G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all
of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.
Estrella, Bautista & Associates for petitioners.
BIDIN, J.:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675,
otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon.
Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No.
7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether
they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout
at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these
results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for
being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be
elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same
election.
Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in
Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely:
(1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong
into two separate districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject
distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution, which provide, to wit:
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standard provided in this section.
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law
has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution.
Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained
the minimum population requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one
representative" proviso in the Constitution:
. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative"
(Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate congressional district for the City of
Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from
the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.
Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong"
necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede
legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI,
Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the
title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as
to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose
of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied).
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census
to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into
two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having
passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements
for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain
all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading
of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The
Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided
by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so
mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not
unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of
R.A.
No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said
argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and
enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further arguments against the validity thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved
a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion
of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants
of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating legislative
districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted
that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district,
having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished, which
development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.
G.R. No. 136781
October 6, 2000
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT
MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, and LUZON
FARMERS
PARTY, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA,
MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-POWER, INC.,
FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA,
AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS -- All Being Party-List
Parties/Organizations -- and Hon. MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. in His Capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 136786
October 6, 2000
AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT
KAUNLARAN
(AKO),
and
ASSOCIATION
OF
PHILIPPINE
ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVES
(APEC), petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by Speaker Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA,
SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN,
KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, FOUR "L", AWATU,
PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN,
ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 136795
October 6, 2000
ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD), NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS'
ORGANIZATIONS
(NCSFCO),
and
LUZON
FARMERS'
PARTY
(BUTIL), petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW,
UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP,
VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL
COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:*
Prologue
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four
inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system
are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats;
that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total
number of votes."
Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be struck down for having been issued in grave abuse
of discretion. The poll body is mandated to enforce and administer election-related laws. It has no power to contravene or amend them.
Neither does it have authority to decide the wisdom, propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress.
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement election laws -- not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or
circumvent them.
In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of parliamentary democracies - into our presidential form of
government, modified by unique Filipino statutory parameters, presents new paradigms and novel questions, which demand innovative legal
solutions convertible into mathematical formulations which are, in turn, anchored on time-tested jurisprudence.
The Case
Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution 1 of the Commission on Elections
(Comelec), Second Division, in Election Matter 98-065;2 and (2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution3 of the Comelec en banc, affirming the said
disposition. The assailed Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38) additional party-list representatives "to complete the full
complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."
The Facts and the Antecedents
Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government -- the party-list method of representation. Under
this system, any national, regional or sectoral party or organization registered with the Commission on Elections may participate in the election
of party-list representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives as regular members. 4 In
effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a district congressman and another for a party-list representative.5
Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the partylist. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and
such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector."
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the "selection or election" of party-list representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on
March 3, 1995. Under this statute’s policy declaration, the State shall "promote proportional representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free
and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."
(italics ours.)
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this law (RA 7941) in this wise:
"Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number
of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall
be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3) seats.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847, prescribing the rules and regulations governing
the election of party-list representatives through the party-list system.
Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives
On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the national elections. A total of one hundred
twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) partylist representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for
the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. The
proclaimed winners and the votes cast in their favor were as follows:6
Party/Organization/
Coalition
Number
of Percentage
Nominees
Votes Obtained Total Votes
1. APEC
503,487
5.5%
Rene
M.
Melvyn D. Eballe
2. ABA
321,646
3.51%
Leonardo Q. Montemayor
3. ALAGAD
312,500
3.41%
Diogenes S. Osabel
4.
VETERANS
FEDERATION
304,802
3.33%
Eduardo P. Pilapil
5. PROMDI
255,184
2.79%
Joy A.G. Young
6. AKO
239,042
2.61%
Ariel A. Zartiga
7. NCSCFO
238,303
2.60%
Gorgonio P. Unde
8. ABANSE! PINAY
235,548
2.57%
Patricia M. Sarenas
9. AKBAYAN
232,376
2.54%
Loreta Ann P. Rosales
10. BUTIL
215,643
2.36%
Benjamin A. Cruz
11. SANLAKAS
194,617
2.13%
Renato B. Magtubo
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802
2.07%
Cresente C. Paez
Silos
After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998, the Comelec en banc further determined that
COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters’ Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered 186,388 votes, which were
equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was proclaimed on
September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list representative.7
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People’s Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social
Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It
alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under
the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit
under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list
representatives who should actually sit in the House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations8 filed their respective Motions for Intervention, seeking the same relief as that sought by PAGASA on substantially the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASA’s Petition was joined by other party-list organizations in a Manifestation they
filed on August 28, 1998. These organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI,
AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care,
Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered
the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that
"at all times, the total number of congressional9 seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and twenty (20%)
percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11
(b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should
be filled up." First, "the system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of
Representatives." Second, "the system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the]
multi-party system." (Boldface in the original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold requirement of RA 7941,
it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should have at least one representative." It thus disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881), Republic Act No. 7941 and
other election laws, the Commission (Second Division) hereby resolves to GRANT the instant petition and motions for intervention, to include
those similarly situated.
ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated based on the list of names submitted by their respective parties,
organizations and coalitions are PROCLAIMED as party-list representatives, to wit:
1. SENIOR CITIZENS
2. AKAP
3. AKSYON
4. PINATUBO
5. NUPA
6. PRP
7. AMIN
8. PAG-ASA
9. MAHARLIKA
10. OCW-UNIFIL
11. FCL
12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN
13. KAMPIL
14. BANTAY BAYAN
15. AFW
16. ANG LAKAS OCW
17. WOMENPOWER, INC.
18. FEJODAP
19. CUP
20. VETERANS CARE
21. 4L
22. AWATU
23. PMP
24. ATUCP
25. NCWP
26. ALU
27. BIGAS
28. COPRA
29. GREEN
30. ANAKBAYAN
31. ARBA
32. MINFA
33. AYOS
34. ALL COOP
35. PDP-LABAN
36. KATIPUNAN
37. ONEWAY PRINT
38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS
to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. 7941."
The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-flopping. In its Resolution No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec
en banc had unanimously promulgated a set of "Rules and Regulations Governing the Election of x x x Party-List Representatives Through
the Party-List System." Under these Rules and Regulations, one additional seat shall be given for every two percent of the vote, a formula
the Comelec illustrated in its Annex "A." It apparently relied on this method when it proclaimed the 14 incumbent party-list solons (two for
APEC and one each for the 12 other qualified parties). However, for inexplicable reasons, it abandoned said unanimous Resolution and
proclaimed, based on its three "elements," the "Group of 38" private respondents.10
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the basis of having obtained at least two percent of
the votes cast for the party-list system, objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. They
contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent of the votes for
the party-list system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be
allocated to those which had garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning parties, as provided
by said Section 11.
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in
the House "should be filled up," the Comelec en banc resolved only the issue concerning the apportionment or allocation of the remaining
seats. In other words, the issue was: Should the remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons be given (1) to the thirteen qualified
parties that had each garnered at least two percent of the total votes, or (2) to the Group of 38 - herein private respondents - even if they had
not passed the two percent threshold?
The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled the two percent vote requirement "will mean the
concentration of representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen organizations representing
two political parties, three coalitions and four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x x. Such strict application of the 2%
'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the Constitution and the legislature -- to develop and guarantee a full, free and open
party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives x x
x." Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission from complying with the constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list representatives
to compose 20% of the House of Representatives."
Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin majority -- with three commissioners concurring11 and
two members12 dissenting -- affirmed the Resolution of its Second Division. It, however, held in abeyance the proclamation of the 51st party
(AABANTE KA PILIPINAS), "pending the resolution of petitions for correction of manifest errors."
Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote requirement imposed by RA 7941, the Commission blithely
rejected and circumvented its application, holding that there were more important considerations than this statutory threshold.
Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the issuance of temporary restraining orders or
writs of preliminary injunction, were filed before this Court by the parties and organizations that had obtained at least two per cent of the total
votes cast for the party-list system.13 In the suits, made respondents together with the Comelec were the 38 parties, organizations and
coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively,
petitioners sought the proclamation of additional representatives from each of their parties and organizations, all of which had obtained at
least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.
On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec "to CEASE and DESIST from constituting itself as a
National Board of Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any other date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the parties, organizations
and coalitions enumerated in the dispositive portions of its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999 Resolution, until further orders
from this Court."
On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias U. Montemayor appeared for petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty.
Gregorio A. Andolana, for petitioners in GR No. 136786; Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta for petitioners in GR No. 136795; Attys. Ricardo
Blancaflor and Pete Quirino Quadra, for all the private respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for Intervenor NACUSIP; and Atty. Jose P. Balbuena
for Respondent Comelec. Upon invitation of the Court, retired Comelec Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong acted as amicus curiae.
Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez appeared, not for any party but also as a friend of the Court.
Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their respective Memoranda in amplification of their verbal arguments.14
The Issues
The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the winners of the subject party-list election can be fully settled
by addressing the following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory
or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the
time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
The Court’s Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees that
they should all be granted additional seats.
First
Issue:
Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory
Whether
the
Twenty
Percent
The pertinent provision15 of the Constitution on the composition of the House of Representatives reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the partylist. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and
such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector."
Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for partylist lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list." We thus
translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
x .20 = No. of party-list representatives
.80
This formulation16 means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a
corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected
during the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:
208
x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic question, however, is this: Does the Constitution
require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is "No."
Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling
The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list."
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled up has been left to Congress. In the exercise of
its prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, by which it prescribed that a party, organization or coalition participating in the party-list
election must obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed together with this legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient
number of participating parties, organizations or coalitions which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold and thereby fill up the twenty
percent party-list allocation in the House, then naturally such allocation cannot be filled up completely. The Comelec cannot be faulted for the
"incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves are the ones who, in the exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and how
many should represent them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent parties, avers that the twenty percent allocation for party-list
lawmakers is mandatory, and that the two percent vote requirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its strict application would make
it mathematically impossible to fill up the House party-list complement.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that Congress was
vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets
down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote
"proportional representation" in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations
and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled
to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes."
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant
portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats."
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory.
It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a "mathematical impossibility," suffice it to say that the
prerogative to determine whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress.17 Our task now, as should have been
the Comelec’s, is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative
mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the context of the actual election process.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies, is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent
or second-guess it. Unless declared unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a statute remains a valid
command of sovereignty that must be respected and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of the rule of law.
Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation
The Two Percent Threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient
number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations
on the proposed bill. We quote below a pertinent portion of the Senate discussion:
"SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point that was raised by, I think, Senator Osmeña when he
said that a political party must have obtained at least a minimum percentage to be provided in this law in order to qualify for a seat under the
party-list system.
They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast, 5 percent or 10 percent of the votes cast.
Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not really been given by the people sufficient
basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of
the party-list system, Mr. President."18
A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of Representatives, as the following shows:
"MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based at, arriving at a five percent ratio which would distribute
equitably the number of seats among the different sectors. There is a mathematical formula which is, I think, patterned after that of the party
list of the other parliaments or congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of Germany."19
Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote requirement, the specification of which they left to Congress to
properly determine. Constitutional Commissioner Christian S. Monsod explained:
"MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of votes. Our proposal is that anybody who has twoand-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat. There are about 20 million who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent would
mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we bring that down
to two percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The average vote per family is three. So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We
believe that there are many sectors who will be able to get seats in the Assembly because many of them have memberships of over 10,000.
In effect, that is the operational implication of our proposal. What we are trying to avoid is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat system.
We believe that it is our job to open up the system and that we should not have within that system a reserve seat. We think that people should
organize, should work hard, and should earn their seats within that system."20
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of
"representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by
representatives chosen by them.21 But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number
of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are
incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts
are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" 22 to ensure
meaningful local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of
courts is simple application, not interpretation or circumvention.23
The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit
An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a multiparty system of representation. Again, we
quote Commissioner Monsod:
"MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the
political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. But we also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and operation in
the implementation of a concept that has very serious shortcomings of classification and of double or triple votes. We are for opening up the
system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of
representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. This way, we will open it up and enable
sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats among the fifty. x x x."24
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party,
organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various
interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats,
if not the entire House.
We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not seriously challenged in these consolidated cases.
Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats
Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld the constitutionality of the two percent vote
threshold and the three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of determining how many party-list seats the
qualified parties, organizations and coalitions are entitled to. The very first step - there is no dispute on this - is to rank all the participating
parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as "parties") according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage
of their respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least
two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more
than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." The problem is how to distribute
additional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law.
One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment
One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion of the votes obtained equivalent to the two percent
vote requirement for the first seat.25 Translated in figures, a party that wins at least six percent of the total votes cast will be entitled to three
seats; another party that gets four percent will be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two percent will be entitled to one seat only. This
proposal has the advantage of simplicity and ease of comprehension. Problems arise, however, when the parties get very lop-sided votes -for example, when Party A receives 20 percent of the total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6 percent. Under the method just
described, Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to 5 seats and Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law,
all the parties will each uniformly have three seats only. We would then have the spectacle of a party garnering two or more times the number
of votes obtained by another, yet getting the same number of seats as the other one with the much lesser votes. In effect, proportional
representation will be contravened and the law rendered nugatory by this suggested solution. Hence, the Court discarded it.
The Niemeyer Formula
Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was developed by a German mathematician and adopted by
Germany as its method of distributing party-list seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of additional seats to which a qualified
party would be entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the total number of votes obtained by
that party and dividing the product by the total number of votes garnered by all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting product
will be the number of additional seats that the party concerned is entitled to. Thus:
No. of remaining seats
to be allocated
No. of additional
No. of votes of
seats of party
x
=
party concerned
concerned
Total no. of votes of
(Integer.decimal)
qualified parties
The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the descending order of the decimal portions of the resulting
products. Based on the 1998 election results, the distribution of party-list seats under the Niemeyer method would be as follows:
Party
Number of Guaranteed Additional Extra Total
Votes
Seats
Seats
1. APEC
503,487
1
5.73
1
7
2. ABA
321,646
1
3.66
1
5
3. ALAGAD
312,500
1
3.55
4
4.
VETERANS 304,802
FEDERATION
1
3.47
4
5. PROMDI
255,184
1
2.90
1
4
6. AKO
239,042
1
2.72
1
4
7. NCSCFO
238,303
1
2.71
1
4
8. ABANSE! PINAY
235,548
1
2.68
1
4
9. AKBAYAN
232,376
1
2.64
4
10. BUTIL
215,643
1
2.45
3
11. SANLAKAS
194,617
1
2.21
3
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802
1
2.16
3
13. COCOFED
186,388
1
2.12
3
Total
3,429,338
13
32
7
52
However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party, those obtaining more than the limit will have to give up
their excess seats. Under our present set of facts, the thirteen qualified parties will each be entitled to three seats, resulting in an overall total
of 39. Note that like the previous proposal, the Niemeyer formula would violate the principle of "proportional representation," a basic tenet of
our party-list system.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and
the non-mandatory character of the twenty percent allocation. True, both our Congress and the Bundestag have threshold requirements -two percent for us and five for them. There are marked differences between the two models, however. As ably pointed out by private
respondents,26 one half of the German Parliament is filled up by party-list members. More important, there are no seat limitations, because
German law discourages the proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit to encourage
the promotion of the multiparty system. This major statutory difference makes the Niemeyer formula completely inapplicable to the Philippines.
Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras mangoes in the Arctic because of fundamental environmental
differences, neither can the Niemeyer formula be transplanted in toto here because of essential variances between the two party-list models.
The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines
It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which demands an equally unique formula. In crafting a
legally defensible and logical solution to determine the number of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the
parameters of the Filipino party-list system.
As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the partylist system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of
three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their
total number of votes."
The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate "proportional representation" into a mathematical formula that will not contravene,
circumvent or amend the above-mentioned parameters.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the
initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the
system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the
computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other
parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly
exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to two additional seats. Another qualified party which
received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first party.
Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of seats has already been predetermined, the second
party should be given less than that to which the first one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties
and the first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no such
thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An academic
mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is not necessary because the present set of facts, given the number of qualified parties
and the voting percentages obtained, will definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales27 that a fractional membership cannot be converted into a whole membership of
one when it would, in effect, deprive another party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of proportional
representation. We said further that "no party can claim more than what it is entitled to x x x."
In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the legislature. Since Congress did not provide for it in the
present law, neither will this Court. The Supreme Court does not make the law; it merely applies it to a given set of facts.
Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least
two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the
second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats
to which the first party is entitled is as follows:
Number of votes
of first party
Proportion
of
votes
of
= first
party
relative
to
Total votes for
total votes for party-list system
party-list system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the
party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without
a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two
seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise,
it would prevent the allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for
the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are entitled may
exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of Representatives.
1âw phi 1
Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is entitled to one additional seat or a total of two seats.
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used
to determine the number of additional seats of the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would
contravene the proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total number of votes cast.
According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first
party received a significantly higher amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same number of seats as the second party would
violate the statutory mandate of proportional representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of
representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the
party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first party.
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional
representation. The formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction:
No.
of
votes
concerned party
of
Total
No.
of
Additional seats
for party-list system
for concerned =
party
No.
of
votes
first party
votes
Total
No.
for party list system
No. of additional
x seats allocated to
of
the first party
of
In simplified form, it is written as follows:
No.
of
votes
Additional seats
concerned party
for concerned =
party
No.
of
votes
first party
of
No. of additional
x seats allocated to
of
the first party
Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is computed as follows:
No. of votes
Additional seats
of ABA
No. of additional
for concerned =
x seats allocated to
party (ABA)
No. of vites of
the first party
first party (APEC)
Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:
Additional seats
321,646
.64 or 0 additional seat, since
for concerned =
x1=
rounding off is not to be applied
party (ABA)
503,487
Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list election to be as follows:
Organization
Votes
%age
of Initial No. Additional
Garnered Total Votes of Seats Seats
Total
1. APEC
503,487
5.50%
1
1
2
2. ABA
321,646
3.51%
1
321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.64
1
3. ALAGAD
312,500
3.41%
1
312,500 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.62
1
4.
VETERANS 304,802
FEDERATION
3.33%
1
304,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.61
1
5. PROMDI
255,184
2.79%
1
255,184 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.51
1
6. AKO
239,042
2.61%
1
239,042 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47
1
7. NCSFO
238,303
2.60%
1
238,303 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47
1
8. ABANSE!
235,548
2.57%
1
321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47
1
9. AKBAYAN!
232,376
2.54%
1
232,376 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.46
1
10. BUTIL
215,643
2.36%
1
215,643 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.43 1
11. SANLAKAS
194,617
2.13%
1
194,617 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.39
1
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802
2.07%
1
189,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.38
1
13. COCOFED
2.04%
1
186,388 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.37
1
PINAY
186,388
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of votes for the other party to that for the first
one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be
entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole
numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of seats
in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party
limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party may be entitled to would
result in a more accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work
within such extant parameter.
The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily coincides with the present number of incumbents; namely,
two for the first party (APEC) and one each for the twelve other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of the incumbencies of their
nominees, albeit through the use of a different formula and methodology.
In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict. We say, however, that our formula merely translated the
Philippine legal parameters into a mathematical equation, no more no less. If Congress in its wisdom decides to modify RA 7941 to make it
"less strict," then the formula will also be modified to reflect the changes willed by the lawmakers.
Epilogue
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and
coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and
proportional representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec effectively arrogated unto itself what the Constitution
expressly and wholly vested in the legislature: the power and the discretion to define the mechanics for the enforcement of the system. The
wisdom and the propriety of these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review.28
Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and respondents - have failed to demonstrate that our lawmakers
gravely abused their discretion in prescribing such requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.29
The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws,30 cannot simply disregard an act of Congress exercised
within the bounds of its authority. As a mere implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act. Its recourse
is to draft an amendment to the law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the legislature.
Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its provisions by the strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic
that to strike down a law or any of its provisions as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the Constitution
prohibits, the statute permits.31
Neither can we grant petitioners’ prayer that they each be given additional seats (for a total of three each), because granting such plea would
plainly and simply violate the "proportional representation" mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be interpreted as a total failure of the law in fulfilling the object of
this new system of representation. It should not be deemed a conclusive indication that the requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated
the
t, is set aside.
4. The proclamation of 25 additional party-list representatives will leave 13 seats for party-list representatives vacant. While Art. VI,
§5(b) of the Constitution fixes a ratio of 80 percent district to 20 percent party-list representatives, does not really require that all seats
allotted to party-list representatives - at present 52 - be filled.
The results of the application of the foregoing steps are summarized and explained in the Consolidated Table appended to this opinion.
G.R. No. 147589
June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD
OMAR
FAJARDO, petitioner,
vs.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE;
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS
NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under "Organizations/Coalitions" of
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION;
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG
BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN
MUNA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP);
PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA;
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but
also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to
benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but
active participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now
dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and
mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 1 issued by the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein
impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list
system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and
political parties. According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of these parties and organizations and
hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as] heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal
and procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as
a result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political parties. These numerous
petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions
which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered
parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral
and political parties and organizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations
of their intent to participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations, but denied those of
several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional representation scheme will encourage multipartisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to directly participate in this electoral window.
"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission
on Elections.
"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the number of sectoral
parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations
and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents]
be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the
May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said
respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan
Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 5
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It
also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. 7 During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph
C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 8
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition 9 before this Court on April 16,
2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17,
2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice. 11
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, 12 docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging Comelec
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions before it;
directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the
parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the
party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as
scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties were directed to submit their respective Memoranda simultaneously within a nonextendible period of five days. 15
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues:
"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law?
"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 16
The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which will determine, after summary evidentiary
hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision.
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there are other plain, speedy and adequate
remedies in the ordinary course of law. 17 The Office of the Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a
petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307A 18 dated November 9, 2000. 19
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution 20 and the
Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration
was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination
against some of herein respondents. 22 The Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner
Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the
urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a
formality because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy. 23 It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely
of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with
extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent
with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules." 25
Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social
justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only
adequate and speedy remedy available." 26
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the party-list system is the most
objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major political
parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No.
7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations." 29
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections,
merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the partylist system as provided in this Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters'
registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to
appoint poll watchers in accordance with law." 30
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out that the participants in the party-list
system may "be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, 31 Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao." 32 This was also
clear from the following exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33
"MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to
parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. 34 He explained: "The purpose of
this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide,
have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the
Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative
districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations
or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties."
More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies
for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent
provision below:
"x x x
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
x x x"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties – even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party -- or any organization or group
for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list
system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the
party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose
of the party-list provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence, when the provision was discussed, he exultantly
announced: "On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to
our people in the legislature." 35
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or
"as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was
enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which
will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open
party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by
enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system,
which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack of well-defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is national in
scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the
"marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is
easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented
constituencies mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional
district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or
underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and underrepresented" become members of
Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but
more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we
repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x
x, to become members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express
terms. 37
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which
states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system
by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire
to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations,
attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all
sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute
are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated
or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association. 38
The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941 "does not limit the participation
in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society." 39 In fact, it contends that any party or group that is not
disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an
organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmariñas Village could participate in the party-list elections. 41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system
seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens – specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties – to be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized
and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates
the spirit of the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of
Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them similarly defies reason and
common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of
bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives of their respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented,
for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political
power does not necessarily emanate from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount
of one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity.
It was for them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity
to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the
larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change.
Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past – the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the
underground movement – to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated during the last elections. The State
cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district elections normally dominated by
traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In
arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for
the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and
the party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, 44 in order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and
organizations to gain representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest scheme possible. 45 Logic shows that the system
has been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it -- those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore
need the "simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it -those privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a student dormitory "open house," which by its
nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves
who can enter the dormitory even without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who
cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of
Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but
also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system
is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended
beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor
underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the qualification
of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system.
Refutation of the Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the
supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or
purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express
the objective sought to be attained. 46 In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and
equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed. 47
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 48 that "the
debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for
their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose
votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its
face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding
thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be
provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-list representation, we should
therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the partylist system of electing congressional representatives was designed to "enable underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole x x x." The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations,
not even to the proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers' deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are, at best,
only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the
law, which must be applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution.
On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The OSG as its counsel admitted before the
Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can
be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 49 Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities
is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. 50
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of the major political parties – Respondents
Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP – on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have been accredited as the five (six,
including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have the "advantage of getting
official Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x." We note, however, that this accreditation does not
refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the purpose of determining which parties would be
entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all
the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution
and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a government entity using
government resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51 It is not equipped to receive evidence and determine the
truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines
promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be elected under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings,
whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this
light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its
work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section
5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and
track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose
the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they
must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to
be elected to the House of Representatives." In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties,
they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko
and other similarly situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political party must claim to represent the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes."52
Third, in view of the objections53 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the
Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. The extent of the
constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks of members and supporters, in order to circumvent
this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in emulation of those parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and
philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will that also not fall within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then certainly the Comelec can pierce through the
legal fiction."54
The following discussion is also pertinent:
"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is not, of course, prohibiting priests, imams or
pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent their group.
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et
cetera."55
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be registered."56 The prohibition was explained by a
member57 of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T] he prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a political party. I do
not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a
political party."58
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as
follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through
any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under
the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered."59
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations.
These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become members of the House of Representatives." A party or an
organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the
very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It
must be independent of the government. The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only
illegal60 and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as
follows:
"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the
expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees.
To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or
the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral
committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to represent a particular district x x x."61
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who have less in life should have more in law. The
party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and
genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an
invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that the party-list system is, without
any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also
prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling
the marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on
dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this could not have been
the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings
on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of
determining the winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that
appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED
to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.
1âwphi 1.nêt
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain from proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list
election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179271
April 21, 2009
BARANGAY
ASSOCIATION
FOR
NATIONAL
ADVANCEMENT
AND
TRANSPARENCY
(BANAT), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS
(sitting
as
the
National
Board
of
Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS
BUSINESS
AND
SCIENCE
PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT
TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), Intervenor.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179295
April 21, 2009
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY TOWARDS
EDUCATIONAL
REFORMS,
INC.,
and
ABONO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 — Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) — in a petition for certiorari
and mandamus,1 assails the Resolution2 promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041
(PL). The COMELEC’s resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National
Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting
as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution.
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 — Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony
Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) — in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition,3 assails NBC Resolution No. 07604 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at least
two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the partylist results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans
Federation Party v. COMELEC5 (Veterans).
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R.
Nos. 179271 and 179295.
The Facts
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93
parties under the Party-List System.6
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed
as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently
been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the
Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."7 There were no intervenors in BANAT’s petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a
memorandum on 19 July 2007.
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen
(13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens’ Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC), Gabriela’s Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan!
Citizen’s Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis,
Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for Party-List, as of 03
July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total of fifteen million two hundred eighty three thousand six
hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of Representation, in connection with the National and Local Elections
conducted last 14 May 2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board of Canvassers reveals that the
projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three thousand one hundred
twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following statistical data:
Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections
i.
Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated
ii.
Total party-list votes remaining
untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred)
15,283,659
uncanvassed/ 1,337,032
iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% outcome) 102,430
from areas not yet submitted for canvass (Bogo, Cebu;
Bais City; Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and Pagalungan,
Maguindanao)
Maximum Total Party-List Votes
16,723,121
WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part:
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled
to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes: provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes, the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold can
be pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC, reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation
Party versus COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional seats of each party, organization or coalition receving more than the required
two percent (2%) votes, stating that the same shall be determined only after all party-list ballots have been completely canvassed;
WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred
sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:
RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ VOTES
COALITION
RECEIVED
1
BUHAY
1,163,218
2
BAYAN MUNA
972,730
3
CIBAC
760,260
4
GABRIELA
610,451
5
APEC
538,971
6
A TEACHER
476,036
7
AKBAYAN
470,872
8
ALAGAD
423,076
9
BUTIL
405,052
10
COOP-NATCO
390,029
11
BATAS
386,361
12
ANAK PAWIS
376,036
13
ARC
338,194
14
ABONO
337,046
WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an URGENT PETITION
FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance
of Restraining Order) has been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties, organizations and coalitions
included in the aforementioned list are therefore entitled to at least one seat under the party-list system of representation in the meantime.
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic
Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers,
hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following parties, organizations and
coalitions participating under the Party-List System:
1
Buhay Hayaan Yumabong
BUHAY
2
Bayan Muna
BAYAN MUNA
3
Citizens Battle Against Corruption
CIBAC
4
Gabriela Women’s Party
GABRIELA
5
Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
APEC
6
Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through A TEACHER
Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards
Educational Reforms, Inc.
7
Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party
AKBAYAN
8
Alagad
ALAGAD
9
Luzon Farmers Party
BUTIL
10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party
COOP-NATCCO
11 Anak Pawis
ANAKPAWIS
12 Alliance of Rural Concerns
ARC
13 Abono
ABONO
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained
at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the Party-List System.
The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to Veterans Federation Party versus
COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred until final resolution of SPC
No. 07-250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot and academic.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in
abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis in the original)
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional
seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELEC’s interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution
No. 07-72:
WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13)
qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462 votes from the projected
maximum total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each;
WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National Board of Canvassers, the projected maximum
total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in Report No. 29, votes
received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the projected maximum total
votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:
Party-List
Projected total number of votes
1
BUHAY
1,178,747
2
BAYAN MUNA
977,476
3
CIBAC
755,964
4
GABRIELA
621,718
5
APEC
622,489
6
A TEACHER
492,369
7
AKBAYAN
462,674
8
ALAGAD
423,190
9
BUTIL
409,298
10 COOP-NATCO 412,920
11 ANAKPAWIS
370,165
12 ARC
375,846
13 ABONO
340,151
WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number of votes among the thirteen (13)
qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the "first party" in accordance with Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC,
reiterated in Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC;
WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-list system of representation that have obtained one
guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by the Supreme Court in Veterans;
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party", the correct formula as expressed in Veterans, is:
Number of votes of first party
Total votes for party-list system
Proportion of votes of first
= party relative to total votes for
party-list system
wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to additional seats:
Proportion
of
by the first party
votes
received Additional seats
Equal to or at least 6%
Two (2) additional seats
Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6%
One (1) additional seat
Less than 4%
No additional seat
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:
1,178,747
= 0.07248 or 7.2%
16,261,369
which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, the correct formula as expressed
in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:
No.
of
votes
concerned party
of
No.
of
first party
of
Additional seats for
=
a concerned party
votes
No. of additional
x seats allocated
to first party
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:
Party List
Percentage
Additional Seat
BAYAN MUNA
1.65
1
CIBAC
1.28
1
GABRIELA
1.05
1
APEC
1.05
1
A TEACHER
0.83
0
AKBAYAN
0.78
0
ALAGAD
0.71
0
BUTIL
0.69
0
COOP-NATCO
0.69
0
ANAKPAWIS
0.62
0
ARC
0.63
0
ABONO
0.57
0
NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act
Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties, organizations or coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to wit:
Party List
Additional Seats
BUHAY
2
BAYAN MUNA 1
CIBAC
1
GABRIELA
1
APEC
1
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained
at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list system to entitle them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate
percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1) additional seat.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in
abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.9
Acting on BANAT’s petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007, which reads as follows:
This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution filed by the Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).
Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden
D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his comments/observations and recommendation thereon [NBC 07041 (PL)], which reads:
COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:
Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of PartyList Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:
1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
shall be proclaimed.
2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable only to the first party-list representative seats
to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking.
3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and
4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every 2% of the votes they received and the
additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained
by each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes cast in the party-list election, after deducting the corresponding votes
of those which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the "ALLOCATION OF
PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX "A" of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of
determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to representative seats and how many of their
nominees shall seat [sic].
5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and that the procedure in allocating seats for
party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N:
The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.
The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes and Partial
Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and
Local Elections" resolved among others that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined
pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results."
1awphi1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the
recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being moot and academic.
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.10
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for
reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use
the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic
Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.11
Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list organizations as
qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc.
(AGAP),12 Anak Mindanao (AMIN),13 and An Waray.14 Per the certification15 by COMELEC, the following party-list organizations have been
proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:
Party-List
No. of Seat(s)
1.1
Buhay
3
1.2
Bayan Muna
2
1.3
CIBAC
2
1.4
Gabriela
2
1.5
APEC
2
1.6
A Teacher
1
1.7
Akbayan
1
1.8
Alagad
1
1.9
Butil
1
1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1
1.11 Anak Pawis
1
1.12 ARC
1
1.13 Abono
1
1.14 AGAP
1
1.15 AMIN
1
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an Urgent Petition for
Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been
filed before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250.
Issues
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is
it merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?16
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their petition:
I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in the allocation of
seats to qualified party-list organizations as said rule:
A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.
B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:
1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional seats for the "First Party" violates the principle
of proportional representation under RA 7941.
2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the "First Party" and another for the qualifying
parties, violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941.
3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different from those required under RA 7941;
C. Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine party-list system as provided for under the same case
of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.
II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations, the same being merely in
consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable case as the issues
involved herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct interpretation and implementation of RA 7941, and are of
transcendental importance to our nation.17
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined the following issues in our
advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or
merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major
political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?18
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated
in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the partylist system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of
three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation— the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their
total number of votes."19
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term "proportional representation," this Court is
compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.
Number
of
The Formula Mandated by the Constitution
Party-List
Representatives:
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the partylist. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and
such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total
number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
xxx
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The House of Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and party-list
representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the House of Representatives.
1avv phi 1.zw+
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives.
We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate
from the first formula in Veterans, thus:
Number
of
seats
available to legislative districts
Number of seats available to
x .20 = party-list representatives
.80
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district
is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list
representatives.
220
x .20 = 55
.80
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives, the Constitution left the manner
of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
Allocation
The
Statutory
and the Three-Seat Cap
of
Limits
Seats
Presented
for
by
the
Party-List
Two
Percent
Representatives:
Threshold
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-List System, as well as on the formula
to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list votes. However, there are
numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of "additional seats" under the Party-List
System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule,20 and Justice Vicente V. Mendoza’s dissent in Veterans presented Germany’s Niemeyer
formula21 as an alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for party-list representatives. Congress enacted R.A.
No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — x x x
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,22 the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall
be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. — The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties,
organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives
proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes
cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate party-list representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT
described this procedure as follows:
(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total Members of the House of Representatives including
those from the party-list groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and
Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be
55 Party-List Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%) of the total party-list votes they obtained;
provided, that no party-list groups shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups under the immediately preceding paragraph
and after deducting from their total the votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to all
the party-list groups which have not secured the maximum three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section
12 of RA 7941.23
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s first interpretation.
The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats
for party-list representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:
(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis;
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization or
coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.24
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of the votes received by each party as
against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is "by making the votes of a party-list with a median percentage of votes as the
divisor in computing the allocation of seats."25 Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s second interpretation.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELEC’s original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for
systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats
alloted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After
determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all qualified
parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the second
percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated
to the concerned party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions,
or remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated
until all the seats are filled up.26
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.
Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.
Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes garnered during the elections.27
Rank
Party
Votes
Rank
Garnered
Party
Votes
Garnered
1
BUHAY
1,169,234 48
KALAHI
88,868
2
BAYAN MUNA
979,039
49
APOI
79,386
3
CIBAC
755,686
50
BP
78,541
4
GABRIELA
621,171
51
AHONBAYAN
78,424
5
APEC
619,657
52
BIGKIS
77,327
6
A TEACHER
490,379
53
PMAP
75,200
7
AKBAYAN
466,112
54
AKAPIN
74,686
8
ALAGAD
423,149
55
PBA
71,544
9
COOP-NATCCO
409,883
56
GRECON
62,220
10
BUTIL
409,160
57
BTM
60,993
11
BATAS
385,810
58
A SMILE
58,717
12
ARC
374,288
59
NELFFI
57,872
13
ANAKPAWIS
370,261
60
AKSA
57,012
14
ABONO
339,990
61
BAGO
55,846
15
AMIN
338,185
62
BANDILA
54,751
16
AGAP
328,724
63
AHON
54,522
17
AN WARAY
321,503
64
ASAHAN MO
51,722
18
YACAP
310,889
65
AGBIAG!
50,837
19
FPJPM
300,923
66
SPI
50,478
20
UNI-MAD
245,382
67
BAHANDI
46,612
21
ABS
235,086
68
ADD
45,624
22
KAKUSA
228,999
69
AMANG
43,062
23
KABATAAN
228,637
70
ABAY PARAK
42,282
24
ABA-AKO
218,818
71
BABAE KA
36,512
25
ALIF
217,822
72
SB
34,835
26
SENIOR CITIZENS
213,058
73
ASAP
34,098
27
AT
197,872
74
PEP
33,938
28
VFP
196,266
75
ABA ILONGGO
33,903
29
ANAD
188,521
76
VENDORS
33,691
30
BANAT
177,028
77
ADD-TRIBAL
32,896
31
ANG KASANGGA
170,531
78
ALMANA
32,255
32
BANTAY
169,801
79
AANGAT KA PILIPINO
29,130
33
ABAKADA
166,747
80
AAPS
26,271
34
1-UTAK
164,980
81
HAPI
25,781
35
TUCP
162,647
82
AAWAS
22,946
36
COCOFED
155,920
83
SM
20,744
37
AGHAM
146,032
84
AG
16,916
38
ANAK
141,817
85
AGING PINOY
16,729
39
ABANSE! PINAY
130,356
86
APO
16,421
40
PM
119,054
87
BIYAYANG BUKID
16,241
41
AVE
110,769
88
ATS
14,161
42
SUARA
110,732
89
UMDJ
9,445
43
ASSALAM
110,440
90
BUKLOD FILIPINA
8,915
44
DIWA
107,021
91
LYPAD
8,471
45
ANC
99,636
92
AA-KASOSYO
8,406
46
SANLAKAS
97,375
93
KASAPI
6,221
47
ABC
90,058
TOTAL
15,950,900
The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each." This clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2
below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by
dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.
Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for the party-list.28
Rank
Party
Votes
Garnered
Votes Garnered over
Guaranteed
Total Votes for PartySeat
List, in %
1
BUHAY
1,169,234
7.33%
1
2
BAYAN MUNA
979,039
6.14%
1
3
CIBAC
755,686
4.74%
1
4
GABRIELA
621,171
3.89%
1
5
APEC
619,657
3.88%
1
6
A TEACHER
490,379
3.07%
1
7
AKBAYAN
466,112
2.92%
1
8
ALAGAD
423,149
2.65%
1
9
COOP-NATCCO
409,883
2.57%
1
10
BUTIL
409,160
2.57%
1
11
BATAS29
385,810
2.42%
1
12
ARC
374,288
2.35%
1
13
ANAKPAWIS
370,261
2.32%
1
14
ABONO
339,990
2.13%
1
15
AMIN
338,185
2.12%
1
16
AGAP
328,724
2.06%
1
17
AN WARAY
321,503
2.02%
1
Total
17
18
YACAP
310,889
1.95%
0
19
FPJPM
300,923
1.89%
0
20
UNI-MAD
245,382
1.54%
0
From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates.
The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are "entitled to one seat each," or the guaranteed
seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled
to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." This is where petitioners’ and intervenors’ problem with the formula
in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion to their total number of votes" to be in proportion to the votes of the first
party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent
threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available
party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the
attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections.
A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all
get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold,
this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100
million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of
occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House
of Representatives."30
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be
observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall
be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion
to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat
each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under
the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for
a rounding off of fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters.
The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by
15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the
percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the
Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining
available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties
next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat
allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:
Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats
Rank Party
Votes
Garnered
over
Votes
Total
Garnered Votes for
Party
List, in %
(A)
Guaranteed
Seat
(First
Round)
(B)
Additional
Seats
(Second
Round)
(C)
(B) plus
(C), in
whole
integers
(D)
Applying
the three
seat cap
(E)
1
BUHAY
1,169,234 7.33%
1
2.79
3
N.A.
2
BAYAN
MUNA
979,039
1
2.33
3
N.A.
6.14%
3
CIBAC
755,686
4.74%
1
1.80
2
N.A.
4
GABRIELA
621,171
3.89%
1
1.48
2
N.A.
5
APEC
619,657
3.88%
1
1.48
2
N.A.
6
A Teacher
490,379
3.07%
1
1.17
2
N.A.
7
AKBAYAN
466,112
2.92%
1
1.11
2
N.A.
8
ALAGAD
423,149
2.65%
1
1.01
2
N.A.
931
COOPNATCCO
409,883
2.57%
1
1
2
N.A.
10
BUTIL
409,160
2.57%
1
1
2
N.A.
11
BATAS
385,810
2.42%
1
1
2
N.A.
12
ARC
374,288
2.35%
1
1
2
N.A.
13
ANAKPAWIS 370,261
2.32%
1
1
2
N.A.
14
ABONO
339,990
2.13%
1
1
2
N.A.
15
AMIN
338,185
2.12%
1
1
2
N.A.
16
AGAP
328,724
2.06%
1
1
2
N.A.
17
AN WARAY
321,503
2.02%
1
1
2
N.A.
18
YACAP
310,889
1.95%
0
1
1
N.A.
19
FPJPM
300,923
1.89%
0
1
1
N.A.
20
UNI-MAD
245,382
1.54%
0
1
1
N.A.
21
ABS
235,086
1.47%
0
1
1
N.A.
22
KAKUSA
228,999
1.44%
0
1
1
N.A.
23
KABATAAN
228,637
1.43%
0
1
1
N.A.
24
ABA-AKO
218,818
1.37%
0
1
1
N.A.
25
ALIF
217,822
1.37%
0
1
1
N.A.
26
SENIOR
CITIZENS
213,058
1.34%
0
1
1
N.A.
27
AT
197,872
1.24%
0
1
1
N.A.
28
VFP
196,266
1.23%
0
1
1
N.A.
29
ANAD
188,521
1.18%
0
1
1
N.A.
30
BANAT
177,028
1.11%
0
1
1
N.A.
31
ANG
KASANGGA
170,531
1.07%
0
1
1
N.A.
32
BANTAY
169,801
1.06%
0
1
1
N.A.
33
ABAKADA
166,747
1.05%
0
1
1
N.A.
34
1-UTAK
164,980
1.03%
0
1
1
N.A.
35
TUCP
162,647
1.02%
0
1
1
N.A.
36
COCOFED
155,920
0.98%
0
1
1
N.A.
Total
17
55
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list
organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one
whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D).
Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list elections. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the
political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much
for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any
single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question is this: Are we going to
classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they
be under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well
as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is
adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we
shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether
he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority political parties, are not
prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is precisely the contention of political
parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang
saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito
reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to
Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register
for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
xxxx
MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass organizations to seek common ground. For
example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to make common goals with mass
organizations so that the very leadership of these parties can be transformed through the participation of mass organizations. And if this is
true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that
they will be attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact
mass organizations so that with their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed because this amendment will
create conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and the political parties to come together. And the party list system is
certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of
representatives of mass organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have in Europe
where labor organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the Christian
Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those
parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic Party. But the businessmen, most of
them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all why political parties and mass organizations should not
combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each other so that the very objectives that we set in this Constitution for sectoral representation
are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs
sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected
representatives later on through a party list system; and even beyond that, to become actual political parties capable of contesting political
power in the wider constitutional arena for major political parties.
x x x 32 (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part
does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general
conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain
of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional
party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the
region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose
principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or
characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election
purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the
framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact,
the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of
the party-list system to the sectoral groups.33 In defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral
party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political
parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court
cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent
violation of the Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish,
or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal
Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major
political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a
fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino
(KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
elections, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration
of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organization’s nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity"34 as
there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors,35 that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee
represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the
Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more
than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which
will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to
the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from
dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table
3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with
this ponencia.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the
distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the
procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is
immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
Associate Justice
T.
CARPIO
Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 816-817. This COMELEC certification should have included An Waray, which was proclaimed on 4
September 2007 under NBC Resolution No. 07-97.
15
16
Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 14.
17
Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 21-22.
18
Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 553; rollo (G. R. No. 179295), p. 341.
19
Supra note 5 at 424.
20
Id. at 446-451. We quote below the discussion in Veterans explaining the First Party Rule:
Formula
Additional Seats for the First Party
for
Determining
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given by the law is that a party
receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive
twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter’s number of seats and so on. The
formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:
Number of votes
of first party
=
Total votes for
party-list system
Proportion of votes of first party relative to
total votes for party-list system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes
cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If
the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first
party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall
not be entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the maximum number of additional
seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case
wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of
seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of
Representatives.
xxx
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats the first party is entitled to.
It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of
the same formula for all would contravene the proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains
six percent of the total number of votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two additional
seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party received a significantly higher amount of votes — say, twenty
percent — to grant it the same number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional
representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of representatives as the one
obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving
six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first party.
Formula
Seats of Other Qualified Parties
for
Additional
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based
on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction:
No.
of
votes
Additional
seats
concerned
party
=
for concerned party
of
No. of additional
x seats allocated
to the first party
Total
No.
of
of party-list system
votes
No.
of
of first party
votes
Total
No.
of
of party-list system
votes
In simplified form, it is written as follows:
No. of votes of
concerned party
Additional
seats
=
for concerned party
No. of votes
of first party
No. of additional
x seats allocated to
the first party
xxx
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of votes for the other party to
that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties
as well.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of additional seats to be awarded since,
in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical
proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may
result in the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional
representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum
number of additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional representation.
But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.
G.R. No. 189793
April 7, 2010
SENATOR
BENIGNO
SIMEON
C.
AQUINO
III
and
MAYOR
JESSE
ROBREDO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO
LARRAZABAL, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original
action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the
nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd)
Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment."
Petitioners consequently pray that the respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any issuances and from taking any
steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October
2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general
circulation.1 In substance, the said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing
first and second legislative districts of the province.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4)
legislative districts in this wise:
District
Municipalities/Cities
1st District
Del Gallego
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao
Population
Libmanan
417,304
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao
San Fernando
2nd District Gainza
Milaor
Naga
Pili
Ocampo
Canaman
Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga
474,899
3rd District Caramoan
Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion
Sangay
372,548
San
Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma
4th District Iriga
Baao
Balatan
Bato
Buhi
Bula
Nabua
429,070
Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an
additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San
Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. The following
table3 illustrates the reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716:
District
Municipalities/Cities
Population
1st District
Del Gallego
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao
176,383
2nd District
Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao
San Fernando 276,777
Gainza
Milaor
3rd District (formerly 2nd District) Naga
Pili
Ocampo
Canaman
Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga
4th District (formerly 3rd District) Caramoan
Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion
Sangay
372,548
San
Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma
5th District (formerly 4th District)
Buhi
Bula
Nabua
Iriga
Baao
Balatan
Bato
439,043
429,070
Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties of the origins of the bill that became the law show that,
from the filing of House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by the Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2) against, the process
progressed step by step, marked by public hearings on the sentiments and position of the local officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of
a new congressional district, as well as argumentation and debate on the issue, now before us, concerning the stand of the oppositors of the
bill that a population of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new district.4
Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the
Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the former second district from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion
in the new second district. No other local executive joined the two; neither did the representatives of the former third and fourth districts of
the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that
requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.5 The petitioners claim that the
reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first
district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard.6 The provision
reads:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) x x x x
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is the minimum population requirement for the creation of
a legislative district.7 The petitioners theorize that, save in the case of a newly created province, each legislative district created by Congress
must be supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid.8 Under this view, existing legislative districts may be
reapportioned and severed to form new districts, provided each resulting district will represent a population of at least 250,000. On the other
hand, if the reapportionment would result in the creation of a legislative seat representing a populace of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the
reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with the minimum population requirement.
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to adopt a population
minimum of 250,000 in the creation of additional legislative seats.9 The petitioners argue that when the Constitutional Commission fixed the
original number of district seats in the House of Representatives to two hundred (200), they took into account the projected national population
of fifty five million (55,000,000) for the year 1986.10 According to the petitioners, 55 million people represented by 200 district representatives
translates to roughly 250,000 people for every one (1) representative.11 Thus, the 250,000 population requirement found in Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is actually based on the population constant used by the Constitutional Commission in distributing the initial
200 legislative seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts independently from the creation of a province, Congress is bound to
observe a 250,000 population threshold, in the same manner that the Constitutional Commission did in the original apportionment.
Verbatim, the submission is that:
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of Camarines Sur failed to meet the population
requirement for the creation of the legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto; and
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as provided in Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and
(4) of the Constitution.12
The provision subject of this case states:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based
on the standards provided in this section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek the dismissal of the present petition based on procedural
and substantive grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal technical defects: first, petitioners committed an
error in choosing to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court; and second, the petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between cities and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents concede the existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue that a plain and simple
reading of the questioned provision will show that the same has no application with respect to the creation of legislative districts in
provinces.13 Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for the reapportionment of districts in provinces. Therefore,
Republic Act No. 9716, which only creates an additional legislative district within the province of Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a
perfectly valid reapportionment law.
We first pass upon the threshold issues.
The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition, the petitioners have committed a
fatal procedural lapse. The respondents cite the following reasons:
1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion.
1avvphi1
2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a tribunal, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. Respondents maintain that in implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they were not acting as a
judicial or quasi-judicial body, nor were they engaging in the performance of a ministerial act.
3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Considering that the main thrust of the instant petition is the declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, the same
could have been ventilated through a petition for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has only appellate, not original
jurisdiction.
The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they had sustained, or is in danger of sustaining any substantial
injury as a result of the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. The respondents, therefore, conclude that the petitioners lack the required
legal standing to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted with issues that, by reason of constitutional importance, need
a direct focus of the arguments on their content and substance.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of procedural rules, 14 as well as relaxed the requirement of
locus standi whenever confronted with an important issue of overreaching significance to society.15
Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)16 and Jaworski v. PAGCOR,17 this Court sanctioned
momentary deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took original cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public
importance. The Jaworski case ratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues
involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny
that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence,
their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are
not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis
supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 18 Tatad v. Executive
Secretary,19 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority20 and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,21 just to name a few, that absence of direct
injury on the part of the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance.
In Lim v. Executive Secretary,22 this Court held that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely,
and so, the standing requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent decision on Chavez v. Gonzales.23
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must apply. The beaten path must be taken. We go directly
to the determination of whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of constitutionality.24 Before a law may be declared
unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or
transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a violation,
the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.25
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they
perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province
to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first
meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from
the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a
province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not
so for a province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in turn, the subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano,
Jr. v. COMELEC.27
In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which was the law that converted the Municipality of
Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional legislative district for Makati, which at that
time was a lone district. The petitioners in that case argued that the creation of an additional district would violate Section 5(3), Article VI of
the Constitution, because the resulting districts would be supported by a population of less than 250,000, considering that Makati had a total
population of only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly created district,
explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand," to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution
for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section
provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even
granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be
increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be
entitled to at least one congressional representative.28 (Emphasis supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other
words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional
districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000
in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to
an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is
entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of
not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income
requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the deliberations on the words and meaning of Section 5
of Article VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred fifty thousand" may be gleaned from the records of
the Constitutional Commission which, upon framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would be
appended to the final document. The Ordinance is captioned "APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark was used for the 1986
nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the population figure was used
to determine how many districts a province, city, or Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose,
population had to be the determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an absolute minimum for one
legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at issue, in the determination of the precise district within the province to which, through the
use of the population benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole, though it was among,
several determinants.
From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided the entire country into two hundred (200) districts, which
corresponded to the original number of district representatives. The 200 seats were distributed by the Constitutional Commission in this
manner: first, one (1) seat each was given to the seventy-three (73) provinces and the ten (10) cities with a population of at least
250,000;30 second, the remaining seats were then redistributed among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area "in accordance with
the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio."31 Commissioner Davide, who later became a Member and
then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his sponsorship remark32 for the Ordinance to be appended to the 1987 Constitution:
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are, in turn, apportioned among provinces and cities
with a population of at least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan Area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of
a uniform and progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980 official enumeration as the point of reckoning.
This projection indicates that our population is more or less 56 million. Taking into account the mandate that each city with at least 250, 000
inhabitants and each province shall have at least one representative, we first allotted one seat for each of the 73 provinces, and each one for
all cities with a population of at least 250, 000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de
Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and
cities in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city. Differentiated from this, the determination of the districts within the
province had to consider "all protests and complaints formally received" which, the records show, dealt with determinants other than
population as already mentioned.
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission narrates:
INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:
Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the northern towns when it was more affinity with the southern town of
Aborlan, Batarasa, Brooke’s Point, Narra, Quezon and Marcos. He stated that the First District has a greater area than the Second District.
He then queried whether population was the only factor considered by the Committee in redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account the standards set in Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative
Department, namely: 1) the legislative seats should be apportioned among the provinces and cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district must be compact, adjacent
and contiguous.
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto Princesa was included with the northern towns. He then inquired what
is the distance between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente.
xxxx
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of 75,480 and based on the apportionment, its inclusion with the northern
towns would result in a combined population of 265,000 as against only 186,000 for the south. He added that Cuyo and Coron are very
important towns in the northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the capital of Palawan before its transfer to Puerto Princesa. He also
pointed out that there are more potential candidates in the north and therefore if Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and Coron are
lumped together, there would be less candidates in the south, most of whose inhabitants are not interested in politics. He then suggested
that Puerto Princesa be included in the south or the Second District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of amendments. He requested that the COMELEC staff study said
proposal.33
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO
On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in the interpellations that District I has a total population of 265,358
including the City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second District has a total population of 186,733. He proposed, however, that Puerto Princesa
be included in the Second District in order to satisfy the contiguity requirement in the Constitution considering that said City is nearer the
southern towns comprising the Second District.
In reply to Mr. Monsod’s query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed transfer of Puerto Princesa City to the Second District, the First
District would only have a total population of 190,000 while the Second District would have 262,213, and there would be no substantial
changes.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledo’s proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City before the Municipality of Aborlan.
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved by the Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the apportionment and districting for the province of
Palawan was approved by the Body.34
The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was decided by the importance of the towns and the city that eventually
composed the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a reservation with the Committee for the possible reopening of the
approval of Region I with respect to Benguet and Baguio City.
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City and Tuba are placed in one district. He stated that he was toying
with the idea that, perhaps as a special consideration for Baguio because it is the summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be divorced
from Baguio City so that it could, by itself, have its own constituency and Tuba could be transferred to the Second District together with Itogon.
Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that the population of Baguio City is only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower during certain times of the year, but the transient population would
increase the population substantially and, therefore, for purposes of business and professional transactions, it is beyond question that
population-wise, Baguio would more than qualify, not to speak of the official business matters, transactions and offices that are also there.
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Lima’s statement that unless Tuba and Baguio City are united, Tuba will be isolated from the rest of
Benguet as the place can only be reached by passing through Baguio City. He stated that the Committee would submit the matter to the
Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr. Regalado stated that the Body should have a say on the matter and
that the considerations he had given are not on the demographic aspects but on the fact that Baguio City is the summer capital, the venue
and situs of many government offices and functions.
On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the reconsideration of the earlier approval of the apportionment and
districting of Region I, particularly Benguet.
Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the amendment of Mr. Regalado was put to a vote. With 14 Members voting
in favor and none against, the amendment was approved by the Body.
Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet with Baguio City will have two seats. The First District shall
comprise of the municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan,
Itogon and Tuba. The Second District shall comprise of Baguio City alone.
There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and districting of Region I.35
Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.
It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into districts based on the distribution of its three cities, with each
district having a city: one district "supposed to be a fishing area; another a vegetable and fruit area; and the third, a rice growing area,"
because such consideration "fosters common interests in line with the standard of compactness."36 In the districting of Maguindanao, among
the matters discussed were "political stability and common interest among the people in the area" and the possibility of "chaos and disunity"
considering the "accepted regional, political, traditional and sectoral leaders."37 For Laguna, it was mentioned that municipalities in the
highland should not be grouped with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner Maambong proposed that they should "balance the
area and population."38
Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, we stated in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC39 that:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The Constitution, however, does not require
mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x. To ensure quality representation through
commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative
district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied).
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of petitioner that an additional provincial legislative district,
which does not have at least a 250,000 population is not allowed by the Constitution.
The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition find support. And the formulation of the
Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a population of 250,000 is a
constitutional sine qua non for the formation of an additional legislative district in a province, whose population growth has increased beyond
the 1986 numbers.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is ─ based on the formula and constant number
of 250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities ─ entitled
to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this
point.40 In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit an additional district for the Province of
Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and complaints against strict conformity with the
population standard, and more importantly based on the final districting in the Ordinance on considerations other than population, the
reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the
creation of a new legislative district is valid even if the population of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by
the petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion from the reconfigured District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the redistricting of Districts One and Two.41
Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the increased population of the erstwhile Districts One and Two,
point to the utter absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion,42 that would warrant the invalidation of Republic Act
No. 9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the
number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just
one of several other factors in the composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and
the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this petition.
1avv phi1
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st)
and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 96859 October 15, 1991
MOHAMMAD
ALI
DIMAPORO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of Representatives, and (Hon. QUIRINO D. ABAD SANTOS, JR.) HON. CAMILO L.
SABIO Secretary, House of representatives, respondent.
Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa and Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987
congressional elections. He took his oath of office on 9 January 1987 and thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and privileges
pertaining thereto.
On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The election was scheduled for 17 February 1990.
Upon being informed of this development by the Commission on Elections, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of
Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of
the Omnibus Election Code. As reported by the Speaker in the session of 9 February 1990:
The Order of Business today carries a communication from the Commission on Elections which states that the Honorable Mohammad
Ali Dimaporo of the Second District of Lanao del Sur filed a certificate of candidacy for the regional elections in Muslim Mindanao on
February 17, 1990. The House Secretariat, performing an administrative act, did not include the name of the Honorable Ali Dimaporo
in the Rolls pursuant to the provision of the Election Code, Article IX, Section 67, which states: Any elective official whether national
or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.' The word 'ipso facto' is defined
in Words and Phrases as by the very act itself – by the mere act. And therefore, by the very act of the (sic) filing his certificate of
candidacy, the Honorable Ali Dimaporo removed himself from the Rolls of the House of Representatives; and, therefore, his name
has not been carried in today's Roll and will not be carried in the future Rolls of the House. ...
Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter dated 28 June 1990 and addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed
his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress." The record does not indicate what action was
taken on this communication, but it is apparent that petitioner failed in his bid to regain his seat in Congress since this petition praying for
such relief was subsequently filed on 31 January 1991.
In this petition, it is alleged that following the dropping of his name from the Roll, petitioner was excluded from all proceedings of the House
of Representatives; he was not paid the emoluments due his office; his staff was dismissed and disbanded; and his office suites were occupied
by other persons. In effect, he was virtually barred and excluded from performing his duties and from exercising his rights and privileges as
the duly elected and qualified congressman from his district.
Petitioner admits that he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of Muslim Mindanao. He, however, maintains
that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present
Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.
In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of Representatives, as well as the grounds
by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides
that "the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon
of June 30, 1992;" while Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years
which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." On the other hand, the
grounds by which such term may be shortened may be summarized as follows:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.
He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these constitutional
provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution. For if it
were the intention of the framers to include the provisions of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 as among the means by which the term of
a Congressman may be shortened, it would have been a very simple matter to incorporate it in the present Constitution. They did not do so.
On the contrary, the Constitutional Commission only reaffirmed the grounds previously found in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and
deliberately omitted the ground provided in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881.
On the premise that the provision of law relied upon by respondents in excluding him from the Roll of Members is contrary to the present
Constitution, petitioner consequently concludes that respondents acted without authority. He further maintains that respondents' so-called
"administrative act" of striking out his name is ineffective in terminating his term as Congressman. Neither can it be justified as an interpretation
of the Constitutional provision on voluntary renunciation of office as only the courts may interpret laws. Moreover, he claims that he cannot
be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a
certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or employment.
In sum, petitioner's demand that his rights as a duly elected member of the House of Representatives be recognized, is anchored on the
negative view of the following issues raised in this petition:
A.
IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION?
B.
COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE
PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING
HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?
On the other hand, respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General contend that Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is still operative
under the present Constitution, as the voluntary act of resignation contemplated in said Section 67 falls within the term "voluntary renunciation"
of office enunciated in par. 2, Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. That the ground provided in Section 67 is not included in the Constitution
does not affect its validity as the grounds mentioned therein are not exclusive. There are, in addition, other modes of shortening the tenure
of office of Members of Congress, among which are resignation, death and conviction of a crime which carries a penalty of disqualification to
hold public office.
Respondents assert that petitioner's filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is an act of resignation which estops him from claiming otherwise as
he is presumed to be aware of existing laws. They further maintain that their questioned "administrative act" is a mere ministerial act which
did not involve any encroachment on judicial powers.
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity
except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
The precursor of this provision is the last paragraph of Section 2 of C.A. No. 666, which reads:
Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one for which he has been lastly elected, shall
be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Section 27 of Article II of Republic Act No. 180 reiterated this rule in this wise:
Sec. 27. Candidate holding office. — Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for an office, other than the one which
he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
The 1971 Election Code imposed a similar proviso on local elective officials as follows:
Sec. 24. Candidate holding elective office. — Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or municipal district officer running
for an office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Every elected official shall take his oath of office on the day his term of office commences, or within ten days after his proclamation if
said proclamation takes place after such day. His failure to take his oath of office as herein provided shall be considered forfeiture of
his right to the new office to which he has been elected unless his failure is for a cause or causes beyond his control.
The 1978 Election Code provided a different rule, thus:
Sec. 30. Candidates holding political offices. — Governors, mayors, members of various sanggunians, or barangay officials, shall,
upon filing of a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.
It must be noted that only in B.P. Blg. 881 are members of the legislature included in the enumeration of elective public officials who are to
be considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of their certificates of candidacy for another office, except for President and
Vice-President. The advocates of Cabinet Bill No. 2 (now Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) elucidated on the rationale of this inclusion,
thus:
MR. PALMARES:
In the old Election Code, Your Honor, in the 1971 Election Code, the provision seems to be different — I think this is in Section
24 of Article III.
Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or municipal district officer running for an office other than the one which
he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.
May I know, Your Honor, what is the reason of the Committee in departing or changing these provisions of Section 24 of the
old Election Code and just adopting it en toto? Why do we have to change it? What could possibly be the reason behind it, or
the rationale behind it?
MR. PEREZ (L.):
I have already stated the rationale for this, Mr. Speaker, but I don't mind repeating it. The purpose is that the people must be given
the right to choose any official who belongs to, let us say, to the Batasan if he wants to run for another office. However, because of
the practice in the past where members of the legislature ran for local offices, but did not assume the office, because of that spectacle
the impression is that these officials were just trifling with the mandate of the people. They have already obtained a mandate to be a
member of the legislature, and they want to run for mayor or for governor and yet when the people give them that mandate, they do
not comply with that latter mandate, but still preferred (sic) to remain in the earlier mandate. So we believe, Mr. Speaker, that the
people's latest mandate must be the one that will be given due course. ...
Assemblyman Manuel M. Garcia, in answer to the query of Assemblyman Arturo Tolentino on the constitutionality of Cabinet Bill No. 2, said:
MR. GARCIA (M.M.):
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker, on the part of the Committee, we made this proposal based on constitutional grounds. We did not propose this
amendment mainly on the rationale as stated by the Gentlemen from Manila that the officials running for office other than the ones
they are holding will be considered resigned not because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily
because under our Constitution, we have this new chapter on accountability of public officers. Now, this was not in the 1935
Constitution. It states that (sic) Article XIII, Section 1— Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees shall serve with
the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain accountable to the people.
Now, what is the significance of this new provision on accountability of public officers? This only means that all elective public officials
should honor the mandate they have gotten from the people. Thus, under our Constitution, it says that: 'Members of the Batasan shall
serve for the term of 6 years, in the case of local officials and 6 years in the case of barangay officials. Now, Mr. Speaker, we have
precisely included this as part of the Omnibus Election Code because a Batasan Member who hold (sic) himself out with the people
and seek (sic) their support and mandate should not be allowed to deviate or allow himself to run for any other position unless he
relinquishes or abandons his office. Because his mandate to the people is to serve for 6 years. Now, if you allow a Batasan or a
governor or a mayor who was mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office other than the one he was elected to, then, that clearly
shows that he has not (sic) intention to service the mandate of the people which was placed upon him and therefore he should be
considered ipso facto resigned. I think more than anything that is the accountability that the Constitution requires of elective public
officials. It is not because of the use or abuse of powers or facilities of his office, but it is because of the Constitution itself which I said
under the 1973 Constitution called and inserted this new chapter on accountability.
Now, argument was said that the mere filing is not the intention to run. Now, what is it for? If a Batasan Member files the certificate of
candidacy, that means that he does not want to serve, otherwise, why should he file for an office other than the one he was elected
to? The mere fact therefore of filing a certificate should be considered the overt act of abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the
people and that he should therefore resign if he wants to seek another position which he feels he could be of better service.
As I said, Mr. Speaker, I disagree with the statements of the Gentleman from Manila because the basis of this Section 62 is the
constitutional provision not only of the fact that Members of the Batasan and local officials should serve the entire 6-year term for
which we were elected, but because of this new chapter on the accountability of public officers not only to the community which voted
him to office, but primarily because under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must serve
their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition. And that is the reason, Mr. Speaker, why we opted to propose Section 62
where candidates or elective public officers holding offices other than the one to which they were elected, should be considered ipso
facto resigned from their office upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy."
It cannot be gainsaid that the same constitutional basis for Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 remains written in the 1987 Constitution. In
fact, Section 1 of Article XI on "Accountability of Public Officers" is more emphatic in stating:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the questioned statutory provision is no longer operative does not hold water. He failed to discern
that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their
entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that
should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public
officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.
In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term"
with "tenure" of office. As succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor General:
The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period
during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer.
Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office (see
Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to
have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure
of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that
"(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided
by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the
Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. As held in the case of State ex rel. Berge vs. Lansing,
the expression in the constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not necessarily exclude all others. Neither
does it preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds. Events so enumerated in the constitution or statutes are merely conditions
the occurrence of any one of which the office shall become vacant not as a penalty but simply as the legal effect of any one of the events.
And would it not be preposterous to say that a congressman cannot die and cut his tenure because death is not one of the grounds provided
for in the Constitution? The framers of our fundamental law never intended such absurdity.
The basic principle which underlies the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is that by enactment of legislation,
a constitutional measure is presumed to be created. This Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative
enactment. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not to be applied with the same rigor in construing a constitution as a statute and only
those things expressed in such positive affirmative terms as plainly imply the negative of what is not mentioned will be considered as inhibiting
the power of legislature. The maxim is only a rule of interpretation and not a constitutional command. This maxim expresses a rule of
construction and serves only as an aid in discovering legislative intent where such intent is not otherwise manifest.
Even then, the concept of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution is broad enough to include the situation
envisioned in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. As discussed by the Constitutional Commissioners:
MR. MAAMBONG:
Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? The term 'voluntary renunciation' does not only appear in Section 3; it
appears in Section 6.
MR. DAVIDE:
Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG:
It is also a recurring phrase all over the constitution. Could the Committee please enlighten us exactly what 'voluntary renunciation'
means? Is this akin to abandonment?
MR. DAVIDE:
Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent the restriction by merely resigning at any given time on the second
term.
MR. MAAMBONG:
Is the Committee saying that the term voluntary renunciation is more general than abandonment and resignation?
MR. DAVIDE:
It is more general, more embracing.
That the act, contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office constitutes an overt,
concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently being held is evident from this exchange between then Members of
Parliament Arturo Tolentino and Jose Rono:
MR. RONO:
My reasonable ground is this: if you will make the person ... my, shall we say, basis is that in one case the person is intending to run
for an office which is different from his own, and therefore it should be considered, at least from the legal significance, an intention to
relinquish his office.
MR. TOLENTINO:
Yes ...
MR. RONO:
And in the other, because he is running for the same position, it is otherwise.
MR. TOLENTINO:
Yes, but what I cannot see is why are you going to compel a person to quit an office which he is only intending to leave? A
relinquishment of office must be clear, must be definite.
MR. RONO:
Yes, sir. That's precisely, Mr. Speaker, what I'm saying that while I do not disagree with the conclusion that the intention cannot be
enough, but I am saying that the filing of the certificate of candidacy is an over act of such intention. It's not just an intention; it's
already there.
In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving Section 27 of R.A. No. 180 above-quoted, this Court categorically pronounced that "forfeiture
(is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are
considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted
official. Thus, as We had occasion to remark, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in Castro vs. Gatuslao:
... The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of the certificate of candidacy should be taken into account. The
law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable, since the vacating is expressly
made as of the moment of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. ...
As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position
being presently held, it is not necessary, as petitioner opines, that the other position be actually held. The ground for forfeiture in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode
of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of the Constitution.
The legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office having been spelled out in Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881 itself, no
statutory interpretation was indulged in by respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives in excluding petitioner's
name from the Roll of Members. The Speaker is the administrative head of the House of Representatives and he exercises administrative
powers and functions attached to his office. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial
functions. It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg.
881. When the Commission on Elections communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy
for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67,
Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. It was their ministerial duty to do so. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged
invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these
officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which
have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are
bound to obey it.
In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and benefit of the people. As
such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which
public policy may dictate on his office.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Dimaporo vs. Mitra
Posted on 2020-11-01
GR 96859, 202 SCRA 779 [Oct 15, 1991]
TERM of the Members of the House of Representatives Art VI, Sec 7. “Term” of office is different from “tenure” of office.
Facts:
Petitioner incumbent Rep. Dimaporo of Lanao del Sur filed on Jan 15, 1990 for Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of
the ARMM. Respondent Speaker Mitra and the Sec. of the House then excluded Dimaporo’s name from its Roll of Members xxx, considering him
permanently resigned from his office upon filing of his Certificate of Candidacy pursuant to the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) Art IX, Sec 67
which states “any elective official xxx running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for the Pres.
and VP shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Having lost in the election, Dimaporo
expressed his intention “to resume performing” his “duties as elected Member of Congress” but he failed his bid hence this petition. He argues
that Sec 67, Art IX of BP 881 is unconstitutional in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman’s term of office on a ground not provided
for in the Constitution.
Issue:
Does Sec 67, Art IX of BP 881 shorten a term of a congressman by means other than that provided in the Constitution?
Held:
No. Dimaporo seems to confuse “term” with “tenure” of office. The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened
by the legislature, but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure), may be affected by circumstances xxx. Under the
questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily
cut short his tenure not his term. The term remains xxx. Forfeiture is automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of
candidacy for another office xxx. It is not necessary that the other position be actually held. The ground for forfeiture in Sec 13, Art VI of the
Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Sec 67, Art. IX of BP, Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of office
under Sec 7(2) of Art VI of the Constitution. Petition dismissed.
Section 11
A.C. No. 7399
August 25, 2009
ANTERO
vs.
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Respondent.
J.
POBRE, Complainant,
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Court’s attention to the following excerpts
of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not
only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded
by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other
disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements.
She, however, explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech
she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to
bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose
what she believed "to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC]," which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon
to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify
for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would
not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: "A
Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged
from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the provision, the Court,
in Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic
world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust
with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected
from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."1
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate
the functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a
polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for
their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience
and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge’s speculation as
to the motives.2
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of
free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this
representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country
and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the
legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the
member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.3 The disciplinary authority of the assembly4 and the voters, not the courts, can
properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.5
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken.
Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this
could not be the last word on the matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect
on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct.
It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as
stating that she wanted "to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court," and calling the Court
a "Supreme Court of idiots."
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.6 We draw her attention to the ensuing passage in Sotto that she should have taken to heart
in the first place:
x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they
might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.
1avvphi1
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. In
this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively
provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct
by others.
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves. She was a former Regional Trial Court
judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected
senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public
faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.7 Senator Santiago
should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make on the people’s faith in the integrity of the courts.
As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC. This allegation
strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of what she said. We quote the passage once more:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not
only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded
by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)
A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being
considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even
parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its
magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege
accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people
and the institution that represents them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiago’s outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as an "unjust act" the JBC had taken in
connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions under the Court’s supervision, its individual
members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBC’s ex-officio chairperson,8 have no official duty to nominate candidates for
appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiago’s wholesale and indiscriminate
assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical and defamatory words against all of them.
At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution
that provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, exercises specific
authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with the end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self interest
may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;
xxxx
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.9
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,10 we reiterated our pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer11 that
the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they
are bound to uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same
canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The
attorney’s oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts."
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel12 that:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold
the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the courts, a
lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of
the liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and
not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."13
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has entrusted that profession with
the administration of the law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as
a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of
his/her oath as a lawyer.14
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity
or good demeanor,15 a good character being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such
privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of "conduct" or "misconduct," the reference is not
confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers’ professional duties, but also covers any misconduct,
which––albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession––would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which their license and the law invest in them.16
This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the people’s faith in courts and trust in the rule of law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary
authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the
integrity of courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it in the case of former Senator
Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang17 who
repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most insolent manner.
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted
an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter
the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the
institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal,
and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear
of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.18 It is intended to protect members of Congress
against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any
circumstance, "offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any public institution."19 But as to Senator Santiago’s
unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics
Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance.20 The lady senator clearly violated the rules of
her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobre’s motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken solely for
the public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We cannot overstress that the senator’s use of intemperate language to demean and
denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.21
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the statements in question. Suffice it to say in
this regard that, although she has not categorically denied making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her
privilege speech. Her implied admission is good enough for the Court.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of
the Constitution, DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.