Mustang Lumber Inc. v. CA, GR 104988, June 18, 1996
FACTS:
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Petitioner Mustang Lumber, Inc., a domestic corporation, was duly registered as a lumber dealer
with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD).
Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent Atty. Vincent A. Robles were
the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Chief of
the Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR, respectively.
Acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen
inside the lumberyard of the petitioner, the SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen
and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team
members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and
almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the
required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo
and impounded them at the DENR.
Thereafter, the team obtained a search warrant to inspect the premises of Mustang Lumber. 
By virtue thereof, the team found more lumber in the lumberyard without the necessary papers.
Thus, the lumbers were confiscated. Secretary Factoran ordered the disposal of the confiscated
lumber.
Consequently, a complaint against Mustang Lumber’s president and general manager was filed
in court. Mustang Lumber filed a motion to quash on the ground that “the information does not
charge an offense. According to Mustang Lumber, the possession of lumber as opposed to
timber is not penalized under Section 68 of PD No. 705.
ISSUE:
No. 705?
Whether possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is penalized in Section 68 of PD
RULING:
Yes.
The possession of lumber is covered by Section 68 of PD No. 705. While the Revised Forestry
Code does not contain any definition of timber or lumber, it does define forest products. The definition
of Processing Plant includes lumber, to wit: “[p]rocessing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or
combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber,
veneer, plywood, wallbond, blockboard (sic), paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood
products.”
“This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the
Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as ‘timber or logs after being prepared
for the market.’ Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.”
Tan v. People, GR 115507, May 19, 1998
DENR v. Daraman, 377 SCRA 39 (2002)
Facts: The accused Daraman and Lucenecio was charged [with] violation of Section 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277 for unlawfully and feloniously gathering,
collectign and possessing seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber without first securing and
obtaining any permit or license therefor from the proper authorities.
In the testimony presented by a forest ranger, when he asked the driver Gregorio Daraman for
some papers for the assorted lumber, the latter replied that he had none because they were not his.
Daraman in his defense, he told the forest ranger that Asan the owner of the furnitureshop was
the one who loaded the assorted lumber into the vehicle and advised him that if somebody would ask
about his lumber, just to tell the person that Asan had the papers for the lumber with him in his
furniture shop. Pablo Opinion, however, did not take his word and he instead impounded the vehicle
together with the assorted lumber.
After trial, the RTC acquitted both accused and ordered the return of the disputed vehicle to
Lucenecio. the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Community and Environment and
Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) conducted administrative confiscation proceedings on the
seized lumber and vehicle in the presence of private respondents.5 The two failed to present documents
to show the legality of their possession and transportation of the lumber seized. Hence, CENRO Officer
recommended to the Regional Executive Director (RED) the final confiscation of the seized lumber and
conveyance.
The DENR moved for reconsideration of the assailed Decision only insofar as it ordered the
"return of the said vehicle to the owner thereof and r claimed that the DENR had exclusive jurisdiction
over the conveyance, which had been used in violation of the Revised Forestry Code pursuant to Section
68-A of PD 705, as amended by EO 277.
The RTC denied the Motion and acquitted private respondents for insufficiency of evidence. The
unrebutted testimony of Respondent Daraman was that, in exchange for the wood shavings from Asan,
the former agreed to take the lumber to the latter’s house in Calbayog City, where the Holy Cross
Funeral Services office was also located. Asan advised Daraman to reply, when asked, that the papers
showing the authorization for the lumber were in the former’s shop in Barangay Blanca Aurora. Finding
the evidence against Respondent Lucenecio to be likewise insufficient, the RTC considered the vehicle as
an effect of the crime and ordered its delivery to him. The decision of the Court has never been brought
on appeal, thereby the same has long become final and executor.
Petitioner contends that the RTC overstepped its jurisdiction when it ordered the return of the
disputed vehicle, because the vehicle had already become government property by virtue of the
forfeiture Order issued by DENR on January 26, 1994. The DENR secretary or his duly authorized
representative, under Section 68-A of PD 705 as amended by EO 277, may order the confiscation and
disposition of all conveyances -- by land, water or air -- used in illegally cutting, gathering, removing,
possessing or abandoning forest products.
Issue: WON the RTC had jurisdiction to release the confiscated vehicle
Rulings:
No. SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly
Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest
laws rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the
confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all
conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the
same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter." If a statute is clear, plain
and free from ambiguity, it must be understood in its literal meaning and applied without resort to
interpretation, on the presumption that its wording correctly expresses its intent or will. The courts may
not construe it differently.
Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of "all conveyances used
either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same" is vested in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) secretary or a duly authorized
representative. The DENR secretary has supervision and control over the enforcement of forestry,
reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules and regulations
Momongan v. Omipon, AM No. MTJ-93-974 March 14, 1995
JURISDICTION MATTERS
Issue:
Whether Judge Omipon had authority to release the assailed truck and thus be free
from any disciplinary sanction?
Ruling: Yes. Judge Omipon had the authority to order the release of the truck. Although the DENR
Secretary or his duly authorized representatives have the power to confiscate any illegally obtained or
gathered forest products and all conveyances used in the commission of the offense, based on Section
68-A of PD No. 705 and AO No. 59, this power is in relation to the administrative jurisdiction of the
DENR. The act of Judge Omipon of releasing the truck did not violate PD No. 705 and AO No. 59 because
his act did not render nugatory the administrative authority of the DENR Secretary. “The confiscation
proceedings under Administrative Order No. 59 is different from the confiscation under the Revised
Penal Code, which is an additional penalty imposed in the event of conviction.” Momongan assails that
Judge Omipon should have turned over the truck to the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO). Judge Omipon however had no mandatory duty to do so, and should therefore not be
visited with disciplinary action.
Taopa v. People, GR 184098, November 25, 2008
The petition was denied. Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopa's alibi because
Cuison's testimony proved Taopa's active participation in the transport of the seized lumber. In particular,
the RTC and the CA found that the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of Taopa's house and that
Taopa and Ogalesco were accompanying the truck driven by Cuison up to where the truck and lumber
were seized. These facts proved Taopa's (and Ogalesco's) exercise of dominion and control over the
lumber loaded in the truck. The acts of Taopa (and of his co-accused Ogalesco) constituted possession of
timber or other forest products without the required legal documents. Moreover, the fact that Taopa and
Ogalesco ran away at the mere sight of the police was likewise largely indicative of guilt. We are thus
convinced that Taopa and Ogalesco were owners of the seized lumber.
Monge v. People, GR 170308, March 7, 2008
TOPIC: POSSESSION OF LUMBER WITHOUT THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTS
Galo Monge vs People of the Philippines
GR no. 170308, March 7, 2008
Facts:
On 20 July 1994, Monge(petitioner) and Potencio were found by the barangay tanods in
possession of and transporting 3 pieces of mahogany lumber in Iriga City. Monge and Potencio were not
able to show any documents or the requisite permit from DENR. Petitioner fled the scene in that instant
whereas Potencio was brought to the police station for interrogation and thereafter the DENR-CENRO.
The trial court found Monge guilty of violation of Section 68 of PD No 705, as amended by E.O.
no. 277 while Potencio was discharged because he was used as a state witness.
Agrrieved, petitioner elevated the case to CA where he challenged the discharge of Potencio as
a state witness on the ground that there is no absolute necessity for his testimony. Monge contested
that it was Potencio who owned the lumbers and not him, that he was only hired by Potencio to
transport the lumbers to a sawmill. The appellate court dismissed his petition, hence, he filed a review
on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not Monge was guilty of the offense charged?
Held:
Yes.
The contention of Monge is unavailing.
Under Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended by E.O No. 277, criminalizes two distinct and
separate offenses namely;
a. Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing of timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without
any authority; and
b. The possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required
under the existing laws and regulations.
In the first offense, the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or
other forest products may be proven by the authorization duly issued by the DENR. The second offense,
however, it is immaterial whether or not the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of forest
products are legal precisely because mere possession of forest products without the requisite
documents consummates the crime.
Petitioner cannot take refuge in his denial of ownership over the pieces of lumber fund in his
possession nor his claim that he was merely hired by Potencio to provide the latter with assistance in
transporting the said lumber. PD No. 705 is a penal statute that punishes acts essentially malum
prohibitum. In other words, mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal
documents, even absent malice or criminal intent is illegal.
Tigoy v. CA, GR 144640, June 26, 2006
FACTS:
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Rodolfo Tigoy was hired as a truck driver of Nestor Ong who had been engaged in the trucking
business in Illigan City.
On October 4, 1993, Tigoy and Sumagang were instructed to transport two trucks which were
half-loaded with bags of cement at Lanao del Norte.
Senior Inspector Rico Lacay Tome (then Deputy Chief of Police of Ozamis City), while escorting
Provincial Director Dionisio Coloma at the ICC Arts Center in Ozamis City, along with the
members of the Special Operation Group, received a dispatch from the 466th PNP Company
situated at Barangay Bongbong, Ozamis City, informing him that two trucks, a blue and green
loaded with cement, that were going towards Ozamis City did not stop at the checkpoint.
The two trucks were apprehended by the PNP officers when they failed to stop and speed away
during check point operation. The drivers offered“grease money” to police officer when they
were asked what was inside the truck.
Upon inspection the police officers discovered file of sawn lumber beneath the cement bags in
both trucks.
The drivers were brought and turned over to the investigator at the City Hall in Ozamis City.
Petitioner Tigoy and Sumagang presented to Dingal the registration papers of the two trucks
and appearing therein was the name of Nestor Ong as the owner. After ascertaining that the
sawn lumber loaded on the two trucks did not have supporting documents, Dingal and his
companions scaled the subject lumber and prepared a tally sheet.
an Information was filed against Nestor Ong, Sumagang, Lolong Bertodazo and petitioner Tigoy
for possession of forest products without legal permit, t
The trial court found Tigoy and the truck owner Nestor Ong guilty of violation of Section 68 of
PD 705 as amended by EO 277. The lumbers was forfeited in favor of the government.
In CA, Nestor Ong was acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence and the conviction of Tigoy was
upheld. Tigoy contended that he is unaware of the unlicensed lumber in the truck. He believed
that what he was transporting were bags of cement.
Issue: Whether or not Roberto Tigoy was guilty of the crime charged?
Held:
Yes.
There are two ways of violating Section 68 of Revised Forestry Code:
1) by cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without a license; and,
2) by possessing timber or other forest products without the legal required legal documents.
Petitioner was charged with and convicted of transporting lumber without a permit which is punishable
under Section 68 of the Code.
Their act of refusing and speeding away when they were required by PNP then offered “grease
money”, by logic, is that the drivers knew that they were carrying contraband lumber. The SC believes
that the drivers had knowledge of the fact they were transporting and were in possession of
undocumented lumber in violation of law. In offenses considered as mala prohibita or when the doing of
act is prohibited by special law such as in the present case, the commission of the prohibited act is the
crime itself. It is sufficient that the offended has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the
special law, and that it is done knowingly and consciously.
Perfecto Pallada v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 131270 March 17, 2000
FACTS:
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Sometime in the latter part of 1992, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) office in Bukidnon received reports that illegally cut lumber was being delivered to the
warehouse of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation in Valencia, Bukidnon. The company is
engaged in rice milling and trading.
DENR officers, assisted by elements of the Philippine National Police, raided the company's
warehouse in Poblacion, Valencia on the strength of a warrant issued by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon and found a large stock pile of lumber of varying sizes
cut by a chain saw. As proof that the company had acquired the lumber by purchase, petitioner
produced two receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6
and 17, 1992. The DENR officers did not, however, give credit to the receipt considering that R.
L. Rivero Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been suspended. What is more, the pieces of
lumber were cut by chain saw and thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill operator.
The team made an inventory of the seized lumber which, all in all, constituted 29, 299. 25 board
feet, worth P488,334.45 in total. The following day, September 29,1992, the first batch of
lumber, consisting of 162 pieces measuring 1,954.66 board feet, was taken and impounded at
the FORE stockyard in Sumpong; Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The seizure order was served on
petitioner Perfecto Pallada as general manager of the company, but he refused to acknowledge
it.
On October 1, 1992, raiding team returned for the remaining lumber. Company President
Francisco Tankiko and a certain Isaias Valdehueza, who represented himself to be a lawyer,
asked for a suspension of the operations to enable them to seek a lifting of the warrant. The
motion was filed with the court which issued the warrant but, on October 5, 1992, the motion
was denied. Accordingly, the remaining lumber was confiscated. By October 9, 1992, all the
lumber in the warehouse had been seized. As before, however, petitioner Pallada refused to
sign for the seizure orders issued by the DENR officers.
Petitioner contends that the term "timber" includes lumber and, therefore, the Certificates of
Timber Origin and their attachments should have been considered in establishing the legality of
the company's possession of the lumber. In support of his contention, petitioner invokes our
ruling in Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. It is likewise argued that the irregularities in
the documentary exhibits should not be taken against petitioner because the documents came
from lumber dealers. In addition, it is contended that the CTOs and Auxiliary Receipts, being
public documents, should be accorded the presumption of regularity in their execution.
ISSUES:
I.
II.
Whether or not the certificate of timber origin was not the proper document to justify
petitioner's possession of the squared timber or flitches?
Whether or not the presence of erasures in the certificate of timber origin render them
valueless as evidence?
RULING:
First. The trial court acted correctly in not giving credence to the Certificates of Timber
Origin presented by petitioner since the lumber held by the company should be covered by
Certificates of Lumber Origin as stated in BFD Circular No. 10-83where it expressly states that
the issuance of a separate certificate of origin for lumber is required in order to "pinpoint
accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in
documenting the origin thereof.
"The contention that the term “timber” includes lumber has no, merit. The statement in
Mustang Lumber that lumber is merely processed timber and, therefore, the word "timber"
embraces lumber, was made in answer to the lower court's ruling in that case that the phrase
"possess timber or other forest products" in §68 of P.D. No. 705 means that only those who
possess timber and forest products without the documents required by law are criminally liable,
while those who possess lumber are not liable. Indeed, different certificates of origin are
required for timber, lumber and non timber forest products.
Second. Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a substitute for
Certificate of Lumber Origin, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were justified in convicting
petitioner, considering the numerous irregularities and defects found in the documents
presented by the latter. These irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which
they are found not only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial court in giving no
credence to the same.
It is argued that the irregularities in the documentary exhibits should not be taken
against petitioner. This contention is untenable. What render these documents without legal
effect are the patent irregularities found on their faces. That petitioner may not have any
responsibility for such irregularity is immaterial. In any case, as the corporate officer in charge of
the purchase of the lumber, petitioner should have noticed such obvious irregularities, and he
should have taken steps to have them corrected. He cannot now feign ignorance and assert
that, as far as he is concerned, the documents are regular and complete.
The presence of such glaring irregularities negates the presumption that the CTOs were
regularly executed by the DENR officials concerned. The presumption invoked by petitioner
applies only when the public accomplished, documents are, on their faces, regular and properly
accomplished.
People of the Philippines v. Que, G.R. No. 120365 December 17, 1996
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Wilson Que appeals from his conviction for violation of Section 68 of
P.D. 705. The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, a member of the Provincial Task Force
on Illegal Logging, received an information that a ten-wheeler truck loaded with illegally cut lumber will
pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on
patrol several times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City and eventually saw the
truck. There were three persons on board the truck: driver Cacao, Wilson Que, who was the owner of
said truck, and an unnamed person. The police then checked the cargo and found that it contained
coconut slabs, but inserted therein were sewn lumber, as admitted by Que himself. When required to
show a permit, Que failed to do so and thus was charged for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705.
Petitioner denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the 258 pcs of lumber
from a legal source. The trial court found petitioner guilty and sentenced him reclusion perpetua. It also
ordered the confiscation of the seized lumber and the 10-wheeler truck. He appealed to CA but it was
denied. The decision appealed is affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner violated Section 68 OF P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 that amended
Section 68, which penalizes the possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal
documents, did not indicate the particular documents necessary to make the possession legal, and
considering that other laws and regulations did not exist at the time of the enactment of said E.O. – YES.
HELD: Appellant interprets the phrase “existing forest laws and regulations” to refer to those laws and
regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E.O. 277. The suggested
interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but
give life to the law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time
of possession of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993
specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products.
Thus Que’s possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly constitutes an
offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705. Also, the court rejected Que’s argument that the law only
penalizes possession of illegal forest products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves
that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is legal.
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit: (1)
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public and, or from private land without any authority; and (2)
Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing
forest laws and regulations. In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of
cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the
authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting,
gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest
products without the proper documents consummates the crime.
Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because E.O. 277 considers
the mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents as malum
prohibitum.
On the second and third assignment of error, appellant contends that the seized lumber are
inadmissible in evidence for being "fruits of a poisonous tree." Appellant avers that these pieces of
lumber were obtained in violation of his constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures as
well as his right to counsel. We do not agree.
JURISDICTION MATTERS
Merida v. People, GR 158182, June 12, 2008
FACTS:
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A certain Tansiongco discovered that Sesinando Merida cut a narra tree in his private land, the
Mayod Property. Tansiongco reported the matter to the punong barangay who summoned
petitioner to a meeting.
During that meeting, Merida made extrajudicial admissions that he did cut the tree but claimed
that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix, who, he alleges, bought the Mayod
Property from Tansiongco.
Tansiongco again reported the matter, this time with the DENR. Merida made the same
extrajudicial admissions. Tansiongco filed a complaint with the Provincial Prosecutor charging
Merida with violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705. During the preliminary investigation,
petitioner submitted a counter-affidavit reiterating his claim that he cut the narra tree with
Calix's permission
The Prosecutor found probable cause and filed the information with the trial court. The trial
court found Merida guilty as charged. The trial court dismissed petitioner's defense of denial in
view of his repeated extrajudicial admissions that he cut the narra tree in the Mayod Property
with Calix's permission. With this finding and petitioner's lack of DENR permit to cut the tree,
the trial court held petitioner liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his defense of denial. Petitioner also
contended that (1) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because it was based
on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as provided under Section 80 of
PD 705 and (2) the penalty imposed by the trial court is excessive
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated 14 May 2003,
did not admit his motion for having been filed late
Hence, this petition.
SC: The petition has no merit.
Issues:
(1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case considering that it
was filed bya private individual and not by a DENR forest officer.
(2) Whether Merida is guilty of violating Section 68 of PD No. 705
Ruling: (1) Yes. The trial court acquired jurisdiction. According to the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the list of cases which must be initiated by the complainant does not include
cases concerning Section 68 of PD No. 705. Moreover, “Section 80 of PD No. 705 does not
prohibit an interested person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for violation of
Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended.”
We sustain the OSG's claim that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No.
2207. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Revised Rules) list the cases which must be
initiated by a complaint filed by specified individuals,18 non-compliance of which ousts the trial court
of jurisdiction from trying such cases.19 However, these cases concern only defamation and other
crimes against chastity20 and not to cases concerning Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Further,
Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an interested person from filing a complaint before any
qualified officer for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Section 80 of PD 705 provides in
relevant parts:
SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - x x x x
Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in
this Chapter, not committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the
deputized officers or officials, shall immediately be investigated by the forest
officer assigned in the area where the offense was allegedly committed, who shall
thereupon receive the evidence supporting the report or complaint.
If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating
forest officer shall file the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized
by law to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases and file an information
in Court. (Emphasis supplied)
We held in People v. CFI of Quezon21 that the phrase "reports and complaints" in Section 80 refers
to "reports and complaints as might be brought to the forest officer assigned to the area by other
forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the deputized
officers or officials, for violations of forest laws not committed in their presence."22
Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the
deputized officers or officials" who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but
Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez
cannot be faulted for not conducting an investigation to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to
support the complaint or report."23 At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section
80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for
petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. For its part, the trial court
correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2207 as the case falls within its exclusive original
jurisdiction.24
(2) Yes. Merida is guilty of violating Section 68 of PD No. 705. Merida constantly
represented to the authorities that he cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property. Therefore,
his extrajudicial admissions are binding on him.
Provident Tree Farms, Inc. v. Hon. Demetrio Batario, GR 92285, March 28, 1994
FACTS:
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Issue:
PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a Philippine corporation engaged in industrial tree
planting. It grows gubas trees in its plantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it supplies to a
local match manufacturer solely for production of matches.
Private respondent A. J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4) containers of
matches from Indonesia, which the Bureau of Customs released on 12 April 1989, and two (2)
more containers of matches from Singapore on 19 April 1989. The records do not disclose when
the second shipment was released.
On 25 April 1989, upon request of PTFI, Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., of the Department
of Natural Resources and Environment issued a certification that "there are enough available
softwood supply in the Philippines for the match industry at reasonable price."
PTFI filed with the Regional Court of Manila a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer
for a temporary restraining order against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to
enjoin the latter from importing matches and "wood-derivated" products, and the Collector of
Customs from allowing and releasing the importations.
PTFI prays for an order directing the Commissioner of Customs to impound the subject
importations and the AJIC be directed to pay petitioner P250,000.00 in actual damages,
P1,000,000.00 in exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
AJIC moved to dismiss the complaint but was DENIED.
PTFI opposed the motion to dismiss
On motion for reconsideration by AJIC and despite the opposition of PTFI, the Court
reconsidered order and dismissed the case on the ground that it had "no jurisdiction to
determine what are legal or illegal importations.
In this present recourse, PTFI seeks to set aside the 8 February 1990 order of respondent court
and prays for the continuation of the hearing in Civil Case No. 89-48836.
o PTFI claims that what was brought before the trial court was a civil case for injunction
o PTFI asserts the inapplicability of the procedures outlined in R.A. No. 1125 relative to
incidents before the Court of Tax Appeals because the instant action is not a protest
case where the aggrieved party is not an importer
o It then argues that since it could not avail of the remedies afforded by the Tariff and
Customs Code, resort to the courts is warranted, citing Commissioner of Customs v.
Alikpala.
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction in the case at bar.
Ruling:
No. The trial court has no jurisdiction. Since the incentive involves a ban against
importation of wood, wood products or wood derived products, such incentive is to be enforced by the
Bureau of Customs which has exclusive and original jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases. “[I]n
fact, it is the duty of the Collector of Customs to exercise jurisdiction over prohibited importations.” “To
allow the regular court to direct the Commissioner to impound the imported matches, as petitioner
would, is clearly an interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over seizure
and forfeiture cases. An order of a judge to impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be based on his
determination and declaration of the invalidity of the importation, hence, a usurpation of the
prerogative and an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In other words, the
reliefs directed against the Bureau of Customs as well as the prayer for injunction against importation of
matches by private respondent AJIC may not be granted without the court arrogating upon itself the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs.” Even though no procedure is outlined for the
enforcement of the import ban, this does not diminish the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over
the subject matter. “The enforcement of statutory rights is not foreclosed by the absence of a statutory
procedure.
People v. CFI of Quezon City Branch VII, GR L46772, February 13, 1992
FACTS:
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Issues:
The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined and
punished under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705
Godofredo Arrozal and Luis Flores, together with twenty (20) other John Does whose
identities are still unknown, the first-named accused being the administrator of the Infanta
Logging Corporation, with intent to gain, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the
privately-owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, titled in the name of her deceased father,
Macario Prudente, under Original Certificate of Title No. 6026, and once inside, illegally cut,
gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of the said owner and
without any authority under a license agreement, lease license or permit, sixty (60) logs of
different species, consisting of about 541.48 cubic meters, with total value of FIFTY
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIVE PESOS and FIFTY TWO CENTAVOS (P50,205.52)
including government charges, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the
aforesaid amount.
The named accused filed a motion to quash the information on two (2) grounds, to wit: (1) that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that the information does not conform
substantially to the prescribed form.
The trial court dismissed the information on the grounds invoked (pp. 32-42, Rollo).
The reconsideration sought was denied on August 9, 1977. Hence, this petition.
(1) Whether the Information charged an offense.
(2) Whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
(1) Yes. The Information properly charged an offense. “The sufficiency of the Information hinges
on the question of whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, meet the essential elements of
the offense defined in the law. The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: (1) that the
accused cut, gathered, collected or removed timber or other forest products; (2) that the timber or
other forest products cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to any private
individual; and (3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without authority under a
license agreement, lease, license, or permit granted by the state.” Failure to allege that the logs were
owned by the State does not affect the validity of the Information. Ownership is not an essential
element of the offense and that the failure to stipulate the fact of ownership of the logs is not material.
Furthermore, the logs were taken from a private woodland and not from a public forest. “The fact that
only the state can grant a license agreement, license or lease does not make the state the owner of all
the logs and timber products produced in the Philippines including those produced in private
woodlands.”
(2) Yes. The trial court has jurisdiction over the case. “The trial court erred in dismissing the
case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter because the Information was filed
pursuant to the complaint of a forest officer as prescribed in Section 80 of PD No. 705.” [T]he authority
given to the forest officer to investigate reports and complaints regarding the commission of offenses
defined in PD No. 705 by the said last and penultimate paragraphs of Section 80 may be considered as
covering only such reports and complaints as might be brought to the forest officer assigned to the area
by other forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development, or any of the deputized
officers or officials, for violations of forest laws not committed in their presence.
Lagua v. Cusi GR L-44649, April 15, 1988
FACTS:
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This is a mandamus case filed against respondents for closing a logging road without authority.
Atty. Ernesto Nombrado, legal counsel for defendants, issued a memorandum to the Chief
Security Guard of Defendant Eastcoast directing the latter to prevent the passage of Plaintiff
Laguas' hauling trucks loaded with logs for the Japanese vessel (there were no other trucks
hauling logs at that time) on the national highway loading towards where the vessel was
berthed. In compliance with this directive, the security force of Defendant Eastcoast closed the
road to the use by plaintiffs trucks and other equipments and effectively prevented their
passage thereof while the vehicles and trucks of other people were curiously not disturbed and
were allowed passess on the same road. It resulted that the loading of logs on the M/S "Kyofuku
Maru" was discontinued.
A letter dated 2 January 1976 was addressed by Aspiras to the Resident Manager of Defendant
Eastcoast with instructions to open and allow Plaintiff Laguas' trucks and machineries to pass
that road closed to them (but not to others) by Defendant Eastcoast.
Accordingly, Sagrado Constantino, Resident Manager of Defendant Eastcoast, issued an order to
their Chief Security Guard for the latter to comply with the Aspiras letter.
When Plaintiffs Laguas were already resuming the hauling operations of their logs towards the
Japanese Vessel on 3 January 1976, again that same road, only the day before ordered by the
BFD to be opened for use and passage by plaintiffs, was closed to them by Defendant
Eastcoast's security men upon a radio message order of Defendant Maglana.
Given no recourse in the face of the blatant and illegal closure of the road in defiance of BFD
orders to the contrary by the Defendant Eastcoast through the order of Defendant Maglana,
Plaintiff Laguas had to depart postpaste to Mati, Davao Oriental, from Baganga where the
shipment and the road closure were made, to seek the assistance of the PC thereat. Thus on 5
January 1976, Provincial Commander Alfonso Lumebao issued a directive to the PC Detachment
Commander at Baganga to lift the illegal checkpoint made by defendants
The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds, namely: (1) lack of
jurisdiction, and (2) lack of cause of action.
The private respondents also argued that petitioner Daylinda Laguas has no capacity to sue as
her name was not registered as an "agent" or "dealer" of logs in the Bureau of Forestry
the trial court issued the questioned order dismissing the petitioners' complaint on the basis of
the abovementioned grounds
o The Court agrees with the defendants that under the law, the Bureau of Forest
Development has the exclusive power to regulate the use of logging road and to
determine whether their use is in violation of laws
Hence, this petition for mandamus which we will treat as a petition for certiorari in the interest of
justice.
Issue:
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over an action for damages arising from the
closure of a logging road.
Ruling:
Yes. The trial court has jurisdiction.
“Presidential Decree No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any
power in the Bureau of Forest Development must first determine that the closure of a logging road is
illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages may be maintained.
Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the alleged illegal
closure of the logging road. Whether such closure was illegal is a matter to be established on the part of
the petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the private respondents. This should appropriately be
threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of Forest
Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way, much less award or deny the
payment of damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.”