought that it belongs to
you. So you have there, the case of Rosales vs
Castelltort.
he has a right to build thereon and he is ignorant of
any defect in the title.
RULES WHERE BUILDER/SOWER/PLANTER
BUILDS/SOWS/PLANTS ON A LAND NOT
BELONGING TO HIM
In the case of Rosales v Castellfort, it also talked
about the issue on whether a landowner can refuse
TO CHOOSE ANY OF THE OPTIONS AND COMPEL
BUILDER TO REMOVE BUILDING. In other words, the
landowner will not choose to sell the land because
it’s not considerably greater than the value of the
building and he is also does not want to appropriate
the building that was built on the property. He does
not want to choose that option. He, however, wants
the builder to remove the building.
Builder/Sower/Planer in Good Faith
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything
has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the works,
sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or
to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the
proper rent. However, the builder or planter
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or
trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if
the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms
of the lease and in case of disagreement, the
court shall fix the terms thereof
CAN LANDOWNER REFUSE TO CHOOSE ANY OF
THE OPTIONS AND COMPEL BUILDER TO
REMOVE BUILDING?
When you build in the property, you honestly believe
that the property is yours or that it belongs to you.
Question: Can he do that?
Answer: SC said he has to choose from the option.
Either he has to appropriate the building by paying
the value of the building or to sell the land to the
builder if the value of the land is not more or
considerably greater than the value of the building.
Sarmiento v Agana GR No 57288; April 30, 1984
But he cannot as respondents here did, refuse
both to pay for the building and to sell the land
and compel the owner of the building to
remove it from the land where it is erected. He
is entitled to such removal only when, after
having chosen to sell his land, the other party
fails to pay for the same.
Atty Bathan:
The choice belongs to the owner of the land,
a rule that accords with the principle of
accession, i.e., that the accessory follow the
principal and not the other way around. Even
as the option lies with landowner, the grant to
him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner
cannot refuse to exercise either option and
complete instead the owner of the building to
remove it from the land. (Rosales v Castellfort,
G.R. No. 157044; October 5, 2005)
Atty Bathan:
Under 448, good faith consists in the honest belief in
the builder, sower or planter that the land he is
building, sowing or planting on is his or some title that
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The only time the landowner is entitled to removal of
the building is when he chose to sell the land to the
builder and the builder fails to pay. There are two
options, either:
1. he will appropriate the building and pay for
the value, or
2. sell the land if the value of the land is not
considerably greater than the value of the
building.
In the latter, he can force the builder to pay. If the
builder does not pay after he has already chosen
the option to sell the land, then he can be entitled
to the removal of the building.
Note: Not applicable to a tenant because he knows
fully well that the land does not belong to you.
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QUEVADA V CA. GR NO 140798; Sept 18, 2006
The above-cited article "covers only cases in
which the builders, sowers[,] or planters believe
themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to
have a claim of title thereto. It does not apply
when the interest is …that of … a mere tenant”
However, it is also applied to cases where a
builder has "constructed improvements with the
consent of the owner."
Atty Bathan:
Here, this is an expression to the general rule
because the “respondents fully consented to the
improvement introduced by petitioners. In fact,
because the children occupied the lots upon their
invitation, the parents certainly knew and approved
the construction ...on those lots”
MACASAET V MACASAET
GR NOS 154391-92; Sept 30 2004
This Court has ruled that this provision covers only
cases in which the builders, sowers or planters
believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at
least, to have a claim of title thereto. It does not
apply when the interest is merely that of a holder,
such
as
a
mere
tenant,
agent
or
usufructuary.66 From
these
pronouncements,
good faith is identified by the belief that the land
is owned; or that -- by some title -- one has the right
to build, plant, or sow thereon.
However, in some special cases, this Court has
used Article 448 by recognizing good faith beyond
this limited definition. Thus, in Del Campo v.
Abesia, this provision was applied to one whose
house -- despite having been built at the time he
was still co-owner -- overlapped with the land of
another. This article was also applied to cases
wherein a builder had constructed improvements
with the consent of the owner. The Court ruled that
the law deemed the builder to be in good faith. In
Sarmiento v. Agana, the builders were found to be
in good faith despite their reliance on the consent
of another, whom they had mistakenly believed to
be the owner of the land
Based on the aforecited special cases, Article 448
applies to the present factual milieu. The
established facts of this case show that
respondents fully consented to the improvements
introduced by petitioners. In fact, because the
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children occupied the lots upon their invitation,
the parents certainly knew and approved of the
construction of the improvements introduced
thereon.73 Thus, petitioners may be deemed to
have been in good faith when they built the
structures on those lots.
Question: Why is it important to consider whether
they are a builder in good faith or in bad faith?
Answer: Because we have to determine the rights of
the landowner.
In this case, the children knew that the property did
not belong to them but the SC gave this as an
exception because they built their house on the land
of the parents due to the invitation of the parents to
build on that land. The parents knew fully well that
they were building in the property. Another is, we
can actually use that when both parties are in bad
faith—in fact here, this could be considered as both
parties in bad faith were the children knew that they
were building on the property not belonging to them
and the parents knew of it and in fact invited them—
WHEN BOTH PARTIES ARE IN BAD FAITH, THEN BOTH
ARE CONSIDERED TO BE IN GOOD FAITH. So, you
follow 448. Following 448, the parents being the
owners of the subject property, will now get to
choose the options, either they will buy the
improvement or sell the property. Again, they can
only sell if the value of the property or the land is not
considerably greater than the value of the building
or of the house. Otherwise, they will put under a force
lease.
GOOD FAITH consists in the honest belief in the
builder, sower or planter that the land he is
building, sowing or planting on is his or some title
that he has a right to build thereon and he is
ignorant of any defect in the title.
MORES V YU-GO GR NO 172292. July 23, 2010
However, tenants like the spouses Mores cannot
be said to be builders in good faith as they have
no
pretension
to
be
owners
of
the
property.10 Indeed, full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made applies only to a possessor
in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the
belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not
apply where one’s only interest is that of a lessee
under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always
be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his
landlord out of his property.
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Atty Bathan:
You cannot say a tenant built on the property of his
leisure in good faith because from the very start, you,
as a tenant, know that said property does not
belong to you.
Question: Will Article 448 apply to co-owner of the
property?
Answer:
SC said no because when you are a co owner, then
you have a right to build on the property. 448 will not
apply. What will apply is the rule on co-ownership.
DEL CAMPO V ABESIA; GR NO. L-49219. APRIL 15,
1988
The court a quo correctly held that Article 448 of
the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner
builds, plants or sows on the land owned in
common for then he did not build, plant or sow
upon land that exclusively belongs to another but
of which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a
third person under the circumstances, and the
situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership.
However, when, as in this case, the co-ownership
is terminated by the partition and it appears that
the house of defendants overlaps or occupies a
portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining
to plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built in
good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the
new Civil Code should apply. Manresa and
Navarro Amandi agree that the said provision of
the Civil Code may apply even when there was
co-ownership if good faith has been established
WHEN LANDOWNER CHOOSES TO APPROPRIATE
IMPROVEMENT
Builder had the right to retain the improvement
until he is paid by the landowner.
NUGUID V CA. GR NO 151815 February 23, 2005
A builder in good faith cannot be compelled to
pay rentals during the period of retention 25 nor be
disturbed in his possession by ordering him to
vacate. In addition, as in this case, the owner of
the land is prohibited from offsetting or
compensating the necessary and useful expenses
with the fruits received by the builder-possessor in
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good faith. Otherwise, the security provided by
law would be impaired. This is so because the right
to the expenses and the right to the fruits both
pertain to the possessor, making compensation
juridically impossible; and one cannot be used to
reduce the other.
Atty Bathan:
Builder had the right to retain the improvement until
he is paid by the landowner if the
LANDOWNER
CHOOSES
TO
APPROPRIATE
IMPROVEMENT because again, there are options
given to the landowner.
It will be very unfair in the part of the builder if he is
asked to pay rentals during the period of
redemption. So, for example, your landowner
chooses to appropriate the improvement, he
communicates his choice today but then he only
pays the building next year. Landowner cannot tell
the builder, “hey builder, pay me rent while you are
still using that improvement”. Because then, the
landowner (builder man guro ni) may say “okay. I will
not pay the improvement anymore because you
owe me rent.
That would be unfair, a circumvention of the law.
Since the builder has the right to retain the
improvement until he is paid by the landowner, the
landowner cannot ask for the payment of rentals
during the period of retention.
Question: what if during the period of retention, the
improvement has been destroyed by a fortuitous
event. Can the builder still compel the owner to pay
for the improvements?
MANOTOK REALTY, INC V TECSON, 164 SCRA 587,
1998
Where the improvements have been destroyed
by a fortuitous event without the fault of the
landowner, the basis of the builder’s right to retain
the premises is extinguished; hence, there is no
other recourse for him but to vacate the premises
and deliver the same to the landowner.
BUILDER/PLANTER/SOWER IN BAD FAITH
Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith
on the land of another, loses what is built, planted
or sown without right to indemnity. (362)
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Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything
has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may
demand the demolition of the work, or that the
planting or sowing be removed, in order to
replace things in their former condition at the
expense of the person who built, planted or
sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to
pay the price of the land, and the sower the
proper rent. (363a)
Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles,
the landowner is entitled to damages from the
builder, planter or sower. (n)
Art. 452. The builder, planter or sower in bad faith
is entitled to reimbursement for the necessary
expenses of preservation of the land
PART II
We have already discussed in Part 1 the discussion
on Accession and ended on Article 448.
BUILDER PLANTER OR SOWER WERE IN BAD FAITH WHILE
THE LANDOWNER IS IN GOOD FAITH
(Provisions: Article 449-452.) These provisions
determine the rights of your landowner as well as the
liabilities of your builder/planter/sower in bad faith.
This right is not available to the landowner under
Article 448. What is available to the landowner under
Article 448 when both parties are in good faith, there
are only two options by the landowners:


to appropriate the improvement
to sell his land only if the value of the land is
not considerably higher compared to the
improvement.
There is no right to demolish. There is only the right
to demolish under Article 448 when your
landowner has already chosen to sell his land to
the builder/planter/sower and yet the latter has
not paid.
In Article 450, if the builder is in bad faith, the
landowner can ask for demolition without any
expense on his part.
Article 451. In the cases of the two
preceding articles, the landowner is
entitled to damages from the builder,
planter or sower. (n)
Article 451 is another right of the landowner. May it
be 449 or 450, there is an additional right available
to him and that is to ask for damages.
Let’s go back to Article 450. There is another right
here: “or he may compel the builder or planter to
pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper
rent”. Here, there is no condition unlike in 448. In 448,
he can only compel the builder to buy the land if the
land is not considerably higher in value than the
value of the improvement but in 450, there is no such
condition which means that your landowner can
compel the builder, because he is in bad faith, to
buy the property. It does not matter how much the
property is compared to the improvement.
While it may seem that the builder in bad faith has
no right, he actually has but only with respect to
necessary expenses of preservation of the land, he
may be entitled to reimbursement.
Article 452. The builder, planter or sower in bad
faith is entitled to reimbursement for the necessary
expenses of preservation of the land. (n)
REMINDER:
If your landowner is in good faith but your
builder/planter/sower is in bad faith, there are
three rights:
1. to appropriate or to use whatever has been
built, planted, or sowed without paying him. The
only thing that the builder, planter or sower in bad
faith can ask for are only reimbursement for the
necessary expenses. If the landowner chooses this
remedy, he can also ask for damages.
2. to ask for the removal or demolition of what has
been built, etc. at the builder’s expense, plus
damages. He will not spend for the demolition but
the builder will. This remedy is not available under
Article 448.
3. the landowner can compel the builder to buy
the land regardless of the value of the land, even
if the value of the land is considerably higher than
the value of the improvement. That is 448. When
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you can only sell the land if your land is not higher
in value but in instances where your builder is in
bad faith, your landowner can compel you to
purchase the property regardless of its value. This
is the punishment of you as a builder because you
knew that the property is not yours but you still built
in it. The landowner can also ask for damages.
IF BOTH ARE IN BAD FAITH
What if the landowner knew someone was building
on his property but he did nothing about it and your
builder is also building on the property that does not
belong to him? What are the rights of the parties?
Article 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the
part of the person who built, planted or sowed on
the land of another, but also on the part of the
owner of such land, the rights of one and the other
shall be the same as though both had acted in
good faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part
of the landowner whenever the act was done with
his knowledge and without opposition on his part.
(364a)
In other words, you go back to Article 448. If both are
in bad faith, treat them as they are both in good
faith.
Article 448. The owner of the land on which
anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own
the works, sowing or planting, after payment of
the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548,
or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay
the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the
proper rent. However, the builder or planter
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or
trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if
the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms
of the lease and in case of disagreement, the
court shall fix the terms thereof.
What happens again if the land is considerably
higher than the value of the improvement?
Then they will now be under a forced lease where
the builder will have to pay rent. They will have to
84 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
agree on the proper and reasonable rent and if they
cannot agree, the court will decide for them.
Art. 455, Civil Code If the materials, plants or seeds
belong to a third person who has not acted in bad
faith, the owner of the land shall answer
subsidiarily for their value and only in the event
that the one who made use of them has no
property with which to pay.
This provision shall not apply if the owner makes
use of the right granted by article 450. If the owner
of the materials, plants or seeds has been paid by
the builder, planter or sower, the latter may
demand from the landowner the value of the
materials and labor.
IF THE LANDOWNER IS IN GOOD FAITH AND THE
BUILDER IS IN BAD FAITH
Article 454. When the landowner acted in bad
faith and the builder, planter or sower proceeded
in good faith, the provisions of article 447 shall
apply.
We go back to Article 447 because it is as if now that
the landowner is building on his property using the
materials of another. Here, the landowner is in bad
faith. He knows that someone is building on his
property and he did not do anything about it while
the builder is in good faith. He honestly believed that
the property is.
WHAT ARE THE RULES ON 447?
The landowner must pay the value of the
materials plus damages.
 The owner of the materials may remove his
materials in any event.
Why? because it is your builder who is in good faith.
He can remove the materials even if it will damage
the property of the landowner.

WHAT IF THE LANDOWNER, BUILDER AND OWNER OF
MATERIALS ARE DIFFERENT PERSONS
There are 3 persons involved. In other words, the one
building on the property does not own the materials
and the one who is building on the property to which
does not belong to him
For example: X is the landowner. Y builds on the
property of X and in building the property, Y used the
property of Z.
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LAND OWNER
Good faith
BUILDER/
PLANTER/
SOWER
Good faith
OWNER
OF MATE
RIALS
Good faith
Good faith
Good faith
Bad faith
Good faith
Bad faith
Bad faith
Bad faith
Good faith
Good faith
Bad faith
Bad faith
Good faith
Bad faith
Good faith
Bad faith
Bad faith
Bad faith
Bad faith
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RIGHTS
LO — either appropriates improvement or
sells land to builder
*if LO chooses to appropriate, he will pay
builder value of improvement
B/P/S — will pay owner of the materials for
the value of the materials
*if B/P/S is insolvent, LO will be subsidiarily
liable to pay the owner of the materials
*if LO will no appropriate, there will be no
subsidiary liability
OM — loses his materials without right of
indemnity (Art. 449 will apply — it is as if he
built, planted, or sown)
As between LO and B/P/S and OM, apply
Art. 448
LO — has the right to appropriate without
paying; or sell the land in any event; or
demolish improvement
As between B/P/S and OM, treat them as if
in good faith; thus B/P/S will pay value of the
materials
B/P/S will pay value of the materials to OM
B/P/S may remove materials whether or not
it causes damages to the property LO will
be liable for damages. If B/P/S will not
remove, LO will pay for value of
improvement plus damages and will
reimburse B/P/S for the value of the
materials he paid to OM
LO and B/P/S will be treated as both in good
faith. Use 448
B/P/S is liable to pay value of the materials
to OM, unless OM removes
LO, if he chooses to appropriate
improvement, will be subsidiarily liable to
OM if B/P/S is insolvent
B/P/S will still be liable to pay value of
materials
to
OM,
offsetted
with
consequential damages that OM may be
liable
B/P/S may choose to remove the
improvement plus damages or to be paid
value of improvement plus damages
Same rule as when all parties are in good
faithC
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FIRST ROW
(Art. 449 will apply — it is as if he built, planted, or
sown)
All three parties are in good faith.
If the landowner is in good faith, and your builder is
also in good faith, and the owner of the materials is
also in good faith, the rights are:
• The landowner either appropriates improvement or
sells land to builder. If landowner chooses to
appropriate, he will pay builder value of
improvement. Here, the landowner and the builder
is in good faith so you follow Art. 448
• Since your builder is using the materials of another,
you will also use Art. 447. Now your builder will pay
the owner of the materials for the value of the
materials. You don’t pay damages because they
are both in good faith.
• Now, what if the builder is insolvent? This is important
because it is the obligation of the builder to pay the
value of the materials to the owner of the materials.
If the builder is insolvent, the landowner will be
subsidiarily liable to pay the owner of the materials
but only when the landowner will choose to
appropriate the improvement. Remember, the
landowner has two options: (a) appropriate the
improvement or (b) sell the land to the builder.
• If the landowner chooses to sell the land to the
builder, then of course the subsidiary liability will not
come in. The subsidiary liability is only there if your
landowner chooses to appropriate.
• Since the landowner and the builder are in good
faith, Art. 448 will apply. The landowner either
appropriates improvement or sells land to builder.
Again, the landowner can only sell the land to the
builder if his land is not considerably higher in value
than the value of the improvement.
THIRD ROW
The landowner is in good faith, but both the builder
and the owner of the materials is in bad faith.
How do you determine their rights:
• Always look at the land owner because his right is
superior, he being the owner of the land. The
landowner has the right to appropriate without
paying; or sell the land in any event; or demolish
improvement. This is because the landowner being
in good faith and the builder being in bad faith, Art.
449 applies, which provides that the landowner can
appropriate without paying anything as a
punishment to the builder. Of course, whether the
landowner choose to appropriate the building or
have it demolished, he can still ask for damages. If
the landowner choose to sell the building, he can
compel the builder to builder to buy it because the
builder is in bad faith.
• As between B/P/S and OM, treat them as if in good
faith; thus B/P/S will pay value of the materials
SECOND ROW
FOURTH ROW
Landowner is in good faith, builder is in good faith,
but the owner of the materials is in bad faith.
When the landowner is in bad faith while the builder
and the owner of the materials are in good faith.
Here, the owner of the materials know that
somebody else is using his materials but he did not do
anything about it. But the builder using the materials
thought that the materials were his and he also
believed that he was building on the property
belonging to him. While the land owner did not know
that someone was building on his property. The
consequences are:
Since the builder and the owner of the materials are
in good faith, follow Art. 447.
• The owner of the materials, because he is in bad
faith, loses his materials without right of indemnity
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• B/P/S will pay value of the materials to OM
• B/P/S may remove materials whether or not it
causes damages to the property
• LO will be liable for damages.
• If B/P/S will not remove, LO will pay for value of
improvement plus damages and will reimburse
B/P/S for the value of the materials he paid to OM
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FIFTH ROW
Here, the landowner and the builder is in bad faith
while the owner of the materials is in good faith
Since both the landowner and the builder is in bad
faith, you treat them as if they are in good faith and
use Art. 448. Under this article, even if the landowner
is in bad faith, since the builder is also in bad faith, the
landowner has the right to either appropriate the
improvement or to sell the land to the builder (if the
land is not considerably higher in value than the
value of the improvement.
ALLUVION
ART. 457. To the owner of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current
of the waters.
ALLUVION
It is the deposit of soil or
to the soil itself
B/P/S is liable to pay value of the materials to OM,
unless OM removes. Because the owner of the
materials is in good faith, so he now has the right to
remove the materials even if it will destroy whatever
was built by the builder. But if the owner of the
materials will not remove it, then the build will have to
pay the owner of the materials plus damages
LO, if he chooses to appropriate improvement, he will
be subsidiarily liable to OM if B/P/S is insolvent.
Remember that the subsidiary liability of the
landowner will only come in if the owner of the
materials is in good faith and the landowner chooses
to appropriate the improvement.
SIXTH ROW
The landowner and the owner of the materials is in
bad faith while the builder is in good faith.
B/P/S will still be liable to pay value of materials to
OM, offsetted with consequential damages that OM
may be liable
ACCRETION
It denotes the act or
process by which a
riparian land gradually
and
imperceptibly
receives addition made
by the water to which
the land is contiguous.
In other words, alluvion
is brought about by
accretion.
Alluvion is the result of the process of accretion.
REQUISITES
1. The deposit or accumulation of soil or sediment
must be gradual and imperceptible
2. The accretion results from the effects of action
of the current of the waters of the river; and
ALLUVION
3. The land where accretion takes place must be
adjacent to the bank of a river
1. The deposit or accumulation of soil or sediment
must be gradual and imperceptible
B/P/S may choose to remove the improvement plus
damages or to be paid value of improvement plus
damages
2. The accretion results from the effects or action of
the current of the waters of the river; and
These options are now given to the builder, as
opposed to the landowner, because he is in good
faith while the landowner is in bad faith.
In other words, if the riparian owner (owner of the land
adjacent to the owner) makes any work or constructs
any work that somehow accumulates the soil deposit,
then you cannot say that there is ALLUVION (natural
process of accretion).
SEVENTH ROW
If all the parties are in bad faith, treat them as if all
are in good faith. Follow the rules outlined in the first
row.
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Meaning:
Those soil deposits cannot be said to belong to the
riparian owner because the requirement is that it
MUST be from the effects or action of current of the
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waters of the river. Hence, it must be through a
NATURAL process and NOT an artificial one.
3. The land where accretion takes place must be
adjacent to the bank of a river.
In other words, even if it is caused by the natural
current of the waters of the sea, and there are soil
deposits there, that soil deposit CANNOT be owned
by the owner by the owner of the land adjacent to
the bay/sea.
Why? The law is very clear that ALLUVION which will
now be owned by the riparian owner is only the result
of the accretion that forms part by the river or
adjacent to the bank of the river.
Note: An alluvion, alhough mandate of Article 457 is
automatically owned by the riparian owner from the
moment the soil deposit can be seen, it does not
automatically become registered land, just because
the lot which receives such accretion is covered by
a Torrens title, thereby making the alluvial property
imprescriptible.
Remember that article 457 is very clear that any soil
deposit that is formed by:
1.
this natural process (must be gradual and
imperceptible),
2. caused by the natural flow/tide of the river,
and
3. adjacent to the river.
Article 457 tells you that if there is such formation and
deposits there that meet the requisites, it is
automatically owned by the riparian owner from the
moment the soil deposit can be seen. HOWEVER,
while the riparian owner is automatically the owner
of the soil deposits, IT DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY
BECOME REGISTERED LAND.
In other words, ownership of the alluvion or accretion
is one thing while registration is another.
Why is it important to emphasize this difference?
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An alluvion is unregistered, and it is is unregistered, it
can be acquired by a third person through acquisitive
prescription if you do not register it. Hence, it is
important that once you notice that there is already
alluvion, YOU MUST ALREADY START THE PROCESS OF
REGISTERING IT.
In other words, you must file a petition for original
registration. Just because Article 457 tells you that you
are the riparian owner, that DOES NOT MEAN THAT
YOU ARE ALREADY PROTECTED precisely why there is
land registration to protect you in your rights.
Hence, if there is alluvion already, start the process of
original registration to protect you of your rights.
Otherwise, if someone will possess that property that is
the consequence of the process of natural accretion,
then that 3rd person may acquire it through
acquisitive prescription.
Office of the City Mayor v. Ebio
G.R. No. 178411
June 23, 2010
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions
that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek
do not form part of the public domain as the
alluvial property automatically belongs to the
owner of the estate to which it may have been
added.
The only restriction provided for by law is that the
owner of the adjoining property must register the
same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the
alluvial property may be subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons.
Rationale: Ownership of the alluvion is one thing,
registration is another.
Grande v. CA
G.R. No. L-17652, June 30, 1962
Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and
registration under the Torrens system of that
ownership is quite another. Ownership over the
accretion received by the land adjoining a river is
governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of
registered land is provided in the registration law
(PD 1529).
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Article 458. The owners of estates adjoining ponds
or lagoons do not acquire the land left dry by the
natural decrease of the waters, or lose that
inundated by them in extraordinary floods.
Here, this tells you that the principle is NOT the same
if you are the owner of the estate adjoining ponds or
lagoons. Even if the ponds or lagoons are left dry,
YOU DO NOT ACQUIRE IT. That is NOT accretion.
Nor do you lose ownership of those part of your
property if it is inundated by extraordinary floods. That
property will remain yours.
AVULSION
Article 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek
or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a
known portion of land and transfers it to another
estate, the owner of the land to which the
segregated portion retains the ownership of it,
provided that he removes the same within two
years.
ALLUVION
Deposit of soil is gradual
or imperceptible
The deposit of the soil
belongs to the owner of
the property where the
same was deposited.
The soil cannot
identified.
be
AVULSION
Deposit of soil is sudden
or abrupt
The owner of the
property from which a
part was detached
retains the ownership
thereof.
The detached portion
can be identified.
CHANGE OF COURSE OF RIVERS
Article 461. River beds which are abandoned
through the natural change in the course of the
waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose
lands are occupied by the new course in
proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of
the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right
to acquire the same by paying the value thereof,
which value shall not exceed the value of the area
occupied by the new bed.
You have a river bed and there’s a change in the
course. Now when the river changed its course, it
affected land owners.
The law says that those affected landowners will now
share in the riverbed that was now left dry due to the
change in course of the rivers, in proportion to the
area that was lost.
In other words, if there are 2 owners who are affected
by the change of the course of the rivers, you will
have to look at the proportion of the affected area. If
for example, the same area for both landowners
(50sqm each) were affected, they will share 50/50 of
the abandoned river or the property that was left dry.
Remember that, yes, 461 says that the owner will not
be those that will be affected by the new course of
the river. But those owners adjacent to the dried up
bed will have the option to buy it from the new
owners. But the value shall not exceed the value of
the area occupied by the new bed.
RULE ON UPROOTED TREES
Art. 460. Trees uprooted and carried away by the
current of the waters belong to the owner of the
land upon which they may be cast, if the owners
do not claim them within six months. If such owners
claim them, they shall pay the expenses incurred
in gathering them or putting them in a safe place.
Here, the rule is:
the owner of the trees will belong to the owner of the
land where the trees will end up if the owners of those
trees DO NOT CLAIM THEM within 6 months.
If the owner claims them, he/she shall pay the
expenses incurred in gathering them or putting them
in a safe place.
Illustration:
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OWNERSHIP OF ISLANDS (ART. 464-465)
If islands are formed on
navigable or floatable
rivers,
who
has
ownership over these
islands?
The state (Art. 464)
If islands are formed on
non-navigable
and
non-floatable
rivers,
who has ownership over
these islands?
It belongs to the nearest
riparian owner or owner
of the margin or bank
nearest to it as he is
considered in the best
position to cultivate
and develop the island.
HAHAHAHAHHAHAHAHAHHHAAHAHAHHA!
Navigable river
What if the island was formed right smack in the
middle and you can’t determine if it’s nearest to
which owner:?
-is one which forms in its ordinary condition by itself or
by uniting with other waters a continuous highway
over which commerce is or may be carried on.
END.
If islands are formed on
navigable or floatable
rivers,
who
has
ownership over these
islands?
Navigable river is one
which forms in its
ordinary condition by
itself or by uniting with
other
waters
a
continuous
highway
over which commerce
is or may be carried on.
If islands are formed on
non-navigable
and
non-floatable
rivers,
who has ownership over
these islands?
To the owners of both
margins if the island is in
the middle of the river,
in which case it shall be
divided longitudinally in
halves.
So if you have a river here and it is in the middle of an
island, and you have 2 owners, you will cut them in
half:
QUIETING OF TITLE
Art. 476 - Whenever there is a cloud on title to
real property or any interest therein, by reason
of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding which is apparently valid or
effective but is in truth and in fact invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and
may be prejudicial to said title, an action may
be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the
title. An action may also be brought to prevent
a cloud from being cast upon title to real
property or any interest therein.
Reasons and basis for an action to quiet title


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Section 377 of the old Code of Civil
Procedure - An action to remove a cloud
from the title to real estate shall be brought
in the province where the land is situated.
equity comes to the aid of him who would
suffer if the instrument were enforced
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WHAT IS A CLOUD ON TITLE?
3. A forged contract;
-
A cloud on title is a semblance of title, either
legal or equitable, or a claim or a right in real
property, appearing in some legal form but
which is, in fact, invalid or which would be
inequitable to enforce
REQUISITES FOR EXISTENCE OF CLOUD
4. A contract of sale or donation which has
become inoperative because of nonperformance by the vendee or donee of a
condition precedent (Art. 1181.);
5. A voidable contract, i.e., where consent was
given
through
mistake,
violence,
intimidation, undue influence, or fraud (Art.
1330.), or by one without capacity. (Art.
1326.)
1. There is an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective;
2. Such instrument, etc. is, in truth and in fact,
invalid,
ineffective,
voidable,
or
unenforceable (despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy), or
has been extinguished or terminated, or has
been barred by extinctive prescription (Art.
478.); and
3. Such instrument, etc. may be prejudicial to
said title.
GROUNDS FOR FILING A COMPLAINT FOR QUIETING
OF TITLE
-
The ground or reason for filing a complaint
for quieting of title must, therefore, be “an
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding.”
Take note: These grounds are exclusive so other
reasons may not be considered valid for the same
action.
INSTANCES WHEN CLOUD OF TITLE EXISTS
1. An absolute fictitious contract of sale or a
sale with simulated consideration. Thus, if
the supposed vendor in an absolutely
simulated contract has every reason to
believe that the supposed vendee may
want the contract enforced, he may bring
an action to declare the contract void and
thus, quiet his title;
What is an action to quiet title?
-
an action to remove cloud on or to quiet title
is a remedy or proceeding which has for its
purpose an adjudication that a claim of title
to realty or an interest thereon, adverse to
the plaintiff, is invalid or inoperative, or
otherwise defective and hence, the plaintiff
and those claiming under him may forever
be free of any hostile claim.
-
a remedy which may be availed of only
when by reason of any instrument, etc.,
which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable
What are the requisites for an action to quiet title to
prosper?
1. The plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an
equitable title to, or interest in the real
property subject of the action (Art. 477.); and
2. The deed, claim, or proceeding claimed to
be casting cloud on his title must be shown to
be, in fact, invalid or inoperative despite its
prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.
THE SUITOR NEED NOT BE IN POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY
2. A sale by an agent without written authority
or after expiration of his authority;
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The suitor also need not have an absolute title or an
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equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with
personality to bring an action to quiet title.
AN ACTION TO
REMOVE CLOUD OF
TITLE
Removes a possible
foundation for future
hostile claim
A preventive action
to prevent future
cloud on title
AN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE
Putting
an
end
to
troublesome litigation in
respect to the property
involved
A
remedial
action
involving
a
present
adverse claim
NOTE: It has been said that the purpose of the
Torrens system is to quiet title to land. Once a title
is registered, the owner may rest secure, without
the necessity of waiting in the portals of the
court, or sitting in the mirador de
su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
If both parties have certificates of title over the same
parcel of land, the issue is, as between them, who has
a better right over said land. Either party may file a
complaint for quieting of title pursuant to Article 476.
NATURE OF ACTION
Quasi in rem – neither suits in rem or in personam.
However, being against the person in respect of the
res, wherein the judgment does not extend beyond
the property in controversy, it acquires a status of
quasi in rem.
•
An individual is named as defendant.
However, a quasi in rem judgment is conclusive only
between the parties.
So, go over the cases please. Those that I have
assigned.
In the case of Calacala v. RP, the Supreme Court said
that if you fail to redeem your property within the
redemption period, then you don’t have a right
anymore over that property. So, you lack already the
first requisite in filing an action to quiet title.
If you fail to redeem, your right will be considered lost.
There is a question here in the action to quiet title.
“Does the suitor, the one who files the action,
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need to be in the possession of the property to have a
cause of action?”
In the case of Tan vs. Valenzuela, 1975, the Supreme
Court said “no, the suitor need not be in possession of
the property”.
WHEN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE ALLOWED
An action to quiet title may be maintained when:
1.
The contract, instrument, or other obligation
has been extinguished or has terminated (ex.
Donation of land cancelled upon failure of donee to
build a school thereon within a certain period)
2.
The contract, instrument, etc. has been
barred by extinctive prescription, as where the
plaintiff has possessed in bad faith the property
publicly, adversely and uninterruptedly for 30 years
SITUATION WHERE 2 CASES WERE FILED,
SAME PROPERTY; Finding of ownership in FE and
ATQTC
Now, supposing there is a case of forcible entry and a
case for quieting of title, on the SAME PROPERTY.
In the FE case, the question of ownership was dealt
upon to pass upon the issue of possession. Which will
prevail? The one under FE, or under the quieting of
title case?
Of course, QUIETING OF TITLE CASE.
This is because in the FE case, this is an ejectment suit.
The issue is on possession. So even if the court will
delve on the issue in ownership, it is only to be able to
determine who has the better right to possess.
If in the ATQTc [action to quiet title case], the court
already passes upon who the owner is, and there is a
conflict in the FE and ATQTC. The one which will
prevail is ATQTC.
Example:
In FE, it was found out that A was the owner.
In ATQTC, it was found out that B was the owner.
In the End, ATQTC will have to prevail. B is owner.
PRESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION TO QUIET TITLE
When will Action prescribe? If the plaintiff is in the
possession of the property, then the ATQT [action to
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quiet title] is imprescriptible.
If he is not in possession, depends, it can be 10 or 30.
10 – for ordinary prescription
30 – extra ordinary prescription
The first thing that you must prove in an action to
quiet title case is that the plaintiff has legal or
equitable title to or interest in the real property.
Article 477. The plaintiff must have legal or
equitable title to, or interest in the real property
which is the subject matter of the action. He need
not be in possession of said property.
Article 479. The plaintiff must return to the
defendant all benefits he may have received from
the latter, or reimburse him for expenses that may
have redounded to the plaintiff's benefit.
in such a way as to cause damage to the land or
tenement of another or to travelers over a public
or private road, the owner of the tree shall be
obliged to fell and remove it; and should he not
do so, it shall be done at his expense by order of
the administrative authorities. (390a)
What is the obligation of the proprietor of the
construction or of the work, or of a building which is in
danger of falling? That is 482.
What if he does not do it?
If he does not comply, then the admin authorities may
order the demolition of the structure at the expense
of the owner or take measures to ensure public safety.
Same thing with large trees, 483.
OBLIGATION OF PLAINTIFF
Purpose of the action to quiet title is to remove the
cloud on the plaintiff’s title or to remove a cloud from
being case thereon, and not to obtain any other
benefit.
Obligation
of
plaintiff to return
or
reimburse
“He who seeks equity must do equity”
1.
Return to the defendant all the benefits he
may have received from the latter
2.
Reimburse defendant for the expenses the
latter incurred which redounded to his benefit
RUINOUS BUILDINGS AND TREES
Article 482. If a building, wall, column, or any other
construction is in danger of falling, the owner shall
be obliged to demolish it or to execute the
necessary work in order to prevent it from falling.
If the proprietor does not comply with this
obligation, the administrative authorities may
order the demolition of the structure at the
expense of the owner, or take measures to insure
public safety. (389a)
Article 483. Whenever a large tree threatens to fall
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owned by different people are already concretely
determined and separately identifiable, even if not
yet technically described.
MODULE 4:
CO-OWNERSHIP
Si vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 122047. October
12, 2000)
484. CO-OWNERSHIP DEFINED
DEFINITION
A.
B.
As a manifestation of ownership – Form
of ownership which exists whenever an
undivided thing or right belongs to
different persons.
As a right – right of common dominion
which two or more persons have in a
spiritual or ideal part of a thing which is
not materially or physically divided.
Requisites of co-ownership
A.
B.
C.
There must be a plurality of owners
Object of ownership must be a thing or
right which is undivided
Each co-owner’s right must be limited
only to his ideal share of the physical
whole
Characteristics of co-ownership
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
There are two or more co-owners
There is a single object which is not
materially or physically divided
There is no mutual representation by the coowners
It exists for the common enjoyment of the
co-owners
It has no distinct legal personality
It is governed first of all by the contract of
the parties, otherwise, by the special legal
provisions, and in default of such provisions,
by the provisions of Title III on co-ownership.
OWNERSHIP OF A CO-OWNER
Although the co-owners may have unequal shares
in the common property, quantitatively speaking,
each co-owner has a right in a qualitative sense.
Ownership of whole and over his aliquot share
Each co-owner is the absolute owner of his own
ideal but definite share.
DISPUTED PORTION/S
DETERMINED
ALREADY
CONCRETELY
There is no co-ownership when the different portions
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Legal Principle: There is no co-ownership when
the different portions owned by different people
are already concretely determined and
separately identifiable, even if not yet
technically described. This situation makes
inapplicable the provision on the right of
redemption of a co-owner in the Civil Code.
Facts:
Spouses Armada transferred their property to
the names of their three sons namely, Crisotomo,
Jose and Severo. Crisostomo through Cresencia
(atty-in-fact) executed a deed of sale in favor
Anita Si.
Spouses Jose Armada (other brother) filed a
complaint to annul the sale on the ground that
there was no written notice of such sale whereas
the deed stated that “the co-owners are not
interested in buying the land”. Further, there was
misrepresentation on the citizenship of
Cresencia is a Filipino citizen.
Petitioners claimed that there was really no coownership since the parents executed three
deeds of sale assigning specific properties to the
brothers. Since there is no co-ownership it follows
that there is no right to redemption.
Lower court dismissed the petition. CA reversed
and said that co-ownership still exists and that
the land was undivided.
Issue: Whether or not Respondent can recover
the land (through right of redemption)
Ruling:
NO - respondent cannot recover the. Under Art.
484 of the Civil Code, there is co-ownership
whenever the ownership of an undivided thing
or right belongs to different persons. There is no
co-ownership when the different portions owned
by different people are already concretely
determined and separately identifiable, even if
not yet technically described. This situation
makes inapplicable the provision on the right of
redemption of a co-owner in the Civil Code.
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The decision of the RTC is correct when it found
that as early as 1954, the lot in question had
already been partitioned when their parents
executed three (3) deed of sales (sic) in favor of
Jose, Crisostomo and Severo. Notably, every
portion conveyed and transferred to the three
sons was definitely described and segregated
and with
the
corresponding
technical
description (sic). In short, this is what we call
extrajudicial partition. Moreover, every portion
belonging to the three sons has been declared
for taxation purposes.
These are the unblinkable facts that the portion
sold to defendant spouses Si by defendants
Crisostomo Armada and Cresenciana Armada
was concretely determined and identifiable.
It was revealed that Marcelino and his son
occupied and built their house on an area
located on the southernmost portion of another
lot and not the adjacent lot designated to him.
The SPS Cabal, herein respondents, confronted
Marcelino on this matter which resulted in an
agreement to a re-survey, and swapping of lots
for the purpose of reconstruction of land titles.
However, the agreed resurvey and swapping of
lots did not materialize.
Now, respondents filed a complaint for
Recovery of Possession against Marcelino. They
alleged that he introduced improvements in
bad faith on their land with knowledge that the
adjacent lot is titled in his name.
Issue:
After the physical division of the lot among the
brothers, the community ownership terminated,
and the right of preemption or redemption for
each brother was no longer available.
Heirs of M. Cabal vs. Spouses L. and R. Cabal
(G.R. No. 153625
Facts:
Marcelo Cabal was the owner of a parcel of
land in Zambales. It is described as Lot G and
covered by an OCT.
1954, Marcelo died, survived by his wife and his
children. It appears however that 5 years before
he died, Marcelo allowed his son, MARCELINO,
to build his house on a portion of the lot. Since
then, Marcelino the son, resided thereon. Next,
the SON OF MARCELINO, also built his house
thereon.
1964, Marcelo’s heirs extra judicially settled
among themselves the lot into undivided equal
shares and TCT was issued in their names. One of
them, Daniel, sold a portion of his undivided
share to SPS Marete and Ebue.
1976, the heirs subdivided lot G into:
1. Lot G-1; Marcelino’s
2. Lot G-2; Higinia, Daniel, Natividad, Juan,
Cecilio, Margarita, Lorenzo, Lauro, and
Anacleto, resulting in the issuance of a
TCT.
in 1977, Marcelino mortgaged his share, to the
Rural Bank of San Antonio, in Zambales.
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w/n Respondent
possession over the land
can
recover
the
Held:
No. Rules on co-ownership do not apply here
because in this case, it is undisputed that
Marcelino built his house on the disputed
property in 1949 with the consent of his father.
Marcelino has been in possession of the
disputed lot since then with the knowledge of his
co-heirs, such that even before his father died in
1954, when the co-ownership was created, his
inheritance or share in the co-ownership was
already particularly designated or physically
segregated. Thus, even before Lot G was
subdivided in 1976, Marcelino already occupied
the disputed portion and even then coownership did not apply over the disputed lot.
Elementary is the rule that there is no coownership where the portion owned is
concretely determined and identifiable, though
not technically described, or that said portion is
still embraced in one and the same certificate
of title does make said portion less determinable
or identifiable, or distinguishable, one from the
other, nor that dominion over each portion less
exclusive, in their respective owners.
Thus, since Marcelino built a house and has
been occupying the disputed portion since
1949, with the consent of his father and
knowledge of the co-heirs, it would have been
just and equitable to have segregated said
portion in his favor and not one adjacent to it.
Undoubtedly, the subdivision survey affected in
1976 spawned the dilemma in the present case.
It designated Lot G-1 as Marcelino's share in the
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inheritance notwithstanding his possession since
1949 of a definite portion of Lot G, now the
southernmost portion of Lot 1-E.
Disposal
of
share
SOURCES OF CO-OWNERSHIP
Co-ownership may be created by any of the
following causes:
A.
By contract – two persons shared in paying
the land with the agreement to divide the
land equally between them
B.
By law – easement of party walls, ACP
between spouses
C.
By succession – heirs of undivided property
before partition
D.
By testamentary disposition or donation inter
vivos – testator or donor prohibits partition
for a period of time
E.
By fortuitous event or by chance –
commixtion or confusion
F.
By occupancy – when two persons catch
a wild animal or fish in the open sea or
gather forest products
Mutual
agency
Distribution
of profits
Effect
of
death
or
incapacity
Duration
Co-owner can
dispose of his
share
without
the consent of
the
other
A
partner
cannot do so
unless
authorized
No
mutual
represent
ation
A
partner
can
generally
bind
the
partnership
Must
be
proportional to
the respective
interests of the
co- owners
Subject to
the
stipulation
of
the
partners
Not
dissolved
by death or
incapacity of a
co-owner
Agreement to
keep the thing
undivided
of
more than 10
years is
void
489. NECESSITY FOR AGREEMENT ON EXPENSES
Co-ownership
Creation
Personality
Purpose
Without
the
formalities of a
contract
No juridical or
legal
personality
Collective
enjoyment
the thing
right
of
or
Partnership
Can
be
created
only
by
contract,
express
or
implied
(xpn:
conjugal
partnership)
Such juridical
personality
distinct from
the partners
exists
No limits
CO-OWNERSHIP V. EASEMENT
Co-ownership
CO-OWNERSHIP V. PARTNERSHIP
Dissolves
partnership
Each owner has a right
of dominion over the
whole property and
over his undivided share
Right of ownership rests
solely on each and
every co-owner over a
single object
Easeme
nt
There is precisely a
limitation on the right of
dominion
The right of dominion is
in favor of one or more
persons and over two or
more different things
SHARE OF CO-OWNERS IN BENEFITS AND
CHARGES
Proportional to the respective interests of each.
Hence, if one’s interest in the co-ownership is ¼,
his share in the benefits and charges is also
¼.
To obtain profits
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CONTRARY STIPULATION IN A CONTRACT
General rule: Any stipulation in a contract
making the share in the benefits of charges
disproportional to the respective interests of the
co- owners is void.
Exception: If the co-ownership is created other
than by a contract (e.g. by will, donation) – the
share of the co-owners need not be
proportionate to their respective interests.
488. OBLIGATION TO CONTRIBUTE TO
EXPENSES
OBLIGATION TO CONTRIBUTE TO EXPENSES
The expenses of preservation of the thing owned in
common and the amount of taxes should be
borne by all.
A co-owner who advanced payment
Has a right to demand reimbursement from the
others in proportion to their respective interests in
the co-ownership. Until reimbursed, he holds a lien
upon the subject property for the amounts due
therefrom.
Refers only to necessary expenses
Examples are those incurred for repair of a building
in a ruinous condition or payment of taxes.
co-owner has the
contribute.
Rule on notification
The co-owner must, if practicable, first notify the
others of the necessity for the repairs.
Take note: Lack of notice even if practicable
would not exempt the other co-owners from their
obligation, but the co-owner who advanced
them has the burden of proving that they were
property incurred.
LIMITATIONS ON CO-OWNER’S RIGHT OF USE
A co-owner may use the thing owned in common
provided he does so:
1.
In accordance with the purpose for
which the co- ownership is intended – to
determine purpose, look into the
agreement, express or implied.

Remedy if a co-owner refuses to contribute to the
necessary expenses.
File an action for specific performance against the
particular co-owner.

RENUNCIATION BY A CO-OWNERS OF HIS SHARE

Renunciation need not be total
Renunciation partakes of the nature of dacion en
pago Constitutes a novation by change of the
object of the obligation, the consent of the other
co-owners and creditor is necessary.
refuses to
Repairs for preservation
A co-owner has the right to compel the others
to contribute to the expenses of preservation,
maintenance or necessary repairs, even if
incurred without the knowledge of the others or
prior notice to them.
Take note: Useful expenses are not covered, unless
others consented.
The co-owner need only renounce so much of his
undivided share as may be equivalent to his share
of expenses and taxes.
means but
In the absence thereof, it is to be
understood that the thing is
intended for that use for which it is
ordinarily adapted according to its
nature
If previously used for a particular
purpose – presumed that such is the
purpose intended by the parties
Co-owners are free to change the
purpose of the co-ownership by
agreement
2.
In such a way as not to injure the interest
of the co- ownership.
3.
In such a way as not to prevent the other
co-owners from using it according to
their rights.
Take note: Failure or refusal of co-owner to
contribute is not tantamount to a renunciation.
When renunciation not allowed
If it is prejudicial to the co-ownership like when a
97 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
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applying supplementary describing the rules that
govern such partnership. Wherein the rules of co
ownership shall be applied as an incidence of the
conjugal partnership granting either spouse the right
to institute a claim on behalf of the properties in the
conjugal partnership.
487. ACTION IN EJECTMENT
By anyone of the co-owners – Any co-owner may
bring, in behalf of himself and others, an action in
ejectment affecting the co-ownership,
FACTS


The suit may proceed without impleading
the other co- owners.
A favourable judgment shall benefit the
other co-owners, but if adverse, the same
cannot prejudice the rights of the coowners who were not impleaded
·
Respondent Karen Go filed two complaints praying
for an issuance of writ of replevin before the RTC for
the seizure of 2 motor vehicles in Navarro’s
possession. The complaint alleged that Karen Go is
doing business under the name of KARGO
enterprises. The cause of action was against Navarro
as evidenced by a lease agreement with option to
purchase as represented by the husband of Karen Go
which is Glenn Go.
·
Navarro answered that the 2 complaints had no cause
of action since Karen Go was not a party thereto. It
was her husband, Glenn Go.
·
RTC dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of
action, but was then set aside upon reconsideration
acting on the assumption that the leased property
was conjugal property
·
The CA denied Navarro’s petition as well as
reconsideration and affirmed the RTC order
Against strangers or a co-owner
The action may be brought against strangers and
even against a co- owner.
Take note: As against a co-owner, the only
purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of
the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek
exclusion of the other co-owner from the property
because the latter has a right of possession.
Building effect of adverse decision
GR: An adverse decision is not res judicata with
respect to other co- owners who are not parties to
the action
XPN: If it appears that the action was instituted in
·
their behalf.
Against co-owners involving co-owned property
Treat all co-owners of a property as indispensable
parties where the suit involves the co-owned
property. Purpose is to prevent multiplicity of suits.
Where co-ownership deemed terminated
When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale
of the property and the court granted the
petitioner, the co-ownership was deemed
terminated, hence right to enjoy possession
ceased.
·
Navarro further alleged that it was erroneous to
assume thatthe party was under conjugal property
The central issue is that the name in the title of the
complaint was identified as Karen Go doing business
under KARGO enterprises, whereas, the agreement
was between Glenn Go and Navarro with Glenn
acting as KARGO enterprises Manager
ISSUE
·
W/N Karen Go or Kargo Enterprises had juridical
personality to sue as the lease agreement was
between Navarro and Glenn Go
RULING.
Navarro vs. Escobido (G.R. No. 153788. November 27,
2009)
·
LEGAL PRINCIPLE
Properties under conjugal partnership of gains are
subjected to the rules provided under the Article 124
of the Family Code with provisions of the Civil Code
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Normally, KARGO is a sole proprietorship which is
neither a natural person, nor a juridical person as
defined by Article 44 of the Civil Code. Thus, it cannot
be a party to a civil action. However, it may file a civil
action pursuant to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules on
Parties in interest.
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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·
Karen Go, as the registered owner of KARGO
enterprises is the party who will directly benefit from
or be injured by a judgment in the case
ROLE OF GLENN GO
·
For the purposes solving the case at bar is centered
on Glenn’s name as a party in the lease agreement
with Navarro
·
Solely for this case, the Supreme Court ruled that
Kargo Enterprises is conjugal property pursuant to
Article 124 of the Family Code :
“Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly….”
·
Thus, it allows either Karen or Glenn to act or speak
with authority in the management of their conjugal
property as it states under Article 108 of the FC that
conjugal partnership is governed by the rules on the
contract of partnership.
· Art. 1811 of Civil Code:
·
A partner is a co-owner with the other partners of
specific partnership property. The incidents of this coownership are such that:
(1) A partner, subject to the provisions of this Title and
to any agreement between the partners, has an
equal right with his partners to possess specific
partnership property for partnership purposes; . . .
·
·
Thus, the spouses are effectively co-owners of
KARGO enterprises, and the properties registered;
both have an equal right to seek possession of these
properties. The SC uses Carandang v. Heirs De
Guzman in their ruling:
“in a co-ownership, co-owners may bring actions for
the recovery of co-owned property without the
necessity of joining all the other co-owners as coplaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been
filed for the benefit of his co-owners.
·
Under this ruling, either of the spouses Go may bring
an action against Navarro to recover possession of
the Kargo Enterprises-leased vehicles which they coown.
·
On this basis, we hold that since Glenn Go is not
strictly an indispensable party in the action to recover
possession of the leased vehicles, he only needs to
be impleaded as a pro-forma party to the suit, based
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on Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules. Hence, Navarro’s
petition is denied.
G.R. No. 166519
March 31, 2009
NIEVES PLASABAS vs. CA
Facts:
In 1974, petitioners Nieves filed a complaint for
recovery of title to property and ordering the
defendants to vacate the occupied portion and
to pay damages. Respondents defended that the
subject land was inherited by all the parties from
their common ancestor, Francisco Plasabas.
Revealed in the course of the trial was that
petitioner Nieves, contrary to her allegations in the
complaint, was not the sole and absolute owner
of the land and that the property was passed on
from his great great grandfather to him and his
siblings, the co-owners.
After resting their case, respondents raised in their
memorandum the argument that the case should
have been terminated at inception for petitioners’
failure to implead indispensable parties, the other
co-owners – Jose, Victor and Victoria.
The trial court, without ruling on the merits,
dismissed the case for lack of cause of action as
the plaintiffs spouses Plasabas Malazarte have no
complete legal personality to sue by themselves
alone without joining the brothers and sisters of
Nieves who are as INDISPENSABLE as the latter in
the final determination of the case. Not
impleading them, any judgment would have no
effectiveness.
ISSUE:
WON RTC and CA were correct in dismissing the
case for non-joinder of the indispensable parties?
WON Article 487 of the Civil Code could not be
applied considering that the complaint was not
for ejectment, but for recovery of title or a
reivindicatory action.
RULING:
NO. Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any
one of the co-owners may bring an action for
ejectment. The article covers all kinds of actions
for the recovery of possession, including an accion
publiciana and a reivindicatory action.
A co-owner may file suit without necessarily
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the
benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of
the plaintiff will benefit the other co-owners, but if
the judgment is adverse, the same cannot
prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded coowners. There is no need to determine whether
petitioners’ complaint is one for ejectment or for
recovery of title. To repeat, Article 487 of the Civil
Code applies to both actions.
Thus, petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to
implead their co-owners as parties. Here, the
allegation of petitioners in their complaint that
they are the sole owners of the property in
litigation is immaterial, considering that they
acknowledged during the trial that the property is
co-owned by Nieves and her siblings, and that
petitioners have been authorized by the coowners to pursue the case on the latter’s behalf.
Impleading the other co-owners is, therefore, not
mandatory, because the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all.
The trial and appellate courts committed
reversible error when they summarily dismissed the
case, after both parties had rested their cases
following a protracted trial commencing in 1974,
on the sole ground of failure to implead
indispensable parties. The rule is settled that the
non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a
ground for the dismissal of an action as the
remedy is to simply implead the non-party
claimed to be indispensable by order of the court.
If petitioner refuses to implead, then the court may
dismiss
the
complaint/petition
for
the
plaintiff’s/petitioner's failure to comply therewith.
Adlawan vs. Adlawan (G.R. No. 161916. January
20, 2006)
Legal principle: A co-owner by virtue of Art. 487 is
allowed to bring an action without necessity of
including all the co-owners as plaintiffs for it is
presumed to be for the benefit of all BUT if the
action of the plaintiff alone, the action should be
dismissed.
FACTS:
A house and lot (lot 7226) was registered in the
name of Dominador Adlawan, the father of
(petitioner) Arnelito Adlawan. He is the
acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador
who is claiming that he is the sole heir. He then
adjudicated to himself the said house and lot and
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out of generosity allowed the siblings of his father
to occupy the property provided that they vacate
when asked. Time came when he demanded that
they vacate and when they refused he filed an
ejectment suit against them.
His aunt and uncle on the other hand, Narcisa (70)
and Emeterio (59) denied his allegations claiming
that the said lot was registered in their parents
name and they had been living in the said house
and lot since birth. The only reason why the said
house and lot was transferred in Dominador’s
name was when their parents were in need of
money for renovating their house, their parents
were not qualified to obtain a loan and since
Dominador was the only one who had a college
education, they executed a simulated deed of
sale in favor of Dominador.
The MTC dismissed the complaint holding that
Arnelito’s filiation and the settlement of the estate
are conditions precedent for the accrual of the
suit. And since Dominador was survived by his
wife, Graciana, her legal heirs are entitled to their
share in the lot.
The RTC ordered Narcisa and Emeterio to turn over
the possession of the lot to Arnelito. It also granted
the motion of execution which was opposed by
the nephew and nieces of Graciana who claim
that they have a share in the lot.
The CA reinstated the decision of the MTC holding
that Arnelito and the heirs of Graciana are coheirs thus he cannot eject them from the property
via unlawful detainer. Thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Arnelito can validly maintain the
ejectment suit
HELD:
NO. The theory of succession invoked by Arnelito
would prove that he is not the sole heir of
Dominador. Since he was survived was his wife,
upon his death, Arnelito and Graciana became
co-owners of the lot. Upon her death, her share
passed on to her relatives by consanguinity thus
making them co-owners as well.
Petitioner contends that Art. 487 allows him to file
the instant petition. (Art. 487. Any one of the coowners may bring an action in ejectment.) It is true
that a co-owner may bring such an action w/o
necessity of joining all the co-owners as plaintiffs
because it is presumed to be instituted for the
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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benefit of all BUT if the action is for the benefit of
the plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed.
Since petitioner brought the suit in his name and
for his benefit alone and his repudiation of the
ownership of the other heirs, the instant petition
should be dismissed.
De Guia vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 120864.
October 8, 2003)
Legal principle: Each co-owner may demand at
any time the partition of the common property
unless a co-owner has repudiated the coownership under certain condition
Facts: Two parcels of land covering a fishpond
were equally owned by Lejano and Araniego. The
one half undivided portion owned by Araniego
was later purchased by De Guia.
Prior to this sale, the whole fishpond was leased by
the heirs of Lejano, with the knowledge and
consent of Heir of Araniego (Abejo), in favor of De
Guia. De Guia continues to possess the entire
fishpond and derived income therein despite the
expiration of the lease contract and several
demands to vacate by Abejo. This prompted
Abejo to filed a complaint for recovery of
possession with damages against De Guia.
However, Abejo failed to present evidence of the
judicial or extrajudicial partition of the fishpond.
Issue: W/N a co-owner can file an ejectment
cases against another co-owner
Ruling: Yes, any co-owner may file an action under
Article 487 not only against a third person, but also
against another co-owner who takes exclusive
possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the
property. In the latter case, however, the only
purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of
the co-ownership.
The plaintiff cannot seek
exclusion of the defendant from the property
because as co-owner he has a right of possession.
The plaintiff cannot recover any material or
determinate part of the property.
It is a basic principle in civil law that before a
property owned in common is actually
partitioned, all that the co-owner has is an ideal or
abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire
property.
101 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
A co-owner has no right to demand a concrete,
specific or determinate part of the thing owned in
common because until division is effected his right
over the thing is represented only by an ideal
portion. As such, the only effect of an action
brought by a co-owner against a co-owner will be
to obtain recognition of the co-ownership; the
defendant cannot be excluded from a specific
portion of the property because as a co-owner, he
has a right to possess and the plaintiff cannot
recover any material or determinate part of the
property.
In this case, since a co-ownership subsists
between ABEJO and DE GUIA, judicial or extrajudicial partition is the proper recourse. An action
to demand partition is imprescriptible and not
subject to laches. Each co-owner may demand at
any time the partition of the common property
unless a co-owner has repudiated the coownership under certain conditions. Neither
ABEJO nor DE GUIA has repudiated the coownership under the conditions set by law.
490. DIFFERENT STORIES OF A HOUSE, DIFF
OWNERS
RULES
When different stories of a house belong to
different owners – contribution to the necessary
expenses for the preservation or maintenance
of the house.
Take note: Only applies if the titles of ownership
do not specify the terms or there is no agreement

Each owner shall bear the cost of
maintaining the floor of his story

Main and party walls, roof and other
things used in common – maintained by
all owners in proportion to the value of
the story belonging to each

Floor of the entrance front door, common
yard and sanitary works common to all –
maintained at the expense of all the
owners pro rata.

Stairs from the entrance to the first story –
maintained at the expense of all the
owners pro rata, except the owner of the
ground floor
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
Stairs from the first to the second story –
maintained by all, except the owner of
the ground floor and first story
491. CONSENT OF OTHER CO-OWNERS FOR
ALTERATIONS
ALTERATION
A change made by a co-owners in the thing
owned in common, which involves:
Change of the thing from the state or
essence in which the others believe it
should remain
Withdrawal of the thing from the use to
which they wish it to be intended
Any other transformation which prejudices
the condition or substance of the thing or
its enjoyment by the others



Examples: Addition of another story to a
building, construction of a house on a land
owned in common
Any act of ownership included
Alteration is not limited to material or physical
changes. It includes any act of ownership, such
as:

Real right or encumbrance is imposed on
the common property (e.g. servitude,
registered lease, mortgage)
Take note: A co-owner may alienate, assign,
mortgage and even substitute another
person in the enjoyment of his undivided
interest in the property because he has full
ownership over it. (Except when personal
rights are involved)
UNANIMOUS CONSENT NEEDED
Unanimous consent of all the co-owners (not just
majority) is necessary even if alteration would
prove beneficial, because alteration is an act of
ownership and not of mere administration.
Form of consent and their effect
A. Express consent – entitles the co-owner to
recovery. Burden of proof is upon him to
prove that such consent was given.
B.
Implied consent – co-owner who made the
alteration has no action against the others
102 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
for their share of the expenses.
Take note: If consent can be shown even if merely
tacit, there is still consent so there is no reason why
the other co-owners should not share in the
expenses. Besides, Article 491 does not expressly
require express consent.
Liability for alteration
A co-owner who makes such alteration without the
express or implied consent of the others acts in bad
faith and as punishment, he should:
A. Lose what he has spent
B. Be obliged to demolish the improvements
done
C. Be liable to pay for losses and damages the
community property or the other coowners may have suffered
Take note: Whatever is beneficial or useful to the
co-ownership shall belong to it.
Intervention of the courts
If the withholding of the consent by one or more of
the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common
interest, the courts may afford adequate relief.
492. ACTS OF ADMINISTRATION & BETTER
ENJOYMENT
RULES FOR ACTS OF AMINISTRATION & BETTER
ENJOYMENT
Meaning of acts of administration and better
enjoyment
They contemplate acts or decisions for the
common benefit of all the co-owners and not for
the benefit of only one or some of them.
Examples:
1. Appointment of administrator to manage
the property
2. Engaging the services of a lawyer to
preserve the ownership and possession of
the property
3. Payment made in the ordinary course of
management
4. Unregistered lease of 1 year or less
Take note: Although the co-owners may have
unequal shares in the common property,
quantitatively speaking, each co-owner has the
same right as any of the others.
Distinguished from alteration

Alteration – is more or less permanent
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
Acts of administration – have transitory
effects and the purpose is for the
preservation, preparation and better
enjoyment of the thing which do not affect
its essence, nature or substance.
Majority rule prevails
The majority represent the controlling interests in
the object of the co- ownership (51% of the
financial interest). The majority also decides the
expenses to improve or embellish the common
property.
Take note: Notice must be given to the minority,
unless it is impracticable to do so.
Intervention of the courts
If there is no majority or if the resolution of the
majority is seriously prejudicial to the interests of the
other co-owners, the court may take such
measures as it may deem proper, at the instance
of the interested party. The court may also appoint
an administrator.
Acts seriously prejudicial
No hard and fast rule as to what should be
considered as “seriously prejudicial” as to justify the
court’s intervention.
Examples:
1. When the resolution calls for a substantial
change of the thing or the use to which
the property has been intended
2. When the resolution authorizes leases,
loans and other contract without the
necessary security
3. When
the resolution upholds the
continued
employment
of
an
administrator who is guilty of fraud or
negligence in his management.
Rules on who decides on the following:
1. Acts of preservation
2. Acts of administration
3. Acts of alteration.
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Acts of
preservati
on or
necessary
repairs
Any coowner
may
decide on
an act of
preservati
on (Art.
489) If
practicabl
e, first
notify his
co-owner
of the
necessity
of repairs
Acts of
administrati
on or
manageme
nt
This is to be
decided by
the majority
of the coowners
(Arts. 489
and 492)
Acts of
alteration,
encumbranc
e, or
alienation
Unanimous
consent of
all the coowners is
needed
By majority
is meant the
controlling
interest
(financial
majority)
not
numerical
majority.
Run to the
courts for
appropriate
relief, if
withholding
of consent of
one or some
of the
coowners is
clearly
prejudicial to
the common
interest (Art.
491)
Appointme
nt of an
administrato
r if there is
no majority.
493 – 494. RIGHTS OF EACH CO-OWNER
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect
of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to
the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership. (399)
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain
in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand
at any time the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing
undivided for a certain period of time, not
exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may
be extended by a new agreement. A donor or
testator may prohibit partition for a period which
shall not exceed twenty years.
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RIGHTS OF EACH CO-OWNER
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Full ownership of his undivided share in the
common property
Full ownership of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto
Right to alienate, assign or mortgage his
ideal interest independently of the other
co-owners
Right to substitute another person in the
enjoyment of his part, except when
personal rights are involved
Demand at any time the partition of the
thing owned in common, insofar as his
share is concerned
Nature of right before partition
Before a property owned in common is actually
partitioned, all that the co-owner has is an ideal or
abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire
property.
Bailon-Casilao vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
78178. April 15, 1988)
Legal Principles: it is now settled that the
appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where
their consent were not secured in a sale of the
entire property as well as in a sale merely of
undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an
action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Facts:
Petitioners, Casilao, Tolentino, Balion, etc. filed a
case for recovery of property and damages with
notice of lis pendens against the defendant and
herein private respondent, Celestino Afable.
The parcel of land involved in this case is a land
with an area of 48,849 square meters, covered by
an OCT in the names of Rosalia, Gaudencio,
Sabina, Bernabe, Nenita and Delia, all surnamed
Bailon, as co-owners, each with a 1/6 share.
Sometime in 1948, Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio
Bailon, two of the co-owners sold a portion of the
land to Delgado. In 1949, Rosalia Bailon alone sold
the remainder of the land to Lanuza. On the same
date, Lanuza acquired the portion of lot sold to
Delgado and sometime after, sold the two parcels
of land to Celestino Afable Sr.
The lower court then rendered a decision, among
others, finding and declaring Celestino Afable, a
co-owner of the land having validly bought the
104 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
two-sixth (2/6) respective undivided shares of
Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon; and
ordering the segregation of the undivided interests
in the property in order to terminate co-ownership
to be conducted by any Geodetic Engineer
selected by the parties to delineate the specific
part of each of the co-owners.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the
lower court but held the petitioners guilty of laches
and dismissed the complaint hence this petition.
Issue:
1. WoN the sale made Rosalia and
Guadencio, as co-owners of the entire
disputed property without the consent of
the other co-owners is valid.
2. WoN the action for recovery of property is
the proper action this case.
RULING:
1. Yes. However, only the rights of the coowner-seller are transferred, thereby
making the buyer a co-owner of the
property.
The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are
clearly specified in Article 493 of the Civil
Code.Thus:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage it and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of
the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the coowners, shall be limited to the portion which may
be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a
co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale
will affect only his own share but not those of the
other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.
This is because under the aforementioned codal
provision, the sale or other disposition affects only
his undivided share and the transferee gets only
what would correspond to his grantor in the
partition of the thing owned in common.
Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by
Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid
with respect to their proportionate shares, and the
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subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale
to private respondent Celestino Afable, the said
Afable thereby became a co-owner of the
disputed parcel of land as correctly held by the
lower court since the sales produced the effect of
substituting the buyers in the enjoyment thereof.
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since
a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a
sale of the entire property by one co-owner
without the consent of the other co-owners is
valid. However, only the rights of the co-ownerseller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a
co-owner of the property.
2. Moreover, the proper action in cases like
this is not for the nullification of the sale or
for the recovery of the thing owned in
common from the third person who
substituted the co-owner or co-owners
who alienated their shares, but the
DIVISION of the common property as of it
continued to remain in the possession of
the co-owners who possessed and
administered it.
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse
of co-owners in cases where their consent were
not secured in a sale of the entire property as well
as in a sale merely of undivided shares of some of
the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under
Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. Neither
recovery of possession nor restitution can be
granted since the defendant buyers are
legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint
ownership of the common property claimed.
Pamplona vs. Moreto (G.R. No. L-33187. March 31,
1980)
FACTS:
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were
husband and wife. During their marriage, they
acquired adjacent lots. They then begot during
their marriage six children, namely, Ursulo, Marta,
La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro.
More than six years after the death of his wife
Monica, Flaviano Moreto, without the consent of
the heirs of his said deceased wife Monica, and
before any liquidation of the conjugal partnership
of Monica and Flaviano could be effected,
executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona,
105 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
married to defendant Apolonia Onte, the deed of
absolute sale.
Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the
plaintiffs (heirs of sps Flaviano and Monica)
demanded on the defendants to vacate the
premises where they had their house and piggery
on the ground that Flaviano Moreto had no right to
sell the lot which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona
as the same belongs to the conjugal partnership
of Flaviano and his deceased wife and the latter
was already dead when the sale was executed
without the consent of the plaintiffs who are the
heirs of Monica.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale to Petitioner is void as to
½ thereof
RULING
In this case, Petitioners point to the fact that
spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega
owned three parcels of land denominated as Lot
1495 having an area of 781 sq. meters, Lot 1496
with an area of 1,021 sq. meters, and Lot 4545 with
an area of 544 sq. meters.
The three lots have a total area of 2,346 sq. meters.
Hence, Flaviano Moreto was entitled to one-half
pro-indiviso of the entire land area or 1,173 sq.
meters as his share, he had a perfect legal and
lawful right to dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share
to the Pamplona spouses. Indeed, there was still a
remainder of some 392 sq. meters belonging to
him at the time of the sale.
The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the
moment the co-owner as vendor pointed out its
location and even indicated the boundaries over
which the fences were to be erected without
objection, protest or complaint by the other coowners, on the contrary they acquiesced and
tolerated such alienation, occupation and
possession, We rule that a factual partition or
termination of the co-ownership, although partial,
was created, and barred not only the vendor,
Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private
respondents herein from asserting as against the
vendees-petitioners any right or title in derogation
of the deed of sale executed by said vendor
Flaviano Moreto.
Thus, the sale to Petitioner is valid in its entirety. The
appeal is granted.
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Del Campo vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 108228.
February 1, 2001)
Facts:
Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia, Jose,
Quirico, and Julita, all surnamed BORNALES were
the original co-owners of a lot based on the
Cadastral Survey of Pontevedra, Capiz.
The lot was divided in aliquot shares among the 8
co-owners. Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in
the lot to Soledad Daynolo. Portion of the lot was
specified in the Deed of Absolute Sale. Thereafter,
Solded Daynolo immediately took possession of
the land and built a house thereon.
Years later, Soledad and her husband mortgaged
the subject portion as a security to Jose Regalado,
Sr. and this transaction was evidenced by the
Deed of Mortgage.
April 14, 1948, three of the co-owners of the lot, Salome, Consorcia, and Alfredo sold 25,000 soiree
meters of said lot to Jose Regalado, Sr. Soledad
Daynolo died. The husband was able to pay and
redeem the mortgaged portion of land. Jose
Regalado, Sr. then executed a Deed of Discharge
of Mortgage in favor of Soledad’s heirs. The heirs
subsequently sold this to herein petitioners, the
spouses Manuel Del Campo and Salvacion
Quiachon.
Meanwhile, Jose Regalado, Sr. caused the
reconstitution of the OCT. The title was then
transferred to him and he then subdivided the
entire property into smaller lots. In 1987, petitioners
Manuel and Salvacion del Campo brought this
complaint
for
"repartition,resurvey
and
reconveyance" against the heirs of the now
deceased Jose Regalado, Sr. Petitioner Claimed
that they owned an area located within Lot 162C-6 which was erroneously included in TCTNo.
14566 in the name of Regalado.
Petitioners alleged that they occupied the
disputed area as a residential dwelling ever since
they purchased the property from the Distajos way
back in 1951. They also declared the land for
taxation purposes and paid the corresponding
taxes. On April 1, 1987, summons were served on
Regalado's widow, Josefina Buenvenida, and two
other children, Rosemarie and Antonio. Josefina
and Rosemarie were declared in default because
only Antonio filed an answer to the complaint.
106 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
During trial, petitioners presented the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed between Soledad
Daynolo and Salome Bornales as well as the Deed
of Mortgage and Deed of Discharge signed by
Jose Regalado, Sr. The Deed of Absolute Sale
showing the purchase by the Del Campos of the
property from the Distajos was likewise given
inevidence.
Issue:
Was the sale by a co-owner Salome of a
physical portion of an undivided property held in
common valid?
Ruling:
The sale by the co-owner Salome of a physical
portion of an undivided property was held to be
valid.
Reason why the sale was valid:
There can be no doubt that the transaction
entered into by Salome and Soleded could be
legally recognized in its entirety since the object
of the sale did not even exceed the ideal shares
held by the former in the co-ownership. As a
matter of fact, the deed of sale executed between
the parties expressly stipulated that the portion of
Lot 162 sold to Soledad would be taken from
Salomes 4/16 undivided interest in said lot, which
the latter could validly transfer in whole or in part
EVEN WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER COOWNERS.
Salomes right to sell part of her undivided interest
in the co-owned property is absolute in
accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a
co-owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso
share and has the right to alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and substitute another person in its
enjoyment. Since Salome's clear intention was to
sell merely part of her aliquot share in Lot 162, in
our view no valid objection can be made against
it and the sale can be given effect to the full
extent. We are not unaware of the principle that
a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a
particular portion of a co-owned property prior to
partition among all the co-owners. However, this
should not signify that the vendee does not
acquire anything at all in case a physically
segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold
to him. The vendee steps into the shoes of the
vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate
abstract share in the property held in common.
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Resultantly, Soledad became a co-owner of Lot
162 when the sale was made in her favor.
Consequently, Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo
could not legally sell the shares pertaining to
Soledad since a co-owner cannot alienate more
than his share in the co-ownership. Even if a coowner sells the whole property as his, the sale will
affect only his own share but not those of the other
co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Since
a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a
sale of the entire property by one co-owner will
only transfer the rights of said co-owner to the
buyer, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of
the property.
Resultantly, Soledad became a co-owner of Lot
162 as of the year 1940 when the sale was made
in her favor. It follows that Salome, Consortia and
Alfredo could not have sold the entire Lot 162 to
Jose Regalado, Sr. on April 14, 1948 because at
that time, the ideal shares held by the three coowners/vendors were equivalent to only 10/16 of
the undivided property less the aliquot share
previously sold by Salome to Soledad. Based on
the principle that "no one can give what he does
not have," Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could
not legally sell the shares pertaining to Soledad
since a co-owner cannot alienate more than his
share in the co-ownership. We have ruled many
times that even if a co-owner sells the whole
property as his, the sale will affect only his own
share but not those of the other co-owners who
did not consent to the sale. Since a co-owner is
entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the
entire property by one co-owner will only transfer
the rights of said co-owner to the buyer, thereby
making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
Legal right of redemption
A co-owner has the right to redeem the property
in case the shares of all the other co-owners or
any of them are sold to a third person.
Take note: Redemption by a co-owner does not
terminate the co- ownership nor give him title to the
entire property.
Renunciation of Interest
A co-owner may exempt himself from the
obligation to contribute to the expenses of
preservation of the thing or right owned in common
and to the taxes by renouncing so much of his
interest as may be equivalent to his share of the
expenses and taxes.
107 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
Personal right
The term “personal right’’ is used in Article 493 in
its real meaning and not in its legal or technical
sense as the opposite of real right.
Right which cannot be transferred because it
affects the personal relations of the co-owners
with one another.
A co-owner may lose his personal right to others,
as by prescription thereof by a co-owner.
SALE OR MORTGAGE OF COMMON PROPERTY
Undivided portion
A co-owner is free to dispose of his pro indiviso
share and of the fruits and other benefit arising
from that share.
Take note: Transferee’s right is limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him upon
partition (he does not acquire any determinate
physical portion of the whole)
Definite portion
A deed of sale appearing to convey a definite
portion of the property does not per se render
the sale a nullity.

Sale is valid subject to the condition that
the interests acquired by vendee is
limited to the part that may be assigned
to the co-owner vendor upon partition

There may also be a valid sale of a
definite portion where estoppel applies,
as when the co-owners consented to the
same or never objected despite
knowledge.
Case in point:
In other words, the sale affects only his
proportionate or abstract share in the property
owned in common, subject to the results of the
partition, but not those of the other co-owners
who did not consent to the sale (Bailon-Casilao v.
Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 138 [1988].)
Whole property
Sale is valid only insofar as his ideal quota, unless
authorized by the other co-owners.
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Take note: Appropriate remedy of other coowners who did not consent to the sale is an
action for partition under Rule 69. Recovery of
possession nor restitution cannot be
sustained since buyer is a legitimate proprietor
and possessor.
Lease of half-interest
A co-owner could validly lease his half-interest
independently of the other co-owner and could
cancel the said lease agreement without the
need of securing the consent of the other.
494. TERMINATION OF CO-OWNERSHIP
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain
in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing
owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing
undivided for a certain period of time, not
exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may
be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a
period which shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is
prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or
coheir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long
as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership. (400a)
TERMINATION OF CO-OWNERSHIP
Co-ownership may be terminated in different ways,
as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
By consolidation or merger in only one of
the co-owners of all the interests of the
others
By the destruction or loss of the property coowned
By acquisitive prescription in favor of a third
person
By the partition, judicial or extrajudicial of
the respective undivided shares of the coowners
By the termination of the period agreed
upon or imposed by the donor or testator,
or of the period allowed by law
By the sale by the co-owners of the thing to
a third person and the distribution of its
proceeds among them
Take note: Redemption is not a mode of
terminating co-ownership. Hence, a co-owner
108 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
who redeems the property in its entirety does not
make him the owner of all of it.
In connection with no. 4, it has been held that the
actual possession and enjoyment of several
portions of the common property by some of the
co-owners does not of itself provide proof that the
property has already been partitioned and
coownership terminated.
A co-owner cannot, without the conformity of the
other co-owners or a judicial decree of partition,
adjudicate to himself in fee simple a determinate
portion of the property owned in common as his
share therein, to the exclusion of the other coowners.
RIGHT OF CO-OWNER TO DEMAND PARTITION
Partition
The division between two or more persons of real
or personal property which they own in common so
that each may enjoy and possess his sole estate to
the exclusion of and without interference from the
others.
Object of a Partition
Both real and personal properties may be the
object of partition. (Del Val v. Del Val, 29 Phil. 534).
Partition has for
its purpose the separation, division, or assignment
of things
held in common, among the people to whom they
may belong. (See Art. 1079). Of course, the thing
itself may be physically divided, or if not, its value
may be partitioned. (See 7 Manresa 585; Art. 1079).
Right to demand
GR: A co-owner has the right to demand at any
time partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concerned for no co- owner
is obliged to remain in the co-ownership.
Reason for Allowing Partition
To remain in a co-ownership would be to subject a
person
to the desires of the rest. Conflicts in management
being bound to arise, the law as much as possible
discourages co-ownership. Hence, no co-owner is,
as a rule, obliged to remain in the co-ownership
Take note: Action to demand partition is
imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches,
absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership by
a co-owner clearly communicated to the other
co-owners.
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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Existence of the fact of co-ownership
Partition presupposes that the thing to be divided
is owned in common and it is presumed that the
parties admit the fact of co-ownership. Hence, it is
immaterial in whose name the property is declared
for taxation purposes.
XPNS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
When the co-owners have agreed to keep
the thing undivided for a period of time, not
exceeding 10 years
 If it exceeds 10 years, the stipulation is
valid only insofar as the first 10 years
are concerned
When the partition is prohibited by the
donor or testator for a certain period, not
exceeding 20 years
When the partition is prohibited by law (e.g.
ACP, CPG, family home, party walls and
fences)
When partition would render the thing
unserviceable for the use for which it is
intended
When another co-owner has possessed the
property as exclusive owner and for a
period sufficient to acquire it by
prescription
Rules:
(1) term may extend for as many times as the
co-owners may stipulate provided that each
extension does not exceed ten years
(2) the wish of the donor or testator should be
respected but as it is against public policy to
allow property to remain undivided for all
time, a maximum period of twenty years is
provided, which period is deemed sufficient
for the fulfillment of the particular reasons of
the donor or testator;
(4), the co-ownership may be terminated in
accordance with Article 498
Take note: If the period stipulated for indivision
exceeding 10 years, the stipulation is only void
insofar as the excess is concerned.
Question: A, B, and C agreed that there should be
no partition till A passes the bar. At the end of 10
years, A has not yet passed. Is the co-ownership
already ended?
ANS.: It is submitted that it should be considered
ended, otherwise the law would be indirectly
violated.
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Question: In the same problem, suppose A passed at
the end of three years, should the co-ownership
already be considered
ended?
ANS.: Yes, since the resolutory condition has arrived.
Tuason v. Tuason
L-3404, Apr. 2, 1951
FACTS: A, B, and C were co-owners of a parcel of
land. They agreed to subdivide it into small lots, and
then divide the proceeds accordingly. Later, A
questioned the validity of the stipulation on the
ground that it virtually compelled them to remain in
the co-ownership till after all the parcels had been
sold.
HELD: The stipulation is valid, for the precise purpose
of the agreement was to eventually put an end to
the co-ownership, after the parcels had been sold.
Their being forced to remain, till after the sale,
should be considered only as a means to an end —
a partnership so to speak, in order to dispose of the
lots
Rules in the Case of Succession or Inheritance
In the law of succession, a testator may provide in his
will that the property he is disposing of will not be
partitioned for 20 years. The legitime may even be
subject to this condition
In one case, testator prohibited his heirs from making
the partition for a period of twenty years. Long
before the expiration of the period, ALL the heirs
mutually
partitioned
the
property
among
themselves. Shortly thereafter one of them
questioned the validity of the partition, claiming that
it was contrary to the express desires of the
deceased. The Supreme Court held that in view of
his previous assent to the partition, he is now
prevented by estoppel from alleging its illegality.
Although a testator may provide for an indivision of
20 years, the heirs may nevertheless partition the
property should any of the grounds for the dissolution
of a partnership exist
Cruz vs. Cristobal (G.R. No 140422, August 7,
2006)
LEGAL PRINCIPLE: Parties who were excluded
from a partition of land are not bound by such
partition agreement; Moreover, the action to
demand the right of partition is imprescriptible as
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long as co-ownership is recognized.
Cristobal
FACTS
·Heirs Cristóbal claim that they are the legitimate
children of Buena Ventura Cristobal during his
first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal
2. whether or not the petitioners are bound by
the Deed of Partition of the subject property
executed by the private respondents;
· Whereas the private respondents claim that
they are children of Cristobal resulting from his
second marriage to Donata Enriquez.
3. Whether or not petitioner’s right to question
the Deed of Partition had prescribed
4.
Whether or not their right to recover their
share of the subject property is barred by laches
· June 18, 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal bought
a parcel of land in San Juan, Manila. He died
intestate in 1930.
On the matter of filiation
· the SC ruled that filiation was proven
·6 decades later, the petitioners learned that
private
respondents had
executed
an
extrajudicial partition of the subject property and
transferred its title to their names.
Validity of the Deed of Partition executed by
private respondents among themselves to the
exclusion of petitioners, the applicable rule is
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court:
· The case was attempted at the barangay, but
to no avail.
“The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or
administration shall be published in a newspaper
of general circulation in the manner provided in
the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof.”
·A case for annulment of title and damages
were filed before the RTC by petitioners against
private respondents to recover their alleged proindiviso shares in the subject property. They had
baptismal certs. To prove filiation as well as
witnesses attesting that they are the children of
the first family of Buenaventura Cristobal.
·The RTC dismissed their petition ruling that
petitioners failed to prove filiation as the
baptismal certificates have scan evidentiary
value and the inaction for a long period of time
amounts to laches.
·The CA ruled that filiation was proven but they
are barred from their right to recover because of
laches
Laches (defined)
Laches is the negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it
has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
ISSUE
·W/N petitioners are bound by the deed of
partition executed by the private respondents
RULING (Petitioners are not barred)
In so ruling the SC sought to resolve four points:
1. whether or not petitioners were able to prove
their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura
110 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
The partition of the subject property by the
private respondents shall not bind the petitioners
since petitioners were excluded therefrom.
Petitioners were not aware of the Deed of
Partition executed by private respondents
among themselves in 1948.
As the extrajudicial settlement executed by the
private respondents in February 1948 did not
affect the right of petitioners to also inherit from
the estate of their deceased father, It was
incorrect for the trial and appellate court to hold
that petitioners' right to challenge the said
settlement had prescribed
Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, "no coowner shall be obliged to remain in the coownership. Such co-owner may demand at
anytime the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned."
Drawing from Budlong v. Bondoc, the provision
of law to mean that the action for partition is
imprescriptible. For Article 494 of the Civil Code
explicitly declares: "No prescription shall lie in
favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership."
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Tirso D. Monteroso Vs Ca
Facts:
Don Fabian married twice and sired eight
children, four from each union. In 1906, Don
Fabian married Soledad Doldol. Out of this
marriage were born Soledad, Reygula, Benjamin,
and Tirso. On April 8, 1927, Soledad Doldol
Monteroso passed away. A little over a year later,
Don Fabian contracted a second marriage with
Sofia Pendejito. From this union were born
Florenda, Reynato, Alberto, and Fabian, Jr.
Consequently, Don Fabian filed an intestate
proceeding for the estate of his deceased first
wife to avoid disputes over the inheritance of his
children from his first marriage. The partition of the
land were labeled as F-1 to F-8 and S-1 to S-4 for
the first and the second marriage, respectively.
Benjamin, son during the first marriage, died in
1947. His children Ruby, Marlene, Henrieto, and
Adelita, filed with the RTC a Complaint for
Recovery of Property with Damages against their
uncle, Tirso. The heirs of Benjamin alleged in their
complaint, their uncle, Tirso, was entrusted with
one-fourth portion of Parcel F-4 as part of the
share from the estate of Soledad D. Monteroso
(bali grandma nila) allotted to their father.
However, their uncle refused to surrender and
deliver the same when they demanded such
delivery upon their reaching the majority age. Tirso
countered that the portion pertaining to Benjamin
was never entrusted to him; it was in the possession
of their sister, Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang,
who was not entitled to any share in Parcel F-4,
having previously opted to exchange her share in
said property for another parcel of land, i.e.,
Parcel F-7, then being occupied by her. Tirso, in
turn, filed a Complaint for Partition and Damages
with Receivership, involving 12 parcels of land
against his stepmother, Pendejito, and all his full
and half-siblings and/or their representatives.
Among others, Tirso alleged that the (1) 12 parcels
of land belong to the conjugal partnerships of the
first and second marriages contracted by Don
Fabian; (2) SP No. 309, which purportedly judicially
settled the intestate estate of his mother, is null
and void for the reason that the project of
partition failed to comprehend the entire estate of
the decedent as Parcels F-6, F-7, and F-8 were
excluded, thereby depriving Tirso of his one-fourth
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share or legitime over the said three parcels of
land; and
RTC found that the heirs of Benjamin have indeed
been deprived of their inheritance which
corresponds to one-fourth share due their father
from the intestate estate of their grandmother. The
RTC ruled, among others, that the Project of
Partition to be valid, and that it constitute res
judicata on the affected properties which were
equally divided to the heirs of Soledad Monteroso.
The CA affirming the RTC, the CA rejected Tirso’s
claim that SP No. 309 is void for settling only a part
of the estate of Soledad D. Monteroso. The CA
held that partial settlement is not a ground for the
nullification of the judicial partition under either
the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 or the present Civil
Code. The appellate court added that the proper
remedy in such a situation is to ask for the partition
and the subsequent distribution of the property
omitted.
Issues:
Whether partition is the proper remedy of Tirso
Monteroso to recover the properties sold by
Fabian Monteroso, Sr. (Tirso’s father) to Soledad D.
Monteroso de Cagampang (Tirso’s sister) when
co-ownership is not pleaded as theory in the
Complaint.
Whether the cause of action of Tirso Monteroso is
not barred by extinctive prescription and laches.
Ruling:
Recognition
Prescription
of
Co-ownership
in
Acquisitive
Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang’s assailed CA’S
decision that the benefits of prescription in their
favor, the Cagampang spouses are deemed to
have admitted the existence of a co-ownership.
They argued that this is flawed since the benefit of
prescription may be availed of without necessarily
recognizing co-ownership
However, what CA tried to convey is clear and
simple: partition is the proper remedy available to
Tirso who is a co-owner of the subject properties
by virtue of his being a compulsory heir of Don
Fabian, like siblings Soledad, Reygula, and
Benjamin. The right to seek partition is
imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches.
Consequently, acquisitive prescription or laches
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does not lie in favor of the Cagampang spouses
and against Tirso, the general rule being that
prescription does not run against a co-owner or
co-heir. The only exception to the imprescriptibility
of an action for partition against a co-owner is
when a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership.
Thus, the appellate court ruled that by invoking
extinctive prescription as a defense, the lone
exception against imprescriptibility of action by a
co-owner, the Cagampang spouses are deemed
to have contextually recognized the coownership of Tirso and must have repudiated such
co-ownership in order for acquisitive prescription
to set in. The subject properties are conjugal
properties of the decedent, Don Fabian, which
cannot be subjected to acquisitive prescription,
the necessary consequence of recognizing the
co-ownership stake of other legal heirs.
Partition Proper, not Barred by Laches nor by
Acquisitive Prescription
Petitioners contend that Soledad MonterosoCagampang acquired ownership of the subject
properties by virtue of the deeds of sale executed
in 1939 by Don Fabian. After the sale, she
registered them under her name and then took
exclusive, adverse, and public possession over
them. Thus, they submit that the prescriptive
period applicable to the instant case under Act
No. 190 had long expired, adding that the CA
erred in finding that Soledad MonterosoCagampang repudiated the co-ownership only in
1961 when she and the other heirs ignored the
demand of Tirso for partition
The fact that Tirso and the other compulsory heirs
of Don Fabian were excluded from the possession
of their legitime and the enjoyment of the fruits
thereof does not per se argue against the
existence of a co-ownership. By asserting his right
as a compulsory heir, Tirso has effectively brought
into the open the reality that the Cagampang
spouses were holding some of the subject
properties in trust and that he is a co-owner of all
of them to the extent of his legal share or legitime
thereon. Before partition and eventual distribution
of Don Fabian’s intestate estate, a regime of coownership among the compulsory heirs existed
over the undivided estate of Don Fabian. Partition
is the proper remedy for compulsory or legal heirs
to get their legitime or share of the inheritance
from the decedent. An action for partition is at
once an action for declaration of co-ownership
and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the properties involved
Being a co-owner of that intestate estate, Tirso’s
right over a share thereof is imprescriptible. As a
matter of law, acquisitive prescription does not
apply nor set in against compulsory heirs insofar as
their pro-indiviso share or legitime is concerned,
unless said heirs repudiate their share. Contrary to
petitioners’ stance, reconveyance is not the
proper remedy available to Tirso. Exception to this,
is if the co-owner repudiates the co-ownership.
Prescription begins to run from the time of
repudiation. In the instant case, however effective
repudiation had not timely been made against
the former. Tirso has at the very least 10 years and
at the most 30 years to file the appropriate action
in court. The records show that Tirso’s cause of
action has not prescribed as he instituted an
action for partition in 1970 or only nine years after
the considered express repudiation.
Partition Proper for Conjugal Properties of Second
Marriage
Tirso and his siblings from the first marriage have a
stake on Parcels S-2, S-3, and S-4, even if these
parcels of land formed part of the conjugal
partnership of gains of the second marriage. There
can be no serious dispute that the children of the
first marriage have a hereditary right over the
share of Don Fabian in the partnership assets of
the first marriage. Thus, Parcel S-1, belongs to all
the heirs of Don Fabian and not a paraphernal
property of Pendejito as it was under a homestead
patent application. Sec 105 of CA 141 which
governs such provides that the applicant shall be
succeeded in his rights and obligations by his heirs
in law after the latter performs all the requirements
therefor. Pendejito shall only be entitled to a
usufructuary right over the property equal to the
corresponding share of each of the heirs.
PRESCRIPTION IN FAVOR OR AGAINST A CO-OWNER
Action to compel partition imprescriptible
GR: Prescription does not run in favor or against a
co-owner “so long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership.” An action to
compel partition may be filed at any time by any
of the co-owners against the actual possessor.
By the same token, laches or estoppel cannot be
invoked against a co-owner who has not been
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sleeping on his rights as long as the co-ownership
continues to be recognized by the other coowners. (David v. Bandin GR 48322, Apr. 8, 1987)
consequence thereof, the action is similar to that of
an action for the recovery of ownership of
property.
Reason: Because the possession of a co-owner is
ordinarily not adverse to the others.
Take Note: period of prescription (Statute of
Limitations)
shall start to run only from such repudiation of
coownership.
Participation in the Partition in Case of the
Alienation
of a Co-owner’s Share
When a co-owner sells his share to a stranger, it is
the
stranger who should participate in the partition,
and not the
original co-owner, since the vendor has ceased to
have an interest in the co-ownership. (Lopez v.
Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567).
Doctrine of equity cannot be involved
Imprescriptibility of action should pre-empt and
prevail over all abstract arguments based only on
equity which should only be applied in the
absence of and never against statutory law.
Acquisitive prescription as laches which is based on
equity cannot be invoked to defeat justice.
XPN: If the co-owner repudiates the co-ownership
which (1) he must make known to the other coowners; (2) evidence of repudiation and
knowledge on the part of the others must be clear
and convincing; and (3) other requirements of
prescription — continuous, open, peaceful, public,
adverse possession for the period of time required
under the law must be present.
Take Note: Mere receiving of rents or profi ts,
payment of land taxes, and the construction of
fences and buildings will not be considered suffi
cient proof of exclusive or adverse possession
because a co-owner as such usually does these.
Prescription begins to run from the time of
repudiation. (There must be a clear repudiation)
Thus, the imprescriptibility of the action to demand
partition cannot be invoked when one of the coowners has claimed the property as exclusive
owner and possessed it for a period sufficient to
acquire it by prescription
However, in Cordova, et al. v. Cordova, the Court
in an obiter made the statement that in a
constructive trust (as in the case of co-heirship
where one heir or co-owner fraudulently deprives
the rest of their shares), prescription
does not run. This doctrine of imprescriptibility of a
constructive trust was reiterated in Juan v. Zuñiga.
It would seem that the BETTER RULE is that a
constructive or implied trust can PRESCRIBE, as
distinguished from an express trust which cannot
prescribe (as long as in this latter case, the
relationship between trustor and trustee is
recognized).
BAR Question
A, co-owner of property with B, succeeds in
acquiring a Torrens Title in his own name to the
property. Five years after B learned of A’s action, B fi
led an action for partition of the property. May A
plead prescription of B’s cause of action? Explain
your answer.
ANS.: Generally, we may say that A cannot plead
prescription. Firstly, this is an instance of coownership, and the rule is clear that here, the right to
demand partition ordinarily does not prescribe;
hence, Art. 494 of the Civil Code states that “each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of
the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned.” Secondly, assuming that an implied
trust has been created, still such a trust cannot
prescribe, if we follow the ruling in Juan v. Zuniga.
Thirdly, assuming that an implied trust can prescribe
(the better rule it seems) as ruled in Cornelio Alzona,
et al. v. Gregoria Capunitan, and other cases, still the
period in the instant problem is only 5 years, hence
negativing prescription.
In such case, the question involved is no longer one
of mere partition but of ownership, and in
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PRESCRIPTION
Vda. De Alberto vs. Court of Appeals (G.R.
No. L-29759
LEGAL PRINCIPLE:
Art. 1100. The action for rescission on account of
lesion shall prescribe after four years from the time
the partition was made. It has also been ruled that
the four years period provided in Article 1100 of
the Civil Code (formerly Art. 1076 of the old Civil
Code) should commence to run from the
approval of the agreement of partition by the
Court.
FACTS:
Private respondent Alberto Jr., a minor, assisted by
his natural guardian, filed a complaint for
acknowledgment and partition on September 8,
1960. Private respondent alleged that in 1941 his
alleged father, Antonio C. Alberto, and his mother,
Andrea Jongco, lived together as husband and
wife and as a result of which, he was born; that
during the time that his alleged father and mother
lived together as husband and wife and up to the
time of his birth, both were single and had no legal
impediment to marry each other; that after his
birth, his father and mother continued living
together as husband and wife, his father
supporting them and introducing him to the public
as his natural child; that even the family of his
father recognized him as such; that on or about
the year 1944, his father and mother separated,
and subsequently, his father married herein
petitioner Natividad del Rosario; that as a result of
the marriage, two (2) children were born herein
petitioners Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto,
Jr.; that although his father was separated from his
mother, he continued to support him and
recognized him as his own child; that when his
father died, and without notice to him, petitioner
Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto instituted
before the then Court of First Instance of Manila
an intestate proceedings for the estate of his
deceased father. Petitioners deliberately omitted
him as one of the heirs and for this reason they
succeeded in having the properties of his
deceased father adjudicated and partitioned
among themselves. The intestate proceedings
were terminated on November 9, 1953.
114 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
The trial court dismissed the complaint. Hence,
private respondent appealed to the CA. The CA
reversed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Did Alberto
prescribe?
Jr.’s
cause
of
action
already
HELD:
As to the issue of prescription, the Civil Code of the
Philippines clearly provides:
Art. 1100. The action for rescission on account of
lesion shall prescribe after four years from the time
the partition was made.
Intestate proceedings were terminated as alleged
in the complaint itself on November 9, 1953 so that
said four years prescriptive period expired on
November 9,1957. Hence, the present action filed
on September 8, 1960 and which has for one of its
objects the rescission of the agreement of
partition among the petitioners, as approved by
the intestate court, is already barred by
prescription.
That an action for rescission is also the proper
action in case of an alleged preterition of a
compulsory heir by reason of alleged bad faith or
fraud of the other persons interested, which is
what the complaint in this case alleges in
substance, is indicated in Article 1104 of the Civil
Code as follows:
Art. 1104. A partition made with preterition of any
of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded,
unless it be proved that there was bad faith or
fraud on the part of the other persons interested;
...
It has also been ruled by this Court that the four
years period provided in Article 1100 of the Civil
Code (formerly Art. 1076 of the old Civil Code)
should commence to run from the approval of the
agreement of partition by the Court (Samson vs.
Araneta, 60 Phil. 27, 36). Thus, in the case at bar, it
is evident that the action to rescind the
Agreement of Partition which was approved by
the Court on November 9, 1953, had already
prescribed when respondent filed the complaint
in the case at bar on September 8, 1960.
While as a general rule the action for partition
among co-owners does not prescribe so long as
the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly
recognized (Art. 494, Civil Code), petitioners
herein had never recognized respondent as a coowner or co-heir either expressly or impliedly.
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Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of
action for partition of property owned in common
(Art. 494) does not apply to the case at bar.
Moreover, private respondent cannot claim
exemption from the effects of prescription on the
plea of minority under the New Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive and
extinctive, runs against: (1) Minors and other
incapacitated persons who have parents,
guardians or other legal representatives:
xxxxxxxxx
Respondent Alberto, Jr. who has a living parent,
his mother, Andrea Jongco, who in fact filed the
complaint in the case at bar for him, falls squarely
under the above-cited provision.
Granting arguendo that respondent is a natural
child of the deceased Antonio Alberto, Sr., the
action for recognition of natural child may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed
parent. And if the presumed father or mother died
during the minority of the child, the latter may file
the action within four (4) years from the
attainment of majority (Art. 285 [1]). However, if
the minor has a guardian as in this case,
prescription runs against him even during minority
(Wenzel etc., et al. vs. Surigao Consolidated
Mining, Inc., 108 Phil. 530 [1960]). In such case, the
action for recognition must be instituted within four
(4) years after the death of the natural father
(Magallanes, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 95
Phil. 795 [1954]). Antonio C. Alberto, Sr., the
alleged father, died on July 3, 1949. The complaint
for acknowledgment and partition was filed
eleven (11) years later, on September 8, 1960.
Hence, prescription had set in.
Neither can it be claimed that the present action
is in substance one for recovery of property in
order to avoid the consequences of prescription,
for as correctly stated by the petitioners, to be
entitled to the recovery of the property from the
estate, Alberto, Jr. must first rescind the partition
and distribution approved by the intestate
proceedings, otherwise, the recovery of any
property from the petitioners is not possible. Be
that as it may, such partition can no longer be
rescinded having been already barred by the
Statute of Limitations.
Furthermore, even granting that Article 1104 of the
Civil Code does not apply and there is an injury to
the rights of plaintiff, tills action would still not
prosper under Articles 1146 and 1149 of the same
115 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
Code which provide that the action must be
brought within four and five years, respectively,
from the time the right of action accrues.
Thus, the Supreme Court did not rule in favor of the
private respondent.
Bicarme v. CA
Legal principle: Where, however, a co-owner or
co-heir repudiates the co-ownership or coheirship, prescription begins to run from the time of
repudiation. Thus, the imprescriptibility of the
action to demand partition cannot be invoked
when one of the co-owners has claimed the
property as exclusive owner and possessed it for a
period sufficient to acquire it by prescription.
Facts: Maria and Cristina are the only surviving coheirs and co-owners of two parcels of land.
Cristina instituted a petition for partition because
her aunt, Maria, refused to share with her the
yearly fruits of the parcels of land. Maria, however,
maintains that she acquired the two parcels of
land in 1925 (cornland) and 1926 (riceland) from
the deceased spouses Bidaya and since then until
the present, had been in open, public, peaceful,
continuous, adverse possession and enjoyment
and in the concept of absolute owner thereof.
Maria further claims that Cristina, her niece, never
shared or contributed to the payment of taxes of
said two parcels of land; and, finally, that Cristina
Bicarme was presumed already dead Without the
knowledge and consent of Cristina, Maria
executed a deed of sale/ Cristina sought to nullify
the deed of sales executed by Maria over the
lands, since it affected her share of the property.
Maria insists that she not only acquired the land
from spouses Bidaya but but also that Cristina’s
right are barred by prescription since Cristina only
asserted her right after 34 years after her right of
action accrued. By the time Cristina went back to
barrio Palao when she was twenty two, when
Maria ignored and repudiated Cristinaʼs
hereditary rights, Cristinaʼs right of action already
accrued and the period of prescription began to
run. The instant action was filed only in 1974 or
some 34 years after it accrued, thus, the present
action is barred by prescription.
The RTC and CA ruled in Christina’s favor, stating
that a provision which states that Maria is the sole
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owner of the lands having acquired the same
from her late father is in the nature of a trust
provision in favor of Christina as co-owner/heir.
Issue: W/N Maria has been in possession long
enough for prescription to take effect
Ruling: No, acquisitive prescription in favour of
Maria is inapplicable
Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides
that in order that a possession may be deemed
adverse to the cestui que trust, or the other coowner the following must concur:
1. that he has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the
cestui que trust or other co-owner;
2. that such positive acts of repudiation have
been made known to the cestui que trust
or other co-owners, and
3. that the evidence thereon must be clear
and convincing
It is correct to say that possession by one co-owner
(trustee) is not deemed adverse to the others. In
this sense, an action to compel partition will lie at
any time and does not prescribe. It is, however,
not legally correct to say that by virtue of the
imprescriptibility of an action for partition,
prescription as a mode of acquiring title, can
never be invoked, or in the present case, that
Maria, as a co-owner can never acquire the
property by prescription.
An action for partition implies that the thing is still
owned in common. If a co-owner or co-heir holds
the property in exclusive adverse possession as
owner, asserting sole and exclusive dominion for
the required period, he can acquire sole title to it
as against the co-heirs or co-owners. The
imprescriptibility of an action for partition cannot
thus be invoked when one of the co-owners has
possessed the property as exclusive owner, and
for a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription.
From the moment one of the co- owners claims
that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the
properties and denies the others any share
therein, the question involved is no longer one of
partition, but of ownership.
In the present case, Maria Bicarme disclaims the
co- ownership by denying that subject properties
are the inherited properties. Other than the tax
declarations in her name, there is no written
116 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
evidence that these were acquired/purchased
from Sps. Placido Biduya. Payment of land taxes
does not constitute sufficient repudiation of the
co-ownership, as it is not an act adverse to
Cristinaʼs rights. Moreover, Cristina, being a minor,
until she claimed her rights, was not even aware
thereof. Neither did Maria make known her
repudiation to Cristina, because all along, Maria
presumed her to be dead. Her refusal to share with
Cristina the yearly profits stemmed from Cristinaʼs
failure to share in the yearly taxes. Acquisitive
prescription cannot therefore apply in this case.
Acts which are adverse to strangers may not be
sufficiently adverse to the co-owners. A mere silent
possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits
or profits from the property, the erection of
buildings and fences and the planting of trees
thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot
serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not
borne out by clear, complete and conclusive
evidence that he exercised acts of possession
which unequivocally constituted an ouster or
deprivation of the rights of the other co- owners
Additionally, it follows that neither can the
doctrine on laches apply, for absent acquisitive
prescription, (i.e., where it has not been shown
that the possession of the claimant has been
adverse and exclusive and opposed to the right
of the others) the case is not one of ownership, in
which case, the doctrine on imprescriptibility of an
actions for partition will apply. Cristinaʼs right to
partition will therefore prosper.
Pangan vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-39299.
October 18, 1988)
Legal Principles: For title to prescribe in favor of
the co-owner, however, there must be a clear
showing that he has repudiated the claims of the
other co-owners and that they have been
categorically advised of the exclusive claim he is
making to the property in question. It is only when
such unequivocal notice has been given that
the period of prescription will begin to run against
the other co-owners and ultimately divest them
of their own title if they do not seasonably
defend it.
Facts:
The disputed property is a parcel of land
originally owned by Leon Hilario as is now being
disputed between petitioners who are his great
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grandchildren by his daughter, and private
respondent, who is his granddaughter by his
daughter Catalina.
In 1964, petitioners filed an application for the
registration of land in their names by virtue of
their continuous and exclusive possession since
1895 which was approved after the requirements
were complied with, there being no opposition
to the application.
In 1966, herein respondent filed a petition to set
aside the decision which was granted by the trial
court admitting the same time her opposition to
the application and setting the case for
reception of her evidence. The evidence sought
to show that the land was inherited by Leon
Hilario’s 3 children, but the son, Felicisimo waived
his right thereto and thereby made his 2 sisters,
Silvestra and Catalina, its exclusive co-owners. As
Catalina's daughter, she was entitled to one-half
of the property, the order half going to Silvestra's
heirs, the petitioners herein and the latter's
grandchildren.
The trial court then issued an order dismissing the
opposition and reinstating his original order, the
reason being that whatever rights Teodora might
have had over the property had been forfeited
by extinctive prescription because she had left
the land in 1942 and had not since then asserted
any claim thereto until 1966.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision on the
ground that the appelles had not clearly proved
that the had not clearly proved that they had
acquired the property by prescription. Hence,
the appellant was entitled to one-half of the
property as heir, conformably to her opposition.
ISSUE: WoN Teodora’s rights over the property
had been forfeited by acquisitive prescription by
failing to assert it in time.
RULING:
No. It is a settled rule that possession by one-coowner will not be regarded as adverse to the
other co-owners but in fact as bene;cial to all of
them. Hence, as long as his co-ownership is
recognized, an action to compel partition will
not prescribe and may be filed at any time
against the actual possessor by any of the other
co-owners. However, if the co-owner actually
holding the property asserts exclusive dominion
over it against the other co-owners, the corollary
117 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
of the rule is that he can acquire sole title to it
after the lapse of the prescribed prescriptive
period. From that moment, the question involved
will be one of ownership and no longer mere
partition.
According to the petitioners, there was such
repudiation which was admitted by the private
respondent herself. Testifying for herself at the
hearing on her opposition in the registration
proceedings.
For title to prescribe in favor of the co-owner,
however, there must be a clear showing that he
has repudiated the claims of the other coowners and that they have been categorically
advised of the exclusive claim he is making to the
property in question. It is only when such
unequivocal notice has been given that the
period of prescription will begin to run against the
other co-owners and ultimately divest them of
their own title if they do not seasonably defend
it.
Adverse possession requires the concurrence of
the following circumstances: 1. That the trustee
has performed unequivocal acts amounting to
an ouster of the cestui que trust; 2. That such
positive acts of repudiation had been made
known to the cestui que trust; and 3. That the
evidence thereon should be clear and
conclusive.
On the basis of the evidence presented by the
parties, the Court is not convinced that the
above requirements have been satis;ed.
Although there are admittedly some precedents
to the contrary, it would appear that the weight
of authority requires a categorical and ;nal
rejection of the co-owners' claim, usually
manifested by a formal legal action, to make the
prescriptive period start to run against the
claimant.
Manifestly, the petitioners have acted in bad
faith in denying their aunt and coheir her legal
share to the property they had all inherited from
Leon Hilario through their respective parents. In
cases where there is a clear showing of
imposition and improper motives, the courts must
be vigilant in the protection of the rights of the
exploited. So said the respondent court, and we
agree. We note that the private respondent "is a
poor and ignorant 62-year old widow" * whose
misplaced trust in her nephews and nieces is
being used now precisely to defeat her claim to
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the share that she believes is rightfully hers. It is a
sorry spectacle, indeed, to see her own close kin
ganging up on her, so to speak, to deprive her
small heritage, and in her old age at that.
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil (G.R. No. 169356.
August 28, 2007)
Facts
Petitioner and respondents are children of the
late Fabian and Maria Lloren Fangonil. The
spouses died intestate, leaving an estate
consisting of seven parcels of land. Prior to their
death, transactions involving parcels number six
and seven took place. A portion of the sixth land
and parcel seven were sold with a right to
repurchase
to
Oribello
and
Estacion,
respectively. It was petitioner who repurchased
and redeemed these properties in 1956 and
1959. In 1995, six of the seven children, excluding
petitioner, filed a petition for judicial partition of
the seven parcels of land. Petitioner opposed
claiming exclusive ownership over parcels six
and seven, and that the right to claim by the
respondents had long prescribed as a result of
their inaction.
Issue
Whether or not Petitioner is the sole owner of
parcel 6 and 7
Ruling
Petitioner is not the sole owner of parcel 6 and 7.
The appeal is dismissed
In this case, the fact that it was petitioner's
money that was used for the repurchase of the
properties does not make her the owner thereof,
in the absence of convincing proof that would
indicate such. At most, Petitioner can only be
considered as a creditor of the owners of parcel
6 and 7
As to the issue of prescription, petitioner's
possession of parcels 6 and 7 did not ripen into
sole and exclusive ownership thereof. First,
prescription
applies
to
adverse,
open,
continuous, and exclusive possession. In order
that a co-owner's possession may be deemed
adverse to the other co-owners, the following
118 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
elements must concur: (1) that he has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to
an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) that such
positive acts of repudiation have been made
known to the other co-owners; and (3) that the
evidence thereon must be clear and
convincing.
Mere silent possession by a co-owner; his receipt
of rents, fruits or profits from the property; his
erection of buildings and fences and the
planting of trees thereon; and the payment of
land taxes cannot serve as proofs of exclusive
ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and
convincing evidence that he exercised acts of
possession which unequivocably constituted an
ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other coowners.
Vda. De Arceo vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
81401. May 18, 1990)
Facts:
Petitioners filed an application for registration of
a land in their names and argued that the land
was owned by Jose, the husband of Petitioner
Virginia and father of other Petitioners, through
prescription. They supported their claims by
citing four events:
1. 1941, Jose entered upon the properties
and until his death in 1970, worked there.
2. Upon his death, they, Virginia and the
other petitioners divided the same by
virtue of an extra judicial partition
3. Ever since Jose had paid taxes for the
property until he died
4. Pedro, the respondent never exerted
efforts or demands to oust Jose in
possession.
Considering, petitioers Virginia, et al. now say
that they acquired the parcels of land by
prescription.
Respondents argued that they co-own the land
with petitioners.
Issues:
w/n the properties were acquired by
prescription
Ruling:
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No.
adverse to the rest.
In order for prescription to set in, these are the
requisite and must concur:
1. There is clear showing that the claimant
has repudiated the co-ownership
2. He has made known to the rest of the coowners that he is assuming exclusive
ownership over the property
3. There is clear and convincing evidence
thereof;
4. His possession is open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious.
In Castillo v. Court of Appeals, L-18046, Mar. 31,
1964, SC said that generally a co-owner may not
acquire exclusive ownership of common property
thru prescription, and that a co-owner is a trustee
for the other co-owners.
In this case,
The evidence for Virginia et al. do not persuade
us that they (through Jose) have acquired the
lots by lapse of time. The fact that in 1941, Jose
wrested possession thereof, so we hold, does not
amount to adverse possession because as a coowner, he had the right of enjoyment, and his
use thereof can not by itself prejudice the light of
his fellow co-owners. The fact that he paid taxes
thereon is not controlling either because
payment of real estate taxes does not
necessarily confer title upon a claimant. The fact
finally that Virginia, et al. had sought to
extrajudicially divide the property is nothing
conclusive because there is no showing that
they, Virginia, et al. had made this known to
Pedro, et al. Under these circumstances, we can
not validly. say that the lands had devolved to
Virginia, et al. by way of prescription.
However, even though there is no acquisitive
prescription, there was found to be a valid
donation inter vivos in this case.
In this case however SC said that the properties
were donated to Jose by donation inter vivos.
Claim of title by prescription founded on adverse
possession
Possession of a co-owner may be deemed
adverse when he makes an open repudiation of
the trust by unequivocal acts made known to the
other co-owners. Hence, he may claim title by
prescription founded on adverse possession
where it appears that:
1.
2.
3.
4.
POSITIVE ACTS OF REPUDIATION
GR: Action to compel partition is imprescriptible.
XPN: If the co-owner repudiates the coownership. Prescription begins to run from the
time of repudiation.
Clear acts of repudiation

POSSESSION OF A CO-OWNER SAME TO THAT OF A
TRUSTEE
Co-ownership, a form of trust
Co-ownership is a form of trust, with each owner
being a trustee for each other. A trust relation
inheres in a co-ownership. Hence, no co- owner
may acquire exclusive ownership of the
common property through prescription for
possession by the trustee alone is not deemed
119 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
He had performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation of the co- ownership
amounting to an ouster of other
Such positive acts of repudiation have
been made known to the other coowners
The evidence is clear, complete and
conclusive in order to establish
prescription without any shadow of
doubt
His possession is open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious
Co-owner executed a deed of partition
and obtained the cancellation of the title
in the name of their predecessor and the
issuance of a new one wherein he
appears as the new owner. Prescription
began to run from issuance.
A COT is a notice to the whole world of his
exclusive title to the land. The issuance
thereof is an open and clear repudiation
of the trust or co- ownership and the lapse
of 10 years of adverse possession was
sufficient to vest title in the co-owner by
prescription.
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Take note: However, if title was secured
through fraud, prescription begins to run
only from the discovery thereof.

Filing by a trustee of an action in court
against the trustor to quiet title to property
or recovery of ownership

Action for reconveyance of land based on
implied trust prescribes within 10 years from
date of issuance of title

Co-owner causes the cancellation of the
title and gets a new certificate of title in his
own name
Not clear acts of repudiation
Cannot constitute adverse possession as basis for
title by prescription

Mere silent possession without acts
amounting to the ouster of the other coowners

Mere receipt of fruits, rents or profits,
erecting fences and buildings adapted for
the cultivation of the land held in trust

Sole fact of a co-owner having declared
the lands in his name for tax purposes and
paid taxes
Heirs of J. Reyes v. Reyes (G.R. No. 158377, Aug.
13, 2010)
FACTS:
Antonio Reyes and his wife Leoncia were owners
of a parcel of residential land covered by Tax
Declaration and on that land, they constructed
their dwelling. The couple had 4 children, namely
Jose Sr., Teofilo, Jose Jr., and Potenciana.
Their father died intestate and was survived by
Leoncia and their 3 sons.
Potenciana having predeceased her father.
(MEANING ANI NAG UNA OG KAMATAY SI
POTENTCIANA) Potencia also died intestate, and
was survived by her children, Gloria, Maria,
Alfredo.
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Jose Jr. and his family resided in the house of the
parents but Teofilo constructed on the property
his own house, where he and his family resided.
Leoncia and her 3 sons excuted the Kasulatan
ng Biling Mabibiling Muli by which they sold their
parcel to Sps. Francia for P500, subject to the
vendors' right to repurchase for the same
amount sa oras na sila'y makinabang.
Potenciana's heirs did not assent to that deed.
Nonetheless, Teofilo and Jose, Jr. and their
respective families remained in possession of the
property and paid the realty taxes thereon.
Leoncia and her children did not repay the
amount of P500.00.
The Spouses Francia both died intestate.
Alejandro (anak ni Jose Sr.) partially paid to SPS
francia the amount of 265. (para sa kadtung
kasulatan) and later the amount of 235 thus on
Aug 1970 the sps transferred to alejandro all their
rights in the property for 500 ( a deed PAG
SASAAYOS NG PAGAARI)
On aug 1970 Alejandro executed kasulatan ng
pag meme-ari declaring him having acquired all
the rights of the heirs of SPS francia, including the
ownership of the property after failing to
repurchase within ghe tiven period.
Leoncia died intestate survived by Jose, Sr.,
Teofilo, Jose, Jr. and the heirs of Potenciana.
after Leonica's death, Teofilo and Jose, Jr., with
their respective families, continued to reside in
the property.
Alejandro also died intestate. Surviving him were
his wife, Amanda, and their children, namely:
Consolacion,
Eugenia,
Luciana,
Pedrito
,Merlinda,
Eduardo
and
June.
(respondents herein)
Amanda Reyes asked the heirs of Teofilo and
Jose, Jr., to vacate the property because she
and her children already needed it. After the
petitioners refused to comply, she filed a
complaint against the petitioners in the
barangay, seeking their eviction from the
property.
In the interim, petitioner Nenita R. de la Cruz and
her brother Romeo Reyes also constructed their
respective houses on the property.
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Amanda filed a suit to quiet the title.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondents are the sole owners
of the land
RULING:
Respondents are not the sole owners of the
land. The land is co-owned by them with
Petitioner
In this case, the CA correctly concluded that the
true agreement of the parties vis-Ã -vis the
Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli was an
equitable mortgage, not a pacto de retro sale.
There was no dispute that the purported vendors
had continued in the possession of the property
even after the execution of the agreement; and
that the property had remained declared for
taxation purposes under Leoncia's name, with
the realty taxes due being paid by Leoncia,
despite the execution of the agreement.
-When Alejandro redeemed the property on
August 11, 1970, he did not thereby become a
co-owner thereof. Alejandro merely became the
assignee of the mortgage, and the property
continued to be co-owned by Leoncia and her
sons Jose, Sr., Jose Jr., and Teofilo. As an assignee
of the mortgage and the mortgage credit,
Alejandro acquired only the rights of his
assignors, nothing more
Yet, the respondents except to the general rule,
asserting that Alejandro, having earlier
repudiated
the
co-ownership,
acquired
ownership of the property through prescription.
The Court cannot accept the respondents'
posture
In order that a co-owner's possession may be
deemed adverse to that of the cestui que trust
or the other co-owners, the following elements
must concur:
1.The co-owner has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation
of the co-ownership amounting
to an ouster of the cestui que trust
or the other co-owners;
2.Such
positive
acts
of
repudiation have been made
known to the cestui que trust or
the other co-owners;
121 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
3.The
evidence
on
the
repudiation is clear and conclusive; and
4.His possession is open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious.
The concurrence of the foregoing elements was
not established herein. For one, Alejandro did not
have adverse and exclusive possession of the
property, as, in fact, the other co-owners had
continued to possess it, with Alejandro and his
heirs occupying only a portion of it. Neither did
the cancellation of the previous tax declarations
in the name of Leoncia, the previous co-owner,
and the issuance of a new one in Alejandro's
name, and Alejandro's payment of the realty
taxes constitute repudiation of the co-ownership.
The sole fact of a co-owner declaring the land in
question in his name for taxation purposes and
paying the land taxes did not constitute an
unequivocal act of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the other co-owner and could not
constitute adverse possession as basis for title by
prescription
Heirs of F. Restar vs. Heirs of D.R. Cichon (G.R. No.
161720. November 22, 2005)- romeo
Facts:
1935, Emilio Restar died intestate.
Restart left 8 children-compulsory heirs
Flores, Dolores, Perpetua, Paciencia, Dominica,
Policarpio, Maria, Adolfo
1960, Emilio Restar’s eldest child, Flores,
executed with one Helen Rester, caused the
cancellation of the Tax Declaration in Emilio
Restar’s name covering a 5.9k square meter
parcel of land THE LOT located at Aklan.
This is among the properties left by Emilio
Restar. The tax declaration was transferred to
Flores.
1998, the other heirs discovered the
cancellation of Emilio’s tax dec and the issuance
in lieu thereof of the other tax dec in the name
of Flores.
On January 21, 1999, heirs of Dolores,
Perpetua, and Maria [all dead], together with
Dominica and Paciencia [who are not dead],
filed a complaint against Flores’ heirs for the
partition of the lot and declaration of nullity of
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documents, ownership and damages
preliminary injunction before the RTC.
and
As alleged by the heirs of Dolores and
others, during the lifetime of Flores, they were
given their shares of palay from the lot and even
after Flores’ death, and up to 1991, after Flores’
death in 1989, the widow Esmeia appealed to
them to allow her to hold on to the lot to finance
the education of their children. Respondents
heirs of Dolores and others, allowed on the
condition that AFTER THE CHILDREN had finished
their education, it would now be divided into 8
equal parts upon their demand for partition of
the lot.
Heirs of flores denied. They claimed that
they had been in possession of the lot in the
concept of owner for more than 30 years and
have been paying realty taxes since time
immemorial they also denied having shared the
produce of the lot or that upon the death of
Flores, Esmenia requested to allow her to hold on
to the land for the children’s education because
the children, according to them, by that time
have already finished their respective courses.
Issue:
w/n there is acquisitive prescription in
favor of the heirs of flores acquired the land
through acquisitive extraordinary prescription.
Held:
Yes.
Article 494:
No co-owner shall be obliged to remain
in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing
owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned.
No prescription shall run
in favor of a co-owner or coheir against his co-owners or
co-heirs so long as he expressly
or impliedly recognizes the coownership.
While the action to demand partition of a
co-owned property does not prescribe, a coowner may acquire ownership thereof by
prescription where there exists a clear
repudiation of the co-ownership, and the coowners are apprised of the claim of adverse and
exclusive ownership.
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other
real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
122 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
Ordinary
acquisitive
prescription
requires
possession of things in good faith and with just
title for a period of ten years. Without good faith
and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be
extraordinary in character which requires
uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years.
The statutory period of prescription, however,
commenced not in 1935 but in 1960 when Flores,
who had neither title nor good faith, secured a
tax declaration in his name and may, therefore,
be said to have adversely claimed ownership of
the lot. And respondents were also deemed to
have been on said date and became aware of
the adverse claim.
Flores' possession thus ripened into ownership
through acquisitive prescription after the lapse of
thirty years in accordance with the earlier
quoted Article 1137 of the New Civil Code.
Clear acts of Repudiation;
Flores Adjudicated unto himself the
whole land in question as his share from his father
by means of the affidavit which he executed
with one Helen Restar, when he requested to
have the land declared in his name. It was also
admitted by the parties that this affidavit was the
basis of the Tax Dec from Emilio to Flores. This is a
concrete act of the repudiation made by Flores
of the co-ownership over the land in question.
Also it was admitted that Flores died only in 1989.
Plaintiffs had all the chances (sic) to file a case
against him from 1960, or a period of 29 years
when he was still alive, yet they failed to do so.
They filed the instant case only on January 22,
1999, almost ten (10) years after Flores' death.
From the foregoing evidence, it can be seen that
the adverse possession of Flores started in 1960,
the time when the tax declaration was
transferred in his name. The period of acquisitive
prescription started to run from this date.
Indeed, the following acts of Flores show
possession adverse to his co-heirs:
 the cancellation of the tax
declaration certificate in the
name of Restar and securing
another in his name;
 the execution of a Joint Affidavit
stating that he is the owner and
possessor thereof to the exclusion
of respondents;
 payment of real estate tax and
irrigation
fees
without
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respondents
having
ever
contributed any share therein;
 and continued enjoyment of the
property and its produce to the
exclusion of respondents. And
Flores' adverse possession was
continued by his heirs.
This was for more than 38 years.
Art. 495. Notwithstanding the provisions of the
preceding article, the co-owners cannot
demand a physical division of the thing owned
in common, when to do so would render it
unserviceable for the use for which it is intended.
But the co-ownership may be terminated in
accordance with Article 498. (401a)
When partition will render thing unserviceable
Co-owners cannot demand a physical division
of the thing owned in common when to do so
would render it unserviceable for the use for
which it is intended (e.g car, piano).
Take note: But co-ownership may be terminated
in accordance with Art 498 – sale, assignment,
etc.
Partition of an Essentially Indivisible Object
(a) A good example of this article would be the
partition of
an automobile owned in common.
(b) If to physically partition is not practicable, the
co-ownership may end under Art. 498.
496. ACTION FOR PARTITION
Classification of the Various Kinds of Partition
(a) From the viewpoint of cause:
1) extrajudicial (or conventional)
2) judicial (when court approval is sought or
when partition is made by the court)
(b) From the viewpoint of permanence:
1) provisional or temporary
2) permanent
(c) From the viewpoint of subject matter:
1) partition of real property
2) partition of personal property
(d) From the viewpoint of forms and solemnities:
1) partition in a judicial decree
2) partition duly registered in the Registry of
Property
3) partition in a public instrument
4) partition in a private instrument
5) oral partition
495. WHEN RIGHT TO DEMAND PARTITION NOT
AVAILABLE
The Law that Governs Partition
(a) First, the Civil Code.
(b) Then, suppletorily, the Rules of Court. (Rule 69
of the
Rules of Court provides for the “Partition”).
ACTION FOR PARTITION
Two principal issues involved
1.
Art. 496. Partition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings.
Partition shall be governed by the Rules of Court
insofar as they are consistent with this Code.
(402)
Purpose and effect of partition
Action for partition implies that the subject
property is still owned in common. It is premature if
property is still in dispute.
Purpose – separation, assignment of the thing held
in common among those to whom it may belong.
To put an end to co-ownership.
Effect – to vest in each a sole estate in specific
property, giving to each one a right to enjoy his
estate without supervision or interference from
others.
2.
Whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner
How the property should be divided (what
portion should go to which co-owner)
Functionally, an action for partition may be seen to
be at once an action for declaration of coownership of the subject property and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate
portion of the property involved.
Two actions involved
A co-owner can seek the partition of the property
in co-ownership and the conveyance to him of his
lawful share. No need to file another action.
Ocampo v. Ocampo (G.R. No. 46296)
Facts
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Upon their death, Spouses Ocampo left 3 parcels
of land which are all owned in common by their
children. However, the land denominated as
parcel A is ostensibly registered in the name of
Fidela Ocampo alone but was acknowledged
by her as a property owned in common by all of
them, brothers and sisters. Petitioners desired to
partition said properties but defendants Fidela
and Felicidad Ocampo (children of sps
Ocampo) refused and instead, mortgaged to
PNB the land in question to secure the payment
of a loan, the proceeds of which were
exclusively to the benefit of said defendants
only.
Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a Motion to Admit
Supplemental Complaint alleging that the TCT in
Fidela’s name was cancelled and was issued to
Sps Helen Ocampo-Barrito (Fidela’s daughter)
and Vicente Barrito on the strength of an alleged
Deed of Donation Inter Vivos ostensibly
executed by defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo in
their favor defendants. Both the donor and
donees were notoriously aware that said parcel
of land was among the lots subject to Civil Case
No. IR-1867.
As Special Defenses, defendants Belen
Ocampo-Barrito argued, among others, that her
title cannot be collaterally attacked in these
supposed partition proceedings. Her mother also
alleged that she is the true and absolute owner
of the real properties described in paragraph 9
of the original complaint having acquired the
same by lucrative title and has, since becoming
owner thereof, been in actual possession thereof
Issues
There were many issues involved in this case e.g.
whether co-ownership is confirmed by long,
public possession by co-owners or whether a
deed of donation intervivos entered in bad faith
deprives the heirs of their hereditary shares. But
at the bottom of this case, the question to be
resolved is:
who owns the disputed property thereby
allowing the parties to proceed with partition.
Ruling
Since the original Complaint was an action for
partition, this Court cannot order a division of the
property, unless it first makes a determination as
to the existence of a co-ownership. The
settlement of the issue of ownership is the first
stage in an action for partition. This action will not
lie if the claimant has no rightful interest in the
124 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
subject property. Parties filing the action are in
fact required by the Rules of Court to set forth in
their complaint the nature and the extent of their
title to the property. It would be premature to
effect a partition thereof until and unless the
question of ownership is first definitely resolved.
Basic is the rule that the party making an
allegation in a civil case has the burden of
proving it by a preponderance of evidence.
Petitioners’ chief evidence of co-ownership of
the property in question is simply the
Acknowledgement of Co-ownership executed
by Fidela. Both RTC and CA were correct in
finding that this piece of documentary evidence
could not prevail over the array of testimonial
and documentary evidence that were adduced
by respondents. On the other hand, Belen clearly
traced the basis of her alleged sole ownership of
the property and presented preponderant proof
of her claim by presenting Deed of Absolute Sale
from Adolfo Ocampo to Felix Ocampo which
was later sold to hr mother who in turn donated
it to her. She also has TCT in her name.
Issues of co-ownership to be resolved first
The issue of co-ownership must first be definitely
resolved in order to effect a partition of properties,
otherwise it would be premature.
HOW PARTITION EFFECTED
Judicially (by judicial proceedings under Rule 69 of
the ROC) or
extra-judicially (pursuant to an agreement).
Take note: Rule governing partition is primarily the
Civil Code. Rules of Court is suppletory.
Rule 39- judicial partition for actions quasi in rem.
When judicial discretion is called upon to make up
for the lack of agreement between the parties, the
courts must consider and respect the interests of
all the parties, and adopt that form of partition
nearest to absolute equity and most consonant
with reason and justice
For a partition to be valid, Rule 74, Sec. 1 of the
Rules of Court requires the concurrence of the
following
conditions:
1. the decedent left no will;
2. the decedent left no debts, or if there were
debts left — all had been paid
3. the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they
are minors, the latter are represented by their
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judicial guardian or legal representatives; and
4. the partition was made by means of a public
instrument
or affidavit duly fi led with the Register of Deeds.
NOTE: The co-owners have the right to voluntarily
terminate
their existing co-ownership over the property thru
an agreement subdividing the land among
themselves. This right exists, even if their subdivision
does not conform to the rules of the National
Planning Commission as to the area of each lot,
frontage, and width of alleys
APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Statute of Frauds does not apply to partition
because it is not legally deemed a conveyance or
sale of a property resulting in ownership, but simply
a segregation and designation of that part of the
property which belongs to each of the co-owners.
Hence, partition is valid and enforceable although
made orally, where not third persons are involved.
Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot (G.R. No. 132518.
March 28, 2000)
case presents a unique situation where there is
an order for partition but there is no showing that
the sketch/subdivision plan was submitted to the
then Court of First Instance for its approval or that
a decree or order was registered in the Register
of Deeds.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. They
found the existence of tax declarations in the
names of Hermogenes Olis and Pascual Oils
(purported owners of Lot Nos. 1639-A and 1639B, respectively) as indubitable proof that there
was a subdivision of Lot No. 1639. It likewise found
thatTomas
Maglucot,
respondents'
predecessors-in-interest, took active part in the
partition as it was he, in fact, who commenced
the action for partition. The court cited Article
1431 of the Civil Code which states that
"[t]hrough
estoppel
an
admission
or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon."
Applying said provision of law, it held that while
there was no court order showing that Lot No.
1639 was partitioned, its absence could not be
used by Tomas Maglucot, or respondents as his
successors-in-interest, to deny the existence of
an approved partitioned against the other coowners who claim that there was one.
LEGAL PRINCIPLE:
The parol evidence rule under the Statute of
Frauds is a substantive rule of contract law under
which a court will not admit evidence of the
parties’ prior negotiations, prior oral or written
agreements,
or
contemporaneous
oral
agreements if that evidence contradicts or
varies the terms of a written contract. However,
courts have recognized numerous exceptions to
the operation of the parol evidence rule such as
an evidence of an oral condition precedent to
the written contract.
Respondents insist that the absence of any
annotation in the certificate of title showing any
partition of Lot No. 1639 and that OCT No. 6725
has not been canceled clearly indicate that no
partition took place. The logic of this argument is
that unless partition is shown in the title of the
subject property, there can be no valid partition
or that the annotation in the title is the sole
evidence of partition.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid partition in 1952.
Held:
FACTS:
The core issue in this case is whether a partition
of Lot No. 1639 had been effected in 1952.
Petitioners contend that there was already a
partition of said lot; hence, they are entitled to
exclusive possession and ownership of Lot No.
1639-D which originally formed part of Lot No.
1639 until its partition. Private respondents,
however, claim that there was no partition;
hence, they are co-owners of Lot No. 1639-D. This
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Yes. It must be noted that there was a prior oral
partition in 1946. Although the oral agreement
was merely tentative, the facts subsequent
thereto all point to the confirmation of said oral
partition. By virtue of that oral agreement, the
parties took possession of specific portions of the
subject lot. In 1592, an order for partition was
issued by the cadastral court. There is no
evidence that there has been any change in the
possession of the parties. The parties’ actual
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possession in accordance to the oral agreement
indicates the permanency and ratification of
such.
Furthermore, records show that respondents
were paying rent for the use the subject lot. Had
they been of the belief that they were co-owners
of the entire lot, they would not have paid rent.
Since the possession of the respondents were
found to be that of lessees of petitioners, it goes
without saying that the latter were in possession
of the lot in the concept of an owner since 1953
up to the time the present action was
commenced.
The respondent is wrong when it said that an
absence of any annotation in the certificate of
title shows that there was no partition. The
purpose of registration is to notify and protect the
interests of strangers to a given transaction, who
may be ignorant thereof, but the non-registration
of the deed evidencing such transaction does
not relieve the parties thereto of their obligations
thereunder. As originally conceived, registration
is merely a species of notice. The act of
registering a document is never necessary in
order to give it legal effect as between the
parties. Requirements for the recording of the
instruments are designed to prevent frauds and
to permit and require the public to act with the
presumption that recorded instruments exist and
are genuine.
ON THE TOPIC OF THE APPLICATION OF THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
On general principle, independent and in spite
of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have
enforce oral partition when it has been
completely or partly performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or
agreement to partition is valid and enforceable
at law, equity will proper cases where the parol
partition has actually been consummated by the
taking of possession in severalty and the exercise
of ownership by the parties of the respective
portions set off to each, recognize and enforce
such parol partition and the rights of the parties
thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a
number of cases involving an oral partition under
which the parties went into possession, exercised
acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed
the partition agreement, that equity will confirm
such partition and in a proper case decree title
in accordance with the possession in severalty.
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A number of cases have specifically applied the
doctrine of part performance, or have stated
that a part performance is necessary, to take a
parol partition out of the operation of the statute
of frauds. It has been held that where there was
a partition in fact between tenants in common,
and a part performance, a court of equity would
have regard to enforce such partition agreed to
by the parties
What a Person Desiring Judicial Partition of Real
Estate Must Do
A person having the right to compel the partition of
real
estate should set forth in his complaint the NATURE
and EXTENT of his TITLE; and an adequate
DESCRIPTION of the real estate. He must join as
DEFENDANTS all the other persons interested in the
property. (Sec. 1, Rule 69, Rules of Court).
(a) Unless all other co-owners and interested
persons are made defendants, the action
will not prosper. (Reyes v. Cordero, 46 Phil.
658).
(b) (b) If a co-owner is dead, his administrator
or his heirs may bring the action.
(c) (c) Insufficiency of description in the
complaint may be cured even during the
trial, not afterwards. (Del Val v. Del Val, 29
Phil. 534).
FACTS:
A and B were co-owners of land. There was a
partition but A happened to be given more than her
share. Many years later, B asked to be given the
extra part but A claimed prescription in her favor. Is
A correct?
HELD:
Yes. True, there can generally be no prescription
among co-owners (while they remain co-owners),
but here, there has already been a partition (and the
co-ownership has therefore ceased). B should have
claimed the extra part earlier. (Valentin Ynot v.
Matea Initan, [CA] 34 O.G. 3360).
What Court Must Do If It Finds that the Plaintiff Has
the Right to Demand Partition
If after the trial the court finds that the plaintiff has
the right thereto, it shall:
 order the partition of the real estate among all the
parties in interests
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 the parties may, if they are able to agree, make
the partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance,
 and the court shall confirm the partition so
agreed upon by all the parties,
 partition and the order that confirms it shall be
recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in
which the property is situated. (Sec. 2, Rule 69,
Rules of Court).
 A final order decreeing partition and accounting
may be appealed by any party aggrieved
thereby. (Ibid.).
Take Note: While a partition effected thru a public
instrument would be desirable, still the law does not
require expressly the constitution of said public
instrument.
If there can be an alienation (or sale) of the real
rights in real properties by virtue of a private
instrument or even orally (provided there has been
full or partial execution or there is no objection), it is
evident that with greater reason should oral
partition or partition by virtue of a private instrument
(of real estate) be allowed, considering that here
there is no change of ownership, but a mere
designation and segregation of the part that
rightfully belongs to each co-owner. (See Hernandez
v. Andal, see also Art. 1079, Civil Code).
Incidentally, it should be noted that while a private
document
of sale of land is valid and binding between the
parties, it is not sufficient by itself to convey title or
any real right to the land. This is because acts and
contracts which have for their object the creation,
transmission, modification, or extinguishment of real
right over immovable property, must appear in a
public instrument. (See Pornellosa, et al. v. Land
Tenure Administration, et al., L-14040, Jan. 31, 1961).
[NOTE: What the buyer must do would be to compel
the seller to execute the needed public instrument.
This is because the sale is valid and enforceable.
(See Art. 357, Civil Code).].
What Court Must Do If the Parties Fail to Agree on the
Partition
If the parties are unable to agree upon the partition,
the court shall appoint not more than three
competent
and
disinterested
persons
as
commissioners to make the partition, commanding
them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in
interest such part and proportion of the property as
the court shall direct. (Sec. 3, Rule 69, Rules of Court).
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(a) A decision directing partition is not final but
interlocutory
because it leaves something more to be done in the
trial court for the complete disposition of the case,
namely, the appointment of commissioners, the
proceedings to be had before them, the submission
of their report which, according to law, must be set
for hearing. (Tan Vda. De Zaldarriaga v. Enriquez, et
al., L-13252, Apr. 29, 1961).
(b) The selection of the commissioners depends
upon the court’s discretion, and will not be altered
by the appellate court, unless abuse of discretion is
proved. (Tell v. Tell, 48 Phil. 70).
Factors to be Considered in Making the Partition
Commissioners shall:
 view and examine the real estate, after due
notice to the parties to attend such
 hear the parties as to their preference in the
portion of the property to be set apart to them
and the comparative value thereof, and
 set apart the same to the parties in lots or parcels
as will be most advantageous and equitable,
having due regard to the improvements,
situation, and quality of the different parts of the
land. (Sec. 4, Rule 69, Rules of Court).
Lands occupied adversely by strangers cannot be
examined by said commissioners. (Araullo v. Araullo,
3 Phil. 567).
Rule if a Physical Partition is Prejudicial
If to make a physical partition is prejudicial, the land
will be given to one co-owner who should reimburse
the rest, unless one asks that a public sale be made.
(See Sec. 5, Rule 69, Rules of Court). The request for
a sale is allowed to forestall collusion between the
assignee and the commissioners regarding the
land’s value
Effectivity of the Partition Made by the
Commissioners
The partition made by the commissioners will not be
effective until approved by the Court. (See Sec. 6,
Rule 69, Rules of Court). The court is allowed, of
course, to approve, amend, or disapprove the
report. New commissioners may even be appointed.
(See Sec. 7, Rule 69, Rules of Court).
Rule as to Who Pays the Costs
The parties shall pay the costs, including the
compensation of the commissioners. (See Sec. 10,
Rule 69, Rules of Court).
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Statement of the Proper Boundaries
If actual partition is made, the judgment shall state
the proper boundaries. (See Sec. 11, Rule 69, Rules of
Court).
Necessity of Delivery
Delivery is a necessary and indispensable incident to
carry into effect the purpose of partition. Therefore,
each co-owner may be placed in possession of the
lot adjudicated to him even if the court’s decision on
the partition be silent in this respect. (Confessor, et al.
v. Pelayo, et al., L-14352, Mar. 27, 1961).
Conversion of Partition Proceeding to One for the
Settlement of an Estate
An ordinary action for partition cannot be converted
into a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
a deceased person, without compliance with the
procedure outlined in the Rules of Court (Rules 7889), especially the provisions on publication and
notice to creditors. (Guico, et al. v. Bautista, et al., L14921, Dec. 31, 1960).
Rule in Partition Sales
In partition sales conducted by authority of the court,
if the sale is made by the sheriff for cash, and the
bidder to whom the property was adjudicated fails
to make immediate payment, the sheriff may sell the
property anew on the same day without
readvertising, even after the hours of sale have
elapsed. Partition sales become valid and binding
only upon confirmation by the court, so that before
such confirmation, the bidder acquires no
contractual right thereunder. Hence, if the property
is resold before the confi rmation of the fi rst sale, and
the resale is duly confi rmed by the court, the original
purchaser is released from further liability upon his
purchase, and cannot be held for the defi ciency
upon the resale. (Tayengco v. Sideco- Hautea, L17385, Nov. 29, 1965).
Effect of an Extrajudicial Partition that is Later On
Approved by a Court of Competent Jurisdiction
Here, the partition renders almost conclusive
questions of possession and ownership over the
property — such that future judicial determination
will generally be precluded. (See Borja Vda. de
Torres v. Encarnacion, L-4681, July 31, 1951).
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Novation of Partition
Lucero v. Banaga L-34224, Oct. 15, 1974
A partition may be novated as long as all the
interested parties consent thereto. This is particularly
so if such novation is required in the interest of justice
and equity, and in order to facilitate the settlement
of the estate.
Effect of Laches
Ramos v. Ramos L-19872, Dec. 3, 1974
FACTS: Forty years after a partition had been made,
plaintiffs complain that the partition that had been
effected was prejudicial to their rights. Ordinarily,
can their complaint still be successfully heard?
HELD: Ordinarily, they should not complain, in view of
their laches or unexplained delay. After 40 years, it
would be very difficult to harness judicial compassion
in behalf of their
claim.
An action questioning the extrajudicial settlement
instituted after more than 25 years from the assailed
conveyance constitutes laches (Heirs of Joaquin
Teves v. CA, 1999)
May Validity of a Partition Be Adjudged in a Land
Registration Case?
The decision of the land registration court upholding
the effectiveness of the “Kasulatan” is VALID, and
therefore the action for annulment of the partition
agreement is barred by res judicata. since the
parties agreed to submit the question of validity of
the “Kasulatan,” the land registration court had
jurisdiction. (Demetrio Manalo v. Hon. Herminio C.
Mariano, et al. 22, 1976)
Prescriptive Period if Partition is Void
The action to declare the nullity of a VOID
extrajudicial partition does not prescribe. (See also
Art. 1409, Civil Code).(Landayan v. Bacani; 1982)
497. PARTICIPATION OF CREDITORS AND
ASSIGNEES
Art. 497. The creditors or assignees of the coowners may take part in the division of the thing
owned in common and object to its being
effected without their concurrence. But they
cannot impugn any partition already
executed, unless there has been fraud, or in
case it was made notwithstanding a formal
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opposition presented to prevent it, without
prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor
to maintain its validity. (403)
Example:
A, B, and C, are the co-owners of a lot. They are
indebted to X for the construction of certain
improvements
thereon.
In
the
partition
proceeding, X is allowed to participate. If X did
not participate, he is not allowed to impugn a
partition already executed unless —
(a) X was defrauded;
(b) or X has previously presented a formal
opposition to prevent it.
Problem (as to Participation of Assignees)
A, B, and C are co-owners. A sold his share to X. Who
is entitled to participate in the partition, A or X?
However, if the co-owners believe that the
partition had been made validly (without the
creditor being prejudiced), they have the right to
prove their contention. (Art. 497).
If A had sold only part of his share, or even if he sold
his entire share, he has not yet delivered same to X
(such that X does not have yet a real right, but only
a personal right against A), then both A and X are
allowed to participate in the partition, together with
B and C. A will participate as co-owner, and X as
“assignee,” as the term is used in this article. (See
Lopez v. Martinez, 5 Phil. 567).
Scope of creditors and assignees
Creditors and assignees are given the right to
participate in the partition whether preferred or
ordinary
Creditors may refer to original or preferred,
provided they became so during the existence of
the co-ownership and not before or after its
formation.
Assignees – transferees of the interests of one
or more of the co- owners and there has been
a delivery.
Illustration:
Thus, in a case where X, a co-owner, sold his
undivided share in two parcels of land to P,
plaintiff, with a right of repurchase within one
year, but before the expiration of the year, X
and Y, the other co-owner, made a judicial
partition of the lands in question which were
adjudicated to Y, it was held that the partition
made between X and Y did not affect the
rights of P who acquired an undivided half
interest on the two parcels of land upon failure
of X to repurchase within the stipulated period.
However, if there has been no delivery yet of
the interest conveyed (so the assignee has
only a personal right against the co-owner), or
the conveyance is not total (so the assignor
remains a co-owner), then both the assignor,
as coowner, and the assignee, as such, have
a right to participate in the partition.
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ANS.: It depends.
If A had sold his WHOLE share, and has delivered
same (such as when X has been put in possession of
the land in place of A, with the result that X now has
a REAL right over the property), then it is NOT A who
should participate but X. (But in this case, X is
participating not as assignee but in his own right, as
CO-OWNER, with B and C.)
Right to notice of partition
Creditors and Assignees have the right to be
notified thereof. Absent the notice, partition will
not be binding on them.
Note: The law does not expressly require previous
notice to creditors and assignees.
Effect of the absence of notice.
The partition will not be binding on the creditors
and assignees.
Remedy of Creditors and Assignees who were not
notified of partition:
The Supreme Court should remand (return) the
case to the cadastral court (the court that
approved the partition in this case) in order to
permit C to file the objections he may deem
convenient. (De Santos v. Bank of the Phil. Islands
58 Phil. 784)
Right to object or to impugn partition
A. If no notice given – C/A may question the
partition already made.
B. If notice is given – C/A to appear and make
known their position
C. They cannot impugn a partition already
executed, unless:
 There has been fraud, regardless of notice
 Partition was made notwithstanding that
formal opposition was presented to
prevent it.
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Note: The debtor or assignor (co-owner or former coowner) has always the right to show the validity of
the partition.
Dealings with Third Persons
Art. 498. Whenever the thing is essentially
indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree
that it be allotted to one of them who shall
indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its
proceeds distributed. (404)
The termination of the co-ownership here is made
not physically but by the law; hence, this article
refers to what is called a “legal or juridical
dissolution.”
Although the thing owned in common being
essentially indivisible (e.g., car) cannot be
physically divided (see Art. 495.), the co-ownership
may nevertheless be terminated in accordance
with the above provision pursuant to the rule in
Article 494 (par. 1.) by adjudication of the thing to
one of the co-owners who shall indemnify the
others or by its sale with the proceeds thereof
divided among the co-owners.
The sale may be public or private, and the
purchaser may be a co-owner or a third person.
Procedure for the ‘Legal’ Partition
(a) First, give the whole to one co-owner who will
now be required to indemnify the rest.
(b) If this is not agreed upon (as when nobody
wants to get it, or more than one desire it), there must
be a sale (public sale, such as an auction or a private
sale). Of course, strangers are allowed to purchase.
(See 3 Manresa 514- 515).
Note: The sale shall be resorted to only when the
right to partition the property is invoked by any of
the co-owners but because of the nature of the
property it cannot be divided without prejudice to
the co-owners and the co-owners cannot agree
that the entire property be allotted or assigned to
one of them upon reimbursement of the shares of
the other co-owners.
Applicable Also to Objects Essentially Divisible
Although the article seemingly refers only to a case
when the property is essentially indivisible, still there is
nothing wrong with applying same to an object that
is essentially divisible. Like real estate when it cannot
be divided without prejudice to the interests of the
parties
Art. 499. The partition of a thing owned in
common shall not prejudice third persons who
shall retain the rights of mortgage, servitude, or
any other real rights belonging to them before
the division was made. Personal rights pertaining
to third persons against the coownership shall
also remain in force, notwithstanding the
partition. (405)
Rights of third persons before partition protected
Partition of a thing shall not prejudice third persons
who shall retain the rights of mortgage, etc.
belonging to them before the division was made.
Take note: Third person – all those with real
rights like mortgage or servitude over the thing
owned in common or with personal rights
against co-owners who had no participation
whatever in the partition
Example:
A, B, and C were co-owners of a parcel of land
mortgaged to M. If A, B, and C should physically
partition the property, the mortgage in M’s favor still
covers all the three lots, which together, formerly
constituted one single parcel. If A alone had
contracted an unsecured obligation, he would of
course be the only one responsible.
Note that both real and personal rights are
protected.
Interests of All Persons Must Be Considered
When the court is asked to help in a partition, the
interests
of all must be considered so that reason and justice
would
prevail.
500-551. OBLIGATIONS OF CO-OWNERS UPON PARTITION
Art. 500. Upon partition, there shall be a mutual
accounting
for
benefits
received
and
reimbursements for expenses made. Likewise,
each co-owner shall pay for damages caused
by reason of his negligence or fraud. (n)
Art. 501. Every co-owner shall, after partition, be
liable for defects of title and quality of the portion
assigned to each of the other co-owners. (n)
Rights of Third persons before partition
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Obligations of co-owners upon partition
1. Mutual accounting for benefits, profits,
or income received for the fruits
2. Mutual
reimbursement
for expenses
(necessary expenses, taxes), for if they
share in the benefits, they should also share
in the charges.
3. Indemnity for damages by reason of
negligence or fraud
4. Reciprocal warrant for defects of
title (or eviction) or quality (hidden
defects) of the portion assigned to
a co-owner.
Reciprocal Warranty
Example: A and B, co-owners, partitioned their land.
Later, C, a stranger was able to prove that he really
owned the lot belonging to B. Should B alone bear
the loss?
ANS.: No. Both A and B must bear the loss in that A
must give half of his portion to B because there is a
reciprocal or mutual warranty against eviction.
Other Effects of Partition
a) each former co-owner is deemed to have
had exclusive possession of the part allotted
to him for the entire period during which the
co-possession lasted. (Art. 543).
[If he buys the shares of the others, this
presumption of exclusive possession does not
refer to said shares. (Ramos Silos v. Luisa
Ramos, L-7546, June 30, 1955).].
(b) partition confers upon each, the exclusive title
over his espective share. (See Art. 1091).
R.A. 4276 CONDOMINIUM LAW
Condominium, defined.
A condominium is an interest in real property
consisting of separate interest in a unit in a
residential, industrial or commercial building
and an undivided interest in common,
directly or indirectly, in the land on which it is
located and in other common areas of the
building. A condominium may include, in
addition, a separate interest in other
portions of such real property. (Sec. 2)
What is a unit?
“Unit” means a part of the condominium
project intended for any type of
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independent use or ownership, including
one or more rooms or spaces located in one
or more floors (or part or parts of floors) in a
building or buildings and such accessories as
may be appended thereto.
Applicability of the Act
The provisions of this Act shall apply to
property divided or to be divided into
condominiums only if there shall be
recorded in the Register of Deeds of the
province or city in which the property lies
and duly annotated in the corresponding
certificate of title of the land, if the latter had
been patented or registered under either
the Land Registration or Cadastral Acts, an
enabling or master deed. (Sec. 4)
The interests in condominium may be
ownership or any other real right in real
property recognized by the law of property
in the Civil Code and other pertinent laws.
Extent of transfer
Any transfer or conveyance of a unit or an
apartment, office or store or other space
therein, shall include the transfer or
conveyance of the undivided interests in the
common areas or, in a proper case, the
membership or shareholdings in the
condominium corporation. (Sec. 5)
Partition of condominium
Where several persons own condominiums
in a condominium project, an action may
be brought by one or more such persons for
partition thereof by sale of the entire project,
as if the owners of all of the condominiums
in such project were co-owners of the entire
project in the same proportion as their
interests in the common areas. (Sec. 8)
Partition shall be made upon showing that:
1. That three years after damage or
destruction to the project which renders
material part thereof unit for its use prior
thereto, the project has not been rebuilt or
repaired.
2. That damage or destruction to the project
has rendered one-half or more of the units
therein
untenantable
and
that
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condominium owners holding in aggregate
more than thirty percent interest in the
common areas are opposed to repair or
restoration of the project.
3. That the project has been in existence in
excess of fifty years, that it is obsolete and
uneconomic, and that condominium
owners holding in aggregate more than fifty
percent interest in the common areas are
opposed to repair or restoration or
remodeling or modernizing of the project.
4. That the project or a material part thereof
has been condemned or expropriated and
that the project is no longer viable, or that
the condominium owners holding in
aggregate more than seventy percent
interest in the common areas are opposed
to continuation of the condominium regime.
5. That the conditions for such partition by
sale set forth in the declaration of
restrictions, duly registered in accordance
with the terms of this Act, have been met.
Declaration of restrictions
1. The owner of a project shall, prior to
the
conveyance
of
any
condominium therein, register a
declaration of restrictions relating to
such project, which restrictions shall
constitute a lien upon each
condominium in the project. 2. The
Register of Deeds shall enter and
annotate
the
declaration
of
restrictions upon the certificate of
title covering the land included
within the project, if the land is
patented or registered under the
Land Registration or Cadastral Acts.
Condominium Corporation
Whenever the common areas in a
condominium project are held by a
condominium
corporation,
such
corporation
shall
constitute
the
management body of the project. The
corporate purposes of such a corporation
shall be limited to the holding of the
common areas, either in ownership or any
other interest in real property recognized by
law, to the management of the project, and
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to such other purposes as may be
necessary, incidental or convenient to the
accomplishment of said purposes.
Perpendicular co-ownership - where the different
stories of a house or a building belong to different
persons. Horizontal co-ownership - if the various units
are in one plane — as when one-story units all set on
the ground.
A combination of both perpendicular and horizontal
co-ownership can result in a situation very similar to
a condominium which may be in the form of a
building consisting of several stories, each story
being by itself divided into different units, owned by
different persons. Note that each unit cannot be
considered owned in common. Under the
Condominium Law, a condominium corporation
can be formed — to take care of common property,
like the common stairs, common halls, etc..
When Is Ownership Acquired?
Condominium Corporation v. Campos, Jr. 104 SCRA
295
The buyer of a unit in a condominium acquires
ownership
over the unit only after he has paid in full its purchase
price.
‘Separate Interest’
Condominium Corporation v. Campos, Jr. (Supra)
The ownership of a condominium unit is the
“separate interest’’ of the owner which makes him
automatically a shareholder in the condominium.
Other Instances
Union Bank v. Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board
210 SCRA 558 (1992)
The act of a subdivision developer of mortgaging the
subdivision without notifying an installment buyer is
violative of PD 957. Said case falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board.
Skyworld Condominium Owners Association v. SEC
211 SCRA 565 (1992)
All incorporators of a condominium corporation must
be
an owner of a condominium unit.
Casa Filipina Realty Corp. v. Offi ce of the President
58 SCAD 773 (1995)
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PD 947 was designed to stem the tide of “fraudulent
manipulations
perpetrated
by
unscrupulous
subdivision and
condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to
deliver
titles to buyers or titles free from liens and
encumbrances.’’
G.O.A.L., Inc. v. CA 85 SCAD 159 (1997)
In a condominium, common areas and facilities are
“portions
of condominium property not included in the units,’’
whereas, a unit is “a part of the condominium
property which is to be subject to private
ownership.’’
Inversely, that which is not considered a unit should
fall under common areas and facilities. Hence, the
parking spaces
not being subject to private
ownership form part of the common
area over which the condominium unit owners hold
undivided
interest.
(2) The holding or control must be with intention to
possess – animus possidendi. The exercise of the right
of possession may be legal or not.
NOTE: The holding or control must be with intention
to possess. (INSANE – animus possidendi cannot be
present)
(3) It must be in ones own right. – either by a person
in his own name or in that of another, by the
possessor himself in his own name or by an agent in
the name of the principal.
NAME OR BY ANOTHER – maybe owner or holder
(lessee)
Owner or by an agent – owner as principal exercised
thru his agent. Strictly speaking, the agent has no
possession in law because it is not by virtue of his own
right.
Relations created by possession.
MODULE 5:
POSSESSION
Art. 523. Possession is the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right.
POSSESSION - possession is the holding of a thing or
the enjoyment of a right with the intention to possess
in one’s own right.
The possessor’s relation to the property itself possessor exercises some degree of control more or
less effective over the object
The possessor’s relation to the world - the possessor
must also have the ability to exclude others from his
possession. Custody is different as no possession
because of lacking of control, and the intention to
exclude others is not present.
Forms or degrees of possession.
Ownership
Ownership - when a thing is completely subjected to
his will in a manner not prohibited by law and
consisted with the rights of others. Ownership confers
rights to the owner (just like the right of possession
thereof)
Possession - is defined as the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right. to possess actually even
without a right.
Elements
(1) There must be holding or control of a thing or right
- possession always implies the element of corpus or
occupation. it is necessary that there should be such
occupancy or there is no possession (should be
possession in fact)
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Possession without any title whatever. — a thief or
squatter – no title or right at all.
Possession with a juridical title. – just like a lessee,
usufructuary. Juridical relation existing between
possessor and owner (or acting in his behalf) but
there is no ownership.
Possession with a just title. – that of an adverse
claimant whose title is sufficient to transfer ownership
but is defective. (like the seller is not the true owner
or couldn’t transfer his rights to the possessor IN
GOOD FAITH).
Possession with a title in fee simple. – highest degree
of possession. From the right of dominion or by an
owner.
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Nature of possession
As an act – holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a
right with animus possidendi.
As a fact – when there is holding or enjoyment,
possession is in fact  a condition of a person having
property under his control with/out a right.
As a right – refers to the right of a person to that
holding or enjoyment to the exclusion of all others
having better right than the possessor.
MAYBE:
Jus possidendi – right to possession which is
incidental to and in the right of ownership
Jus possessionis – independent from the right of
ownership.
Possession as a fact
Benefits to possessor – possession gives rite so rights
and presumptions. A possessor has in his favor the
presumption that his possession is lawful – and that
he is the owner or has been given the right of
possession by the owner. (the disturber should
present better right or ownership).
As proof of ownership – possession not a definite
proof of ownership or is non possession inconsistent
therewith.
Classes of Possession
(1) Possession in one’s own name or in the name of
another
(2) Possession in the concept of owner or possession
in the concept of holder
(3) Possession in good faith or possession in bad faith.
Extent of possession
Actual possession is occupancy in fact of the whole
or at least substantially the whole. With reference to
land, it consists n the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
naturally exercise over his property.
Constructive possession, on the other hand, is
occupancy of part in the name of the whole under
such circumstances that the law extends the
occupancy to the possession of the whole.
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Doctrine of Constructive Possession
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that
a man has to have his feet on every square meter of
ground before it can be said that he is in possession.
The general rule is that the possession and cultivation
of a portion of a tract of land under claim of
ownership of all is constructive possession of all. It is
sufficient that the possessor was able to subject the
property to the action of his will
Republic vs. Jacob (G.R. No. 146874. July 20, 2006)
Marcos issued Proclamation No. 739, for the
exploration and development of geothermal
energy, natural, and methanols gas. Jacob’s lot was
affected by the proclamation.
The property was previously owned by Bondal who
sold it to Monjardin, Jacob’s uncle. Monjardin
placed his name on the tax declaration. However,
since Monjardin was unable to personally cultivate
the property, he asked Jacob’s mother, Josefa, to
cultivate it. Monjardin later sold the lot to Jacob’s
parents but were unable to place their names in the
tax declaration. Jacob later inherited the property
from her parents. Despite learning that the property
was affected by the proclamation, Jacob
nevertheless filed an application for the confirmation
and registration of her title. Jacob failed to present
the Deed of Sale between Bondal and Monjardin
and was only able to show the tax declarations still in
the name of Bondal.
The Republic opposed, saying that the land was part
of the public domain, therefore, not subject to
appropriation.
W/N Jacob and her predecessors-in-interest have
been occupying the lot in the concept required by
law
Ruling: In this case, when Jacob applied for
registration on May 6, 1994, the property was no
longer alienable and disposable since August 14,
1970 by virtue of Proclamation No. 739. Since the
application for confirmation was done 24 years after
the proclamation was issued, the period of
possession and occupancy can no longer be
tacked in her favour.
Moreover, Jacob failed to show that she had
acquired ownership over the property through
herself or through her predecessors-in-interest
though open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
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possession and occupation of the property since
1945 or earlier. In this case, Jacob failed to show the
deed of sale between Bondal and Monjardin. The
only deed of sale she had was the deed of absolute
sale between Monjardin and her parents. She even
failed to show any tax declaration over the
property.
Sarmiento vs. Lesaca (G.R. No. L-15385. June 30,
1960)
Sarmiento filed a complaint against Lesaca praying
for the rescission of the contract of sale executed
between them for failure of Lesaca to place
Sarmiento in the actual physical possession of the
land she bought from Lesaca.
Sarmiento bought the land for P5,000 which was
executed by a deed of sale, however, when she
tried to take actual physical possession of the lands
but was prevented from doing so by one Martin
Deloso who
claims to be the owner thereof.
Sarmiento then wrote Lesaca asking the latter either
to change the lands sold with another of the same
kind and class or to return the purchase price
together with the expenses she had incurred in the
execution of the sale, plus 6 percent interest; and
that since defendant did not agree to this, she filed
the present action.
W/N the execution of a deed of absolute sale placed
the vendee Sarmiento in actual possession of the
land thus relieving Sarmiento of her obligation to
deliver the same
she did not
As provided in Article 1462, the thing sold shall be
deemed delivered when the vendee is placed in the
control and possession thereof, which situation does
not here obtain because from the execution of the
sale up to the present the vendee was never able to
take possession of the lands due to the insistent
refusal of Martin Deloso to surrender them claiming
ownership thereof. And although it is postulated in
the same article that the execution of a public
document is equivalent to delivery, this legal fiction
only holds true when there is no impediment that
may prevent the passing of the property from the
hands of the vendor into those of the vendee
Undoubtedly, in a contract of purchase and sale the
obligation of the parties is reciprocal, and, as
provided by the law, in case one of the parties fails
to comply with what is incumbent upon him to do,
135 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
the person prejudiced may either exact the
fulfillment of the obligation or rescind the sale. Since
plaintiff chose the latter alternative, it cannot be
disputed that her action is in accordance with law.
Concept of Possession and Occupation in
Registration Cases
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since
June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and
registrable title to, such lands based on the length
and quality of their possession.
Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person
acquires ownership of a patrimonial property
through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good
faith and with just title. Under extraordinary
acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted
adverse possession of patrimonial property for at
least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just
title, ripens into ownership.
Malabanan vs. Republic (G.R. No. 179987, April 29,
2009)
In 1998, Mario Malabanan led an application for
land registration covering a parcel of land located
in Silang Cavity. Malabanan claimed that he
purchased the land from Eduardo Velazco, and that
he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
OCENPO of the land for more than 30 years.
Aristedes Velazco, Malabanan’s witness, testified
before the court that the property originally
belonged to a 22-hectare property owned by Lino
Velazco, her great-grandfather. Lino had 4 sons –
Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban. Esteban
is Aristedes’ grandfather. The property was divided
among the 4 of them. In 1996, Magdalena, Esteban’s
wife, became the administrator of all the properties
of the Velazco sons. After Esteban and Magdalena
died, their son Virgilio succeeded them in
administering the properties, including the subject
land, which is owned by his uncle, Eduardo Velazco.
Eduardo sold this to Malabanan. Also, a certificate
issued by CENRO, DENR dated JUNE 1, 2001 was
presented verifying the said land as A and D. RTC
ruled in favor of Malabanan. Republic appealed,
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now represented by the OSG, CA reversed the
decision of the RTC.
such possession are found in the same person, such
as the actual possession of an owner or a lessor of
land.
Whether or not Petitioner validly registered the land
They INVALIDLY REIGSTERED THE LAND
Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the
agricultural land subject of the application needs
only to be classified as alienable and disposable as
of the time of the application, provided the
applicant’s possession and occupation of the land
dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a
conclusive presumption that the applicant has
performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant arises, and the applicant
becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an
imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the
land has already ceased to be part of the public
domain and has become private property
In the name of another. — When possession is in the
name of another, the one in actual possession is
without any right of his own, but is merely an
instrument of another in the exercise of the latter’s
possession, such as the possession of an agent,
servant, or guard.
(EXERCISED EITHER):
(a) voluntary – by an agreement
(b) necessary or legal – by virtue of law, such
as possession in behalf of incapacitated.
TAKE NOTE: The unauthorized voluntary possession by
a third person in the name of another shall become
effective only after it is ratified by the latter.
Possession in the name of another may also be:
In this case, the petitioners failed to present sufficient
evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of
the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the
requisite character and period of possession possession and occupation that is open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or
earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure
converted to private property even upon the
subsequent declaration of it as alienable and
disposable. Prescription never began to run against
the State, such that the land has remained ineligible
for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to
be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress
enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation
declaring the land as no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national
wealth.
How Exercised
Art. 524. Possession may be exercised in one’s own
name or in that of another.
An owner or a holder may exercise his possession in
his own name, that is, personally; or through another,
that is, through an agent acting in the name of the
owner or holder. In the same way, possession may be
acquired by the same person who is to enjoy it or by
one acting for another.
In one’s own name. — When possession is in one’s
own name, the fact of possession and the right to
136 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
Physical or material – a mere keeper or custodian.
(no independent right or title to retain or possess the
same)
Juridical - when the possession gives the transferee
a right over the thing which the transferee may set
up against the owner, such as the possession of an
agent who receives the proceeds of sales of goods
delivered to him in agency by his principal.
Art. 525. The possession of things or rights may be had
in one of two concepts: either in the concept of
owner, or in that of the holder of the thing or right to
keep or enjoy it, the ownership pertaining to another
person.
Possession may be had in one of two concepts.
Possession in the concept of owner.
Possession in the concept of owner. — This takes
place when the possessor of a thing or right, by his
actions, is considered or is believed by other people
as the owner, regardless of the good or bad faith of
the possessor. It is possession under a claim of
ownership or title (en concepto de dueño) by one
who is the owner himself or one who is not the owner
but claims to be and acts as the owner.
Possession in the concept of holder
Possession in the concept of holder. — This takes
place when the possessor of a thing or right holds it
merely to keep or enjoy it, the ownership pertaining
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to another person. It is possession not under a claim
of ownership (or not in the concept of owner), the
possessor acknowledging in another a superior right
which he believes to be of ownership, whether this
be true or not.
Possession may be had in one of two ways:
possession in the concept of an owner and
possession of a holder. A possessor in the concept of
an owner may be the owner himself or one who
claims to be so. On the other hand, one who
possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in
another a superior right which he believes to be
ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.
Carlos vs. Republic (G.R. No. 164823. August 31,
2005)
Maria Carlos filed an application for registration
of land in Tagquit alleging that she isin open,
continuous, exclusive, and notiours possession since
July 12, 1945 or earlier under a bona fide claim of
ownership. She further claimed that her possession
was since 1948 for more than 50 years.
Petitioner presented testimonial evidence
o Sergio Cruz, 83 years old, neighbor testified that it
was owned by Jose Carlos (father of Maria)
o
Daniel Castillo, 76, corroborated Mr. Cruz
testimony
o Victoria testified corroborated the claim and
further added that the land was sold to Usman
Development Corp. in 1996 but failed to deliver title.
Only a commitment to deliver was made in order to
collect the unpaid balance
Petitioner presented officers from DENR to
ascertain that the property is not public land
Trial court granted the application, but was
reversed by CA, stating that the applicant has lost
her land in question as early as October 1996 to
Usman Development Corp. Occupation and
possession belonged to the company
ISSUE - Whether or not Petitioner can validly register
the land
Petitioner cannot register the land
In this case, it is clear in the case at bar that the
applicant, Maria Carlos, no longer had possession of
the property at the time of the application for the
issuance of a certificate of title. The application was
filed in court on December 19, 2001. Teresita Carlos
Victoria, the daughter of Maria Carlos, admitted
during the hearing that her mother had sold the
property to Ususan Development Corporation in
1996. They also presented as evidence the deed of
137 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
absolute sale executed by and between Maria
Carlos and Ususan Development Corporation on
October 16, 1996
This contradicts petitioner's claim that she was in
possession of the property at the time that she
applied for confirmation of title.
Nonetheless, even if it were true that it was petitioner
who had actual possession of the land at that time,
such possession was no longer in the concept of an
owner. Possession may be had in one of two ways:
possession in the concept of an owner and
possession of a holder. A possessor in the concept of
an owner may be the owner himself or one who
claims to be so. On the other hand, one who
possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in
another a superior right which he believes to be
ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.
Petitioner herein acknowledges the sale of the
property to Ususan Development Corporation in
1996 and in fact promised to deliver the certificate
of title to the corporation upon its obtention. Hence,
it cannot be said that her possession since 1996 was
under a bona fide claim of ownership. Under the law,
only he who possesses the property under a bona
fide claim of ownership is entitled to confirmation of
title.
Possession in concept of both owner and holder or in
neither
(1) It is possible that a person may exercise possession
both in the concept of owner and in the concept of
holder.
(2) The agent, parent, guardian, administrator, and
other legal representatives possess neither in the
concept of owner nor in the concept of holder. They
possess in the name of another
Possessor in good faith; Possessor in bad faith
Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith
who is not aware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who
possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing.
Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of
law may be the basis of good faith.
Possessor in good faith and possessor in bad faith
defined.
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(1) A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware
that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any
flaw which invalidates it.
(2) A possessor in bad faith is one who possesses in
any case contrary to the foregoing, i.e., he is aware
that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition a
flaw which invalidates it.
Possession, depending on the manner it has been
acquired, may be either in good faith (buena fe) or
in bad faith (mala fe). Article 526 presupposes that
there exists a flaw in the title or mode of acquisition
(see Art. 712.) of the possessor who is either aware or
not aware of it. If there is no flaw, there can be no
issue regarding good or bad faith. Good faith is
always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad
faith on the part of the possessor rests the burden of
proof.
WHEN DISTINCTION IS IMPORTANT - importance
principally in connection with the receipt of fruits and
the payment of expenses and improvement and the
acquisition of ownership by prescription under Article
1127
When distinction immaterial - is immaterial in the
exercise of the right to recover under Article 539
which speaks of every possessor.
Where possession in name of another – (personal to
the possessor) the good or bad faith of the agent or
legal representative will benefit or prejudice him for
whom he acts.
Requisites for possession in good faith or in bad
faith.
(1) The possessor has a title or mode of acquisition
(2) There is a flaw or defect in said title or mode;
(3) the possessor is unaware or aware of the flaw or
defect or believes that the thing belongs or does not
belong to him.
Po Lam vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 116220.
December 6, 2000)
DOCTRINE: It has been held that a purchaser cannot
be considered as being “aware of a flaw which
invalidates [his] acquisition of the thing,’’ where the
alleged flaw, the notice of lis pendens, was already
being cancelled at the time of the purchase
The case stems from a controversy regarding two lots
situated in Legazpi, Albay, which the spouses
138 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
purchased from Lim Kok Chiong. The lots were the
subject of litigation between Lim and his brother
Felix. Felix sought an action to annul the sale by Lim
to Legazpi Avenue Hardware Company (LACHO) on
the ground that the said deeds included the threefourteenth 3/14 pro-indiviso portion of subject lots
which he (Felix Lim) inherited by Will from his foster
parents. During the pendency of said annulment
case, Felix sought the annotation of notice of lis
pendens on the TCTs of the 2 lots. The trial court
found that Lim (after the sale, LACHO) was the
absolute owner of the lots and upheld the sale. For
this reason, the court ordered the cancellation of
notice of lis pendens on the titles. One of the notices
was cancelled but the other was not acted upon.
Felix appealed, and eventually the CA maintained
the ruling of the trial court and ordered the
cancellation of the other TCT
While Felix’s appeal was pending, LACHO sold the
lots to the spouses Po Lam, which they later leased
to Jose Lee. What happened was, the first lot (or Lot
A) was bout by the sps at a time when notice of lis
pendes was already cancelled while the second lot
(or Lot B) was bought while its TCT still has notice of lis
pendens. Felix then impleaded the spoused Po Lam
in the continuing civil case between him and his
brother. After the expiration of his lease, Jose Lee
refused to pay Po Lam and instead said he would
deposit the payment to Felix. The Po Lam spouses
filed an action with the trial court in Legazpi, which
declared them the lawful owners of the lots. The RTC
and CA sustained, but the SC reversed stating that
the Po Lam spouses were vendees in bad faith
because they knew of the notice of lis pendens
annotated on the TCTs.
W/N petitioners are buyers in good faith.
In the second lot (or Lot B), Sps Po cannot be
deemed buyers in good faith. The annotation of lis
pendens on its transfer certificate served as a notice
to them that the said lot is involved in a pending
litigation. Settled is the rule that one who deals with
property subject of a notice of lis pendens, cannot
invoke the right of a purchaser in good faith. Neither
can he acquire better rights than those of his
predecessors in interest. A transferee pendente lite
stands in the shoes of the transferor and is bound by
any judgment or decree which may be rendered for
or against the transferor.
However, on the first lot (Lot A) which Sps Po
purchased by the time notice of lis pendens had
already been cancelled, SC still said that they
cannot be considered purchasers in good faith. A
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purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which
should put a reasonable man on guard and claim
that he acted in good faith in the belief that there
was no defect in the title of the vendor. In this case,
it could not be denied that notice of lis pendens
inscription appears on the transfer certificate of the
first lot. This fact coupled with the non-cancellation
of the notice of lis pendens on the other lot should
have sufficiently alerted the petitioners on a possible
defect in the title of LACHO, especially when said lots
were simultaneously sold to the petitioners in a single
deed of sale.
Subject lot being at the heart of a commercial
district of Legaspi City, petitioners should be aware
of the pending litigation affecting the lots under
controversy, and gambled on the outcome of the
litigation anyway.
Concept of Good Faith
(1) A question of intention ascertained by outward
acts. - Good faith or the want of it, is not a visible,
tangible fact that can be seen or touched but rather
a state or condition of mind which can only be
ascertained by actual or fancied tokens or signs. An
individual’s personal good faith is a concept of his
own mind and, therefore, may not conclusively be
determined by his protestations alone.
(2) Essence. — The essence of bona fides or good
faith, therefore, lies in honest belief in the validity of
one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim, and
absence of intention to overreach another or to
defraud
or
seek
advantage.
One is considered a possessor in good faith if he is
not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it
Heirs of M. Cabal vs. Spouses L. and R. Cabal (G.R.
No. 153625, July 31, 2006)
Petitioner in this case, Marcelino, is one of the heirs of
Marcelo Cabal. Before he died on August 1954,
Marcelo Cabal (Marcelo) was the owner of a 4,234square meter parcel of land situated at Barrio
Palanginan, Iba, Zambales, registered with the RD.
Sometime in 1949, five years before he died, Marcelo
allowed his son, Marcelino, to build his house on a
portion of the lot.
Since then, the son of Marcelino also built his house
on the lot. On August 17, 1964, Marcelos heirs extrajudicially settled among themselves the Lot into
undivided equal shares of 423.40-square meters
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each. In the interim, based on a consolidated
subdivision plan, it was revealed that Marcelino and
his son occupied and built their houses on an area
located on the southernmost portion of another lot
and not the adjacent lot designated to him, but to
his brother Lorenzo and the latter’s wife, Rosita. The
spouses Lorenzo and Rosita Cabal (respondents)
confronted Marcelino on this matter which resulted
to an agreement on March 1, 1989 to a re-survey
and swapping of lots for the purpose of
reconstruction of land titles. However, the agreed
resurvey and swapping of lots did not materialize
and efforts to settle the dispute in the barangay level
proved futile.
Hence, on August 10, 1994, respondents filed a
complaint for Recovery of Possession with Damages
against Marcelino before the Municipal Trial Court of
Iba, Zambales.
Marcelino
contended that
respondents have no cause of action against him
because he has been in possession in good faith
since 1949 with the respondent’s knowledge and
acquiescence. He further avers that acquisitive
prescription has set in. On January 24, 1997, during
the pendency of the trial of the case, Lorenzo died.
MTC ruled in favor of Marcelino. Respondents
appealed to the RTC which reversed the MTC’s
ruling, stating that Marcelinos possession was in the
concept of a co-owner and therefore prescription
does not run in his favor; that his possession, which
was tolerated by his co-owners, does not ripen into
ownership.
Marcelino a builder in good faith?
Marcelino is deemed a builder in good faith at least
until the time he was informed by respondents of his
encroachment on their property. Marcelino’s
possession of the disputed lot was based on a
mistaken belief that the lot covered by his title is the
same lot on which he has built his house with the
consent of his father. There is no evidence, other
than bare allegation, that Marcelino was aware that
he intruded on respondents’ property when he
continued to occupy and possess the disputed lot
after partition was effected.
Negrete vs. Court of First Instance of Marinduque
(G.R. No. L-31267. November 24, 1972)
Legal principle: The essence of the bona fides or
good faith lies in honest belief in the validity of one’s
right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of
intention to overreach another
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Facts: In 1967, Negrete filed an action for recovery
against Maderazo alleging that they have been in
an open and peaceful possession of their land since
1945 until Maderazo forcibly entered their land in
1954 and started cultivating it.
Maderazo denied the claims of Negrete and
asserted that they already became the owners of
the land through acquisitive prescription having
possessed it in good faith within a period of 10 years.
There is good faith because the Negrete’s possession
is by virtue of the deed of sale executed Tito Oriendo
in 1954
The municipal trial court decided in favor of
Maderazo based on the finding that he has been in
material and physical possession of said land since
1951 when he bought it.
Issue: W/N the deed of sale executed by Tito
Oriendo on August 30, 1954 in favor of Maderazo
could be considered as a valid basis for good faith
and as a just title, in order to justify the acquisition of
the disputed land by ordinary prescription thru
adverse possession of only 10 years
Ruling: No, a deed of sale, to constitute a just title
and to generate good faith for the ordinary
acquisitive prescription of ten (10) years, should refer
to the same parcel of land, which is adversely
possessed.
In the case at bar, the deed of sale in favor of
Maderazo covers a parcel of land which is patently
different from the disputed land owned by Negrete
as to area, location and boundary owners. The land
of Negrete is 9 ha located in Sitio Puting Buhangin,
Mogpog, while the land of Maderazo is only 3,700
sqm and situated in barrio Puyog, Boac. The 2
parcels have also different boundary owners.
Maderazo cannot claim good faith in occupying
said land on the basis of the said deed of sale.
Having signed the deed of sale, which clearly
indicates the area, location, and boundaries of the
lot, he is therefore aware that the land sold to him is
not the same lot which belonged to Negrete.
Moreover, Maderazo did not submit any tax
declaration or tax receipts in the name of Tito
Oriendo.
Maderazo is a possessor in bad faith and can only
acquire ownership by extraordinary acquisitive
prescription thru an adverse possession of 30 years
(Art. 1137 Civil Code). Since he only occupied it from
1954-1967 (13 years), his claim is untenable.
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Baltazar vs. Caridad (G.R. No. L-23509. June 23, 1966)
Good faith must rest on a colorable right in the
builder, beyond a mere stubborn belief in one's title
despite judicial adjudication. The fact that in 1959
appellants demolished and replaced their old house
with new and bigger ones, cannot enervate the
rights of the registered owners. Otherwise. the rights
of the latter to enjoy full possession of their registered
property could be indefinitely defeated by an
unsuccessful opponent through the simple
subterfuge of replacing his old house with a new one
from time to time.||| (Baltazar v. Caridad, G.R. No.
L-23509, [June 23, 1966], 123 PHIL 1317-1323)
Facts:
In the cadastral proceeding, the trial court rendered
decision, awarded lot in question to the spouses Julio
Baltazar and Constancia Valencia as their conjugal
partnership property.
In the meanwhile, Julio Baltazar, the registered
owner of Lot 8864, died. On 6 December 1961, his
surviving wife and children filed a motion, in the
cadastral case of the spouses praying for writ of
possession against Silvina Caridad and her daughter,
Eduarda Caridad, who had been in possession of the
southern portion of said Lot 8864 since1939, while the
cadastral case involving said lot was pending before
the trial court, and before the decision was rendered
and the corresponding decree issued in 1941. The
trial court issued granted Baltazar’s motion, and
overruled Caridad’s opposition but directed the
sheriff not to remove or destroy the permanent
improvements on the lot without an express
command. On 2 January 1962, the order having
become final, the sheriff enforced the writ and
placed Baltazar in possession of the southern portion
of the lot.
On 23 January 1962, Baltazar presented a motion to
compel Eduarda and Silvina Caridad to remove the
irrespective houses which they built in the southern
portion of the disputed lot,and, in the event of their
failure to do so, to order the sheriff to demolish the
same. On 20 March 1962, the trial court, after due
hearing, granted Baltazar’s motion, ordering the
Caridads to remove their respective houses from the
southern portion of said lot 8864 within 30 days from
receipt of said order. Not satisfied, the Caridads
appealed (CA-GR 31289-R). The appellate court,
however, certified the appeal to the Supreme Court
for raising only questions of law.
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Whether or not Plaintiff can recover possession over
the land
Ruling: Plaintiff can recover possession over the land
- In this case, the above contentions of respondents
are without merit. It is to be noted that respondents
do not dispute that during the pendency of the
cadastral proceeding, rendition of the judgment
awarding said lot No. 8864, and consequent
issuance of the final decree of registration of the
same in favor of Julio Baltazar.
Appellants cannot be regarded as builders in good
faith because they are bound by the 1941 decree of
registration that obligated their parents and
predecessors-in-interest. Good faith must rest on a
colorable right in the builder, beyond a mere
stubborn belief in one's title despite judicial
adjudication. The fact that in 1959 appellants
demolished and replaced their old house with new
and bigger ones cannot enervate the rights of the
registered owners. Otherwise, the rights of the latter
to enjoy full possession of their registered property
could be indefinitely defeated by an unsuccessful
opponent through the simple subterfuge of
replacing his old house with a new one from time to
time.
Concept of Bad Faith
Bad faith is, of course, the opposite of good faith. It
does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose to do
wrong or cause damage. It contemplates a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or
some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior
purposes.
Heirs of T. de Leon Vda. De Roxas vs. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 138660. February 5, 2004)
This petition stems from a case filed by Trinidad de
Leon Vda. De Roxas to set aside the decree of
registration over two unregistered parcels of land
granted
to
Maguesun
Management
and
Development Corporation ("Maguesun") before the
Regional Trial Court on the ground of actual fraud
which was then finally granted by the SC in case G.R.
118436.
Further argued that, Argued that the following acts
of Meycauayan constitute indirect contempt under
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure: (1)
Meycauayan's defiance of the final and executory
Decision and Resolution of this Court in G.R. No.
141 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
118436; (2) its act of filing pleadings before the land
registration court to prevent execution of the
Decision and Resolution; (3) its act of filing a
Complaint raising the same issues in its Petition for
Intervention which this Court had already denied
and urging the trial court to ignore and
countermand the orders of this Court.
Thereafter, Mecauayan filed a petition for
intervention and alleged that it purchased parcels of
land from Maguesun which form part of the property
awarded to the heirs of Trinidad de Leon Vda Roxas
and contended that the judgement should not
impair his rights as a purchaser in good faith and for
value.
Further, argued that it was a purchaser in good faith
because it had no knowledge of any pending case
involving the lots. Meycauayan claims that the trial
court had already canceled the notice of lis
pendens on the titles when it purchased the lots from
Maguesun
Whether or not Respondent Meycauayan is liable for
contempt
Yes, meycauayan is liable for contempt
In this case, Meycauayan's obstinate refusal to abide
by the Court's Decision in G.R. No. 118436 has no
basis in view of this Court's clear pronouncement to
the contrary. The fact that this Court specifically
ordered the cancellation of Meycauayan's titles to
the disputed parcels of land in the Resolution dated
29 July 1998 should have laid to rest the issue of
whether the Decision and Resolution in G.R. No.
118436 is binding on Meycauayan. Clearly,
Meycauayan's defiance of this Court's Decision and
Resolution by filing an action for reconveyance,
quieting of title and damages involving the same
parcels of land which this Court already decided
with finality constitutes indirect contempt under
Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Furthermore, as found by this Court in G.R. No.
118436, the Roxas family has been in possession of
the property uninterruptedly through their caretaker,
Jose Ramirez who resided on the property. Where
the land sold is in the possession of a person other
than the vendor, the purchaser must go beyond the
certificates of title and make inquiries concerning
the rights of the actual possessor. Meycauayan
therefore cannot invoke the right of a purchaser in
good faith and could not have acquired a better
right than its predecessor-in-interest. This Court has
already rejected Meycauayan's claim that it was a
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purchaser in good faith when it ruled in G.R. No.
118436 that there had been no intervening rights of
an innocent purchaser for value involving the lots in
dispute
Indeed, one who buys property with full knowledge
of the flaws and defects of the title of his vendor and
of a pending litigation over the property gambles on
the result of the litigation and is bound by the
outcome of his indifference. A purchaser cannot
close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable
man on guard and then claim that he acted in good
faith believing that there was no defect in the title of
the vendor.
Meycauayan's act of filing a Complaint for
Reconveyance, Quieting of Title and Damages
raising the same issues in its Petition for Intervention,
which this Court had already denied, also constitutes
forum shopping. Forum shopping is the act of a party
against whom an adverse judgment has been
rendered in one forum, seeking another and possibly
favorable opinion in another forum other than by
appeal or special civil action of certiorari. There is
also forum shopping when a party institutes two or
more actions based on the same cause on the
expectation that one or the other court might look
with favor on the party.
Benin vs. Tuason (G.R. No. L-26127. June 28, 1974)
·Plaintiffs (Benin) here alleged that they were the
owners and possessors of the 3 parcels of
agricultural lands described in the complaint
and located in the barrio of La Loma.
·According to plaintiffs, they inherited the
properties from their ancestor (Sixto Benin). And,
in turn, Sixto inherited the same from his father
(Eugenio Benin).
·Plaintiffs further alleged that their predecessorsin-interest had possessed the 3 parcels of land
openly, adversely, and peacefully – cultivating
the same and exclusively enjoying the fruits
harvested therefrom.
·Lolo Eugenio (plaintiff’s grandfather), subjected
the 3 parcels of land to a cadastral survey in 1894
by the Bureau of Lands.
·During the cadastral survey by the BoL, father
Sixto and the plaintiffs here claimed the
ownership over the 3 parcels of land, on the
ground that they declared the same for taxation
purposes in 1940 under a tax declaration
certificate.
142 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
·After the outbreak of WW2 (around 1942),
evacuees from Manila and other places – with
the plaintiff’s consent – constructed their houses
on the parcels of land and paid monthly rentals
to the plaintiffs.
·Around the year 1951, plaintiffs alleged that
JMTCI (through their agents and representatives
and with the aid of armed men) bulldozed and
illegally entered the constructions of the lessees
and other improvements on the parcels of land.
·In 1953, plaintiffs discovered that their lands had
been fraudulently or erroneously included in an
OCT in the Tuasons’ names.
·Eventually, only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co.
Inc. (JMTCI) was served with summons. On the
other hand, the other defendants were ordered
summoned by publication in accordance with
the Rules of Court.
·However, only JMTCI appeared before the
court. So, the other defendants were all
declared in default.
·Moreover, the lower court declared JMTCI as a
purchaser in bad faith.
ISSUE: Was JMTCI in bad faith? NO; no evidence to
prove this.
RULING:
·The lower court declared that herein appellant
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was a purchaser in bad
faith. We do not find any evidence in the record
that would sustain such a finding of the lower
court.
·One reason given by the lower court in
declaring appellant JMTCI a purchaser in bad
faith is the fact that the incorporators of the Heirs
of D. Tuason, Inc. and the incorporators of JMTCI
were practically the same persons belonging to
the same Tuason family.
·However, the Court did not see anything wrong
if some incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason Inc.
are also incorporators of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
·It is not surprising to see 2 or more corporations
organized by the same persons or group of
persons, with different purposes, for different lines
of business and with distinct or separate assets
and interests.
·Another reason given by the lower court in
declaring appellant JMTCI a buyer in bad faith is
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that when JMTCI bought Parcel 1 originally
covered by an OCT, it was aware of the fact that
the appellees or their predecessors in interest
were in possession of, and were cultivating, the
six parcels of land that they now claim in these
cases.
·The conclusion of the lower court is too strained.
·JMTCI merely relied on the title of the Heirs of D.
Tuason, Inc. when it bought the land covered by
a TCT, and the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. likewise
relied on the title of the Mayorasgo Tuason when
it bought the land covered by another TCT from
the judicial receiver, duly authorized and
approved by the court.
·The Court, therefore, cannot agree with the
lower court when it declared appellant JMTCI a
purchaser on bad faith.
Art. 527. Good faith is always presumed, and
upon him who alleged bad faith on the part of a
possessor rests the burden of proof.
Presumption of Good Faith
This appearance of lawful possession must be
accepted even though it be in reality nothing more
than a disguise for bad faith, because this cannot be
known with certainty until proved, and because
every person is presumed to be honest until the
contrary is shown.
Art. 528. Possession acquired in good faith does
not lose this character except in the case and
from the moment facts exist which show that the
possessor is not unaware that he possesses the
thing improperly or wrongfully.
Interruption of Good Faith
Possession which begins in good faith is presumed to
continue in good faith until the possessor acquires
knowledge of facts showing a defect or weakness in
his title.
Suobiron vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 109903.
November 20, 1995)
Facts:
Spouses Luis Adelantar and Fortunata Ponce were
declared owners of 2 parcels of land in LRC Case No.
143 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
673 against Doroteo Legarde and Bernabe, Basilia,
Quintin and Fortunato, all surnamed Lorezo.
After the American forces liberated Panay Island,
the CFI was reorganized. Pursuant to Act 3110, the
clerk of court submitted a report stating that all court
records were destroyed or burned as a result of the
battle for liberation. Thereafter, on 7 June 1945 the
court issued an order directing the reconstitution of
the records.
On 18 August 1945 Luis Adelantar filed a motion for
reconstitution of the records of LRC Case No. 673
furnishing copies thereof to the Lorezos which the CFI
gave due course on 25 August 1945. On 28 January
1946, the CFI directed the issuance of decrees
covering the property in litigation in the name of the
spouses Luis Adelantar and Fortunata Ponce.
Taking advantage in the meantime of the chaotic
conditions during the war, Quintin Lorezo and
Bernabe Lorezo entered the litigated property and
appropriated the produce thereof. Consequently,
on 26 August 1947, the Adelantars filed an action in
the CFI of Iloilo against the Lorezos for recovery of
possession, docketed as Civil Case No. 938. The CFI
rendered judgment declaring the Adelantar spouses
owners of the property.
The property soon became the subject of a
cadastral survey. Fortunata Ponce filed an answer
claiming ownership. The spouses Andres Suobiron
and Socorro Suobiron also filed an answer claiming
ownership of portions thereof by purchases from
Quintin in 1960, from Basilia and Isabel Lorezo in 1961,
and from Canuto Lucero in 1969.
On 29 August 1986, the trial court directed the
petitioners to vacate the property and deliver
possession thereof to private respondents and to pay
them jointly and severally P39,750.00 annually as net
produce from 1970 until possession was restored to
the latter, P10,000.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay
the costs of suit.
Petitioners instituted an action to annul the orders
dated 25 August 1945 and 28 January 1946 of the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo in LRC Case
No. 673 directing the issuance of decrees covering
the property in litigation in the name of the spouses
Luis Adelantar and Fortunata Ponce.
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that the land
registration court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in issuing both orders because the
requirements of the law on reconstitution of court
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records were not complied with thus rendering void
not only the orders but also the decrees and
certificates of title issued thereunder.
Issue:
w/n the decision in civil case is conclusive under the
doctrine of res judicata
[when was the possession in good faith interrupted?]
Ruling:
Yes. The decision in Civil Case No. 938 declaring
the Adelantar spouses owners of the two (2) parcels
of land claimed by Basilia Lorezo, Isabel Lorezo and
Canuto Lucero is conclusive upon the parties therein
as well as their successors-in-interest, the parties
herein, under the doctrine of res judicata. The trial
court held petitioners liable to private respondents
for the net produce of the properties in question from
the time the former's possession in good faith was
legally interrupted.
This is when they were served summons in
connection with private respondents' complaint for
recovery of possession with damages filed 22 July
1970, docketed as Civil Case No. 8283, at the rate of
P1,500.00 per hectare or P39,750.00 for 26.5 hectares
annually until possession was restored. It may be that
petitioners acquired the disputed properties in good
faith and had since then occupied the same but
such bona fide character of possession ceased
when they were served summons. Possession
acquired in good faith may not lose this character
except in the case and from the moment facts exist
which show that the possessor is not unaware that he
possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully,
conformably with Art. 528 of the Civil Code.
Whether or not the defendant be a possessor in
good faith, for there is no doubt that he can be, and
the law makes no attempt to deny it, from the
service of judicial summons, there exists an act that
this possessor knows that his right is not secure, that
someone disputes it, and that he may yet lose it; and
if the court holds that restitution be made, that time
determines all the legal consequences of the
interruption, the time when the possession in good
faith ceased to be so before the law.
Maneclang vs. Baun (G.R. No. 27876. April 22, 1992)
The filing of a case alleging bad faith on the part of
a vendee gives cause for cessation of good faith. In
Tacas vs. Tobon, this Court held that if there are no
144 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
other facts from which the interruption of good faith
may be determined, and an action is filed to recover
possession, good faith ceases from the date of
receipt of the summons to appear at the trial and if
such date does not appear in the record, that of the
filing of the answer would control. The date of service
of summons to the City of Dagupan in Civil Case No.
D-1785 is not clear from the record. Its Answer,
however, was filed on 5 November 1965.
Accordingly, its possession in good faith must be
considered to have lasted up to that date.
TLDR: good faith is interrupted on the date of receipt
of summons; if unclear, then it is the filing of the
answer which is the case at bar.
Margarita Santos died intestate on June 12 1947.
A petition for the settlement of her estate was filed
by Hector Maneclang at 21 years of age.
On Sept 1949 Pedro Feliciano, Admin of the
estate of Margarita filed a petition the “authority to
dispose of so much of the estate that is necessary to
meet the debts enumerated” which was granted
despite notice to heirs
Oscar Maneclang, in 1952, the new
administrator executed a deed of sale to the mayor
Angel Fernadez of Dagupan. The City took
possession and constructed a public market at
P100,000. The city has been in OCEN of the property
since construction.
On Sept 1965, Adelaida Maneclang, the new
administratrix filed an annulment of the sales made
by the previous administrator pursuant to the Order
of Sept. 1949 wherein the City of Dagupan was
involved
Evidence adduced that Oscar Maneclang was
induced to sell to Dagupan at a rate of P.83 per
square per month or a total monthly rental of P3.7k
Trial Court annulled all the sales and restored
possession to petitioner. Holding that the City of
Dagupan is not a purchaser in good faith and for
value as Oscar Maneclang was induced to sell.
ISSUE
W/N there was possession good faith on the part
of Dagupan City over the subject land
RULING (Yes, lasting from October 4, 1952 to the filing
of the complaint in 1965)
We do not agree that Dagupan has to pay
plaintiff accumulated rentals for the use of property
from October 4, 1952 to the filing in 1965 of the
complaint + interest at 6% per annum from the later
date.
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While there was an order granting to sell the land
issued in September 1949, the same was secured
during the incumbency of the judicial administrator.
THEREFORE, even assuming he was induced,
there was already an order to authorizing the sale of
the property rendered by a judge in lawful exercise
of his position
Article 526 of the Civil Code, a possessor in good
faith is one who is not aware that there exists in his
title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it; furthermore, mistake upon a doubtful
or difficult question of law may be the basis of good
faith.
We find no circumstance in the case to have
alerted the vendee, City of Dagupan to a possible
flaw in the authority of the judicial administrator to
sell the property.
However, Article 528 of the Civil Code provides
that: "Possession acquired in good faith does not lose
this character except in the case and from the
moment facts exist which show that the possessor is
not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly
or wrongfully." The filing of a case alleging bad faith
on the part of a vendee gives cause for cessation of
good faith.
The date of summons is unclear, but the filing
was on November 5, 1965. Accordingly, its possession
in good faith must have lasted up to that date. Thus,
Dagupan was a possessor in good faith entitled to
the fruits of the property with no obligation to pay
Margarita Baneclang.
Thus, in bad faith si Dagupan City on the filing of
their answer on November 5, 1965
Other presumptions on possession
Art. 529. It is presumed that possession continues
to be enjoyed in the same character in which it
was acquired, until the contrary is proven.
Presumption on the continuance of possession. There
are other presumptions aside from Articles 527 and
529 affecting possession, namely:
(6) uninterrupted possession (Art. 561.); and
(7) possession
1138[2].)
during
intervening
period.
(Art.
Susceptibility of Possession
Art. 530. Only things and rights which are
susceptible of being appropriated may be the
object of possession.
(1) Must be susceptible of being appropriated. — Not
all things and rights may be the object of possession.
To be the object of possession, the thing or right must
be susceptible of being appropriated
(2) Need not be susceptible of prescription. - To be
susceptible of prescription, the things must be within
the commerce of men. But there are things which
can be susceptible of appropriation, and, therefore,
the object of possession cannot be the object of
prescription
(a) res nullius (property without owner) - they
can be possessed because they are capable of
being appropriated but they cannot be acquired by
prescription which presupposes prior ownership in
another
(b) Property of public dominion (Art. 1113.)
cannot also be the object of prescriptio
ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION
Art. 531. Possession is acquired by the material
occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right,
or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our
will or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right.
Acquisition of possession through succession
Does not need to be actual or physical all the time.
(1) uninterrupted possession of hereditary property
(Art. 533, par. 1.);
3 ways to acquire:
(2) possession with just title (Art. 541.);
(a) material occupation or exercise of a right;
-as to things: in its general and material sense
or possession as a fact
(3) possession of movables with real property (Art.
542.);
(4) exclusive possession of common property (Art.
543.);
(5) continuous possession (Art. 554.);
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-as to rights: exercise of such right like passing
over the servient land.
The material occupation of a thing as
a means of acquiring possession may
take place not only by actual
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delivery but also by “constructive
delivery.’’
(1) tradicion brevi manu which takes
place
when
one
already
in
possession of a thing by a title other
than ownership continues to possess
the same under a new title, that of
ownership.
(2)
tradicion
constitutum
possessorium which happens when
the owner continues in possession of
the property alienated not as owner
but in some other capacity, such as
that of lessee, pledgee, or depositary.
(b) by subjection of the thing or right to our will - so
broad in scope that it practically covers all means of
acquiring possession. It refers more to the right of
possession than to possession as a fact.
(1) tradicion longa manu, which is
effected by the mere consent or
agreement of the parties, as when
the vendor merely points to the thing
sold which shall thereafter be at the
control and disposal of the vendee.
(2) tradicion simbolica, which is
effected by delivering an object such
as a key where the thing sold is stored
or kept, symbolizing the placing of the
thing under the control of the
vendee.
(c) proper acts and legal formalities established for
acquiring such right of possession. – refers to
acquisition by virtue of a just title such as when
transmitted thru succession, donation, contract or
execution of a public instrument… or when
possession is given by the sheriff to the purchaser at
public auction, --or pursuant to writ of execution or
possession.
Art. 532. Possession may be acquired by the
same person who is to enjoy it, by his legal
representative, by his agent, or by any person
without any power whatever; but in the last case,
the possession shall not be considered as
acquired until the person in whose name the act
of possession was executed has ratified the
same, without prejudice to the juridical
consequences of negotiorum gestio in a proper
case.
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Possession may be acquired:
(1) personally, or by the same person who is to
enjoy it;
(2) thru an authorized person or by his legal
representative or agent; and
(3) thru an unauthorized person or by any person
without any power or authority whatever.
If a person authorized to acquire possession for
another acted beyond his powers, the principal is
not bound unless the latter ratifies the act of
acquisition. If the person acted without authority or
legal representation, possession shall not also be
considered as acquired until the alleged principal
ratifies the act.
Exception: Negotiorum gestio  person voluntarily
manages the property of another.  such possession
takes effect even without the ratification of the
owner.
Art. 533. The possession of hereditary property is
deemed transmitted to the heir without
interruption and from the moment of the death of
the decedent, in case the inheritance is
accepted. One who validly renounces an
inheritance is deemed never to have possessed
the same.
Acquisition of possession through succession
Acceptance
(1) Inheritance accepted. — In case the inheritance
is accepted, the possession of the hereditary
property is deemed transmitted by operation of law
to the heir without interruption and from the moment
of death of the decedent.
Thus, if D, decedent, died on June 1, 2003, and H,
heir, accepted the inheritance on August 1, 2003,
possession is deemed transmitted on June 1, 2003.
Repudiation
(2) Inheritance repudiated. — If this inheritance is
validly renounced, the heir is deemed never to have
possessed the same.
Art. 534. One who succeeds by hereditary title shall
not suffer the consequences of the wrongful
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possession of the decedent, if it is not shown that he
was aware of the flaws affecting it; but the effects of
possession in good faith shall not benefit him except
from the date of death of the decedent.
Effects of bad faith of Decedent on Heir
If the decedent was in bad faith, the heir shall not
suffer the consequences of the wrongful possession
of the latter because bad faith is personal to the
decedent and is not deemed transmitted to the
heirs. The heir suffers the consequences of such
possession only from the moment he becomes
aware of the flaws affecting the decedent’s title.
Art. 535. Minors and incapacitated persons may
acquire the possession of things; but they need
the assistance of their legal representatives in
order to exercise the rights which from the
possession arise in their favor.
Possession by Minors and Incapacitated Persons
NOTES: Regarding “acquisition of possession,” it is
clear that possession by them is allowed only in those
matters where they have capacity to act and NOT
possession where juridical acts are imperative like
the possession of land the ownership of which he
desires to test in court for in such a case, and in similar
ones, the intervention of the legal representatives or
guardians is needed.
(1) Possession by persons without capacity - The
persons referred to in the provision are
unemancipated minors and other persons who have
no capacity to act such as spendthrifts, deafmutes
who cannot read and write, those under civil
interdiction, etc.
(2) Possession of corporeal things - “Things,’’ as used
above, are limited to corporeal things only
(3) Acquisition of possession by material occupation.
- Article 535 refers principally but not exclusively to
material occupation. As a general rule, acquisition
of possession “by the action of our will’’ and “by the
proper acts and legal formalities’’ (Art. 531.) is not
applicable to incapacitated persons.
(4) Exercise of rights of possession through legal
representatives - Incapacitated persons may
acquire property or rights by prescription either
personally or through their parents, guardians, or
legal representatives.
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In the exercise of this right, they need the assistance
of their legal representatives.
Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired
through force or intimidation as long as there is a
possessor who objects thereto. He who believes
that he has an action or a right to deprive
another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the
aid of the competent court, if the holder should
refuse to deliver the thing.
Recourse to the courts.
If a person believes that he is entitled to the property
which another possesses, he should claim the same
from the person in possession. If the latter accedes
and
voluntarily
returns
possession
and
acknowledges that the property does not belong to
him, there is no necessity of any one interfering; but
if the person in possession refuses to deliver the
property, the one who believes himself to be entitled
to it, however well-founded his belief may be,
cannot take the law into his own hands but must
seek the aid of the competent court or request the
assistance of the proper authority.
Villafuerte vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 134239.
May 26, 2005.)
Facts: Sps. Villafuerte operated a gasoline station
on the premises of three adjoining lots owned by
several persons. One of these lots were owned
by Edilberto de Mesa while another is owned by
Gonzalo and Federico Daleon. The remaining
lots were owned by Anicia Yap-Tan, the mother
of the wife of Villafuerte. De Mesa and Daleon
acquired their lots subject to the lease by
Petrophil Corporation which had built the
gasoline station managed by the Villafuertes.
When the lease to Petrophil expired, the
Villafuertes obtained a new lease from de Mesa
for a period of one year. However, with regard to
the lot owned by Daleon, the Villafuertes were
not able to secure a lease renewal, but instead
received demand letters for them to vacate
which the subsequently ignored.
Due to this, a complaint for ejectment was filed
by Daleon against the Villafuertes wherein no
settlement was reached. After the expiration of
the lease contract with de Mesa, the Villafuertes
continued to operate the gas station despite the
demands to vacate.
On an early morning, de Mesa and Daleon, with
the aid of several persons and without the
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knowledge of the Villafuertes, caused the
closure of the gasoline station by constructing
fences around it. Due to this, the Villafuertes
countered with a complaint for damages with
preliminary mandatory injunction against de
Mesa and Daleon. The Villafuertes amended
their complaint to include the computation for
damages. De Mesa and Daleon, in their
defense, stated that they did the fencing
because of the Villafuerte’s refusal to vacate.
The lower court denied the application for
preliminary mandatory injunction stating that
they have no more right to stay on the premises.
For the damages claimed by the Villafuertes, the
Court ruled in favor of the spouses and ordered
de Mesa and Daleon to pay damages. The
Court ruled that though the spouses were
deemed undersirable lessees, it was improper for
de Mesa and Daleon to resort to fencing their
properties to remove them. The CA affirmed the
lower court’s decision but with modification of
the amount for damages.
Whether or not Respondent is liable for damages
Ruling: Yes, Article 536 of the Civil Code
previously quoted explicitly provides for the
proper recourse of one who claims to be entitled
to the possession of a thing. When private
respondents personally took it upon themselves
to evict petitioners from their properties, which
act was in clear contravention of the law, they
became liable "for all the necessary and natural
consequences of [their] illegal act."
Art. 537. Acts merely tolerated, and those
executed clandestinely and without the
knowledge of the possessor of a thing, or by
violence, do not affect possession.
Possession by mere tolerance
Does not affect possession. Ang nag stay kay dli ma
apektuhan iyahang possession and also kadtong
mg ani resort sa violence chuchu kay dli sad maka
kuha or maka interrupt.
(1) Force or intimidation - The force or intimidation
may be employed by a person in ejecting the
possessor or owner, or in preventing his return after
occupying the property in his absence.
RULE DOES NOT APPLY IF THE POSSESSOR MAKES NO
OBJECTION as provided for under 536.
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(2) Acts merely tolerated - it means permission,
express or tacit, by virtue of which the acts of
possession are performed. Hence, it is simply a
question of whether permission was given or not.
Possession by forbearance, permission, or tolerance
is lawful but this becomes illegal when, upon
demand to vacate by the legal owner, the possessor
refuses to comply with such demand.
The mere silence or failure to take any action will not
be construed as abandonment of rights on the part
of the real possessor
(3) Acts executed clandestinely and without the
knowledge of the possessor – acts are not public
and unknown to the possessor ow owner. 2 requisites
must be present as to not affect the possession.
It is presumed that a clandestine possession is
unknown to the owner. BUT owner being not
PERSONALLY aware does not necessarily make it
clandestine.
Arambulo vs. Gungab (G.R. No. 156581.
September 30, 2005)
Emerciana Gungab is the registered owner of
the contested parcel of land with improvements
in Quezon City. In separate letters, Gungab
made a formal demand to Victoria and Miguel
Arambulo to vacate the subject property which
the latter refused. Because of their falure to
amicably settle the issue in the barangay,
Gungab filed a separate ejectment complaint
against Arambulo, alleging that she tolerated
the occupancy of Arambulo without rent and
that they refused to vacate upon demand.
Arambulo, in defense, asserting that Arambulo is
a co-owner of the property.Arambulo alleged
that after Pedro Reyes, the father of Emerciana
and Victoria, died, the property became part of
the common properties of the Reyes clan.
Through the permission given by the wife of
Pedro (Anastancia), the Arambulos have been
occupying the property for the last 20 years and
that the possession of the said portion was with
the knowledge, consent, and tolerance of the
co-owners.
The MeTC dismissed the ejectment case which
was upheld by the RTC, citing that the
theArambulos have the right to retain possession
of the property pursuant to Article 448 of the CC.
However, the CA reversed the ruling, citing that
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Gungab, having a genuine TCT, has the
preferred right to possess. They deemed that the
claim of co-ownership was unsubstantiated.
Whether or not Respondent Gungah can eject
Petitioner Arambulos
Yes, the respondent can eject petitioner, -The
evidence showed that respondent has a Torrens
Title over the land. The Court of Appeals correctly
ruled that respondent, as registered owner, is
preferred to possess it.
Persons who occupy the land of another at the
latter's tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them is bound by an implied
promise that they will vacate the same upon
demand, failing which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
Notably, Anastacia Reyes only allowed
petitioners to use and occupy certain portions of
the subject property. They admitted their "use
and possession" of these portions of the subject
property "had been with the knowledge,
consent and tolerance of all the other coowners." Consequently, after respondent
obtained title to the subject property and
withdrew her tolerance later on, petitioners'
refusal to vacate it rendered their possession
thereof unlawful.
Barnachea vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 150025.
July 23, 2008)
Ignacio filed a complaint for ejectment against
Barnachea before the MTC. The subject matter
were lots titled to the Ignacios which are
adjacent to the property that Barnachea owns
and occupies. The properties were originally part
of the land owned by a certain Luis Santos in
which it was inherited by his daughter
Purificacion Santos Imperial. The land was then
subdivided and transferred to tenant-farmers
Santiago Isidro and Procopio de Guzman. The
Ignacios own the land from Usudri while the
Ignacios own the land from de Guzman. To avert
the implementation of the writ of exection
obtained by Ignacio, Barnachea filed a Notice
of Appeal. Pending the resolution on the issue of
ejectment, Ignacio’s sister (Leticia) filed a
petition for Quieting of Title with the RTC. Due to
this, Barnachea filed an urgent motion for
suspension of proceedings which was denied by
the RTC.
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Whether or not the ejectment case should be
suspended
No, they cannot suspend the ejectment case as
It has been held that a person who occupies
land of another at the latter's tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them,
is necessarily bound by an implied promise that
he will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy
In this case, a plain reading of the complaint
shows Ignacio positions that they was in prior
possession of the disputed property; that Ignacio
allowed them to occupy the disputed property
by tolerance; that Ignacio eventually made a
demand that the Barnachea vacate the
property (on August 26, 1998, which demand
them received on August 31, 1998); and that the
Barnachea refused to vacate the property in
light of the defenses they presented. Separately
from the complaint, Ignacio characterized the
action they filed against Barnachea in the MTC
as an unlawful detainer when they stated in their
memorandum that as alleged in the complaint,
what was filed by Ignacio was an ejectment suit
for unlawful detainer.
Llobrera vs. Fernandez (G.R. No. 142882. May 2,
2006)
Fernandez, as one of the registered co-owners of
the subject land, served a writted demand
letters to the Sps. Llobrera. The latter refused to
vacate which led to the filing of a formal
complaint in the Barangay. With the failure to
amicably settle the dispite, Fernandez filed a
complaint for ejectment and damages against
Llobrera before the MTCC. Llobrera alleged in
their Answer that they had been occupying the
property in question beginning the year 1945
onwards, when their predecessors-in-interest,
with the permission of Gualberto de Venecia,
one of the other co-owners of said land,
developed and occupied the same on
condition that they will pay their monthly rental
of P20.00 each. From then on, they have
continuously paid their monthly rentals to
Gualberto de Venecia or Rosita de Venecia or
their representatives, such payments being duly
acknowledged by receipts. Beginning sometime
June 1996, however, the representative of
Gualberto de Venecia refused to accept their
rentals, prompting them to consign the same to
Banco San Juan, which bank deposit they
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continued to maintain and update with their
monthly rental payments.
The MTCC ruled in favor of Fernandez and
ordered Llobrera to vacate the premises. The
RTC and CA affirmed this judgement of the lower
court.
Is Llobrera’s possession of the property under a
contract or just mere tolerance?
Tolerance – Sps lollbrera failed to present any
written memorandum of the alleged lease
arrangements between them and Gualberto De
Venecia. The receipts claimed to have been
issued by the owner were not presented on the
excuse that the March 19, 1996 fire burned the
same. Simply put, there is a dearth of evidence
to substantiate the averred lessor-lessee
relationship.
In Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled:
A person who occupies the land of another at
the latters tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound by
an implied promise that he will vacate upon
demand, failing which, a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
The alleged consignation of the P20.00 monthly
rental to a bank account in respondent's name
cannot save the day for the petitioners simply
because of the absence of any contractual
basis for their claim to rightful possession of the
subject property.
Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be
recognized at the same time in two different
personalities except in the case of copossession. Should a question arise regarding the
fact of possession, the present possessor shall be
preferred, if there are two possessors, the one
longer in possession; if the dates of the
possession are the same, the one who presents a
title; and if all these conditions are equal the
thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending
determination of its possession or ownership
through proper proceedings.
Possession in two different personalities
Personalities – not same with person.
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Possession as a fact may exist at the same time in two
or more distinct personalities but, as a general rule,
the law will recognize only one as the actual or real
possessor. The exception is provided in the cases of
co-possession, such as co-ownership, where the
property is possessed at the same time in common
by the co-owners also; and possession where the
property is possessed at the same time by two
persons, one in the concept of owner and the other,
in the concept of holder (e.g., lessor and lessee,
principal and agent).
Preference of Possession
Article 538 applies whether the property is real or
personal.2 In case a dispute arises regarding the fact
of possession, the order of preference is as follows:
(1) The present or actual possessor shall be preferred;
(2) If there are two possessors, the longer in
possession;
(3) If the dates of possession are the same, the
possessor with a title, i.e., right or document
evidencing his right to support his possession; and
(4) If all the above are equal, the fact of possession
shall be judicially determined, and in the meantime,
the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit
EFFECTS OF POSSESSION (ARTS 539-561)
Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be
respected in his possession; and should he be
disturbed therein he shall be protected in or
restored to said possession by the means
established by the laws and the Rules of Court.
A possessor deprived of his possession through
forcible entry may within ten days from the filing
of the complaint present a motion to secure from
the competent court, in the action for forcible
entry, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
to restore him in his possession. The court shall
decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the
filing thereof.
Rights of every possessor
(1) the right to be respected in his possession;
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(2) the right to be protected in or restored to said
possession by legal means should he be disturbed
therein; and
Whether or not Petitioner can be ejected
(3) the right to secure from a competent court in an
action for forcible entry the proper writ to restore him
in his possession
Ruling: Yes, the presumption of ownership
granted by law to a possessor in the concept of
an owner under Article 541 is only prima facie
and cannot prevail over a valid title registered
under the Torrens System.
Possessor vs. Owner
Apostol vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 125375.
June 17, 2004)
On September 3, 1993, the respondents, Spouses
Emmanuel and Edna Chua, filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer against the petitioners,
Spouses Elpidio and Amelia Apostol, in the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Metro
Manila. The respondents alleged Luz B. Pascua
was the owner of the parcel of land located in
Quezon City covered by TCT No. 198936 with an
area of 315 square meters. She sold a portion of
the property to the respondents on July 8, 1976
for P45,548. On June 7, 1993, the Spouses
Pascua executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over
the property and the improvements thereon in
favor of the respondents. On the basis of the said
deed, the respondents were issued (TCT) No.
87610 over the property on June 8, 1993.
In the meantime, the petitioners filed a
complaint against the respondents, the Spouses
Chua, the Spouses Pascua, and the Register of
Deeds in the RTC of Quezon City, for annulment
of deed of sale and TCT No. 86338, and for
reconveyance with damages. The petitioners
alleged that they had been in possession of the
property since 1973; their adverse claim over the
property was annotated on June 20, 1979 as
Entry No. PE 8812; Luz Pascua died on December
2, 1984 but Paulo Pascua did not inherit the
property from her because the same had
already been sold to the respondents; Paulo
Pascua executed a falsified affidavit for selfadjudication over the property on the basis of
which he was able to secure, on May 20, 1993,
TCT No. 86338.
Respondents a complaint for unlawful detainer
against the petitioners, Spouses Elpidio and
Amelia Apostol
Argued that they purchased the land from
Spouses Pascua and acquired a TCT thereon but
Petitioner still refused to vacate the land.
Petitioner was only in possession by tolerance by
the Spouses Pascua
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In Pangilinan v. Aguilar, we held that it is an
accepted rule that a person who has a torrens
title over the property, such as the respondents,
is entitled to the possession thereof. We
reiterated our ruling in the Pangilinan Case in
Javelosa v. Court of Appeals, and declared that
the registered owners are entitled to the
possession of the property covered by the said
title from the time such title was issued in their
favor.
In this case, the petitioners claim that, as alleged
in their answer to the complaint for unlawful
detainer, the respondents' title over the property
is a nullity; hence, the complaint for unlawful
detainer against the petitioners should be
dismissed for lack of merit. Such allegation does
not help their present recourse. Under Section 48
of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of
title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified or cancelled,
except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in
accordance with law. The issue of the validity of
the title of the respondents can only be assailed
in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.
Whether or not the petitioners have the right to
claim ownership over the property is beyond the
power of the court a quo to determine in an
action for unlawful detainer.
Ayson vs. Enriquez Vda. De Carpo (G.R. No.
152438. June 17, 2004)
Principle:
One who has never been in possession of a
property may acquire a better right to possess as
where he acquires title to it through a sale
between him and a mortgagee thereby
divesting the mortgagor of ownership and the
right to retain possession thereof.
Petitioner here is an owner of three parcels of
land in Pampanga.
Petitioner has been in possession of the
properties being THE OWNER.
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When August 29, 1980 came, petitioner Lolita
Ayson mortgaged the properties to the
Philippine National Bank.
She failed to comply with her obligation and
such the properties were foreclosed by the
bank.
She also failed to redeem the properties within
the prescribed period.
TCTs were then issued in the name of the Bank.
to do so justified respondents' action for
ejectment.
Remedies of person deprived of Possession
The actions established by law and the Rules of Court
are:
(1) forcible entry or unlawful detainer,
Following, the Bank then sold the properties to
De Carpio, the respondent. TCT also was issued
in his favor.
(2) accion publiciana,
Petitioner here is now seeking the annulment
of the TCT in favor of respondent.
Petitioner wanted the TCTs to be annulled and
the deed of sale between the bank and
respondent be annulled too, plus damages.
With said case still pending, RESPONDENT told
the petitioner to vacate the premises.
(4) replevin or manual delivery of personal property
Issue: who has the better right to possess
[possessor ex-owner vs owner]
Ruling:
The case then, according to the Supreme
Court was one of unlawful detainer because the
once owner here who has the right to possess
ceased to have such right when she failed to
exercise her right of redemption.
Respondent now, was able to present evidence
showing that after the foreclosure petitioner
failed to redeem it within the redemption period
and was divested of her ownership and right to
retain possession which possession she derived
from ownership.
Thus, in questioning who has the stronger right
in this case, it should be respondent because the
petitioner does not have any more right to
possess the property regardless if she is the owner
or not as it was already divested from her the
moment, she lost ownership of the property.
Respondent acquired a better right to possess
the property after acquiring title to it through a
sale between her and the mortgagee-bank.
The continued occupation of the property by
the petitioner was merely tolerated by the
respondent. Consequently, the former was
bound by an implied promise that she would
vacate the premises upon demand. Her failure
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(3) accion reivindicatoria, and
Dumo vs. Espinas (G.R. No. 141962. January 25,
2006)
Spouses Dumo are the owners-possessors of a
parcel of sandy beach resort in Bauang, La
Union. Severa J. Espinas filed a "Quieting of Title
and/or Ownership and Possession against
spouses Sandy and Presnida Saldana, subject
matter of the case being the same resort.
Although a decision has been rendered against
the defendants in the case against spouses
Saldana, the same was not enforced.
Disgruntled with the refusal of the sheriff to put
them in possession over the questioned real
property, and in open defiance with the official
action taken by the sheriff, all defendants acting
for the interest of Espinas took it upon themselves,
employing force, intimidation, and threat, to
enter the property.
Despite protests made by Spouses Dumo, who
were
there
then
present
and
visibly
outnumbered by defendants and their agents
who were armed with sticks, bolos, hammers,
and other deadly weapons, successfully drove
out plaintiffs, and took over the premises.
Spouses Dumo prayed for the payment of
actual, moral and exemplary damages. The MTC
rendered judgment holding that petitioners were
able to prove their right of possession over the
subject property. Respondents appealed the
case to the RTC of Bauang, La Union. The RTC
reversed and set aside the Decision of the MTC.
It also ruled that as regards damages, the only
damage that can be recovered is the fair rental
value or the reasonable compensation for the
use and occupation of the leased property.
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Spouses Dumo filed a petition for review with the
CA. The CA held that the MTC correctly found
that the petitioners were in possession of the
subject land and agreed with the ruling of the
RTC that in forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases, the only damage that can be recovered
is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the
property concerned.
Whether or not Petitioners are entitled to the
award of damages
No, we agree with the CA and the RTC that there
is no basis for the MTC to award actual, moral
and exemplary damages in view of the settled
rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage
that can be recovered is the fair rental value or
the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the property. Considering that the
only issue raised in ejectment is that of rightful
possession, damages which could be recovered
are those which the plaintiff could have
sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused
by the loss of the use and occupation of the
property, and not the damages which he may
have suffered but which have no direct relation
to his loss of material possession. Although the
MTC's order for the reimbursement to petitioners
of their alleged lost earnings over the subject
premises, which is a beach resort, could have
been considered as compensation for their loss
of the use and occupation of the property while
it was in the possession of the respondents,
records do not show any evidence to sustain the
same. Thus, we find no error in the ruling of the
RTC that the award for lost earnings has no
evidentiary or factual basis; and in the decision
of the CA affirming the same.
Corporation vs. Treyes (G.R. No. 170916. April 27,
2007)
CGR Corporation, Herman M. Benedicto and
Alberto R. Benedicto (petitioners) claimed to have
occupied 37.3033 hectares of public land
in Barangay Bulanon, SagayCity, Negros Occide
ntal for 25 years.
However, Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr., with his men,
forcibly entered the leased properties and
barricaded the entrance to the fishponds, set up
a barbed wire fence along the road going to CRG
Corporation fishponds, and harvested several tons
of milkfish, fry and fingerlings. It was alleged that
the respondents also ransacked the church.
153 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
CGR filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in
Sagay City separate complaints for Forcible Entry
with Temporary Restraining Order with Preliminary
Injunction and Damages and reserved a separate
civil action. The MTC found Treyes and his men
guilty of forcible entry.
CGR filed a separate complaint alleging therein
that he suffered damages for the actions of Treyes
during and after the forcible entry. A claim for
additional damages which arose from incidents
occurring after the dispossession by Treyes of the
premises was thereafter prayed for. The MTC
awarded the claims of CGR.
RTC dismissed the complaint for damages on the
ground of prematurity saying that “damages may
only be maintained after a final determination on
the forcible entry cases has been made.”
Whether a complainant in a forcible entry case
can file an independent action for damages
arising after the act of dispossession had occurred
YES, Corporation may institute a separate and
independent complaint for damages even during
pendency of separate complaints for forcible
entry, arising after the act of dispossession had
occurred based on the separate acts done after
the dispossession such as the stealing of fish and
ransacking of the church.
As per Dumo v. Espinas, it was settled that the only
form of damages that may be recovered in an
action for forcible entry is the fair rental value or
the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the property.
This is because the only issue to be resolved in a
case for forcible entry is rightful possession and the
only damages one could recover from such
action for forcible entry is that which the plaintiff
could have had if he was still the possessor of the
property. The only damages you can get is what
you lost when you are deprived of material
possession. Everything else should be claimed by
ordinary action.
Wilmon Auto Supply Corp vs. Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 97637. April 10, 1992)
Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation (or Ramon
Que), Iloilo, Multi Parts Supply Corporation (or
Ramon Que), Virgilio Ang, Henry Tan, Southern
Sales Corporation, and Chang Liang, Jr. were
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lessees of a commercial building and bodegas
standing on registered land in Iloilo City owned in
common by Lucy A. Solinap, Fr. Jerry R. Locsin,
Lourdes C. Locsin, Manuel C. Locsin and Ester L.
Jarantilla. After the expiration of the period in the
lease agreement, lessor executed an Absolute
Deed of Sale in favor of Star Group Resources
and Development.
In the Deed of Sale, it was stated that vendee
shall henceforth deal with the lessees and
occupants of the properties herein sold without
any further warranty or obligation on the part of
the Vendors.
Being the vendee, Star Group then filed an
action of unlawful detainer against Wilmon Auto
Supply.
Petitioner refused to concede invoking that the
lessors violated their leasehold rights because
they were not accorded with: 1) rights of preemption; 2) buyer is not required to honor leases;
3) the lessees were denied the option to renew
their leases upon the expiration thereof.
These same propositions were also raised in the
case it filed with the RTC. In the unlawful detainer
cases, it was decided by the MTC that the case
should proceed against some of the lessees but
not with the others. The lessees filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied. They filed a
petition for certiorari and the RTC held in the end
that the pendency of the case in the RTC did not
warrant suspension of the unlawful detainer case
with the MTC.
Whether or not the unlawful detainer suits in MTC
against petitioner, lessees, for the reason that
their lease had expired, should be abated by the
action filed in RTC by lessees based on the
contention that they are entitled to a right of preemption/prior purchase of the leased premises.
No, an ejectment suit cannot be suspended by
an action filed with the RTC based on a tenant’s
claim of his right of pre-emption being violated.
The Court gave relevant precedents such as:
 injunction suits do not abate ejectment
 accionpubliciana does not suspend an
ejectment suit
 writ of possession does not bar execution
of judgment
 action for quieting title does not bar an
ejectment suit.
154 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
The reason for the above rulings of the
precedence were that the actions in the
Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de
facto possession, and on not a few occasions,
that the case in the RTC was merely a ploy to
delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding or
that the issues presented in the former could
quite as easily be set up as defenses in the
ejectment action and there resolved.
SC said that the cases cited by the petitioners
were exceptions such as in Vda. De Legazpi v.
Avendano case, it was based on strong reasons
of equity not found in the present petition. In
Vda. De Murga v. Chan, the essential requisite of
an unequivocal demand to vacate and
surrender the premises had not been fulfilled.
SC stressed that in forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases, the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the
MTC, MeTC and MCTC have the competence to
resolve “the issue of ownership.... only to
determine the issue of possession.” Hence,
Petition was dismissed
emira vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 76031.
March 2, 1994)
Lot 4221of petitioner Semira, the subject parcel
of the present controversy, was once owned by
private respondent Buenaventura An. Private
respondent previously acquired the subject
parcel from a certain Juana Gutierrez for P850.00
by means of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa"
executed on 4 January 1961. Aside from the
estimated area of 822.5 square meters
appearing in the deed of sale, the boundaries of
the lot were also stated.
Buenaventura An sold the same to his nephew,
Cipriano Ramirez, in 1972 for the lump sum of
P2,500.00 also by means of a "Kasulatan ng
Bilihan ng Lupa" which likewise incorporated
both the estimated area and the definite
boundaries of the land. Cipriano Ramirez, in turn,
sold the lot to petitioner Semira in 1979 with the
very same boundaries mentioned in the deed of
sale executed in his favor by his uncle
Buenaventura An. However, the area stated in
the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" was 2,200
square meters and not 822.5 appearing in the
previous document. As delimited by its
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boundaries, the lot is actually much bigger than
822.5 square meters. This was confirmed by the
Taysan Cadastral Mapping Survey conducted in
1974 where it is definitely stated that the area of
Lot 4221 is 2,200 square meters; hence, the
reason for the change.
On 17 March 1979, petitioner Semira entered the
subject parcel and began the construction of a
new rice-mill. However, on 18 April 1979, a
complaint for forcible entry was filed against him
by Buenaventura An in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Taysan-Lobo. The latter claimed that the
area of Lot 4221 was 822.5 square meters only
and that the excess of 1,377 square meters
forcibly occupied by petitioner formed part of
the land he owned. Private respondent insists
that he only sold 822.5 square meters, hence, his
nephew could not have transferred a bigger
area to petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner
Semira claims that he owns the entire 2,200
square meters since it is the size of Lot
4221following its established boundaries.
Whether or not the question of ownership
is so necessarily involved that it would be
impossible to decide the question of bare
possession without first setting that of
ownership.
Whether or not petitioner Semira’s
ejectment from the disputed area,
despite the absence of clear and
indubitable proof that private respondent
had prior physical possession, was
proper; and
1. In the instant case, the issue of possession
cannot be decided independently of the
question of ownership. The question of who has
prior possession hinges on the question of who
the real owner of the disputed portion is. And the
latter, in turn, depends on whether such portion
is part of Buenaventura An’s property or that of
Lot 4221 of petitioner Semira.
We sustain petitioner Semira’s contention that he
owns the entire 2,200 square meters since it is the
size of Lot 4221 following its established
boundaries. We have repeatedly ruled that
where land is sold for a lump sum and not so
much per unit of measure or number, the
boundaries of the land stated in the contract
determine the effects and scope of the sale, not
the area thereof. Hence, the vendors are
obligated to deliver all the land included within
155 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
the boundaries, regardless of whether the real
area should be greater or smaller than that
recited in the deed. This is particularly true where
the area is described as" humigit kumulang," that
is, more or less.
Hence, when private respondent Buenaventura
n sold Lot 4221 to his nephew Cipriano Ramirez
by means of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa"
which incorporated both the area and the
definite boundaries of the lot, the former
transferred not merely the 822.5 square meters
stated in their document of sale but the entire
area circumscribed within its boundaries.
2. No, the ejectment for forcible entry was not
proper, absent any clear and indubitable proof
that private respondent had prior physical
possession.
Considering the facts established in this case, it is
not difficult to sustain petitioner Semiraover
private respondent Buenaventura Anwhen the
latter failed even to prove prior possession in his
favor. Absent such element, it cannot be said
that he was forcibly deprived of the disputed
portion. Hence, his action for forcible entry must
fail.
It should be emphasized, however, that the case
before us is merely an action of forcibleentry and
that the issue of ownership was decided for the
sole purpose of resolving priority of possession.
Hence, any pronouncement made affecting
ownership of the disputed portion is to be
regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not
bar nor prejudice an action between the same
parties involving
Reynante vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 95907.
April 8, 1992)
More than 50 years ago, petitioner Jose
Reynante was taken as tenant by the late Don
Cosme Carlos, owner and father-in-law of herein
private respondents, over a fishpond.
During the tenancy, petitioner Jose Reynante
constructed a nipa hut where he and his family
lived and took care of the nipa palms (sasahan)
he had planted on lots 1 and 2 covering. These
lots are located between the fishpond and the
Liputan (formerly Meycauayan) River. Petitioner
harvested and sold said nipa palms without
interference and prohibition from anybody.
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After the death of Don Cosme Carlos, his heirs
(private respondents' predecessors-ininterest)
entered into a written agreement denominated
as with petitioner Jose Reynantewhereby the
latter for and in consideration of the sum of
P200,000.00 turned over the fishpond he was
tenanting to the heirs of Don Cosme Carlos and
surrendered all his rights therein as caretaker.
Pursuant to the said written agreement,
petitioner surrendered the fishpond and the two
huts located therein to private respondents.
Private respondents thereafter leased the said
fishpond to one Carlos de la Cruz. Petitioner
continued to live in the nipa hut constructed by
him on lots 1 and 2 and to take care of the nipa
palms he had planted therein.
On February 17, 1988, private respondents
formally demanded that the petitioner vacate
said portion since according to them petitioner
had already been indemnified for the surrender
of his rights as a tenant. Despite receipt thereof,
petitioner refused and failed to relinquish
possession of lots 1 and 2. Hence, on April 22,
1988, private respondents filed a complaint for
forcible entry with preliminary mandatory
injunction against petitioner alleging that the
latter by means of strategy and stealth, took over
the physical, actual and material possession of
lots 1 and 2 by residing in one of the kubos or huts
bordering the Liputan River and cutting off
and/or disposing of the sasa or nipa palms
adjacent thereto.
Whether or not Petitioner Reynante can be
ejected
No.
If a plaintiff cannot prove prior physical
possession, he has no right of action for forcible
entry even if he should be the owner of the
property.
The evidence on record shows that petitioner
was in possession of the questioned lots for more
than 50 years. It is undisputed that he was the
caretaker of the fishpond owned by the late Don
Cosme Carlos for more than 50 years and that he
constructed a nipa hut adjacent to the fishpond
and planted nipa palms therein. This fact is
bolstered by the "SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY"
executed by Epifanio Lucero (Records, p. 66),
Apolonio D. Morte (Records, p. 101) and Carling
Dumalay (Records, p. 103), all of whom are
disinterested parties with no motive to falsify that
156 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
can be attributed to them, except their desire to
tell the truth.
Assuming private respondents had acquired the
alluvial deposit (the lot in question), by accretion,
still their failure to register said accretion for a
period of fifty (50) years subjected said accretion
to acquisition through prescription by third
persons.
It is undisputed that petitioner has been in
possession of the subject lots for more than fifty
(50) years and unless private respondent can
show a
better title over the subject lots, petitioner's
possession over the property must be respected.
Bañes vs. Lutheran Church of the Philippines (G.R.
No. 142308. November 15, 2005)
1990, certain members of the Lutheran Church in
the Philippines filed an action against its
President, Thomas Batong, and six other
members of the board of directors, before the
Securities and Exchange Commission [protector
and supervisor of the corporate sector].
They said that they filed this action because of
accounting and damages with prayer for
preliminary injunction and appointment of a
management committee.
These resulted for the divisions of the LCP into
two factions:
1. BATONG / SAGUILAYAN group - includes
petitioners
2. LADLAD / ALMAZAN group - includes
respondents.
By virtue of the injunction issued by SEC,
respondents now with the aid of certain
members from the DILG, PNP, RTC, TRIED TO
DISPOSSESS PETITIONERS, as previous clergyman
and occupants of residential houses owned by
LCP and form part of the compound where the
principal office of the LCP is located.
Petitioners did not want to leave the premises.
Because of this issue THE RESPONDENTS DID THIS:
1. Padlock the main gate of the subject
property
2. Prevented the petitioners and their
families from going in and out of the said
place
3. Place security guard stationed at the
premises who were told not to allow
petitioners to enter and exit the property.
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There were letters written and made addressing
how important the property was to the
petitioners. Almost a month thereafter,
petitioners Manuel G. Del Rosario and Elmer J.
Bañes wrote letters addressed to Rev. Eduardo
Ladlad, as LCP President. They wrote there their
desire and pleaded to stay for a little longer and
be allowed to enter and leave the premises
before leaving for good when they find another
place to stay. Petitioners Bañes and Del Rosario
eventually
left
the
premises;
however,
petitioners-spouses SanRamon did not write any
letter but they were able to leave the premises
by befriending the guards posted at the gate.
On December 3, 1993, petitioners filed an action
for forcible entry with prayer for issuance of
temporary restraining order and preliminary
mandatory injunction against the respondents
herein.
Petitioners claim that they had been in
possession of the subject premises long before
the SEC case was filed and it was only because
petitioners refused to recognize the duly
constituted board of directors that they were
made to suffer by being taken out of the house
they had long been occupying. They further
claim that the respondents, together with several
armed security guards, forcibly took possession
of the residential houses, occupied by
petitioners, and evicted petitioners therefrom.
On the other hand, respondents assert that
petitioners did not possess the subject properties
in their own right but as mere agents and/or
representatives of the respondent LCP, thus, they
never had any cause of action to file a case for
forcible entry. Respondents also assert that the
dispossession of the petitioners was effected
without force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth, and that petitioners were willing to
voluntarily leave the subject premises and
merely requested for an extension of their stay
therein, showing there was no force, intimidation
or stealth.
It has been settled that the laws should not be
taken by the people into their own hands.
Thus, even if parties have the right to regain
possession, parties should not resort to remedies
other than the ones granted by law.
Clearly in the instant case, the presence of the
security guards in the subject property restricting
petitioners'
mobility
constitutes
force
contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court.
It is true that petitioners Bañes and Del Rosario
wrote LCP expressing their willingness to
voluntarily vacate the premises upon finding
another place to live in, but this is after
respondents had padlocked the premises and
used armed men to prevent their coming to and
from the premises. Otherwise stated, said letters
do not negate the initial use of force by
respondents which constituted forcible entry. It is
undisputed that respondents owned the property
occupied by petitioners, still their use of force in
evicting petitioners therefrom was not justified.
Indeed, regardless of the actual condition of the
title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be thrown out by a strong
hand, violence or terror. The owner who has title
over the property cannot take the law into his
own hands to regain possession of said property.
He must go to court.
Respondents cannot justify their forcible entry in
the premises occupied by petitioners by
claiming that the latter have no valid right to the
continued
possession
of
the
property.
Respondents should have filed the appropriate
unlawful detainer case against them instead of
forcing them out of the premises.
Art. 540. Only the possession acquired and enjoyed
in the concept of owner can serve as a title for
acquiring dominion.
Possession as basis for acquiring ownership
Issue:
w/n the actions of respondents were valid
insofar as they wanted to seek remedies for
being dispossessed of their properties
Held:
Nope.
157 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
(1) As holder — Possession held in the concept of
holder, as by a lessee, depositary, agent, trustee,
etc., cannot be the basis of prescription, nor
possession acquired through force or intimidation,
merely tolerated, or which is not public and is
unknown to the present possessor.
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(2) As equitable mortgagee — Where the contract
entered into was judicially declared to be actually
an equitable mortgage rather than a contract of
sale of a parcel of land, “constructive possession’’
over the land cannot ripen into ownership as it
cannot be said to have been acquired and enjoyed
in the concept of owner.
(3) As claimant under a possessory information title.
— The inscription in the property registry of an
informacion possesoria under the Spanish Mortgage
Law was a means provided by the law then in force
in the Philippines prior to the transfer of sovereignty
from Spain to the United States of America, to record
a claimant’s actual possession of a piece of land,
established through an ex parte proceeding
conducted in accordance with prescribed rules.
Such inscription merely furnishes, at best, prima facie
evidence of the fact that at the time the proceeding
was held, the claimant was in possession of the land
under a claim of right as set forth in his application.
(4) As claimant under a certificate of title. — The rule
is wellsettled that mere possession cannot defeat the
title of a holder of a registered Torrens title to real
property. But the true owner of the property may be
defeated by an innocent purchaser for value
notwithstanding the fraud employed by the seller
(forger) in securing his title.
(5) As possessor of forest land. — Possession of forest
land, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private
ownership.
(6) As possessor of a different kind of land. - In a case,
the petitioner acquired exclusive rights to a mineral
land by virtue of its mining claim which it acquired
before the 1935 Constitution which prohibited the
donation of all lands of the public domain except
agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at
the time of its adoption. The private respondent
contends that his predecessor-in-interest has been in
possession of said lot even before the war and has,
in fact, cultivated the same, and has, therefore,
acquired the property by virtue of acquisitive
prescription.
It was held: “Their possession was not in the concept
of owner of the mining claim but of the property as
agricultural land, which it was not. The property was
mineral land, and they are claiming it as agricultural
land. They were not disputing the rights of the mining
locators nor were they seeking to oust them as such
and to replace them in the mining of the land. Since
the subject lot is mineral land, private respondent’s
possession no matter how long did not confer them
158 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
upon possessory rights over the same.’’ (Atok Big
Wedge Mining Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 193
SCRA 71 [1991].)
Balatero vs. Intermadiate Appelate Court (G.R.
No. 73889. September 30, 1987)
Property in dispute was originally owned by
parents of Josefa and AlejoIglupas. After death
of parents, the lot was given to Alejo and his wife
Tomasa. After Alejo died, Tomasa sold the lot t
Josefa and her husband Juan Badelles.
On June 9, 1930, Josefa mortgaged the property
to Juan Veloso in order to secure a loan. (Loan
was paid in 1947). On April 30, 1954, Josefa and
her children sold a portion of the lot to petitioner
Florencio Balatero.
During the court proceeding for the lots in
dispute, the trial court finds Balatero and heors of
Badelles as registrable owners over the lots as
they had title over the lots.Juan Veloso
appealed the decision and so IAC reversed
lower court’s decision adjudicating the entire lot
to respondent finding tha the contract was a
contract of sale of the land.
Was the contract that of a contract of sale or an
equitable mortgage?
Ruling
Juan Veloso's contract with Josefa was that of an
equitable mortgage and not of sale.
SC said that the price consideration to Veloso of
P68 was unusually inadequate when the same
parcel of land was bought by Josefa herself from
Tomasa for P111. If the contract was indeed of
sale then why did Josefa sell it for a price almost
half of what she laid for 12 years earlier? This fact
shows that the contract was an equitable
mortgage than a contract of sale.
As such, Veloso was merely a holder and so even
if he executed an affidavit to consolidate his
right of ownership over the land 4 years after
execution of contract, it was of no use because
the constructive possession over the parcel of
land did not ripen into ownership because the
contract was an equitable mortgage and not
contract of sale.
The "constructive possession" over the parcel of
land mentioned by the appellate court did not
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ripen into ownership. The rule is that only the
possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept
of owner can serve as a title for acquiring
dominion. (Article 447, old Civil Code, Article 540,
new Civil Code) As can be gleaned from the
facts earlier stated, Juan Veloso never owned
the subject parcel of land because the contract
over the same between Josefa Iglupas and Juan
Veloso was actually an equitable mortgage and
not a contract of sale.
Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona (G.R.
No. 66130. September 8, 1994)
Isabel, Consuelo, and Serapia were sisters who
filed a petition to register 6 parcels of land under
their name. The land has an area of 10,481 sq m.
The same was inherited by them from their
parents who acquired the same from Spanish
grant. The sisters showed possessory information.
The lower court ruled in their favor but only
awarded 4 parcels of land. Parcel no. 1 and 2
were not yet decided upon as there was a
separate case involving one Constanciodela
Pena Tan. The heirs appealed to have lots 1 & 2
be included.
Director of lands argued that that neither the
applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest had
sufficient title of the land applied for nor had they
been in possession thereof for a period of at least
thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing
of the application and that the same is public
land.
Respondents filed an application for registration
of five (5) parcels of land denominated as Lot
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of plan Psu 215382 with the
Court of First Instance of Quezon, Gumaca
Branch
Furthermore, argued that they are owners of
such land by virtue of a possessory information
title dated May 20, 1896 under the Royal Decree
of February 13, 1894 in favor of their predecessor,
Maria Rosita Lorenzo
Whether or not the respondent can validly
register the land
No.
To begin with, the original tracing cloth plan of
the land applied for was not submitted in
159 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
evidence by private respondents. Such omission
is fatal to their application as the submission of
the original tracing cloth plan is a statutory
requirement of mandatory character. While a
blue print of survey Plan Psu 215382 as surveyed
for the Heirs of Magdalena Lizada was presented
before the trial court, the same falls short of the
mandatory requirement of law.
Private respondents contend that they are in
possession of the original tracing cloth plan but
they did not submit it in evidence for fear that it
may be lost or misplaced while in possession of
the court. This contention spurs disbelief. The
original tracing cloth plan, together with the
duplicate copy of their application for
registration of land title were under the custody
of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) at
that time
The basis of the claim of the Heirs of Tesalona,
herein private respondents, is a Spanish title, a
possessory information title issued on May 20,
1896 to Maria Rosita Lorenzo pursuant to the
Royal Decree of February 13, 1894 for 1.0481
hectares. But private respondents did not submit
the original of the possessory information title.
What was submitted was an unclear, illegible
copy of a Spanish document purporting to be
the title evidencing the land grant of 1896.
Moreover, proof of loss or unavailability of the
original document as required by Section 5, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court was not established
thus, rendering admissibility of the said
secondary evidence questionable and dubious.
The land is a swampy area covered by
mangrove trees and the like, these lots may very
well be considered and classified as forest lands.
Moreover, well-entrenched is the rule that
possession of forest lands, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into private ownership. Its inclusion
in a title, whether the title be issued during the
Spanish regime or under the Torrens System,
nullifies the title.
Indicia of Ownership or Possession
Tax declarations, assessment, or payment of tax
as indicia of ownership/possession
(1) Mere tax declarations of ownership do not vest or
prove ownership of the property in the declarant nor
are even sufficient to sustain a claim for possession
over a land in the absence of actual possession of
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the same. They are merely an indicium of a claim of
ownership. Nevertheless, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner.
(2) Neither is tax assessment nor payment of realty
tax on a property conclusive proof of ownership; at
most, it constitutes mere prima facie proof of
ownership or possession of the property; yet it is also
undeniable that the payment of realty tax coupled
with actual possession in the concept of owner is one
of the most persuasive and positive indicia, which
shows the will or desire of a person to possess with
claim of ownership or to obtain title to the land or
property on which such tax is imposed for no one in
his right mind would be paying taxes for a property
that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession.
Bartolome vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R.
No. 76792. March 12, 1990)
Epitacio Batara owned a parcel of land. In 1912,
before he left Laoag to settle in Culalabo, Gamo
(Burgos), Isabela, Epitacio entrusted the lot to his
cousin, Doroteo Bartolome, who owned the lot
bounding Epitacio's property on the south. In
1916, Epitacio Batara died in
Isabela. In 1926, Doroteo Bartolome, to whom
Epitacio had entrusted his land, migrated to
Davao City. Doroteo died there two years later.
Thereafter, the Director of Lands instituted
cadastral proceedings over the said land
involved herein (Cadastral Case No. 53). On
October 23, 1933, Ursula Cid, the widow of the
son of Doroteo Bartolome, Bernabe, who died in
1928, filed an answer in Cadastral Case No. 53,
claiming ownership over Lot No. 11165 with an
area of 1660 square meters. The land was
allegedly acquired by Ursula Cid through
inheritance from Doroteo Bartolome, the father
of Ursula's deceased husband, Bernabe. More
than three months later or on January 30, 1934,
Resurreccion Bartolome, the grandchild of
Epitacio Batara, also filed an answer in the same
cadastral case claiming ownership over a
portion of Lot No. 11165 with an area of 864
square meters alleging that he acquired it by
inheritance
from
his
grandfather
and
grandmother . . . Epitacio Batara and Maria
Gonzales.
From then on, no further proceedings were held
in the cadastral case. In June 1968 (after 34
years), the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte
sent out notices for the "continuation of the
160 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
hearing" on June 13, 1968 in Cadastral Case No.
53. It should be remembered, however, that from
the time Ursula Cid and Resurreccion Bartolome
filed their answers to the petition in the cadastral
case, there had been no progress in the
proceedings. A year later or in 1969, Maria J.
Bartolome filed in Cadastral Case No. 53 a
motion to admit answer in intervention, alleging
that she is one of the children of Doroteo
Bartolome and that she and her co-heirs had
been excluded in Ursula Cid's answer to the
petition. She therefore prayed that the answer of
Ursula Cid be amended so as to include the
rightful heirs of Doroteo Bartolome alleging that
they were co-owners of the said Lot No. 11165
which they inherited from Doroteso Bartolome..
Three months later, Ursula Cid filed a motion to
amend her answer to reflect the complete
ground or basis of acquisition of Lot No. 11165. In
her amended answer, Ursula Cid stated that she
was the absolute owner of Lot No. 11165; that she
had been the possessor of Lot No. 11165 for over
fifty years; she claimed that her husband,
Bernabe Bartolome, who together with her,
purchased the said lot which used to be three
adjoining lots from their respective owners; and
that Lot No. 11165 had been declared for tax
purposes in the name of her late husband
Bernabe Bartolome.
No hearing was conducted in the case until
1974. To buttress her claim that she and her
husband purchased Lot No. 11165, Ursula Cid
presented at the trial three deeds of sale: [a] one
dated March 1, 1917 showing that Bernabe
Bartolome and Ursula Cid bought a 374-square
meter lot for fifteen pesos from the spouses
Domingo Agustin and Josefa Manrique (Exhibit
2); [b] another document dated February 18,
1913 executed by Ignacia Manrique in favor of
Bernabe Bartolome evidencing the sale of
another lot also for fifteen pesos (Exhibit 3); and
[c] still another deed executed by Maria
Gonzales (wife of Epitacio Bitara) on February 9,
1917 in favor of Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula
Cid ceding to the latter 772 square meters of
land for P103.75 (Exhibit 4). The last-mentioned
piece of land is the one being claimed by
Resurreccion Bartolome.
On May 10, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of
Ilocos Norte rendered a decision which held that
the deed of sale executed by Maria Gonzales
(Exhibit 4) has no probative value as the same is
incomplete and unsigned. The court also held
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that Ursula Cid's possession of the land after the
claimants had filed their respective answer(s) or
after the declaration of a general default, did
not confer ownership on her because said
possession was interrupted and merely tolerated
by all the parties during the pendency of the
case.
Ursula Cid appealed to the then Intermediate
Appellate Court. In its decision reversing the
lower court, the appellate court held that the
deeds of sale presented by Ursula Cid are
ancient documents under Section 22 (now
Section 21), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It also
ruled that Ursula Cid's continuous possession of
the lot from its acquisition and her exercise of
rights of ownership over it vested her with the
legal presumption that she possessed it under a
just title.
Whether or not deed of sale executed by Maria
Gonzales (Exhibit 4) is an ancient document
under Section 22 (now Section 21) of Rule 132
which would be admissible in evidence even
without proof of its execution?
No, the deed of sale (Exhibit 4) is not an ancient
document.
The SC agreed with the IAC that the first two
requirements ordained by Section 22 (now
Section 21) are met by Exhibit 4. It appearing that
it was executed in 1917, Exhibit 4 was more than
thirty years old when it was offered in evidence
in 1983. It was presented in court by the proper
custodian thereof who is an heir of the person
who would naturally keep it.
However, the third requirement, that no
alterations or circumstances of suspicion are
present was not conformed with.
According to Dominador Bartolome (son of
Ursula Cid), he first saw Exhibit 4 in the possession
of his mother when he was just eleven years old.
He noticed that the document had a fourth
page containing the signature of Maria
Gonzales and that all four pages were sewn
together. However, when the document was
entrusted to him by his mother in 1947 as he was
then representing the family in litigation
concerning the land, the document's fourth
page was already missing. He stated that his
mother told him that the fourth page was lost
during the Japanese occupation while they
were evacuating from Davao City.
161 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
On its face, the deed of sale (Exhibit 4) appears
unmarred by alteration. However, the missing
page has nonetheless affected its authenticity. It
is important because it allegedly bears the
signature of the vendor of the portion of Lot No.
11165 in question and therefore, it contains vital
proof of the voluntary transmission of rights over
the subject of the sale. Without that signature,
the document is incomplete. Verily, an
incomplete document is akin to if not worse than
a document with altered contents.
Necessarily, since Exhibit 4 is not an ancient
document, proofs of its due execution and
authenticity are vital. Under Section 21 (now
Section 20) of Rule 132, the due execution and
authenticity of a private writing must be proved
either by anyone who saw the writing executed,
by evidence of the genuineness of the
handwriting of the maker, or by a subscribing
witness. The testimony of Ursula Cid's and her son
Dominador on the authenticity of Exhibit 4 do not
fall within the purview of Section 21 (now Section
20). The signature of Maria Gonzales on the
missing fourth page of Exhibit 4 would have
helped authenticate the document if it is proven
to be genuine. But as there can be no such proof
arising from the signature of Maria Gonzales in
the deed of sale since the said fourth page was
missing, the same must be excluded.
Alonso vs. Cebu Country Club, Inc. (G.R. No.
130876. January 31, 2002)
Legal principle: Although tax declarations or
realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence
of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia
of possession in the concept of owner for no one
in his right mind will be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or constructive
possession.
Facts: Alfonso discovered that his father had
certificates showing acquisition over Lot 727,
known as the Banilad Friar Lands, in 1911 having
been assigned the property by Alburo. Alfonso’s
father paid the required instalment under Act.
1120 and was issued a patent. The Director of
ands issued a deed of sale however, the deed
was not registered because of the lack of the
signature of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources.
Upon inquiry into the present status of the land,
Alfonso learned that Lot 727 had been
administratively reconstituted from the owner’s
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duplicate under a TCT in the name of Cebu
Country Club. Since there are no records that
Alfonso’s father ever sold the lands to anyone, he
demanded the Cebu Country Club resort the
land to his ownership and possession.
3. other than himself, there is no other person
occupying, or having any interest over the
property; and,
4. there are no tenants or agricultural lessees
thereo
However, the Club refused to do so, alleging that
it had been possessing the land in the concept
of an owner since 1935, regularly paid real estate
taxes, and had acquired it in good faith.
The Republic of the Philippines, being the
opposite-appellant, then filed its opposition,
maintaining, among others, that: (1) petitionerappellee and his predecessors-in-interest have
not been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land
in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; (2)
the muniment of title and tax declarations as well
as tax payments relied upon do not constitute
sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of
the land by petitioner-appellee and of his open,
continuous possession and occupation thereof
in the concept of owner since 12 June 1945, or
prior thereto, and (3) the subject property
pertains to the public domain and is not subject
to private appropriation.
Issue: W/N Alfonso is indeed the owner of the lot
Ruling: No, Alfonso, nor any of his predecessorsin-interest, had any title one the land. The most
that they could claim was that the Director of
Lands had issued a sales patent in his father’s
favour.
The sales patent, however, and even the
corresponding deed of sale were not registered
with the Register of Deeds and no title was ever
issued in the name of Alfonso’s father. Thus, the
deed of sale was void because approval by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is
indispensable for the validity of the sale.
Cebu Country Club was in possession of the land
since 1931, and had been paying the real estate
taxes, evidence by tax declarations in its name
with the title number indicated thereon.
Although tax declarations or realty tax payments
are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession
in the concept of owner for no one in his right
mind will be paying taxes for a property that is
not in his actual or constructive possession.
Republic vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 108926.
July 12, 1996)
This case involves a petition to review and set
aside a decision confirming Democrito O. Plaza’s
title over subject property.
In 1986, Plaza filed a petition for the registration
and confirmation of his title over subject property
alleging, among others, that:
1. by virtue of the deed of sale, he is the owner
thereof:
2. he and his predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the property prior
to, and since 12 June 1945;
162 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
Aside from the Republic, there were also others
who opposed the petition, but from among the
oppositors, only the Republic filed a notice of
appeal which was then approved. Hence the
petition by the Republic. The Republic then
argued that the burden rests on the applicant to
show by convincing evidence that he has a
registrable title over the property sought to be
titled, which the latter failed to do. According to
petitioner, aside from mere tax declarations all of
which are of recent vintage, private respondent
has not established actual possession of the
property in question in the manner required by
law (Section 14, P.D. 1529) and settled
jurisprudence on the matter. Thus, no evidence
was adduced that private respondent
cultivated much less, fenced the subject
property if only to prove actual possession. The
actual fencing of
the property was done only starting 1988 when
the actual occupants were forcibly ejected and
driven out from their respective abodes and
presented as witnesses by virtue of Presidential
Proclamation No. 679 entitled "Reserving for Slum
Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) Sites and
Services of the National Housing Authority, A
Certain Parcel of Land of the Public Domain
Situated in the Municipality of Las Piñas, Metro
Manila.
ISSUE: WoN Democrito Plaza sufficiently
established ownership over the subject
property.
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RULING:
Yes. The CA correctly found that Plaza and his
predecessors-in-interest have acquired and
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the subject property for a
period of 30 years under a bona fide claim of
ownership are the tax declarations of petitionerappellee's predecessors-in interest, the deed of
sale, tax payment receipts and petitionerappellee's tax declarations.
Although tax declarations or realty tax payments
of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner for no one in
his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession. 25 They constitute at
least proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property. The voluntary declaration of a
piece of property for taxation purposes manifests
not only one's sincere and honest desire to
obtain title to the property and announces his
adverse claim against the State and all other
interested parties, but also the intention to
contribute
needed
revenues
to
the
Government. Such an act strengthens one's
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership
On the allegation that subject property belongs
to the public domain.
We agree with the CA that "the issuance of the
proclamation did not have any effect on the
subject property as the proclamation only
withdrew it from sale or settlement and reserved
the same for slum improvement and sites and
services program, but subject to actual survey
and existing private rights. The proclamation did
not prohibit the registration of title of one who
claims, and proves, to be the owner thereof.
Besides, its implementing Letters of Instruction
recognize that there may be lands declared
included in the Slum Improvement Resettlement
(SIR) program that are privately owned.
Over time, Courts have recognized with almost
pedantic adherence that what is inconvenient
or contrary to reason is not allowed in law —
Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non
permissum est in lege. Undoubtedly, reason and
law and respondent entitled to rights of
ownership over the disputed property.
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Cequeña vs. Bolante (G.R. No. 137944. April 6,
2000)
On October 15, 1975, respondent Honorata
Bolante and Miguel Mendoza, brother of
petitioners, had a dispute on the ownership of
the land during the cadastral survey. Because of
this dispute, herein petitioners filed a civil case
against respondent claiming ownership and
possession of the parcel of land in question.
During the pre-trial conference,
stipulated the following facts:
parties
1. The land subject of the case was formerly
declared for taxation purposes in the name of
Sinforoso Mendoza prior to 1954 but isnow
declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza.
2. The parties agree[d] as to the identity of the
land subject of instant case.
3. [Petitioners] are the daughters of Margarito
Mendoza while the [respondent] is the only
daughter of Sinforoso Mendoza.
4.Margarito Mendoza and Sinforoso Mendoza
[were] brothers, now deceased.
5. During the cadastral survey of the property on
October 15, 1979 there was already a dispute
between Honorata M. Bolante and Miguel
Mendoza, brother of [petitioners].
6. [Respondent was] occupying the property in
question.
After trial, the court a quo rendered its judgment
in favor of petitioners awarding the questioned
property to petitioners and ordered herein
respondent to vacate the property subject of
the case and deliver possession thereof to the
heirs of Margarito Mendoza. Aggrieved by the
decision, respondent filed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed
the trial court's decision. Hence, this Petition.
Whether or not Respondent is the owner of the
land
Respondent's possession was not disturbed until
1953 when the petitioners' father claimed the
land. But by then, her possession, which was in
the concept of owner — public, peaceful, and
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uninterrupted — had already ripened into
ownership.
Furthermore, she herself, after her father's
demise, declared and paid realty taxes for the
disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof
of actual possession of the property, can be the
basis of a claim for ownership through
prescription
In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two
years of farming the subject land, did not
acquire ownership. It is settled that ownership
cannot be acquired by mere occupation. Unless
coupled with the element of hostility toward the
true owner, occupation and use, however long,
will not confer title by prescription or adverse
possession. Moreover, the petitioners cannot
claim that their possession was public, peaceful
and uninterrupted.
We cannot sustain the petitioners' contention
that their ownership of the disputed land was
established before the trial court through the
series of tax declarations and receipts issued in
the name of Margarito Mendoza. Tax
declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership. At most, they constitute
mere prima facie proof of ownership or
possession of the property for which taxes have
been paid. In the absence of actual public and
adverse possession, the declaration of the land
for tax purposes does not prove ownership. In
sum, the petitioners' claim of ownership of the
whole parcel has no legal basis.
Seriña vs. Caballero (G.R. No. 127382. August 17,
2004)
Facts:
Aug. 11, 1982, Jesus Serina and his wife,
Enriqueta, filed a complaint for quieting of title,
recovery of possession and damages, prayer for
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against Caballero and his tenants.
Serina alleged that they are the
ABSOLUTE OWNERS and have been in actual and
constructive possession of land for 35 years.
They also said that Sometime in March
1982, they discovered that Caballero was
already claiming ownership of the said land and
offered it for sale or mortgage to third parties.
164 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
They
also
discovered
that
the
respondents Donela were occupying the land as
tenants and caretakers of the land.
Petitioners then claimed that their father
bought the land from Marbella who inherited it
from her father. THey showed evidence like the
Deed of Sales last 1947.
They presented a Deed of Sale 6 dated
August 23, 1947 showing that their father bought
5 hectares of ricefield, bounded on the North by
Raymundo Seriña, on the East by Teofilo
Saburnido, on the South by Obdelio Caballero,
on the West by Obdullo Caballero from
Marbella.
In his answer, Caballero alleged that he
was the lawful owner and that he had been in
physical possession of the disputed land since
time immemorial. He said that his grandfather
originally owned it and that his grandfather
declared the parcel of land for tax purposes.
The Lower Court however ruled that Serina
could not have owned since it was not clearly
shown that the land bought by the father of
Serina was the same land owned by Caballero
which the Serina Couples are seeking to claim.
CA affirmed RTC.
Issue:
WHo has the better right to possess based on
ownership?
Held:
Respondents.
Since the property has not been clearly
identified by the petitioners, their claim of
acquisitive prescription cannot be considered.
Insufficient identification of the portion of land
claimed in absolute ownership cannot ripen into
ownership. Possession as a means of acquiring
ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a
mere fiction.
It is useless to prove that there was payment of
taxes because you cannot even prove the
boundaries and specifications of the property.
Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership. At most, they constitute
mere prima facie proof of ownership of the
property for which taxes have been paid. They
may be indicia of ownership but they do not
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absolutely prove the ownership, absent
supporting evidence and adverse possession.
Failure to establish the identity of the land is fatal
in claiming ownership.
In so far as the proof of the identity of the lot is
concerned: Petitioners said that these are the
boundaries:
First. The petitioners alleged in their complaint
that the boundaries of their property are as
follows:
Art. 541. A possessor in the concept of owner has
in his favor the legal presumption that he
possesses with a just title and he cannot be
obliged to show or prove it.
North - Alejo Seriña
South - T. Sabornido
Just Title
Just Title - as used in Article 541, does not always
mean a document or a written instrument. The
possessor may prove his title by witnesses.
East - A. Seriña & T. Sabornido
West - F. Caballero
On the other hand, the Deed of Sale provides
that the property sold to them has the following
boundaries:
North - Raymundo Seriña
South - Obdullo Caballero
East - Teofilo Saburnido
West - Obdullo Caballero
Clearly does not match.
Second. The complaint of the petitioner’s states
that the property they are claiming has an area
of 2.5 hectares. On the other hand, the Deed of
Sale25 provides that the subject property has an
area of 5 hectares.
Third. The complaint alleged that the property is
located in "Mantadiao, Opol, Misamis Oriental,"
while the Deed of Sale shows that the property
purchased is located in "Puntakon, Igpit,
Cagayan Or. Misamis."
We agree with the CA that there was no showing
that Tax Declaration No. 2442 in the name of
Eustaquio Caballero was cancelled. Absent any
specific statement therein to that effect, it
cannot be presumed that Tax Declaration No.
4029 in the name of Dr. Seriña cancelled Tax
Declaration No. 2442.
Moreover, the land covered by Tax Declaration
No. 2442 is different from that covered by Tax
Declaration No. 4029.
165 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
Possessor in concept of owner presumed with just
title
Actual or constructive possession under claim of
ownership raises the disputable presumption of
ownership. (Art. 433.) In other words, a possession is
presumed ownership until the contrary is shown (3
Sanchez Roman 439.); or a possessor is presumed to
have a just title, and he cannot be obliged to show
or prove it. (Olego v. Rebueno, 1975)
Reason for presumption
To protect the owner of property from
inconvenience; otherwise, he will always have to
carry his titles under his arms to show them anytime
to whosoever may ask for it and who, with or without
reason, may bring a suit.
Burden of proving just title.
onus probandi
(1) The or the burden of proof is on the plaintiff who
seeks the recovery of property. (Bondad v. Bondad,
1916).
Thus, a purchase verbally made confers ownership
upon the possessor provided he holds himself out as
the owner until it is shown or proved that he is not.
(Heirs of Jumero v. Lizares, 1910). However, where X,
present possessor of property claimed by Y, admits
that the property used to belong to Z from whom Y
claims to derive his right, X, in view of his admission of
Z’s prior ownership, must prove his just title to
overcome the contrary presumption in favor of Z’s
prior ownership even though X is in possession of the
property. (Sarita v. Candia, 1912)
(2)A person who is not, in fact, in possession cannot
acquire a prescriptive right to a land by the mere
assertion of a right therein.
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Where the possessor is really the owner, the fact that
a third person questions his right does not impair said
right. An owner and possessor whose title is true and
valid (infra.) cannot be required to show that his
possession is or has been adverse as against a new
claimant who has neither title nor possession.
(Gamboa v. Gamboa, 52 Phil. 503 [1928].)
Different kinds of title.
(1) true and valid or titulo verdadero y valido (Art.
1130.)
The just title presumed by the provision is title which
by itself is sufficient to transfer ownership without
need of possessing the property for the period
necessary for acquiring title by prescription. The
presumption of just title does not apply in acquisitive
prescription. The adverse possessor must prove his
just title. (Art. 1131.)
(2) just title or titulo justo
For the purposes of prescription, there is just title
(titulo
justo) when the adverse claimant came into
possession of the property through one of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or
other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner
or could not transmit any right (Art. 1129.); and also
for the purposes of prescription, just title must be
proved; it is never presumed. (Art. 1130.)
(3)colorable title or titulo colorado)
one which a person has when he buys a thing in
good faith, from one who is not the owner but whom
he believes to be the owner. The just title required for
acquisitive prescription is not titulo verdadero y
valido but only titulo colorado. (Solis v. Court of
Appeals)
(4) putative title or titulo putativo
A colorable title is to be distinguished from putative
title (titulo putativo), being one which a person
believes he has but in fact he has not because there
was no mode of acquiring ownership, as when one
is in possession of a thing in the mistaken belief that it
had been bequeathed to him. (see Doliendo
v.Biarnesa, 1906)
Inclusion of Movables in Possession
Art. 542. The possession of real property presumes
that of the movables therein, so long as it is not
shown or proved that they should be excluded.
(449)
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Refers to material possession only of things; rights are
not covered. The possession may be in the concept
of owner
or in the concept of holder, in one’s own name or in
another’s, or in good faith or in bad faith.
Most common example: owner and the lessee of a
building
If the building is occupied by the owner, we can
suppose that all movables found therein are his. If the
building is occupied by the lessee, we can suppose
the same with respect to him because in this case
the possessor is the lessee, and it is not the custom
that in the contract of lease, movables are delivered
with the building. It is not a case of the accessory
following the principal; if it were
so, then the building being owned by the lessor, the
movables would also belong to him.
On the contrary, the building being owned by the
lessor, the movables belong to the possessor, the
lessee, for it is supposed that he who needs the
movables would introduce them in the building.
Continuity and Interruption of Possession
Art. 543. Each one of the participants of a thing
possessed in common shall be deemed to have
exclusively possessed the part which may be
allotted to him upon the division thereof, for the
entire period during which the co-possession
lasted. Interruption in the possession of the whole
or a part of a thing possessed in common shall
be to the prejudice of all the possessors.
However, in case of civil interruption, the Rules of
Court shall apply.
Exclusive possession of previous co-owner deemed
continuous.
The article speaks of co-possession of a thing, not of
co-ownership. (Art. 484.) Nevertheless, its principle is
applicable to copossession of a real right. The object
of a co-ownership as well as co-possession may be a
thing or a right such as usufruct.
The rule enunciated in the first part of Article 543 is
derived from Article 493, and by considering
inherited property as a thing owned in common,
confirms the principle laid down in Article 1091.1 (4
Manresa 255.) It was held applicable with respect to
property held in common by co-heirs. (Beltran v.
Dorinao, 32 Phil. 66 [1915].)
All participants of a thing possessed in common
constitute only one personality and the personality
ceases when there is a partition. (see Art. 538.) From
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that moment of cessation, the personality of each
participant begins. By fiction of law, each
copossessor is deemed (not merely presumed) to
have possessed exclusively and continuously during
the period of co-possession the part assigned to him
in the division. Stated another way, the effects of the
division retroact to the commencement of the
copossession. But the division shall be without
prejudice to the rights of creditors. (see Art. 493.
Illustration:
Suppose X, Y, and Z have been co-possessors in the
concept of owners of a fifteen (15) hectare parcel
of land until they divided the property equally on the
8th year. If on the 4th year after the division, T claims
ownership of the portion alloted to X, the latter can
assert title by acquisitive (ordinary) prescription
through possession of ten (10), for he is deemed to
have possessed his portion exclusively and
continuously for a period of twelve (12) years.
interruption prejudices all but not that they should
share equally the portion lost
Note: The word “equal’’ before “prejudice’’ in the
old Article was deleted by the Code
Commission.
Note: Interruption, according to Article 543, must
refer to the whole thing itself or part of it and not to
a part or right of a co-possessor.
In a co-possession, there is only one thing and many
possessors. If the right of a co-possessor is contested,
he alone shall be prejudiced. With respect to the
thing, the prejudice shall be against all.
Reason
The thing being undivided, it would be unjust to
make the injury to fall on only one co-possessor
although only the possession of a part of the thing
may have been interrupted.
Interruption in possession of the thing.
Rights of Possessor in Good Faith to Fruits Received
Interruption in the possession of the whole or part of
a thing shall be to the prejudice of all the possessors.
(Art. 543.)
Art. 544. A possessor in good faith is entitled to
the fruits received before the possession is legally
interrupted. Natural and industrial fruits are
considered received
from the time they are gathered or severed.
Possession is interrupted for purposes of prescription
either:
1. naturally, i.e., when through any cause it
should cease for more than one (1) year; or
2. civilly, i.e., when the interruption is produced
by judicial summons to the possessor. (Arts.
1120, 1121, 1123.) In civil interruption, only
those possessors served with judicial
summons are affected
Second part of the article may be illustrated as
follows:
In the same example above, if X, Y, and Z lose
possession of the whole land after five (5) years, then
their possession shall be reduced by three (3) years.
The possession of X, Y, and Z may have been
exercised by themselves or through an agent who
takes charge of the cultivation of the property for
them. Now, if for some reason the agent lost
possession of three (3) hectares (1/5) of the land at
the end of the 5th year, possession of the remaining
twelve (12) hectares (4/5) continues without
interruption.
If they have equal shares in the co-possession, their
shares in the remaining portion and the area lost shall
also be in equal shares; if their shares or interests are
unequal then they share in the same proportion. The
167 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
Civil fruits are deemed to accrue daily and
belong to
the possessor in good faith in that proportion.
(451)
Right of possessor in good faith to fruits
received.
The fruits of a thing generally belong to the owner
(Art. 441.) but a possessor in good faith is entitled to
the fruits received until good faith ceases and bad
faith begins. Legal interruption of possession in good
faith takes place upon service of judicial summons to
the possessor. (Mindanao Academy, Inc. v. Yap)
Whenever there is cessation of good faith in the eyes
of the law whether by reason of the filing of a
complaint or not, possession in good faith should be
deemed legally interrupted from such cessation and
not merely from the
service of judicial summons.
(1) Where there is no complaint. — To every possessor
in good faith there comes a time when he is
considered a possessor in bad faith. Possession in
good faith ceases from the moment facts exist which
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show that the possessor is not unaware that he
possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. (Art.
528.)
A possessor in bad faith is not entitled to the fruits. He
has
the duty to reimburse the fruits received including
that which the legitimate possessor could have
received. (Art. 549.)
(2) Where there is a complaint. — Although he may
not have been convinced of it before, the possessor
becomes aware that his possession is unlawful from
the time he learns of the complaint, from the time he
is summoned to the trial. It is at this time that his
possession is legally interrupted, according to Article
1123, and from that time be considered a possessor
in good faith.
Hence, all fruits that the possessor may receive from
the
time that he is summoned, or when he answers the
complaint, must be delivered or paid by him to the
owner or lawful possessor. (Ortiz v. Kayanan)
Note: The right of the possessor in good faith is limited
to the fruits, referring to natural, industrial, and civil
fruits (see Art. 441.) Other things (e.g., building)
belong to the owner of the land. But the possessor in
good faith is liable for reasonable rents being civil
fruits, from the time of the interruption of good faith.
When fruits considered received.
(1) In the case of natural and industrial fruits. — They
are considered received from the time they are
gathered or severed. Fruits gathered before legal
interruption belong to the possessor in good faith. If
the fruits are still ungathered or unharvested, Article
545 applies. (see Arts. 443, 449.)
Article 443. He who receives the fruits has the
obligation to pay the expenses made by a
third person in their production, gathering,
and preservation.
Article 449. He who builds, plants or sows in
bad faith on the land of another, loses what
is built, planted or sown without right to
indemnity.
A possessor in bad faith has no right
whatsoever to the fruits, gathered or
pending, except only necessary expenses for
gathered fruits
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(2) In the case of civil fruits. — Their accrual, not their
actual receipt, shall determine when they are
considered received at the time that good faith is
legally interrupted. They are deemed to accrue daily
and belong to the possessor in good faith in that
proportion.
Thus, where the ownership of certain houses in
possession
of X was declared by final judgment of the court to
belong to Z on May 21, the rents accrued before
May 21 should belong to X and those accruing
beginning May 21, to Z, although the rent was by the
terms of the contract of lease between X and the
lessee payable in advance. Portion of the rent which
accrued before May 21 but received by Z on or
subsequent to May 21 belongs
to X.
Division of Fruits and Expenses
Art. 545. If at the time the good faith ceases,
there should be any natural or industrial fruits, the
possessor shall have a right to a part of the
expenses of cultivation, and to a part of the net
harvest, both in proportion to the time of the
possession.
The charges shall be divided on the same basis
by the two possessors. The owner of the thing
may, should he so desire, give the possessor in
good faith the right to finish the cultivation and
gathering of the growing fruits, as an indemnity
for his part of the expenses of cultivation and the
net proceeds; the possessor in good faith who for
any reason whatever should refuse to accept
this concession, shall lose the right to be
indemnified in any other manner.
544 - does not apply when the possessor is in bad
faith, the fruits are civil, or the fruits are natural or
industrial but they have been gathered or severed
when good faith ceases.

Applies in the case of fruits already gathered
at the time good faith ceases
545- since civil fruits are produced day by day,
Article 545 does not apply to them.
(1) Sharing of expenses and charges. — If there are
pending natural and industrial fruits at the time good
faith ceases, the two possessors shall share in the
expenses of cultivation and the charges (i.e.,
expenses made not on the property itself but on
account of it, such as taxes, interest on mortgages)
in proportion to the time of possession.
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Thus, if at the time of receipt of the judicial summons,
X, has been in possession in good faith for six (6)
months, and the harvest was made three (3) months
later by Y, the owner, who continues in possession,
the expenses and charges shall be divided between
X and Y in the proportion of 6 to 3, or 2 to 1.
Assuming the expenses incurred are as follows:
(a) X = P1,000 and Y = P500. — They shall
share the same
amount incurred by them.
(b) X = P500 and Y = P1,000. — In this case, X
shall reimburse Y P500 out of the net harvest.
(2) Sharing of fruits. — In the same example above,
the net harvest shall be divided in the same
proportion of 2 to 1.
Assuming the total harvest for the year is P7,500 and
the
expenses are the same, the net proceeds of the
harvest after deducting the total expenses would
amount to P6,000. Hence, the sharing will be: X =
P4,000 and Y = P2,000. In other words, under (a)
above, X would be able to recover P5,000 and Y =
P2,500, from the total harvest of P7,500; under (b)
above, X, P4,500 and Y, P3,000.
(3) Unjust enrichment may result. — Under Article
545, the
expenses are not shared in proportion to what each
receives from the harvest. In certain cases, unjust
enrichment may result.
Suppose, in the first example, the period of
possession and the amount of cultivation expenses
incurred are:
X = 3 years and P1,000;
Y = 6 years and P500.
In this case, X will get P2,000 and Y, P4,000 out of the
net harvest. The law says that the possessor shall
have a right to a part of the expenses for cultivation
in proportion to the time of possession. Therefore, X is
entitled only to P500 of the P1,500 cultivation
expenses although he spent P1,000 while Y is entitled
to P1,000, although he spent only P500. Thus, X would
recover P2,500 (P2,000 + P500) and Y, P5,000 (P4,000
+ P1,000) from the total harvest of P7,500, with Y
unjustly enriching himself to the extent of P500 of the
expenses.
In effect, X would get only P2,000 from the net
harvest of P6,000 (P7,500 – P1,500) while Y would get
P4,000. The more equitable rule is to make the
sharing of the expenses and charges in the same
169 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
proportion that the harvest is divided. On the basis of
1 to 2 proportion in favor of Y, X’s share in the total
harvest will be P2,500 and Y, P5,000. Since X is entitled
to reimbursement for the excess of P500, the actual
division of the total harvest will be: X = P3,000 (P2,500
+ P500) and Y = P4,500 (P5,000 – 500). By a
proportionate division of the net har vest of P6,000, X
will get P2,000 plus P500 (to be reimbursed by
Y) or P2,500 and Y, P4,500 less P1,000 (P500 cultivation
expenses + P500 to be reimbursed to X), or P3,500.
(4) Option of owner. — The owner or new possessor
who recovers possession has the option either:
(a) to pay the possessor in good faith indemnity
for his cultivation expenses (and charges) and his
share in the net harvest or;
(b) to allow instead the possessor in good faith to
finish the cultivation and gathering of the
growing fruits in lieu of said indemnity.
In case of refusal of the possessor in good faith for
any reason whatever to accept this concession, he
forfeits the right to be indemnified in any other
manner. (see Azarcon v. Eusebio, 105 Phil. 656
[1959].) This is considered just because even if the
possessor were to continue in possession, he could
not expect more. The owner should exercise this
option in case a loss, instead of net proceeds, is
probable.
(5) Where there are no fruits or fruits less than
expenses. — Since reimbursement for expenses
would have to come from the net harvest, if there is
no net harvest because there are no fruits or the fruits
are less than the expenses, the rule in Article 545 that
the expenses shall be borne in proportion to the
period of possession cannot apply. If the fruits are
merely insufficient, the same should be divided in
proportion to their respective expenses. If there are
no fruits, each should bear his own expenses subject
to the right of the possessor in good faith to be
refunded for necessary expenses under Article 546,
unless the owner or new possessor exercises his
option referred to above.
Expenses
Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded
to every possessor; but only the possessor in good
faith may retain the thing until he has been
reimbursed
therefor.
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Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the
possessor
in good faith with the same retention, the person
who has defeated him in the possession having
the option
of refunding the amount of the expenses or of
paying
the increase in value which the thing may have
acquired by reason thereof.
This is because sa harvest mas dako man pud si Y,
the value of the harvest is 3m and the harvest should
go to x and y in the same proportion. 3m x 3/9 -x 3m
x 6/9 - y (being owner)
Now supposing mo ana ang owner dli siya mo share
sa expenses, or mo share lage ko pero minusan. The
law gives the owner the option to let the possessor
finish cultivation. the law gives owner the option na
okay possessor humana ang cultivation, i wil not give
any share sa expenses but i will also not get any part
of the harvest.
WHAT IF THE POSSESSOR WILL REFUSE? The
ocnsequence is if the possessor refuses he shall lose
the right to be indemnified in any other manner.
General rules as to expenses.
(1) Purpose of rules. — A person who possesses a
thing in the concept of owner may incur necessary,
useful, or luxurious expenses.
Illustration:
Let us say x received summons--> jan 1 in possession
(GF) but march 31 his gf was already interrupted.
On march 31 there was pending fruits or to be
gathered. it was to be harvested sept 30, 19.
The expense needed is 120k while the value of the
harvest is 3m.
There will be sharing of the expenses in proportion of
the possession.
How to share?
So look at the possesion from jan 1 to marchj 31 that
is 3 months of possession in gf. from march 31 to sept
30, sa harvest, that is possession already in bad faith.,
how do you share the expenses? since pending ang
fruits? it would be diff if the fruits were gathered
during the duration of jan - march then all wil belong
to x bec of gf. but since na interrupt man ang gf, it
would also be unfair on the part of x who planted it
that is why the law gives the sharing, that is why in
proportion of the possession. in proportion of
possession in GF or BF.
3/9 x3/9 because GF man si X from jan 1 to march 31.
so bf naman siya sa march 31- sept 30, so ang
kanang expenses dapat kang y, you will ask why
mas dako si y?
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In order to administer complete justice between the
owner of land and the possessor in good faith
thereof, in such a way as neither may enrich himself
of that which does not belong to him, nor any one of
them remain prejudiced by the vagueness of the
rules established to give each one of them that to
which they are entitled, the law correctly employs
the expressions “necessary expenses,’’ “useful
expenses’’ and “expenditures for pure luxury or mere
pleasure.’’
(2) Possessor in good faith entitled to many rights. —
The Civil Code gives the possessor in good faith
greater indemnity in case he has incurred on the
land necessary expenses than in case he has only
incurred useful expenses (Art. 546.) or those for pure
luxury or mere pleasure, and also greater indemnity
in case said expenses are useful than in case they
are for pure luxury or mere pleasure. (see Art. 448.)
Reason
Necessary expenses are incurred for the
preservation of the realty in order that it may
produce the natural, industrial, and civil fruits it
ordinarily produces; and expenses purely for
ostentation and mere pleasure are not considered
by the Civil Code as leading to the production of all
of the aforesaid three kinds of fruits but only of the
civil fruits (Rivera v. Roman Catholic Church, 1920).
Article 546 does not specifically state how the useful
improvements should be determined. Guided by the
objective of Article 546, it is the current market value
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of the improvements which should be the basis of the
reimbursement. The right of the owner or new owner
of the land to retain the improvements while the
corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the
tenancy while the corresponding indemnity is not
paid implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the
land on which they are built, sown, or planted. The
builder, etc. who is not paid, is entitled to retain
ownership of the improvements and necessarily, the
income therefrom. (Pecson v. Court of Appeals,
1995)
(3) Possessor in bad faith generally without rights.
— The possessor in bad faith has no rights
except as provided in Articles 546 and 549,
the right to be refunded for necessary
expenses and the limited right of removal of
improvements for pure luxury. No mere lessee
can claim to be a possessor or builder in
good faith, i.e., one who possesses in the
concept of an owner (Eusebio v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 1988).
CONCEPT OF NECESSARY EXPENSES
NECESSARY EXPENSES
Necessary expenses are made for the preservation
of the thing or those which seek to prevent the
waste, deterioration, or loss of the thing or those
without which the thing would deteriorate or be lost
Examples of necessary expenses
• Those incurred for cultivation, production and upkeep and for repairs of a house which was
uninhabitable and almost in ruins
• Those incurred for ordinary repairs required by the
wear and tear due to the natural use of the thing
and are indispensable for its preservation. Such
repair does not increase the value of the thing, but
merely prevent it from becoming useless
• Taxes, which the co-owner may compel the others
to contribute to
What are NOT necessary expenses:
• Filling in and levelling of a land because it is not a
repair (which implies the putting of something back
into the condition in which it was originally) but an
improvement in the condition of the land
• Construction of a house because it is not necessary
for the preservation of the land
• Making improvement on a land by a purchaser at
a sheriff’s sale just to prevent redemption
• Paying the costs of litigation over the property for
they shall be borne by every possessor
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• Adding a dining room, kitchen, or closet to a house
• Right of Possessor with respect Necessary Expenses
1. Right of reimbursement and retention
If possessor is in good faith, he shall have the right to:
• be refunded; and
• retain the thing until he is reimbursed therefore
During the period of retention, he cannot be obliged
to pay rent or damages for refusing to vacate the
premises for he is merely exercising his right of
retention which has the character of a real right
registerable as an encumbrance on the certificate
of title.
TN: This principle applies as well to useful expenses.
But the retention right does not entitle the possessor
to the fruits of the thing.
2. Right of reimbursement without retention
If possessor is in bad faith, he is entitled only to a
refund WITHOUT right of retention as a punishment for
his bad faith.
A possessor in bad faith sued by the owner to
recover the property should file a counterclaim for
the refund of necessary expenses to which he is
entitled; otherwise, a subsequent action to recover
the same will be barred. This rule may not be
applicable to a possessor in good faith.
3. Right of removal
A possessor, whether in good faith or in bad faith, is
not granted the right of removal with respect to
necessary expenses as they affect the existence or
substance of the property itself.
CONCEPT OF USEFUL EXPENSES
USEFUL EXPENSES
Useful expenses are expenses which add value to a
thing, or augment its income or introduce
improvements thereon or increase its usefulness to
the possessor, or better serve the purpose for which
it is intended.
Examples of useful expenses
• Levelling the ground, cutting down the trees and
removing the shrubbery
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• Building a dining room, kitchen, closet and
ballroom, and a stable suitable as a coach house
and dwelling
• Constructing a fishpond as it gives the owner the
benefit of industrial fruits or an irrigation system but
not including farming implements and work
animals which the possessor retains and which do
not remain on the land
• Building a chapel because it satisfies spiritual and
religious yearnings and contributes to the
attainment of man’s higher destinies
Right of Possessor with respect to Useful Expenses
1. Right of reimbursement and retention or removal
If possessor is in good faith, he has the right to:
• Reimbursement and retention, as with regard to
necessary expenses (necessary expenses ang naa
sa book but I think this is useful expenses?) ; or
• He may remove them provided the removal can
be done without damage to the principal thing
The right of a possessor in good faith is subject to the
superior right of a prevailing party to exercise his
option either to pay the amount of the expenses or
the increase in value of the thing.
• Right to offset may be granted by the court when
the owner of the property and the possessor in
good faith have claims against each other. The
question of how much is to be offset is factual in
nature and needs to be proved by factual
evidence
2. No right whatsoever
If possessor is in bad faith, he has no right whatsoever,
neither refund nor retention nor removal, regarding
useful expenses.
• Useful expenses incurred during the period of
retention by a possessor in good faith are to be
considered in bad faith.
• One who possesses a land registered in the name
of another under the Torrens system cannot be a
possessor in good faith because registration being
binding on the whole world. A Torrens title issued
pursuant to a court decree is superior to a
homestead patent granted subsequent to such
decree
• Possession of a lot by lessees is not possession in
good faith for purposes
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Ramel vs. Aquino (G.R. No. 133208, July 31, 2006)
PS. the case talked about rescisiion and breach
of contract, but focus lang sa improvements and
good faith chuchu
Legal Principle: As a possessor in good faith, the
right to offset may exist, but the question of how
much is offset is factual which needs to be
verified by proper evidence.
FACTS
Petitioners filed for specific performance and
injunction with damages against Respondent
Aquino is the registered owner of a land in
Isabela under TCT 36937.
o On Oct. 21, 1975, he mortgaged his property
to Development Bank of the Philippines for P50k.
In 1983, the property was in danger of being
foreclosed so they offered to sell 8.2 hectares to
petitioners on Aug. 7, 1983 at 110,700 and which
was orally agreed by the parties. Breakdown of
payment as follows:
o Petitioner will pay for Mortgage obligation
with DBP in P85,543
§ P10k on Sept 7, 1983
§ P3,097 on Nov. 18, 1983
§ P10k on April 2, 1984
o P25,000 paid to respondent in installment
§ P5k paid on the same day as offer
§ P15k on Sept. 7,1983
§ P4,800 on Feb 12, 1984
Respondents also sold 2,484 sqm. of the
Southern portion of the mortgaged property to
petitioners for P2,700 on Sept. 7, 1983
Petitioners alleged that they introduced
improvements such as rice paddies, drainage
canal, fence and a house
Nov. 18, 1983, Petitioners applied for restructuring of the mortgage loan
Oct 1, 1984, petitioner went to DBP to pay
but found out that respondents had paid the
bank P72,703.06. Petitioners offered to return the
said sum but was refused and even threatened
to withdraw the certificate of title
In the pendency of the case, petitioners
settled in full the DBP loan amounting to P108,
216 (principal +amortization)
RTC ordered the execution of the deed of
sale for the 2,484 sqm lot but declared the oral
contract between the parties as rescinded.
(affirmed by CA) Thus:
o
Aquino must pay Ramel P29,800 for the
amount received for the land
o 108,216 for the amount paid to bank
Respondent-intervenors are the sibling of aquino
Benjamin and Virginia
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ISSUE
W/N there is legal ground to order the offsetting
of the claim of improvements by petitioners to
the claim of fruits derived from the land by
respondents.
RULING
Petitioners argue under Article 546 and 547
of the civil code that as possessors in good faith
and in the concept of an owner, they are
entitled to the fruits received before possession
was legally interrupted and they must be
reimbursed for their expenses for the increase in
the value the subject property may have
required.
Despite the lack of proof, the trial court
ordered
an
offsetting
between
the
improvements introduced to the land and the
fruits derived which was affirmed by the CA
HOWEVER, SC ruled that offsetting is not
proper as there was a failure on both parties to
prove their respective claims as the evidence
was lacking.
The right to offset may exist, but the question
of how much is offset is factual which needs to
be verified by proper evidence. There was no
information in the case on improvements made
on the land as well as their respective values
USEFUL IMPROVEMENTS
Art. 547, NCC
If the useful improvements can be removed
without damage to the principal thing, the
possessor in good faith may remove them,
unless the person who recovers the
possession exercises the option under
paragraph 2 of the preceding article.
REMOVAL OF USEFUL IMPROVEMENTS
1. Possessor in good faith
Right of removal is given to the possessor only when
the two conditions are present:
• The removal can be done without damage or
injury to the principal thing (i.e., there has been no
real accession); and
• The prevailing party does not choose to keep the
improvements by refunding the expenses incurred
or paying the increase in value which the thing
may have acquired by reason thereof
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If the two conditions are present, the prevailing party
cannot refuse the possessor’s right to remove but he
cannot compel him to remove. The right is purely
potestative.
If the first condition is not present and the prevailing
party does not choose to reimburse the possessor in
good faith, the latter has no right to remove.
2. Possessor in bad faith
The possessor cannot remove the useful
improvement even if the removal is possible without
injury to the principal thing.
TN: The rule is different with respect to improvements
for pure luxury or mere pleasure.
EXTENT OF DAMAGE CONTEMPLATED IN REMOVAL
The useful improvements must have been attached
to the principal thing in a way that their removal will
causes damage or injury. The damage must be
substantial or important, one that will cause a
diminution in the value of the property.
Thus, injuries which only need ordinary repairs are not
covered and the possessor may remove the
improvements. The repairs are at the expense of the
possessor since it is he who is benefited by the
removal.
EXPENSES FOR PURE LUXURY
Art. 548, NCC
Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure
shall not be refunded to the possessor in
good faith; but he may remove the
ornaments with which he has embellished
the principal thing if it suffers no injury
thereby, and if his successor in the possession
does not prefer to refund the amount
expended.
EXPENSES FOR PURE LUXURY
Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure are
expenses not necessary for the preservation of a
thing nor do they increase its productivity. While it
may add value to the thing, they are incurred merely
to embellish the thing and for the convenience or
enjoyment of particular possessors (i.e. luxurious
expenses, or ornamental expenses, or expenses for
pure ostentation)
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TN: An expense may be luxurious under certain
circumstances or with respect to particular persons
but useful under different conditions or as to other
persons.
Examples of luxurious expenses
• Water fountains or statues in gardens, swimming
pools, and wall paintings
RIGHT OF POSSESSOR WITH RESPECT TO LUXURIOUS
EXPENSES
1. Right of removal without right of reimbursement
If possessor in good faith, he is not entitled to refund
but may remove the ornaments on two conditions:
• The principal thing suffers no damage or injury
thereby; and
• The successor in possession does not prefer to
refund the amount expended
2. Right of reimbursement
If possessor in bad faith, he is entitled to the same
rights as a possessor in good faith BUT the owner or
lawful possessor is liable only for the value of the
ornaments, in case he prefers to retain them, at the
time he enters into possession.
TN: Neither the possessor in good faith nor the
possessor in bad faith is entitled to reimbursement for
luxurious expenses unless the prevailing party
decides to keep the improvements
RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF POSSESSOR IN BAD FAITH
Art. 549, NCC
The possessor in bad faith shall reimburse the
fruits received and those which the legitimate
possessor could have received, and shall have
a right only to the expenses mentioned in
paragraph 1 of Article 546 and in Article 443. The
expenses incurred in improvements for pure
luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to
the possessor in bad faith, but he may remove
the objects for which such expenses have been
incurred, provided that the thing suffers no injury
thereby, and that the lawful possessor does not
prefer to retain them by paying the value they
may have at the time he enters into possession.
RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF A POSSESSOR IN BAD FAITH
• Fruits — Not entitled to fruits
- must reimburse the value of fruits received,
subject to Art. 443
- No right to pending fruits
- Must reimburse the value of fruits which the
legitimate possessor could have received
- Bound to account for the fruits received as well
as those which the lawful possessor should or
might have received
• Necessary expenses — Only entitled
reimbursement without right of retention
• Useful expenses — Not entitled to refund AND
forfeits the improvements. Not granted the right of
removal
• Luxurious expenses
- Not entitled to refund
- Loses the improvements but is granted the
limited right of removal if removal is possible
without injury to the principal thing and the
lawful possessor does not exercise his option
TN: If the lawful possessor decides to retain the
luxurious improvements, he shall pay only the value
they may have at the time he enters into possession.
• The possessor in good faith is reimbursed the
amount expended if the option to retain the
improvements is exercised by the lawful
possessor (Art. 548.) which amount is ordinarily
higher than the value of the improvements at the
time possession is recovered because of
deterioration or wear and tear resulting from use
or any other reason.
• However, should the value of the improvements
be higher than the amount expended and the
possessor is in bad faith, he is entitled to be paid
only the amount expended; otherwise, instead
of being punished for his bad faith, the law will be
giving him a greater right than a possessor in
good faith.
• Charges — He shall share them with the owner or
lawful possessor in proportion to the time of their
possession
• Deterioration or loss — He is always liable, whether
it was due to his fault or negligence, or due to a
fortuitous event
• Others
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to
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- Liable to the owner or lawful possessor for an
amount equal to a reasonable rent for the use
and occupation of the property
- Liable for any other damage caused to the
property or suffered by the lawful possessor rising
from possession
MWSS vs. CA and THE CITY OF DAGUPAN G.R. No.
L-54526 August 25, 1986
FACTS:
The City of Dagupan filed a complaint against
the former National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority, now the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System (MWSS), for recovery of the
ownership and possession of the Dagupan
Waterworks System. NAWASA interposed as one
of its special defenses R.A. 1383 which vested
upon it the ownership, possession and control of
all waterworks systems throughout the Philippines
and as one of its counterclaims the
reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred
for necessary and useful improvements
amounting to P255,000.00. Judgment was
rendered by the trial court in favor of the CITY on
the basis of a stipulation of facts. The trial court
found NAWASA to be a possessor in bad faith
and hence not entitled to the reimbursement
claimed by it. NAWASA appealed to the then
Court of Appeals and argued that the CITY
should have been held liable for the amortization
of the balance of the loan secured by NAWASA
for the improvement of the Dagupan
Waterworks System.
In support of its claim for removal of said useful
improvements, MWSS argues that the pertinent
laws on the subject, particularly Articles 546, 547
and 549 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, do
not definitely settle the question of whether a
possessor in bad faith has the right to remove
useful improvements.
ISSUE:
Does a possessor in bad faith have the right to
remove useful improvements?
RULING:
No. Recognized authorities on the subject are
agreed on this point.
Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
provides that "he who builds, plants or sows in
bad faith on the land of another, loses what is
built, planted or sown without right to indemnity."
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As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever
useful improvements it had made without right to
indemnity (Santos vs. Mojica, Jan. 31, 1969).
Moreover, under Article 546 of said code, only a
possessor in good faith shall be refunded for
useful expenses with the right of retention until
reimbursed; and under Article 547 thereof, only a
possessor in good faith may remove useful
improvements if this can be done without
damage to the principal thing and if the person
who recovers the possession does not exercise
the option of reimbursing the useful expenses.
The right given a possessor in bad faith is to
remove
improvements
applies
only
to
improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure,
provided the thing suffers no injury thereby and
the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain
them by paying the value they have at the time
he enters into possession (Article 549).
The decision in the case of Mindanao Academy,
Inc. vs. Yap (13 SCRA 190) cited by petitioner
does not support its stand. On the contrary, this
Court ruled in said case that "if the defendant
constructed a new building, as he alleges, he
cannot recover its value because the
construction was done after the filing of the
action for annulment, thus rendering him a
builder in bad faith who is denied by law any
right of reimbursement."
Sabido vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R.
No. 73418. September 20, 1988)
Spouses Dasal and Pecunio filed a case for
queiting of title against herein respondents
Spouses Sabido and Rances for the subject Lots
B and C.
The Lower Court ruled in favor of Spouses Dasal.
The sheriff then executed the Writ of Execution as
ordered by then Presiding Judge Sunga. During
the execution of the writ, the sheriff learned that
a certain Dominador Sta. Ana was occupying a
portion of lot B together with two other persons
(tenants of Sta. Ana).
Third party Sta. Ana was given an opportunity to
present evidences to prove his ownership upon
Lot B which according to him he purchased in
good faith. Subsequently, it was proved that the
lot he claims was different from that of the
subject Lot B.
Furthermore, it was established that Sta. Ana has
a relationship with the Spouses Dasal which
should alerted him that the subject lot was under
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litigation and that he was also present during the
ocular inspection made in which he fails to
invoke his right upon the issuance of the decision
of the ownnership of the subject Lot B which
estabilshed bad faith on his part.
The RTC and CA ruled in favor of Spouses
Sabido. However, part of the decision of the
Appellate Court grants Sta.Ana an option to
either remove his improvements or make an offer
to the lawful owners to pay for the price of the
lot where his improvements were introduced.
Issue:
Whether or not the Appellate Court erred in
granting Sta. Ana the right to exercise the option.
Yes, the Appellate Court erred in granting such
right to Sta. Ana
RULING:
The right to exercise the option is only given to a
builder in good faith (previous discussions). The
only option for a possessor in bad faith is only
granted with regards to improvements for pure
luxury or mere pleasure. Provided, two conditions
must be satisfied.
(1) removal will not cause damage to the
principal thing
(2) the lawful owner does not prefer to retain
them by paying the reasonable price.
Hence, it is clear that the private respondent has
to remove all his constructions over Lot "B" and
vacate the premises. This is his only option. Being
adjudged in privy with the spouses Dasals, he
cannot avail himself of the rights granted to a
builder in good faith. He, therefore, must remove
all his useful improvements over Lot "B" at his own
expense and if the same have already been
removed, he cannot be entitled to the right of
retention or to any reimbursement
We, therefore, find that the appellate court
committed reversible error in holding that the
private respondent is entitled to exercise the
option to pay the value of the disputed area of
Lot "B" and to reimbursement for the value of the
demolished portion of his building
COSTS OF LITIGATION
Art. 550, NCC
The costs of litigation over the property shall
be borne by every possessor.
COSTS OF LITIGATION
Costs of litigation are borne by every possessor of the
property because they redound to his benefit, the
176 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
court action being necessary to maintain his
possession.
“Every possessor” refers to any possessor — in good
faith or in bad faith, in the concept of owner or
holder, or in his own name or in that of another. It
does not include the prevailing party who succeeds
in the possession.
TN: Under the Rules of Court (Sec. 1, Rule 142.), the
costs of an action shall, as a rule, be paid by the
losing party. The court may, however, for special
reasons, adjudge that either shall pay the costs, or
that the same be divided, as may be equitable.
Art. 550. The costs of litigation over the property
shall be borne by every possessor.
Cost of litigation over property
Rule: Borne by the possessor of the property
Reason: they redound to his benefit, the court action
being necessary to maintain his possession.
Note: “Every possessor’’ refers really to any possessor
— in good faith or in bad faith, in the concept of
owner or holder, or in his own name or in that of
another. It does not include the prevailing party who
succeeds in the possession
Who bears the cost?
Rules of Court (Sec. 1, Rule 142.) states that the costs
of an action shall, as a rule, be paid by the losing
party. The court may, however, for special reasons,
adjudge that either shall pay the costs, or that the
same be divided, as may be equitable.
Improvements/Loss/Deterioration
Art. 551. Improvements caused by nature or time
shall always inure to the benefit of the person who
has succeeded in recovering possession.
Improvements caused by nature or time
Neither the possessor in good faith nor in bad faith is
entitled to:
(a) improvements caused by NATURE (like alluvium,
etc.). (See 4 Manresa 275-276).
(b) improvements caused by TIME (like the improved
fl avor of wine).
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Reason: These accrue to the owner or legitimate
possessor, so no reimbursement occurs.
judicial summons, and whether or not due to a
fortuitous event.
Does this require any kind of possession?
Thus, the possessor in bad faith is liable in every case
until delivery is made to the lawful possessor even if
the deterioration was caused by a fortuitous event
and even before judicial summons, as punishment
for his bad faith.
This article covers all the natural accessions
mentioned in Arts. 457-465 which must follow the
ownership of the principal thing, and generally, all
improvements that are not due to the will of the
possessor. No distinction is made regarding the kind
of possession.
The former possessor got the benefits from the
property during his possession. It is but just that the
improvements mentioned which take place after
the possession is recovered inure to the owner or
lawful possessor. Hence, he should not pay for them
Art. 552. A possessor in good faith shall not be
liable for the deterioration or loss of the thing
possessed, except in cases in which it is proved
that he has acted with fraudulent intent or
negligence, after the judicial summons. A
possessor in bad faith shall be liable for
deterioration or loss in every case, even if caused
by a fortuitous event. (457a)
Art. 553. One who recovers possession shall not be
obliged to pay for improvements which have
ceased to exist at the time he takes possession of
the thing. (458)
Improvements which have ceased to exist.
The improvements referred to were enjoyed by the
possessor alone. Having ceased to exist, the owner
or lawful possessor who came too late cannot
benefit from them.
What about for the expenses?
He is liable for necessary expenses even if the thing
for which they were incurred no longer exists.
Necessary
expenses
are
not
improvements. (see Art. 546, par. 1.)
Rules for liability for loss or deterioration:
considered
Losing Possessions, Modes
1. If the possessor is in good faith
a. Before receipt of judicial summons—NOT
liable
b. After receipt of judicial summons-- his good
faith
is
converted into
bad faith.
Nevertheless:
o
loss or deterioration thru
fortuitous event — not liable.
o
thru fraudulent intent
negligence — liable
or
[NOTE: The possessor may
become
negligent
or
indifferent for he may sense
that after all, he may lose the
case.]
2. If the possessor is in bad faith
He is absolutely liable, whether or not the loss or
deterioration occurred before or after receipt of
177 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:
(1) By the abandonment of the thing;
(2) By an assignment made to another either by
onerous or gratuitous title;
(3) By the destruction or total loss of the thing, or
because it goes out of commerce;
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the
provisions of article 537, if the new possession has
lasted longer than one year. But the real right of
possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years.
(460a)
Article 556. The possession of movables is not
deemed lost so long as they remain under the
control of the possessor, even though for the time
being he may not know their whereabouts. (461)
THROUGH THE POSSESSOR’S VOLUNTARY WILL AND
INTENT:
a. Abandonment
b. Assignment
(onerous
conveyance)
or
gratuitous
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AGAINST THE POSSESSOR’S WILL:
1) possession of another for more than one year.
(Art. 555).
2) final judgment in favor of another (with a
better right).
3) expropriation.
4) prescription in favor of another.
5) recovery or reivindication by the legitimate
owner or possessor. (See 2 Castan 48).
BECAUSE OF THE OBJECT:
1) destruction or total loss of the thing. (Art. 555).
2) going out of commerce. (Art. 555).
3) escaping from possessor’s control of wild animals.
(Art. 560).
1. By abandonment
“Abandonment’’ is the voluntary renunciation of all
rights which a person has over a thing thereby
allowing a third person to acquire ownership or
possession thereof by means of occupancy.
Who may abandon?
Both the owner or a mere possessor.
Note: The possessor, however, cannot abandon
ownership which belongs to another. Since
abandonment involves the renunciation of a
property right, the abandoner must have a right to
the thing possessed and the legal capacity to
renounce it. (see Arts. 38, 39.)
Should there be an intention to abandon?
YES. An owner of property cannot be held to have
abandoned the same until at least he has some
knowledge of the loss of its possession or of the thing,
and a thing cannot be considered abandoned
under the law until the spes recuperandi (hope of
recovery) is gone and the animus revertendi
(intention to return) is finally given up.
Effect of abandonment
By voluntary abandonment, a thing becomes
without an owner or possessor and is converted into
res nullius and may thus be acquired by a third
person by occupation.
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Here, there is not only loss of occupancy or actual
possession but also of legal rights to possession — not
only a physical relinquishment of the thing but also
an intention not to reclaim ownership or enjoyment
thereof.
Not applicable to land
Abandonment which converts the thing into res
nullius, ownership of which may be acquired by
occupation, can hardly apply to land, as to which
said mode of acquisition is not available (see Art.
714.), let alone to registered land to which no title in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or possession
2. By assignment
“Assignment’’, as used, is understood to mean the
complete transmission of the thing or right to another
by any lawful manner. It may either be by onerous or
gratuitous title. The effect is that he who was the
owner or possessor is no longer so. Abandonment is
always gratuitous.
3. By destruction, total loss, or withdrawal from
commerce
Destruction or total loss covers not only that which is
caused voluntarily or intentionally but also that which
is caused by accident. Under the Civil Code, a thing
is lost when it perishes, or goes out of commerce, or
disappears in such a way that its existence is
unknown, or it cannot be recovered. (Art. 1189.)
So, loss is the broader term including both destruction
and withdrawal from commerce.
4. By possession of another for more than one
year
This refers to possession de facto (possession as a fact
or material possession) and not de jure (legal right or
real right of possession).
a. After one year, the former possessor can no
longer bring an action for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer. Possession by violence
(Art. 537.), or force, intimidation, strategy or
stealth (see Art. 536.) for more than one year
will cause the loss of possession de facto
according to law on forcible entry. (Rules of
Court, Rule 70, Sec. 1.)
b. Possession by mere tolerance even for over a
year does not affect possession de facto.
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c. After ten years, the possessor or owner may
bring an accion publiciana or reivindicatoria
to recover possession de jure unless he is
barred
by
prescription,
ordinary
or
extraordinary. (see Arts. 1134, 1137.)
5. By recovery by lawful owner or possessor
Possession may also be lost when it is recovered from
the person in possession by the lawful owner in a
reivindicatory action or by the lawful possessor in an
action to recover the better right of possession.
Possessory acts of a mere holder
Art. 558. Acts relating to possession, executed or
agreed to by one who possesses a thing
belonging to another as a mere holder to enjoy or
keep it, in any character, do not bind or prejudice
the owner, unless he gave said holder express
authority to do such acts, or ratifies them
subsequently. (463)
Rule:
Acts relating to possession of a mere holder do not
bind or prejudice the possessor in the concept of
owner unless said acts were previously authorized or
subsequently ratified by the latter. (see Art. 1317.)
Possession may be acquired for another by a
stranger provided there be subsequent ratification.
(Art. 532.)
Possession over Movables
Art. 559. The possession of movable property
acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or
has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may
recover it from the person in possession of the
same. If the possessor of a movable lost or of
which the owner has been unlawfully deprived,
has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the
owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing
the price paid therefor. (464a)
PARAS:
1. When Possession of a Movable is Equivalent
to Title
Acquired in BF: Never equivalent to a title
Acquired in Good faith:
1. GR: Equivalent to a title. Hence if the owner
wants to get it back, he must REIMBURSE.
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2. XPN: Not equivalent to a title when the owner
had LOST it or had been UNLAWFULLY
DEPRIVED of it (when stolen), UNLESS the
possessor had acquired it in good faith at a
“public sale” (auction sale, where the public
had been properly notified)
Example:
If I am in possession of a Rolls Royce automobile,
having acquired it in good faith from the seller (who
thought he owned it), I am considered entitled to
said automobile, with an actual title that can be
defeated only by the true owner. The true owner can
get the car back only if he will reimburse me the
price I had paid for the car.
Consequences:
1. My title is not that of an absolute owner but
one that can be defeated only by the true
owner who gives reimbursement.
2. While I am not yet the absolute owner, my
possession may eventually ripen into full
ownership thru acquisitive prescription (4
years in this case for I have GOOD FAITH, and
my just title is given by Art. 559, unlike in the
case of REAL PROPERTY, where my just title
must be proved for purposes of prescription).
(See Sotto v. Enage, 43 O.G. 5057; Manresa).
Should I acquire ownership by prescription, I
cannot be compelled to give up the car’s
ownership, even if a refund is offered to me.
(Sotto v. Enage, supra).
3. It is necessary of course that my possession
be in the concept of owner (4 Manresa 339),
and that the true owner had not lost the
property nor been unlawfully deprived of it.
(Art. 559, see also 4 Manresa 339).].
Problem:
I purchased in good faith a stolen automobile. The
owner now wants to get it back, but does not want
to reimburse me the price I had paid. Will the owner
prevail?
ANS:
Yes, because although my possession was in good
faith, still it is not equivalent to title for the owner had
been unlawfully deprived of his car. Hence, the
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owner can get it back without reimbursing me. (See
Tuason and Sampedro, Inc. v. Geminea, [CA] 46
O.G. 1113, Mar., 1950).
If acquired in bad faith: no right thereto is acquired
by the possessor. The property may be recovered by
the true owner or possessor without reimbursement.
Problem:
If acquired in good faith:
I purchased in good faith at an auction sale a stolen
automobile. Can the owner get it back without
reimbursing me for the price I paid?
Rules:
ANS:
The owner can get it back, but I should fi rst be
refunded the price I paid since my purchase had
been made in good faith, at a public auction or sale.
(Art. 559, 2nd paragraph).
SUMMARY
PRINCIPLE
OF
RECOVERY
1. Owner
may
REIMBURSEMENT
OR
NON-RECOVERY
RECOVER
WITHOUT
a. From possessor in BAD FAITH
b. From possessor in GOOD FAITH ((if owner had
LOST the property or been unlawfully
deprived of it) (the acquisition being from a
private person)
2. Owner MAY RECOVER but should REIMBURSE:
a. if possessor acquired the object in good
faith at a PUBLIC SALE or AUCTION. (Art.
559). [Because the publicity attendant to
a public sale should have been sufficient
warning for the owner to come forward
and claim the property. (Manresa).].
3. Owner CANNOT RECOVER, even if he offers to
REIMBURSE (whether or not the owner had lost
or been unlawfully deprived):
a. if possessor had acquired it in good faith by
purchase from a merchant’s store, or in fairs,
or markets in accordance with the Code of
Commerce and special laws.
b. if owner “is by his conduct precluded from
denying the seller’s authority to sell.”
(ESTOPPEL).
c. if possessor had obtained the goods
because he was an innocent purchaser for
value and holder of a NEGOTIABLE
document of title to the goods.
DE LEON:
Right of possessor who acquires movable claimed
by another.
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1. Possession equivalent to a title
Possession in good faith of a movable is presumed
ownership. It is equivalent to a title. No further proof
is necessary. This is sometimes known as the doctrine
of irrevindicability.
Thus, if X buys in good faith books from Y, an
impostor, who succeeded in purchasing the books
from Z by falsely identifying himself and paying the
price by means of a check which was dishonored,
the law establishes an actual right thereto in favor of
X. (EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp. v. Santos, 186
SCRA 614 [1990].)
Note: The possessor’s title, however, is NOT absolute.
It is equivalent to title but is NOT title itself. It is merely
presumptive because it can be defeated by the true
owner.
2. Where owner or possessor has lost or has
been unlawfully deprived of a movable.
2 XPNS to the General Rule of Irrevindicability:
a. Right of ownership, a real right
The right of ownership is a real right enforceable
against the whole world. While actual possession of
personal property is equivalent to title thereto, so
long as no proof is offered that the same was
acquired in bad faith, an owner who has lost
possession of his movable property or was unlawfully
deprived of its possession, can still enforce his right of
ownership without reimbursement against the actual
possessor or even a bona fide purchaser for value
except when the possessor acquired it in a public
sale.
What is included in unlawful deprivation?
includes all cases of taking that constitute a criminal
offense (conviction is not necessary), such as theft,
robbery, estafa, etc., including those involving abuse
of confidence.
But the seller of movable property who was not paid
by the first buyer who, in turn, sold it to another who
acquired it in good faith, cannot claim to have been
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“unlawfully deprived of his property.’’ (EDCA
Publishing & Distributing Corp. v. Santos, supra.)
b. Necessity of proof
It is, however, necessary in order that the owner of a
chattel may contest the apparent title of the
possessor that he present adequate proof of the loss
or illegal deprivation. Without such proof, the present
holder can not be put on his defense, even if, as
possessor, he has no actual proprietary title to the
movable property in question.
c. Effect of filing of a criminal case against the
transferor
The legitimate owner or possessor should avail
himself of the proper remedy of replevin under the
Rules of Court. (Rule 60 thereof.) The acquirer in good
faith is entitled to be respected in his possession until
ruled otherwise by a competent court and,
therefore, should not be compelled to surrender it to
one who claims to be the owner.
The mere filing of a criminal case by the owner
against the transferor does not justify a court in
disturbing the possession of the possessor in good
faith because such filing does not necessarily mean
that loss or unlawful deprivation has occurred and
furthermore, the possessor not being a party to the
criminal case, the court has no jurisdiction over him.
d. Effect of non-payment of price by transferor
Where the owner has voluntarily parted with the
possession of a thing and there is no showing of loss
or unlawful deprivation, the owner cannot recover.
Non-payment only creates a right to demand
payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal
prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. (EDCA
Publishing & Distributing Corp. v. Santos, supra.)
3. Where the property was acquired at a public
sale
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the
owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it
in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot
recover without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
A public sale is one where there has been a public
notice of the sale in which anyone is allowed to bid
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for the object he desires to buy. Hence, the mere
registration of a sale on the books of a municipality
such as that of a large cattle does not confer a
public character upon the sale agreed to between
two individuals only, without previous publication of
notice for general information in order that bidders
may appear.
4. When owner cannot recover
It is a fundamental doctrine of law that no one can
give what he has not. Sale is a derivative mode of
acquiring ownership and the vendee gets only such
rights as the vendor had. The exceptions to the rule
are:
(a) Where the owner of the movable is, by his
conduct, precluded from denying the seller’s
authority to sell;
(b) Where the law8 enables the apparent owner to
dispose of the movable as if he were the true owner
thereof;
(c) Where the sale is sanctioned by statutory or
judicial authority;
(d) Where the sale is made at merchant’s stores, fairs
or markets (Art. 1505.);
(e) Where the seller has a voidable title which has not
been avoided at the time of the sale to the buyer in
good faith for value and without notice of the seller’s
defect of title (Art. 1506.);
(f) Where recovery is no longer possible because of
prescription (Art. 1132.); and
(g) Where the possessor becomes the owner of the
thing in accordance with the principle of finder’s
keeper. (see Art. 719.)
Edu vs. Gomez (G.R. No. L-33397)
Legal principle: The acquirer or the purchaser in
good faith of a chattel of movable property is
entitled to be respected and protected in his
possession as if he were the true owner thereof
until a competent court rules otherwise.
Facts: The Commission on Land Transportation
received a report that a car was stolen from the
residence of Lt. Bala. Several agents of the AntiCarnapping Unit (ANCAR) recognised the subject
car in the possession of Abello. Thus, they
immediately seized and impounded the vehicle
as stolen property. Edu, as Commission of Land
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Transportation seized the car, pursuant for Sec. 60
of RA 4136 which empowers him to seize the motor
vehicle for delinquent registration.
Abello filed a complaint for replevin, alleging that
she had purchased the car from its registered
owner, Guansing under a notarial deed of
absolute sale. The CFI ruled in Abello’s favour and
ordered the sheriff to seize the property from the
Commission on Land Transportation.
Issue: W/N the car can be seized from the custody
of the Commission on Land Transportation
Ruling: Yes, the acquirer or the purchaser in good
faith of a chattel of movable property is entitled to
be respected and protected in his possession as if
he were the true owner thereof until a competent
court rules otherwise.
In the meantime, as the true owner, the possessor
in good faith cannot be compelled to surrender
possession nor to be required to institute an action
for the recovery of the chattel, whether or not an
indemnity bond is issued in his favor. The filing of an
information charging that the chattel was illegally
obtained through estafa from its true owner by the
transferor of the bona fide possessor does not
warrant disturbing the possession of the chattel
against the will of the possessor.
EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp. vs. Santos
(G.R. No. 80298
FACTS:
EDCA Publishing sold 406 books to a certain
Professor Jose Cruz who ordered these by
telephone, which was agreed to be payable on
delivery. The books were subsequently delivered
to him with the corresponding invoice, and he
paid with a personal check.
Cruz then sold the 120 of the books to Leonor
Santos who asked for verification, and was then
showed the invoice for the books. EDCA became
suspicious when Cruz ordered another set of books
even before his check cleared. Upon
investigation, EDCA found that he wasn’t the
person he claimed to be (Dean in DLSU). EDCA
had the police capture Cruz, as well as seize the
books from Santos. Santos demanded the return
of the books.
Protesting this high-handed action, the private
respondents sued for recovery of the books after
182 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
demand for their return was rejected by EDCA. A
writ of preliminary attachment was issued and the
petitioner, after initial refusal, finally surrendered
the books to the private respondents.
ISSUE: Has EDCA been unlawfully deprived of the
books because the check issued by the impostor
X in payment therefor was dishonored?
RULING:
NO.
1. Contract of sale is consensual
It is the contention of the petitioner that the
private respondents have not established their
ownership of the disputed books because they
have not even produced a receipt to prove they
had bought the stock. This is unacceptable.
Precisely, the first sentence of Article 559 provides
that "the possession of movable property acquired
in good faith is equivalent to a title," thus
dispensing with further proof.
Moreover, EDCA cites numerous cases holding
that the owner who has been unlawfully deprived
of personal property is entitled to its recovery
except only where the property was purchased at
a public sale, in which event its return is subject to
reimbursement of the purchase price. It argued
that it was unlawfully deprived of the property
because the impostor acquired no title to the
books that he could have validly transferred to the
private respondents. Its reason is that as the
payment check bounced for lack of funds, there
was a failure of consideration that nullified the
contract of sale between it and Cruz.
The contract of sale is consensual and is perfected
once agreement is reached between the parties
on the subject matter and the consideration
pursuant to Arts. 1475, 1477, 1478 of the CC:
ART. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the
moment there is a meeting of minds upon the
thing which is the object of the contract and upon
the price. From that moment, the parties may
reciprocally demand performance, subject to the
provisions of the law governing the form of
contracts. xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be
transferred to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery thereof.
ART. 1478. The parties may stipulate that ownership
in the thing shall not pass to the purchaser until he
has fully paid the price.
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2.
Ownership of the thing sold is transferred
upon delivery
It is clear from the above provisions, particularly
the last one quoted, that ownership in the thing
sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment
of the purchase price only if there is a stipulation
to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that such
ownership shall pass from the vendor to the
vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery
of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not
yet been paid.
Non-payment only creates a right to demand
payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal
prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But
absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of
the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to
the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another.
(3) Cruz acquired ownership over the books sold
Actual delivery of the books having been made,
Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he
could then validly transfer to the private
respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for
them to EDCA was a matter between him and
EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the
private respondents to the books.
One may well imagine the adverse consequences
if the phrase "unlawfully deprived" were to be
interpreted in the manner suggested by the
petitioner. A person relying on the seller's title who
buys a movable property from him would have to
surrender it to another person claiming to be the
original owner who had not yet been paid the
purchase price therefor. The buyer in the second
sale would be left holding the bag, so to speak,
and would be compelled to return the thing
bought by him in good faith without even the right
to reimbursement of the amount he had paid for
it.
(4) EDCA was negligent
“It bears repeating that in the case before us, Y
took care to ascertain first that the books
belonged to X before she agreed to purchase
them. The EDCA invoice X showed assured her
that the books had been paid for on delivery. By
contrast, EDCA was less than cautious — in fact,
too trusting — in dealing with the impostor.
Although it had never transacted with him before,
it readily delivered the books he had ordered (by
183 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
telephone) and as readily accepted his personal
check in payment. It did not verify his identity
although it was easy enough to do this. It did not
wait to clear the check of this unknown drawer.
Worse, it indicated in the sales invoice issued to
him, by the printed terms thereon, that the books
had been paid for on delivery, thereby vesting
ownership in the buyer.’’
It would certainly be unfair now to make the
private respondents bear the prejudice sustained
by EDCA as a result of its own negligence. We
cannot see the justice in transferring EDCA's loss to
the Santoses who had acted in good faith, and
with proper care, when they bought the books
from Cruz.
While we sympathize with the petitioner for its
plight, it is clear that its remedy is not against the
private respondents but against Tomas de la
Peña, who has apparently caused all this trouble.
The private respondents have themselves been
unduly
inconvenienced,
and for merely
transacting a customary deal not really unusual in
their kind of business. It is they and not EDCA who
have a right to complain.
Possession of Animals
Art. 560. Wild animals are possessed only while
they are under one’s control; domesticated or
tamed animals are considered domestic or tame,
if they retain the habit of returning to the premises
of the possessor. (465)
Animals may be:
1.Wild or animals, whether terrestrial or aquatic, living
in a state of nature independently of and without the
aid and care of man;
2. domesticated or tamed, or animals which are wild
or savage by nature but have been subdued and
made use of by man and become accustomed to
live in a tamed condition; or
3. domestic or tame, or any of the various animals
(e.g., dog, carabao, cow) which live and are born
and reared, under the control and care of man,
lacking the instinct to roam freely
Wild animals may be the object of hunting. (Art. 713.)
They are possessed only if they are under one’s
control. Possession of wild animals is lost when they
regain their freedom or come under another’s
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control. Domesticated animals are possessed if they
habitually return to the premises of the possessor.
(see Arts. 715-716.)
Lawful recovery of possession unjustly lost
Art. 561. One who recovers, according to law,
possession unjustly lost, shall be deemed for all
purposes which may redound to his benefit, to
have enjoyed it without interruption. (466)
This article applies to both possession in good faith as
well as to possession in bad faith, but only if
beneficial to the possessor.
Thus, a possessor in good faith will be deemed to be
in continuous possession for purposes of prescription.
(see Art. 554.)
A possessor in bad faith is not liable for the fruits he
recovered during the time he was unlawfully
deprived of possession, for to consider him in
possession continuously would be prejudicial and
not redound to his benefit.
So that is what generally like you should prompt. Yes.
Characteristics of a usufruct
a) It is a real right, whether or not you register it.
Unlike a lease, it's not considered a real right
if you don't register it, but if you register it,
then it becomes a real right.
b) It is also of temporary duration. It is
transmissible, and it may be constituted on
real or personal property consumable or
non-consumable tangible or intangible the
ownership of which, as we said is vested in
another person.
Ways of classifying your usufruct
o
The recovery of possession must be according to
law, that is, through legal means or by requesting the
aid of competent authorities (Bishop of Cebu v.
Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286 [1906].); otherwise, the benefit
of continuous and uninterrupted possession during
the intervening period cannot be invoked.
MODULE 6
USUFRUCT
We'll cover usufruct. So what is the usufruct? –
Usufruct is a real right; it is temporary in nature, which
authorizes its holder to enjoy all the benefits which
result from the normal enjoyment of another's
property with the obligation to return at the
designated time either the same thing, or in special
cases, it's equivalent.
o
o
This is an exception to the general rule that an owner
of the property has the right to enjoy the usufruct of
the thing. Here, while you may be the owner of the
property, you can let somebody else enjoy the
usufruct of your property, and that arrangement is
what we call a usufruct, and that is Article 562.
Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another
with the obligation of preserving its form and
substance unless the title, constituting it, or the law
otherwise provides.
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o
Whether or not impairment of object is
allowed
a. It's a normal usufruct - involves a nonconsumable thing, meaning for one
to enjoy that thing he or she does not
need to consume it. Like, you should
over, of course, have a lot. You don't
even eat or consume the parcel of
land to be able to usufruct or to enjoy
a normal usufruct.
b. Abnormal usufructa thing that
needs to be consumed for you to be
able to enjoy its use. So, for example,
a usufruct for over 100 sacks of rice for
you to be able to enjoy the usufruct
of the ratio of course we consume it,
or five barrels of gasoline, a usufruct
of such, you have to consume the
natural you have to use it.
According to its origin
a. Legal – provided for my law
b. Voluntaryentered
into
by
agreement
c. Mixed – partly legal and partly
voluntary.
As to number of usefructories
a. Simpleonly one usufruct of
recording
b. Multiple- it could be simultaneous
wherein many speakers will be able
to enjoy at the same time or it could
be successive, where one will enjoy it
during a certain period of time and
then another we'll use it in another
period of time
Terms and conditions
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a.
o
o
o
o
Pure - it could be with a term or a
period
b. Conditional
Quality or kind of the object
o of things
o of rents
Quantity or extent of object
a. Total
b. Partial
Extent the owner’s patrimony
a. Universal - all the owners properties
b. Particular property only
expressed or in the last will and
testament and by prescription that is
article, 563.
o
Article 564, we have also already
made mention that it could be
universal or could be particular. It
could be the whole or part of the fruit.
It could be a simple usufruct of frog or
multiple usufruct, which could also be
simultaneous or successive could be
with a term and the period or it could
be with a condition, or with a
condition. So, it's all there under 500
article 568.
o
Article 565 makes mention that the
rights and obligations of the
usufructory shall be those provided in
the title constituting the usufruct, in
default of such title or in case it is
deficient the provisions contained in
the following chapter shall be
observed.
What is the difference between a usufruct
and a lease?
o
A usufruct is always a real right. A
lease is generally a personal right,
unless it's registered it becomes a real
right. In usufruct, the person creating
this usufruct should be the owner or
his duly authorized agent. While in
lease, the lessor may not be the
owner because there is what we call
subleasing the lessee sublease the
property that he is using so not
necessarily that lessor is the owner of
the property. Usufruct may be
created by law by contract or by will
if the testator or prescription while
lease it's generally, created by
contract.
It tells you that, since the usufruct may be may be
constituted by virtue of an agreement then the rights
and obligations, will have to be agreed upon and
you will look at the agreement.
o
o
o
Usufruct covers all the fruits and all the
usufructs and benefits of the entire
property while lease generally refers
to certain uses only.
Another usufruct part involves more
or less passive owner who allows the
usufructuary to enjoy the object
given in the usufruct. Lease involves a
more active owner or lessor to enjoy it
usufruct. In usufruct, the usufructuary
pays for ordinary taxes and the fruits
while in lease, the lessee is not
generally under the obligations to
make repairs and pay taxes.
Article 563 we've mentioned already,
how do you create the usufruct of or
in other words, how do you classify
usufruct according origin. So how is it
created. Again, it could be, by law,
by way of private personal it's
185 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
o
What are the rights usufructory?
Again, who is the usufructory? that is the person
being allowed by the owner of a property, enjoy the
fruits, and enjoy the use of the property.
o
What are the rights of the usufruct as to the
fruits?
That's article 566. It says, the usufructory shall
be entitled to all the natural, industrial and civil
fruits of the property in usufruct, with respect the
hidden treasure, which may be found on the
land or tenement he shall be considered a
stranger. So, since usufruct is where a usufructory
may enjoy the fruits and the use of the property,
then the usufructuary can enjoy the three types
of fruits and what are these again? you have
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natural fruits. your industrial fruits and your civil
fruits.
need it. But banking on your rights are usufructory,
you entered into lease contracts.
Now what if there is a hidden treasure. If you're
usufructory over a parcel of land and you find a
hidden treasure. Do you own that treasure?
For example, you entered into a lease contract it is
from 2019 up until December of 2020. So, again,
you're the usufructory you're thinking. All right, one of
my rights is to rent this out, and one of my rights is
usufructory is to enjoy the rentals. But then again,
remember the condition that the usufruct of will
terminate when the children of the owner would
need the property.
The law says your ownership over that hidden
treasure, will be will be guided by the Civil Code, with
respect to hidden treasure and the usufructory is to
be considered to be a stranger. And what does the
law say under the Civil Code. The law says that the
stranger will get half of the hidden treasure, and the
other half will be, will belong to the owner of the
property,
What are the rights of the usufructory as to civil fruits?
Article, 568, it says, if you usufructory has leased the
lands or tenement given in usufruct and the usufruct
should expire before the termination of the lease, the
or his heirs and successors shall receive only the
proportionate share of the rent that must be paid by
the lessee. Now, as we mentioned already, when
you talk about usufruct for over a property, then you
have the right to make usufruct of the thing.
If the object of the usufruct is a parcel of land. One
way of enjoying the use of the thing is by renting it
out by entering into lease contracts. So, in 568. What
it tells you is that you entered into lease contracts
with third persons. But the duration of the lease
extended much later then rather after the usufruct
was terminated. When will that happen?
For example, the usufruct was created between you
and the owner of the property with a condition, and
the condition of the owner of the property was that
you continue to be a usufructory until such time that
his children would want now to make usufruct of the
property. So the extinguishment of the usufruct is
dependent upon the need of the children, which, as
you as usufructory, you don't know when they would
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Now, September, 2020 the children now made
notice that they are going to use the property. So
that's the condition, resolutory condition which
extinguishes, the usufruct that means that the
usufruct is terminated that on September, 2020 but
then you have lease contracts ending on December
2020.
What happens now? That is article 568, your 568 tells
you that as a usufructory, you are entitled to the
rentals from 2019, up to September 2020. Why?
Because you are still a usufructory, up until it is
terminated. From the time it is terminated, up until
the time that the lease contracts will also be
terminated.
Should the owner of the land, object of the usufruct
should respect the lease? The rent during that time
will now belong to the owner of the property, object
of the usufruct, that is article 568.
569 talks about also, how, how you treat the civil
fruits. When are they considered earned? 569 says
civil fruits are deemed accrue daily and belongs to
the usufructory in proportion to the time the usufruct
may last.
What does that mean?
For example, the property object of usufruct is a of
building. And again, as usufructory, you decided to
rent it out. Now just like most rentals of apartments or
buildings, there is a set date. When you will make the
payment. So for example, the agreement in the
rental contracts, which you have with your lessees.
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When you are renting out the building, it's every fifth
of the month. So, for rental for let's say, September,
its already paid in advance, fifth of September.
Now, let's say for example, there was a condition
again that the usufruct would be terminated, should
the owner decide to make use of the property.
September 5, you already received rentals. Let's just
assume that the rental is 30,000. 30,000 per month
and you as usufructory you already received the
rental for September on September 5. Now your
owner, the owner of the building already give you
notice that the usufruct will end on September 20, will
the entire 30,000 which you collected for the month
of September belong to you?
Say for example that there was a condition that the
usufruct will be terminated should the owner decide
to make use of the property. Sept 5, you already
received rentals, let’s assume that the rental is 30k
per month. And you as usufructuary, received the
rental for sept on sept 5, it’s advanced. Now, the
owner of the building already gave you notice that
the usufruct will end of sept 20.
Question: Will the entire 20k which you as
usufructuary, collected on the fifth of the month, for
the entire month sept, belong to you?
Answer: The law says that the civil fruits accrue daily.
That means that this 30k is supposedly earned spread
out for the whole month of sept, as daily. Since your
usufruct will end on sept 30, that means that the
portion of the 30k that was earned from sept 1-sept
20 will belong to the usufructuary. But from the 21st
up to the of 30th of sept will now belong to the owner
of the property. So even if you as a usufructuary
already received it in full on sept 5, you will only get
30k divided by 30 days for sept which is 20k and the
owner 10k. And since you already have the 30k,
keep the 20k and give the owner 10k. That is what is
meant by Article 569.
Usufruct Constituted on Certain Rights
Article 570. Whenever a usufruct is constituted on
the right to receive a rent or periodical
pension, whether in money or in fruits, or in the
interest on bonds or securities payable to bearer,
each payment due shall be considered as the
proceeds or fruits of such right.
Whenever it consists in the enjoyment of benefits
accruing from a participation in any industrial or
commercial enterprise, the date of the distribution
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of which is not fixed, such benefits shall have the
same character.
In either case they shall be distributed as civil fruits,
and shall be applied in the manner prescribed in
the preceding article.
Whatever you get, that is considered as fruits.
As to Natural and Industrial Fruits
Article 567. Natural or industrial fruits growing at
the time the usufruct begins, belong to the
usufructuary.
Those growing at the time the usufruct terminates,
belong to the owner.
In the preceding cases, the usufructuary, at the
beginning of the usufruct, has no obligation to
refund to the owner any expenses incurred; but
the owner shall be obliged to reimburse at the
termination of the usufruct, from the proceeds of
the growing fruits, the ordinary expenses of
cultivation, for seed, and other similar expenses
incurred by the usufructuary.
The provisions of this article shall not prejudice the
rights of third persons, acquired either at the
beginning or at the termination of the usufruct.
How about natural and industrial fruits, is it the same
as civil fruits? It is different.
Fruits growing at the beginning of usufruct
Natural or industrial fruits growing at the time the
usufruct begins, belong to the Usufructuary
Example: today the owner of the parcel of land
grants you usufructuary. When you entered the
property, you saw coconut trees with coconuts
growing.
Question: who will enjoy the fruits?
Answer: 567 says it shall be usufructuary.
Question: why?
Answer: Because it is presumed that when the owner
of the property granted you usufructuary rights, then
he must have thought about you enjoying the fruits
of his property.
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Fruits growing at the termination of usufruct
Question: How about those that are growing at the
time the usufruct terminates and you as a usufruct,
have planted there and then there are fruits
growing? Who owns the fruits?
Answer: The law says that those that are growing at
the time the usufruct terminates belong to the
owner. Whoever will be in possession at the time will
now become the owner. So, when the usufruct
terminates, the owner will now enter into possession.
So, whatever fruits you are growing there, it will now
be enjoyed by the owner.
Question: So, if its owner to the usufruct, will the
usufruct reimburse the owner upon entering the
property and there were fruits growing in it?
Answer: Clearly, in this case, the owner spent for or
cultivated said fruits. The law says Art 567 the
usufructuary, at the beginning of the usufruct, has no
obligation to refund to the owner any expenses
incurred. Again the reason being that the owner
must have thought of the usufruct when he granted
the right to him.
Question: If it is Usufruct to owner upon termination
where usufruct cultivated and spent for the fruits and
then the usufruct ends, the owner enters the property
and there were growing fruits. Will the owner be
obliged to reimbursed?
Answer: In the first scenario, usufruct is not obliged to
reimburse. But at the end of the usufruct, the law says
but the owner shall be obliged to reimburse at the
termination of the usufruct but with a qualification
Qualification: but it must be FROM THE PROCEEDS of
the growing fruits. The owner is obliged to reimburse
all the ordinary expenses of cultivation, for seed, and
other similar expenses incurred by the usufructuary.
But it must come from the proceeds of the growing
fruits.
Illustration:
If after termination, owner enters to the property, he
harvests the fruits and sells them for 200K and the
ordinary expenses is 150K, then from the 200K, owner
pays usufruct 150K.
Question: What if the proceeds of the fruits is much
less than the expenses incurred, should the naked
owner pay more than the proceeds? For example,
he receives only 150k as proceeds and the expenses
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for cultivating them by the usufruct is 200k, how
much should the owner pay, 150k or 200k?
Answer: The law says ONLY FROM THE PROCEEDS. The
owner is obliged to pay 150K only.
As to Increase Which the Thing in Usufruct May
Acquire
Who will get to enjoy the increase in value? Of
course, your usufructuary at the time the usufruct
lasts.
Article 571. The usufructuary shall have the right to
enjoy any increase which the thing in
usufruct may acquire through accession, the
servitudes established in its favor, and, in general,
all the benefits inherent therein.
If during the usufruct, there where buildings
constructed in the property, then your usufructuary
will also get to enjoy them.
Transactions that the Usufructuary May Enter Into
Article 572. The usufructuary may personally enjoy
the thing in usufruct, lease it to another, or alienate
his right of usufruct, even by a gratuitous title; but
all the contracts he may enter into as such
usufructuary shall terminate upon the expiration of
the usufruct, saving leases of rural lands, which
shall be considered as subsisting during the
agricultural year.
GNRL: Usufructuary may alienate his right of usufruct
Because usufruct is his, and he can sell it or lease it
out or even by a gratuitous title, he can let
somebody enjoy his usufructuary rights. But all the
contracts but all the contracts he may enter into as
such usufructuary shall terminate upon the expiration
of the usufruct
EXPN: leases of rural lands which shall continue and
the law mandates that the lease be respected and
it shall be considered as subsisting until the end of the
agricultural year.
Abnormal Usufruct
What are the consequences if you are the
usufructuary? What your rights as usufructuary when
the usufruct is an abnormal one?
There are two kinds of abnormal usufruct:
1. You need to consume it to be able to use it.
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2. You don’t need to consume it, but when you use
it, it gradually deteriorates (Art 573)
Article 573. Whenever the usufruct includes things
which, without being consumed, gradually
deteriorate through wear and tear, the
usufructuary shall have the right to make use
thereof in accordance with the purpose for which
they are intended, and shall not be obliged to
return them at the termination of the usufruct
except in their condition at that time; but he shall
be obliged to indemnify the owner for any
deterioration they may have suffered by reason of
his fraud or negligence.
Example:
There was a usufruct constituted in your favor over a
car. When you used the car, you don’t consume it,
you don’t eat it, but it will gradually deteriorate. This
is also an abnormal usufruct.
The law tells you that you can use it and you are not
obliged to return the car as when you received it.
Reason:
Because it gradually deteriorates. If the usufruct is for
five years and you received it brand new, the law
does not require you to return the car as it was five
years ago when the usufruct was constituted. That is
just tear.
The law however says that you will be obliged to
indemnify the owner of the deterioration was caused
by your fraud or negligence. So, if you are a reckless
driver, the car has so many scratches and dents
caused by your recklessness and not be accident. It
was proven to be cause by you, then you have to
indemnify the owner, but if it is just ordinary wear and
tear, then return the thing in the same condition.
Question: How about if the car deteriorates due to
heavy flooding, is the usufruct liable?
Answer: That is a fortuitous event so the usufructuary
is not liable, but he is liable for ordinary repairs
Article 574. Whenever the usufruct includes things
which cannot be used without being consumed,
the usufructuary shall have the right to make use
of them under the obligation of paying their
appraised value at the termination of the usufruct,
if they were appraised when delivered. In case
they were not appraised, he shall have the right to
return the same quantity and quality, or pay their
current price at the time the usufruct ceases
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Example: five barrels of gasoline. If they are
appraised, then you return the appraised value of
the usufruct because for you to be able to enjoy the
use of that gasoline, you have to consume it so
naturally by the end of the usufruct it’s gone. So, your
obligation as the usufructuary is pay its appraised
value if they were appraised, if not same quantity
and quality or pay the current price at the end of the
usufruct.
Question: Can money be an object of usufruct?
Answer: Yes, it can be object of usufruct also.
Basically, it’s just your simple loan or mutuum where
you have to return what you have borrowed.
Usufruct on fruit-bearing trees and shrubs
Article 575. The usufructuary of fruit-bearing trees
and shrubs may make use of the dead trunks, and
even of those cut off or uprooted by accident,
under the obligation to replace them with new
plants.
USUFRUCT ON FRUIT-BEARING TREES AND SHRUBS
Article 575. The usufructuary of fruit-bearing trees
and shrubs may make use of the dead trunks, and
even of those cut off or uprooted by accident,
under the obligation to replace them with new
plants. (483a)
Article 576. If in consequence of a calamity or
extraordinary event, the trees or shrubs shall have
disappeared in such considerable number that it
would not be possible or it would be too
burdensome to replace them, the usufructuary
may leave the dead, fallen or uprooted trunks at
the disposal of the owner, and demand that the
latter remove them and clear the land. (484a)
578. The usufructuary of an action to recover real
property or a real right, or any movable property,
has the right to bring the action and to oblige the
owner thereof to give him the authority for this
purpose and to furnish him whatever proof he may
have. If in consequence of the enforcement of
the action he acquires the thing claimed, the
usufruct shall be limited to the fruits, the dominion
remaining with the owner. (486)
I mentioned earlier that you can also make rights as
an object of usufruct. So the right to recover property
may also be an object of usufruct.
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So if you’re given such usufructuary right over an
action to recover, then the owner of the property
should give you all the evidence necessary for you
to be successful in recovering the property.
Should you be successful in recovering the property,
then you will now be able to enjoy the property. But
of course, OWNERSHIP WILL STILL BELONG TO THE
NAKED OWNER.
Problem:
Now, as a usufructuary on a parcel of land, you
decided to build a mansion. You decided to build a
swimming pool and other useful and luxurious
improvements and expenses, At the end of the
usufruct, can you ask for reimbursement for those
you have built on the property?
ANS:
The law says, YOU ARE NOT. Article 579 says the
usufructuary may make on the property held in
usufruct such useful improvements or expenses for
mere pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he
does not alter its form or substance; but he shall have
no right to be indemnified therefor. He may,
however, remove such improvements, should it be
possible to do so without damage to the property.
(487)
Rationale: Being a usufructuary, you know that’s not
your property and you know some time, that
usufructuary will end and the property will revert to
the owner.
If we allow reimbursement, then your usufructuary
may improve the owner out of his property. Suppose
the property is in the province and the value is just
1m and you built improvements worth 30m, if the law
allows indemnification, then you are already
improving the owner out of his property.
Now what is his recourse?
He may remove such improvements, should it be
possible to do so without damage to the property.
(487)
What if the usufructuary does not wish to remove?
Can the owner compel him to remove?
NO. The owner cannot compel him to remove. In the
same manner, if the usufructuary wants to remove
the improvements because he can do so without
damaging the property of the owner, the owner also
cannot stop him.
Moralidad v. Pernes
(G.R. No. 152809. August 3, 2006)
This is an example of a usufruct with a condition
and the condition is that they live in harmony. You
have here an aunt that letting her relatives stay on
her property with a condition to live in harmony.
Unfortunately, however, this aunt was abused by
her relatives and so she wanted them out of the
property. In response, they wanted the aunt to
reimburse them with the value of the
improvements they made on the property.
RULING:
They are not entitled to reimbursement for the
improvements they introduced on the property.
This is clearly a usufruct and the instrument says
that you are allowed to use the property with the
condition to live in harmony. The usufruct
terminated when they were no longer living in
harmony. And although you built improvements
on the property, a usufructuary is not entitled to be
reimbursed because you know fully-well that that
is not your property.
If the improvements cannot be removed without
damage, what can a usufructuary do?
Article 580. The usufructuary may set off the
improvements he may have made on the
property against any damage to the same. (488)
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Pursuant to Article 580, if you cause any damage to
the property of the usufruct, then you can offset it
with the improvements you have made.
usufruct of the part allotted to the co-owner shall
belong to the usufructuary. (490)
So if you cause damage amounting to P500,000 but
the value of the improvement is P800,000 then you
can set it off. Since there is an excess of P300,000
then you can remove some of the improvements
amounting to P300,000.
The usufructuary’s rights will just be like the co-owner
of the co-owned property.
But what if you can’t remove improvements
amounting to P300,000 without damage or injury?
Then it will accrue to the owner of the property
because of the principle that “accession follows the
principal.”
How to construe:
Should the co-ownership cease by reason of the
division of the thing held in common, the usufruct of
the part allotted to the co-owner shall belong to the
usufructuary. (490)
When you say “belong”, it doesn’t mean belong as
in ownership, but you will have the usufructuary right
over the property allotted to the you.
OBLIGATIONS OF THE USUFRUCTUARY
How about if it’s the reverse?
The damage exceeds the value of the
improvements, let’s say damage is P800,000 and the
improvements is only P500,000, then of course you
have to PAY UP THE DEFICIENCY.
Can your naked owner still sell the property even if
it’s enjoyed by your usufructuary?
Article 581. The owner of property the usufruct of
which is held by another, may alienate it, but he
cannot alter its form or substance, or do anything
thereon which may be prejudicial to the
usufructuary. (489)
YES he still can, being the owner of the property.
How about you are granted usufructuary rights by a
co-owner of a property over a co-owner property?
Article 582. The usufructuary of a part of a thing
held in common shall exercise all the rights
pertaining to the owner thereof with respect to the
administration and the collection of fruits or
interest. Should the co-ownership cease by reason
of the division of the thing held in common, the
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We can divide them into three:
1. Obligations BEFORE the usufruct begins
2. Obligations DURING the usufruct
3. Obligations after TERMINATION of
usufruct
the
Article 583. The usufructuary, before entering
upon the enjoyment of the property, is obliged:
(1) To make, after notice to the owner or his
legitimate representative, an inventory of all the
property, which shall contain an appraisal of the
movables and a description of the condition of
the immovables;
(2) To give security, binding himself to fulfill the
obligations imposed upon him in accordance with
this Chapter. (491)
BEFORE THE USUFRUCT BEGINS:
1. Make an inventory.
2. Give a security binding himself to fulfill the
obligations
imposed
upon
him
in
accordance with this chapter.
Who bears the expenses in the inventory?
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The expenses should be borne by the usufructuary
because it is for his benefit that the usufruct was
made and so inventory being an obligation of the
usufructuary should also be at his expense.
Is there particular form required for your inventory?
NO. There is none so long as your inventory will have
a list of all properties that are objects of your usufruct
and will also contain an appraisal of your movables
and the description of the condition of your
immovables.
Is there an instance where this obligation is excused?
Article 585. The usufructuary, whatever may be
the title of the usufruct, may be excused from the
obligation of making an inventory or of giving
security, when no one will be injured thereby. (493)
So when you say “when is the obligation excused?”,
that means that your usufructuary MAY NOT MAKE
AN INVETORY AND MAY NOT GIVE A SECURITY ONLY
WHEN NO ONE IS INJURED BY SUCH.
2nd
Now going back to the
obligation of the
usufructuary to give security, what is the purpose of
giving the security?
The purpose is to ensure fulfillment by the
usufructuary of the obligations imposed upon him
including the duty to return to the owner of the thing
in usufruct at the termination of the usufruct.
Because again, usufruct is merely enjoyment thing.
Hence, it is not perpetual. It is only for a limited time
as granted by the naked owner of the thing, and so
the naked owner must be protected. Hence, the
security serves as the naked owner’s insurance that
the usufructuary will make sure to take care and
return the thing which is the object of the usufruct at
the termination.
Is there a specific kind of security required by law?
NONE. It could be in the form of another property or
cash but there is NO particular form of security.
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When security is not applicable/required:
Article 584. The provisions of No. 2 of the
preceding article shall not apply to the donor who
has reserved the usufruct of the property donated,
or to the parents who are usufructuaries of their
children's property, except when the parents
contract a second marriage. (492a)
Article 584 speaks of an instance where the giving of
the security is not applicable or not required. And
when is this?
1. to the donor who has reserved the usufruct of
the property donated,
2. or to the parents who are usufructuaries of
their children's property, except when the
parents contract a second marriage.
This article speaks of 2 instances when giving a
security is NOT APPLICABLE.
Example:
You are the donor and I donated a parcel of land in
favor of X. But I tell X that “yes, I am donating the
naked ownership to you, BUT I will, however, reserve
the use of the property for 20 years.”
Now are you required as a usufructuary to give a
security to X?
NO. Because you are the donor so why should you
give a security to X when you could’ve chosen to
keep the property for yourself.
Because I am the donor. I was the one who gave this
to you, so why should I give a security to you who is
the donee of the property? I am merely reserving its
enjoyment I could have chosen not to give it to you,
but I gave it to you anyway. The law does not give
the donor the obligation to give a security to your
donee.
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Another instance is the parents. When the parents
are usufructuaries of their children’s properties.
Because, if you can still remember in your obligations
and contracts, the properties of the minors will be
under the care of the parents, so the parents may
enjoy the property.
Now, if the parents are usufructuaries of the
children’s properties, they being the guardians of
their children, are not required to give a security.
Atty Bathan:
After reading paragraph 2, -- So, here remember
that even the usufructuary has failed to give a
security, it does not terminate the usufruct. Look at
the first paragraph of 586. It does not terminate the
usufruct, it just says that if it is a movable, then it may
be sold, and if immovable maybe placed under
administration.
But there is an exception to the exception – as the
general rule is that the usufructuary has to give a
security, and the exception for this is that the donor
and the parents.
BUT if the sale or the investment in securities, if the
placing of it in administration, the object of the
usufruct, if it will gain or have profit, who shall the
profit belong to?
BUT the exception to the exception as to requiring
the parent to give a security, is when the parent will
contract a second marriage to protect the children.
2nd paragraph says that it will still be the usufructuary.
Because again, a usufruct is where the usufructuary
is given the right to enjoy the use and the fruits of the
property which is the object of the usufruct. That is
why the 2nd paragraph of 586 says that interest of the
proceeds of the sale of the movables and that on
public securities and bonds, and the proceeds of the
property placed under administration, shall belong
to the usufructuary.
Because now, this particular parent is married to
someone else, so that is to protect also the children.
WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF FAILURE TO GIVE SECURITY?
This is article 586.
586: Should the usufructuary fail to give security in
the cases in which he is bound to give it, the owner
may demand that the immovables be placed
under administration, that the movables be sold,
that the public bonds, instruments of credit
payable to order or to bearer be converted into
registered certificates or deposited in a bank or
public institution, and that the capital or sums in
cash and the proceeds of the sale of the movable
property be invested in safe securities.
The interest on the proceeds of the sale of the
movables and that on public securities and bonds,
and the proceeds of the property placed under
administration, shall belong to the usufructuary.
Furthermore, the owner may, if he so prefers, until
the usufructuary gives security or is excused from
so doing, retain in his possession the property in
usufruct as administrator, subject to the obligation
to deliver to the usufructuary the net proceeds
thereof, after deducting the sums which may be
agreed upon or judicially allowed him for such
administration.
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And in the 3rd paragraph, (reading codal) – so again,
the usufruct is not terminated. The naked owner who
granted the usufruct may become the administrator
of these properties and withhold the possession. In
other words, what is just being taken away, what
right is being taken away from the usufructuary is the
right to possess. BUT AS TO THE ENJOYMENT OF THE
FRUITS, it is still there. Because, your naked owner is
still mandated to become the administrator and to
deliver the fruits, but subject of course to the fact
that your administrator can deduct from the
proceeds the amount that is agreed upon or
judicially granted to him for costs of administration.
Now, is there any other thing that you may offer lieu
of security? This is 587.
587: If the usufructuary who has not given security
claims, by virtue of a promise under oath, the
delivery of the furniture necessary for his use, and
that he and his family be allowed to live in a house
included in the usufruct, the court may grant this
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petition, after due consideration of the facts of the
case.
WHAT THEN ARE THE OBLIGATIONS OF YOUR
USUFRUCTUARY DURING THE USUFRUCT?
The same rule shall be observed with respect to
implements, tools and other movable property
necessary for an industry or vocation in which he
is engaged.
Take care of the property.
If the owner does not wish that certain articles be
sold because of their artistic worth or because
they have a sentimental value, he may demand
their delivery to him upon his giving security for the
payment of the legal interest on their appraised
value.
Atty Bathan:
When does article 587 apply?
It applies when the usufructuary who is under
obligation to give a security, cannot afford to do so
and no one is willing to give security for them. So
here, they really need it but they cannot afford to
give a security. This is what 587 is about.
588: After the security has been given by the
usufructuary, he shall have a right to all the
proceeds and benefits from the day on which, in
accordance with the title constituting the usufruct,
he should have commenced to receive them.
Atty Bathan: Now, 588. This talks about the
retroactive effect of giving the security. (READING
CODAL).
For example, the usufruct is supposed to start on July
1, 2020. But the usufructuary was only able to give a
security on September 1, 2020. If there were any
proceeds or fruits or interest on the property object
of the usufruct from July to September, that still
belongs to the USUFRUCTUARY because, the effect
of giving the security will retroact to the date when
the usufruct should have begun.
Now, those are the 2 obligations of the usufructuary
before the usufruct begins.
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Remember that the property is not yours. Yes, you
may enjoy its possession, enjoy the fruits of that
property, but you have to take care of such
property.
And, 589 says that, the usufructuary shall take care
of the things given in usufruct as a good father of a
family.
You have to take of the things given in usufruct as a
good father of the family.
590: A usufructuary who alienates or leases his right
of usufruct shall answer for any damage which the
things in usufruct may suffer through the fault or
negligence of the person who substitutes him.
Now, I think I have mentioned in the earlier videos
that the usufructuary can in fact have a substitute or
appoint a substitute in the enjoyment of the usufruct.
Now, 590 tells you about the liability for fault or
negligence of the substitute. WHO IS LIABLE?
(READING CODAL) So the substitute of the
usufructuary is like an extension of his person. If the
substitute will cause damage to the property which
is the object of the usufruct then it is the usufructuary
who will be liable to the naked owner.
591: If the usufruct be constituted on a flock or
herd of livestock, the usufructuary shall be obliged
to replace with the young thereof the animals that
die each year from natural causes, or are lost due
to the rapacity of beasts of prey.
If the animals on which the usufruct is constituted
should all perish, without the fault of the
usufructuary, on account of some contagious
disease or any other uncommon event, the
usufructuary shall fulfill his obligation by delivering
to the owner the remains which may have been
saved from the misfortune.
Should the herd or flock perish in part, also by
accident and without the fault of the usufructuary,
the usufruct shall continue on the part saved.
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Should the usufruct be on sterile animals, it shall be
considered, with respect to its effects, as though
constituted on fungible things.
Replace things in Usufruct
Another obligation of the USUFRUCTUARY is 591 to
replace things in usufruct. Now 591 says (READING
CODAL). – so, this talks about a usufruct over a flock
or herd of livestock.
Now, what you need to remember here, is that YES
there is an obligation to replace, but where do you
get the replacement?
For those that die due to natural causes and those
that die due to the rapacity of beasts of prey. YOU
REPLACE THEM WITH THE YOUNG. So, if the have
produced the young of animals, then that is what is
used to replace those that died. You do not have to
buy from outside sources, just have to get it from
there, from the young.
(READING PARAGRAPH 2) Here again, there is no
obligation to replace if all should perish without the
fault of the usufructuary. BUT THE OBLIGATION IS TO
DELIVER WHAT EVER REMAINS.
(READING PARAGRAPH 3) So, the usufruct is not
terminated. Because there is just partial loss. It will
continue with what was saved.
Lastly, (READING PARAGRAPH 4) sterile animals,
meaning they cannot produce. This means that, if
those animals are sterile and the usufruct is upon
them, then that means you can cook them,
consume them or you can sell them.
Make repairs
Atty Bathan:
Now, another obligation of your usufructuary is to
make repairs. 592 on ordinary repairs. (READING
CODAL)
Now, what do you mean by ordinary repairs?
By ordinary repairs are understood such as (reading
paragraph 2). Again, such is not a cause to
terminate the usufruct. The owner will just do the
repairs but will have to demand upon the
usufructuary to pay for such repairs or to reimburse if
the owner has already paid for them.
593: Extraordinary repairs shall be at the expense
of the owner. The usufructuary is obliged to notify
the owner when the need for such repairs is
urgent.
Atty Bathan:
How about for extra ordinary repairs? Meaning those
repairs not for the ordinary wear and tear? That is
593.
(READING CODAL). Such shall be at the expense of
the owner, and not of the usufructuary. Now,
ordinary expenses are for the usufructuary because
it’s the usufructuary who is enjoying the property.
BUT FOR EXTRAORDINARY REPAIRS, it must be your
naked owner who should shoulder such repairs.
WHAT ARE EXTRA ORDINARY REPAIRS?
592: The usufructuary is obliged to make the
ordinary repairs needed by the thing given in
usufruct.
First, those required by the wear and tear due to the
natural use of the thing but not indispensable for
preservation.
By ordinary repairs are understood such as are
required by the wear and tear due to the natural
use of the thing and are indispensable for its
preservation. Should the usufructuary fail to make
them after demand by the owner, the latter may
make them at the expense of the usufructuary.
Second, those required by the deterioration of or
damage to the thing caused by exceptional
circumstances but not indispensable again for its
preservation and those required by the deterioration
of or damage to the thing caused by exceptional
circumstances and are indispensable for its
preservation.
Remember, that while the extraordinary repairs
should be shouldered by the NAKED OWNER, what is
the obligation of the usufructuary?
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The obligation of the usufructuary is to notify the
naked owner.
594: If the owner should make the extraordinary
repairs, he shall have a right to demand of the
usufructuary the legal interest on the amount
expended for the time that the usufruct lasts.
Should he not make them when they are
indispensable for the preservation of the thing, the
usufructuary may make them; but he shall have a
right to demand of the owner, at the termination
of the usufruct, the increase in value which the
immovable may have acquired by reason of the
repairs.
Atty Bathan:
Now, if your owner will make the extraordinary
repairs and of course the usufructuary will continue
to make use of the property subject of the usufruct.
Your 594 says that… (READING)
So, not the amount itself but just the legal interest.
Because, it is the usufructuary who is benefiting from
it. So, it may have been extraordinary repairs, and it
maybe the owner who spent for it but the one
benefiting from it is your usufructuary. So, the law is
requiring the usufructuary to pay the owner the legal
interest for the time that the usufruct lasts.
(READING 2nd paragraph)
Now, in this case when usufructuary was the one
who made the extraordinary repairs because it is
indispensable for its preservation. Does he have the
same right as a possessor in good faith to retain the
possession of the property until he is reimbursed with
the increase in value?
Permit works and improvements by the naked
owner.
Art. 595. The owner may construct any works and
make any improvements of which the immovable
in usufruct is susceptible, or make new plantings
thereon if it be rural, provided that such acts do
not cause a diminution in the value of the usufruct
or prejudice the right of the usufructuary. (503)
This is because it is his property.
The limitation is that the acts do not cause a
diminution in the value of the usufruct or prejudice
the right of the usufructuary.
How about for annual taxes and charges?
Who will be liable?
Art. 596. The payment of annual charges and
taxes and of those considered as a lien on the
fruits, shall be at the expense of the usufructuary
for all the time that the usufruct lasts. (504)
Art. 597. The taxes which, during the usufruct, may
be imposed directly on the capital, shall be at the
expense of the owner.
If the latter has paid them, the usufructuary shall
pay him the proper interest on the sums which
may have been paid in that character; and, if the
said sums have been advanced by the
usufructuary, he shall recover the amount thereof
at the termination of the usufruct. (505)
For annual taxes and charges pertaining to the fruits
of the property
Yes. The usufructuary like a possessor in good faith
has the right of retention even after the termination
of the usufruct until he is reimbursed for the increase
in value of the property caused by extraordinary
repairs for preservation. The increase in value is the
difference between the value of the property before
the repairs were made and the value after the
repairs were completed.
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for annual taxes and charges pertaining to the fruits
of the property, the one who will pay for that is your
usufructuary.
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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But 597, The taxes which, during the usufruct, may be
imposed directly on the capital, shall be at the
expense of the owner. This is because it is for the
property itself and not the fruits.
If the owner has paid them, the Usufructuary shall
pay him the property interest on the sums because
he is the one using the property, but only the interest
and not the total amount that was paid.
…if the said sums have been advanced by the
usufructuary, he shall recover the amount thereof at
the termination of the usufruct. (505)…
Example:
There is a parcel of land that is the object of usufruct.
Now, this parcel of land is subject to real property
taxes, a tax on the land. Who will pay for that? Is this
capital or fruits? Capital. IT must be paid by the
naked owner.
If however, there are harvest on the land, so the
usufructuary sells it and has income over the harvest,
then the income is fruits, Who will pay for the taxes
now? The usufructuary.
[this is what is meant by 596 and 597]
Additionally, going back to the real property taxes
on the land. Yes, its your naked owner who will pay
for those taxes but your naked owner can demand
for payment of interest for what he has paid, during
the time that the usufruct lasts. He may demand this
from your usufructuary.
Art. 598. If the usufruct be constituted on the whole
of a patrimony, and if at the time of its constitution
the owner has debts, the provisions of articles 758
and 759 relating to donations shall be applied,
both with respect to the maintenance of the
usufruct and to the obligation of the usufructuary
to pay such debts.
The same rule shall be applied in case the owner
is obliged, at the time the usufruct is constituted,
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to make periodical payments, even if there should
be no known capital. (506)
Article 758. When the donation imposes upon the
donee the obligation to pay the debts of the
donor, if the clause does not contain any
declaration to the contrary, the former is
understood to be liable to pay only the debts
which appear to have been previously
contracted. In no case shall the donee be
responsible for the debts exceeding the value of
the property donated, unless a contrary intention
clearly appears. (642a)
Article 759. There being no stipulation regarding
the payment of debts, the donee shall be
responsible therefor only when the donation has
been made in fraud of creditors.
The donation is always presumed to be in fraud of
creditors, when at the time thereof the donor did
not reserve sufficient property to pay his debts
prior to the donation. (643)
598, this article talks about whether your usufructuary
will pay the debts constituted on the whole of a
patrimony.
Take note that “the whole of a patrimony” means
that it is referring to the whole or all the properties of
your naked owner.
What is 758 and 759?
It says if there is a stipulation for the payment of the
usufructuary for the debts of the owner, ion other
words, the naked own says “Okay, you will be my
usufructuary, I have debts, and I put there clearly
that you will be liable clearly to pay for my debts.
Then, therefore, the law says that you will be liable to
pay for the debts. But, only for the debts contracted
by the naked owner before the constitution of the
usufruct.
If there is no stipulation about the payment of debts,
the usufructuary shall be responsible to pay the
debts of the naked owner only when the usufruct
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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was created in fraud of creditors which is always
presumed when the owner did not reserve sufficient
property to pay his debts prior to the usufruct.
should he not do so, for damages, as if they had
been caused through his own fault. (511)
Why is there a presumption of fraud if your naked
owner did not reserve sufficient properties before the
constitution of the usufruct?
If he knows that someone is trying to trespass the
property, he should notify. If it causes damage to the
owner, the usufruct will be liable for damages as if
they had been caused through his own fault.
Because, if you have debts, you should put in mind
that you have to pay these debts. Why would you
enter into an agreement for usufruct when you still
have a debt? Thus, fraud is presumed.
ANOTHER OBLIGATION OF THE USUFRUCTUARY:
ANOTHER OBLIGATION OF THE USUFRUCTUARY:
Secure the naked owners or courts’ approval to
collect credits in certain cases.
Art. 599. The usufructuary may claim any matured
credits which form a part of the usufruct if he has
given or gives the proper security. If he has been
excused from giving security or has not been able
to give it, or if that given is not sufficient, he shall
need the authorization of the owner, or of the
court in default thereof, to collect such credits.
The usufructuary who has given security may use
the capital he has collected in any manner he
may deem proper. The usufructuary who has not
given security shall invest the said capital at
interest upon agreement with the owner in default
of such agreement, with judicial authorization;
and, in every case, with security sufficient to
preserve the integrity of the capital in usufruct.
(507)
Pay court expenses and costs
Art. 602. The expenses, costs and liabilities in suits
brought with regard to the usufruct shall be borne
by the usufructuary.
Art. 600. The usufructuary of a mortgaged
immovable shall not be obliged to pay the debt
for the security of which the mortgage was
constituted.
Should the immovable be attached or sold
judicially for the payment of the debt, the owner
shall be liable to the usufructuary for whatever the
latter may lose by reason thereof. (509)
Example:
A house is granted to X as a usufructuary by the
naked owner Y, but Y used this house as a collateral
for a loan.
Is X obliged to pay the loan of Y? No. He is not.
ANOTHER OBLIGATION OF THE USUFRUCTUARY:
Notify the naked owner of any prejudicial acts that
have been committed by a third person.
Art. 601. The usufructuary shall be obliged to notify
the owner of any act of a third person, of which he
may have knowledge, that may be prejudicial to
the rights of ownership, and he shall be liable
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What if the immovable is attached?
Supposing Y fails to pay his loan and the house is
foreclosed. What is the liability of Y to X
(usufructuary)?
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Y, the owner will be liable to X for whatever the latter
may lose by reason thereof.
OBLIGATIONS OF THE USUFRUCTUARY AT THE
TERMINATION OF THE USUFRUCT
Of course, to return the thing in usufruct.
Art. 612. Upon the termination of the usufruct, the
thing in usufruct shall be delivered to the owner,
without prejudice to the right of retention
pertaining to the usufructuary or his heirs for taxes
and extraordinary expenses which should be
reimbursed. After the delivery has been made, the
security or mortgage shall be cancelled. (522a)
Remember, the one we mentioned that he has the
same right as a possessor in GF?
The right of retention, after termination if he is not yet
reimbursed with extraordinary expenses that he has
spent.
These are for the EXTRAORDINARY expenses that he
has spent that are necessary for the preservation of
the property.
Article 597. The taxes which, during the usufruct,
may be imposed directly on the capital, shall be
at the expense of the owner.
Article 588. After the security has been given by
the usufructuary, he shall have a right to all the
proceeds and benefits from the day on which, in
accordance with the title constituting the usufruct,
he should have commenced to receive them.
(496)
Article 590. A usufructuary who alienates or leases
his right of usufruct shall answer for any damage
which the things in usufruct may suffer through the
fault or negligence of the person who substitutes
him. (498)
MODES OF EXTINGUISHING YOUR USUFRUCT
Art. 603. Usufruct is extinguished:
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a
contrary intention clearly appears;
…After the delivery has been made, the security or
mortgage shall be cancelled. (522a)…
(2) By the expiration of the period for which it
was constituted, or by the fulfillment of any
resolutory condition provided in the title
creating the usufruct;
ANOTHER OBLIGATION
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in
the same person;
to pay legal interest
-
-
for the time that the usufruct lasts on the
amount spent by the owner for extraordinary
repairs and also the proper interests of the
sums paid as taxes by the naked owner [594,
597]
indemnify the owner for any losses due to his
negligence or of his transferees. [588 to 590]
Article 594. If the owner should make the
extraordinary repairs, he shall have a right to
demand of the usufructuary the legal interest on
the amount expended for the time that the
usufruct lasts.
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(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person
constituting the usufruct;
(7) By prescription. (513a)
By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary
intention clearly appears;
Means that even if there is a resolutory condition or
a term or period that is agreed upon by the parties
for the usufruct, if the usufructuary dies, it will
terminate the usufruct.
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However, the usufructuary and naked owner can
expressly agree on a different intention like when
even if the usufructuary will die, the usufruct will
continue.
So, who will Enjoy the usufruct?
It will now be the heirs of the usufructuary. But the
general rule is when the usufructuary dies, the
usufruct is also terminated.
Another mode:
By the expiration of the period for which it was
constituted, or by the fulfillment of any resolutory
condition provided in the title creating the usufruct;
Because a usufruct is also a contract, then of course
these are modes of terminating a contract. If the
agreement is that the usufruct will only be for 10
years, then after the 10 years, the usufruct is
terminated.
If there is a condition attached to it, and the
happening of the condition will bring the termination
of the usufruct, then the happening of which will
terminate it.
Another mode:
By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the
same person;
So, if the naked owner is also the one in possession
and enjoying the property then there is no usufruct.
Therefore, it is also another way of terminating the
usufruct.
Example:
Naked owner granted the usufructuary rights to Y.
Y has been enjoying it for quiet some time. Naked
owner decides to donate the property to Y. Y is not
the owner of the property, he is usufructuary and the
donee. Therefore, the usufruct has been terminated.
Another mode:
Another mode:
by the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
So, if the thing in usufruct has been totally lost, means
there is no more property, then of course no usufruct
as there is no more property to enjoy.
Another mode:
by the termination of the right of the person
constituting the usufruct;
If the person granting the right of usufruct does not
anymore own the property. Thais will also terminate
the usufruct.
Another mode:
by prescription
Question: Will the death of the naked owner
terminate the usufruct? No.
What the law tells you is that if it’s the usufructuary
who dies then it terminates the usufruct, not when the
naked owner dies.
What does it mean then?
The implication now is that the heirs of the naked
owner will have to respect the usufructuary rights of
the usufructuary up until such time that the usufruct
is terminated based on the title or based on the
contract that was granted by the original owner.
(The naked owner who has died).
Baluran vs. Navarro
(she emphasized na basahon daw ni)
This is an example of a usufruct with a resolutory
condition,
The resolutory condition was that there will be a
return of the property ion case the children would
want to make use of it.
The children now wanted to make use of the
property so there is now an obligation to return the
property.
By renunciation of the usufructuary;
Another Example:
Moralidad vs Pernes
Remember that being a usufructuary is a right
granted to the usufructuary. It is a right that may be
renounced if he or she does not want to enjoy the
property anymore then he may renounce it. Thus,
usufruct is terminated.
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The aunt who granted to the niece and the
nephew the enjoyment of the property but the
condition was to live harmoniously.
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However, the niece and the nephew abused the
aunt physically and so she wanted them to leave
the property.
Q: Why is the usufruct extinguished when the town is
abandoned, or the corporation or association is
dissolved?
This is a resolutory condition and because of this,
the usufruct was ended when the harmonious
living was ended.
A: Because in this case, the usufructuary has legally
died. Remember, one of the grounds for the
termination of the usufruct is the death of the
usufructuary.
In fact, there was also an issue in this case as to
whether or not the usufructuary can be paid for
the value of the improvements that they made.
They cannot be paid. They know already that the
property does not belong to them. Whatever they
build belongs to the naked owner. They do not
have the right to be indemnified.
Article 604. If the thing given in usufruct should be
lost only in part, the right shall continue on the
remaining part. (514)
This means that partial loss will not terminate the
usufruct. AS mentioned, the grounds among others,
include only “total loss” and not partial loss.
Usufruct will remain on that part that was not lost.
Partial loss will not terminate the usufruct. As mention
in Art. 603, the ground for termination of the usufruct
is total loss of the thing. Thus, if it is only partial loss,
then the remaining part of the usufruct will remain.
USUFRUCT IN FAVOR OF JURIDICAL OR NONJURIDICAL ENTITIES
ART. 605, NCC
Usufruct cannot be constituted in favor of a town,
corporation, or association for more than fifty
years. If it has been constituted, and before the
expiration of such period the town is abandoned,
or the corporation or association is dissolved, the
usufruct shall be extinguished by reason thereof.
Fifty years is the limit or a period within which a
usufruct may be granted to a town, corporation, or
association. The usufruct cannot last for more than
this period.
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National Housing Authority vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 148830, April 13, 2005
Any usufruct in favour of a town, corporation, or
association is limited, by law, to a period of 50 years.
If the town is abandoned, or the corporation and
association is dissolved, the usufruct shall be
extinguished.
USUFRUCT WITH DURATION DEPENDENT ON THE AGE
OF A THIRD PERSON
ART. 606, NCC
A usufruct granted for the time that may elapse
before a third person attains a certain age, shall
subsist for the number of years specified, even if
the third person should die before the period
expires, unless such usufruct has been expressly
granted only in consideration of the existence
of such person.
GR: A usufruct granted for the time that may elapse
before a third person attains a certain age, shall
subsist for the number of years specified, even if the
third person should die before the period expires
Example: X grants the right of usufruct to Y over a
parcel of land, and the basis for the period is until the
son of Y reaches 25 years old. The usufruct was
granted today, when the son of Y is 5 years old, thus,
the period for which the usufruct is granted is for 20
years.
But what is now the implication if the son of Y dies
before reaching 25 years old? The law provides that
the usufruct will continue because the original period
should be followed. Thus, even if the son of Y dies at
20 years old, there is still the remaining 5 years
because the original period was really 20 years.
XPN: Unless such usufruct has been expressly granted
only in consideration of the existence of such person
Example: X grants the right of usufruct to Y over a
parcel of land, until Y’s son reaches 25 years old and
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the reason for X’s grant of the usufruct is for Y’s son to
enjoy the property.
Now, X’s grant of the usufruct was clearly meant to
depend on the existence of the son of Y. If the son of
Y dies at 20 years old, the usufruct is now terminated
because this is the exception to the general rule.
Rule 2: If the naked owner will decide to construct a
new building, then the naked oner now has the right
to occupy the old building. HOWEVER, the naked
owner has to pay legal interest to the usufructuary
until the original period of the usufruct will end.
PAYMENT AND COST OF INSURANCE
USUFRUCT ON LAND AND BUILDING, AND THE
BUILDING IS DESTROYED
ART. 607, NCC
If the usufruct is constituted on immovable
property of which a building forms part, and the
latter should be destroyed in any manner
whatsoever, the usufructuary shall have a right to
make use of the land and the materials.
The same rule shall be applied if the usufruct is
constituted on a building only and the same
should be destroyed. But in such a case, if the
owner should wish to construct another building,
he shall have a right to occupy the land and to
make use of the materials, being obliged to pay
to the usufructuary, during the continuance of the
usufruct, the interest upon the sum equivalent to
the value of the land and of the materials.
PARAGRAPH 1 (USUFRUCT OVER LAND)
1. The usufruct is over an immovable or a parcel of
land;
2. On the parcel of land is a building; and
3. The building is destroyed
Rule: By virtue of the contract of usufruct, the
usufructuary can enjoy the land and the building.
materials. If the building is destroyed, the usufruct will
continue because this is not a total loss of the thing
since the land is still there. This is just partial loss.
Thus, since it is just partial loss, the usufructuary can
still make use of the land and the materials of the
building.
PARAGRAPH 2 (USUFRUCT OVER BUILDING)
1. The usufruct is over a building; and
2. The building is destroyed
Rule 1: Here, the same rule in paragraph 1 still
applies. If the usufruct is over a building and the
building is destroyed, the usufructuary can also enjoy
the land and the building materials.
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ART. 608, NCC
If the usufructuary shares with the owner the
insurance of the tenement given in usufruct, the
former shall, in case of loss, continue in the
enjoyment of the new building, should one be
constructed, or shall receive the interest on the
insurance indemnity if the owner does not wish to
rebuild.
Should the usufructuary have refused to
contribute to the insurance, the owner insuring the
tenement alone, the latter shall receive the full
amount of the insurance indemnity in case of loss,
saving always the right granted to the
usufructuary in the preceding article.
PARAGRAPH 1 (Naked owner and usufructuary share
in insurance premium)
1. There is a usufruct over a building;
2. There is an insurance over the building;
3. The naked owner and the usufructuary will share
in the payment of the insurance premiums;
4. The building gets destroyed; and
5. The naked owner receives the claim on the
insurance
Rule: The usufructuary will
a. Naked owner rebuilds — Continue to use and the
building if the naked owner will construct a new
building; or
b. Naked owner will not rebuild — Receive interest
on the insurance indemnity from the naked
owner if the latter will not rebuild
PARAGRAPH 2 (Usufructuary does not share in the
insurance premium)
1. There is a usufruct over a building;
2. There is an insurance over the building;
3. The usufructuary will not share or refused to share
in the payment of the insurance premiums;
4. The building gets destroyed; and
5. The naked owner receives the claim on the
insurance
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Rule: The usufructuary will be
a. Given the interest on the insurance indemnity;
b. But will have no right to occupy the new building
if the owner chooses to rebuild because he did
not share in the payment of the insurance
premium
EXPROPRIATION OF A THING IN USUFRUCT
ART. 609, NCC
Should the thing in usufruct be expropriated for
public use, the owner shall be obliged either to
replace it with another thing of the same value
and of similar conditions, or to pay the usufructuary
the legal interest on the amount of the indemnity
for the whole period of the usufruct. If the owner
chooses the latter alternative, he shall give security
for the payment of the interest.
If the property under usufruct is expropriated by the
State, and the usufructuary is no longer able to enjoy
the property, the naked owner will now have the
obligation to either:
a. Replace the expropriated property with another
thing of the same value and of similar conditions;
or
b. Pay legal interest on the amount of the indemnity
that he received from the State
ART. 610, NCC
A usufruct is not extinguished by bad use of the
thing in usufruct; but if the abuse should cause
considerable injury to the owner, the latter may
demand that the thing be delivered to him, binding
himself to pay annually to the usufructuary the net
proceeds of the same, after deducting the
expenses and the compensation which may be
allowed him for its administration.
Even if the usufructuary has abused the thing in
usufruct, it does not terminate the usufruct
The usufructuary will still have the right to the fruits
because a usufruct is about enjoying the use and the
fruits.
Thus, even if there has been bad use of the thing, it
does not terminate the usufruct. It is not among the
grounds for termination of the usufruct under Art. 603.
USUFRUCT IN FAVOR OF SEVERAL PERSONS
ART. 611, NCC
A usufruct constituted in favor of several persons
living at the time of its constitution shall not be
extinguished until death of the last survivor.
This speaks of several usufructuaries who are all living
at the same time.
Example: X constituted a usufruct over a parcel of
land in favour of A, B, and C. If A dies, the
usufructuary is not terminated so long as B and C are
still alive. The usufruct will only be terminated when
the last survivor has died. Of course, this is granting
that the period for the usufruct has not yet ended.
Policarpio vs. Asuncion
G.R. No. L-21809, January 31, 1966
A usufruct constituted in favor of several persons
living at the time of the constitution shall not be
extinguished until the death of the last survivor. The
rights of the deceased usufructuaries accrue to
those who are living, unless the usufruct is made in a
will and the testator provides otherwise.
ART. 612, NCC
Upon the termination of the usufruct, the thing in
usufruct shall be delivered to the owner, without
prejudice to the right of retention pertaining to the
usufructuary or his heirs for taxes and extraordinary
expenses which should be reimbursed. After the
delivery has been made, the security or mortgage
shall be cancelled.
Q: What is the right of the owner?
A: It will give the owner the right to get back the thing
and to become the administrator of the thing.
The owner still has the obligation to give the net
proceeds (if any). The net proceeds have to be
given because the owner still has to deduct the cost
of administration.
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MODULE 7:
EASEMENT
Article 613
An easement or servitude is an encumbrance
imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of
another immovable belonging to a different
owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is
established is called the dominant estate; that
which is subject thereto, the servient estate.
ATTY BATHAN:
In other words, the estate that is being burdened by
the easement is the servient estate; by the root word
SERVE (it serves the dominant estate). Such estate is
the one that has the encumbrance, the easement.
On the other hand, the dominant estate is the one
benefiting from the easement.
DEFINITION
A real right constituted on another’s property,
corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which the
owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to
allow somebody else to do something on his
property for the benefit of another thing or person.
ATTY BATHAN:
So, as we said, it is a real right (reading slide) … That
is why it is an encumbrance, a burden because the
owner of the property is now being told not to do
something or being told to ALLOW to do something.
In other words, you are now being (either by law or
by an agreement) asked to something or to abstain
from doing something on his property. Something
that he could choose not to do if it were not for the
easement.
CHARACTERISTICS OF EASEMENT
INSEPARABLITY FROM THE ESTATE
ARTICLE 617. Easements are inseparable from the
estate to which they actively or passively belong.
ATTY BATHAN:
In usufruct, if you have already seen the video
lecture in usufruct, you will know that usufruct can be
a subject or a contract and can even be alienated,
and assigned separate from the estate.
BUT HOW ABOUT EASEMENT? Again, we said that it is
inseparable from the estate. So, the answer is:
No. They are intransmissible in the sense that they
cannot be alienated or mortgaged independently of
the estate. This is because, it is inseparable from the
estate and is a burden on such estate.
May an easement be an object of usufruct?
No, it cannot be an object of usufruct. An easement
cannot be the object of usufruct because it has no
existence independent of the immovable to which it
attaches. The existence of an easement is
dependent on the immovable to which it is
attached.
So, as we said it has no independent character and
it is inseparable from the estate to which it belongs.
Will selling the dominant estate extinguish the
easement established in its favor?
Again, what is the dominant estate? The dominant
estate is the one enjoying the benefit of the burden.
So, what happens to the easement if the dominant
estate is sold? Let us say for example a very easy
easement, A RIGHT OF WAY.
So, if there is a land owned by A, and then you have
a land owned by B beside A’s land. Now, A is the
servient estate in the sense that there is a right of way
on A’s property and the one enjoying is B.
The question now here is, what if B here (the
dominant estate) is sold to C? Will the easement that
is on A’s estate continue? So, will selling the
dominant estate extinguish the easement or, will the
easement continue on A’s estate?
The law ways, If the dominant estate is alienated,
such alienation carries with it also the easements
established in its favor even if they are not annotated
as an encumbrance on the certificate of title. Thus, a
vendee of real property on which an easement of
right of way exists, does not acquire the right to close
that servitude or put up obstruction thereon, to
prevent the neighboring estates from using it.
May an easement be alienated independently from
the estate, just like a usufruct?
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So, in other words, even if the dominant estate is
being sold, whoever the new owner is of the
dominant estate will also enjoy the easement, that
was established in favor of that estate.
So even if it is not annotated at the back of the
certificate of title, of the servient estate that was sold,
the knowledge of the transferee or of the buyer of
the servient estate is tantamount to registration.
But what if it is the SERVIENT ESTATE that is sold and the
easement is NOT ANNOTATED in the Torrens
Certificate of Title, is the easement extinguished?
Therefore, you should still allow, that part of your
estate that is burdened with the easement of right of
way as the new owner of the servient estate.
Now, what if the servient estate is the one sold? Like
in our example earlier, the servient estate was A’s
immovable. But what if the easement is not
annotated in the Torrens Cert of Title? Is the
easement extinguished?
Another Characteristic:
Yes. An easement is extinguished or cut-off,
however, by the registration of servient estate under
the Torrens system without the easement being
annotated on the corresponding certificate of title.
(Purungganan v. Paredes, 69 SCRA 69 [1976])
So, if the servient estate is sold, the one with the right
of way and there is no annotation there that there is
an easement in favor of B’s estate, the new owner of
the servient estate need not carry on the easement
of right of way if there is no annotation in the Cert of
Title.
But what if it is the SERVIENT ESTATE that is sold and the
easement is NOT ANNOTATED in the Torrens
Certificate of Title, is the easement extinguished?
General Rule:
Yes. An easement is extinguished or cut-off,
however, by the registration of the servient estate
under the Torrens system without the easement
being annotated on the corresponding certificate of
title. (Purugganan v. Paredes, 69 SCRA 69 [1976])
-
But if the existence of an easement was
known to the transferee or grantee of the
servient estate, such knowledge is
equivalent to registration. It is an
established principle that actual notice
or knowledge is as binding as registration.
(Mendoza v. Rosel, 74 Phil. 84 [1943])
INDIVISIBILITY
Article 618. Easements are indivisible. If the servient
estate is divided between two or more persons,
the easement is not modified, and each of them
must bear it on the part which corresponds to him.
If it is the dominant estate that is divided between
two or more persons, each of them may use the
easement in its entirety, without changing the
place of its use, or making it more burdensome in
any other way. (535)
Will the partition of either the dominant or servient
estate modify the easement?
Atty. MLB: Does the partition of either the dominant
or servient estate have any effect on your
easement?
No. The partition between two or more persons of
either the servient of dominant estate does not
affect the existence of the servitude which continues
in its entirety.
Whether its your dominant estate that is being
partitioned or divided, or whether it is the servient
estate, it will not affect the existence of the servitude
or of the easement. It will continue and the owners
now of the individual parts of the dominant estate
can still make use in its entirety the burden on the
servient estate.
Also, if it is the servient estate now which is being
divided, then the owners now will bear upon them
the easement that is attributable to their property that
is now being divided.
Atty. MLB:
But, if the new owner of the servient estate actually
has knowledge that there was an easement there,
then your SC said that if the existence of an
easement was already known to the transferee or
grantee of the servient estate, such knowledge is
equivalent to a registration.
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Another Characteristics:
IT IS A REAL RIGHT BUT WILL AFFECT THIRD PERSONS
ONLY WHEN DULY REGISTERED.
IT IS ENJOYED OVER ANOTHER PERSON’S
IMMOVABLE, NEVER ON ONE’S OWN PROPERTY.
A: Precisely why it is called an easement. It is called
a burden because it is n somebody else’s property.
Someone else is enjoying the property. That is why
we have two estates. The Dominant Estate and the
Servient Estate.
The SE is the one being burdened. The DE is the one
who enjoys it. They are separate estates. You cannot
enjoy it on your property. If the easement is on our
property then that is not an enjoyment. That is a
burden that is imposed upon on your property.
IT INVOLVES TWO NEIGHBORING ESTATES (IN THE
CASE OF REAL EASEMENT), THE DOMINANT TO WHICH
A RIGHT BELONGS AND THE SERVIENT UPON WHICH
AN OBLIGATION RESTS
IT IS A RIGHT LIMITED BY THE NEEDS OF THE
DOMINANT OWNER OR ESTATE, WITHOUT
POSSESSION.
A: We have been saying that it’s the DE that is
enjoying the burden imposed upon the SE.
While they are enjoying it however, there is no
possession on the Servient Estate.
Example:
The right of way which is in favor of the Dominant
Estate, then they can pass by the right of way but
they are not deemed to be possessing that part of
the Servient Estate.
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IT CANNOT CONSIST IN THE DOING OF AN ACT
UNLESS THE ACT IS ACCESSORY IN RELATION TO A
REAL EASEMENT
IT IS A LIMITATION ON THE SERVIENT OWNER’S RIGHTS
OF OWNERSHIP FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE DOMNANT
OWNER; AND THEREFORE, IT IS NOT PRESUMED
A: It is a limitation on the right of an owner.
If you are an owner of an SE, in a Right of Way
Easement, that is actually a limitation on your
ownership of your estate which is a Servient Estate.
If there was no right of way, then you could have
used the entire property in whatever way you want.
Because of the easement that is for the benefit of the
community or of the neighboring estate, or for other
persons, then that part of the Right of Way, you
cannot use the way you wanted to use it.
It is a limitation on your right as an owner of a
property that is burdened by the easement.
CAN YOU
PROPERTY?
IMPOSE
EASEMENTS
ON
PERSONAL
Easements cannot be imposed on personal property
but only on immovable. However, the term
“immovable”, as used in the law, must be
understood in its common and not in its legal sense.
“…its common and not in its legal sense.”
-
This is not the immovable as defined by
law. Earlier in the semester, we learned
that there are movables that are
immobilized by law. That is not included,
the easements on immovable day that
this chapter is referring to are really the
immovable in the real sense of the word.
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CLASSIFICATIONS OF EASEMENT
As to recipient of benefit (Art 613 and Art 614)
Article 613. An easement or servitude is an
encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for
the benefit of another immovable belonging to a
different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is
established is called the dominant estate; that
which is subject thereto, the servient estate.
Article 614. Servitudes may also be established for
the benefit of a community, or of one or more
persons to whom the encumbered estate does
not belong
CONTINUOUS EASEMENT
For an easement to be continuous, it is not necessary
that the use be incessant; it is sufficient that the use
may be so. Not necessary that it be continuous all
throughout for so long as it may actually be so.
EXAMPLES:
Right to support a beam on another’s wall
 early continuous without intervention with the
act of man
Right of aqueduct
 Passage of the water does not suffer from
any intervention of man
DISCONTINUOUS EASEMENTS
This classification deals with the question who
benefits the easement?
This is used at intervals and where there is
intervention by man
Easement according to recipient of benefit could be
either:
1. Real
 when the easement is in favor if another
immovable (Art 613); or
EXAMPLE:
right of way
 if a man wishes to pass through there, he may
do so. If he does not want, then no one is
using the right of way making it a
discontinuous easement
2. Personal
 when it is in favor of a community or of one
or more persons (art 614). Thus, it may be
public or private
a) public or;
b) private
As to manner of its exercise;
As to whether or not its existence is indicated (Art.
615)
CONTINUOUS VS DISCONTINUOUS
The distinction lies in the fact that in continuous
easements, the exercise or enjoyment can be had
without the intervention of man while in
discontinuous easements, such exercise of
enjoyment requires the intervention of man.
Article 615. Easements may be continuous or
discontinuous, apparent or nonapparent.
To determine WoN it continuous or discontinuous
easement, you are going to ask yourself, is the
enjoyment of this particular easement needs the
intervention of man?
Continuous easements are those the use of which
is or may be incessant, without the intervention of
any act of man.
If No= Continuous
If Yes = Discontinuous
Discontinuous easements are those which are used
at intervals and depend upon the acts of man.
Apparent easements are those which are made
known and are continually kept in view by external
signs that reveal the use and
enjoyment of the same.
Nonapparent easements are those which show no
external indication of their existence.
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APPARENT EASEMENT
To continue an apparent easement, it is not
necessary that its sign be seen; it is sufficient if it may
be seen or known on inspection.
Question: Is it necessary that it should be seen at all
times?
Answer: No. It is not required. It is sufficient that it may
be seen or known upon inspection.
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there is such easement, you can no longer
build within 3m from the boundary line which
I will discuss when I reach that topic.
AS TO DUTY OF SERVIENT OWNER
This means the classification of easement based on
what the servient owner must do
Article 616. Easements are also positive or
negative.
ANOTHER WAY OF CLASSIFYING EASEMENT IS:
As to source
A positive easement is one which imposes upon
the owner of the servient estate the obligation of
allowing something to be done or of doing it
himself, and a negative easement, that which
prohibits the owner of the servient estate from
doing something which he could lawfully do if the
easement did not exist.
Article
619.
Easements
are
established either by law or by the will
of the owners. The former is called
legal (by law) and the latter voluntary
easements (by agreement)
EXAMPLE OF POSITIVE EASEMENT
Right of way
 Note: positive easement is when you ask a
servient owner to do something or to allow
something to be done on his property.
 Right of way is an example because here you
are asking the owner to allow the owner of
the dominant estate to go through the
property owned by the servient estate. It is
allowing something to be done.
EXAMPLE OF NEGATIVE EASEMENT
Easement of light and view
 Note: negative easement is that which
prohibits the owner of the servient estate from
doing something which he could lawfully do
if the easement did not exist.
 It is something he could have done on his
property but because of the easement, he
could no longer do it.
 In Easement of light and view which
presupposes neighboring estates, the circuit
owner cannot build anything within 3 meters
form the boundary line because the
dominate estate may not want the servient
estate to have a direct view of his property. If
there was no easement of light and view,
then you can build anything on your property
even if it is one centimeter from the boundary
line because it is your property even if it’s 1
cm from the boundary line because that is
your property but because there is an
easement of light and view, if the dominant
owner acquires such easement then you can
no longer build within 3m from the boundary
line. It is something that you could have done
if it were not for the easement but because
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MODES OF ACQUIRING EASEMENTS

Continuous and Apparent Easements –
o Article 620. Continuous and apparent
easements are acquired either by
virtue of a title or by prescription of
ten years.
Q: Now, why can they be acquired
through acquisitive prescription these
continuous
and
apparent
easements?
A: Because they are the only
easements that fulfills two important
requisites required by law for
prescription:
 the possession be public
 the possession is continuous
And it being continuous and
apparent (public), that fulfills the 2
requisites.
COMPUTATION OF PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
Article 621. In order to acquire by prescription the
easements referred to in the preceding article, the
time of possession shall be computed thus: in
positive easements, from the day on which the
owner of the dominant estate, or the person who
may have made use of the easement,
commenced to exercise it upon the servient
estate; and in negative easements, from the day
on which the owner of the dominant estate
forbade, by an instrument acknowledged before
a notary public, the owner of the servient estate,
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from executing an act which would be lawful
without the easement.
Again, you go back to positive and negative
easement. Again, positive easement is burdening
the servient owner to allow something to be done
on his property while negative easement is you are
prohibiting the owner from doing something on his
property, something which he could have done if
it were not for the easement.
Let us illustrate this:
FOR POSITIVE EASEMENTS

The period is counted from the day on which
the owner of the dominant estate began to
exercise it.
o Example: from the day a window is
opened on a party wall
 These are just concepts that
we are learning prior to really
learning about the different
kinds of easements.
 When you open a window on
a party wall, a party wall is
that wall being shared by two
buildings, if you open it, then
you can directly see the other
building. That is a positive
easement. You are allowing
something to be done and
that is allowing the dominant
owner, the one who opened
the wall, to have the view of
the inside of the building of
the servient estate. You count
10 years from the opening of
that wall if the owner of the
servient estate does nothing
within the 10 years then from
the time of the opening of the
wall, plus 10 years, he already
acquires the easement of
view.
FOR NEGATIVE EASEMENTS
o
something on his estate, something
that he can lawfully do had it not
been for the easement.
Example: easement of view because
you cannot build anymore within 3m
from the boundary line if the owner of
the dominant estate has already
acquired it
Why can a negative easement be acquired by
acquisitive prescription when it is clearly not
apparent?
• The notarial prohibition makes it apparent, as it is
made public
• If prohibition was only orally made or made in a
private instrument, the easement cannot be
acquired through acquisitive prescription
Why is it not apparent? Because you are merely
being not told not to do something. You cannot see
it because you are told not to do it.
Thus, how can it qualify as being continuous and
apparent when you cannot see it because you are
being prohibited from doing it? What is the reason
behind the law for allowing negative easements to
be acquired thru acquisitive prescription?
This is because, the 10-year prescriptive period for
negative easements is only counted from the time of
notarial prohibition. When it is notarized, it becomes
public. So when it becomes public, it is now
apparent.
If prohibition was only orally made or made in a
private instrument, the easement cannot be
acquired through acquisitive prescription.
Example: X and Y’s buildings are joined by a party
wall. If X opens a window on a party wall in 2009 and
Y does not close the opening, has X acquired the
easement by acquisitive prescription in 2019?
Answer: Yes, the prescriptive period is counted from
the opening of the window. Anytime before 2019, Y
can close the window. If he does not, the X acquires
the easement and the window can no longe be
closed
The ten-year prescriptive period will be
counted from the day on which a notarial
prohibition was made on the servient estate.
o Again, the negative easement is an
It is a positive easement because you are asking Y,
easement where you are prohibiting
the serbient (idk if this is the right word?) owner, to
the servient owner from doing
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allow X to view the inside of the building. If Y does not
do anything to close the wall from 2009 to 2019, he
just left X alone, then Y can no longer close it beyond
2019. This is because X has already acquired it thru
acquisitive prescription.
Q: In the example, is there a need for a notarial
prohibition for starting the period to run?
A: No because in positive easements, the period is
counted from the time it was exercised. Thus, it was
counted from the time of the opening of the wall
because that is the time X exercised the viewing into
Y’s building
However, if X made the opening in 2009 and Y
closed it the next year, Y can still do so. Thus, from
2009 to 2019, if Y does not want X to see the inside of
the building, all he has to do is close it within the 0year period. If Y does not act within the 10-year
period, X will acquire it through acquisitive
prescription upon the lapse of the 10-year period.
Example: X and Y own neighbouring parcels of land.
X constructs a building on his land. X made a written
prohibition against Y in 2008 not to construct a
building within 3 meters from the boundary line in
accordance with the Easement of Light and View.
The prohibition was made in a private instrument. In
2019, Y constructs a building 2 meters from the
boundary line. Can X compel Y to remove the
building since he has acquired already the
Easement of Light and View?
Answer: No, the prohibition was not a notarial
prohibition. X has not yet acquired the easement.
The 10-year period must start from the giving of the
notarial prohibition. In the example, the Easement of
Light and View was not made public due to the lack
of the notarial prohibition. It was merely a private
instrument. Thus, there is no Easement of Light and
View that has been acquired.
However, it would have been different if the
prohibition was made in a public instrument, where
it was notarized. If X gave Y the notarised prohibition
in 2008 and Y did nothing for 10 years, then in 2019, if
X built 2 meters from the boundary line, then he has
to move back. This is due to the notarial prohibition
and the lapse of the 10-year period in favour of Y.
FOR CONTINUOUS NON-APPARENT EASEMENTS AND
DISCONTINUOUS ONES (APPARENT AND NONAPPARENT)
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ART. 622, NCC
Continuous
non-apparent
easements,
and
discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may
be acquired only by virtue of a title.
Q: Why can’t continuous non-apparent and
discontinuous easements not be acquired through
prescription?
A: These easements only be acquired by virtue of a
title because prescription has two requisites:
1. It must be public; and
2. It must be continuous
If it is continuous non-apparent (private), then one
requisite is lacking for prescription. If it’s
discontinuous, then it is not continuous.
TN: Easement of an aqueduct is considered a
continuous and apparent easement.
Ronquillo v. Roco
G.R. No. L-10619, February 28, 1958
An easement of right of way, though it may be
apparent,
is
nevertheless
discontinuous
or
intermittent and therefore, cannot be acquired
through prescription, but only by virtue of a title.
Thus, even if you have been using the right of way for
more than 50 years, it cannot be acquired through
prescription. This is because it has been considered
by law as a discontinuous easement.
It is considered by law as a discontinuous easement.
Why?
Because you need the intervention of man to make
use of the easement of right of way.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF A DOMINANT OWNER
AND THE SERVIENT OWNER
Article 626. The owner of the dominant estate
cannot use the easement except for the benefit
of the immovable originally contemplated.
Neither can he exercise the easement in any other
manner than that previously established. (n)
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Example:
If the easement was provided for with an agreement
that the use of the right of way is only for your factory,
for trucks to be able to pass through and there was
an agreement that only 10 trucks per day will be
allowed to pass through to protect the integrity of
the right of way. So since that is the agreement, then
you should use it only for that. You cannot use it for
any other purpose than that which was agreed
upon.
Example:
If the agreement is that it is only for passage of
personal cars to your house. But then you are making
your house as your factory and now trucks are
passing the right of way. THIS IS ALSO NOT ALLOWED
because this is not what was originally
contemplated.
Article 627. The owner of the dominant estate may
make, at his own expense, on the servient estate
any works necessary for the use and preservation
of the servitude, but without altering it or rendering
it more burdensome.
For this purpose he shall notify the owner of the
servient estate, and shall choose the most
convenient time and manner so as to cause the
least inconvenience to the owner of the servient
estate. (543a)
So if the dominant estate wants to put trees, shrubs
on the right of way, he can do so so long as it does
not alter it nor render it more burdensome on the
part of the owner of the servient estate.
Of course, he should always notify the owner of the
owner of the servient estate should he make any
works and should choose the most convenient time
and manner so as to cause the least inconvenience
to the owner of the servient estate.
Rights and Obligations of the Dominant Owner
Rights:
1. To exercise all rights necessary for the use of
the easement (Art. 625).
2. To make on the servient estate all works
necessary for the use and preservation of the
servitude (Art. 627 par. 1)
3. To renounce the easement if he desires to
exempt himself from contribution to
necessary expenses—SHOULD THERE BE
SEVERAL DOMINANT ESTATES (Art. 628, par. 1);
and
4. To ask for mandatory injunction to prevent
impairment of his use of the easement.
Obligations:
1. He can only exercise rights necessary for the
easement (Art. 625)
2. He cannot use the easement except for the
benefit of the immovable originally
contemplated (Art. 626)
3. He cannot use the easement in any other
manner than that previously established.
4. He cannot make any works or construct
anything which is not necessary for the use
and preservation of the servitude (Art. 626,
par. 7)
5. He cannot alter the easement or render it
more burdensome (ibid);
6. He shall notify the servient owner of works
necessary for the use and preservation of the
servitude (ibid);
7. He must choose the most convenient time
and manner in making the necessary works
as to cause the least inconvenience to the
servient owner (ibid);
8. He must contribute to the necessary
expenses if there are several dominant
estates in proportion to the benefits derived
from the works (Art. 628, par. 1).
Rights and Obligations of a Servient Owner
Rights:
1. To retain the ownership of the portion of the
estate on which the easement is established
(Art. 630).
Note: Just because someone else is benefiting from
it, doesn’t mean the servient owner ceases to be the
owner.
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2. To make use of the easement (Art. 628, par.
2,) unless there is an agreement to the
contrary; and
3. To change the place or manner of the use of
the easement, provided it be equally
convenient. (Art. 629, par. 2)
Obligations:
1. He cannot impair the use of the easement
(Art. 629, par. 1); and
2. He must contribute to the necessary
expenses in case he uses the easement,
unless there is an agreement to the contrary.
(Art. 628, par. 2)
MODES OF EXTINGUISHING EASEMENTS
Article 631.
Easements are extinguished:
(1) By merger in the same person of the ownership
of the dominant and servient estates;
(2) By nonuser for ten years; with respect to
discontinuous easements, this period shall be
computed from the day on which they ceased to
be used; and, with respect to continuous
easements, from the day on which an act
contrary to the same took place;
(3) When either or both of the estates fall into such
condition that the easement cannot be used; but
it shall revive if the subsequent condition of the
estates or either of them should again permit its
use, unless when the use becomes possible,
sufficient time for prescription has elapsed, in
accordance with the provisions of the preceding
number;
(4) By the expiration of the term or the fulfillment of
the condition, if the easement is temporary or
conditional;
(5) By the renunciation of the owner of the
dominant estate;
(6) By the redemption agreed upon between the
owners of the dominant and servient estates.
(546a)
Note:
(4) Your easement can also be voluntary, meaning,
it is also a contract. It can also be premised upon a
condition or a term.
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(5) Because it’s the owner of the dominant estate
that is enjoying the burden upon the servient estate.
LEGAL EASEMENTS
Article 637. par. 1. - Lower estates are obliged to
receive the waters which naturally and without
the intervention of man descend from the higher
estates, as well as the stones or earth which they
carry with them.
Article 637. par. 2. The owner of the lower estate
(servient estate) cannot construct works which will
impede this easement; neither can the owner of
the higher estate make works which will increase
the burden.
These easements are those that
demandable and or created by law.
are
legally
KINDS OF LEGAL EASEMENTS
1. Public Legal Easements – to benefit the
community or public in general
2. Private Legal Easements – to benefit a
certain group of people or private individuals
These are your easements:








Water
Right of Way
Party Wall
Light and View
Drainage
Intermediate Distances
Against Nuisance
Lateral and Subjacent Support
EASEMENTS RELATING TO WATERS
1. Natural Drainage – By talking about natural
drainage, this has something to do with the
flow of the water.
This means, therefore, that it involves two
estates: lower and higher estates. Which of
these is considered the dominant estate?
Higher estate.
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While your servient estate is the lower estate
because when you look at this article, it gives
the servient estate the duty or obligation to
receive the waters flowing naturally from the
higher estate. The higher estate is the
dominant estate because it is the one
benefitting from this burden that is being
given on the lower estate.
The second paragraph of Article 637 gives
you the obligation of both the dominant and
servient estate.
This is an example of a continuous easement
because it does not need the intervention of
man because water naturally flows because
of gravity.
Here, you see a picture (mountain something
with houses on the higher part - kamo nalang
imagine). You have higher and lower estates.
Of course, for example, let’s say if your trains
then there’ll be water naturally flowing from
the higher to the lower estate so it is the
obligation of the lower or servient estate to
catch the waters or to receive the waters.
The owner of the lower estates cannot
construct works which will impede this
easement, such as walls, ditches or fences, or
a dam which block the natural flow of the
owners. The dominant owner may demand
their removal or destruction and recover
damages.
2. Easements on Riparian Banks for Navigation,
Floatage, Fishing, Salvage, and Towpath
3. Easement of a Dam
4. Easement for Drawing Water or for Watering
Animals
5. Easement of Aqueduct
6. Easement for the Construction of a Stop Lock
or Sluice Gate
DUTY OF SERVIENT OWNER
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct
works, which will impede this easement, such as
walls ditches or fences, or a fan which block the
natural flow of the waters. The dominant owner
may demand their removal or destruction and
recover damages.
DUTY OF DOMINANT OWNER
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The owner of the higher tenement cannot make
works which will increase the burden. If the waters
are the result of artificial development, or are the
overflow from the irrigation dams, or proceed from
industrial establishments recently set up, the owner
of the lower estate shall be entitled to
compensation for his loss or damages
Atty Bathan:
It is the obligation of the lower estate or your servient
estate to catch the waters. Owners of the lower
estate cannot construct works which will stop the
flow of the water. They cannot construct works which
will impede the easement such as walls, bleachers or
fences or a dam which will block the natural flow of
the waters.
The dominant owner may be demand if there is
structure impeding the water, that it be removed or
destroyed and he may recover damages. Operative
term there is NATURAL. He cannot make the flow
greater than it is naturally.
Easements in Riparian Banks for Navigation,
Floatage, Fishing, Salvage and Towpath
Art. 638. The banks of rivers and streams, even in
case they are of private ownership, are subject
throughout their entire length and within a zone of
three meters along their margins, to the easement
of public use in the general interest of navigation,
floatage, fishing and salvage.
Estates adjoining the banks of navigable or
floatable rivers are, furthermore, subject to the
easement of towpath for the exclusive service of
river navigation and floatage.
If it be necessary for such purpose to occupy lands
of private ownership, the proper indemnity shall
first be paid
Easement of 3 meters: for public use in the general
interest of navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage.
If land is public ownership,
There is no indemnity
 because it is owned by the state so the
general public may use it without paying
indemnity
If land of private ownership,
The proper indemnity shall first be paid before it may
be occupied. Riparian owners cannot be rehires to
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subject their property to the easement for the
benefit of the public without prior indemnity.
Easement of Dam
Art. 639. Whenever for the diversion or taking of
water from a river or brook, or for the use of any
other continuous or discontinuous stream, it should
be necessary to build a dam, and the person who
is to construct it is not the owner of the banks, or
lands which must support it, he may establish the
easement of abutment of a dam, after payment
of the proper indemnity.
Easement for drawing water or for watering
animals
Art. 640. Compulsory easements for drawing water
or for watering animals can be imposed only for
reasons of public use in favor of a town or village,
after payment of the proper indemnity.
Art. 641. Easements for drawing water and for
watering animals carry with them the obligation of
the owners of the servient estates to allow
passage to persons and animals to the place
where such easements are to be used, and the
indemnity shall include this service.
Remember that since easement is a burden, with
legal or voluntary easement, there must be proper
indemnity to the sevient owner because it is a
burden on their part.
Easement for Drawing Water or for Watering Animals
Article 640. Compulsory easements for drawing
water or for watering animals can be imposed
only for reasons of public use in favor of a town or
village, after payment of the proper indemnity.
(555)
Article 641. Easements for drawing water and for
watering animals carry with them the obligation of
the owners of the servient estates to allow
passage to persons and animals to the place
where such easements are to be used, and the
indemnity shall include this service. (556)
Requisites:
1. It must be imposed for reasons of public use;
2. It must be in favor of a town or village; and
3. There must be payment of proper indemnity
Easement of Aqueduct
Article 642. Any person who may wish to use upon
his own estate any water of which he can dispose
shall have the right to make it flow through the
intervening estates, with the obligation to
indemnify their owners, as well as the owners of the
lower estates upon which the waters may filter or
descend. (557)
Note: Your aqueduct is basically like your drainage
system.
Requisites:
Article 643. One desiring to make use of the right
granted in the preceding article is obliged:
(1) To prove that he can dispose of the water and that
it is sufficient for the use for which it is intended;
(2) To show that the proposed right of way is the most
convenient and the least onerous to third persons;
(3) To indemnify the owner of the servient estate in
the manner determined by the laws and regulations.
(558)
When an easement of aqueduct for private interest
cannot be imposed
Article 644. The easement of aqueduct for private
interest cannot be imposed on buildings,
courtyards, annexes, or outhouses, or on orchards
or gardens already existing. (559)
Why? It may destroy the integrity of a building
because this is also a drainage, and it is usually
placed under land so if there’s already buildings,
courtyards, annexes, or outhouses, or on orchards or
gardens already existing and the aqueduct is for
private use, then it CANNOT be allowed.
Can a servient owner build over the aqueduct?
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Article 645. The easement of aqueduct does not
prevent the owner of the servient estate from
closing or fencing it, or from building over the
aqueduct in such manner as not to cause the
latter any damage, or render necessary repairs
and cleanings impossible. (560)
YES, with the following conditions attached to it:
1. Must be in such manner as not to cause the
latter any damage, or render necessary
repairs and cleanings impossible.
Classification of an Easement of Aqueduct
Article 646. For legal purposes, the easement of
aqueduct shall be considered as continuous and
apparent, even though the flow of the water may
not be continuous, or its use depends upon the
needs of the dominant estate, or upon a schedule
of alternate days or hours. (561)
Here, we have the law classifying the easement of
aqueduct despite the fact that it may not be
continuous because the law already classifies it as
continuous and apparent.
Easement for the construction of a stop lock or
sluice gate
EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY
ARTICLE 649.
The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real
right may cultivate or use any immovable, which
is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to
other persons and without adequate outlet to a
public highway, is entitled to demand a right of
way through the neighboring estates, after
payment of the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a
manner that its use may be continuous for all the
needs of the dominant estate, establishing a
permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist
of the value of the land occupied and the
amount of the damage caused to the servient
estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary
passage for the cultivation of the estate
surrounded by others and for the gathering of its
crops through the servient estate without a
permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the
payment of the damage caused by such
encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of
the immovable is due to the proprietor's own
acts.
ARTICLE 674.
ARTICLE 650.
One who for the purpose of irrigating or improving
his estate, has to construct a stop lock or sluice
gate in the bed of the stream from which the water
is to be taken, may demand that the owners of the
banks permit its construction, after payment of
damages, including those caused by the new
easement to such owners and to the other
irrigators.
The easement of right of way shall be established
at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate,
and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.
Another easement is easement for the construction
of a stop lock or a sluice gate.
Definition
A right granted by law to the owner of an estate
which is surrounded by other estates belonging to
other persons and without an adequate outlet to a
public highway to demand that he be allowed a
passageway throughout such neighboring estates
after payment of the proper indemnity.
In other words, the person who can demand an
easement of right of way is a person who owns a
land or an estate, and such land is being surrounded
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by other lands owned by several or different persons
and he does not have an adequate outlet to a
public highway. Here, the land is surrounded and
isolated.
Of course, he will demand from the neighboring
estates a right of way, after payment of proper
indemnity.
BLUE – It is not necessarily the shortest but the point
that is least prejudicial
EMPHASIS ON THE REQUISITES
(1) Claimant must be an owner of enclosed
-
Nature of the Easement
This easement is COMPULSORY and LEGALLY
DEMANDABLE so long as all the requisites are present.
-
Requisites of the EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY
(a) The claimant must be an owner of an enclosed
immovable or one with real right.
(b) There must be no adequate outlet to a public
highway.
immovable or one with real right.
Can usufructuary demand for an easement
of right of way?
o Yes. This is because a usufructuary
has a real right.
How about a lessee?
o It depends.
 Yes, if he registered the lease
with the Registry of Deeds
then the lease can be
considered a real right.
 No, if he did not register
because that does not make
the lease a real right yet.
(c) The right of way must be absolutely necessary.
(d) The isolation must not be due to the claimant’s
own act. (Meaning he did not box himself in).
(2) There must be no adequate outlet to a public
NATURE OF THE EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY
-
Compulsory and legally demandable, so long as all
the requisites are present.
Requisites of the Easement of Right of Way
a. Claimant must be an owner of enclosed
immovable or one with real right.
b. There must be no adequate outlet to a public
highway.
c. The right of way must be absolutely
necessary.
d. The isolation must not be due to the
claimant’s own act.
e. The easement must be established at the
point least prejudicial
f. There must be payment of proper indemnity
RED – Meaning, he did not box himself in. and the
reason why he does not have access or outlet to a
highway is because he boxed himself in.
In one of the cases I have assigned, where he put a
wall to the side of his estate where there is an outlet
to a public highway. He cannot demand anymore a
right of way in the neighboring estates. So, it must not
be due to the claimants’ own act.
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highway.
What if there is another outlet but it is quite
dangerous or costly?
o Where the use of an existing is
dangerous or is very difficult, or is very
costly, or is not always available, or
requires travel at a long distance, a
new right of way may be demanded.
Valdez vs. Tabisula, July 28, 2008
The owner of the servient estate subject to the
easement cannot obstruct the use of the
easement, as when he fences the original right of
way and moves the path to another portion of his
land if the proposed new location is farther and is
not as convenient as the original path. He may be
restrained by injunction.
(3) The right of way must be absolutely
-
necessary
You cannot ask for a right of way merely for
convenience.
Thus, it has been held that the right cannot
be claimed merely for the convenience of
the owner of the enclosed estate.
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When you already have an outlet to the highway
but you will say that “I don’t like to pass that way
because it is a rocky road, I like this way through
the neighboring estate”.
You can’t do that because that is merely for
convenience.
IT
MUST
BE
ABSOLUTELY
NECESSARY.
Ramos, Sr. vs, Gatchalian Realty, Inc., October 12,
1987
R should have, first and foremost, demanded from
SRL
Subdivision
the
improvement
and
maintenance of the road right of way because it
was from said subdivision that he acquired his lot
and not from G Realty. To allow him access to
Sucat Road through G Avenue simply because it
allows him a much greater ease in going to and
coming from the main thoroughfare is to
completely ignore what jurisprudence has
consistently maintained through the years
regarding an easement of right of way that mere
inconvenience for the dominant estate is not
enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition
of this servitude, there must be a real not a fictitious
or artificial necessity for it.
The isolation must not be due to the claimant’s own
act
If the owner constructs a permanent obstruction to
his property that gives him an access to the highway,
he cannot demand a right of way from neighbouring
estates
The easement must be established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate
The criterion of least prejudice or injury to the servant
estate shall be observed although the distance may
not be the shortest or is eve the longest. This is a
question of fact to be determined by the court in
each particular case.
Q: Why must it be the least prejudicial point?
A: Because it is a burden on the servient estate
KINDS OF EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY
1. PRIVATE — when it is established in favour of a
private persons, such as the right granted on Art.
649
2. PUBLIC — when it is available in favour of the
community or public at large
Q: Can you acquire an easement of right of way by
acquisitive prescription?
A: No. The easement of right of way, being
discontinuous, cannot be acquired by prescription,
notwithstanding that the same may be apparent.
The use of a footpath or road may be apparent but
it is not a continuous easement because its use is at
intervals and depends upon the acts of man. It can
be exercised only if a man passes or puts his feet over
somebody else’s land
• It is discontinuous because moving through a
right of way needs the intervention of man. Thus,
even if you have been using the right of way
since time immemorial, you cannot acquire it by
prescription.
BUT the right to demand a right of way under the
conditions provided in Art. 649 is IMPRESCRIPTIBLE
WIDTH OF EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY
ART. 651. The width of the easement of right
of way shall be that which is sufficient for the
needs of the dominant estate, and may
accordingly be changed from time to time.
If before, you only you a motorcycle, thus, needing
only a small easement of right way. If you
subsequently purchased a car, you can ask that the
width of the right of way be increased; otherwise,
you would not be able to use the right of way. You
cannot be forced to just have a motorcycle
There must be payment of proper indemnity
a. If the passage is of a continuous and permanent
nature — the indemnity consists of the value of
the land occupied plus the amount of damages
caused to the servient estate
Larracas v. Del Rio (C.A., 37 O.G. 287): A person need
not content himself, like his neighbors, with a
pathway and deny himself the use of an automobile.
In the present age when motor vehicles are a vital
necessity, a dominant proprietor has a right to
demand a driveway for his automobile and not a
mere pathway for persons
b. If the passage is temporary in nature — the
indemnity consists in the payment of damage
caused to the servient estate
WHEN LAND OF TRANSFEROR OR TRANSFEREE IS
ENCLOSED
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ART. 652. Whenever a piece of land
acquired by sale, exchange or partition, is
surrounded by other estates of the vendor,
exchanger, or co-owner, he shall be obliged
to grant a right of way without indemnity.
In case of a simple donation, the donor shall
be indemnified by the donee for the
establishment of the right of way.
When land of transferor or tranferee is enclosed.
Article 653. In the case of the preceding article, if
it is the land of the grantor that becomes isolated,
he may demand a right of way after paying a
indemnity. However, the donor shall not be liable
for indemnity.
the buyer pay proper indemnity because that is one
of the requisites of a right of way, but you should be
indemnity.
The buyer, need not pay indemnity. In other words,
the seller is obliged to grant a right of way without
indemnity. Why is there no indemnity when again we
previously said that there must be indemnity that is a
requirement that's a requisite for the granting over
right but, wait, that this because it presupposes that
the consideration of the sale already includes with it
the indemnity for the right of way. In other words, it
presupposes this, that when the buyer bought that
enclosed estate from the seller, it will really include a
right of way because why then would you buy an
enclosed immovable if you you cannot access it or
you cannot access, you do not have access to the
highway.
Let me illustrate it kay, so you have several parcels of
land.
Now all these parcels of land were previously owned
by the seller. Now the seller decides to sell the purple
line in the middle to the buyer. So, the buyers line is
now enclosed by all the other lands of the seller, and
then you have there at the top, your road or your
highway so as you can see, the buyers land is
enclosed and it does not have an access or an
outlet rather to the highway. So now of course, with
all the requisites being present the buyer can
actually demand from the seller or right of ways so
that he may have access. But the question is, should
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Another example. Again, all of those lands are
previously owned by the seller know the seller sells, all
the estates surrounding it to the buyer. Now, the seller
is isolated that the seller’s land, he left for himself a
land that is enclosed. Okay, So, he does not have
access to the road or highways, Can the seller
demand a right believe from the buyer Yes, he can.
The question is, should seller pay indemnity for the
right of way? This time the seller should pay. Why?
because he is the one who receives money anyway
and so when you will demand for a right away, he
must pay indemnity.
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donor demand from the donee a right of way? Of
course, the question now is should the donor pay
proper indemnity? No, he should not pay proper
indemnity anymore.
Why? He was the one who gave that land to the
donee so it is but fair that the donee should give the
right of way without asking from the donor. It is
presumed that the granting of a right of way was a
condition, otherwise, why would the donor donate
all those surrounding estate if there was no condition
to give him a right of way?
RESPONSIBILITY FOR REPAIRS AND TAXES
Article 653, talks about donation. This time, again all
the parcels of land were previously owned by the
donor. The donor donated to the donee. Now the
donee does not have access to the road or
highway. As we said if it’s an enclosed immovable,
you can demand a right of way. The question is
should the donee pay the donor indemnity for
demanding a right of way? Yes, he must pay, the
donor is obliged to grant him a right of way but the
donee must pay. Why? Because he’s the one being
given the land and so he must if he must ask for a
right of way he must pay proper indemnity. He paid
nothing for it anyway.
Article 654. If the right of way is permanent, the
necessary repairs shall be made by the owner of
the dominant estate. A proportionate share of the
taxes shall be reimbursed by said owner to the
proprietor of the servient estate.
Extinguishment of Compulsory Easement of Right
of Way
Article 655. If the right of way granted to a
surrounded estate ceases to be necessary
because its owner has joined it to another
abutting on a public road, the owner of the
servient estate may demand that the easement
be extinguished, returning what he may have
received by way of indemnity. The interest on the
indemnity shall be deemed to be in payment of
rent for the use of the easement.
The same rule shall be applied in case a new road
is opened giving access to the isolated estate.
What
about if it's the reverse again all parcels of land
were owned by the donor, but then
the
donor
donates all his parcels of land to the donee except
that in the middle. Now, the donor is isolated, he
does not have access to the highway. Can the
219 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
In both cases, the public highway must
substantially meet the needs of the dominant
estate in order that the easement may be
extinguished.
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Illustration:
(2) In dividing walls of gardens or yards situated in
cities, towns, or in rural communities;
Road/ Highway
Road/
Highway
C
X,
eventu
ally
bought
by A
D
RoW
from B’s
estate
A
B
(3) In fences, walls and live hedges dividing rural
lands.
D
(1) Whenever in the dividing wall of buildings there
is a window or opening;
A’s estate is enclosed and does not have access to
the highway at the left or at the top. So, A
demanded right of way on the estate of B, it was
legally demandable and all the requisites are
present. A will pay proper indemnity to B.
Then, A buys X’s land. The right of way on B’s land will
no longer be necessary because A has now an
access to the highway since he joined or bought
property which has access.
The law says that B may demand that the right of way
be removed. It’s not automatic.
Removal of RoW needs demand
B has to DEMAND that it be removed. And B has to
return indemnity received retaining interest that will
serve as payment.



Exceptions (Art. 660)
Article 660. It is understood that there is an exterior
sign, contrary to the easement of party wall:
Demand
Return indemnity
Retain Interest
EASEMENT OF PARTY WALL
What is a party wall?
 Is a common wall which separates two
estates, built by common agreement at the
dividing line such that it occupies a portion of
both estates on equal parts.
Presumption
General Rule (Art. 659)
Article 659. The existence of an easement of party
wall is presumed, unless there is a title, or exterior
sign, or proof to the contrary:
(1) In dividing walls of adjoining buildings up to the
point of common elevation;
220 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
(2) Whenever the dividing wall is, on one side,
straight and plumb on all its facement, and on the
other, it has similar conditions on the upper part,
but the lower part slants or projects outward;
(3) Whenever the entire wall is built within the
boundaries of one of the estates;
(4) Whenever the dividing wall bears the burden
of the binding beams, floors and roof frame of one
of the buildings, but not those of the others;
(5) Whenever the dividing wall between
courtyards,
gardens,
and
tenements
is
constructed in such a way that the coping sheds
the water upon only one of the estates;
(6) Whenever the dividing wall, being built of
masonry, has stepping stones, which at certain
intervals project from the surface on one side only,
but not on the other;
(7) Whenever lands inclosed by fences or live
hedges adjoin others which are not inclosed.
In all these cases, the ownership of the walls,
fences or hedges shall be deemed to belong
exclusively to the owner of the property or
tenement which has in its favor the presumption
based on any one of these signs.
Ditches or drains
Article 661. Ditches or drains opened between
two estates are also presumed as common to
both, if there is no title or sign showing the contrary.
There is a sign contrary to the part-ownership
whenever the earth or dirt removed to open the
ditch or to clean it is only on one side thereof, in
which case the ownership of the ditch shall belong
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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exclusively to the owner of the land having this
exterior sign in its favor.
Cost of Repairs and Construction
Article 662. The cost of repairs and construction of
party walls and the maintenance of fences, live
hedges, ditches, and drains owned in common,
shall be borne by all the owners of the lands or
tenements having the party wall in their favor, in
proportion to the right of each.
Nevertheless, any owner may exempt himself from
contributing to this charge by renouncing his partownership, except when the party wall supports a
building belonging to him.
If the party walls support his building, it is unfair to
allow him to renounce part of his ownership because
either way that party walls support his building.
Illustration:
Article 664. Every owner may increase the height
of the party wall, doing so at his own expense and
paying for any damage which may be caused by
the work, even though such damage be
temporary.
The expenses of maintaining the wall in the part
newly raised or deepened at its foundation shall
also be paid for by him; and, in addition, the
indemnity for the increased expenses which may
be necessary for the preservation of the party wall
by reason of the greater height or depth which
has been given it.
If the party wall cannot bear the increased height,
the owner desiring to raise it shall be obliged to
reconstruct it at his own expense and, if for this
purpose it be necessary to make it thicker, he shall
give the space required from his own land. (577)
wall
BUILDING B
party
BUILDING A
or damaged and he will bear necessary expenses to
prevent any damage.
How about if one of the owners of the party wall
would like to increase the height?
Building A and building B are joined together by a
party wall. 2/3 of the party wall is within the boundary
of building A and 1/3 of it is in the boundary of
building B.
What does this mean?
This means that the cost for the repairs or
construction of such party wall, 2/3 will be
shouldered by building A and 1/3 by the owner of
building B.
If they shared it equally, then they will share the
expenses equally.
Demolition of Building
Article 663. If the owner of a building, supported
by a party wall desires to demolish the building, he
may also renounce his part-ownership of the wall,
but the cost of all repairs and work necessary to
prevent any damage which the demolition may
cause to the party wall, on this occasion only, shall
be borne by him.
If he wants to destroy the party wall that supports its
building, then part of the part wall will be destroyed
221 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
So if you remember the previous illustration, if the
owner of building A would like to increase the height,
he would do so at his own expense. Now, if the
increase in height could not assure the integrity of
the wall without increasing the foundation, he will
also have to spend for that.
If it also has to be demolished so that he may make
the party wall enough to bear the weight of the
increase in height, if me must destroy it, and
reconstruct it, he will also have to shoulder the
expenses.
Article 665. The other owners who have not
contributed in giving increased height, depth or
thickness to the wall may, nevertheless, acquire
the right of part-ownership therein, by paying
proportionally the value of the work at the time of
the acquisition and of the land used for its
increased thickness. (578a
If in our previous illustration, the owner of building B
wishes also to increase the height, he may do so but
he must also indemnify the other owner, in
proportion.
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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Proportional Use
Article 666. Every part-owner of a party wall may
use it in proportion to the right he may have in the
co-ownership, without interfering with the
common and respective uses by the other coowners. (579a)
Easement of Light and View
Easement of Light
The right to admit light from the neighboring estate
by virtue of the opening of a window or the making
of certain openings.
Easement of View
The right to make openings or windows, to enjoy the
view through the estate of another and the power to
prevent all constructions or works which would
obstruct view or make the same difficult. It
necessarily includes the easement of light.
own
the
easement
PRESCRIPTION.
through
ACQUISITIVE
Illustration:
If A opens a window on a party wall, can B close it
after 10 years?
A: No. A has already acquired the Easement of View
10 years after the opening of the wall. Why? The
period of prescription for the acquisition of an
easement of light and view shall be counted: From
the time of the opening of the wall.
When is the prescriptive period?
10 years.
Hence, B should have closed it within the 10-year
period from the opening of the windows. After the 10
years, he can no longer closed it. A has already
acquired the easement of view. A has already
acquired the right to view whatever is on B’s building.
Is it possible to have light without view?
YES.
Can you open a window or opening on a party wall?
Remember: A party wall is a wall shared by two
buildings.
Article 667. No part-owner may, without the
consent of the others, open through the party wall
any window or aperture of any kind. (580)
Prescriptive Period—Acquisition of Easement
Article 668. The period of prescription for the
acquisition of an easement of light and view shall
be counted:
(1) From the time of the opening of the window, if
it is through a party wall; or
(2) From the time of the formal prohibition upon the
proprietor of the adjoining land or tenement, if the
window is through a wall on the dominant estate.
(n)
(1) If you make an opening through a party wall
even without the consent of the owners, you may
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Illustration:
If A opens a window on his building, can B (owner of
neighboring land) compel A to close it since the
window has direct view to his land?
For acquisitive prescription to apply, the distances
provided by law must be followed.
Article 670.
No windows, apertures, balconies, or other similar
projections which afford a direct view upon or
towards an adjoining land or tenement can be
made, without leaving a distance of two meters
between the wall in which they are made and
such contiguous property.
Neither can side or oblique views upon or towards
such conterminous property be had, unless there
be a distance of sixty centimeters.
The nonobservance of these distances does not
give rise to prescription.
Note: So this time, the buildings are not adjoining.
If A opens a window on his building, can B (owner
of neighboring land) compel A to close it since
the window has direct view of his land?
-If there was notarial prohibition by A not to
obstruct his view and 10 years has lapsed from
the time of notarial prohibition, then B cannot
compel A to close it. A has already acquired the
easement through acquisitive prescription.
-However, if there was notarial prohibition by A
but 10 years has not yet lapsed from the time of
notarial prohibition, B can compel A to close it.
-If there was no notarial prohibition or even if
there was written or oral prohibition, B can
compel A to close it anytime even after the lapse
of 10 years from the time of prohibition.
In other words, if you want to acquire the easement
of light and view through acquisitive prescription,
you as the dominant owner, must also follow certain
223 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
distances provided by law. Otherwise, if you do not
follow certain distances in the construction of your
structure or building, then you cannot acquire the
easement of light and view.
In other words (this is for Article 670), the one wanting
to acquire the easement of light and view must
follow these distances to impose upon the servient
estate (the neighboring estate) the easement, if he
wants to acquire it through acquisitive prescription.
Article 671.
The distance referred to in the preceding article
shall be measured in cases of direct views from
the outer line of the wall when the openings do
not project, from the outer line of the latter when
they do, and in cases of oblique view from the
dividing line between the two properties.
So, if that is your house, and
then you have a window
there, facing your neighbor’s
estate. For the 2 meters
distance that you must follow
under Art 670, that line, you
see there, that is the
boundary line. In other words,
that is your house, then the boundary line, then your
neighbor.
Now, you want to acquire an easement of light and
view to be imposed upon your neighbor. But, before
you can do that, you have also to follow the
distances. Again, the distance is that your opening
on your building or your house, if it is a direct view
(that view – direct view because when you look at
that (the blue window), you can directly see your
neighbor by opening it).
So, the
distance should
be from
the outer wall,
to
the
dividing line –
should
be 2 meters.
Again, it
is
“directly”
because
by opening the
blue window, you can see your neighbors.
That is a window, so it must be from the outer wall up
to the dividing or the boundary line.
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If you do not follow the distances…
BUT WHAT IF IT’S A TERRACE?
-You cannot acquire the easement
through acquisitive prescription.
Meaning, if you open from your building, it is counted
10 years from the giving of the formal notarial
prohibition upon your neighboring estate.
If there is a terrace, the 2 meters will not be counted
from here (kana gi tudlo sa pointer).
Because when you go out of the terrace and you
stay there, you can see directly your neighbor. So,
the 2 meters must start from the outer most portion.
So, the 2 meters must start from the outer most
portion. This is your 2 meters.
If the Easement of View has been acquired
Article 673. Whenever by any title a right has been
acquired to have direct views, balconies or
belvederes overlooking an adjoining property, the
owner of the servient estate cannot build thereon at
less than a distance of three meters to be measured
in the manner provided in article 671. Any stipulation
permitting distances less than those prescribed in
article 670 is void.
In other words, you followed the distances and also
gave the formal notarial prohibition to your
neighbor. Hey, do not block my view neighbor. I am
building my house here, and I am now giving you a
formal notarial Prohibition (it must be notarized to
make it public).
Diba, we said, an easement can only be acquired
through acquisitive prescription if it is public and
continuous.
NOW THE OBLIQUE
An easement of light and view is continuous and has
to be public. Since it is not apparent, you have to
make the prohibition public by having it notarized.
When such document is notarized, it becomes
public.
This one is Oblique because, you cannot directly see.
You will have to peep out to see. This is why, the
distance is shorter. It is only 60 Cm that you have to
follow. This is because, it is harder to see, and it is not
direct view. Pa side view siya. You will have to bring
your head out of the window to see your neighbor.
This is really easier to teach face to face but let us
contend with this.
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If the Easement of View has been acquired…
Art. 673. Whenever by any title a right has been
acquired to have direct views, balconies or
belvederes overlooking an adjoining property, the
owner of the servient estate cannot build thereon
at less than a distance of three meters to be
measured in the manner provided in Article 671.
Any stipulation permitting distances less than those
prescribed in Article 670 is void.
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ARTICLE 670. No windows, apertures, balconies, or
other similar projections which afford a direct view
upon or towards an adjoining land or tenement
can be made, without leaving a distance of two
meters between the wall in which they are made
and such contiguous property.
back please, what you are building, 3 meter from the
boundary line” this will cause a gap of 5 meters
between you and your neighbor. This is to give you
enough view.
Illustration:
Neither can side or oblique views upon or towards
such conterminous property be had, unless there
be a distance of sixty centimeters.
The nonobservance of these distances does not
give rise to prescription. (582a)
ARTICLE 671. The distances referred to in the
preceding article shall be measured in cases of
direct views from the outer line of the wall when
the openings do not project, from the outer line of
the latter when they do, and in cases of oblique
view from the dividing line between the two
properties. (583)
Now, how do you make it public if its not apparent to
acquire it through prescription?
You have to make the prohibition public by having it
NOTARIZED. When a document is notarized, it
becomes a public document.
If you have:
-
-
opened a window on your house,
you followed the 2 meter distance if
DIRECT VIEW or 60 cm if OBLIQUE VIEW,
you gave a formal notarial prohibition to
your neighbor, “do not block my view,
neighbor”
10 years has already passed.
What does this mean? It means that the
owner of the Servient estate cannot build
thereon at less than a distance of 3 meters to
be measured in the manner provided in
Article 671.
When you say easement of iew, it is not necessarily
like telling your neighbors to “hey do not build
anything at all”, that is not right,
What you are telling him is like “move back 3
meters”. While you, you observe only 2 meters
distance from the boundary line or 60 cm in oblique,
once you acquire the easement of view, you are
asking your neighbor, “yes you may build but move
225 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
See Illustration above and follow these:
This is your house, the one with the blue window, with
a direct view to your neighbor. Window on the side.
THIS IS A DIRECT VIEW.
The black line in between is your boundary line.
It has been said that to acquire the easement of
view, you must observe 2 meters distance from the
outer wall or where the window is open up to the
dividing land. But if it’s a terrace then at the end of
the terrace.
The right side is your neighbor’s house. You followed
the distance and served a formal notarial prohibition
to your neighbor.
At this time, he has not built anything yet. You said,
“please do not block my view, neighbor ☹ ☹” in
accordance with the civil code, I am demanding
that you do not block my view!”
Your neighbor did nothing for 10 years. He started to
build on his property only after 10 years.
After 10 years, you should have already acquired the
easement of view through prescription.
Because of this, when he [YOUR NEIGHBOR] builds
after 10 years, he has to observe 3 meters. This is to
give you a total of 5 meters between so that you can
have a view.
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WHAT IF, THERE IS ANOTHER SITUATION [please still
refer to the illustration above] Now, what if, you
followed all the distances and gave a formal notarial
prohibition to your neighbor not to block your view.
On the 5th year from the time you made a formal
notarial prohibition to your neighbor and HE BUILT ON
THE PROPERTY. He built closest to the boundary line
almost no gap has been observed, he did not
observe 3 meters and just gave around 1 inch from
the boundary line.
Can you ask him to demolish the building and move
back?
No. you have not acquired it yet. He has the right to
do everything he wants with and to his property. But
if you have already acquired it then the neighbor will
have to follow. If he does build and the prescriptive
period has not expired yet, then he can.
ARTICLE 675. The owner of a tenement or a piece
of land, subject to the easement of receiving
water falling from roofs, may build in such manner
as to receive the water upon his own roof or give
it another outlet in accordance with local
ordinances or customs, and in such a way as not
to cause any nuisance or damage whatever to
the dominant estate. (587)
INTERMEDIATE DISTANCES AND WORKS FOR CERTAIN
CONSTRUCTIONS AND PLANTINGS
ARTICLE 677. No constructions can be built or
plantings made near fortified places or fortresses
without compliance with the conditions required
in special laws, ordinances, and regulations
relating thereto. (589)
How about trees?
ARTICLE 672. The provisions of article 670 are not
applicable to buildings separated by a public way
or alley, which is not less than three meters wide,
subject to special regulations and local
ordinances. (584a)
ARTICLE 679. No trees shall be planted near a
tenement or piece of land belonging to another
except at the distance authorized by the
ordinances or customs of the place, and, in the
absence thereof, at a distance of at least two
meters from the dividing line of the estates if tall
trees are planted and at a distance of at least fifty
centimeters if shrubs or small trees are planted.
Why so? Because there is already a distance
between the two houses or buildings.
Every landowner shall have the right to demand
that trees hereafter planted at a shorter distance
from his land or tenement be uprooted.
IF BUILDINGS SEPARATED BY A PUBLIC WAY OR ALLEY
Another Easement:
DRAINAGE OF BUILDINGS
ARTICLE 674. The owner of a building shall be
obliged to construct its roof or covering in such
manner that the rain water shall fall on his own
land or on a street or public place, and not on the
land of his neighbor, even though the adjacent
land may belong to two or more persons, one of
whom is the owner of the roof. Even if it should fall
on his own land, the owner shall be obliged to
collect the water in such a way as not to cause
damage to the adjacent land or tenement.
(586a)
RED - When you make a construction, you have to
make sure that water should fall on your own land,
you do not make it fall into another person’s land
even if you are a co-owner of that neighboring land.
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The provisions of this article also apply to trees
which have grown spontaneously. (591a)
This is the same rule as when you construct houses,
so if you plant trees:
-
At least 2 meters from the dividing line IF
TALL TREES
At a distance of 50 cm if SHRUBS or SMALL
TREES are planted
Every landowner shall have the right to demand that
trees hereafter planted at a shorter distance from his
land or tenement be uprooted. The provisions of the
article shall also apply to trees who have grown
spontaneously.
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ART. 679. No trees shall be planted near a
tenement or piece of land belonging to another
except at the distance authorized by the
ordinances or customs of the place, and, in the
absence thereof, at a distance of at least two
meters from the dividing line of the estates if tall
trees are planted and at a distance of at least fifty
centimeters if shrubs or small trees are planted.
Every landowner shall have the right to demand
that trees hereafter planted at a shorter distance
from his land or tenement be uprooted.
The provisions of this article also apply to trees
which have grown spontaneously.
It is the same rule when you construct houses. When
you plant trees, it must be two meters from the
dividing line of the estates if tall trees are planted
and at a distance of at least fifty centimeters if shrubs
or small trees are planted.
ART. 680. If the branches of any tree should
extend over a neighboring estate, tenement,
garden or yard, the owner of the latter shall have
the right to demand that they be cut off insofar
as they may spread over his property, and, if it be
the roots of a neighboring tree which should
penetrate into the land of another, the latter
may cut them off himself within his property.
ART. 681. Fruits naturally falling upon adjacent
land belong to the owner of said land.
This talks about rules when branches will extend to
your neighbors, or when you have fruit growing trees
and the fruits fall on your neighbor’s land, or when
roots of your trees cross-over to your neighbour’s
lands
• Branches — the neighbouring owner can only
demand that it be cut off. He cannot cut it off
himself
• Roots — the neighbouring owner can cut it off
himself by virtue of accession
• Fruits — the neighbouring owner will own the fruit
EASEMENT AGAINST NUISANCE
ART. 682. Every building or piece of land is subject
to the easement which prohibits the proprietor or
possessor from committing nuisance through
noise, jarring, offensive odor, smoke, heat, dust,
water, glare and other causes.
ART. 683. Subject to zoning, health, police and
other laws and regulations, factories and shops
may be maintained provided the least possible
annoyance is caused to the neighborhood.
LATERAL AND SUBJACENT SUPPORT
ART. 684. No proprietor shall make such
excavations upon his land as to deprive any
adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or
subjacent support.
You cannot make excavation upon your land as to
deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient
lateral or subjacent support.
ART. 685. Any stipulation or testamentary provision
allowing excavations that cause danger to an
adjacent land or building shall be void.
ART. 686. The legal easement of lateral and
subjacent support is not only for buildings standing
at the time the excavations are made but also for
constructions that may be erected.
This contemplates existing and future buildings
ART. 687. Any proprietor intending to make any
excavation contemplated in the three preceding
articles shall notify all owners of adjacent lands.
VOLUNTARY EASEMENTS
As discussed, there are two kinds of easements:
1. Legal easements
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2. Voluntary easements
CONSENT OF ALL CO-OWNERS NECESSARY
Just like any other contract, an easement may be
agreed upon by the parties. These are what we call
voluntary easements
ART. 691. In order to impose an easement on an
undivided tenement, or piece of land, the
consent of all the co-owners shall be required.
ART. 688. Every owner of a tenement or piece of
land may establish thereon the easements which
he may deem suitable, and in the manner and
form which he may deem best, provided he does
not contravene the laws, public policy or public
order.
The consent given by some only, must be held in
abeyance until the last one of all the co-owners
shall have expressed his conformity.
Just like in obligations and contract, parties can
enter into any agreement, with respect to easement,
so long as it is not contrary to laws, public policy or
public order.
ART. 689. The owner of a tenement or piece of
land, the usufruct of which belongs to another,
may impose thereon, without the consent of the
usufructuary, any servitudes which will not injure
the right of usufruct.
But the consent given by one of the co-owners
separately from the others shall bind the grantor
and his successors not to prevent the exercise of
the right granted.
The easement cannot be enjoyed by the dominant
estate on the estate that is being co-owned, as long
as there is no consent by all the co-owners.
All co-owners must give their consent
But whatever was the decision of the predecessorin-interest, it will bind the successors.
MODULE 8:
Q: Can the naked owner impose a servitude on his
land without the usufructuary’s consent?
• In other words, you have a land and you also
have a usufructuary. Can the naked owner
impose a servitude or agree on being burdened
by an easement without the usufructuary’s
consent?
Art. 694.
A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else
which:
A: Yes, the owner of a tenement or piece of land, the
usufruct of which belongs to another, may impose
thereon, without the consent of the usufructuary,
any servitudes which will not injure the right of
usufruct.
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
NUISANCE
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of
others; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or
morality; or
ART. 690. Whenever the naked ownership of a
tenement or piece of land belongs to one person
and the beneficial ownership to another, no
perpetual
voluntary
easement
may
be
established thereon without the consent of both
owners.
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of
any public highway or street, or any body of water;
or
If it’s a perpetual voluntary easement, it’s not a
legally demandable easement, that is agreed upon
by the parties, it can only be established with the
consent of both the naked owner and the
usufructuary.
Concept of Nuisance
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(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
The term Nuisance is incapable of exact and
exhaustive definition.
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Derived from the French Word nuire which means
to injure, hurt or harm.
The term is comprehensive as applied to almost all
wrongs which have interfered with the rights of
citizen in person, property, the enjoyment of his
property, or his comfort
 is applied to that class of wrongs which arises from
the unreasonable, unwarrantable, or unlawful use by
a person of his own property, and which produces
such
material
annoyance,
inconvenience,
discomfort, or hurt, that the law will presume a
consequent damage.
Statutory Definition of Nuisance
the harm or the cause of the harm (or both)
negligence is not an essential ingredient of
nuisance. (but to be liable for nuisance, there must
be injury to another in the enjoyment of his legal
right).
Nuisance Distinguished from Trespass
Nuisance
consists of a use of
one’s own property in
such a manner as to
cause injury to the
property or other right
or interest of another
and generally results
from the commission
of an act beyond the
limits of the property
affected
Tresspass
a trespass is a direct
infringement of another’s
right of property.
the injury is
consequential
the injury is direct and
immediate
No actual physical invasion of the property shall be
nuisance.
Nuisance distinguished from negligence.
These two terms are synonymous. They are different
in nature and consequences.
NEGLIGENCE
NUISANCE
The breach of duty on
the
part
of
the
negligent is based on
a want of care
A
person
who
maintains a nuisance
is liable for the resulting
injury
to
others
regardless
of
the
degree of care or skill
exercised to avoid the
injury.
There is a violation of a
relative duty here, the
failure to use the
degree
of
care
required
under
particular
circumstances
in
connection with an
act or omission which
is not of itself wrongful.
The
creation
or
maintenance of a
nuisance is a violation
of an absolute duty,
the doing of an act
which is wrongful in
itself.
---
Where the damage is
necessary
consequence of what
the
defendant
is
doing, or is incident to
the business itself or
the manner in which it
is conducted, whether
there is proper care or
not.
The
law
of
nuisance applies.
Creates the liability
because of WANT of
proper care resulting
to another’s injury.
This is wrongful in itself
because of the injury
caused regardless of
the
presence
or
absence of care.
Encroachment upon the space about another’s land
(not the land itself) is nuisance.
When rules on negligence, applicable.
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These torts nuisance and injuries negligent act or
omission may be, and frequently are, co-existing and
practically inseparable, as where acts or omissions
constituting negligence also give rise to a nuisance,
and it is difficult at times to distinguish between
actions of nuisance and those based on negligence.
It has been held that where the acts or omissions
constituting NEGLIGENCE are the IDENTICAL ACTS
which, it is asserted, GIVE RICE TO A CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR NUISANCE, the rules applicable to
negligence will be applied.
exist where one is injured in relation to a
right which he enjoys by reason of his
ownership of an interest in land, and
where an individual wrong arising from
an unreasonable, unwarrantable, or
unlawful use of one’s property produces
such
material
annoyance,
inconvenience, discomfort, or hurt that
the law will presume a consequent
damage.
Distinguished
PUBLIC NUISANCE
PRIVATE NUISANCE
Affects:
Affects:
Public and Private Nuisances.
Art. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A
public nuisance affects a community or
neighborhood or any considerable number of
persons, although the extent of the annoyance,
danger or damage upon individuals may be
unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not
included in the foregoing definition.
Defined;
Public Nuisance
-
has been defined as the doing of or the
failure to do something that injuriously
affects safety, health, or morals of the
public, or works some substantial
annoyance, inconvenience, or injury to
the public. It is a nuisance which causes
hurt, inconvenience, or damage to the
public generally, or such a part of the
public as necessarily comes in contact
with it in the exercise of a public or
common right. It is a condition of things
which is prejudicial to the health,
comfort, safety, property, sense of
decency, or morals of the citizens at
large, resulting either from an act not
warranted by law, or neglect of a duty
imposed by law.
Private Nuisance
-
has been defined as one which violates
only private rights and produces damage
to but one or a few persons, and cannot
be said to be public. It has been said to
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Affects the public at
large, or such of them
as may come in
contact with.
Affects individuals or a
limited number of
individuals only.
Remedies:
Remedies:
These are indictable.
These are actionable,
either
for
their
abatement
or
for
damages, or both.
Mixed Nuisances.
A thing may be private nuisance without being a
public one or a public nuisance without being a
private one.
On the other hand a nuisance may BE BOTH PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE in character, it may be a public
nuisance because it violates public rights to the injury
of many persons, and it may also be private in
character in that it produces special injury to private
rights (see Art. 703.) to any extent beyond the injury
to the public.
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Article 703. A private person may file an action on
account of a public nuisance, if it is specially
injurious to himself.
Nuisance per se and nuisance per accidens
Definition, based on their nature
Mixed Nuisances.
Examples:
A house abutting on a street railway track is
a private nuisance to the railway company
and a public nuisance because it obstructs
the street.
Raising and breeding animals (pigs, goats
and sheep) for commercial purposes in a
vicinity that is fast becoming a fashionable
residential district and where it is shown that
the place where the animals are kept are
found to be unsanitary on account of the
offensive odors, pernicious to health, coming
from manure scattered therein, stagnant
water, etc. constitutes both public and
private nuisance.
The keeping or storage of gasoline may
constitute a nuisance, either private or
public. Whether or not it becomes a
nuisance depends upon the location, the
quantity,
and
other
surrounding
circumstances. While it would not necessarily
depend upon the degree of care used in the
storage, the manner in which the tanks are
constructed and operated may be
considered.
Nuisance per se and nuisance per accidens
Based on their nature, Nuisance is either:
1. Per se (in law)
2. Per accidens (in fact)
Nuisance per se
-
is an act, occupation, or structure which
unquestionably is a nuisance at all times
and under any circumstances, regardless
of location or surroundings. It is anything
which of itself is a nuisance because of its
inherent qualities, productive of injury or
dangerous to life or property without
regard to circumstance.
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(1) Nuisance per se (or in law)
 an act, occupation, or structure which
unquestionably is a nuisance at all times and
under any circumstances, regardless of
location or surroundings.

anything which of itself is a nuisance
because of its inherent qualities, productive
of injury or dangerous to life or property
without regard to circumstance
Examples:
(a) a house of prostitution and gambling houses
 also classified as a public nuisance
(b) houses constructed without governmental
authority on public streets and river beds
 for they obstruct at all times the free use by
the public of said places

they may be summarily removed without
judicial proceedings. (Sitchon v. Aquino, 98
Phil. 458 [1955].)
(c) Any and all squatters on
resettlement projects are likewise
 also a public nuisances

government
can be abated or ejected without judicial
proceedings. (Mendoza v. National Housing
Authority; 1982); see Arts. 699[3]
(2) Nuisance per accidens (or in fact)
 act, occupation, or structure, not a nuisance
per se, but which may become a nuisance
by reason of circumstances, location, or
surroundings.
Example:
a) raising and breeding pigs in a house within
city limits
Distinction
The difference between nuisance per se and
nuisance per accidens lies in the proof, not in the
remedy. The responsibility for a nuisance for either
sort is the same.
(1) In the
becomes
existence
without a
case of a nuisance per se, the thing
a nuisance as a matter of law. Its
need only be proved in any locality,
showing of specific damages, and the
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right to relief is established by averment and proof of
the mere act.
But whether a thing not a nuisance per se is a
nuisance per accidens or in fact, depends upon its
location and surroundings, the manner of its conduct
or other circumstances, and in such cases, proof of
the act and its consequences is necessary. The act
or thing complained of must be shown by evidence
to be a nuisance under the law, and whether it is a
nuisance or not is generally a question of fact.
(2) As nuisance per se affects the immediate safety
of persons and property, they may be summarily
abated under the undefined law of necessity.
But if the nuisance be per accidens, even the
municipal authorities, under their power to declare
and abate nuisances, would not have the right to
compel the abatement of a particular thing or act as
a nuisance without reasonable notice to the person
alleged to be maintaining or doing the same at the
time and place of hearing before a tribunal
authorized to decide whether such a thing or act
does in law constitute a nuisance. (Monteverde v.
Generoso, 52 Phil. 23 [1928].)
Doctrine of attractive nuisance.
Reason for doctrine
“One who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character
likely to attract children in play, and who fails to
exercise ordinary care to prevent children from
playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to
a child of tender years who is injured thereby,
even if the child is technically a trespasser in the
premises. The principal reason for the doctrine is
that the condition or appliance in question
although its danger is apparent to those of age,
is so enticing or alluring to children of tender
years as to induce them to approach, get on or
use it, and this attractiveness is an implied
invitation to such children.’’ (Hidalgo Enterprises,
Inc. v. Balandan, 1952]; Taylor v. Manila Electric
Railroad and Light Co., 1910
Hidalgo Enterprises Inc. v. Guillermo Balandan,
Anselma Anila and CA GR No. L-3422. June 13, 1952,
J. Bengzon
Legal Principle: Attractive nuisance doctrine
generally is not applicable to bodies of water,
artificial (e.g. water tanks) as well as natural, in the
absence of some unusual condition or artificial
feature other than the mere water and its location.
Facts: Hidalgo Enterprises was the owner of an iceplant factory in San Pablo, Laguna. In the factory,
there were two tanks full of water, both 9-ft deep, for
cooling purposes of its engine. There was no fence
or top cover; the edges of the tanks were barely a
foot high from the surface of the ground. The factory
itself was surrounded with a fence. However, the
wide gate entrance was continually open, and
anyone could easily enter the factory. There was no
guard assigned on the gate. Around noon on April
16, 1948, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 3 years old,
was playing with other boys his age when he entered
the factory premises through the gate. Mario
Balandan then took a bath in one of the tanks of
water and, later on, sank to the bottom of the tank.
He died of “asphyxia secondary to drowning.” The
CFI and CA ruled that Hidalgo Enterprises
maintained an attractive nuisance and neglected
to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid
accident to person entering its premises.
Issue: Whether or not a water tank is an attractive
nuisance.
Held: No. Hidalgo Enterprises Inc.’s water tanks are
not classified as attractive nuisance. Other issues
such as whether it exercised reasonable
precautions, and if the parents were guilty of
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contributory negligence are immaterial. Appealed
decision reversed. Hidalgo Enterprises is absolved
from liability.
Ratio: One who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely
to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise
ordinary care to prevent children from playing
therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of
tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child
is technically a trespasser in the premises. This is the
doctrine of attractive nuisance. The principal reason
for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in
question although its danger is apparent to those of
age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender
years as to induce them to approach, get on or use
it, and this' attractiveness is an implied invitation to
such
children. The
majority
of
American
jurisprudence posits that the doctrine of attractive
nuisance is generally not applicable to bodies of
water, whether artificial or natural. The exception to
this is if there is some unusual condition or artificial
feature other than mere water and its location.
Furthermore, in Anderson v. Reith-Riley Const. Co.,
the Indiana Appellate Court explained why bodies
of water are not considered as attractive nuisance.
It ruled that children have been instructed early on
to exercise caution around bodies of water and are
presumed to know the danger. Dissent of J. Pablo:
Children are naturally curious and do not have
perfect knowledge of things. They are amazed by
the natural attraction of the waters and shall explore
where their curiosity leads them unless there is
something that prevents them. As such, petitioners
should have placed fences around the ponds as an
ordinary precaution. (Note: translated and
paraphrased from Spanish text)
Application to bodies of water
Not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well
as natural in the absence of some unusual condition
or artificial feature other than the mere water and its
location.
 a swimming pool or pond or reservoir of water
is not considered an attractive nuisance. Art.
695
If the owner of private property creates an
artificial pool on his own property, merely
duplicating the work of nature without adding
any new danger, he is not liable because of
having created an attractive nuisance. (Hidalgo
Enterprises, Inc. v. Balandan, supra, citing
Anderson v. ReithRiley Const. Co., 44 NE 2d. 184,
185, 112 Ind. App., 170.)
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LIABILITY OF SUCCESSOR OF PROPERTY
CONSTITUTING A NUISANCE
General rule: only the creator of a nuisance is liable
for the damage resulting therefrom but; If the
injurious effect of a nuisance is a continuing one,
every successive owner or possessor of property
constituting a nuisance who fails or refuses to abate
the nuisance, or maintains or permits its continuation
has the same liability as the original owner or
possessor who created it.
Art. 696. Every successive owner or possessor of
property who fails or refuses to abate a nuisance
in that property started by a former owner or
possessor is liable therefor in the same manner as
the one who created it.
REQUISITES TO RENDER THE NEW OWNER OR
POSSESSOR LIABLE
1. He has actual knowledge of the existence of
the nuisance and that;
2. it is within his power to abate the same.
Art. 697. The abatement of a
nuisance does not preclude the right
of any person injured to recover
damages for its past existence.
ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE AND RECOVERY OF
DAMAGES
The action to abate nuisance and the action to
recover damages are distinct remedies either or
both of which the plaintiff may pursue at his election.
In other words, the two remedies are concurrent and
not exclusive.
Abatement of nuisance – takes place after injury or
damage has already been caused; the injured
person may still recover damages resulting from or
growing out of the nuisance which has been
abated.
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NOTE: The owner of property abated as a nuisance
is not entitled to compensation unless he can show
that the abatement is unjustified
Art. 698. Lapse of time cannot legalize
any nuisance, whether public or
private.
ABATEMENT WITHOUT JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
A summary abatement of nuisance without judicial
proceedings is recognized and established even in
the absence of statute on the ground that the
requirement of preliminary formal legal proceedings
and a judicial trial would result in defeating the
beneficial object sought to be obtained.
Limitations to this exercise:
EFFECT OF LAPSE OF TIME
General rule: The right to bring an action to abate a
public or private nuisance is not extinguished by
prescription.
Exception: Article 698 is subject to exception under
the special rule in Article 631(2) which expressly
prescribes that easements are extinguished by
obstruction and non-use for ten years.
Art. 699. The remedies against a
public nuisance are:
(1) A prosecution under the Penal
Code or any local ordinance; or
(2) A civil action; or
(3) Abatement,
proceedings.
without
judicial
REMEDIES AGAINST A PUBLIC NUISANCE
The remedies provided in Art. 699 are not exclusive
but cumulative.
Remedies 1, 2, and 3 can all be availed by public
officers; Remedies 2 and 3 can be availed by private
persons if the nuisance is especially injurious to the
latter.
1. Police power of the State – the State’s right to
destroy or abate by a summary proceeding
whatever may be regarded as a public
nuisance, and in the exercise of this power,
the legislature may, subject to constitutional
limitations, declare what shall be deemed a
nuisance and provide for its suppression
2. Right to compensation – the property taken
or destroyed for the purpose of abating a
nuisance is not taken for public use, and
there is accordingly no obligation to make
compensation for such taking; the State may
authorize the removal, destruction or
abatement of nuisances before any judicial
decision, and leave the party to his right to
appeal to the courts, by an action for
damages, for a determination of the
question whether the thing abated was a
nuisance
3.
Need for abatement- There is a need for
provisions on abatement of a nuisance for a
well-rounded Civil Code because one of the
most serious hindrances to the enjoyment of
life and property is a nuisance, whether
public or private.
TN: The lawfulness of a business is not a defense in an
action for abatement of nuisance. Neither can
estoppel be availed of as a defense where the
nuisance is illegal.
Criminal institution – instituted only for public
nuisance
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ROLE OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS WITH RESPECT TO PUBLIC
NUISANCE
ART. 700, NCC
The district health officer shall take care
that one or all of the remedies against a
public nuisance are availed of.
ART. 701, NCC
If a civil action is brought by reason of the
maintenance of a public nuisance, such
action shall be commenced by the city or
municipal mayor.
ART. 702, NCC
The district health officer shall determine
whether or not abatement, without
judicial proceedings, is the best remedy
against a public nuisance.
DISTRICT HEALTH OFFICER
1. Has the duty to see to it that one or all of the
remedies against a public nuisance are availed
of
2. Abatement can only be availed with the
intervention of the district health officer — Shall
determine whether abatement without judicial
proceedings, is the best remedy against a public
nuisance because he is the person best informed
and qualified to determine the best remedy to
meet a given situation
Articles 700 and 702 of the Civil Code which is a
general law
2. In the National Building Code, the Building Official
is authorized when any building or structure is
found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, to
order its repair, vacation or demolition
depending upon the degree of danger to life,
health or safety
3. In the Fire Code of the Philippines, fire hazards
shall be abated immediately. Thus, the Director
General of the Philippine National Police, or his
authorized representative may issue orders for
such abatement.
ROLE OF PRIVATE PERSONS WITH RESPECT TO PUBLIC
NUISANCES
ART. 703, NCC
A private person may file an action on account of
a public nuisance, if it is specially injurious to
himself.
GR: The action must be commenced by the city or
municipal mayor
XPN: A private person may also file an action if the
public nuisance is especially injurious to him.
• While the district health officer may also
institute proceedings to abate a nuisance, this
power can be properly exercised only when
the nuisance is one that affects public health
and sanitation.
ex. The nuisance (e.g., bodies of filthy or dirty water;
a building in danger of falling on his property)
becomes as to him a private nuisance affecting him
in a special way different from that sustained by the
public in general. The action may be for damages,
abatement, or injunction.
TN: Failure to observe Art. 702 (intervention of the
DHO) is not an award for damages. Art. 707 provides
two instances when a private person or public
official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be
liable for damages
Special injury
What constitutes special injury to a person must be
determined from the particular facts and
circumstances of each case.
CITY OR MUNICIPAL MAYOR
GR: The action must be commenced by the city or
municipal mayor
For private suits to prosper, there must be an invasion
or violation of some private right, as distinguished
from the public right, which the plaintiff has in
common with the rest of the public.
XPN: A private person may also file an action if the
public nuisance is especially injurious to him.
Other instances where abatement is not
commenced by the Mayor:
1. In the City of Manila, the abatement of illegal
constructions is expressly lodged under its charter
(R.A. No. 409.) in the City Engineer. Its charter
being a special law, it was held to prevail over
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TN: The injury need not be unique to the complaining
party. The fact that many are injured does not make
the nuisance a public one. An action may be
maintained if there is common misfortune of a
number or even a class of persons, so long as the
grievance is not common to the whole public.
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In the absence of a showing of special or unusual
damages, differing from those suffered by the
general public, a cause of action does not arise in
favor of a private individual.
Art. 704. Any private person may abate a public
nuisance which is specially injurious to him by
removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing
which constitutes the same, without committing a
breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury.
But it is necessary:
(1) That demand be first made upon the owner or
possessor of the property to abate the nuisance;
(2) That such demand has been rejected;
(3) That the abatement be approved by the
district health officer and executed with the
assistance of the local police; and
(4) That the value of the destruction does not
exceed three thousand pesos.
Conditions for extrajudicial abatement of a public
nuisance:
1. The proposed abatement be approved by
the mayor; and
2. Executed with the assistance of the local
police
Note: The Code Commission believes that in view of
the newness of the remedy, extrajudicial abatement
might cause breaches of the peace, unless the
above conditions are complied with.
Effect: The party injured may remove, and if
necessary, destroy the thing which constitutes the
nuisance, without committing a breach of the
peace, or doing unnecessary damage.
Necessity of giving notice
Usually, notice must be given to the person
responsible before abating the nuisance, especially
if it is necessary to enter upon his property in order to
do so.
Purpose of the notice: to give such person an
opportunity to abate the nuisance himself.
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Note: Where, however, the person knows that the
other party claims that the thing abated is a
nuisance and desires its abatement, and refuses an
offer by such party to pay for removing it, he is not
entitled to further notice.
When can the giving of notice be dispensed with?
If the danger to health, life, or property is imminent
and the necessity of prompt removal of the nuisance
is urgent.
Remedies against a Private Nuisance
Art. 705. The remedies against a private nuisance
are:
(1) A civil action; or
(2) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
Art. 706. Any person injured by a private nuisance
may abate it by removing, or if necessary, by
destroying the thing which constitutes the
nuisance, without committing a breach of the
peace or doing unnecessary injury. However, it is
indispensable that the procedure for extrajudicial
abatement of a public nuisance by a private
person be followed.
Note: The remedies above (Art. 705.) are the same
as the remedies against a public nuisance except for
the absence of the first remedy of criminal
prosecution. (Art. 699[1].)
In abating a nuisance, whether public or private, a
person may go to the extent of destroying the thing
which constitutes the nuisance, PROVIDED:
1. He commits no breach of the peace nor
causes unnecessary injury, and
2. Provided further that the procedure for the
extrajudicial abatement of public nuisance
prescribed in Article 704 is complied with.
(Art. 706.)
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Liability for damages in case of extra-judicial
abatement of nuisance
I.
Art. 707. A private person or a public official
extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable
for damages:
II.
(1) If he causes unnecessary injury; or
III.
(2) If an alleged nuisance is later declared by the
courts to be not a real nuisance.
Article 707 provides for 2 grounds to hold a private
person or public official extrajudicially abating a
nuisance liable for damages.
IV.
Note: The abatement of a nuisance does not
preclude the right of any person injured to recover
damages for its past existence. (Art. 697.)
V.
Reason for providing liability for damages: This
liability for damages provides a sort of deterrent
against the unreasonable resort to the extrajudicial
abatement of nuisance by unscrupulous parties and
at the same time affords the victim a civil remedy to
recover damages without prejudice to such other
remedies granted by law.
VI.
MODULE 9:
TITLE III – DONATION
CHAPTER ONE: NATURE OF DONATIONS
Art. 725. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a
person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in
favor of another, who accepts it. (618a)
CONCEPT
-
In its generic sense, the term donation
includes all forms of gratuitous dispositions.
The donation the article speaks of and which
is governed by Title Three is the donation
proper or the true (or real) donation, or
ordinary donation.
NATURE AND EFFECT OF DONATION
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Although Art 725 defines donation as
an act, it is really a contract, with all
the essential requisites of a contract.
It falls under contracts of pure
beneficence,
the
consideration
being the mere liberality of the
benefactor.
The Civil Code considers donation
not among the contracts that transfer
ownership but as a particular mode
of
acquiring
and
transmitting
ownership.
As a mode of acquiring ownership,
donation results in an effective
transfer of title over the property from
the moment the donor is made
aware of the acceptance by the
donee, provided that the donee is
not disqualified or prohibited by law
from accepting the donation.
Once accepted, it is generally
considered irrevocable, and the
donee becomes owner of property,
except:
1.
on
account
of
officiousness,
2.
failure of the donee to
comply with the charge
imposed on the donation,
3.
or ingratitude.
The effect of donation is to reduce
the patrimony or asset of the donor
and to increase that of the donee.
Hence, the giving of a mortgage or
any other security does not constitute
a donation.
Heirs of R. Florencio vs. Heirs of T. De Leon (G.R.
No. 149570, March 12, 2004)
Facts
Teresa Sevilla de Leon, owned a residential lot with
an area of 828 square meters which was covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). In the 1960s, De
Leon allowed the spouses Rosendo and Consuelo
Florencio to construct a house on the said
property and stay therein without any rentals
therefor.
On September 26, 1966, De Leon, with the consent
of her husband Luis, leased the aforesaid parcel of
land for P5 per month to Bienvenido Santos
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The condition: "for as long as the lessor
(Teresa de Leon) had an outstanding loan with the
Second Quezon City Development Bank of
Quezon City but not to exceed the period of
fifteen (15) years."
De Leon assigned her leasehold right in
favor of the Second Quezon City Development
Bank. The lease and De Leon's leasehold right
were annotated at the back of TCTs.
Thereafter, Bienvenido Santos constructed
a house thereon.
De Leon then died intestate.
Her heirs respected her wishes and allowed
Rosenda Florencio to continue staying in the
property.
Years later or in 1995, Florencio died.
However, his heirs THE RESPONDENTS remained in
the property. Heirs of De Leon told the Heirs of
Florencio to vacate the property within 90 days
after they demanded them.
The RESPONDENT heirs of Florencia claimed
that Teresa de Leon executed a Deed of Donation
in favor of Rosendo Florencio. They also said that
the latter accepted the donation as seen by his
signature on page one of the deed of donation
they showed.
They claimed that the property would
have been registered in the name of Rosendo
Florencio, as assisted and coordinated by the heirs
of De Leon but was superseded by the untimely
death of Jose De Leon, the husband of Teresa.
Because of this, it remained under the name of
Teresa De Leon. [wala nadayon ang pag register
sa property in the name of Florencio]
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners, as heirs of
Rosendo Florencio, have a better right to the
physical or material possession of the property
over the respondents, the heirs of Teresa de Leon,
the registered owner of the property.
Held:
No. DONATION IS ONE OF THE MODES OF
ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP. As such among the
attributes of ownership is the right to possess the
property.
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Here, the Donation was not proven to be
ultimately true. It is valid on its face but the court
found contrary evidence:
1. If she, indeed, donated the property, she would
surely have turned over the owner's duplicate of
TCT to Florencio, to facilitate the issuance of a new
title over the property in his favor. There was an
imperative need for the deed to be registered in
the Office of the Register of Deeds, and the title to
the property to be thereafter issued in the name
of the donee, Florencio. At the very least, Florencio
should have caused the annotation of the deed
immediately after October 1, 1976 or shortly
thereafter. Such annotation would have been
binding on the respondents, as De Leon's
successors-in-interest, as well as to third persons.
However, Florencio failed to do so. Even as De
Leon died intestate in 1978, Florencio failed to
secure title over the property in his name before
he himself died intestate in 1995. It is incredible
that he would fail to register the deed and secure
title over the property under his name for almost
twenty years.
2.
It was only in 1996, or eighteen years after
the death of De Leon when the respondents sued
the petitioners for ejectment that the latter
claimed, for the first time, that De Leon had
executed a deed of donation over the property in
favor of their predecessor, Florencio.
3.
The petitioners should have declared the
property under their names and paid the realty
taxes therefor, if they truly believed that they were
its owners. They failed to do so
4.
The petitioners never adduced in
evidence the owner's duplicate of TCT No. T-44349
under the name of De Leon, nor did they explain
why they failed to adduce in evidence the said
owner's duplicate of the title.
5. A reading of the deed will show that at the
bottom of page one thereof, Florencio
was to subscribe and swear to the truth of
his acceptance of the donation before
Municipal Mayor Marcelo G. Aure of San
Miguel, Bulacan. However, the mayor did
not affix his signature above his typewritten
name
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6.
It appears that a second page was
added, with the name of Atty. Manguiat
typewritten therein as notary public, obviously,
with the use of a different typewriter.
Thus, because they failed to prove the validity of
the deed of donation. There will be no claim of
possession based on the ownership acquired by
them in pursuance of a donation.
REQUISITES OF DONATION
1.
Donor must have capacity to make the
donation of a thing or right
2.
Donative intent (animus donandi) or intent to
make the donation out of liberality to benefit the
donee
3.
There must be delivery, whether actual or
constructive
4.
Donee must accept or consent to the
donation.




In certain donations, the form prescribed by
law must be followed (See Art 748-749)
The subject matter of a donation may be a
thing or right. A person may be a donee
although he is incapacitated to enter into a
contract if he is not specially disqualified by
law to accept donations.
Not enough that the act is gratuitous, there
must be an intent to benefit the donee.
The acceptance or consent of the donee is
required because no one can be obliged to
receive a benefit against his will.
Heirs of C. Reyes vs. Calumpang (G.R. No.
138463. October 30, 2006)
The instant case involves Lot No. 3880 of the
Cadastral Survey of Tanjay, Negros Oriental which
has a land area of around 25,277 square meters,
more or less. Said lot was originally owned by a
certain Isidro Reyes, who sired eight children. The
protagonists in this case are the descendants,
specifically the grandchildren, of the three eldest
children of Isidro Reyes, namely, Victoriana,
Telesfora and Leonardo.
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Among Isidro’s children, it was Leonardo who
managed the properties of their father. In 1924, a
cadastral survey was conducted pursuant to Act
No. 2259. Leonardo, through his representative,
Angel Calumpang, filed an answer in the
cadastral court naming all eight children of Isidro
Reyes as claimants of the said lot.
On July 10, 1949, a certain DominadorAgir filed a
claim over the disputed lot, naming some
grandchildren of Leonardo Reyes (greatgrandchildren of Isidro Reyes). The Decision
granted judicial confirmation of the imperfect title
of petitioners over said lot. OCT No. OV-227 was
issued on August 5, 1954 in the name of petitioners,
namely: Victorino, Cipriano, Luis, Ricardo, Jesus,
Daylinda, Jovito, Guillermo, and Beatriz, all
surnamed Reyes.
The nine registered co-owners, however, did not
take actual possession of the said lot, and it was
Victorino and Cipriano Reyes who paid the land
taxes. The heirs of Telesfora Reyes Manaban and
Victoriana Reyes Manaban (daughters of Isidro
Reyes) retained possession over a hectare portion
of the said lot where they built their houses and
planted various crops and fruit bearing trees.
Meanwhile, sometime in 1968, Jose Calumpang,
grandson of Leonardo Reyes and cousin of
petitioners, also took possession over a hectare of
the said lot, planting it with sugarcane. Thus, Jose
Calumpang and his son Geoffrey continued to
plant sugarcane over almost a hectare of the said
lot while the heirs of Telesfora Reyes Manaban and
Victoriana Reyes Manaban---the respondents
Agalas and Manabans---occupied the rest of the
same lot which is about one hectare.
Sometime in 1972, respondent AgapitoAgala
(grandson of Victoriana Reyes Manaban) was
informed by his cousin Victorino Reyes, one of the
petitioners and registered co-owner of Lot No.
3880, that there was already a title over the said
lot. This prompted respondent AgapitoAgala and
the other heirs of Telesfora and Victoriana to seek
advice from a judge who suggested that they
request the registered co-owners to sign a
quitclaim over the said lot. A conference was
allegedly held on December 27, 1972, where three
(3) of the registered co-owners Victorino, Luis, and
Jovito all surnamed Reyessigned a Deed of
Quitclaim, where, for a consideration of one peso
(P1.00), they agreed to release, relinquish and
quitclaim all their rights over the land in favor of
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the legal heirs of the late Victoriana Reyes and
Telesfora Reyes.
The Deed of Quitclaim was annotated on the
back of OCT No. OV-227. Thereafter, respondent
AgapitoAgala had the then Police Constabulary
(PC) summon the other registered co-owners,
namely: Cipriano, Ricardo, Daylinda, Guillermo,
and Beatriz, to sign another deed of quitclaim. But
the latter allegedly ignored the call, prompting the
heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora Reyes to file on
June 9, 1975 in Civil Case No. 6238, with the
Dumaguete City RTC, Branch 40, a Complaint for
Reconveyance of Real Property, Cancellation of
Certificate of Title and Damages against the
registered co-owners of the disputed lot who did
not sign a deed of quitclaim and DominadorAgir,
who filed the amended answer in the cadastral
proceedings in 1949. On April 28, 1987, the trial
court dismissed the complaint and ruled in favor of
the registered co-owners of Lot No. 3880. On
appeal, the CA upheld the trial court and affirmed
the RTC November 29, 1989 Decision. The CA
Decision was not raised for review before this
Court, thereby attaining finality.
Consequently, on July 2, 1991, petitioners filed the
instant civil case for Recovery of Possession,
Declaration of Non-existence of a Document,
Quieting of Title and Damages against Jose
Calumpang,
Geoffrey
Calumpang,
AgapitoAgala, Lorenzo Manaban, Heirs of
Olympia Manaban, PelagiaManaban, Felipe
Cueco and Heirs of RestitutoManaban (herein
respondents) in Dumaguete City RTC.
Petitioners, as registered owners of Lot No. 3880,
alleged that by tolerance they allowed
respondents Jose and Geoffrey Calumpang to
cultivate an area of about one hectare of the said
property; and also by tolerance allowed
respondents Manabans and Agalas to occupy
another hectare portion of the same lot. They
further alleged that in December 1972, petitioners
Victorino, Luis, and Jovito Reyes got sick; and
believing that they were bewitched by the
occupants of the said lot, they signed a Deed of
Quitclaim, waiving all their rights and interests over
their respective shares in the disputed lot in favor
of the heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora Reyes; and
that thereafter, the latter filed Civil Case No. 6238
in 1987, which was dismissed by the Dumaguete
City RTC.
W/N the quitclaim is a donation
240 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
No. Petitioners contended that the Deed of
Quitclaim is really a donation and thus
necessitates acceptance by respondents Agalas
and Manabans. However the antecedents of the
execution of the Deed of Quitclaim shows
otherwise. Victorino, Luis, and Jovito Reyes signed
the Deed of Quitclaim to relinquish their rights in
recognition of respondents’ right over the said
land and thus conveyed their rights and interest in
the quitclaim to respondents Agalas and
Manabans (the heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora
Reyes).
It should be remembered that respondents Agalas
and Manabans are the heirs of Victoriana and
Telesfora Reyes. Originally the rights and interests
of respondents over Lot No. 3880 were formally
filed in 1924 in the cadastral proceedings in the
Cadastral Court. Leonardo Reyes instructed his
representative to file an answer asserting the
ownership of said lot by the eight (8) children of
Isidro Reyes which includes Victoriana and
Telesfora. However on July 10, 1949, another claim
was filed by DominadorAgir only in behalf of the
children of Higino and Policarpio Reyes, and
excluded Victoriana and Telesfora Reyes. Thus,
when OCT No. OV-227 was issued, the
respondents Agalas and Manabans, as heirs of
Victoriana and Telesfora, were excluded.
In this factual setting, respondents could have
filed an action for reconveyance to recover their
shares in Lot No. 3880. However, instead of
instituting such a suit, respondents were able to
convince Victorino, Luis, and Jovito, all surnamed
Reyes, to execute a Deed of Quitclaim restoring to
them their shares. Therefore, it is clear that the
quitclaim is not a donation for the three (3)
Reyeses---Victorino, Luis, and Jovito who merely
acknowledged the ownership of and the better
right over the said lot by the heirs of Victoriana and
Telesfora Reyes. Having acquired title over the
property in 1954 to the exclusion of respondents
Agalas and Manabans, through the Deed of
Quitclaim executed in 1972, the three (3) Reyeses
merely acknowledged the legal rights of
respondents over their shares in the said lot. In fine,
the Deed of Quitclaim, not being a donation, no
formal acceptance is needed from the Agalas
and Manabans.
Art. 726. When a person gives to another a thing
or right on account of the latter’s merits or of the
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services rendered by him to the donor, provided
they do not constitute a demandable debt, or
when the gift imposes upon the donee a burden
which is less than the value of the thing given,
there is also a donation. (619)
Seventh Day Adventist vs. Northeastern
Mindanao Mission
(G.R. No. 150416. July 21, 2006)
Legal principle: Donation presupposes an existent
donee whether natural or juridical. Hence, a
juridical entity inexistent at the time of donation
could not have the personality nor capacity to
accept such donation.
FACTS:
This case involves two supposed transfers of the lot
previously owned by the spouses Cosio. The first
transfer was a donation to petitioner SDA which
was accepted by their predecessors-in-interest in
1959 while the second transfer was through a
contract of sale to respondents Northeastern
Mindanao Mission in 1980. A TCT was later issued in
the name of respondents NMM.
Claiming to be the alleged donee’s successors-ininterest, petitioner SDA filed a case for
cancellation of title, quieting of ownership and
possession, declaratory relief and reconveyance
with prayer for preliminary injunction and
damages against respondents. They also
declared themselves a de facto corporation for
which reason they should benefit from the
donation.
Respondents NMM, on the other hand, argued
that at the time of the donation, petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest has no juridical personality
to accept the donation because it was not yet
incorporated. Moreover, petitioners were not
members of the local church then.
The RTC upheld the sale in favor of respondents,
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, on
the ground that all the essential requisites of a
contract were present and it also applied the
indefeasibility of title.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation was void.
Yes, the donation was void because the local
church had neither juridical personality nor
capacity to accept such gift since it was inexistent
at the time it was made. The deed of donation was
not in favor of any informal group of SDA members
but a supposed SPUM-SDA Bayugan (the local
church) which, at the time, had neither juridical
personality nor capacity to accept such gift.
The Court denied petitioner SDA’s contention that
there exists a de facto corporation. There are
stringent requirements before one can qualify as a
de facto corporation: (a) the existence of a valid
law under which it may be incorporated; (b) an
attempt in good faith to incorporate; and (c)
assumption of corporate powers. While there
existed the old Corporation Law (Act 1459), a law
under which the local church could have been
organized, petitioners admitted that they did not
even attempt to incorporate at that time nor the
organization was registered at the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Corporate existence
begins only from the moment a certificate of
incorporation is issued. No such certificate was
ever issued to petitioners or their supposed
predecessor-in-interest at the time of the
donation.
Hence, petitioners obviously could not have
claimed succession to an entity that never came
to exist. And since some of the representatives of
petitioner Seventh Day Adventist Conference
Church of Southern Philippines, Inc. were not even
members of the local church then, it necessarily
follows that they could not even claim that the
donation was particularly for them.
On the other hand, there is sufficient basis to affirm
the title of respondents by virtue of the absolute
sale.
Jutic vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-44628.
August 27, 1987)
LEGAL PRINCIPLE: A letter showing an intention to
donate is not sufficient to prove donation; and
most certainly not the form required by law in
donations.
HELD:
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FACTS: The properties of Arsenio Seville, who had
no wife or children, here are under dispute which
includes 2 parcels of agricultural land. Petitioners
herein are heirs of Melquiades Seville who was one
of the siblings of the deceased Arsenio Seville.
Respondents are other heirs claiming rightful
ownership over the properties. The petitioners
claim that the 2 parcels of land with improvements
thereon was donated to their father in an affidavit
executed by Arsenio Seville to Melquindes Seville.
It stated that the latter was the only one to whom
the former intended (note: this is only a manifest
intention or desire similar to the previous case- the
last part of the document says ―That I make this
affidavit to amek manifest my intention and desire
as to the way the above –mentioned property...‖)
to inherit all his properties.
ISSUES: Whether or not there was a valid donation
from Arsenio Seville to Melquiades Seville?
RULING: NO. A close reading of the letter reveals
that it is not a donation inters vivos or motis causa
but a mere declaration of an intention and a
desire. The fact that the property was mortgage
by Arsenio with the knowledge of the Melquiades
shows that ownership has not yet transferred. Also
when Arsenio died, payments to the loan for
which the property was mortgaged stopped and
was not continued by the petitioners. It was even
foreclosed but was later on redeemed by one of
Arsenio’s brothers, Zoilo, who is also one of the
respondents.
Petitioners has a rightful claim over the property
based on the fact that they are heirs of Arsenio but
not because of the alleged affidavit executed in
favour of Melquidas.
What are the kinds of donation?
1.
As to taking effect:
a.
Inter vivos or that which takes effect
during the lifetime of the donor
b.
Moris causa or that which takes
effect upon the death of the donor
c.
Propter nuptias or that by reason of
marriage
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2.
As to consideration
a.
Pure or simple; or that the cause of
which is the pure liberality of the donor in
consideration of the donee’s merits
b.
Remuneratory or compensatory; or
that which is given out of gratitude on account of
the services rendered by the donee to the donor,
provided they do not constitute a demandable debt
c.
Modal or that which imposes upon
the donee a burden (services to be performed in the
future) less than the value of the gift
d.
Onerous or that the value of which is
considered the equivalent of the consideration for
which it is given, or that made for a valuable
consideration, and is thus governed by the rules on
oblicon
Di Siock Jian vs. Sy Lioc Suy (G.R. No. L-17783. June
22, 1922)
Legal principle: Where, in a donation, an
obligation is imposed upon the donee to support
the donor and defray his necessary expenses
during his lifetime, the donation is not a pure, but
a conditional, one, since the obligation imposed
upon the donee is in the nature of the condition
without which the donation would not have been
made.
Facts: Siock Jian, as the guardian of two minors,
asks that the sale of the lot that was donated to
them be declared void since it was made to
defraud the minors. She alleges that she has been
collecting rents on the property and paying taxes
since 1919 on behalf of the minors.
She further states that Sy Lioc Suy executed a
deed of donation in the favor of his minor children
represented by Siock Jian, which was accepted
on the same date.
However, on the date of execution, Di Siock Jian
was not the judicially appointed guardian of the
property of the plaintiff minors, but she was the
mother of said minors. It was only later, on
December 9, 1919, she was appointed by the
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Court of First Instance of Manila as guardian of the
persons and properties of said minors;
On July 5, 1919, Sy Lioc Suy executed a document
revoking said donation, and on July 12 of the same
year, he executed another document of purchase
and sale of the same property, in favor of the other
defendants. Sy Lioc asks that the deed of donation
be declared void because they are the legal
owners of the lot and that Jian render an account
of all the moneys received by her as rent of said
property with interest and costs.
The fifth clause of the deed of donation contains
an obligation on the part of the person, accepting
the donation on behalf of the donees, to provide
the donee with lodging, food, clothing, and
laundry, medical attendance and medicine, and
all other things necessary for his subsistence
during his lifetime, this obligation to cease upon
the destruction of the property by accident of
fortuitous event.
Issue: W/N Siock Jian can accept the donation on
behalf of her minor children
Ruling: No, since Siock Jian did not have their legal
representation, the donation is void, as made in
violation of the law.
In this case, the donation is conditional, for the
reason that it was made with the condition that the
person accepting it on behalf of the minor donees,
should defray his lodging, food, clothing, and
laundry and fulfill the other obligations stated in
the said clause of the donation.
Article 626 of the Civil Code provides that person
who cannot enter into a contract cannot accept
conditional or onerous donations without the
intervention of their legal representatives. In this
case, Jian, the mother of the minors had not been
appointed by the court as guardian of her children
when she accepted said donations. Not being
then the legal representative of her children, she
could not validly accept said donation, for while
she is considered as the natural guardian of her
minor children and by virtue thereof she has the
right to have them in her custody and educate
them, yet this right does not extend to the
properties of said minors unless declared so by the
court. (Sec. 553. Code of Civil Proc.) If the donation
was not duly accepted in accordance with the
article 623, there was not any contract binding
upon the donor, and nothing could, therefore
prevent him from withdrawing the offer.
243 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
Whenever the donation does not impose any
obligation upon the donee, the acceptance may
be made by the donee himself, although under
article 1263 he cannot consent. However, in a
conditional or onerous donation in favor of minors,
as is the case under consideration, there is
stronger reason for requiring for the intervention of
their legal representatives because it goes to the
validity of the acceptance in such a way that the
lack of this is so, in the first place, because no one
can contract in the name of another without being
authorized by him or without having his legal
representation (art. 1259, Civ. Code), and in the
second place, because obligations arising from
contract have the force of law between the
contracting parties and must be performed in
accordance with their stipulations (art. 1091, Civ.
Code) and it is precisely because, as in the case
at bar, certain obligations are imposed upon the
donees, that the consent to assume them is
required to be given by their legal representative
to protect the rights of the donor. If the mother who
accepted the conditional donation was legal
representative of her children, the acceptance is
valid; if she did not have their legal representation,
it is void, as made in violation of the law.
City of Manila vs. Rizal Park Co (G.R. No. 31063.
September
13,
1929)
This is an action to compel the defendant, Rizal
Park Co., Inc., the successor in interest of C. W.
Rosenstock & Company to execute the transfer
and conveyance of the parcel of land known as
block 44 of the Rizal Park subdivision in the City of
Manila to the plaintiff, the City of Manila.
The record shows that by the instrument, Exhibit A,
C. W. Rosenstock & Co., bound itself to assign,
transfer and convey to the City of Manila,
gratuitously and irrevocably, the absolute
ownership of said block 44, whereon the city may
build or erect a school or schools, or buildings for
educational purposes, with playgrounds, within
the period of three years from the date of the
execution of said instrument.
The City of Manila, in turn, accepted the
assignment made and promised by C. W.
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Rosenstock & Co., obligating itself to make the
constructions indicated in the instrument Exhibit A.
The City of Manila, after requiring the defendant
Rizal Park Co. Inc. (successor-in-interest to C.W.
Rosenstock & Co) in the block in question, to
execute the deed of conveyance of said block,
the defendant refused to comply with this
obligation, thus giving rise to this action wherein
the plaintiff prays for judgment against the
defendant compelling it to execute the necessary
deed assigning, transferring and conveying to the
City of Manila gratuitously and without any
payment or compensation, irrevocably and free
from all conditions, the full and absolute ownership
of the parcel of land described in the complaint,
whereon the City of Manila may construct a school
or schools, or any building for educational
purposes, and the necessary playgrounds for the
recreation of the school children.
The court then decided the case ordering the
defendant to execute the said deed assigning
and conveying to the City of Manila the full
ownership of block No. 44 described in the
certi>cate of title.
having failed to construct said buildings within said
period of three years, it has lost the right to the
assignment.
ISSUE: WoN the construction of the buildings
mentioned in the deed is a condition precedent
before the execution of the deed of conveyance
of block 44.
RULING: NO. According to the jurisprudence, both
in this jurisdiction and in Spain and the United
States, when the terms of a contract are clear and
positive and leave no room for doubt, no
interpretation should be given which would alter
or change its strict and literal meaning.
A careful reading of paragraph 1 of the contract
copied above, reveals the fact that the
construction of the buildings for the school in the
block in question is not a condition precedent to
the assignment of said block to the City of Manila,
and that the three- year period from the date of
the deed fixed therein was given for the execution
of the deed of gift by the defendant, and not for
the building of the schoolhouses by the City of
Manila.
I. That said partnership, C. W. Rosenstock & Co.,
does hereby bind and obligate itself to assign,
transfer, and convey to the City of Manila,
gratuitously and free of all payment or indemnity
and irrevocably, the absolute and unconditioned
ownership of the land hereinafter described,
whereon the city may build a schoolhouse or
schoolhouses, or buildings for educational
purposes, with playgrounds for the recreation
and enjoyment of the school children, within
three years from the date hereof. . . .(Here follows
the technical description of this parcel.)"
This is a contract of assignment, or, more
specifically, a contract of onerous donation by
virtue of which the defendant binds itself to
convey gratuitously in favor of the plaintiff the land
in question, in consideration of the improvements
that the City of Manila agrees to make in the Rizal
Park subdivision; and the City of Manila agrees to
make certain improvements in said subdivision, in
consideration of the assignment of a portion
thereof which the defendant binds itself to make
in favor of the plaintiff.
The defendant then appealed and raised the
interpretation of the deed Exhibit A and deduced
three conclusions from the terms of this
paragraph, to wit: (1) That the City of Manila
should first have built upon the block in question,
a school or schools, or building for educational
purposes, and the necessary playground for the
recreation and enjoyment of the school children,
before having the right to obtain the assignment
promised by the defendant; (2) that the
construction of said buildings should have been
made by the City within three years from the date
of the deed, or from October 24, 1912; and (3) that
There is nothing in paragraph I of the deed in
question requiring the City of Manila to construct
buildings on the block in question before the
defendant would be obliged to execute the
promised assignment. If this was the intention of
the parties, they would have clearly stated it in the
contract. And of course it would have been
impossible for the City of Manila to accept such a
condition, knowing, as it should have known, that
it cannot erect any building on land that is not its
absolute and exclusive property.
244 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
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o "Art. 734. The donation is perfected
from the moment the donor knows
of the acceptance by the donee."
Lagazo vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112796.
March 5, 1998)
o
Legal Principle: In order to ascertain that the kind
of donation is an onerous donation, there must be
a clear intention by the donor to impose a burden
on the donee. Otherwise, it is merely a simple
donation whose nature is that of liberality and in
which acceptance is indispensable.
o "Art. 749. In order that the donation
of an immovable may be valid, it
must be made in a public
instrument, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of
the charges which the donee must
satisfy.
FACTS:
-
Petitioner filed an action to recover a piece of
land as he claims that he acquired it through a
donation by his grandmother.
-
The trial court ruled in favor of petitionerappellant, claiming their evidence to be more
credible
-
CA reversed ruling as there was there was no
proof of acceptance of the donation.
-
Appellant argues that such formality was
inapplicable as the donation was onerous-he paid
for the amortization due on the land before and
after execution of the deed of donation.
o
-
ISSUE
-
3.
As to effectivity or extinguishment
W/N the donation is simple or onerous
-
-
The court ruled that the donation was simple.
Although petitioner paid full payment of the
purchase price of the lot, such payment was not
imposed by the donor as a condition for the
donation
It was clear that it was not onerous as the deed
displayed no intention on the part of the donor to
burden or charge the petitioner
Thus, as a simple donation the following
provision are applicable:
245 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
Justice Vitug: “The donation,
following the “theory of cognition”
is perfect upon the moment the
donor knows of the acceptance
by the done”, Acceptance is
indispensable
Donation may be accepted at any time during
the lifetime of the donor, provided there was proof
that such acceptance was received by the donor
in the deed of the donation and the instrument
embodying acceptance.
RULING (Donation was simple)
-
"Art. 746. Acceptance must be
made during the lifetime of the
donor and the donee."
a.
Pure
b.
Conditional
c.
With a term
Remuneratory donations




In this kind of donation, the motivating cause
is gratitude, acknowledgment of a favor, a
desire to repay for past services.
A donation given for future services cannot
be remuneratory.
It is necessary that the past services do not
constitute a demandable debt. Otherwise,
payment, not anymore donation.
A debt is demandable when it can be legally
demanded or enforced by the donee
against the donor who has thus an obligation
to pay it. But a debt that has been
renounced is not a demandable debt.
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
A donation made to one who saved the
donor’s life or his properties or took care of
the donor while the latter was ill, or to a
lawyer who renounced his fees for services
rendered to the donor, falls under this class of
donation.
DONATIONS WITH MIXED FEATURES
-
What about gratuities and pensions?


While technically a gratuity is different from a
donation, in substance, they are the same.
A gratuity is similar to a pension and is
essentially remunerative donation.
The above donations are also considered by
some writers and even by the Supreme Court
as remuneratory or onerous Article 733
inadvisedly makes reference to them as
remuneratory donations.
Article 733. Donations with an onerous cause
shall be governed by the rules on contracts
and remuneratory donations by the provisions
of the present Title as regards that portion
which exceeds the value of the burden
imposed. (622)
Modal Donations



In a modal donation, a burden (which is
necessarily future) less than the value of the
gift is imposed upon the donee.
If the burden is considered the equivalent of
the thing or right given, then it’s an onerous
donation.
The burden may consist in a real or personal
charge which is capable of being valued in
terms of money.
Examples of Modal Donations
1. One made with the charge that the donee
“defray the expenses of the subsistence and
burial’’ of the donor and “if perchance
anything should remain from the price of the
land, the surplus of the said expenses is
granted to him by me’’
2. One made with the condition that the person
accepting it on behalf of the minor donees
“should defray his [donor’s] lodging, food,
clothing, and laundry, and fulfill the other
obligations stated in the donation,’’
provided that the burden is less than that of
the donation.
3. One imposing upon the donee the obligation
to give a life pension (with a lesser value) to
the donor or to a third person;
4. A donation of a parcel of land to a municipal
corporation to be used exclusively for some
specified public purpose, such as a public
park or school site.
5. A donation of a parcel of land on the
condition that the donation shall be deemed
revoked if the donee fails to build a house
and reside therein or establish a school within
a certain period of time.
246 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
Example:
Where R donates to E a parcel of land worth
P300,000 but E has to give another parcel of land
or perform some services worth P100,000, the
transaction is onerous as to the P100,000 which
must be in the form of a contract of barter or
exchange, and simple as to the P200,000 which
must follow the form of donations.
-
-
Strictly speaking, remuneratory donations are
those which are given on account of services
rendered by the donee to the donor. Modal
donations are conditional only in the sense
that a burden, charge, condition or limitation
is imposed by the donor but the burden is not
technically a condition in the sense of an
uncertain event upon which the effectivity or
extinguishment of donation is made to
depend4 for it is really a mere obligation
imposed by the donor upon the donee as a
consideration of the donation.
Actually, a modal donation has a dual
nature, i.e., it is partly onerous and partly
simple — the portion equivalent to the
burden is onerous and is governed by the
rules on obligations and contracts including
those as to form
Art. 727. Illegal or impossible conditions in simple
and remuneratory donations shall be considered
as not imposed. (n)
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EFFECTS OF ILLEGAL OR IMPOSSIBLE CONDITIONS
Article 1183. Impossible conditions, those contrary
to good customs or public policy and those
prohibited by law shall annul the obligation which
depends upon them. If the obligation is divisible,
that part thereof which is not affected by the
impossible or unlawful condition shall be valid.
-
-
Conditions are illegal when they are contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy (see Art. 1306.), and impossible,
when they, in the nature of things, cannot
exist or cannot be done.
Under Article 1183, the presence of such
conditions annuls the obligation which
depends upon them. In other words, both the
obligation and the condition are void. The
reason behind the law is that the obligor
knows his obligation cannot be fulfilled. He
has, therefore, no intention to comply with his
obligation.
When deemed not imposed –
-
Under Article 727, the illegal
condition in a simple or
donation would be deemed
following
the
rule
in
dispositions.
or impossible
remuneratory
not imposed
testamentary
Art. 873. Impossible conditions and those
contrary to law or good customs shall be
considered as not imposed and shall in no
manner prejudice the heir, even if the testator
should otherwise provide. (792a)
-
-
The donation will be considered as a simple
one.
They are related because donations and
testamentary dispositions are gratuitous
modes of transmitting ownership, pure
liberality
Condition is merely an accessory clause, it
should not affect the validity of the donation
itself unless it clearly appears that the
intention of the donor is that it wont take
effect without the condition
When is it rendered void?
-
If the donation is onerous (or modal, as to its
onerous portion), the illegal or impossible
condition will render it void. Being
contractual in nature, the rule applicable
would be that found in Article 1183.
Article 1183. Impossible conditions, those
contrary to good customs or public policy and
those prohibited by law shall annul the
obligation which depends upon them. If the
obligation is divisible, that part thereof which is
not affected by the impossible or unlawful
condition shall be valid.
RULES FOR ILLEGAL/IMPOSSIBLE CONDITIONS:
o
o
Simple/Remuneratory- conditions are
considered NOT IMPOSED
Onerous/Modal- condition will render the
donation VOID
AS TO TAKING EFFECT:
Art. 728. Donations which are to take effect
upon the death of the donor partake of the
nature of testamentary provisions, and shall be
governed by the rules established in the Title
on Succession. (629)
Art. 729. When the donor intends that the
donation shall take effect during the lifetime of
the donor, though the property shall not be
delivered till after the donor’s death, this shall
be a donation inter vivos. The fruits of the
property from the time of the acceptance of
the donation, shall pertain to the donee, unless
the donor provides otherwise. (n)
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN DONATIONS INTER VIVOS
and DONATIONS MORTIS CAUSA
Inter vivos
takes effect during the
lifetime of the donor,
independently of his
death, even if the
actual execution may
be deferred until said
death
made out of the
donor’s pure generosity
247 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
Mortis causa
Takes effect upon the
death of the donor
testator; so that
nothing is conveyed to
or acquired by the
donee — until said
death
while the second is
made in
contemplation of his
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Survival of donor will still
make it valid
Must follow formalities
of donations [Art 748 –
749]
Must be accepted by
the done during his lifetime
The first cannot be
revoked except for
grounds provided for
by law (Arts. 760, 765.),
the right to dispose of
the property is
completely conveyed
to the donee (although
certain reservations as
to possession and
enjoyment, for
example, may be
made)
Subject to donor’s tax
death without the
intention to lose the
thing or its free disposal
in case of survival
This is void if the donor
survives the donee
Can only be accepted
after the donor’s death
always revocable at
any time and for any
reason before the
donor’s death
this right to dispose of
the property is retained
by the donor while he is
still alive; and
Subject to estate tax
Whether a donation is inter vivos or mortis
causa depends
-
1. The designation of the donation as mortis
causa (or inter vivos) or a provision in the
deed of donation to the effect that the
donation is “to take effect at the death of
the donor,’’ and similar statements are
not controlling criteria. Such statements
are to be construed together with the rest
of the instrument in order to give effect to
the real intent of the transferor.
2. The fact that the donation is given in
consideration of love and affection or
past or future services is not an exclusive
characteristic of donations inter vivos
because a transfer mortis causa may be
made also for those reasons.
3. The fact that the donor reserved
sufficient properties for his maintenance
in accordance with his standing in
society, may indicate his intention to part
with the ownership of the property
donated.
Follow the formalities
for the validity of wills
[Arts. 728, 805, 806] for it
is in reality a legacy or
devise; otherwise, it is
void and cannot
transfer ownership
DESIGNATION given to donations NOT CONCLUSIVE
-
Examples:
upon the nature of the disposition made as
reflected from the provisions contained in the
donation and
the intention of the parties as demonstrated
by the circumstances attendant upon its
execution.
Test to answer:
Did the donor intend to transfer the ownership of the
property donated upon the execution of the
donation? If this is so, then it is inter vivos; otherwise, it
is merely mortis causa.
248 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
Gestopa vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 111904.
October
5, 2000)
Facts:
Sps. Diego and Catalina Danlag were the
owners of the 6 parcels of unregistered lands.
They executed three deeds of donation
mortis causa, two of which are dated March 4,
1965 and another dated October 13, 1966, in favor
of private respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil.
The first deed pertained to parcels 1 &
2.The second deed pertained to parcel 3. The last
deed
pertained
to
parcel
4.
All deeds contained the reservation of the
rights of the donors (1) to amend, cancel or revoke
the donation during their lifetime, and (2) to sell,
mortgage, or encumber the properties donated
during the donors' lifetime, if deemed necessary.
On January 16, 1973, Diego Danlag, with
the consent of his Wife, Catalina, executed a
deed of donation inter vivos covering the
aforementioned parcels of land plus two other
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parcels in favor of private respondent Mercedes.
There are conditions in this donation:
1. Danlag sps. Shall continue to enjoy the
fruits of the land during their lifetime,
2. Donee Mercedes cannot sell or dispose of
the land during the lifetime of the said
spouses, without their prior consent and
approval.
Mercedes then transferred the tax dec to her
name. She paid taxes.
1979 however, Diego and Catalina
Danlag sold parcels 3 and 4 to Agripino Gestopa,
herein petitioners. The Danlags, revoked that
donation covering the 6 parcels of land subject of
the aforecited deed of donation inter vivos.
In 1983, respondent Mercedes Pilapilfiled
with the RTC a petition against the Gestopas and
the Danlags, for quieting of title over the above
parcels of land. She alleged that she was an
illegitimate daughter of Diego Danlag. That she
lived and rendered incalculable beneficial
services to Diego and his mother, Maura Danlag,
when the latter was still alive.
In their opposition, the Gestopas and the
Danlags averred that the deed of donation dated
January 16, 1973 was null and void because it was
obtained by Mercedes through machinations and
undue influence. Even assuming it was validly
executed, the intention was for the donation to
take effect upon the death of the donor. Further,
the donation was void for it left the donor, Diego
Danlag, without any property at all.
ISSUES
1. Was the donation inter vivos or mortis
causa?
2. Was the revocation of the donation valid?
1. It is a donation Inter Vivos.
The granting clause shows that Diego donated the
properties out of love and affection for the donee.
This is a mark of a donation inter vivos. Second, the
reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the
donor intended to transfer the naked ownership
over the properties.
The court said that there is no need for such
reservation if the donor remained owners of the
properties.
Third, the donor reserved sufficient properties for
his maintenance in accordance with his standing
in society, indicating that the donor intended to
part with the six parcels of land.
Lastly, the donee accepted the donation. An
acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is
inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for
donations inter vivos.
Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will,
are not required to be accepted by the donees
during the donors' lifetime.
Also, it was proven by the facts that Danlag sps.
Already know the distinction between a donation
mortis causa and inter vivos because they have
already made 3 prior donations which were mortis
causa.
2.
No. A valid donation, once accepted,
becomes irrevocable, except on account of
officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with
the charges imposed in the donation, or
ingratitude. The donor-spouses did not invoke any
of these reasons in the deed of revocation. Finally,
the records do not show that the donor-spouses
instituted any action to revoke the donation in
accordance with Article 769 of the Civil
Code.Consequently, the supposed revocation on
September 29, 1979, had no legal effect
Held:
249 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
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Cuevas vs. Cuevas (G.R. No. L-8327. December 14,
1955)
Antonina Cuevas executed a notarized
conveyance entitled "Donacion Mortis Causa,"
ceding to her nephew Crispulo Cuevas the
northern half of a parcel of unregistered land in
Nueva Ecija. In the same instrument appears the
acceptance of Crispulo Cuevas. Subsequently the
donor revocated the donation and brought
action in RTC to recover the land conveyed, on
the ground (1) that the donation being mortis
causa, it had been lawfully revoked by the donor;
and (2) even if it were a donation inter vivos, the
same was invalidated because (a) it was not
properly accepted; (b) because the donor did
not reserve sufficient property for her own
maintenance, and (c) because the donee was
guilty of ingratitude, for having refused to support
the donor.
RTC denied the recovery sought.
CA forwarded to SC because the case faise
questions of law. The deed was a valid donation
inter vivos with reservation of beneficial title during
the lifetime of the donor.
ISSUE: Whether the true nature of the deed
embodies a donation inter vivos, or a disposition of
property mortis causa revocable freely by the
transferor at any time before death.
because the formalities of testaments were not
observed.
When the donor stated that she would continue
to retain the "possession, cultivation, harvesting
and all other rights and attributes of ownership,"
she meant only the dominium utile, not the full
ownership. The words "rights and attributes of
ownership" should be construed ejusdem generis
with the preceding rights of "possession, cultivation
and harvesting" expressly enumerated in the
deed. Had the donor meant to retain full or
absolute ownership she had no need to specify
possession, cultivation and harvesting, since all
these rights are embodied in full or absolute
ownership; nor would she then have excluded the
right of free disposition from the "rights and
attributes of ownership" that she reserved for
herself.
It is highly desirable that all those who are called
to prepare or notarize deeds of donation should
call the attention of the donors to the necessity of
clearly specifying whether, notwithstanding the
donation, they wish to retain the right to control
and dispose at will of the property before their
death, without need of the consent or intervention
of the beneficiary, since the express reservation of
such right would be conclusive indication that the
liberality is to exist only at the donor's death, and
therefore, the formalities of testaments should be
observed; while, a converso, the express waiver of
the right of free disposition would place the inter
vivos character of the donation beyond dispute.
RULING:
Neither the designation mortis causa, nor the
provision that a donation is "to take effect at the
death of the donor", is a controlling criterion in
defining the true nature of donations.
The crux of the controversy revolves around the
provisions of the deed of donation. There is an
apparent conflict in the expression that the donor
reserves to herself "the right of possession,
cultivation, harvesting and other rights and
attributes of ownership while I am not deprived of
life by the Almighty"; but right after the same donor
states that she "will not take away" (the property)
"because I reserve it for him (the donee) when I
die."
In the first, the donation is operative inter vivos; in
the second, we would be confronted with a
disposition mortis causa, void from the beginning
250 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
WHAT IF THERE IS DOUBT?
In case of doubt, the conveyance should be
deemed donation mortis causa in order to avoid
uncertainty as to the ownership of the property
subject to the deed.
The legal principle enunciated in Article 1378 is that
in case of doubt relative to a gratuitous contract, the
construction must be that entailing “the least
transmission of rights and interests.
Art. 729. When the donor intends that the donation
shall take effect during the lifetime of the donor,
though the property shall not be delivered till after
the donor’s death, this shall be a donation inter
vivos. The fruits of the property from the time of the
acceptance of the donation, shall pertain to the
donee, unless the donor provides otherwise.
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Donations to be delivered after the donor’s death.
Delivery – There can be a donation inter vivos even
if the property will not be delivered until the death of
the donor, the donee shall become the owner and
the fruits shall pertain to him unless otherwise
provided.
IN PRAESENTI  which takes effect during the life of
the donor but the property is delivered after the
latter’s death.
(1) Title to property is conveyed subject only to life
estate of donor
- “I also declare that it is the condition of the
donation that the donee cannot take possession of
the properties donated before the death of the
donor xx.”
(2) Possession and enjoyment of property to take
effect only after donor’s death
- the donation would take effect only after the
donor’s death “simply meant that the possession
and enjoyment of the fruits of the properties
donated should take effect only after the donor ’s
death and not before.’’
(3) Property donated in consideration of love and
affection to be delivered only after donor’s death
- “to take effect after the donor’s death.”
Alejandro vs. Geraldez (G.R. No. L-33849. August
18, 1977) FACTS:
Sps. Gavino Diaz and Severa Mendoza executed
a Deed of Donation in favor of their children,
Olimpia, Angel and Andrea Diaz. In the deed of
donation, the Sps. Donated 8 lots, with reservations
on certain lots, to their children and daughters-inlaw and with conditions that they are not allowed
to alienate the same to 3rd persons while the
couple are still alive and that they shall continue
to administer the same until their death.
The donees manifested their acceptance in the
same deed of donation.
When Gavino died, Severa executed a deed of
donation in favor of Angel and Andrea, giving the
251 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
siblings each a ½ portion of Lot 2377-A. When
Severa died, Andrea sued Angel to have the lots
2377-A and 2502 partitioned. This was on the
condition that Andrea Diaz would bear the funeral
expenses to be incurred after the donor’s death
while Angel Diaz was also donated the other half
because because he defrayed the funeral
expenses on the occasion of the death of his
father. Teodorico Alejandro, the surviving spouse
of Olimpia, moved to intervene claiming 1/3
portion of Lot 2502.
The trial court ruled that the donation was a
donation mortis causa because the ownership of
the properties donated did not pass to the donees
during the donor’s lifetime but was transmitted to
the donees only upon the death of the donors. It,
however, sustained the partition of Lot 2502 since
it was an extrajudicial partition. Both parties
appealed to the SC, Andrea contending that it is a
donation inter vivos while Alejandro contending it
to be mortis causa.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation is a donation inter
vivos or mortis causa
RULING:
The donation is a donation inter vivos because it
took effect during the lifetime of the donors as
provided in Art. 729. It was stipulated in the deed
that out of love and affection by the donors to the
donees, the latter are donating wholeheartedly
and unconditionally free from any kind of lien and
debt. Likewise, it was accepted by the donees
which is a requirement for donations inter vivos.
Donations mortis causa are never accepted
during the donor’s lifetime.
The donation complies with all the requisite legal
formalities (Art. 749.); it takes effect immediately
after the execution of the deed of donation; it was
accepted (donations mortis causa being in the
form of a will are never accepted by the donees
during the lifetime of the donor); the limited right
of the disposition given to the donees implies that
the ownership had passed to them by means of
the donation. Although there was a stipulation
where the couple reserved to themselves the
administration, ownership and rights over the
properties mentioned, this should not be construed
as to mean that ownership will pass only after their
death. This refers to the beneficial ownership and
not the naked title and what the donors reserved
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to themselves by means of that clause was the
management of the donated lots and the fruits
thereof.
The donation is inter vivos because the ownership
of the property donated passed to the donee; it is
not provided that the transfer was revocable
before the donor’s death; and it is stated that the
transfer will be void if the transferee dies ahead of
the transferor. The two clauses should be
interpreted together and this means that the
charge or condition as to the donor’s share of the
fruits shall terminate upon the donor’s death. The
reservation clause which provides that the donees
cannot sell the lots to 3rd persons while the couple
is still alive implies that the ownership already
passed.
Vita vs. Montanano (G.R. No. 50553. February 19,
1991)
Facts: Vita filed, in his capacity as judicial
administrator of the estate of deceased Edilberto
Vita, a complaint to recover from defendantsappellants Soledad Montanano, Estanislao
Jovellano and Estebana Jovellano the possession
of three (3) parcels of land. Vita claims that during
the lifetime of Edilberto Vita, he was the owner
and possessor of these three (3) parcels of land
covered by tax declarations. When he died on
January 23, 1962, defendants-appellants, through
stealth and strategy, took possession of the
above-stated parcels of land and gathered the
fruits therefrom. Notwithstanding demands from
plaintiff-appellant, defendants-appellants refused
to surrender the possession of these parcels of
land.
Defendants’s Answer:
The lands do not belong to Edilberto Vita. Instead,
they claim that the two parcels of land belong to
Soledad Montanano as these were conveyed to
her by Isidra Montanano (her aunt and wife of
Edilberto Vita) and Edilberto Vita in a document
signed and executed by them. The other land is
owned in common by Soledad Montanano, her
brother Jose and sisters Elena and Alodia. It
originally belonged to Francisca Asilo, deceased
sister of their grandmother, Micaela Asilo. Its
ownership was transferred to them under the
252 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
arrangement sanctioned by Edilberto Vita himself
wherein all the proceeds from the yearly harvests
therefrom shall be spent for the yearly masses to
be held for the souls of Francisca Asilo and Isidra
Montanano. This being the case, plaintiff is now
estopped from instituting this action. Defendants
claim also that Edilberto Vita could not have
inherited these parcels of land from Isidra
Montanano as the latter's estate has never been
the subject of a judicial or extra-judicial
proceeding.
Defendants-appellants
and
intervenorsappellants allege the following: 1) that a donation
mortis causa (as in the case of the November 22,
1938 donation), being in the nature of a legacy,
need not be accepted; their acceptance of that
donation is superfluous and 2) that the December
20, 1940 donation is a donation inter vivos
because: a) there is no stipulation or provision
therein that the donation is essentially revocable;
b) there was an acceptance of the donation; c)
the donation was not simply made in
consideration of the death of the donor but of her
affection for the donees.
RTC ruling:
Considering that the plaintiff has not shown by
preponderating evidence that the three (3)
parcels of land covered in the complaint belong
to the estate of Edilberto Vita and it appearing
likewise that the defendants and intervenors have
not shown that the parcels of land covered in the
counterclaim were validly donated to them and
that they have legally accepted the donation
made by Isidra Montanano, the complaint is
dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not acceptance is necessary in
a donation mortis causa; and whether the
donation dated December 20, 1940 is mortis
causa or inter vivos.
HELD: It is explicit in Article 725 of the Civil Code
that acceptance is necessary in a donation. This
applies to all kinds of donation because the law
does not make any distinction. The rationale
behind the requirement of acceptance is that
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nobody is obliged to receive a benefit against his
will.
donation mortis causa because the donee is
expressly prohibited to make any disposition of the
property during the donor’s lifetime.
Based on the first part of the paragraph which
states " '[n]a bagaman at sa kasulatang ito ay
lubusan ng ibinibigay at ipinagkakaloob sa bawat
isa . . . na iyon ay patuluyan nang ngayo'y
iginagawad sa kanila ng walang pasubali, na
magagawa na nila ang buong karapatan
ngayon bilang tunay na may-ari . . . ", supra, it was
obviously the intention of Isidra Montanano to
grant a donation inter vivos to defendantsappellants and intervenors-appellants. Although
the rest of the paragraph states "'gayon man, ay
kami pa ring mag-asawa ang mananatili sa pagmamayari, pakikinabang at pamomosision, –– na
kani-kaniyang pag-aaring dito'y ipinagkakaloob,
sa buong panahon na ang bawat isa sa amin
mag-asawa'y nabubuhay, at kung kailan bawian
kami ng hiram na buhay, ay saka at saka pa
lamang maaring matamo nila ang ganap na
pagmamayari at pakikinabang sa mga pagaaring iyan.
Facts: Aurora Virto Vda. De Montinola executed
an instrument entitled “Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos” naming her grandchildren as donees. The
subject of the donation is Lot 3231 of the Cadastral
Survey of Panay in Montinola’s name. The deed
also contained the donees’ signatures in
acknowledgment of their acceptance of the
donation. The same was registered, and the
donor’s title cancelled.
It is true that the last paragraph in each donation
contains the phrase "that after the death of the
donor the aforesaid donation shall become
effective." . . . However, said expression must be
construed together with the rest of the paragraph,
and thus taken, its meaning clearly appears to be
that after the donor's death, the donation will take
effect so as to make the donees the absolute
owners of the donated property, free from all liens
and encumbrances; for it must be remembered
that the donor reserved for himself a share of the
fruits of the land donated. Such reservation
constituted a charge or encumbrance that would
disappear upon the donor's death, when full title
would become vested in the donees.
Sicad vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 125888.
August 13, 1998
Legal principle: When all rents, fruits and proceeds
of the donated properties shall remain for the
exclusive benefit and disposal of the donor, during
her lifetime, and that without the knowledge and
consent of the donor, the donated properties
could not be disposed of in any way, this is
253 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
Montinola however retained the owner’s
duplicate copy of the new title as well as the
property itself, until she transferred the same to the
Sicads. She revoked the donation and filed a
petition with the RTC in Roxas City for the
cancellation of the new title and the
reinstatement of the donor’s title. She alleged
that her donation was one mortis causa which
had to comply with the formalities of a will and
since it had not, the donation was void. The
donees opposed and claimed that the donation
was inter vivos.
Issue: W/N the donor intended to effect the the
immediate transfer of ownership to the donees
Ruling: A donation which purports to be one inter
vivos but withholds from the donee the right to
dispose of the donated property during the
donor’s lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a
donation mortis causa the right of disposition is not
transferred to the donee while the donor is still
alive.
The evidence establishes that on December 11,
1979, when the deed of donation prepared by
Montinola's lawyer, Montinola expressed her wish
that the donation take effect only after ten (10)
years from her death, and that the deed include a
prohibition on the sale of the property for such
period. Accordingly, a new proviso was inserted in
the deed reading: "however, the donees shall not
sell or encumber the properties herein donated
within 10 years after the death of the donor."
Not only did Aurora Montinola order the insertion
in the deed of that restrictive proviso, but also, after
recordation of the deed of donation, she never
stopped treating the property as her own. She
continued, as explicity authorized in the deed
itself, to possess the property, enjoy its fruits and
otherwise exercise the rights of dominion, paying
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the property taxes as they fell due — all these she
did until she transferred the Property to the Sicad
Spouses on July 10, 1990. She did not give the new
certificate of title to the ostensible donees but
retained it, too, until she delivered it to the Sicads
on the occasion of the sale of the property to
them. In any event, the delivery of the title to the
donees would have served no useful purpose
since, as just stated, they were prohibited to effect
any sale or encumbrance thereof for a period of
ten (10) years after the ostensible donor's
decease. And consistent with these acts denoting
retention of ownership of the property was
Montinola's openly expressed view that the
donation was ineffectual and could not be given
effect even after ten (10) years from her death.
In the case at bar, nothing of any consequence
was transferred by the deed of donation in
question to Montinola’s grandchildren, the
ostensible donees. They did not get possession of
the property donated. They did not acquire the
right to the fruits thereof, or any other right of
dominion over the property. More importantly,
they did not acquire the right to dispose of the
property- this would accrue to them only after 10
years from Montinola’s death. Indeed, they never
even laid hands on the certificate of title to the
same. They were thus simply ‘paper owners’ of the
donated property. The donation in question,
though denominated inter vivos, is in truth one
mortis causa; it is void because the essential
requisites for its validity have not been complied
with
Instances of Donations Inter Vivos
(1) Donor warrants title to property over which she
reserved lifetime usufruct. — “This gift to E in
recompense for her services to me, does not pass
title to her during my lifetime; but when I die, she shall
be the true owner of the two aforementioned
parcels x x x and she shall be rightfully entitled to
transmit them to her children.
(2) Donation accepted by donees who were given
limited right of disposition, with donor reserving
beneficial ownership. — The parents executed in a
public instrument a deed of donation of parcels of
land to their children as a token of their affection and
esteem, and the donees accepted the donation in
the same public instrument, with a reservation clause
that the donees shall shoulder the expenses for the
illness and funeral of the donors and the donees
254 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
cannot sell the properties during the donors’ lifetime
except when necessary to defray the expenses and
support of the donors.
(3) Donation was executed out of love and affection
as well as a recognition of the personal services
rendered by the donee. — the transfer of ownership
for the properties donated was immediate and
independent of the death of the donor. The
provision as regards the reservation of properties for
the donor’s subsistence in relation to the other
provisions of the deed of donation confirms the
intention of the donor to give naked ownership
thereof to the donee immediately after the
execution of the deed of donation.
(4) Ownership and possession of property
immediately transferred to donee but his right to fruits
to begin only after donor’s death - The provision in the
deed that the income of the lands be delivered to
the donor for her enjoyment until she dies, does not
affect the character of the donation, because the
law precisely requires , for the validity of a donation,
that there be reserved to the donor in full ownership
or in usufruct, an amount sufficient to support her in
a manner appropriate to her station.
(5) Causes of revocation specified. — Neither does
the fact that the donation is revocable give it the
character of donation mortis causa inasmuch as the
revocation is not made to depend on the donor’s will
exclusively, but on failure to fulfill the condition
imposed. On the other hand, this condition, in so far
as it renders the donation onerous, takes it further
away from the disposition mortis causa and brings it
nearer to contract.’’
(6) Donor states that he makes a perfect, irrevocable
and consummated donation. — The express
irrevocability of the donation is the distinctive
standard that identifies a document as a donation
inter vivos, a quality absolutely incompatible with the
idea of conveyances mortis causa where
revocability is of the essence of the act to the extent
that a testator cannot lawfully waive or restrict his
right of revocation.
(7) Donor and donee prohibited from alienating and
encumbering the property. — It remains to be a
donation inter vivos despite an express provision that
the donor continues to be in possession and
enjoyment of the donated property while he is alive.
On the other hand, the prohibition on the donees
only meant that they may not mortgage or dispose
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of the donated property while the donor enjoys and
possesses the property during his lifetime.
(8) Usufruct reserved by the donor. — From the terms
of the donation, the donor intended to and did
dispose of her properties irrevocably in favor of the
donee, subject only to the conditions therein
expressed, one of which was that the latter would
have no right to the products during the donor’s
lifetime. This merely indicates a reservation in herself
of the usufruct over said properties, which usufruct
would be consolidated with the naked ownership of
the donee upon the former’s death. The reservation
of a lifetime usufruct is an indication that the donor
intended to transfer the naked ownership of the
property donated.
Alejandro vs. Geraldez, supra.
FACTS:
Sps. Gavino Diaz and Severa Mendoza executed
a Deed of Donation in favor of their children,
Olimpia, Angel and Andrea Diaz. In the deed of
donation, the Sps. Donated 8 lots, with reservations
on certain lots, to their children and daughters-inlaw and with conditions that they are not allowed
to alienate the same to 3rd persons while the
couple are still alive and that they shall continue
to administer the same until their death.
donors to the donees, the latter are donating
wholeheartedly and unconditionally free from any
kind of lien and debt. Likewise, it was accepted by
the donees which is a requirement for donations
inter vivos. Donations mortis causa are never
accepted during the donor’s lifetime.
The donation complies with all the requisite legal
formalities (Art. 749.); it takes effect immediately
after the execution of the deed of donation; it was
accepted (donations mortis causa being in the
form of a will are never accepted by the donees
during the lifetime of the donor); the limited right
of the disposition given to the donees implies that
the ownership had passed to them by means of
the donation.
If the deed of donation makes an actual
conveyance of the property to the donee, subject
to a life estate in the donors, the donation is inter
vivos (Guarin vs. De Vera, 100 Phil. 1100).
Articles 729, 730 and 731 have to some extent
dissipated the confusion surrounding the two kinds
of donation. The rule in article 729 is a
crystallization of the doctrine announced in
decided cases:

The donees manifested their acceptance in the
same deed of donation.
When Gavino died, Severa executed a deed of
donation in favor of Angel and Andrea, giving the
siblings each a ½ portion of Lot 2377-A. When
Severa died, Andrea sued Angel to have the lots
2377-A and 2502 partitioned. This was on the
condition that Andrea Diaz would bear the funeral
expenses to be incurred after the donor’s death
while Angel Diaz was also donated the other half
because because he defrayed the funeral
expenses on the occasion of the death of his
father. Teodorico Alejandro, the surviving spouse
of Olimpia, moved to intervene claiming 1/3
portion of Lot 2502.

RULING:
The SC ruled that the donation is a donation inter
vivos because it took effect during the lifetime of
the donors as provided in Art. 729. It was stipulated
in the deed that out of love and affection by the
255 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9

De Guzman v. Ibea: In that case, it was
provided in the deed that the donor
donated to the donee certain properties
so that the donee "may hold the same as
her own and always" and that the donee
would administer the lands donated and
deliver the fruits thereof to the donor, as
long as the donor was alive, but upon the
donor's death the said fruits would belong
to the donee. It was held that the naked
ownership was conveyed to the donee
upon the execution of the deed of
donation and, therefore, the donation
became effective during the donor's
lifetime
In Sambaan vs. Villanueva, 71 Phil. 303, the
deed of donation, as in Balaqui vs.
Dongso, 53 Phil. 673, contained conflicting
provisions. It was provided in the deed that
the donation was made "en consideracion
al afecto y cariño" of the donor for the
donee but that the donation "surtira
efectos despues de ocurrida mi muerte"
(donor's death).
There can be donation inter vivos despite
the statement in the deed that it was
mortis causa. The donation was construed
as a conveyance in praesenti ("a present
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grant of a future interest") because it
conveyed to the donee the title to the
properties donated "subject only to the life
estate of the donor" and because the
conveyance took effect upon the making
and delivery of the deed. The acceptance
of the donation was a circumstance which
was taken into account in characterizing
the donation as inter vivos.
Notwithstanding the provision in the deed
that it was only after the donor's death
when the 'title" to the donated properties
would pass to the donee and when the
donee would become the owner thereof,
it was held in the Balaqui case that the
donation was inter vivos. It was noted in
that case that the donor, in making a
warranty, implied that the title had already
been conveyed to the donee upon the
execution of the deed and that the donor
merely reserved to herself the "possession
and usufruct" of the donated properties.
-
In 1965 and 1966, 3 deeds of donation mortis
causa over unregistered lands were executed in
favor of Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil by spouses
Diego and Catalina Danlag
-
In 1973 Diego, with Catalina’s consent, executed
a donation intervivos over the same lands in favor
of Mercedes.
-
IN June of 1979 the spouses sold the lands in
question to petitioners Gestopa, and only
executed a deed of revocation in Sept. of the
same year.
The donation is inter vivos because the ownership
of the property donated passed to the donee; it is
not provided that the transfer was revocable
before the donor’s death; and it is stated that the
transfer will be void if the transferee dies ahead of
the transferor. The two clauses should be
interpreted together and this means that the
charge or condition as to the donor’s share of the
fruits shall terminate upon the donor’s death. The
reservation clause which provides that the donees
cannot sell the lots to 3rd persons while the couple
is still alive implies that the ownership already
passed.
-
Mercedes filed with RTC for quieting of land. RTC
declared the donations revoked and the absolute
owners were spouses Danlag. Accordingly the
deed of sale was valid
-
CA reversed the decisions holding that the
reservation by the donor of lifetime usufruct and
the limitation on the right to sell subject land
changed the donation into inter vivos from mortis
causa. That Mercedes was the absolute owner of
the properties
-
Furthermore, it also declared the sale to Spouses
Gestopa void and null with no force and effect as
the deed of revocation was null and void having
no force and effect.

o TAKE NOTE: in the same document,
it indicated that spouses Danlag
§
shall enjoy the fruits of the
land during their lifetime,
§ imposed a limitation on the
right of Mercedes to sell
property
ISSUE
Gestopa vs. Court of Appeals, supra
-
W/N the donation is Inter vivos or mortis causa.
RULING
Legal Principle: Case law provides that
acceptance is a mark of donation intervivos.
Additionally, there was an intention to part with
the property by an indication of a lifetime usufruct
in favor of the donors.
-
FACTS
256 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
The SC affirms the decision of the CA
The donation in the case at bar is that of inter
vivos for the following reasons:
1. The reservation of lifetime usufruct
indicates that the donor intended to
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transfer the naked ownership over the
properties
2. The donor reserved sufficient properties
for his maintenance in accordance
with his standing in society, indicating
to part with the six parcels of land
3. The donee accepted the donation
4. Having
already
executed
prior
donation mortis causa it was clear in
the subsequent instruments executed
that they were of donation inter vivos.
-
-
-
In citing Alejandro v. Geraldez, an acceptance
clause is a mark that the donation is intervivos as
donation mortis causa are in the form of a will, and
it is not required to be accepted by the donees
during the donor’s lifetime.
ON the matter of revocation, nothing on the
record showed the institution of an action to
revoke donation by the spouses; thus, it had no
force or effect.
Petitioners were also not able to overcome the
presumption of regularity over the tax declarations
made by Mercedes.
Thereafter, the parties executed
notarized document that stated:
another
“Na ang titulo numero TCT-T-2260 (RT-4036)
ng Lungsod ng Kabite, bahay sa loteng tirahan ng
Bagong Pook na nababanggit sa nasabing
kasulatan, ay mananatili sa poder o possession ng
Ina, na si Basilisa Comerciante habang siya ay
nabubuhay at Gayon din ang nasabing Titulo ay
hindi mapapasangla o maipagbibili ang lupa
habang may buhay ang nasabing Basilisa
Comerciante.”
Feb 1979, Basilia executed a Deed of Sale in favor
of Apolinaria Austria Magat for P5000.
Basilia’s children contested. They said that the
donation was inter vivos and thereby irrevocable.
The trial court disagreed and said it was a
donation mortis causa, therefore revocable.
CA said it is inter vivos because it says “ganap at
hindi na mababawi sana ulit”
Issue: Was the donation inter vivos? Can it be
revoked?
Held: Yes. it is inter vivos and cannot be revoked.
Austria-Magat vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
106755. February 1, 2002)
Facts:
Basilisa Comerciant, mother of five children,
executed a Deed of Donation to her five children
covered by Transfer Certificate, with an area of
150 square meters.
The document states:
“Kusang loob na ibinibigay ko at
ipinagkakaloob ng ganap at hindi na mababawi
sana ulit ng apat na anak ko at sa kanilang mga
tagapagmana”
257 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
The court found that whether the donation is inter
vivos or mortis causa depends on whether the
donor intended to transfer ownership over the
properties upon the execution of the deed.
In Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, the court recalls
the characteristics of a donation mortis causa:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the
transferee before the death of the transferor; or,
what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2) That before his death, the transfer
should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for
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indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor
should survive the transferee.
SC finds and so holds that in the case at bar the
donation is inter vivos. The express irrevocability of
the same ("hindi na mababawi") is the distinctive
standard that identifies that document as a
donation inter vivos. The other provisions therein
which seemingly make the donation mortis causa
do not go against the irrevocable character of the
subject donation.
According to the petitioner, the provisions which
state that the same will only take effect upon the
death of the donor and that there is a prohibition
to alienate, encumber is mortis causa. The court
disagrees.
The said provisions should be harmonized with its
express irrevocability. In Bonsato where the
donation per the deed of donation would also
take effect upon the death of the donor with
reservation for the donor to enjoy the fruits of the
land, the Court held that the said statements only
mean that “after the donor’s death, the donation
will take effect so as to make the donees the
absolute owners of the donated property, free
from all liens and encumbrances.
In Gestopa v. Court of Appeals, the Court held
that the prohibition to alienate does not
necessarily defeat the inter vivos character of the
donation. It even highlights the fact that what
remains with the donor is the right of usufruct and
not anymore the naked title of ownership over the
property donated. In the case at bar, the provision
in the deed of donation that the donated property
will remain in the possession of the donor just goes
to show that the donor has given up his naked title
of ownership thereto and has maintained only the
right to use (jus utendi) and possess (jus
possidendi) the subject donated property.
Another indication in the deed of donation that the
donation is inter vivos is the acceptance clause
therein of the donees. We have ruled that an
acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is
inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for
258 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
donations inter vivos. On the other hand,
donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will,
are not required to be accepted by the donees
during the donor’s lifetime.
Furthermore, the act of selling the property to
petitioner herein cannot be construed as a valid
act of revocation of donation. A formal case
ought to be filed pursuant to Art 764 which speaks
of an action bearing a prescriptive period of 4
years from non compliance with the deed of
donation. In this case, the 4 year prescriptive
period does not even apply because none of the
terms (if any) were even violated.
Del Rosario vs. Ferrer (G.R. No. 187056, September
21,
2010)
FACTS: The Spouses Gonzales executed a
donation Mortis Causa in favor of their two children
Asunscion and Emiliano and their granddaughter
Jarabini. The donation mortis causa however did
not contain an attestation clause. It was also
stipulated to be irrevocable by the donors. The
donees also accepted the donation and signed
the acceptance clause.
Meanwhile, before his death, Leopoldo (the donor
husband) executed a deed of assignment of his
rights and interests over the 126 square meter
property to Asunscion only.
In 1998, Jarabini filed a petition for the probate of
the donation Mortis Causa execute don August 27,
1968. Asunscion opposed this petition and
presented the deed of assignment executed in her
favor on December 19, 1968.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation was a
donation mortis causa or a donation inter vivos.
HELD: The donation was a donation inter vivos.
The SC emphasized that irrevocability is an idea
which is absolutely incompatible with donations
mortis causa since they are by nature revocable.
The three requisites for a donation mortis causa
are as follows :
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1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee
before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor
should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by
means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose
of the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor
should survive the transferee.
The clear intent to make the donation irrevocable
makes the donation a donation inter vivos since a
donation mortis causa is by nature revocable as
shown in the second requisite.
The SC also holds that the legal effect of a
stipulation whereby a donee reserves the right of
administration, ownership and possession while
still living and only have the donation take effect
upon their death is that the donors retain
beneficial ownership of the property while still
living.
Furthermore, the fact that the donees accepted
the donation through signing the acceptance
clause supports the conclusion that the donation
was inter vivos since acceptance clauses are only
needed in donations inter vivos. Donations mortis
causa need not be accepted by the donees since
they are in the form of a will.
(2) Donation to take effect and pass title only by and
because of death. — In this case, the donation was
regarded as mortis causa although the donated
property was delivered to the donee upon the
execution of the deed and although the donation
was accepted in the same deed.
TAKE NOTE CLASS: In a case where the donation was
“to become effective upon the death of the
donor,’’ its nature as a donation mortis causa was
“confirmed by the fact that the donation does not
contain any clear provision that intends to pass
proprietary rights to the donee prior to the donor’s
death.
(3) Donated properties to be delivered after donor’s
death. — Where it was provided that the donated
properties would be given to the donees after the
expiration of thirty days from the donor’s death, the
grant was made in the future tense, and the word
“inherit’’ was used.
(4) Right to dispose and enjoy reserved by donor. —
Where the donor has the right to dispose of all the
donated properties and the products thereof, such
reservation is tantamount to a reservation of the right
to revoke the donation.
Since the donation was inter vivos, it was already
operative and final. It was already deemed
perfected when the donor learned of the donees
acceptance of the donation. This gives rise to the
conclusion that the subsequent deed of
assignment in favor of Asuncsion was void since by
then, Leopoldo did not have any right to assign.
(5) Donation makes no actual conveyance. —
Where the circumstances surrounding the execution
of the deed of donation reveal that the donation
could not have taken effect before the donor’s
death and the rights to dispose of the donated
properties and to enjoy the fruits remained with the
donor during her lifetime.
Instances of Donations mortis causa
TAKE NOTE CLASS: Donation mortis causa without a
form of last will and testament is void.
(1) Registration of deed of donation prohibited. —
the grantor’s reservation of the right to dispose of the
property during her lifetime means that the transfer is
not binding on her until she dies. It does not mean
that the title passed to the grantee during her
lifetime.
Maglasang vs. Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan (G.R.
No. 131953. June 5, 2002)
FACTS:
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On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan
executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas
Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of Donation
Inter Vivos for House and Lot" covering one-half
(½) portion of the former's house. Four other deeds
of donation were subsequently executed by
Conchita Cabatingan on January 14, 1995,
bestowing upon petitioners for two parcels of
land.
The deed of donation stated among others, that it
was for and in consideration of the love and
affection of the DONOR for the DONEE; which shall
become effective upon the death of the DONOR;
PROVIDED, that in the event that the DONEE should
die before the DONOR, the present donation shall
be deemed automatically rescinded and of no
further force and effect."
When Conchita died in May 9, 1995, and upon
learning of the existence of the foregoing
donations, respondents filed an action to annul
the said four (4) deeds of donation and alleged
that petitioners, through their sinister machinations
and strategies and taking advantage of Conchita
Cabatingan's fragile condition, caused the
execution of the deeds of donation, and, that the
documents are void for failing to comply with the
provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of
wills and testaments, considering that these are
donations mortis causa.
Petitioners
deny
respondents'
allegations
contending that Conchita Cabatingan freely,
knowingly and voluntarily caused the preparation
of the instruments.
Most importantly, they insisted that the donations
are inter vivos donations as these were made by
the late Conchita Cabatingan "in consideration of
the love and affection of the donor" for the donee,
and there is nothing in the deeds which indicate
that the donations were made in consideration of
Cabatingan's death.
The lower court ruled in favor of the respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether the donations to the petitioners are
donations mortis causa or inter vivos.
HELD:
Donations are donations mortis causa
260 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
In determining whether a donation is one of mortis
causa, the following characteristics must be taken
into account:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the
transferee before the death of the transferor; or
what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by
means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose
of the properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor
should survive the transferee.
In the present case, the nature of the donations as
mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the
donations do not contain any clear provision that
intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners
prior to Cabatingan's death. The phrase "to
become effective upon the death of the DONOR"
admits of no other interpretation but that
Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the
ownership of the properties to petitioners during
her lifetime.
Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the
donations as mortis causa in the Acceptance and
Attestation clauses of the Deed of Donation. That
the donations were made "in consideration of the
love and affection of the donor" does not qualify
the donations as inter vivos because transfers
mortis causa may also be made for the same
reason.
Herein subject deeds expressly provide that the
donation shall be rescinded in case petitioners
predecease Conchita Cabatingan. As stated in
Reyes v. Mosqueda, one of the decisive
characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that
the transfer should be considered void if the donor
should survive the donee. This is exactly what
Cabatingan provided for in her donations. If she
really intended that the donation should take
effect during her lifetime and that the ownership
of the properties donated be transferred to the
donee or independently of, and not by reason of
her death, she would have not expressed such
proviso in the subject deeds
Cariño vs. Abaya (G.R. No. 46706. June 26, 1940)
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FACTS:
Petrona Gray and Dorotea Gray both died
intestate and without either ascendants or
descendants. Miguel Carino, who was designated
as the one administer or deliver the properties,
predeceased Dorotea Gray. After the lapse of
about seven years from the death of Dorotea
Gray, or on February 16, 1935, Jose Carino, son of
Miguel Carino and petitioner herein, commenced
intestate proceedings in the CFI of Ilocos Sur in
which he prayed that he be appointed
administrator of the estate left by the Gray sisters.
Father Fernando Ma. Abaya, respondent herein
and first cousin of Petrona and Dorotea Gray,
interposed an opposition to the amended petition
alleging that the document executed by the Gray
sisters is null and void and praying that the court
make an adjudication to that effect. While on the
one hand, Jose Carino contended that the
document is a donation inter vivos creating at the
time a trust, Father Fernando Abaya, on the other,
alleged that said document is a will. CFI ruled I
favor of petitioner.
Father Abaya appealed in the CA contending
that the document was neither a donation inter
vivos as contended by the petitioner nor a will, but
a void donation mortis causa, void because it was
not executed with the formalities of a will.
Judgment was to his favor.
ISSUE: WON the donation is inter vivos or mortis
causa
HELD: Mortis causa
RATIO: The SC concurs in the conclusion of the CA
that the document in dispute is a donation mortis
causa.
The seventh clause of the document reciting that
"we the sisters do hereby order that all these
properties shall be given to those to whom they
have been assigned by virtue of this instrument at
the expiration of thirty days after the death of the
last one to die between us," considered in
conjunction with the fact that the grantors
employed the terms "there shall given to," "shall
administer," and "shall be administered," which
have reference to the future, clearly brings forth
the intention on the part of the Gray sisters to make
the distribution of their estate, effective after their
death.
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The seventh clause, being without limitation,
applies as well to the properties intended to be
distributed as to the properties merely to be
administered by Miguel Carino. It is worthy of
observation, also, that in the ninth clause of Exhibit
C-1 the phrase "together with those who had been
mentioned to inherit from us" supplies a cogent
reason for concluding that the grant therein made
was meant to take effect the death of the
grantors for the word "inherit," as used here, implies
the acquisition of property by the heirs after the
death of the Gray sisters.
The Court of Appeals found that the respondent
is the nearest relative of Petrona and Dorotea
Gray, a finding of fact which we cannot revise. It
results that, as such the respondent has an interest
in any property of his deceased cousins, in that, in
default of testamentary heirs, he would be entitled
to inherit from them to the exclusion of more
remote relatives. The respondent declaration in
the present action that the document which
would otherwise have impaired such right to
inherit, is void. Hence, the petitioner's contention,
under the fourth assignment of error, that the
respondent is without legal personality and interest
in this suit, is without merit.
Sicad vs. Court of Appeals, supra
Legal principle: A donation which purports to be
inter vivos but withholds from the donee the right
to dispose of the donated property during the
donor’s lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In such
a donation, the right of disposition is not
transferred to the donee while the donor is still
alive.
Facts: Aurora Virto Vda. De Montinola executed
an instrument entitled “Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos” naming her grandchildren as donees. The
subject of the donation is Lot 3231 of the Cadastral
Survey of Panay in Montinola’s name. The deed
also contained the donees’ signatures in
acknowledgment of their acceptance of the
donation. The same was registered, and the
donor’s title cancelled.
Montinola however retained the owner’s duplicate
copy of the new title as well as the property itself,
until she transferred the same to the Sicads. She
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revoked the donation and filed a petition with the
RTC in Roxas City for the cancellation of the new
title and the reinstatement of the donor’s title. She
alleged that her donation was one mortis causa
which had to comply with the formalities of a will
and since it had not, the donation was void. The
donees opposed and claimed that the donation
was inter vivos.
Issue: W/N the donor intended to effect the the
immediate transfer of ownership to the donees
Ruling: A donation which purports to be one inter
vivos but with holds from the donee the right to
dispose of the donated property during the
donor’s lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a
donation mortis causa the right of disposition is not
transferred to the donee while the donor is still
alive.
The evidence establishes that on December 11,
1979, when the deed of donation prepared by
Montinola's lawyer, Montinola expressed her wish
that the donation take effect only after ten (10)
years from her death, and that the deed include a
prohibition on the sale of the property for such
period. Accordingly, a new proviso was inserted in
the deed reading: "however, the donees shall not
sell or encumber the properties herein donated
within 10 years after the death of the donor."
Not only did Aurora Montinola order the insertion
in the deed of that restrictive proviso, but also, after
recordation of the deed of donation, she never
stopped treating the property as her own. She
continued, as explicity authorized in the deed
itself, to possess the property, enjoy its fruits and
otherwise exercise the rights of dominion, paying
the property taxes as they fell due — all these she
did until she transferred the Property to the Sicad
Spouses on July 10, 1990.
She did not give the new certificate of title to the
ostensible donees but retained it, too, until she
delivered it to the Sicads on the occasion of the
sale of the property to them. In any event, the
delivery of the title to the donees would have
served no useful purpose since, as just stated, they
were prohibited to effect any sale or
encumbrance thereof for a period of ten (10)
years after the ostensible donor's decease. And
consistent with these acts denoting retention of
ownership of the property was Montinola's openly
expressed view that the donation was ineffectual
and could not be given effect even after ten (10)
years from her death.
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In the case at bar, nothing of any consequence
was transferred by the deed of donation in
question to Montinola’s grandchildren, the
ostensible donees. They did not get possession of
the property donated. They did not acquire the
right to the fruits thereof, or any other right of
dominion over the property. More importantly,
they did not acquire the right to dispose of the
property- this would accrue to them only after 10
years from Montinola’s death. Indeed, they never
even laid hands on the certificate of title to the
same. They were thus simply ‘paper owners’ of the
donated property. The donation in question,
though denominated inter vivos, is in truth one
mortis causa; it is void because the essential
requisites for its validity have not been complied
with.
Effect of a Suspensive Condition on Donations Inter
Vivos (Art. 730)
Art. 730. The fixing of an event or the imposition of
a suspensive condition, which may take place
beyond the natural expectation of life of the
donor, does not destroy the nature of the act as a
donation inter vivos, unless a contrary intention
appears.
A condition is an uncertain event which may or may
not happen. If it is suspensive, the acquisition of rights
shall depend upon the happening of the event
which constitutes the condition.
A donation subject to a suspensive condition takes
effect only upon the fulfillment of the condition
In 730 the donor intends the donation to take effect
during his lifetime but imposes a suspensive
condition which may take effect beyond his lifetime.
If the condition is fulfilled after the donor’s death, it
does not change the nature of it as being INTER
VIVOS.
EXCEPTION:
When the donor really intended that the donation
should take effect after his death. (THIS WOULD THEN
BECOME DONATION MORTIS CAUSA)
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Effect of a Resolutory Conditions on Donations Inter
Vivos (Art. 731)
Art. 731. When a person donates something,
subject to the resolutory condition of the donor’s
survival, there is a donation inter vivos.
A donation subject to a resolutory condition takes
effect immediately but shall become inefficacious
upon the happening of the event which constitutes
the condition. Thus, if R donates to E a house and lot,
the donation to become effective upon
acceptance, subject to the condition that E shall
support R during R’s lifetime, with the express
provision that the donation shall be revoked ipso
facto in case of failure of E to fulfill the condition, the
donation is inter vivos.
In a case, a 5,600 square meter parcel of land was
donated to the Bureau of Public Schools for a
municipality with the condition that the said property
should be used exclusively and forever for school
purposes only. However, the funds for a new school
building could not be released because the
government required that it be built on a onehectare parcel of land. This led the donee to
exchange the donated property for a bigger one.
The donor sought to revoke the donation on the
ground that the donee breached the condition. It
was held that the condition for the donation was not
in any way violated “The purpose of the donation
remains the same, which is the establishment of a
school. The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered
or affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a
much bigger one was in furtherance and
enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The
acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the
release of the funds for the construction of a Bagong
Lipunan school building which could not be
accommodated by the limited area of the donated
lot.’’ Such exchange did not constitute breach of the
terms and conditions of the donation
(4) Even if the donation is subject to the resolutory
condition of the donor’s survival, the donation is still
inter vivos.
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Central Phil. University vs. Court of Appeals (G.R.
No. 112127. July 17, 1995)
FACTS: In 1939, the late Don Ramon Lopez was a
member of the board of trustees of Central
Philippine University when he executed a donation
to the school, stating that the land must be for
exclusive use of a medical college. 50 years later,
The heirs of Ramon Lopez filed an action to annul
the donation, stating the failure of the school to
construct the medical college over the land.
The trial court held that petitioner failed to comply
with the conditions of the donation and declared
it null and void. The court a quo further directed
petitioner to execute a deed of reconveyance of
the property in favor of the heirs of the donor,
namely, private respondents herein.
Petitioner appealed to the CA which ruled that
the annotations at the back of petitioner's
certificate of title were resolutory conditions
breach of which should terminate the rights of the
donee thus making the donation revocable.
Petitioner now alleged that the court of Appeals
erred, among others, in holding that the quoted
annotations in the certificate of title of petitioner
are onerous obligations and resolutory conditions
of the donation which must be fulfilled noncompliance of which would render the donation
revocable
ISSUE: WoN the donation was predicated on a
resolutory condition
RULING:
A clear perusal of the conditions set forth in the
deed of donation executed by Don Ramon Lopez,
Sr., gives us no alternative but to conclude that this
donation was onerous, one executed for a
valuable consideration which is considered the
equivalent of the donation itself, e.g., when a
donation imposes a burden equivalent to the
value of the donation. A gift of land to the City of
Manila requiring the latter to erect schools,
construct a children's playground and open
streets on the land was considered an onerous
donation. Similarly, where Don Ramon Lopez
donated the subject parcel of land to petitioner
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but imposed an obligation upon the latter to
establish a medical college thereon, the donation
must be for an onerous consideration.
Under Art. 1181 of the Civil Code, on conditional
obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the
extinguishment or loss of those already acquired,
shall depend upon the happening of the event
which constitutes the condition. Thus, when a
person donates land to another on the condition
that the latter would build upon the land a school,
the condition imposed was not a condition
precedent or a suspensive condition but a
resolutory one.
-
Trinidad sold the land to Mondejar without a deed
of sale
-
In 1987, the highschool failed to materialize thus
a resolution by the SB of Talacogon was enacted
to revert the land donated back to the owners. In
the meantime Mondejar had already sold portions
of the land to Bautista
-
A complaint was filed against Mondejar as
Trinidad never conveyed nor sold the property to
Mondejar.
-
It is not correct to say that the schoolhouse had to
be constructed before the donation became
effective, that is, before the donee could become
the owner of the land, otherwise, it would be
invading the property rights of the donor. The
donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of
the condition. If there was no fulfillment or
compliance with the condition, such as what
obtains in the instant case, the donation may now
be revoked and all rights which the donee may
have acquired under it shall be deemed lost and
extinguished.
Quijada vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 126444.
December 4, 1998
Legal Principle: Ownership is transferred upon the
perfection of conditional deed of donation and is
only reverted back to the donors in the nonfulfillment of the resolutory condition.
Heirs of Quijada filed a complaint against
respondents for quieting of title, possession and
ownership over land.
-
Trinidad Quijada executed a conditional deed of
donation to Municipality of Talacogon on the
condition that the parcel of land shall be used
solely and exclusively as part of the campus of the
of its provincial high school. However, Trinidad still
had possession despite the donation
CA reversed the decision stating that the sale to
Mondejar was valid as Trinidad retained an
inchoate interest by virtue of automatic reversion
clause in the donation.
ISSUE
-
W/N the donation reverted back to Trinidad who
authorized the sale to Mondejar.
RULING (Sale valid)
-
The donation was conditioned upon the
construction of a high school on the donated land,
but it was never materialized.
-
The donation further provided an automatic
reversion of property back to the owners if the
Provincial high school closed or discontinued
-
In essence, the donee continues to be the owner
of the land as long as the resolutory condition
subsists and is capable of fulfillment in addition to
the fact that no period was indicated. Thus,
Trinidad had no authority to sell. However, the
resolution to discontinue the high school enacted
by the municipality made the period irrelevant
and the automatic reversion under the deed of
donation arose. Thus, the ownership reverted back
to the donor.
FACTS
-
Trial court rendered in favor of petitioners
- The sale was valid as the donor remained an
inchoate interest over the property at the time the
sale was effected by virtue of the automatic
reversion clause in the contract.
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Provisions governing Inter Vivos Donations (Art. 732)
Art. 732. Donations which are to take effect inter
vivos shall be governed by the general provisions
on contracts and obligations in all that is not
determined in this Title.
Donations inter vivos are donations of property that
are not mortis causa. They include those simple,
remunerative, modal and onerous, whether or not
subject to any condition or term.
Simple donations and the gratuitous portions of
modal donations are governed primarily by Articles
725 to 773 as they are gratuitous contracts, and
suppletorily, by the general provisions on obligations
and contracts.
Perfection of Donation
Art. 734. The donation is perfected from the
moment the donor knows of the acceptance by
the donee.
Necessity of acceptance
There is no donation without acceptance by the
donee otherwise, donation null and void. Nobody is
obliged to receive a benefit against his will.
Note: The acceptance must be made during the
lifetime of the donor and the donee. (Art. 746.)
Notice of acceptance
Perfection takes place, not from the time of
acceptance by the donee but from the time it is
made known, actually or constructively, to the
donor. Only then it produces legal effects.
Acceptance in same/separate instrument
If the donation and acceptance are in the same
public instrument, signed by both donor and donee
in the presence of witnesses, the donation is deemed
already perfected inasmuch as knowledge of the
acceptance is established by the instrument itself.
Where the acceptance by the donee was made in
a separate instrument, there must be


proof that a formal notice of such
acceptance was received by the donor, and
in case the donation involves immovable
property, noted in both the deed of donation
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and the separate instrument embodying the
acceptance. (Lagazo v. Court of Appeals,
1998.)
Revocation before/after perfection.
If the donor revokes the donation before learning of
the acceptance by the donee, there is no donation.
GNRL: Once a valid donation is perfected, it cannot
be revoked without the consent of the donee
EXPN: Falls on any grounds provided by law such as:



inofficiousness,
failure of the donee to comply with the
charges imposed in the donation or
by reason of ingratitude.
(Arts. 760, 764, 765.)
Registration of donation
As between the parties to the donation and their
assigns, the registration of the deed of donation with
the Registry of Deeds is not needed for its validity and
efficacy.
Lagazo vs. Court of Appeals, supra
Facts:
Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes, a widow and
grandmother of plaintiff-appellee, was awarded
in 1975 a 60.10 square meter lot which is a portion
of the Monserrat Estate under its land-for-thelandless-program.
After leaving for Canada, Catalina then then
executed a special power of attorney to Lagazo
who is the plaintiff-appellee to execute all
documents necessary for the final adjudication of
her claim as awardee of the lot.
In 1985, Catalina Jacob executed in Canada a
Deed of Donation over a Lot 8W in favor of plaintiffappellee. Following the donation, plaintiffappellee checked with the Register of Deeds and
found out that the property was in the delinquent
list, so that he paid the installments in arrears and
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
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the remaining balance on the lot and declared
the said property in the name of Catalina Jacob.
It was contended here that Lagazo did not
accept the donation. What he did was he paid for
the installments in arrears and for the remaining
balance of the lot in question.
Lagazo, petitioner, contends that the burdens,
charges or conditions imposed upon a donation
need not be stated on the deed of donation
itself.
Thus, although the deed did not
categorically impose any charge, burden or
condition to be satisfied by him, the donation was
onerous since he in fact and in reality paid for the
installments in arrears and for the remaining
balance of the lot in question. Being an onerous
donation, his acceptance thereof may be express
or implied, as provided under Art. 1320 of the Civil
Code, and need not comply with the formalities
required by Art. 749 of the same code. His
payment of the arrearages and balance and his
assertion of his right of possession against private
respondent clearly indicate his acceptance of the
donation.
The issue to determine who owns the property is
whether the donation is simple or onerous. If
onerous then such doing of the payment of the
arrears should be deemed an acceptance.
Issue:
Was the donation onerous or simple?
Held: Simple.
At the outset, let us differentiate between a simple
donation
and
an
onerous
one. A simple or pure donation is one whose
cause is pure liberality (no strings attached), while
an onerous donation is one which is subject to
burdens, charges or future services equal to or
more in value than the thing donated. Under
Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with an
onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on
contracts; hence, the formalities required for a
valid simple donation are not applicable.
266 | U S C L a w i n t h e t i m e o f C O V I D - 1 9
We rule that the donation was simple, not onerous.
Even conceding that the petitioner's full payment
of the purchase price of the lot might have been a
burden to him, such payment was not however
imposed by the donor as a condition for the
donation.
The acceptance of a donation may be made at
any time during the lifetime of the donor. And
granting arguendo that such acceptance may
still be admitted in evidence on appeal, there is
still need for proof that a formal notice of such
acceptance was received by the donor and
noted in both the deed of donation and the
separate instrument embodying the acceptance.
In this case, petitioner Lagazo was not able to
show acceptance. At the very least, this last legal
requisite of annotation in both instruments of
donation and acceptance was not fulfilled by
petitioner. For this reason, the subject lot cannot
be adjudicated to hiM
Dolar vs. Barangay Lublub (G.R. No. 152663.
November 18, 2005)
Facts: Petitioner and SerafinJaranilla are coowners of a parcel of land in Brgy. Lublub,
Dumangas, Iloilo. They donated the land to the
said barangay with the following conditions:
A.) That the area donated shall be for the purpose
of constructing building and/or establishing public
plaza, sports complex, public market, health
centers and the like for the use of the Barangay of
Lublub which area shall be hereinafter be known
as DON VENANCIO DOLAR PLAZA and shall be so
designated in a proper landmark;
B.) That the construction and development of the
area above-described shall be initiated and
completed within five (5) years from the execution
of this Deed of Donation and should the same be
not made or completed then this Deed of
Donation shall have no force and effect
whatsoever and the ownership of the abovedescribed property will revert back to the
DONORS including all or any unfinished
improvement the DONEE might have placed or
constructed.
Based on: De Leon, Paras, Atty Bathan’s lectures
PROPERTY A.Y. 2020-2021 | Atty. Bathan |LEX FELIPES
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C.) That . . . should the use of the area be
converted to uses other than herein stipulated,
then this DEED OF DONATION shall be deemed
revoked and the ownership shall revert back to
the DONORS .
The barangay captain accepted it. The property
became a site for government office buildings
and recreational facilities. The petitioner executed
another deed of donation with the same
conditions.
The barangay’s peaceful possession of the area
was undisturbed until the mother lots were
included for list of tax delinquent properties for
disposition. The highest bidder during the
succeeding auction was the petitioner. The
petitioner then filed for an action to quiet the title
due to the failure of the barangay to comply with
the conditions.
have the free disposal of the thing donated and to
alienate it shall not be valid.
Note: a co-owner cannot donate by metes and
bounds, but only an aliquot part of the whole
property owned in common.
Capacity to contract but not to dispose
A person may have capacity to contract but not the
capacity to dispose of property.
Under the Family Code:


Issue: Whether or not the donation was valid and
perfected.
Ruling: Yes. The donation is presumed to be valid.
The petitioner is not the proper party to file the
case due to the grounds that he had invoked. The
proper pa