Erdogan’s Turkey: Reconsidering the Idea of an Islamist Politics
Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his AKP party have largely dominated Turkish politics since
first ascending to power in 2002. While being most popular amongst rural voters and parties he
consolidated a large amount of support in the 2002 election, and had even strong performances in
2007, 2011, and once again in 2015. However, 2015 was also the year that the previously liberal
and democratic minded AKP, seen as a model for democracy around the region, faced an
attempted coup the foundations of which had been laid as early as 2007. Referring to Erdogan’s
politics as the revival of a supposed religious/secular divide in Turkish politics, has been the
norm, especially to explain the accelerated authoritarianism the regime adopted following the
2015 coup attempt. Equally, Erdogan is seen as now showing the innate relationship between
democratic backsliding on one hand, and a commitment to Islamist politics on the other;
however the history of both the AKP and the relationship between the secular establishment and
Islamist parties reflects a more complicated history of Turkish democracy. Surprisingly, often
times the secular establishment itself becomes the obstacle to how democracy functions, and
serves as the political impetus through which Islamist parties are strengthened as both
constitutive forces of religious and secular politics contend with each other for political survival.
A brief history of the AKP’s rise to power and the relationship between the military and Islamist
parties will further add to a reconsideration of the religious/secular divide narrative, as well as
leading us to conclude that Erdogan far from being an Islamist absolutist is very much a
pragmatic, conservative, nationalist whose Islamism becomes salient when politically necessary.
Erdogan since coming to power in 2002 had pursued relatively liberal policies, often
reflecting on the importance of democracy, and straying from Islamist orthodoxy for his
willingness and enthusiasm to work with and integrate Turkey into the larger European social
and economic sphere. Formal negotiations to join the EU had begun and Turkey seemed to be
well on its way towards further democratic reforms.The general narrative shifts here, with most
people claiming that Erdogan then reversed course and started pursuing more authoritarian
policies. This is true, and relations with the EU soured significantly because of this, but this isn’t
due to some Islamist politics that Erdogan was desperate to implement. If anything, as a
reformist within the larger Islamist movement, his shift should be seen as surprising. The culprit
here ironically, can be said to be the secular establishment itself, including the military. The
military and the government have often had a tense relationship since the birth of the modern
Turkish nation, especially when the secular military feels that Islamist politicians are threatening
the existing status quo. In 2007, as the AKP party was poised to completely dominate Turkish
politics with Islamist Abdullah Gul as the president elect, the courts threw a legal challenge
which reinterpreted the process’ by which the National Assembly met to elect a president in the
first place. While this eventually failed, Erdogan pursued a massive investigation to root out the
secular “deep state” which could not conceivably be seen as interfering even in democratic
process’ as a justification for preventing Islamist rule.
This narrative can be seen unfolding numerous times during the 20th century in Turkish
politics and yet general analysis continues to see Erdogan’s clamping down on the military solely
as the opportunistic moment at which his true “Islamist” politics could now come to term.
Indeed, while senior members of the military were thrown into prison one of the largest obstacles
to Islamist rule historically was somewhat neutralized. However, Erdogan alone cannot be
blamed for the democratic backsliding in my view, and neither should his politics be seen as
uniformly Islamist as much as they are pragmatic. The Turkish secular establishment in the bid
to uphold “democracy” has on many occasions interfered with the ability of that democracy to
play out itself; with numerous coups and interventions to prevent Islamist candidates from
running, and even in 1996 when Erbakan, the most notable figure perhaps in the history of
modern Turkish Islamism, was elected as president, he was removed in a post-modern silent
coup in 1997 just one year later. Thereby, as much as we can reference Islamist politics for the
democratic backsliding we can also equally cite a secular establishment which has historically
viewed upholding the Kemalist status-quo as more important than upholding the diverse
outcomes that a multi-party democracy might entail. However, there’s a larger problem here as
well – that being, Erdogan’s politics can hardly be called uniformly Islamist.
While Erdogan presented himself as democratic and liberal to his European colleagues,
beginning negotiations for membership to the EU, he continued to maintain a strong religious
presence at home, thereby reflecting a certain dualism in Erdogan’s political attitude. He is
neither afraid to utilize the language of democracy and human rights, as well as liberalizing the
Turkish economy to appeal to foreign investors and international markets, nor is he afraid to
stoke up religious tensions at home, positing himself as a religious leader as much as a political
one. Indeed, even within the authoritarian backslide, Turkey’s experiment with neoliberalism has
largely continued with fewer regulations, weak labor-unions, and an ever expanding consumer
society. On one hand Erdogan is an authoritarian ruler preventing the functioning of Turkish
democracy, by cracking down on journalists, dissenters, and rival politicians, yet equally on the
other hand, he is upholding a global neoliberal status-quo which would seem to undermine this
supposed Islamist absolutism which has historically been opposed to such internationally
focused and liberal economic policies. While his Turkish nationalism can be subsided when
attempting to negotiate with the EU, it becomes paramount in responding to domestic concerns
such as the Kurdish bid for statehood, where a strong Turkish national identity is necessary to
raise public support for the AKP’s brutal response. More and more the seemingly contradictory
and diverse range of AKP positions both contemporary and historical add to the notion that
Islamist absolutism is not a strong priority for Erdogan, as much as political survival is.
In this sense the initial posturing of the AKP seems to make more sense. After all, in
opposition to Erbakan’s more traditional wing, the party focused more on the idea that upholding
the Turkish constitution and secularism were key, yet now we see an increased relationship with
authoritarianism. And yet, this same authoritarianism includes elements of a neoliberal economic
policy which is a far-cry from anything Islamist programs have called for historically, either in
the traditional or the reformist wing. Erdogan’s politics are more accurately described then as a
kind of pragmatic Islamism with aspects of conservatism and nationalism as well, when and
where necessary. Thereby, the strict divide between a religious/secular politics whereby Erdogan
reflects the religious Islamist side, and the opponents are secular liberals, is confused by the
prospects of an AKP regime which incorporates significant aspects of both consensus’. Since
2015, he has largely abandoned any sense of a democratic ideal yet we should not ignore the past
where this very much was the AKP platform, and shifted to preserve their political survival. It is
becoming more and more evident that no political ideology or platform, seems to have a
monopoly on the history of the AKP, even Islamism. Neither should democratic backsliding be
understood solely as the responsibility of Islamist political tendencies, but rather the result of a
complex relationship between a secular establishment and Islamist political parties, both of
which have at times undermined the functioning of democracy.
The religious/secular divide also continues to be undermined under Erdogan’s regime,
both from the state and the citizenry. The recent Gezi Park protests, the largest protests in
modern Turkish history showed how the state doesn’t seem to be entirely invested in either camp
of the dichotomy and neither is the citizenry. Responding to the transformation of previous green
and public spaces into large urban shopping and retail centers, resorts, and grandiose mosques,
the protests reflected both an environmental tone and a larger societal critique of increasing AKP
authoritarianism. All members of political society were involved to some degree including
Marxists, feminists, Islamists, conservatives, liberals etc. And interestingly, they seemed to
promote a universal dislike for the urban renewal policies as opposed to a selective one. As in,
Islamist groups protested the grandiose mosques, just as business elites even protested the new
shopping centers. In that sense, the concerns of the citizenry and special interest groups almost
transcended their immediate interests and referents, launching instead a critique of the
transformation of the Turkish landscape itself along with AKP’s authoritarian heavy-handed
policies. The Ramadaan protests, which included iftar dinners for example, included both secular
and religious groups coalescing along a general consensus, and the state itself responded to them
in an equally universal fashion. The AKP didn’t discriminate amongst Islamist protestors and
non-Islamist ones for example, such that both the state and society abandoned these narratives
when pursuing their respective goals, whether it was the urban renewal policies of the state, or
critiques of AKP authoritarianism on the opposing side. Just as Erdogan himself had initially
been successful through a pragmatic approach whereby traditional Islamic symbolism was used
in tandem with placating to the Anatolian bourgosie and a further neoliberal push in the Turkish
economy, so too had the revolt against authoritarian practices equally become a hybrid mix
between religious groups, secular groups, traditionalists and conservatives, and neoliberals and
social reformers. Thereby, the future of Turkish politics, just as its past cannot be understood
solely by the explanatory force of some supposed dichotomy between religious and secular
politics; instead the operationalization of these narratives by both the state and the citizenry will
have to be examined going forward.
Equally, the idea of Erdogan as an Islamist absolutist, thereby leading to an inevitable
democratic backsliding also doesn’t seem to hold up against the historical record of the complex
relationship between the secular establishment and Islamist politics, both of which have played a
role in contributing to democratic backsliding. Erdogan will utilize conservative, pragmatic,
neoliberal, nationalist and any other narratives or platforms when and where necessary, based on
varying needs in domestic and international policy.